In November the Council will be under the presidency of Peru. The Council mission to Afghanistan, although comprising only a selection of Council members, will inevitably divert a lot of energy and focus away from the work programme in New York.

Fortunately, November is unusually light in terms of mandate expiry and review dates. Only one mandate renewal is expected, the EU Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR) and only one review is scheduled – Ethiopia/Eritrea. But there are a full range of other pressing issues.

Public meetings are likely to include:

- Adoption of the Security Council Annual Report
- The regular Middle East meeting
- Bosnia-Herzegovina (extension of EUFOR mandate)

There will be an open debate on Children and Armed Conflict preceded by an Arria formula meeting.

The Council will be closely monitoring events in:

- DRC (in the aftermath of the presidential election);
- Somalia (given the extremely volatile situation involving increasing conflict between the transitional government and the Islamic courts, as well as the involvement of both Ethiopia and Eritrea); and
- Côte d’Ivoire (following another postponement of the elections and the restructuring of the president’s role).

In all three situations the prospects for violent developments remain very real. Events could trigger Council action, including possibly formal meetings.

Pressure of events in September and October has created the impression—and perhaps the reality—that some key issues have faded off the Council radar screen. These include:

- Lebanon, where the Council undertook in resolution 1701 to remain “actively involved”; and
- Northern Uganda, where the absence of Council signals about the current peace negotiations and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Army have been noticed and the Secretary-General’s advice in June is yet to be taken up.

Iran and nuclear proliferation is likely to be the main focus of attention from the media and the general public during November. A Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran, following the failure of recent negotiations in search of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme, seems likely. But, as has been the case on this issue throughout 2006, the real action is not taking place within the Council at all. Apart from rare informal briefings, the ten elected Council members have no role in negotiation of the draft resolution. That is being conducted between the five permanent members plus Germany.

The negotiations will be difficult and perhaps protracted. But eventual agreement between the P5 plus Germany on a sanctions resolution seems likely. The behaviour of North Korea, in exploding a nuclear weapon, has undermined the position of those like China and Russia who previously favoured a conciliatory approach. Accordingly, the debate is likely to focus more on the nature of the sanctions rather than the principle. Also the previous legal arguments over reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter are likely to be less significant in November, since consensus language on that issue was agreed in the resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea.

Most observers seem to expect that a compromise will be struck on a package of sanctions resembling the measures imposed on North Korea, but with a more modest impact—reflecting the fact that Iran is still only a potential proliferator. In this regard the issues in dispute could include:

- whether to include enforcement mechanisms such as a sanctions committee;
- whether to provide exemptions for certain nuclear cooperation (such as Russia’s assistance with a nuclear power station) and if so under what conditions;
- whether to include financial sanctions to prevent funds transferred to Iran from being used to support the nuclear programme (given the huge differences in scale between North Korean exports and Iran’s exports the potential impact of such a measure is much higher in the case of Iran—both on Iran and also on financial institutions and importers in many countries); and
- whether it is possible to have a more graduated or stepped menu of sanctions within each of the various categories imposed on North Korea—thus introducing benchmarks or “carrots” as well as well as “sticks”.

These issues are complex not only politically, but also technically. The technical aspects and the need for the measures to be legally enforceable in many jurisdictions seem likely to mean that the solutions will take time.

The underlying issue, of whether sanctions will have enough impact sufficiently quickly to induce a readiness to negotiate, remains a widespread concern. Equally worrying for many Council members is what happens next if the sanctions do not produce results—or worse if Iran decides to up the ante.

North Korea will continue to be very much on the work programme in November, but the main focus is likely to be implementation of resolution 1718. All UN member states must report by 13 November on the measures they have taken under their domestic law to impose sanctions on the DPRK. (But there is a possibility that the Sanctions Committee will modify this deadline.) The Sanctions Committee (chaired by Slovakia) has to:

- establish Committee guidelines and procedures;
- review the lists of controlled items;
- designate persons and entities in North Korea for targeted sanctions; and
- designate persons and entities to whom the prohibitions on financial transfers will apply

A report by the Chair of the Sanctions Committee to the Council is possible.

Darfur/Sudan

The violence in the Darfur region continues to rage on, with suggesting that the government has suffered some severe setbacks. Public comment about the latter by UN Special Representative, Jan Pronk, led Khartoum to seek to expel him. (This issue has subsequently been deftly resolved by Kofi Annan in a compromise allowing Pronk to remain in office till the end of the year.)

The Council members have no mandate review relating to Sudan in November, but as usual consultations based on the Secretary-General’s monthly report on Darfur are likely. Public concern in many countries continues to grow and pressure for punitive sanctions will be in the background. However, in recent weeks there have been increasingly helpful interventions by African and Arab countries, trying to lead Sudan to a more realistic position. Council members recognise that the agreements reached with great difficulty in September to extend and refinance AMIS expire in December and that time is rapidly running out.

There are also signs of an important but less obvious development arising from Sudan’s inability to quickly force a successful military outcome in Darfur following its denial of consent for a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. There have been some recent hints of flexibility based on a two track approach:

- pressure by the international community on the rebels to return to a renewed peace negotiating process; and
- an international force in Darfur which would be styled as “AMIS plus” or “UN minus”—in any event a force with much of the features and mandate envisaged in resolution 1706 but with ambiguity about its title.

It remains to be seen whether these developments can evolve into a successful new approach. The Council may, for a range of reasons, prefer to allow this to develop without active or formal involvement, instead encouraging the Secretary-General behind the scenes and tolerating creative interpretation of resolution 1706. As we have pointed out in September and October, there is considerable scope in 1706 for a large UN presence under the AMIS umbrella. But in the long run the real test will be ensuring that the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly will support the outcome. Also ensuring that management and financial risk is minimised will be essential. Given the imminent transition in senior positions in the Secretariat, the latter is not a small issue.
Iran

Expected Council Action

The five permanent members of the Council are now discussing an EU3 (France, Germany and the UK) proposal for sanctions against Iran. P5 plus Germany discussions of how to deal with Iran’s non-compliance with resolution 1696 are likely to be prolonged and difficult. But, as with previous Council negotiations on nuclear proliferation a compromise resolution is likely. Also, following recent precedent extensive discussion with the ten elected Council members seems unlikely.

Key Recent Developments

The report from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the Council on 31 August indicated that Iran had not complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement and under Security Council resolution 1696.

Instead of immediately referring the issue back to the Security Council the EU3, the US, China and Russia (EU3+3) decided to explore with Iran the possibility of a return to the negotiations. Contacts between Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy chief, and Ali Larijani, the Iranian nuclear negotiator, resumed on 9 September. They last met in Berlin on 27 September but failed to achieve any agreement.

On 6 October, the EU3+3 met in London. They indicated that the Iranian refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities during negotiations was the breaking point. At time of writing, an EU3 draft resolution including measures under article 41 of the UN Charter as envisaged in resolution 1696 had been submitted to the US, Russia and China. Press reports suggest that the draft involves sanctions similar to those in resolution 1718 on North Korea, but somewhat less in scope.

Options

The Council has the following options:
- decide that Iran’s nuclear activities constitute a threat to international peace and security and adopt sanctions such as an embargo on nuclear material and technology and on military material for the delivery of nuclear weapons and perhaps also some targeted sanctions;
- impose more limited measures such as an embargo on the transfer of technology and on civilian and military dual use equipment, services and personnel as well as travel bans and asset freezes for Iranian nuclear scientists; and
- establish a sanctions committee.

Key Issues

Since the diplomatic route was tried and failed in September, the issue of action versus diplomacy is less to the fore than previously. And certainly the behaviour of North Korea has weakened the hand of China and Russia who had been advocating a longer term and more nuanced approach. However, the underlying issue still remains whether imposing sanctions on Iran will succeed or whether it will increase

Status Update since our October Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in our October Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in October included:
- Appointment of a new Secretary-General: Ban Ki-moon of South Korea was appointed as the next Secretary-General following a selection process in the Council which ended more quickly than most observers had predicted. He will begin his term on 1 January 2007 (S/RES/1715).
- Security Council Election: Four of the five Council seats for the 2007-08 term were decided: Belgium, Indonesia, Italy and South Africa. At press time the deadlock between Guatemala and Venezuela continues and a compromise candidate to fill the Latin American & Caribbean seat has yet to emerge. Voting will resume on 31 October.
- Liberia: The Council reviewed Liberian sanctions on 20 October concluding that timber sanctions would not be reinstated due to the Liberian government’s passage of required forestry legislation. However, diamond sanctions were maintained with a review expected by the end of the year (SC/8856).
- Peacebuilding Commission: The PBC had its first round of country-specific meetings in October and recommended both Sierra Leone and Burundi for support from the Peacebuilding Fund. Meanwhile, the Council, in acknowledgement of Burundi’s need for continued support, adopted resolution 1719 on 25 October authorising the mandate of a new UN Integrated Office in Burundi which will commence on 1 January 2007 after the current peacekeeping mission’s mandate expires.
- Women, Peace and Security: On 26 October the Council held its annual debate on Women, Peace and Security marking the sixth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325. In a presidential statement the Council noted progress in women’s participation in peacebuilding and requested recommendations from the Secretary-General to promote more effective implementation of resolution 1325 moving forward (S/PRST/2006/42).
- Great Lakes: The mandate of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region was extended to 31 December, although clearly with reluctance. The Council will consider Tanzania’s request to extend the mandate to 31 March 2007. This decision will hinge on the progress made in organising the second Great Lakes summit, tentatively scheduled for 14-15 December in Nairobi (S/2006/811 and S/2006/812).
- Western Sahara: The Secretary-General’s report recommended a six-month mandate renewal and direct negotiations between Morocco and Frente Polisario with no preconditions (S/2006/817). At press time, the Council was expected to renew MINURSO’s mandate on 31 October.
- Central African Republic: The Secretary-General’s latest report highlighted the security situation on the country’s border with Chad and Sudan and noted that the government had requested BONUCA’s renewal for another year upon its 31 December expiry (S/2006/828). On 30 October the Council will hold a private debate on the CAR.
- Guinea-Bissau: The Council’s 4 October consultations on Guinea-Bissau covered the latest report by the Secretary-General which recommended a slight revision to and a one-year extension of the UNOGIS mandate (S/2006/783). The current mandate expires on 31 December. The Secretary-General named Shola Omoregie (Nigeria) as his representative in Guinea-Bissau on 3 October.
- Georgia: Resolution 1716 renewed UNOMIG’s mandate until 15 April 2007.
- Timor-Leste: The Council held consultations on 27 October on the arrangements between UNMIT and the Australian-led international forces. The report of the Special Commission of Inquiry will also be on Council members’ minds.
the risks of proliferation. A related issue, therefore, remains whether some other formula for a return to the negotiation table, without suspension as a precondition, can be devised.

Issues related to sanctions likely to be dividing the P5 include:

- Implementation of Sanctions: The creation of a sanctions committee signals strong willingness to implement the measures. An issue may be whether to delay deciding on a committee at this stage (as occurred with North Korea in resolution 1695 of July).
- Choice of Items: A key issue may be whether sanctions should strictly target nuclear items or also extend to chemical and biological items, as well as the means of delivery.
- Exemptions: The extent to which Russia should be exempted from any future ban on trading nuclear items with Iran, given its contribution to the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Reference to Chapter VII and related legal questions seem unlikely to be such a vexed issue as in the past because an acceptable formula seems to have been reached in resolution 1718 on North Korea.

Council Dynamics
The US argues that sanctions should be as wide and tough as possible. Russia and China prefer more limited and less severe measures and certainly not ones that would affect their economic interests with Iran. It seems that the Europeans are in between these two approaches. This will impact discussions on the nature of items to be embargoed (Russia and China may reject the listing of the means of nuclear weapons delivery) and whether a sanctions committee should be established. A consensus may be found on an incremental approach.

As before, the elected members of the Council seem likely to become part of the discussions only at a later stage.

Underlying Problems
Sanctions against Iran modelled closely on the North Korean resolution could have very significant effect on banks involved in processing payment for Iranian oil exports. American financial institutions have little to lose because of American bilateral sanctions on Iran already in place. However, these kinds of measures would seriously affect others, especially European banks.

For Historical Background and Other Relevant Facts, please refer to our February 2006 Forecast.

Useful Additional Sources
- Sick, Gary, “The Truth about Iran,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006
- International Responses to Iran’s Nuclear Program, a Century Foundation roundtable held on 5 October 2006. The rapporteur’s report can be found at http://www.tcf.org/publications/international-affairs/iran_roundtable.pdf

Key Facts
The DPRK’s nuclear ambitions have been of concern to the international community for over a decade. In December 2002 the DPRK expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors shortly after being accused by the US of running a secret uranium programme. In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In February 2005 the DPRK announced that it had developed nuclear weapons. By the end of 2005 the six-party talks between China, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the US and the DPRK aimed at the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula had ceased to operate.

In 2006 the DPRK’s nuclear activities came before the Council. In early July the DPRK launched seven missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2 prompting the Council to condemn the missile tests and affirm that proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

On 3 October 2006 the DPRK announced the imminent test of a nuclear weapon. On 6 October the Council in a presidential statement urged the DPRK to cancel its planned nuclear test and return to the six-party talks. The statement warned the DPRK that a nuclear test would be a clear threat to international peace and security.

In spite of these warnings the DPRK abandoned any semblance of ambiguity and on 9 October conducted an underground test of a nuclear weapon. Widespread international condemnation followed. A strong resolution was introduced in the Council in response to the DPRK’s action. After intense negotiations the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1718 on 14 October. Acting under Chapter VII it imposed sanctions and established a Sanctions Committee on the DPRK. The resolution requires the following by all member states:
- ban sales to, or export from, the DPRK of military hardware;
- ban sale or export of nuclear and missile related items (as set out in documents S/2006/814, S/2006/815 and S/2006/816 unless amended by the Sanctions Committee within 14 days);
- ban sales, transfers and supply of luxury goods;
- freeze finances and bans travel of anyone

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North Korea
Expected Council Action
The Council may receive a briefing from the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the steps taken by UN member states to implement resolution 1718. Resolution 1718 asks member states “to report to the Security Council” by 13 November on actions taken to implement the resolution. (But there is a possibility that the Sanctions Committee will modify this deadline.) It is widely expected that despite the reference in the resolution to the “Council”, the Sanctions Committee will review the information provided and report to the Council.

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involved in nuclear and missile programmes;
- ensure that no funds, assets or common resources are made available to or for the benefit of persons or entities conducting the DPRK’s nuclear programme; and
- calls upon member states to cooperate in allowing inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK.

The Sanctions Committee on the DPRK held its first meeting on 23 October having chosen Slovakia as chair and Argentina and Qatar as vice-chairs.

The DPRK had threatened a second nuclear test but a Chinese envoy who met with President Kim Jong-il shortly after the adoption of resolution 1718 indicated that the DPRK was unlikely to conduct another test.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan, South Korea, Russia and China to discuss coordination of resolution 1718’s implementation.

Key Issues
The key issue on the minds of many Council members is whether the sanctions can be effectively implemented. The lists cover a broad range of items and will require stringent monitoring from member states. One of the measures with the potential for the sharpest impact (the prevention of funds being available to named persons and entities) still requires decisions by the Sanctions Committee on the names and this will be very complex to enforce.

There are a number of issues related to setting up the Sanctions Committee.
- Resolution 1718 does not create a panel of experts. Given the extensive lists it is going to be difficult for the Committee to effectively monitor compliance.
- The Committee will therefore need to rely on the Secretariat.
- In order to start its work the Committee still has to adopt guidelines for operations, reporting and for listing and de-listing items.

Another issue is how resolution 1718 will affect the possibility of the DPRK coming back to the stalled six-party talks. Pyongyang boycotted the talks in September 2005 in response to the US financial restrictions against eight firms allegedly linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acted against a bank in Macau believed to be laundering money. It may be that the financial restrictions in resolution 1718 will further exacerbate this.

Council Dynamics
All Council members agreed that a firm response was needed to the DPRK’s announcement that it had tested a nuclear bomb. The Council was also in agreement that the DPRK needed to return immediately to the six-party talks. The strong reactions from the US, Japan and the European members were expected. China was clearly disturbed at the fact that the DPRK had chosen a path that threatened the status quo on the peninsula. In a marked change from its traditional position, China publicly called the nuclear test a “brazen act”.

The adoption of resolution 1718 took days of intense negotiations. The US wanted direct sanctions and the possible use of force while China and Russia favoured a carrot and stick approach. China’s resistance to an open-ended reference to Chapter VII resulted in a resolution that refers explicitly to article 41 (non-forceful measures). The final resolution involved compromises on all sides, but the marked shift in the positions of China and Russia are perhaps the most significant in terms of the larger issue of non-proliferation.

In implementing resolution 1718 China, as the DPRK’s largest economic partner, will play a key role in ensuring the effectiveness of the sanctions. In the past China has made it clear that it did not want to see economic collapse and that is undoubtedly still true. However, all the signs are that Beijing is now willing to put real pressure on Pyongyang’s leadership.

Options
The Council does not expect the DPRK to reconsider withdrawing from the NPT or to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

Options available to the Council include:
- a resolution setting up a panel of experts; and
- progressively tightening the impact of financial measures in resolution 1718.

Underlying Problems
As it becomes increasingly isolated and the sanctions take their toll on the DPRK’s economy it is possible that it may decide that it has little to lose by testing another nuclear weapon.

The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK, Vitit Muntarbhorn, in a report to the General Assembly in October said that the DPRK’s nuclear test is likely to make donors reluctant to provide aid to the coun-

try and that this could exacerbate the precarious humanitarian situation.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a Sanctions Committee.
- S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004) affirmed that proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
- S/RES/825 (11 May 1993) called upon DPRK to reconsider withdrawing from the NPT and to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over DPRK’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.

Selected Letters
- S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the letter from Japan requesting a meeting of the Security Council after DPRK launched ballistic missiles.

Other
- S/2006/833 (20 October 2006) was the note from the president of the Council on the election of the chairman and vice-chairman for the Sanctions Committee on the DPRK.
- S/2006/814, 815, and 816 (13 October 2006) contained the list of items related to ballistic missile programmes.
- A/61/349 (15 September 2006) was the report by Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK.
- The Joint Statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks can be found at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/53490.htm.
- The text of DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003 can be found at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm.
27 December 2002 The DPRK expelled IAEA nuclear inspectors.
11 June 1993 The DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT one day before it would have taken effect, but announced that it would no longer allow IAEA inspections.
12 March 1993 The Central People’s Committee announced DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT.
31 December 1991 North and South Korea agreed on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
31 August 1998 The DPRK test fired a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan.
12 September 1985 The DPRK signed the NPT.

**Darfur/Sudan**

**Expected Council Action**

The impasse over the transition in Darfur from the AU force to a UN peacekeeping operation is likely to continue to generate Council discussion in November. But no formal action is expected at least until the results are known of diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis Sudan and the AU Peace and Security Council high-level meeting, scheduled for the end of November.

Pressure on Council members for a solution (and especially alternatives) to the standoff is likely to increase as the deadline for renewing the mandate of the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) on 31 December approaches. The mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) expires on 30 April 2007.

The regional dimension of the Darfur crisis is also expected to be in the minds of members. But it is unclear when the Secretary-General’s assessment mission to Chad and the Central African Republic will take place, or when the report on Chad requested in resolution 1706 will emerge.

**Key Recent Developments**

The security situation in Darfur has continued to deteriorate to alarming levels. The latest report from the Secretary-General noted that “the region is... on the brink of a catastrophic situation”. Attacks against civilians and aid workers and all-out clashes markedly increased in October, as did spill-over effects into Chad. Some note an increase in rebels’ fighting power and coordination, as well as important military defeats for Khartoum.

The conflict seems to have entered a new, more complex phase, with the new involvement of more Arab tribes and an increase in inter-tribal fighting. To gather support, the government seems to be appealing to inter-tribal rivalries.

The spate of diplomatic efforts on the transition issue continued in October. High-level EU and UK visits to Khartoum and AU headquarters heightened a desire for finding a workable formula and the possibility that alternative options would need to be considered after October.

Khartoum has signalled a willingness to accept increased UN logistical and financial support to AMIS as an alternative to immediate transition, but pressed for the Council to create leverage on the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Increased efforts from Arab states to resolve the impasse included high-level meetings with Sudan on the sidelines of the signing of a peace deal with eastern rebels in Asmara in mid-October as well and bilateral meetings involving Libya and Egypt.

US special envoy Andrew Natsios also visited Khartoum and Cairo.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, was expelled from Sudan reportedly due to his comments on the government’s military setbacks in Darfur. (At press time, he was in New York.)

Khartoum circulated a note verbale in early October stating that “any volunteering to provide peace keeping troops to Darfur will be considered as a hostile act.” The note created considerable anxiety among potential troop contributors and outrage among some Council members. It led to a request for clarification on whether that was the official Sudanese position and for a retraction in writing.

There is increasing AU concern with the impasse. The lack of funds and airlift for the additional AMIS troops authorised in September is also an AU concern. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, in one of the strongest recent signals from AU member states, has reportedly warned that a “full genocide” should not be allowed in Darfur.
There are reports of willingness to resume the peace talks from both sides. Leadership seems to come from Eritrea, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and key opposition figures living in Asmara, whom the government seems willing to work with due to their role in facilitating the eastern peace deal. But some form of autonomy for Darfur in addition to more compensation and more power-sharing, seems to be a negotiating demand.

Chad and Sudan renewed accusations of support for rebel movements in each other’s territory. Chadian rebels made statements opposing the deployment of a UN operation in Chad. At the time of writing, Council members expected a briefing from the Secretariat with possible scenarios including a monitoring presence or a multidimensional operation. The latter possibility was highlighted in a 6 October Chadian letter requesting the deployment of UN police for security in camps. Another Council meeting, scheduled for 30 October, will focus on the Central African Republic.

Options
Two options, seemingly opposite, may be emerging as possible solutions to the transition impasse. The first is to develop a much larger package of UN assistance to AMIS using assessed contributions (or “AMIS plus”). This option would require new managerial, and command and control structures, and could entail the placing of a large number of UN personnel and assets under nominal AMIS direction. It could be endorsed either in a new resolution under Chapter VIII (with which those members that have invested heavily in the transition may be uncomfortable) or be carried out with a creative interpretation of resolution 1706.

The other is a renewed focus on public pressure with the use of sanctions, especially if “AMIS plus” does not prove to be acceptable. Possible objectives include inducing consent for the transition, containing the parties’ ability to inflict harm on civilians, and perhaps as a rettributive measure for the lack of consent.

On Chad, options range from a small monitoring presence or a multidimensional operation, perhaps one comprising mostly civilian police. A smaller presence raises questions of an inadequate response to insecurity in camps in Chad, but a large operation faces difficulties in force generation as well as financial problems.

On the Central African Republic, options include increasing the UN peacebuilding office the country to improve available information. Another option is a small monitoring presence in cooperation with the peacekeeping forces from the Central African Economic and Monetary Community.

Key Issues
The key issue is how best to reach a solution to the current impasse. Time is an issue and some believe that the current focus on obtaining consent for the transition seems to have reached its limits. The lack of coherence in signals sent to Khartoum has also been an issue.

A related immediate issue is the provision of resources to the AU to implement AMIS’ new concept of operations, which includes an increase in troops to up to 11,000. There is awareness of the AU’s frustration with the impasse and the need to encourage the AU to extend AMIS beyond December.

An emerging issue is thus whether alternative options to a December transition should be considered at this point.

Some are open to increasing UN assistance to AMIS through quiet diplomacy. Members are aware that recent signals from Khartoum may represent an opening to a solution to the standoff that needs to be explored. If taken seriously, this approach will raise important issues.

- This unprecedented cooperation would require innovative approaches on command and control, management, communications and budget.
- This approach would have to prove acceptable to Sudan, the AU and the Council, especially by balancing Khartoum’s concerns with an effective force that has strong African character and leadership. An additional issue is how acceptable—also from a financial standpoint—the placing of significant UN resources and staff under AU authority could be.
- The approach would need to be acceptable to those members who have been most strongly advocating for the transition. (The agreement may be more easily forthcoming if it were presented as a step under resolution 1706, leaving open the possibility of transition at a later stage.)
- Reopening and improving the peace process between Khartoum and the rebels with a stronger political role for the UN—while keeping a central role for the AU—may also need to be part of the package.

A complicating issue for some members is that public pressure has stepped up significantly and talk of possible sanctions as a backstop may become a feature of any eventual deal.

The resumption of peace talks and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation involves a number of subsidiary issues including the need for an acceptable framework for the talks, the distance between the parties’ positions, and the delicate balance with the power-sharing arrangements in the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement and not least finding effective and acceptable leadership for peace talks.

On the regional dimension, an emerging issue is how best to approach the spillover effects without upsetting the political balance in Chad. Members are aware of Chadian rebels’ opposition and the possible influx of refugees into Chad from Darfur should UN contingents be deployed.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There seems to be some willingness to allow room for quiet diplomacy and for the results of the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in November before the next steps.

But some—especially the US—will continue to see a need for public pressure and sanctions. There also seems to be scepticism on the effectiveness of carrots. Russia, China and Qatar are increasingly vocal about the possibility of UN assistance to AMIS as a real alternative to transition.

African members are concerned with the future of AMIS and of the AU’s role vis-à-vis Darfur, with some more vocal about the unacceptable nature of Khartoum’s opposition. There also seems to be concern about the relative sidelining of the AU in the current diplomatic efforts.

There is increasing support among Arab states for a real solution but based on a quieter approach, particularly the need to work
on specific Sudanese concerns with resolution 1706 and on the undisputed parts of the resolution, such as UN assistance to AMIS, as initial, immediate steps.

There seems to be support within the Council for considering the Chad/CAR dimension more proactively. But there has been opposition to broader discussions on the internal situation in Chad, with preference for limiting to cross-border issues.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

**Selected Meeting Records**
- S/PV.5528 (18 September 2006) was the latest briefing by Jan Pronk, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Sudan.
- S/PV.5519 (31 August 2006) was the adoption of resolution 1706.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**
- S/2006/764 (26 September 2006) was the latest monthly report on Darfur.
- S/2006/728 (12 September 2006) was the latest quarterly report on Sudan.
- S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 (28 August 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS. The report was complemented by an update, S/2006/645.

**Latest Panel of Experts’ Report**
- S/2006/795 (3 October 2006)

**Other**
- S/2006/789 (5 October 2006) was a letter from Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir welcoming UN assistance to AMIS.
- S/2006/779 (28 September 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General to Sudanese President Al-Bashir detailing UN assistance to AMIS.

**Historical Background**
For the full historical background, please see our February, July and October Forecasts.

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**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

**UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and approximately 6,015 police personnel
- Strength as of 30 September 2006: 10,284 total uniformed personnel, including 8,914 troops, 705 military observers and 665 police
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006—30 June 2007 $1,126.30 million (does not include mandate in Darfur, estimated between $1.4-1.7 billion)

**UNMIS: Duration**
24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007

**UNMIS: Fatalities**
Seven, including two military and five civilian staff

**Head of AMIS**
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

**AMIS: Size and Composition of Mission**
- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police personnel
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Gambia

**AMIS: Duration**
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December

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**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**
A Council delegation will travel to Afghanistan in mid-November. The mission will be headed by Ambassador Kenzo Oshima of Japan and will include Argentina, China, Denmark, France, Greece, Qatar, Russia, the UK and the US. During the week-long visit the mission will meet with Afghan officials, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in various locations in Kabul, northern and southern Afghanistan, and also Pakistani officials in Islamabad.

Upon completion of the mission, Japan will brief the Council on the mission’s report. An open meeting on the results of the mission is also likely.

The mandate of UNAMA is currently in place until 24 March 2007.

**Key Recent Developments**
This year has seen the highest civilian death toll since 2001, with reportedly more than 3,000 people killed. The deterioration of the security situation—including the proliferation of suicide bombings, the resurgence of the Taliban and foreign fighters—is hampering reconstruction work and could be diminishing popular support for the Karzai government.

ISAF took responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan in October, following a high-level NATO meeting on 21 September. The move is seen as necessary for boosting the effectiveness of operations, particularly in the south, and to offset overall troop shortfalls. (A smaller number of US troops is exclusively focused on counterterrorism.) NATO’s call for reinforcements, particularly in southern Afghanistan, has not been met with great enthusiasm by its members. Some ISAF contributors favour the concentration of activities on reconstruction rather than counterinsurgency. Germany, ISAF’s third-largest contributor, is apparently reluctant to become involved in counterinsurgency. Other countries, such as Norway, have reportedly declined to send more troops. Spain, Italy and France are also apparently hesitant about moving their troops to the south.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported in September that opium cultivation in Afghanistan had increased by 59 percent since 2005. (Observers note that this is much higher than under the Taliban and that there is some criticism of the international community for laxity in this regard.) In a press statement in early October, the Council expressed concern at the increase in the cultivation and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan and reaffirmed its support for the Afghan government’s national drug-control strategy.

At the end of September, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met at the White House...
under the auspices of US President George Bush. Both countries agreed to call tribal gatherings along the Afghan-Pakistani border to address cross-border Taliban movements. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have become difficult over cross-border and counterterrorism issues and both have traded accusations of insufficient efforts.

Options

After the mission, Council members may wish to adopt a statement reinforcing the mission’s findings and possibly also:

■ expressing support for the efforts of the Afghan government, ISAF and the Afghan security forces in stabilising the country’s security situation and extending state authority;

■ expressing concern with the deteriorating security situation; and

■ referring to the regional dimension and expressing support for the actions currently undertaken to promote regional cooperation.

Key Issues

Key issues for the Council are whether it can play any role to help arrest the further deterioration of security conditions and improve the prospects for the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact (the framework launched in January for cooperation among the Afghan government, the UN and the international community). Other important issues include the messages sent regarding the proliferation of narcotics cultivation and the regional dimension, particularly regarding Pakistan and Iran.

The terms of reference for the mission are likely to include key issues such as:

■ demonstration of the continued commitment to the reconstruction process based on the Afghan Compact and resolution 1662, which revised and extended UNAMA’s mandate until March 2007;

■ support for efforts in improving security, governance and development and, in particular, counternarcotics;

■ the need for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and the disbandment of illegal armed groups;

■ human rights protection, public and justice sector reforms, and the rule of law;

■ the activities of UNAMA and ISAF, including ISAF’s cooperation with the Afghan security forces and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); and

■ assessment of the regional dimension.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions


Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2006/727 and A/61/326 (11 September 2006) was the latest report.

Other Relevant Documents

- SC/8850 (9 October 2006) was a press statement expressing concern about the security situation in Afghanistan and the increase in opium cultivation and trafficking.
- S/2006/765 (26 September 2006) was the latest ISAF report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission

Tom Koenigs (Germany)

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: 199 international civilians, 729 local civilians, 12 military observers, seven civilian police, 41 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 24 March 2007

ISAF Military Commander

Lt. Gen. David Richards (UK)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: about 31,000 troops
- Contributors of military personnel: 37 NATO and non-NATO countries
- Current top contributors: UK, Germany, Canada, US and the Netherlands
- Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2007

OEF: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: about 8,000 troops
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October 2001 to present

Somalia

Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, is expected to brief the Security Council in November. The wider regional implications of involvement in Somalia by Ethiopia and Eritrea are likely to play an increasing role. A presidential statement directed at Ethiopia and Eritrea is an option.

The Council will examine the request from the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for a partial exemption to the arms embargo for the IGAD mission in Somalia (IGASOM). Action on that front seems unlikely, though, because many Council members remain concerned that this would have a negative impact on the situation.

The Somalia sanctions Monitoring Group will also submit its report to the Sanctions Committee at the end of November. The mandate of the Monitoring Group expires on 3 December, and the Council is expected to renew it for an additional six months.

Key Recent Developments

Tensions between the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have exacerbated the situation during the past month.

The UIC seized the town of Kismayo on 25 September in the economically important region of lower Juba, without any fighting. With this move, the UIC now controls all ports in southern and central Somalia, and the TFG in Baidoa is increasingly isolated. There are recent reports that fuel supplies to Baidoa are now severely restricted. The TFG complains that the UIC has violated the 5 September ceasefire agreement.

In response to these heightened tensions, and following encouragement by the Council to become actively engaged, Lonseny Fall met with officials in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. On 9 October the warlords aligned with the TFG took over Buur Hakaba, a town close to TFG’s seat in Baidoa, with Ethiopian
support. Ethiopia initially denied military involvement but has recently admitted that its troops are in Somalia as “trainers”. UIC forces claim to have captured an Ethiopian officer and have warned of imminent war with Ethiopia.


The report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (due by the end of October) is expected to state that the rise of the UIC has dramatically weakened the TFG and report that the security situation seems to have improved in the regions under UIC control.

The International Contact Group met on 19 October amid growing concern about activities by Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group for six months;
- respond to the request from IGAD and the African Union for a partial lifting of the arms embargo for the IGAD mission;
- adopt a presidential statement sending explicit warning signals to Ethiopia and Eritrea;
- reinforce the arms embargo through the adoption of targeted sanctions while allowing a very limited exemption of the embargo for non-lethal equipment for the TFG, to support the Somali national security forces;
- elaborate on the conditions for IGASOM’s deployment, such as consent from both parties, consensus within IGAD and guarantees that it would help the political process; and
- actively encourage a power-sharing agreement between the TFG and the UIC.

Key Issues
While the Council is keen to support the Khartoum peace talks between the UIC and the TFG, the issue is whether supporting the deployment of IGASOM and exempting it from the arms embargo would fatally undermine this goal. Even partially lifting the arms embargo may undermine peace talks.

A related issue is that in the absence of a peace process the TFG may collapse, entailing a takeover of the country by the UIC. This could exacerbate Ethiopia’s frustration and increase the risks of a wider war involving Ethiopia (and perhaps Eritrea). Therefore, the challenge for the Council will be to continue to support the transitional institutions as the legitimate entities in Somalia while taking into account the UIC as a political reality.

The arms embargo has been widely violated by both the TFG and the UIC as well by their outside supporters. The issue of reinforcing this embargo remains on the table. Many experts believe that it is technically impossible to impose targeted sanctions in Somalia. Increasing pressure on state violators of the embargo is therefore a key issue.

Another issue is the composition of IGASOM. The National Security and Stabilisation Plan excludes the participation of neighbouring countries. Sudan and Uganda are potential contributors but it remains to be seen how willing they are to commit troops. And there is no new evidence which suggests there would be consent from the UIC.

For its part, the Monitoring Group believes that IGASOM would be a destabilising factor; that even a partial lifting of the arms embargo would dangerously militarise the country; and that targeted sanctions are impracticable.

Underlying Problems
An important underlying issue is the implication of recent developments for the parts of Somalia that have declared autonomy (Puntland and independence (Somaliland). The UIC is opposed to any federal system, and therefore there is a real possibility for future conflict in the north.

The UIC seems to be facing three major problems.
- First, the UIC does not appear to have a clear leader. Although Hassan Dahir Aweys is allegedly the overall leader, Sharif Ahmed, in charge of the executive council, is also very influential.
- Second, there is no consensus among the Courts on Sharia, although the majority tends toward more radical interpretations.
- Third, the Courts still function based on clan relations, and this has the potential for opening divisions in the UIC in the long run.
The number of Somali refugees in Kenya is increasing due to recent tensions, and this poses the risk of a humanitarian crisis. Most refugees seem to fear that war with Ethiopia is likely and reject the imposition of strict Sharia rules.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006) renewed the Monitoring Group’s mandate for six months.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/31 (13 July 2006) expressed support for the Transitional Federal Institutions and willingness to consider the African Union’s request for an exemption to the arms embargo.
- A letter from Somalia which included the IGASOM deployment plan was submitted to the president of the Council on 16 October. (The UN document number is pending.)
- A letter from Somalia which included the NSSP was submitted to the president of the Council on 6 October. (The UN document number is pending.)

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2006/418 (20 June 2006) was the latest report.

Latest Report of the Monitoring Group
- S/2006/229 (4 May 2006)

For a historical background, please see our January and September 2006 Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia
François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)
Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (Qatar)

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
A report on the developments in the area under control of the UN Interim Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is expected. Whether this report will also contain political elements related to the implementation of resolution 1701 remains to be seen. Council action is unlikely.

Also in November, the Council is likely to receive recommendations on the tribunal to try those responsible for the bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others in Lebanon.

Key Recent Developments
As of 19 October, UNIFIL comprised 7,200 personnel, including 1,500 German naval personnel on the maritime force. The Israeli army has almost entirely withdrawn from south Lebanon and the Lebanese army has fully deployed to the area. An audit mission has been commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to assess the capacity and needs of the Lebanese troops.

In the zone covered by UNIFIL, there has not been any seizure of illegal weapons. Frequent Israeli breaches of the Lebanese airspace continue, in violation of resolution 1701, causing concern within UNIFIL and leading the French contingent of UNIFIL to deploy anti-aircraft missiles for self-defence.

The Secretary-General reported on implementation of resolution 1559 on 19 October. He noted the following:
- there has been good progress with the extension of the government’s control over Lebanese territory;
- on the issue of the delineation of the border between Lebanon and Syria in the Sheb’a Farms area, the Secretary-General is working on proposals for the Council;
- the Israeli air violations of Lebanese sovereignty are a matter of serious concern;
- there have been intercepts of arms shipments into Lebanon in violation of the arms embargo established in resolution 1701;
- the National Dialogue’s decision to disarm the Palestinian militias outside the camps has not been implemented within the six-month deadline, which expired on 26 August; and
- the National Dialogue did not reach agreement on the disarmament of Hezbollah and has yet to resume.

The Secretary-General has also established a task force comprising political, legal, and cartographic experts to develop proposals for the delineation of the Lebanese border with Syria in the Sheb’a Farms area. This may take some time as it seems that there are considerable cartographic and legal issues.

Options
If the Council does not receive a substantive report from the Secretary-General on resolution 1701, which seems likely, an option may be to consider how, given the transition underway to a new Secretary-General, the 1701 process can be reenergized.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is to decide whether it really wants to remain actively involved in seeking long-term solutions and thus fulfill its commitment made in paragraph 9 of resolution 1701.

There are also other issues related to implementation of resolution 1701 that the Council needs to address as they are crucial for the implementation of a permanent ceasefire.

- Israel’s violations of the Lebanese airspace increase the concerns of UNIFIL troops and may provide Hezbollah with the pretext to back-track on 1701.

- Reports of intercepted arms shipments into Lebanon violates the arms embargo and the Council may want to ask for further details and act accordingly.

- The status of the Sheb’a Farms remains an issue. Israeli occupation of what Hezbollah considers Lebanese land (though considered Syrian by the UN) provides the militia with an excuse for keeping its weapons. Following both Lebanese and Syrian statements that the farms are Lebanese, the Secretary-General has been mandated to present proposals to the Council on how to resolve that issue. The Lebanese government has asked the Council to “place the Sheb’a Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled.” The Secretary-General replied that “such a measure would still require the determination of the precise geographic scope of the Sheb’a Farms area, and […] the possible steps to be undertaken, from the perspective of the United Nations, for the sovereignty of the Sheb’a Farms area to be transferred from the Syrian Arab Republic to Lebanon.” This proves to be a difficult task given the
absence of cartographic evidence that the farms belong to Lebanon. Therefore, those proposals may be further delayed.

A related issue is the UNIFIL troop level and whether it is still necessary to attain the 15,000 troops ceiling. The UNIFIL Force Commander Major General Alain Pellegrini has suggested there is no urgency to meet the full ceiling.

The rationalisation of reporting to the Council on Lebanon is an issue. Elements of resolution 1701 encompass elements of resolution 1559 and overlapping substance and procedure are presenting logistical difficulties.

It seems that the delay of the report on the establishment of the international tribunal is related to internal disagreements within the Lebanese government. If it is stalled further in November, the issue will be how much leverage the Council has over this process and how it can exercise influence for the tribunal to be established before the end of the year. For issues related to the tribunal, please refer to our October Forecast.

Council Dynamics

It appears that some of the momentum on Lebanon may have been lost and Council members seem reluctant to take initiative to promote 1701’s implementation. Many Council members consider that there is currently too little information on specific issues—for instance, the last report on implementation of resolution 1559 only vaguely refers to arms shipments.

There is also some reluctance within the Council to pressure the Lebanese government to sign the agreement on the creation of the tribunal.

Underlying Problems

An issue still not resolved is the situation of Al-Ghajar, a village located on the Blue Line separating Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Since 2000, two-thirds of the village has been under Lebanese control but residents from both sides of the village have Israeli citizenship. While those living in the Golan Heights area can usually work and travel freely within Israel, the ones living on the Lebanon side have difficulties. Since the recent war the Israeli army has been occupying both sides. The Tripartite Commission established pursuant to resolution 1701—composed of Israel and Lebanon and headed by UNIFIL—is trying to find a solution to this complicated situation and have the IDF withdraw from the Lebanese side.

Reports from Human Rights Watch indicate that both the Israeli army and Hezbollah used cluster munitions during the recent conflict. There are about one million hazardous unexploded munitions in southern Lebanon, which have already caused an average of three civilian casualties per day since the cessation of hostilities.

Selected UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encouraged Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border and called for further efforts to disband and disarm Hezbollah and to restore fully Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of an international character.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disbanding of militias.

Reports

- S/2006/832 (19 October 2006) was the last Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1559.
- S/2006/730 (12 September 2006) was the report on implementation of resolution 1701.
- S/2006/670 (18 August 2006) was the report on the implementation of the cessation of hostilities.
- S/2006/176 (21 March 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of a tribunal of international character.

Letters

Lebanon has been submitting numerous letters to the Secretary-General and the Council on Israeli acts of aggression against Lebanon. For a full list, please visit the online version of the report.

For more details please refer to our: 25 September Special Research Report on resolution 1701; August 2006 Forecast and 20 July Update Report on Lebanon/Israel; April 2006 Forecast on resolution 1559; and the December 2005 Forecast on the Golan Heights and UNDOF.

Other Relevant Facts

Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to Lebanon
Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander
Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France)

UNIFIL Strategic Cell within the UN DPKO
Director: Giovanni Ridino (Italy)
Deputy Director: François Estrade (France)

Size and Composition of Mission

- As of 13 October 2006: 5,827 military personnel, including 5,710 troops and 117 staff officers, assisted by 53 military observers from UNTSO; and supported by some 97 international civilian and 308 local civilian staff
- Troop contributing countries: Belgium, China, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland and Spain.

Cost (approved budget)

1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 $97.58 million (gross): This amount does not yet take into account the financial implications of the expansion of UNIFIL.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to review the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and options for the future of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) before the end of November. (UNMEE’s mandate expires on 31 January 2007 as required by resolution 1710).

The expected outcome is a presidential statement reinforcing the Council’s intention to change UNMEE’s mandate if there is no progress by January.

The Peacekeeping Operations Working Group of the Security Council is expected to meet in early November to discuss the possible options for the future deployment of UNMEE.

Special Research Report on resolution 1701; August 2006 Forecast and 20 July Update Report on Lebanon/Israel; April 2006 Forecast on resolution 1559; and the December 2005 Forecast on the Golan Heights and UNDOF.
Key Recent Developments
On 16 October Eritrea moved 1,500 troops and 14 tanks into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Eritrean troops also seized one of UNMEE’s checkpoints. Both the Security Council and the Secretary-General expressed concern over Eritrea’s action calling it a breach of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and calling on Eritrea to immediately withdraw its troops from the TSZ. In a press statement, the Council also called on both parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid escalating tension.

Ethiopia on October 19 said that it would not react militarily to what it considered a minor provocation. Eritrea on the other hand rejected the Council’s call to withdraw its troops. It claimed that the soldiers had entered the TSZ to engage in development projects and that the tanks had accompanied them for protection.

UNMEE has found it increasingly difficult to operate in Eritrea as the Eritrean government continues to place restrictions on UNMEE personnel and to ban UN helicopter flights in its airspace. In December 2005, Eritrea expelled UNMEE’s North American and European staff. These restrictions have constrained UNMEE’s ability to properly monitor the TSZ and violate the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. There have been ongoing detentions of UNMEE local staff that have also impacted UNMEE’s work. Recently a UN Volunteer was detained by the Eritrean authorities for five weeks before he was released in early October.

On 29 September the Council adopted resolution 1710 extending the mandate of UNMEE for four months and expressing its intention to transform or reconfigure UNMEE if the parties showed no progress toward border demarcation.

The demarcation process continues to be stalled. Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea attended the 24 August meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). No dates for a future meeting have been proposed.

Options
The Council will discuss the options presented by the Secretary-General but no decision is expected at this point. The possible options for reconfiguring UNMEE are likely to be similar to those presented in the Secretary-General’s January report.

■ Maintain the status quo. In this option the UNMEE configuration and mandate would not change. This would buy time for diplomatic initiatives and could act as a deterrent to hostilities. However, safety concerns would remain and UNMEE would likely have difficulty performing tasks because of Eritrea’s restrictions.
■ Relocate UNMEE headquarters from both Asmara and Addis Ababa, but keep troops in the TSZ. The integrity of the TSZ would thereby be upheld but the impact of restrictions imposed by Eritrea would be reduced. However, there would be enhanced logistical challenges and the scope for further restrictions by Eritrea would not be eliminated.
■ Deploy a preventive force in Ethiopian territory south of the TSZ. This option could assist in deterring hostilities and better ensure the safety of UN personnel but it would not guarantee the integrity of the TSZ, nor would it allow for monitoring of the situation on the Eritrean side of the TSZ.
■ Reduce UNMEE to an observer mission. This could be either on both sides of the TSZ or only on the Ethiopian side. It would uphold the principle of the TSZ but at best only limited monitoring would be possible.
■ Reduce UNMEE to a liaison mission. A small office would be maintained in each capital as a political solution is pursued. The scope for operational restrictions in Eritrea would remain.
■ Withdraw UNMEE. UN support for political contact between the parties could be provided from outside the region but it would mean abandoning the UN role in preventing hostilities and maintaining the integrity of the TSZ.

A possible option in November is for the Council (perhaps informally) to narrow down the range of options provided by the Secretary-General by excluding less attractive options and requesting the Secretary-General to develop the remaining options further.

Key Issues
There are several key issues facing the Council in reviewing the options for UNMEE.

■ Should the Council be more proactive in trying to get the two parties to make concessions so that there can be progress in demarcating the border?
obligations to comply with the EEBC decision regarding the border.

### Children and Armed Conflict

#### Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to hold an open debate on the report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict as well as the results of an independent review of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on 28 November. Some sensitivity about the future use of the monitoring and reporting mechanism is expected.

A presidential statement is likely. However, if there is agreement to change the mandate of the monitoring and reporting mechanism then a resolution is possible.

#### Key Recent Developments
In July 2005 the Council adopted resolution 1612 which created two significant structures: a formal monitoring and reporting mechanism and a Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

The monitoring and reporting mechanism is a Secretariat procedure for collecting, organising and verifying information, and for reporting on grave violations against children and Armed Conflict. It has been set up in the seven situations selected for the first phase of implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In addition, nascent monitoring and reporting mechanisms are in place in Uganda and Thailand (to monitor events from Myanmar). The mechanism is located within the UN country teams in developing action plans. In Côte d’Ivoire, the military wing of the rebel New Forces (Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles, or FAFN) and four militia groups have signed a regional action plan to end recruitment of children. However in other countries, getting concrete commitments from the parties has been difficult.

As a result of the recent violence in the Middle East, the Secretary-General’s report includes Lebanon for the first time and more comprehensive sections on the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel as well as Iraq. Given its recent inclusion in the formal agenda of the Council, Myanmar has been moved from Annex II covering situations not on the Council’s agenda to Annex I that lists the parties that recruit or use children in situations already on the Council agenda.

Since resolution 1612 was adopted last year, there are signs that the Council is more willing to include the issue of child soldiers in country resolutions. Resolution 1698 on the DRC, adopted in July, contained the landmark decision to extend the scope of possible sanctions to political and military leaders and individuals recruiting and using children in armed conflict in violation of international law.

The independent review requested in resolution 1612 was originally expected at the end of July, but the deadline was not met due to delays in establishing the Working Group and appointing the current Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict. The review, which is being conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is expected to evaluate the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism, assess resource implications and make recommendations on the full implementation of the mechanism.

#### Options
The most likely option is for the Council to issue a presidential statement highlighting the progress made since resolution 1612’s adoption but it may want further time to consider the recommendations of the OIOS review.

However, if there is quick agreement on some elements, such as expanding the mandate of the monitoring and reporting mechanism a resolution is possible.

If Council members want a more in depth analysis of the recommendations, they may ask the Working Group to assess the recommendations in the review with the possibility of a resolution at a later date. This option could be tied in to the Working Group’s plan to look at its procedures and scope towards the middle of 2007.

#### Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether to agree to the full implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism in all cases. The Secretary-General is suggesting that the Council expand its focus and allow

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### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1681 (31 May 2006) extended UNMEE until 30 September and downsized the mission to 2,300 troops.
- S/RES/1640 (23 November 2005) demanded border demarcation and the lifting of restrictions on UNMEE.
- S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000) increased UNMEE and authorised it to monitor the TSZ.
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

#### Other Relevant Facts

- **General and Chief of Mission**: Vacant, pending appointment.
- **Other Relevant Facts**: Reporting on grave violations against children and Armed Conflict.
- **Primary Context**: Confrontation between parties, which may include governmental, insurgent or rebel forces.
- **Other Context**: Consists of parties at war.
- **Key Issues**: Prevention, cessation.
- **Selected Letters**:
  - S/2006/362 (2 June 2006) was the letter from the president of the EEBC to the Secretary-General containing a report on the EEBC meeting of 17 May.
  - S/2006/328 (25 May 2006) was the letter from the Legal Counsel to Ethiopia to the president of the EEBC.
- **Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**:
  - S/2006/749 (19 September 2006) was the latest report.
  - S/2006/1 (3 January 2006) was the report with options for the future deployment of UNMEE.
  - S/2005/142 (7 March 2005) contained the EEBC’s appraisal of the stalling of the demarcation, a historical summary of the process, and the 2002 Demarcation Directions.
- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission**: Vacant, pending appointment.

### Size and Composition of Mission
- **Authorised maximum strength**: 2,300 troops.
- **Strength as of 30 September 2006**: 2,269 military personnel.
- **Key troop contributing countries**: India, Jordan and Kenya.

### Cost
- **Approved budget**: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 $182.24 million (gross)

### Duration
- **31 July 2000 to present**: current mandate expires 31 January 2007
equal attention to children affected by armed conflict in all situations of concern. This would open up the monitoring and reporting mechanism to situations in both Annex I and Annex II, and could mean reporting on parties in countries which are not on the Council agenda.

A related issue stemming from this recommendation is the need to change the criteria for putting parties on the Secretary-General’s “naming and shaming” lists. The recruitment and use of child soldiers is the current basis for the lists. However, the Secretary-General has called for other grave violations to be considered which could result in many more parties being included. These violations include the killing and maiming of children, rape, abduction and denial of humanitarian access. An important consideration for some members is that expanding the criteria in this way would require more resources.

Another issue is how much more the Council is willing to do to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. While there has been some progress in this setting-up phase, the real test will be in the action taken by the Council and the Working Group. The Council will need to determine how much of its energy and resources it is willing to devote to producing concrete results such as time-bound action plans from parties involved in using children in armed conflict.

Council Dynamics
The scope of the monitoring and reporting mechanism has been a divisive issue in the Council over the years. China and Russia are uncomfortable with completely opening up the monitoring and reporting mechanism to countries in Annex II. Japan and the US are also likely to react cautiously. They have traditionally been reluctant to put more resources into thematic areas. The progress to date may not be enough to convince them that the scope of the monitoring and reporting mechanism should be expanded.

The use of sanctions is a complicated issue for some members. As part of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, China agreed to forward to the Sanctions Committee on the DRC grave concerns about repeated violations by leaders of the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais, or MRC) and by militia leader Laurent Nkunda. But China is less likely to accept recommendations for sanctions on a wider group of parties. (Please refer to our 13 September 2006 Update for more details.)

Underlying Problems
The dynamic in the Council on this issue is likely to change next year. France has been the driving force behind this issue as chair of the Working Group. If France chooses not to take on another term, the combination of a new chair and five new elected members may result in a settling-in period that could slow down the current momentum on this issue.

Another potential problem is the increasing workload of the Working Group. The frequency of the meetings and the number of reports being considered may result in recommendations not being implemented.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006) renewed sanctions and extended them to political and military leaders responsible for recruiting children and individuals who use children in armed conflict in the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005) set up the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1261 (25 August 1999) condemned targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, urged parties to armed conflict to take into consideration protection of children and urged states to facilitate disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2006/33 (24 July 2006) was the most recent presidential statement reiterating the Council’s commitment to the issue of children and armed conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Secretary-General’s Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2005/72 (9 February 2005) was the latest report which contained an action plan for the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism.</td>
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<th>Selected Letters</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2006/724 (8 September 2006) was the letter from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict transmitting the recommendations on the DRC.</td>
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</table>

For historical background please refer to our 12 July Profile on Children and Armed Conflict.

**Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions**

Given a challenging new mandate by the Council in December 2005 “to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions”, the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions, under the leadership of Greece, is expected to present its recommendations to the Council by the end of November. These will cover best practices, including in the following areas:

- Committee working methods;
- monitoring and enforcement of sanctions regimes;
- sanctions design, implementation and evaluation;
- evidentiary standards for the reports of the monitoring mechanisms; and
- a standard format for reports.

Our January Forecast reported on previous discussions in the Working Group aimed at increasing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions and covered the best practices developed to that point with regard to targeted sanctions, including timely action at all decision-making levels (the Council, the sanctions committees and at the national level), transparency in the sanctions process and an adherence to rigorous standards by expert groups.

It is anticipated that the Council will act on these recommendations. Past recommendations contained provisions that were strongly opposed by some Council members, resulting in the package becoming stalled in the Council. Under the Greek leadership strenuous effort has been made to produce a set of recommendations on which the Council will be able to agree.
Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

At press time, a draft resolution sponsored by France and extending the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire is being discussed by Council members. Because the current transitional period ends on 31 October, the resolution is expected to be adopted sooner rather than later. In November, the Council will carefully monitor the implementation of this resolution and may follow-up on any recommendations from the International Working Group (IWG). Targeted sanctions will be taken up again if it seems the situation might unravel further.

The Group of Experts of the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee is required by resolution 1708 to submit before 1 December a brief written update on the implementation of the arms and diamonds embargo, and on obstructions to the peace process.

The mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) expires on 15 December.

Key Recent Developments

Tensions in Côte d’Ivoire have increased in the last several weeks between the presidential side and the rebel Forces Nouvelles. In early October Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the leader of the Presidential Party (Front Populaire Ivoirien, or FPI), warned of violence against nationals of neighbouring countries who are living in Côte d’Ivoire if the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) failed to force the rebels to disarm. Those threats were later repeated by Mamadou Koulibali, the speaker of the National Assembly. The Secretary-General issued a statement deploiring the remarks.

In late September the South African mediator President Thabo Mbeki met with Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny. Meanwhile, the Ivorian opposition leaders asked for the termination of Mbeki’s mediation on the basis that he was too partial, and this triggered his resignation.

ECOWAS leaders met on 6 October and agreed on recommendations for a new postponement of the elections, which were supposed to have been held on 31 October. Those recommendations were not made public but they were submitted to the AU Peace and Security Council.

The AU Peace and Security Council meeting on 17 October decided that:

- the Ivorian president’s mandate be extended by 12 months, during which time the provisions of Security Council resolution 1633 should be fully implemented;
- the prime minister should have all necessary authority over the public services and the defence and security forces to implement the roadmap;
- the prime minister should be allowed to rule by ordinances or decrees, in particular on issues concerning the identification programme;
- the Chairman of the AU, Denis Sassou Nguesso, should be in charge of the mediation;
- the government’s security forces should be unified and their republican and neutral character be reinforced;
- the AU and ECOWAS should organise seminars on security sector reform, in which “the principles of civilian control of armed forces and personal and individual responsibility” for violations of human rights should be examined;
- the role of the High Representative for the Elections should be strengthened; and
- the UN Security Council should adopt sanctions against individuals who are blocking the peace process.

In his latest report on Côte d’Ivoire, published on 18 October, the Secretary-General made similar recommendations. In addition, he recommended that the Council:

- increase the troop level of UNOCI by three battalions in order to meet the level of four battalions that he had recommended in January 2006;
- provide the prime minister with the power to appoint senior public officials and the high command of the defence and security forces;
- make it clear in a resolution that if the Ivorian leaders failed again to conduct elections before the end of the interim period, the Council along with the AU and ECOWAS, would put into place “transitional governance arrangements”;
- adopt sanctions against defence and security forces commanders, as well as political leaders, if they disrupt the implementation of the roadmap and refer the “more serious” cases to the International Criminal Court; and
- establish two task forces on the restructuring of the defence and security forces and on the identification process under the prime minister’s authority.

Another important component of the Secretary-General’s recommendations is that international instruments setting the institutional arrangements for the transitional period should take precedence over the Ivorian constitution when there is a divergence. More specifically, articles 35 (the requirements that all candidates for the presidency have to fulfil) and 48 (the implementation of extraordinary measures by the president in case of crisis) of the Ivorian constitution should not be invoked.

Options

To maintain pressure on the different parties to implement the resolution, the Council has the following options:

- increase UNOCI’s strength by three battalions;
- transfer additional troops from the UN Mission in Liberia on an emergency basis (in January, when the UNMIL drawdown will begin, there may be more such transfers to UNOCI);
- impose targeted sanctions on the spoilers of the peace process, especially if there is an upsurge of violence;
- adopt a presidential statement endorsing the next IWG communiqué; and
- begin discussions of the Secretary-General’s recommendations that the Council should signal readiness to refer most serious peace process spoilers to the International Criminal Court.

Key Issues
A key issue will be ensuring that the prime minister is able to exercise effectively his reinforced powers. How much support from the international community and additional protection from UNOCI this may require is as yet unclear.

In the long run, another key issue will be to ensure that the parties do not lapse into even more entrenched positions as a result of yet another 12-month interim period.

An additional issue is the strength of UNOCI and whether it will have sufficient capacity to resist violence against it as occurred in early 2006.

Council Dynamics
France has the lead and remains concerned that pressure be maintained on the various actors in Côte d’Ivoire.

It seems that a consensus has emerged on the way to approach the new interim period, with an increased role for the prime minister and the UN.

China and Russia remain concerned that imposing sanctions on important political leaders may have a negative impact on the peace process. This approach was related to achieving progress before the 31 October deadline. The failure to meet the deadline may lead them to modify their approach. China and Russia may also be reluctant to endorse the principle of prevalence of international instruments over the Ivorian constitution.

The US may resist proposals for an additional increase in UNOCI’s troop level. The US seems to consider that in the absence of progress in the peace process, there is no need for increasing troop contributions or for a transfer of troops from UNMIL before the UNMIL drawdown in January.

Underlying Problems
The risk of violence in November is high. Forces Nouvelles have rejected the AU’s recommendation to extend Gbagbo’s term and are demanding his replacement by a transition leader with two vice-presidents, one from each side. The supporters of the president, for their part, may react to the further limitation of Gbagbo’s power. Violent street demonstrations are possible.

UN Documents
Most Recent Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1708 (14 September 2006) extended the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 December and requested a brief written update before 1 December.
- S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 personnel.
- S/RES/1633 (21 October 2005) extended President Gbagbo’s term by 12 months, established the roadmap to be supervised by the IWG, called for the designation of a prime minister with executive powers and reaffirmed its readiness to impose sanctions.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2006/821 (17 October 2006)

Latest report by the Sanctions Committee
- S/2006/735 (13 September 2006)

Selected Letter
- PSC/AHG/Comm (LXIV) Rev. 1 (17 October 2006) was the AU Peace and Security Council decision on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.

For historical background please refer to our 1 December 2005 Update.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Pierre Schori (Sweden)
High Representative for the Elections
Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

Size and Composition of UNOCI
- Authorised strength since 2 June 2006: 8,115 military personnel and 1,200 police officers
- Strength as of 30 September 2006: 8,986 total uniformed personnel, including 7,843 troops, 194 military observers; 949 police; supported by 369 international civilian personnel, 509 local staff and 228 UN Volunteers
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

Cost
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 $43 8.17 million

Democratic Republic of Congo
Expected Council Action
The Council will be following developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) closely. A Council statement, particularly in the event of further violence following the 29 October election, is likely.

The mandate of the EU mission in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) expires on 30 November. Renewal is not likely to be sought. But a serious deterioration of security conditions may lead to reconsideration.

Work on targeted sanctions under resolutions 1649 (against foreign and Congolese militia leaders) and 1698 (against individuals that recruit, use or target children in armed conflict) is likely to resume. (Separately, the Secretary-General has been asked for recommendations on sanctions against individuals obstructing the action of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) or the Group of Experts, but it is unclear whether this will emerge in November.)

MONUC’s current mandate expires on 15 February 2007.

Key Recent Developments
High-level efforts to increase confidence between presidential candidates Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba have continued and included an agreement prohibiting the movement of armed troops in Kinshasa to be monitored by MONUC and Congolese police.

The situation nonetheless remains tense, particularly in the countryside, where clashes have been reported. There are concerns with extremist, xenophobic rhetoric and the divide between eastern and western provinces.

In a briefing to the Council on 17 October, the Secretariat noted the fragility of the present situation and the role of MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo in deterring further clashes. Observers note that, should there be a massive breakdown in law and order international forces could have difficulty restoring stability.
Kabila seems to have gained key support from many previous presidential contenders and the leading coalition in the national assembly, inaugurated on 22 September. Kabila’s coalition has won 224 seats, followed by Bembia’s coalition with 116 seats. No party, however, achieved an absolute majority.

At the time of writing, the second round of presidential elections was scheduled for 29 October, and results are expected by mid-to late-November. The new president is expected to be sworn in by 10 December.

There is still uncertainty surrounding the formation of the new government, since it would require the appointment of the prime minister, who will then appoint the cabinet. Constitutional provisions are unclear as to whether the national assembly alone or the full parliament—including the senate—is competent to appoint the prime minister. The senate will only be elected by provincial assemblies on 29 December.

The Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict forwarded to the Sanctions Committee a list of individuals for targeted measures under resolution 1698. The list is still pending consideration.

Options
Should the situation deteriorate quickly, members will face the option of renewing EUFOR RD Congo, perhaps until the new government is seated. This would require leadership from the EU.

Options also include:
- Working on a list of individual sanctions perhaps using the Working Group’s suggestions;
- Discussing guidance to the Secretariat on MONUC’s concept of operations for the period immediately after the conclusion of the electoral period. This could include key areas such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and repatriation; and
- Continuing to discuss the longer term, post-election role for MONUC, including a more integrated, forward-looking strategy, and what role the Council could play.

Key Issues
The key issue is how best to ensure that the electoral process is finalised so as to bring to a conclusion the transitional process. A consequential issue is how best to deal with the potential for violence in November and December.

Members are conscious of the difficult timing of EUFOR RD Congo’s withdrawal vis-à-vis the release of election results, and there are some differences of interpretation, some contributors seeming to understand that 30 November is the start date of the repatriation of troops, while, for others, the date is the deadline on which all troops should have been repatriated.

There is also awareness of the potential need for reinforcements and related financial questions if EUFOR RD Congo does not stay. In this regard, a further issue is the future of the troops loaned to MONUC from the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The ONUB mandate expires on 31 December at the Burundian government’s request. Previously, there has been resistance in the Council to permanently augmenting MONUC by incorporating the borrowed contingents. This issue needs to be addressed either in November or in December.

Other key issues in the minds of Council members include:
- How to encourage political accommodation between Congolese stakeholders after the elections;
- The constitutional issues regarding the prime minister’s nomination and the new government’s position vis-à-vis MONUC;
- MONUC’s future concept of operations; and
- Achieving progress with the sanctions list.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There is unity within the Council on the need to keep the situation under close review as the electoral process unfolds. There is also consensus that the primary responsibility for maintaining a peaceful environment lies with the candidates and Congolese security forces.

Members are aware of the concerns of some EUFOR RD Congo contributors with prolonging the deployment. The EU currently seems intent on withdrawing EUFOR RD Congo, but this could change if the situation deteriorates.

Wider divisions in the Council on MONUC’s size and cost over the medium-term are likely to persist.

Regarding sanctions, most members seem supportive of moving forward with targeted measures under resolutions 1649 and 1698.

Underlying Problems
The Secretary-General has indicated that MONUC’s role over the long-term should include inter alia supporting government institutions and building an adequate security environment. Key areas include governance, security sector reform and natural resource management. The Secretary-General has also indicated that he would consult with the new government on the proposed MONUC role, including its strategy, objectives and benchmarks prior to reporting by the end of January. Given the likely delays in installing the government, it will be difficult to complete the tasks in the brief time available.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) authorised the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo.
- S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised the implementation of the ONUB mandates.
- S/RES/1671 (25 April 2006) authorised the extension of ONUB forces.
- S/RES/1699 (10 April 2006) authorised temporary increases in MONUC’s strength for the elections.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2006/40 (22 September 2006) expressed readiness to consider measures against those threatening the elections.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was the report on foreign armed groups in the DRC.
- S/2006/525 (18 July 2006) was the latest report of the Group of Experts.

Historical Background
23 September 2006 The candidates agreed to make Kinshasa a weapons-free zone and to the cantonment of their respective militias.
22 September 2006 The new national assembly was inaugurated.
8 September 2006 The results of the national assembly polls showed that no party won a majority of seats.

For full historical background, please refer to our April and September Forecasts.
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to reauthorise the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) before the end of its mandate on 21 November.

The High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, will also brief the Council.

Key Facts
In February 1992 the Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) through resolution 743. After years of bitter ethnic strife, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia on 14 December 1995 signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which together with its annexes had been agreed on 21 November 1995 in the US city of Dayton.

UNPROFOR was replaced by NATO and subsequently EU forces, currently EUFOR. The UN assumed a civilian role deploying the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a UN civilian office, which together were known as the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

During its eight years, the IPTF inter alia was involved in certifying and decertifying Bosnian police officers. If decertified, a police officer would be barred from law enforcement duties. A total of 16,762 officers were certified and 598 were decertified. 150 of the latter have taken cases to the Bosnian courts, arguing that the decertification process lacked an impartial and independent examination of their rights as well as a poor review mechanism. The High Representative believes that this is a matter that requires the Council’s attention, since the Bosnian courts may not have the competence to annul a decision or order new ones to be taken.

The EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH on 1 January 2003.

On 1 October 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first election that was fully administered by the country’s authorities with initial election results showing a move away from nationalist parties.

The EU is preparing to reduce its involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In early October, EU defence ministers backed a plan to cut EUFOR progressively to 1,500 troops from about 6,500 currently.

In early June, EU officials agreed that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) could begin preparations to close by 30 June 2007. Early next year, they will review and confirm the closure of OHR and recommendations will be made to the Security Council for endorsement of the closure.

Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s parliament remains slow. Police reform has also been slow in 2006. The Police Directorate is expected to finalise its report on reforms by the end of the year. Last January, the EUPM was extended for two years.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sufficiently stable in the face of the possible closure of the Office of the High Representative or reductions in EU troops in the near future.

A related issue is ensuring that a stalled constitutional reform process is reenergised under the new government.

An issue in the minds of many Council members will be medium term goals of the Bosnian Serbs who still seem to be seeking independence from Bosnia. Montenegró’s referendum to break away from Serbia in May has given them new momentum and they will be carefully watching the ongoing Kosovo status talks.

The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska has so far failed to deliver war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic to the ICTY is also a key issue for many Council members. The Council will want to be informed on what the Republika Srpska is doing to cooperate with the tribunal. There will be even greater impetus to resolve this issue before the EU downsizes its troops.

The appeal by various former police officers against decertification decisions by the IPTF will also be an issue since it has been raised by the High Representative.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Most Council members expect the EUFOR reauthorisation to be straightforward and are not looking to complicate the matter. In his briefing, Schwarz-Schilling is expected to raise the need for Council involvement in resolving the problem of decertification of police officers, but most Council members are not inclined to get actively involved even though they acknowledge the need to resolve the issue.

Options
The Council’s most likely option is a 12-month renewal of EUFOR, with a review after six months if the EU decides to close the OHR by mid-2007. Keeping in mind the possible drawdown and phasing out of this Office, one option is to renew EUFOR’s mandate for only six months instead of 12.

Language in the resolution to put pressure on the parties to cooperate with the ICTY is also a possible option.

On the decertification appeals issue, an option is to request the Secretary-General for a report from the Office of Legal Affairs on technical options for resolution on the issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1639 (21 November 2006) was the most recent resolution.
- S/RES/1575 (22 November 2004) established EUFOR.
- S/RES/1035 (21 December 1995) established the IPTF.
- S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995) was on the implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and transfer of authority from UN Protection Force to the multinational implementation force.
- S/RES/743 (21 February 1992) established UNPROFOR.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/476 (30 June 2006) was the letter from the Secretary-General to the president of the Council with the latest report on the activities of EUFOR.
- S/2006/75 (3 February 2006) was the Secretary-General’s letter conveying the 29th report of the High Representative to the president of the Council.

Other

- S/2006/809 (12 October 2006) was the latest EUFOR report.
- S/1995/999 (and annexes) (21 November 1995) was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes.

For a more detailed list of UN documents and historical background please visit the online version of the November Forecast.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-Terrorism Committee</strong>&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1373</td>
<td>S/RES/1373 (29 Jul 2000)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1377 (12 Nov 2001)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1456 (20 Jan 2003)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1535 (26 Mar 2004)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1566 (8 Oct 2004)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1624 (14 Sep 2005)</td>
<td>Resolution 1373 established obligations on all states to adopt a legal framework to: • prevent and suppress international terrorism; • establish cooperation between states; • implement mutual legal assistance; • share intelligence; • assist in tracing and freezing of assets related to terrorists and terrorism; • implement border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and access to weapons; • deny safe haven to terrorists; and • become parties to the then 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and to implement them fully. Resolution 1624 called on all states to prohibit and prevent incitement to terrorism and to report to the CTC on actions taken to implement the provisions of the resolution. States are required to comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.</td>
<td>The measures mandated by resolution 1373, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities.</td>
<td>Country Visits: Assisted by experts of relevant international and regional organisations, the CTED is expected to conduct country visits to India, Pakistan and Nigeria by the end of November. The purpose of these visits is to assess the level of implementation of the measures mandated by resolution 1373. Annual CTED Review: The CTED will continue to prepare for its review and evaluation by the Security Council at the end of 2006. This will be considered in the context of a decision to be taken by the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 1535 on whether the mandate of the CTED should be extended beyond 31 December 2007. This year-end review will coincide with the end of Denmark as chair of the CTC. A report from the outgoing chair would be a useful addition to the review process and would be of benefit to the succeeding chair of the Committee.</td>
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<td><strong>Resolution 1540</strong>&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1540 (28 Apr 2004)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1673 (27 Apr 2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 1540 established obligations on all states to adopt legal and administrative frameworks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes. By resolution 1673, the Council called on all states to report to the Committee and decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote full implementation by all states of the resolution, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation.</td>
<td>While the measures mandated by resolution 1540, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities, states are required to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.</td>
<td>Reports Review: The Committee with the assistance of its Group of Experts will continue to evaluate states’ reports on their level of implementation of the resolution’s provisions and engage those states who fail to comply with the reporting requirements. The Committee’s mandate and the mandate of the group of experts will expire 27 April 2008. Committee Outreach: The Committee will hold two outreach conferences during November, one in Accra, Ghana and another in Lima, Peru.</td>
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<td><strong>Al-Qaida and Taliban</strong>&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1267 (15 Oct 1999)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1333 (19 Dec 2000)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1390 (16 Jan 2002)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1455 (17 Jan 2003)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1526 (30 Jan 2004)&lt;br&gt;S/RES/1617 (29 Jul 2005)</td>
<td>assets freeze; travel ban; arms embargo</td>
<td>Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, designated by the Committee on the Consolidated List. As of 4 October 2006, there were 359 individuals and 124 entities on the List.</td>
<td>Reports: The Monitoring Team will submit its sixth report (due 7 November) to the Committee. The report is expected to provide a synopsis of implementation by the Committee of prior Team recommendations. Review of Sanctions Measures: Pursuant to resolution 1617, during November, the Council will review the sanctions measures with a view to their possible further strengthening. De-listing: The Committee has begun work on the de-listing process and establishing new de-listing guidelines. No result is immediately expected. Among the issues to be agreed is a process for review of the current designated list and removal of names from the list as appropriate. While there is still no consensus, a recommendation originally mooted by France to establish a focal point for the review appears to have picked up support in the Committee. Monitoring Team: The mandate of the Monitoring Team will expire on 29 December and the Council is expected to adopt a new resolution before extending the mandate.</td>
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| Côte d'Ivoire             | S/RES/1572 (15 Nov 2004)             | arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds     | Designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list (last updated 30 May). | Report: A brief written update from the Group of Experts is due before 1 December. This report is expected to highlight the level of implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1572 and 1643 and include recommendations for future Council action.  
Action Pending: The recommendations from the last report of the Group of Experts (S/2006/735) will be considered by the Committee in the coming weeks. There are some 22 recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of the sanctions measures.  
Mandate: The sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts are due to expire 15 December. |
|                           | S/RES/1584 (1 Feb 2005)               |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1632 (18 Oct 2005)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1643 (15 Dec 2005)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1708 (14 Sep 2006)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
| Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) | S/RES/1718 (14 Oct 2006)             | Arms Embargo: supply, sale, transfer or transit of:                   | The DPRK and persons named to a designated list.                                              | The measures imposed on the DPRK and designated individuals will be under constant review by the Security Council and may be strengthened, modified, suspended or lifted depending on the level of compliance by the DPRK with the provisions of the resolution.  
Under the terms of resolution 1718 states are supposed to report to the Council on actions taken to implement the resolution within thirty days. |
|                           |                                      | • any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missile or missile systems or related material including spare parts;  
• items on designated lists determined by the Committee or the Council which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction programs; and  
• technical training, service, etc., related to the embargoed items. |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           |                                      | Luxury Goods are not defined by the resolution.                       |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           |                                      | Assets Freeze: funds and other financial assets and economic resources of persons designated by the Committee or by the Council |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           |                                      | Travel Ban: on persons designated by the Committee or the Council.    |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           |                                      |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | S/RES/1493 (28 Jul 2003)             | arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures                  | Arms Embargo: any recipient in the DRC territory; excludes DRC army and police under certain conditions.  
Travel Ban and Assets Freeze: as designated by the Committee: individual violators of the arms embargo, political and military leaders of foreign armed groups, and political and military leaders of Congolese militias who are receiving support from outside the DRC. As of 18 August, there were 15 individuals and one entity listed.  
Aviation Restrictions: on all aircraft entering and departing DRC territory. | Committee Chair: The new Permanent Representative of Peru is expected to be appointed to chair the Committee, replacing his predecessor.  
Mandate: The sanctions measures and the mandate of the Group of Experts will expire 31 July 2007. |
|                           | S/RES/1533 (12 Mar 2004)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1596 (18 Apr 2005)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1616 (29 Jul 2005)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1649 (21 Dec 2005)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1654 (31 Jan 2006)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
|                           | S/RES/1698 (31 Jul 2006)             |                                                                        |                                                                                               |                                                                                      |
## Upcoming Sanctions Issues

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Subsidiary Bodies</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Target(s) / Designated Lists</th>
<th>Committees Forecast</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong> S/RES/1518</td>
<td>S/RES/661 (6 Aug 1990) S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) S/RES/1518 (24 Nov 2003)</td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> Iraqi territory  <strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005 there were 89 individuals, and as of 2 June 2004 there were 206 entities listed.</td>
<td>No Committee action expected, except periodic update of the designated list by the Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia</strong> S/RES/1521</td>
<td>S/RES/1521 (22 Dec 2003) S/RES/1532 (12 Mar 2004) S/RES/1607 (21 Jun 2005) S/RES/1647 (20 Dec 2005) S/RES/1683 (13 Jun 2006) S/RES/1689 (20 Jun 2006)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze; export of rough diamonds Resolution 1683 modified the arms embargo to exempt sale of certain arms to the government. Resolution 1689 decided not to renew the timber sanctions.</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> any recipient in Liberian territory.  <strong>Travel Ban:</strong> peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee, as of 30 November 2005 there were 59 individuals listed.  <strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> Charles Taylor and designated associates, as of 30 November 2005 there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed.</td>
<td><strong>Mandate Review:</strong> The Council, following its review of the diamonds and timber sanctions, removed the timber sanctions. However, the Council maintained the diamond sanctions which will remain in place until a further review in December, to ensure that the Government of Liberia has in place the legal and institutional framework necessary to meet the requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The arms embargo and travel bans will also be reviewed in December.  <strong>Report:</strong> The next report of the Panel of Experts (is due by 15 December and the Panel’s mandate will expire 21 December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong> S/RES/918</td>
<td>S/RES/918 (17 May 1994) S/RES/1011 (16 Aug 1995) S/RES/1161 (9 Apr 1998)</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states if the arms are to be used in Rwanda and restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Rwanda</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone</strong> S/RES/1132</td>
<td>S/RES/1132 (8 Oct 1997) S/RES/1171 (5 Jun 1998)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> non-governmental forces and restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone  <strong>Travel Ban:</strong> Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Bodies</td>
<td>Resolutions</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Target(s) / Designed Lists</td>
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</table>
| **Somalia**      | S/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992) | arms embargo | Any recipient in Somali territory. | **Reports:** A final report by the Monitoring Group is due by late November and its mandate expires 3 December.  
**Action Pending:** The Council has not yet taken action as it said it would in resolution 1676, including on the recommendations made in the Group’s last report (S/2006/229 of 4 May) to strengthen the sanctions regime to prevent violations of the arms embargo. This included a recommendation for the Council to impose an integrated arms embargo that would serve to reduce the availability of funds for the violators. |
|                  | S/RES/751 (24 Apr 1992) | In resolution 1676 the Council reaffirmed the sanctions measures and the mandate of the Monitoring Group and expressed its intention to consider specific actions, including the Group’s recommendations to improve implementation and compliance with the sanctions measures. | | |
|                  | S/RES/1519 (16 Dec 2003) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1558 (17 Aug 2004) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1587 (15 Mar 2005) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1630 (14 Oct 2005) | | | |
| **Sudan**        | S/RES/1556 (30 Jul 2004) | arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze | | **Report:** The final report by the Panel of Experts is due by 30 August 2007 and the Panel’s mandate will expire 29 September 2007.  
**Action Pending:** Action by the Council is still pending on the recommendations made by the Panel in its last report (S/2006/250 of 19 April). |
|                  | S/RES/1591 (29 Mar 2005) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1665 (29 Mar 2006) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1672 (25 Apr 2006) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1679 (18 May 2006) | | | |
|                  | S/RES/1713 (29 Sep 2006) | | | |
| **Syria**        | S/RES/1636 (31 Oct 2005) | travel ban; assets freeze | | **No Committee action is expected prior to next UNIIIC report.** |
|                  | | | | |
Notable Dates for November

Reports Expected in November

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report/Meeting</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>early November</td>
<td>SG report on Children and Armed Conflict (UN)</td>
<td>S/RES/1612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-November</td>
<td>An independent review by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services on the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism for Children and Armed Conflict</td>
<td>S/RES/1612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>SG report on the options for downsizing the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
<td>S/RES/1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late November</td>
<td>Final report of the Monitoring Group of the 751 Committee concerning Somalia</td>
<td>S/RES/1676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>Report on Darfur (monthly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>Report on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>S/RES/1701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November 2006 Mandates Expire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mandates Expire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 November</td>
<td>EU Military Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>EU Reserve Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November 2006 Other Important Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Important Dates</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-5 November</td>
<td>China-Africa Summit in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 November</td>
<td>A donors’ round table for Guinea-Bissau will be held in Geneva.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-17 November</td>
<td>A Council mission to Afghanistan is being planned and an open meeting and report following the mission’s return is likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 November</td>
<td>Resolution 1718 called on all member states to report to the Council regarding actions taken to implement sanctions on North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November-1 December</td>
<td>The fifth session of the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC Rome Statute will be held at the Hague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November-8 December</td>
<td>Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29 November</td>
<td>A NATO summit will be held in Latvia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also expected in November:

- Under Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari may visit Myanmar for talks with the government and possibly brief the Council upon his return.
- An agreement between the Secretary-General and the Lebanese government on an international tribunal to try those suspected of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination, as requested in resolution 1664, is expected in November.
- The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, François Lonseny Fall, is expected to brief the Council on Somalia.
- A meeting of the Contact Group for Kosovo is expected in early November.
- The Council is expected to adopt its Annual Report to the General Assembly in a public meeting in mid-November.
- Secretary-General elect, Ban Ki-moon, is expected in New York in mid-November to begin the transition leading to the commencement of his term as Secretary-General on 1 January 2007.
- A high-level meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council regarding Darfur is expected towards the end of the month.
- A Council debate on Children and Armed Conflict is expected in late November.
- The Informal Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions will present its recommendations to the Council in late November.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The second Great Lakes summit is tentatively scheduled for 14-15 December in Nairobi.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is expected in December.
- The mandates of UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNUB and BONUC will expire in December.
- The Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly is expected to be presented on 11 December.
- A substantive session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is being planned for late February or early March 2007.
- The Council is tentatively planning visiting missions for 2007 to West Africa (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste and Central Africa.
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at the Hague will begin in April 2007.