Overview for October

After an exceptionally busy summer and a September filled with the usual annual flurry of high level activities related to the open debate of the General Assembly, October is likely to see Council members turning more sustained attention to several ongoing serious problems. Although there will only be three peacekeeping mandate renewals and relatively few other actions required by previous Council decisions, the month, under Japan’s presidency, is shaping up as another busy one.

At least three issues where it had been hoped that high level meetings on the margins of the General Assembly might have prompted significant progress and possibly even breakthroughs—Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Iran—instead yielded little or nothing at all and will therefore necessitate persistent Council attention in October.

Sudan
Despite the worsening situation on the ground in Darfur and a massive diplomatic effort to pressure Sudan to consent to a transition from the African Union’s force (AMIS) to the UN, there has been only very limited progress. The AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting in New York in September decided to keep its peacekeepers in Darfur until the end of the year, thus preventing the worst-case scenario that all international actors might withdraw from Darfur. But the Council has suffered further setbacks to its efforts, such as the lack of consensus on a presidential statement on the eve of the AU meeting.

Côte d’Ivoire
The situation in that country has lately taken a sharp turn for the worse, with the abandonment of any hope on the part of the international community that the elections, already once postponed, could be held by the end of October. The increasingly belligerent attitude of the country’s president, Laurent Gbagbo and a rise in tension between the government and the still-armed opposition are causes for concern. Much hope had hinged on a long-planned “mini-summit” in New York at the time of the high-level debate at the General Assembly. To the considerable dismay of all the other key actors gathered there, however, Gbagbo failed to show up and made comments to the press at home that he might ask the UN to leave. The Council, meanwhile, has been unable to agree on imposing targeted sanctions on two influential Gbagbo supporters. In October, the Council will therefore need to make several important decisions, including: setting a

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Aide-Memoire
Important matters pending for the Council are:
- In October 2004 the Council requested a report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support of transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations. This has not been submitted.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- A draft resolution on Small Arms circulated by Argentina in March 2006 has not been adopted.
- A year after the September 2005 World Summit asked for “fair and clear procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions” and that the Council consider reforms to the Military Staff Committee neither issue has been addressed.
- The quarterly report on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is due. The last report was circulated in May 2006, and it is unclear when NATO will issue the next report.
- Council members are still to follow-up on the Secretary-General’s recommendations vis-à-vis the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). (S/2006/478) The report was submitted on 29 June, but action has been on hold.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 1
new deadline for the presidential elections; whether or not to further pursue the targeted sanctions route; and whether to attempt to make new arrangements for the fragile Ivorian peace process.

**Iran**

Despite high expectations that top level meetings, which could take advantage of the dignitaries’ presence at the opening of the General Assembly, would provide a catalyst for efforts at achieving a diplomatic solution to the looming Iranian crisis, no progress has been seen, largely due to the unexpected absence in New York of Ali Larijani, the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator.

Meanwhile, the 31 August report from the Director-General of the IAEA indicated that Iran had not complied with its obligations under resolution 1696. But, in order to give diplomacy another chance, the P5 plus Germany decided to re-establish contacts with Iran to explore the possibility of a return to the negotiations on the principle of “double suspension”—keeping the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme outside the Council while Iran commits to a suspension of uranium enrichment activities. Therefore, whether the issue will come back to the Council in October depends on progress of the current discussions between Larijani and the EU’s Javier Solana. If the talks show some results, they will continue until an agreement is reached on the resumption of negotiations. If there is too little or no progress, it is possible that within two weeks the P5 plus Germany will start discussing sanctions.

**Lebanon**

Beyond the consideration of two reports expected in October (the fourth report on the implementation of resolution 1559, and a new one on the proposed design of a tribuneal of international character to try suspects in the assassination of the Lebanese leader Rafik Hariri) Lebanon is likely to be on the Council members’ minds because of numerous issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 that put an end to the hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in August. They include the ongoing deployment of the strengthened peacekeeping force in Lebanon, UNIFIL; the need to more vigorously implement resolutions 1559 and 1680 (some new elements are expected from the upcoming 1559 report); and the Secretary-General’s still pending proposals on the delineation of Lebanon’s international borders, in particular the Sheba’a Farms. There is also the larger question of whether the Council is willing and able to use the momentum gained in August with the passage of 1701 to continue to exercise proactive leadership on that resolution and all related issues.

Speakers during the open debate at the General Assembly cited the Council’s action on the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel as an example of the UN acting at its best and an illustration for why a strong and effective United Nations is needed. It remains to be seen whether the Council will prove them right.

**Uganda**

Uganda is likely to be on many Council members’ minds. They will be closely following the peace talks between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). With a promise by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni of an amnesty for the LRA’s top leaders and the pending International Criminal Court warrants against them, accountability will be a key issue for many members. Some members may also want to focus on the follow up to the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the LRA, such as the appointment of a special envoy.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo**

At press time, members were discussing the renewal of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to February 2007. In October, Council members will be paying close attention to the developments on the ground, in particular the preparations for the 29 October run-off elections and the potential for election-related violence. The issue of the long-term future of MONUC will linger in the background, but is unlikely to be seriously addressed until after the electoral process is finalised. On sanctions, listing individuals for targeted measures will continue to be on the minds of some members, especially as the Council awaits the Secretary-General’s observations on the application of individual sanctions against those obstructing the work of MONUC or the Group of Experts.

The process leading to the appointment of the next Secretary-General will shift into high gear in October. While it is unclear whether the winner of this race will be known by the end of the month there is likely to be some crystallisation of the matter. Three new candidates were formally put forward by their governments in September: Prince Zeid al-Hussein, Jordan’s ambassador to the United Nations; Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the Latvian president; and Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s former finance minister. The overall dynamic of this process has been changed not only by that increased number and by the entrance of the first ever woman candidate for the post, but also by the fact that the Thai coup removed the government that nominated one of the candidates, the country’s deputy prime minister Surakiart Sathirathai. As of this writing, the military government has confirmed its support for that candidate, but the coup and its aftermath are likely to be factors in members’ decisions.

As we go to press, still in September, the Council is scheduled to hold another straw poll on the candidates. The modalities for this poll are still being discussed and it is unclear whether a new feature will be added (such as the use of a different colour ballot for the P5, a strong US preference at this stage), or whether the old routine will remain. Regardless, October is likely to see significant new developments, such as new straw poll rules, the dropping (and perhaps adding) of candidates, and possibly a final resolution.

On 16 October, the Council and the rest of the world will be poised to learn the Council’s composition for 2007. Of the five seats, three are uncontested, but the Asian and the Latin American seats are being disputed between Indonesia and Nepal; and Guatemala and Venezuela, respectively. With Korea’s recent decision to drop out from the race (in order to focus the government’s attention on its candidate for the Secretary-General), Indonesia is now optimistic that it has the necessary support for a two-thirds majority at the General Assembly. The Latin American race remains a cliff-hanger.

The annual open debate on women, peace and security as a follow-up to resolution
OVERVIEW continued
1325 is the only thematic debate currently envisaged for October. It is likely to focus on women’s role in the consolidation of peace and may also address the role for the newly established Peacebuilding Commission to take gender into account in country-specific post conflict work.

The Council’s October review of the diamond sanctions in Liberia will likely raise interest in the UN’s overall efforts at curbing the trade in “conflict diamonds”. We offer in this issue a piece focusing on that complex aspect of the Council’s activities.

In addition, several issues are most likely to be addressed in consultations because of the reports due. These are:
- the Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA);
- the report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic;
- the periodic report on Somalia; and
- two reports on Timor-Leste: one by the Special Commission of Inquiry into the recent crisis; and the other by the Secretary-General on arrangements between the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the international security forces.

Two further mandates are due to be renewed in October: those of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

Finally, issues such as small arms and the Security Council mandate review, that for months have figured in a footnote to the monthly programme of work, may come closer to the front burner in October.

Darfur/Sudan
Expected Council Action
The Council will continue to focus on the planned transition from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur to the UN. The Council is also likely to be paying close attention to the beginning of the implementation of the UN package of assistance to AMIS, which resolution 1706 sets as the start of a phased transition. A report or a briefing on the implementation of the assistance package seems likely.

Members will also need to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which expires on 8 October.

The Council is also likely to continue to explore both diplomatic talks and public pressure, but there is an increasing sense that the Council needs to develop an alternative plan. Some members have been frustrated with Sudan’s opposition to UN deployment and will possibly start serious thinking on ways to step up pressure on Sudan and key regional players, perhaps along with a package of incentives for Khartoum. But others seem to be increasingly comfortable with accepting UN assistance to AMIS as the sole possible option.

The regional dimension is also expected to surface. A Secretariat briefing on Chad in early October and perhaps a report by the end of the month seem likely.

Status Update since our September Forecast

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Recent developments on the situations covered in our September Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in September included:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar: Myanmar was placed as an item on the Council’s agenda after a procedural vote of 10-4 (China, Congo, Qatar and Russia), with one abstention (Tanzania). The 15 September vote was a result of a letter from the US concerning the deteriorating situation in Myanmar. (S/2006/742) The Council was scheduled to be briefed on Myanmar in a private meeting on 29 September.</td>
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<td>Middle East: The Council held a ministerial-level debate on the Middle East on 21 September. The meeting was held at the request of the Arab League which proposed that the Council consider the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict on all tracks. (SC/8836)</td>
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<td>DRC: The Council issued a presidential statement on 22 September stressing its commitment to ensuring both a peaceful run-off election and the success of the peace process. (S/PRST/2006/40) The Council is expected to renew MONUC’s mandate on 29 September.</td>
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<td>Kosovo: Joachim Rücker, head of UNMIK and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo, briefed the Council on 22 September on the latest developments in Kosovo, including the status talks and the need to start planning for the end of UNMIK’s mandate. (SC/8827) The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for status talks, Martti Ahtisaari said it was important to achieve a negotiated settlement by year’s end.</td>
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<td>UN and Regional Organisations: The Council held an open debate on the challenges of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations on 20 September. A presidential statement was issued emphasising more effective partnerships would be consistent with the Council’s responsibility to maintain international peace and security. (S/PRST/2006/39)</td>
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<td>Liberia: At press time the Council was expected to renew the UNMIL mandate on 29 September. The resolution will address the current ninety day suspension of timber sanctions which are not expected to be reinstated given that Liberia passed the required forestry legislation. In his latest report the Secretary-General recommended a year-long mandate and placed a priority on the security arrangements for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. (S/2006/743)</td>
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<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea: The Council is expected to renew the UNMIL mandate on 29 September. An open question is whether or not it will be another technical rollover with language suggesting a possible future downsizing if no progress is made regarding the border demarcation issue or a six month renewal of the mandate as recommended by the Secretary-General in his last report. (S/2006/749)</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire: On 14 September the Council adopted resolution 1708 which extended the mandate of the Group of Experts to 15 December 2006.</td>
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<td>Children and Armed Conflict: The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict submitted its recommendations on children in the DRC to the Council. (S/2006/724)</td>
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<td>Iraq: The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ashraf Qazi, on 14 September. At the same meeting US Ambassador John Bolton briefed the Council on behalf of the countries which make up the Multinational Forces in Iraq. (SC/8829)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan: At press time the Council was expected to renew the mandate of the 1591 Committee’s Panel of Experts on 29 September.</td>
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Members will be paying attention to the deployment of an assessment mission in Chad and possibly in the Central African Republic perhaps in October.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Council on 31 August created a mandate for an approximately 23,000-strong UNMIS operation in Darfur, “inviting” Sudan’s consent. Resolution 1706 also envisaged the transition as a gradual process beginning with UN assistance to AMIS from 1 October. Chad and Russia abstained from the vote.

The resolution also mandated UNMIS to monitor cross-border rebel activity and to establish a multidimensional presence in key locations in Chad and, if possible, in the Central African Republic, and to contribute to the implementation of the Tripoli Peace Agreement that Sudan and Chad signed in February. It further requested a Secretary-General’s report on civilian protection in Chad and improving security on the Chadian side of the border.

The flurry of diplomatic and civil society activity to secure Sudan’s consent continued in September, in particular during the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the General Assembly. At the General Assembly, US President George W. Bush stated that “if the Sudanese government does not approve this peacekeeping force quickly, the United Nations must act”. And, at the time of writing, US congressmen seemed to be considering legislation barring companies with businesses in Sudan from US government contracts.

Also at the General Assembly, Khartoum seems to have indicated an opening to an incentives package by underlining the need for debt relief and the lifting of economic measures against Sudan. While rejecting the transition, it also expressed support for UN assistance to AMIS.

Bilateral contacts with Khartoum and public pressure were accompanied by a Council debate on Sudan, an Arria formula meeting with celebrity speakers, a briefing from Jan Pronk, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sudan, and a ministerial meeting sponsored by the US and Denmark with the AU, the UN, Council members and regional players (ministers are expected to meet again in October to take stock of the efforts made on consent). The Secretary-General continued to emphasise the need for consent, but also stressed that the government could be held individually and collectively responsible for the consequences of its current attitude.

Considerable nervousness surrounded the renewal of AMIS’ mandate on 20 September, as Sudan continued to reject the transition. An AMIS withdrawal was seen as the worst possible outcome. After intense consultations with the Sudanese government, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) eventually renewed the AMIS mandate until 31 December with UN assistance, reiterated its intention to impose targeted measures, acquiesced to Arab League funding and indicated the need for detailed consultations involving Sudan, the UN and the AU on the transition. The PSC is also expected to reconvene at the level of heads of state and government in November.

The PSC also approved a new concept of operations for AMIS, increasing the troop ceiling to 11,000. Additional troops are expected to come from current contributors.

The Council adopted a two-week rollover of UNMIS to take stock of the current diplomatic initiatives and to study the PSC decision.

Meanwhile, Khartoum has started a major military offensive in Darfur, with reports of ongoing air strikes and an impending humanitarian catastrophe. Khartoum has portrayed its action as part of its plan to stabilise Darfur and implement the peace agreement, but some observers argue that the accord has become a cover for the elimination of rebel groups and attacks against civilians.

In late August, the Secretariat sent a letter to the Sudanese government with a preliminary analysis of the government’s plan. The plan envisages the deployment of about 26,500 Sudanese troops and does not mention the transition. The assessment, *inter alia*, notes concern that the deployments are a violation of the peace agreement and of the arms embargo, and that the UN cannot provide support for elements of the plan that are belligerent or inconsistent with international norms. The Council was not able to reach consensus on a presidential statement in mid-September that denounced the plan and supported the PSC’s decision in advance.

Another major military offensive began in Chad, with the government targeting key rebel positions in the east.

**Options**

Two sets of options to obtain consent have emerged.

The first one is to step up pressure on Khartoum. This could include economic and targeted sanctions as well as a no-fly zone under resolution 1591. Those actions could also be taken by member states unilaterally. Measures could also include stepping up the activities of the International Criminal Court.

But it is unclear whether the importance Khartoum attaches to Darfur would lead it to harden its position, rather than give consent. It is also unclear whether Chad, or any of Sudan’s neighbouring countries, would allow the use of its territory.

Difficulties may also arise from the possibility that, even with pressured (and probably hesitant) consent, Khartoum could create practical, debilitating limitations to UNMIS’ ability to discharge its mandate.

An emerging option is to agree on a package of incentives for consent to be combined with a set of sticks.

Some observers have argued that the Council should focus instead on bolstering AMIS with UN assets as an alternative to the transition, perhaps under UN-assessed contributions. This combination would be unprecedented, and its implications in terms of command and control, management and budget are large and unclear.

A likely additional option in the immediate future is to concentrate efforts on guaranteeing that the full package of UN assistance to AMIS recommended by the Secretary-General is quickly implemented.

A further option would be to focus on achieving a truce in Darfur and on revamping negotiations with the non-signatories to the peace agreement, with a view to ceasing the hostilities and creating conditions for the implementation of an eventual agreement as AMIS is boosted with UN assets. This option carries the difficulty of selecting an effective mediator; the likely option being the AU.
Key Issues
How best to obtain Sudan’s consent continues to be the central question on Darfur. So far, the approach has been to engage the government and has involved a spectrum of positions ranging from overt pressure to quiet diplomacy. However, there has been an incompatibility between pressuring Khartoum on the one hand, and conceding of positions ranging from overt pressure to quiet diplomacy. However, there has been agreement, given the difficulties with progress in the Abuja peace talks.

As to what strategy Council members will adopt, two opposite conclusions have emerged:
- for some Council members, the issue is how best to step up pressure on Khartoum, perhaps with a carrot-and-stick approach; and
- for others, the issue is exploring an alternative to consent and transition, perhaps through the provision of increased UN assistance to AMIS.

However, there is awareness that the situation on the ground is now much closer to open conflict. This raises huge questions as to the risks involved in deploying a peacekeeping operation to implement a peace agreement that is consistently violated. And this is complicated by the possibility that any consent may be hesitant and half-hearted.

Another issue is the implementation of other key provisions of resolution 1706, such as the assistance package for AMIS.

On the regional dimension, members are aware that the establishment of a UN presence in Chad—which N’Djamena seems to support—would likely create uneasiness in Khartoum.

For some, the real issue is then how to achieve progress on the political track, which seems to have been abandoned since May. This poses difficult questions as to who could mediate a second peace agreement, given the difficulties with progress in the Abuja peace talks.

Time itself is an issue. For practical reasons, the Secretariat is already working with the scenario that transition would only take place in the first quarter of 2007. Given the current Sudanese military offensive, even with UN assistance, the position of AMIS may become untenable.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members still seem to be in agreement that consent is necessary for the transition.

But some members have displayed increasing frustration and impatience with Khartoum’s opposition, in particular at Sudan’s posture vis-à-vis the renewal of AMIS. Frustration has also increased with the lack of consensus to adopt a statement denouncing the government’s plan. Members such as China do not seem to have been comfortable with the language proposed.

Western members have also faced increasing domestic pressure to avert a catastrophe in Darfur. Among these members, there is great interest in continuing to pressure states with closer ties to Khartoum, such as China and Arab states.

There is an interest in the use of carrots and sticks, such as the forthcoming package of proposals that British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in mid-September along with the plan for a summit on Darfur.

Some members—the US in particular—insist on the transition and have been uncomfortable with any alternative plans, especially with the prospect of increasing UN assistance to AMIS in lieu of a transition which China, Russia and Qatar seem to support.

Among African members of the Council, and within the AU PSC, there is a high degree of frustration with Khartoum’s tough position but also with a perceived lack of consultations with the AU prior to the adoption of resolution 1706, particularly on management of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. There is also concern with the maintenance of an African character in eventual UNMIS contingents in Darfur.

Underlying Problems
The next steps will include the implementation of the UN assistance package for AMIS. It will consist of about 45 civilian staff, 105 military staff officers and 23 police advisors, plus assets such as global positioning system devices and possibly armoured personal carriers. The aim is to assist with command and control, mobility, communications and air control, inter alia. Arrangements are also expected to be made with UNMIS troop contributors from non-Western countries to transfer personnel under the package. But the second, more resource-intensive package would be contingent on consent to the transition and could thus face the government’s opposition.
Historical Background
20 September 2006 The AU extended AMIS until 31 December.
31 August 2006 The Council adopted resolution 1706.
29 August 2006 The new government offensive in Darfur began.
For the full historical background, please see our February, July and September 2006 Forecasts.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In October, the Council will receive recommendations from the African Union on the future of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. The AU is expected to receive proposals from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 4 October and from the International Working Group (IWG), which is the body in charge of following the peace process. Based on those recommendations, the Council will discuss its approach to the instability afflicting the country. It is likely to adopt a resolution setting a new deadline for the presidential elections and possibly making new arrangements for the peace process.

The Secretary-General will also submit his report on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), whose mandate will expire on 15 December.

Key Recent Developments
In late August the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire, Pierre Schori, announced that presidential elections could not be held by 31 October due to technical reasons relating to non-compliance with the roadmap. Since then, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire has deteriorated. The elections in Côte d’Ivoire were first postponed in October 2005 by one year with resolution 1633, which also established institutional arrangements for the interim period. (Please see our 1 December 2005 Update Report and September 2006 Forecast for more details).

Following the announcement, Ivorian Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny organised a summit in Yamoussoukro to decide on the future of the peace process with President Laurent Gbagbo, rebel leader Guillaume Soro and the two main opposition leaders, Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié. There were no concrete results as President Gbagbo’s opponents strongly rejected his determination to remain in power until elections are held.

On 8 September, the IWG recommended that the UN take measures in order to move the process forward by:
• defining new “institutional and governance arrangements”;
• adopting a new resolution reinforcing the exercise of powers of the prime minister

and allowing a greater involvement of the international community in the implementation of the roadmap; and
• imposing sanctions against individuals blocking the peace process.

Because these proposals, if carried out, would considerably reduce the power of the president, tensions between President Gbagbo and the UN increased. Talking to the press, Gbagbo stated that:
• he will remain in office until a next president is elected;
• he will oppose the suspension of any constitutional provisions;
• time for proposals and negotiations are over; and
• he will submit proposals for a new peace process to the African Union. There are reports that the proposals may include demands for the departure of the impartial forces (UNOCI and the French Licorne forces). (Côte d’Ivoire’s ruling party, the Ivorian Popular Front [Front populaire ivoirien, or FPI] already called for the departure of French peacekeepers and the dissolution of the IWG.)

Gbagbo boycotted the UN General Assembly meeting. He also refused to participate in the 20 September mini-summit in New York between the Secretary-General, regional leaders and Ivorian opposition leaders that was aimed at evaluating ways to implement the peace plan. The Secretary-General believes that the current institutional arrangements should be reinforced and made effective in order to avoid indefinite postponement of the elections. No statement was issued after the meeting, but it seems that he would be in favour of:
• prolonging the mandate of the Ivorian president by another year, which he deemed as the amount of time needed to implement the roadmap;
• giving more executive powers to the prime minister as well as the means to carry them out;
• reinforcing the mandate and size of UNOCI because of growing security risks;
• reinforcing the mandate of the High Representative for the elections; and
• suspending all constitutional provisions that are incompatible with the implementation of the peace process.

The South African mediator, President Thabo Mbeki, opposed any decision in the

Other Relevant Facts

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

**UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and approximately 6,015 police personnel
- Strength as of 27 August 2006: 10,274 uniformed personnel, including 9,608 military and 666 police in the south
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006—30 June 2007: $1,126.30 million (does not include mandate in Darfur, estimated between $1.4-1.7 billion)

**UNMIS: Duration**
24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 8 October 2006

**UNMIS: Fatalities**
Seven, including two military and five civilian staff

**Head of AMIS**
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

**AMIS: Size and Composition of Mission**
- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police personnel
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Gambia

**AMIS: Duration**
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2006
absence of the Ivorian president. Therefore, the summit failed to bring solutions to the current deadlock.

Another important development was the blockage by China and Russia on 18 September of proposed sanctions against two influential political leaders close to Gbagbo, Mamadou Koulibaly, the speaker of the National Assembly, and Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the chairman of the ruling FPI, who were held responsible for delaying the national identification programme.

Options
The Council’s options will depend on the proposals of the African Union. While it is expected that ECOWAS will make recommendations following the Secretary-General’s approach, the AU may dilute them as it will have to take into account President Gbagbo’s proposals for a new peace process. Gbagbo’s proposals may include demands for the replacement of the current international forces by AU forces. South African mediator Thabo Mbeki may support a solution preferred by Gbagbo. It remains to be seen whether the AU would support this type of proposal.

The Council, therefore, has the following options:
- fully support the AU recommendations;
- renew for one year the current arrangements;
- prolong the mandate of the Ivorian president by one year while changing the current institutional arrangements, thereby granting additional executive powers to the prime minister and asking for a suspension of the constitution;
- impose additional sanctions against individuals blocking the peace process; and
- adopt a resolution transferring additional troops and police units from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to reinforce UNOCI.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is to determine how best to salvage the current peace process. Providing the prime minister with the necessary power to resume the disarmament and the national identification processes, and exercising further pressure on those blocking the process is an option. But this may trigger violence, especially if the president is further deprived of his prerogatives, as the Young Patriots (the militants in favour of the president) say they are ready to take over the streets. Renewing the current arrangements for 12 months may prevent violence but may also play in favour of the status quo, with the risk of further entrenching Gbagbo and delaying elections.

A related issue is the degree of involvement of the UN and the Council. For most of the year, the Council has tended to follow the recommendations of the AU and play a supportive role. Given Gbagbo’s increasingly confrontational behaviour, the issue is now to determine which institution, the Council or the AU, is in a better position to avoid a further postponement of elections and renewed violence. This issue will become particularly important if Gbagbo decides that the current international forces should leave the country.

If the Council decides that the best option is to make new institutional arrangements to tilt the balance of power towards the prime minister, it will have to provide him with extra guarantees so that he will be able to exercise power, such as a certain degree of control over the army.

Council Dynamics
After the consensus of the last few months, the Council now appears increasingly fragmented. In September it was unable to impose targeted sanctions because of Russia and China’s opposition. Many in the Council also seem uncertain as to what the approach should be. The US favours following the AU. France, which has the lead, seems to prefer a more direct involvement of the Council. The Council also appears divided on the issue of the Ivorian president’s mandate, with the African members of the Council seeming to prefer a short renewal of Gbagbo’s mandate.

Underlying Problems
The IWG identified the main obstacles to the peace process as the following:
- lack of political will;
- disagreement over the voters’ lists;
- the interruption of the disarmament process;
- conflict over institutional prerogatives; and
- the obstacles preventing the prime minister from exercising powers granted to him in resolution 1633.

**UN Documents**

**Most Recent Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1708 (14 September 2006) extended the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 December and requested a brief written update before 1 December.
- S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 personnel.
- S/RES/1633 (21 October 2005) extended President Gbagbo’s term by 12 months, established the roadmap to be supervised by the IWG, called for the designation of a prime minister with executive powers and reaffirmed its readiness to impose sanctions.

**Most Recent Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/738 (13 September 2006) was the tenth IWG communiqué.

For historical background please refer to our 1 December 2005 Update Report.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
- Pierre Schori (Sweden)

**High Representative for the Elections**
- Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

**Size and Composition of UNOCI**
- Authorised strength since 2 June 2006: 8,115 military personnel and 1,200 police officers
- Strength as of 31 July 2006: 7,806 total uniformed personnel, and 728 police officers
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

**Cost**
- 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $438.17 million
Expected Council Action

Lebanon is likely to take a considerable amount of the Council’s time and attention in October. Members will be following developments related to the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has a mandate that expires on 31 August 2007.

A report by Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Nicolas Michel, on the tribunal of an international character to try those responsible for the bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others in Lebanon is expected by the Council in October. The report will contain detailed information on the form of the tribunal and an annex with the draft agreement between the Secretary-General and the Lebanese authorities (the tribunal’s constituting treaty) and the statute of the tribunal. The Council may present amendments to the agreement.

The Council in October will also receive a report by Terje Røed-Larsen, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559, on steps taken to implement the resolution, which calls for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia, and supports the extension of the control of the Lebanese government over all Lebanese territory. The Council may react to the report by adopting a presidential statement.

Key Recent Developments

On 14 August the Council adopted resolution 1701 which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, strongly reinforced the mandate and troop level of UNIFIL, and provided some elements for a permanent ceasefire. Those elements included a call for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to develop proposals within thirty days on the implementation of those provisions as well as for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms (for additional information, please refer to our 25 September Special Research Report on resolution 1701).

The Secretary-General presented his report on 12 September, in which he noted that he would come back to the Council at a later stage on the issue of the Sheb’a Farms because he needed to study further the implications of a transfer of the area from Syria to Lebanon. On the issue of disarmament, he noted that the fourth semi-annual report on implementation of resolution 1559 would provide a further update. The Council, under a tight schedule, did not react. There has been no progress since last April on the issues of border delineation between Lebanon and Syria or on the disarmament of militias as the Lebanese national dialogue was interrupted because of the hostilities. At a mass rally on 22 September in Beirut, Hezbollah proclaimed that no army in the world would make it disarm.

Options

On the issue of implementation of resolution 1701, the Council may:

- adopt a presidential statement reacting to the 12 September report indicating that it looked forward to receiving the next report on implementation; and
- ask the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for UNIFIL as there is none at the moment.

After receiving the Røed-Larsen report, the Council has the following options:

- adopt a presidential statement welcoming the report, encouraging the parties to work harder within the Lebanese national dialogue to meet the requirements of resolution 1559 and reiterating that Syria has to undertake concrete steps to delineate its common border with Lebanon; and
- provide clarifications, as part of a broader statement or in a separate document, on the reporting methods for resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 as some elements of these resolutions overlap.

Following the report on the tribunal, the Council may:

- provide its quiet assent to the agreement as it is (a Council resolution is not necessary for the Secretary-General to have the authorisation to sign the agreement);
- adopt a presidential statement welcoming the agreement and asking for wide cooperation with the tribunal; and
- initiate consultations and propose amendments to the bilateral agreement and the statute of the tribunal via a letter to the Secretary-General.

Key Issues

Because resolution 1701 encompasses elements of resolutions 1559 and 1680, including the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia and the delineation of the Syria/Lebanon border in the Sheb’a Farms area, a single report on implementation of resolution 1701 may be satisfactory in the future. But it seems that the Council is not willing to “dilute” the Røed-Larsen report, because 1559 is still considered to be the basis for a solution in Lebanon. Also, this apparent confusion over the reporting mechanisms in fact provides the Secretary-General with more flexibility.

Another issue is whether the Secretary-General wholly fulfilled his mandate under operational paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 given the absence of concrete recommendations in his report.

The other issue for the Council to decide is whether to step into a leadership role in carrying forward the agenda of resolution 1701, or retreat to the minimalist approach which characterised its response to the crises in Gaza and Lebanon in 2006, and which attracted much criticism.

With regard to the tribunal, its format is likely to resemble the format of the special court for Sierra Leone with a hybrid domestic and international character, and with an agreement between the UN and the government as the constituting treaty. The Council will consider the draft agreement, whose details are unknown at the time of writing, and will likely discuss the following issues:

- Jurisdiction: The tribunal’s jurisdiction could be limited to those charged with...
the death of Hariri and 22 others killed in the attack, or expanded to include other attacks in Lebanon since 1 October 2004. Resolution 1644 authorised the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to extend its technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities for their investigation on the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004. Resolution 1686 supported the Commission’s intention to extend this assistance further, which could indicate that the tribunal’s jurisdiction will be broader in scope as well. However, UNIIIC has the lead on the Hariri investigation and only provides assistance for the other investigations.

■ Applicable Law: The Lebanese authorities wish to have Lebanese substantive criminal law applied. But the UN will insist that the tribunal operates in a manner consistent with international fair trial standards. For example, Lebanese criminal law allows for the death penalty, whereas the UN has always insisted on excluding capital punishment from tribunals that it has helped establish.

■ Location: For security reasons and the perception of objectivity, it will be difficult to locate the tribunal on Lebanese territory. News sources have mentioned Cyprus as a possible location, due to its advantageous geographical location. One issue will be to determine whether that country’s internal law requires a Security Council resolution for the proceeding to be held on its soil (as was the case with the Netherlands for the trial of Charles Taylor).

■ Composition: Lebanon has emphasised that it considers significant international participation essential for the tribunal’s success. But an equilibrium between the Lebanese and international character of the court is an issue because Lebanon also wants to keep the lead in the process.

■ Funding: While the majority of the costs may be shouldered by Lebanon, the UN or other donors could also contribute. The risk of a lack of funding and therefore a lack of continuity, as with the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Cambodia tribunal, needs to be avoided.

■ Timing: It is unlikely that a date for commencing the trials will be set at this point, as this depends on the progress made in the investigation. Also, Lebanon will have to ratify the tribunal’s constituting treaty.

■ Detention: Several human rights organisations as well as Under Secretary-General Michel have raised concerns about the suspects currently in Lebanese custody and the length of pre-trial detention.

■ Cooperation by Syria: If Syrian nationals are implicated in the attacks, it is questionable whether Syria would be willing to extradite the suspects. Syria had previously stated that any Syrian suspects would be tried by Syrian courts.

Council Dynamics
France, the UK and the US are willing to keep pressure on the Syrian government on the issues of delineation of the border with Lebanon, establishment of diplomatic relations and prevention of flow of arms to Lebanon.

The main point of contention with regard to the Lebanese tribunal is the issue of jurisdiction. Some members favour a broader approach while others would prefer that the tribunal focus only on the Hariri murder, an option that would also reduce the costs of the tribunal. The Lebanese authorities also seem to be cautious about the degree of international involvement.

While some consider that a broad approach for the whole Middle East region is necessary to secure a long-term solution, others like the US remain reluctant to create linkages and believe that each conflict (Israel/Lebanon, Israel/Syria and Israel/Palestine) has a better chance of being resolved separately and sequentially.

Finally, the Council remains divided on the issue of its active involvement for a long-term solution of the Lebanese conflict as some members are willing to let the Secretary-General take initiatives.
Members will be paying close attention to the developments on the ground as work on these issues progresses.

Contrary to earlier expectations, a draft resolution on modifications to the embargo has not yet been presented, and it is unclear at press time when it will emerge. In the absence of an established peace process involving consent from all parties, it seems unlikely at this stage that the Council will support the proposed IGASOM.

Members also expect the regular report of the Secretary-General on Somalia in October.

Key Recent Developments

The second round of talks between the TFG and UIC led to an agreement on 5 September creating joint security forces after a power-sharing deal is reached, rejecting foreign interference and reaffirming the June truce. Somali foreign minister Ismail Hurre Buba reportedly indicated the TFG’s position is that the agreement does not prevent the deployment of IGASOM, which the UIC vehemently opposes. Together with the reported presence of Ethiopian troops, this is seen as a major difficulty for the third round of talks scheduled for 30 October.

IGAD heads of state and government met on 5 September to adopt the mission plan. IGASOM is expected to have 8,000 troops from Uganda and perhaps Sudan as well. Djibouti and Eritrea did not attend the meeting. The AU Peace and Security Council officially endorsed the mission plan on 13 September.

Kenyan foreign minister Raphael Tuju (as chair of IGAD’s council of ministers) and Somali minister Buba appealed at a Council meeting on 25 September for exemptions, citing the adoption of the national security and stabilisation plan and IGASOM’s mission plan. Both documents were expected to be circulated to Council members at press time.

Tensions between the TFG and the UIC further increased with an assassination attempt against Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf on 18 September and the UIC’s taking control of Kismayo on 25 September.

The TFG has considered the move a violation of the June truce and has accused the UIC of receiving support from Eritrea. The UIC has considered the government’s support for IGASOM a violation of the September agreement, and has reportedly called for support from foreign Muslim fighters.

Options

Options include supporting the talks using the sanctions regime, perhaps by signalling willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals resisting a negotiated path to peace between the TFG and UIC. This could also include adopting criteria for targeted sanctions.

Members may also consider sending political signals to encourage the UIC to cooperate, perhaps through more overt criticism of the Ethiopian presence.

The option of granting arms embargo exemptions to IGASOM seems less likely at the present stage. An alternative may be to encourage the parties to reach a negotiated agreement on the issue.

Another option is to modify the arms embargo to support training for the Somali security sector.

Key Issues

The broader issue is how best to support the talks. In that context, the key question is how to devise a balanced approach, now that the recent events seem to have crystallised the view that alienating the UIC may be counterproductive.

One immediate issue is whether the IGASOM mission would have potential negative effects on the security situation, and how best to deal with the regional dimension. There is the risk that a passive approach to external interference could stimulate further deterioration in relations between the UIC and TFG. On the other hand, without Ethiopian assistance, the TFG may collapse altogether.

Another immediate issue is the potential effect of modifications of the arms embargo and targeted sanctions on the TFG/UIC talks.

The lack of clarity of the UIC’s intentions is also a key issue.

A complex issue relates to the assessment of the national security and stabilisation plan and IGASOM’s mission plan according to criteria in Council statements. Moreover, with the growth in the UIC’s influence, the key issue seems to be whether the mission should be made contingent upon consent from both parties.
Council and Wider Dynamics
A more cautionary and balanced approach to sanctions issues in Somalia seems to be emerging within the Council.

Most members seem to have in mind that IGASOM may have negative effects on the talks, and that there is no consensus within IGAD itself on this issue. Members are also aware that, given the absence of funding for the mission, it is unclear how it can actually be deployed.

Most members seem to be seeking additional time to observe developments on the ground before adopting a position or starting wider negotiations on the modifications of the arms embargo.

Others, in particular China and Tanzania, seem to have a higher degree of sympathy for the AU/IGAD request.

5 September 2006 The TFG and the UIC reached an agreement on joint security forces. IGAD adopted a revised IGASOM mission plan.

For the full historical background, please see our January, May and September 2006 Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

| Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia |
| François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) |
| Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee |
| Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (Qatar) |

UN Documents

- **Selected Security Council Resolutions**
  - S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006) renewed the Monitoring Group’s mandate for six months.

- **Selected Presidential Statements**
  - S/PRST/2006/31 (13 July 2006) expressed support for the Transitional Federal Institutions and willingness to consider the AU’s request for an exemption to the arms embargo.

- **Selected Letters**
  - SC/2006/442 (29 June 2006) was the letter from the Arab League with the results of the first meeting between the TFG and UIC on 22 June.

- **Selected Secretary-General’s Report**
  - S/2006/418 (20 June 2006) was the latest report.

- **Latest Report of the Monitoring Group**
  - S/2006/229 (4 May 2006)

Historical Background

25 September 2006 IGAD and Somalia called for exemptions to the arms embargo at a Council meeting. The UIC took control of Kismayo.

18 September 2006 President Yusuf suffered an assassination attempt.


13 September 2006 President Yoweri Museveni promised amnesty for the LRA leadership after a final peace agreement, despite the arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Kony and Otti have conditioned attendance in the talks on the lifting of ICC warrants.

The breakthrough came after Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni promised amnesty for serious crimes.

President Museveni has indicated that, in the event of an agreement, he would ask the Court to lift the warrants and perhaps present an alternative plan, seemingly based upon traditional reconciliation mechanisms. But in order to have the arrest warrants revoked, Uganda would have to invoke the complementarity provisions of the ICC statute and show the judges of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber that it is capable of handling these kinds of cases. Observers note that one possibility for Uganda would be to develop a national mechanism mixing traditional rites and formal justice with a view to complying with international standards. The judges would likely consider Museveni’s promise of amnesty as a factor in rendering a decision.

Some observers have raised a possibility of a decision from the ICC chief prosecutor not to prosecute on grounds that this would best serve the interests of justice. It is unlikely that the prosecutor would be willing to contemplate this move. In any event, to halt prosecutions, he would need to get an approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Another possibility raised by observers is asylum for LRA commanders in a state which is a non-signatory to the Rome Statute, perhaps coupled with a Council request to the ICC to suspend prosecutions. This seems unacceptable to some Council members since it could be seen as undermining the Court and promoting impunity. Under the ICC statute, the Council may ask for a suspension of prosecutions for 12 months, renewable.

Options
The options for Council action seem limited, at least until the peace talks are concluded. Available options, perhaps in a statement, are to:

- express support for the negotiations, perhaps with a limited logistical role for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (it seems that UNMIS is analysing this possibility);

- to be aware that a blanket amnesty may undermine the legitimacy of the talks and that the UN would not recognise an amnesty for serious crimes.
threaten sanctions against LRA commanders; and
underline the need for improving living conditions in northern Uganda. But some will be conscious that any mention of domestic issues may face opposition. Members may also emphasise the need for accountability.

Other options are to:
• impose targeted sanctions and mandate UNMIS to arrest the LRA leadership should the talks fail; and
• consider the Secretary-General’s recommendations, particularly the appointment of a special envoy.

Key Issues
The main issue is how best to support the talks while (for some members) making sure that peace and justice go together.

Members are aware that the seemingly inevitable Ugandan plea for the lifting of ICC arrest warrants will pose huge questions, as discussed above.

There is also awareness that ICC warrants have contributed to the pressure on the LRA and that impunity may in fact renew the potential for conflict.

Council Dynamics
A concern with the implications of the talks’ outcome on accountability looms large. Some members have already indicated that a solution that undermines justice and the ICC is unacceptable. During the debate on strengthening international law in July, most members strongly supported the ICC and emphasised the importance of ending impunity.

There is also an interest in following up on the Secretary-General’s recommendations, particularly the appointment of a special envoy, and in providing support for the peace talks.

Underlying Problems
Observers note that progress in the peace talks so far has been incremental and success is not yet guaranteed. There is distrust between the parties. The LRA delegation does not include the top leadership, which seems exclusively interested in an amnesty. And the government will need to show results in implementing the multiyear Peace, Recovery and Development Plan, reintegrating fighters and facilitating the return of two million internally displaced persons.

The LRA seems nonetheless extremely weak militarily. It is under pressure of ICC warrants and the DRC’s acceptance of Ugandan incursions should talks fail.

The talks may soon turn to substantive issues. The government has focused on ceasing hostilities and reintegration, and the LRA delegation has focused on solving root causes, power-sharing, wealth-sharing and the restructuring of government institutions, in particular the armed forces. Serious discrepancies are likely to continue between these two approaches.

Security Council Elections

Expected Action
On 16 October, the General Assembly will hold elections for five non-permanent seats on the Security Council.

Background
In the Asian group, with South Korea no longer in the running, the one available seat is being contested by Indonesia and Nepal. In the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), Guatemala and Venezuela are competing for one seat. South Africa (in the African Group) and Belgium and Italy (in the Western European and Others Group) are assured of seats as their elections are uncontested. (Please see our 14 August Special Research Report for more details about seat allocation and voting procedure.)

Recent Developments
The South Korean government on 31 August announced its decision to withdraw its bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in order to focus on the contest for the Secretary-General position.

Indonesia is optimistic that it now has the support of many countries that had originally agreed to vote for South Korea. It has been endorsed by ASEAN and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and is confident of having strong support from Africa.

Nepal remains cautiously optimistic and is counting on support from South Asia and the landlocked countries. However, there are still concerns about its internal stability.

Guatemala’s campaign has been overshadowed by the very public rift between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the United States, which has been supportive of Guatemala. Venezuela has based its campaign on an anti-US position and has proclaimed the need to bring balance to a unipolar world. Over the last few months, Chávez has personally crossed the globe with offers of friendship, oil deals and financial assistance. Venezuela has said that it has support from China, Russia, Iran, Syria and Cuba as well as MERCOSUR, CARICOM, the Arab League and most African countries. Guatemala is confident of backing from Mexico, Colombia, Central American countries and most of Europe.

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<td><strong>Selected Security Council Resolutions</strong></td>
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<td>• S/RES/1663 (24 March 2006) and 1653 (27 January 2006) requested the LRA report.</td>
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| **Selected Meeting Records** |
| • S/PV.5525 (15 September 2006) was the latest briefing from Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland on the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda. |
| • S/PV.5474 (22 June 2006) was the debate on strengthening international law. |
| • S/PV.5415 (19 April 2006) was a briefing from the Ugandan government. |

| **Selected Secretary-General’s Reports** |
| • S/2006/478 (29 June 2006) was the LRA report. |

| Historical Background |
| 26 August 2006 The parties agreed to a truce. |
| 12 August 2006 ICC-indicted LRA commander Raska Lukwiya was reportedly killed. |
| 4 August 2006 The LRA announced a unilateral ceasefire. |
| 14 July 2006 Peace talks started. |
| 4 July 2006 Kampala offered amnesty to LRA leaders in the event of a peace agreement. |

For historical background and a complete list of UN documents, please refer to our April Update Report, and our June and July 2006 Forecasts.

Useful Additional Sources
*Peace in Northern Uganda? Africa Briefing No. 41, International Crisis Group, 13 September 2006*
Undecided countries like Chile, Peru, Panama and Ecuador are being vigorously courted by both countries.

Options
The Asian group contest is likely to be less of a tussle than first envisioned. If Indonesia has estimated its support correctly, the Asian group seat could be resolved without protracted rounds of voting. A possible option is for Nepal to withdraw at the last minute if it is clear that Indonesia has the two-thirds majority (128 of 192 votes) needed.

In the Latin American group, both candidates have enough support to block the other from getting the two-thirds majority, so several rounds of voting are expected. After the third inconclusive ballot of closed voting, according to the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, the election can be opened up to new candidates. One option at this stage is for a third candidate from Latin America to be pushed forward in an attempt to break the deadlock. Several possibilities have been suggested but it is unlikely that any country considering this option will show its hand at this stage.

Security Council Diamond Sanctions and the Kimberley Process

The Council’s review in October of the Kimberley Process certification scheme has fuelled a number of conflicts in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Angola. Studies on causes and prevention of conflicts have drawn attention to illicit exploitation of extractive natural resources as an important source of revenue for armed groups. The illicit diamond trade has been linked directly to the financing of arms and ammunition by rebel groups.

Preventing the illicit exploitation of commodities in conflict situations thus became a priority for the international community. The Council recognised the need to establish controls over the trade of rough diamonds, beginning with the diamond sanctions on Angola in 1998 (resolution 1173). It has prohibited importation of rough diamonds from conflict states and urged them to establish Certificate of Origin regimes for the trade in rough diamonds. The General Assembly, in resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000, called on all concerned parties—including countries that produce, process, export or import diamonds—to “find ways to break the link between diamonds and armed conflict.”

Increasingly, the Council has turned to the use of targeted sanctions as a tool for conflict prevention and resolution, particularly in Africa. There have been some successes, particularly with regard to diamond sanctions imposed on UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) in Angola, the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in Sierra Leone, and against Liberia to end Charles Taylor’s support and facilitation of the RUF.

However, while the Council is apt to employ targeted sanctions more widely in conflict situations, the effectiveness of sanctions regimes often suffers from lack of full implementation by many countries. In some cases, this is due to lack of capacity and, in others, lack of commitment. Moreover, a number of outstanding recommendations to further improve the implementation of sanctions regimes are yet to be adopted by the Council. Nevertheless, there have been significant improvements in sanctions regimes in recent years resulting primarily from changes in the design and implementation of sanctions, prompted by the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes.

Kimberley Process
The international community’s responses to the problem of conflict diamonds, particularly the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, are having a significant impact on the illicit trade in rough diamonds. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which was adopted 5 November 2002 after almost two years of negotiations, went into effect January 2003. It requires governments to implement import- and export-control regimes that certify and control the trade in rough diamonds, and it creates a documentary trail from the extraction to the polishing of diamonds.

The UNITA sanctions were broadly supported by the Non-Aligned Movement, Organisation of African Unity, and the Southern African Development Community. In 2000 a number of initiatives were made in support of diamond sanctions. These included: efforts by the Belgian government to curb diamond sanctions and by the Diamond High Council (a non-profit diamond trade organisation) to make Angola diamond sanctions more effective; the African diamond-producing countries’ proposal to convene a conference of experts for the purpose of devising a system of controls to facilitate the implementation of the measures contained in resolution 1173 (1998); and South Africa’s announcement of its intention to host the conference. It was contemplated that the conference would develop arrangements allowing for increased transparency and accountability in the control of diamonds from point of origin to the bourses. The conference, held at Kimberley, South Africa in May 2000, began the process of establishing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

The Council adopted resolution 1459 on 28 January 2003 specifically endorsing the Kimberley Process and welcoming the Certification Scheme as a valuable tool against the traffic in conflict diamonds. The Council’s subsequent approach used its Chapter VII powers to require countries, including Liberia, to establish a Certificate of Origin regime in conformity with the requirements of the Certification Scheme and to adopt relevant laws and an effective administrative mechanism to become a member of the Kimberley Process. The Council’s use of its powers under Chapter VII—under which all sanctions resolutions are adopted—to impose the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’s requirements on governments in conflict situations has contributed significantly to the Scheme’s early success. In less than three years, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has been credited with reducing significantly the illicit trade in diamonds, denying rebel armies a major source of funding.

Angola
Before the Kimberley Process, the Council began imposing the Certificate of Origin regime requirement on governments of conflict-ridden, diamond-exporting coun-
tries. First employed against UNITA, the Council decided in resolution 1173 of 12 June 1998 that all states must take the necessary measures to prohibit all imports from Angola of all diamonds not controlled by the Angolan government’s Certificate of Origin regime.

In 2000, while chairing the Angola Sanctions Committee in the Council, Canada initiated visits to the region and the diamond centres of Europe in an effort to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions against UNITA. The chairman made a dramatic presentation of evidence to the Council vividly highlighting sanctions violations. This exposed the extent to which UNITA relied on rough diamonds to finance its rebellion. These efforts by the Canadian chairman set unprecedented new standards for the work of Council sanctions committees and triggered tougher measures against UNITA.

Resolution 1295 (2000), while imposing further restrictions on Angolan conflict diamonds, encouraged states hosting diamond markets to impose significant penalties for possessing rough diamonds imported in contravention of resolution 1173. It emphasised that non-compliance constituted a violation of the UN Charter and that implementation of the measures required the use of an effective Certification of Origin. Resolution 1295 also established a monitoring mechanism to collect additional information and investigate relevant leads relating to violations of the sanctions measures.

The Sierra Leone-Liberia Link

The role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict was similar to that of Angola. However, the RUF received from the Liberian government significant support that served as a conduit for the illicit trade in Sierra Leone diamonds as well as a source of arms supplies. The Council expressed concern about the relationship between the conflict and the diamond trade and confirmed reports that such diamonds were transiting neighbouring countries, including Liberia. Consequently, it adopted resolution 1306 of 5 July 2000 imposing a prohibition on trade in all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.

The Council requested the Sierra Leonean government to establish a Certificate of Origin regime for the export of rough diamonds and to notify the Sanctions Committee of its details when fully operational. Once the Committee reported to the Council that an effective regime was fully operational, diamonds exported by the government under the new regime would be exempt from the sanctions. The Council requested the Sanctions Committee to hold an unprecedented exploratory hearing in New York to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and the trade in arms and related materiel in violation of resolution 1171 (1998). The Council also asked for the Committee to report to it on its hearings. Participants included representatives of interested states and regional organisations, the diamond industry and other experts.

The Council authorised establishment of a Panel of Experts to collect information on possible violations of the diamond sanctions and the link between the trade in diamonds and the trade in arms and related materiel, and to report their findings and recommendations to the Council through the Committee.

A subsequent report by the Panel of Experts (S/2000/1195) confirmed that diamonds represented a major and primary source of income for the RUF, that the bulk of RUF diamonds left Sierra Leone through Liberia, and that such illicit trade could not have been conducted without the permission and involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest levels. Concerned about the unequivocal and overwhelming evidence presented implicating the Liberian government as actively supporting the RUF at all levels, and since the Liberian government had ignored all of the Council’s efforts to cease its support of the RUF, in March 2001, the Council adopted resolution 1343. In this resolution the Council demanded that the Liberian government end its support to the RUF, and cease all direct or indirect imports of Sierra Leonean rough diamonds not controlled by the Certificate of Origin regime of the Sierra Leonean government in accordance with resolution 1306.

Liberia

Also in resolution 1343, the Council imposed a number of sanctions on the Liberian government and its senior government and military leaders. These included an embargo on importation of diamonds from Liberia whether or not originating from Liberia territory, a provision aimed specifically at prohibiting the illicit trade of Sierra Leone diamonds through Liberia.

In this resolution, the Council also called on the Liberian government to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds, transparent and internationally verifiable and approved by the Sanctions Committee. The Council urged all West African diamond-exporting states to establish their own Certificate of Origin regimes similar to that adopted by the Sierra Leone government.

The Liberia Sanctions Panel of Experts confirmed that the Liberian government continued to breach the sanctions measures. The Council repeatedly called on the Liberian government to establish a Certificate of Origin regime, bearing in mind the discussions then taking place in the Kimberley Process. It renewed the diamond sanctions through a series of resolutions ending with resolution 1689 of 20 June 2006.

The inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on 16 January as president of Liberia launched a new chapter in the relationship between the Council and Liberia. In resolution 1689, the Council welcomed the cooperation of the new Liberian government with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the progress towards compliance. However, noting the findings of the Panel of Experts, the Council extended the sanctions on Liberia’s diamonds for another six months to be reviewed in four months. This period would allow the Liberian government sufficient time to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime that is transparent and internationally verifiable, with a view to joining the Kimberley Process.

As reported by the Panel of Experts in June in its most recent report, with US assistance in achieving Kimberley Process compliance, Liberia’s new government is
increasingly moving toward meeting the necessary objectives for the lifting of the sanctions on Liberian diamonds. The report noted that there was still much to be done in areas of technical and logistical capability, the implementation of internal controls and reforming procedural frameworks for the export of diamonds. The report also noted that illegal mining activities continued unabated. The Panel of Experts concluded that while most of the components for a credible, internationally accredited certification scheme are now available, the harmonisation of these components into a functioning mechanism was still some months away. The Panel emphasised that the need for continued international assistance is critical if Liberia is to make a successful application for participation in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Liberia’s successful establishment of an effective Certificate of Origin and readiness to join the Kimberley Process will be the main criteria for the lifting of the sanctions. The October review will be the first Council review of diamond sanctions set specifically against the standards of the Kimberley Process.

Côte d’Ivoire

In response to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting in Moscow in November 2005 adopted a resolution setting out a series of measures to prevent the introduction of conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire into the legitimate diamond trade. In its final communiqué, the Plenary cited evidence of ongoing illicit production of diamonds in the northern, rebel-controlled regions of Côte d’Ivoire, and concluded it posed a threat to the Certification Scheme. It agreed to conduct, in cooperation with the UN, a detailed assessment of the volume of rough diamonds produced in and exported from Côte d’Ivoire, and to identify where Ivorian diamonds are entering the trade. The Plenary also requested all participants to take action against any of their nationals or companies found to be involved in illicit diamond trade or production in Côte d’Ivoire.

Taking note of the decisions of the Kimberley Process Plenary, and recognising the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources linked to the conflict, the Council adopted resolution 1643 on 15 December 2005 imposing a prohibition on the import of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. The Council welcomed the measures agreed by the participants in the Kimberley Process and called upon all states in the region which are not participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to intensify their efforts to become members in order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring the import of diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire.

The Côte d’Ivoire diamond sanctions are scheduled to be reviewed by the Council by 15 December 2006.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006) renewed the prohibition on the import of rough diamonds from Liberia.
- S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005) renewed the ban on Liberia rough diamonds.
- S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) dissolved the 1343 committee, established the 1521 Committee and prohibited the import of Liberia rough diamonds.
- S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) instituted an immediate embargo on diamond exports from Sierra Leone, and requested a Panel of Experts to examine the link between diamond exports and weapons purchased for use in Sierra Leone’s civil war.
- S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000) imposed further sanctions on UNITA and called for punishment of diamond sanctions violators.

### Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.4113 and Resumption (15 March 2000) was the Security Council meeting in which the Canadian chairman of the Sanctions Committee presented evidence of UNITA sanctions violations.

### Selected Panel of Experts’ Reports

- S/2006/379 (7 June 2006) addressed technical and logistical issues regarding illegal mining activities in Liberia and the implementation of internal controls to conform to the KPCS for the export of diamonds.
- S/2000/1195 (19 December 2000) confirmed that diamonds exported from Sierra Leone were the major source of RUF funding; the evidence implicated the Liberian government.
- S/2000/203 (10 March 2000) outlined findings relating to the significance of diamonds for UNITA, its arms and military equipment, the supply of petroleum products and the recommendations on related matters.

### Other

- A/RES/58/290 (14 April 2004) was the General Assembly resolution on the role of diamonds fuelling conflict.
- A/RES/55/56 (1 December 2000) was the General Assembly resolution on breaking the link between rough diamonds and armed conflict.

### Useful Additional Sources

For information on the Kimberley Process visit www.kimberleyprocess.com
Women, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action
The Council will hold its annual open debate on women, peace and security on 27 October. The theme of this year’s discussion is women’s role in the consolidation of peace. A presidential statement addressing the challenges of implementing and monitoring resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is the expected outcome, and it could possibly refer to the Peacebuilding Commission’s role in taking gender into account in its country-specific work. Prior to the debate, the Council will have received the Secretary-General’s fourth report on women, peace and security.

Preceding the debate, the UK will host an Arria formula meeting with NGOs.

Key Recent Developments
After last year’s open debate on women and peace and security, the Council (as in previous years) adopted a presidential statement that:
- stressed the importance of accelerating full and effective implementation of resolution 1325;
- welcomed the system-wide action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 as formulated in the Secretary-General’s third report on women and peace and security;
- requested the Secretary-General to update, monitor and review the implementation of the action plan on a yearly basis and report to the Council, starting October 2006;
- urged the Secretary-General to appoint a gender adviser within the Department of Political Affairs;
- called on member states to continue implementation of resolution 1325, including through the development of national action plans and strategies; and
- condemned in the strongest terms all acts of sexual exploitation and abuse by all categories of personnel in UN peacekeeping missions.

Since the adoption of this statement, the Council has made reference to resolution 1325 on four occasions in its peacekeeping-related resolutions. It has also consistently stressed the policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse in its mandate-related resolutions. With many member states adopting implementation strategies, such as national action plans focused on recruiting more female peacekeepers, observers consider progress made on a national level as fairly positive.

The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein and the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno briefed the Council on sexual exploitation and abuse on 23 February 2006, followed by an open debate. Both Prince Zeid and Guéhenno stressed there was still much progress to be made. The Council did not adopt a presidential statement after the debate, as it had done after the first time Prince Zeid and Guéhenno had briefed the Council on the issue in May 2005.

The appointment of a gender adviser within the Department of Political Affairs has been stalled due to lack of funding. Requests for outside funding have not yet yielded results and, since the department is on a zero-growth budget, it is unclear at this point when such an appointment could take place.

Even though the resolution that established the Peacebuilding Commission mentions gender, several member states have expressed disappointment about its implementation to date, in particular the lack of funding which does not allow for a permanent gender adviser. During the 2005 debate on women, peace and security, several Council members stressed the importance of full integration of resolution 1325 in the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission. The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is planning to encourage the Peacebuilding Commission to secure women’s participation in the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the two first countries to be taken on by the Commission.

Key Issues
A recurring question has been if it would be desirable, six years after the passage of 1325, to adopt a new resolution on women, peace and security. Adopting one would reiterate the Council’s commitment to obtaining a greater female component in peacekeeping operations, but would also entail the risk of actually diluting the power of resolution 1325. Since the contents of 1325 are generally well-known, the resolution provides a clear point of reference. In addition, as long as the goals of 1325 have not yet been fully realised, some diplomats and NGOs have questioned what added value a new resolution might have.

Council Dynamics
Issues within the scope of resolution 1325 are actively promoted by a number of Council members including Denmark, France, Ghana and the UK. Outside the Council, the “Friends of 1325,” which includes 28 states from various regions under the leadership of Canada, are also actively involved.

During the 2005 debate on women, peace and security, then-Council member Algeria expressly stated that the topic transcended the Council’s mandate. China and Russia made similar statements, stressing that other UN bodies were more apt at dealing with women’s issues. During this year’s debate on sexual exploitation and abuse, however, the Council’s competence to address the matter was not questioned, even though a number of Council members pointed to other UN organs when referring to the implementation of Prince Zeid’s recommendations.

The repeated reports of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers may have played a role in making the Council more willing to address gender-related issues. Even though some members may raise objections to the occurrence of thematic debates in the Council, there is general agreement that women’s participation in peacekeeping is part of the solution to the problem of exploitation and abuse and that it therefore deserves due attention.

Underlying Problems
Gender issues are still not systematically integrated in peacekeeping activities. Whether the Peacebuilding Commission will structurally involve a gender perspective in its work, as prescribed by its mandate, is an open question at this point.

One reason for the limited attention the Council has given to gender issues and the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse, is that the Council considers member states to be mainly responsible for adopting suitable measures to promote women’s involvement and combat sexual exploitation and abuse. This was expressly included in the presidential statement following the first Council meeting on sexual exploitation and abuse, and also played a role in the discussions on resolution 1325.
### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) established the Peacebuilding Commission and called upon the Commission to integrate a gender perspective into all its work.
- S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) expressed the Council’s willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions and urged the Secretary-General to ensure that field operations include a gender component.

#### Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PV/5294 (27 October 2005) reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1325 and welcomed the system-wide action plan for its implementation as proposed by the Secretary-General in his 2005 report.

#### Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2005/636 (20 October 2005)

#### Other
- S/PV.5294 (27 October 2005) was the 2005 debate on women, peace and security.

### Historical Background
For a complete historical background, please refer to our November 2005 Forecast.

### Useful Additional Sources

UNIFEM portal on women, peace and security http://www.unifem.org

Inter-Agency Working Group on Women and Gender and Equality http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge

Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security http://peacewomen.org

### Peacebuilding Commission

#### Expected Action
The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is expected to hold its first formal country-specific meetings on Sierra Leone and Burundi on 12 and 13 October, respectively. Reports from the Peacebuilding Support Office and from the Sierra Leonean and Burundian governments are expected. The meetings are likely to result in short initial lists of major outstanding issues or a specific strategy for peacebuilding for each country, as well as next steps (in particular the holding of thematic meetings on those outstanding issues).

At the time of writing, the Organisational Committee was expected to decide, prior to the country-specific meetings, on:
- civil society participation (some groups have already suggested modalities for that);
- Sweden’s request to participate in the meetings on Sierra Leone; and
- requests from the EU Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to participate in PBC meetings.

#### Key Recent Developments
On 23 June, the Organisational Committee held its first meeting, in which the members elected Angola as chair and El Salvador and Norway as vice-chairs, adopted the rules of procedure, and indicated that Burundi and Sierra Leone would be considered for its country-specific mode.

Since then, members have received informal country-specific briefings in July and held a seminar with civil society organisations in September. The Organisational Committee also prepared an initial list of members for country-specific meetings.

The EU Commission forwarded a request for participation in PBC meetings as an “other institutional donor” under paragraph 9 of resolution 1645 as requiring that “other institutional donors” should have experience and reach that is relatively comparable to the other institutions mentioned in that paragraph, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

On country-specific strategies, options include whether to address politically sensitive issues such as human rights, rule of law and democratic governance. Recent events in Burundi could bring this discussion clearly into focus.

#### Key Issues
The main issue for PBC members is the urgency to begin working on country-specific strategies.

Divisive issues could emerge on country-specific strategies, in particular the concerned governments’ record on democratic governance, corruption and human rights. Members are aware that any action needs the consent from those governments. This could potentially highlight differences in the understanding of the practical meaning of peacebuilding, especially its more political aspects.

#### PBC Dynamics
The EU Commission and OIC requests highlight existing concerns among some members about the possible influence of Western donors (particularly in the Organisational Committee), which no doubt goes back to the negotiations leading to the creation of the PBC.

Most members, however, seem reasonably confident that past meetings have clarified the PBC’s role and paved the way for progress on country-specific strategies. There are concerns that the meeting on Burundi may face difficulties in view of the recent events in that country.

Views still differ as to whether the Organisational Committee should be involved in broad thematic issues at this stage, or concentrate more on organisational matters.
**Georgia**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which expires on 15 October 2006.

A vigorous discussion of recent developments, including the Georgian parliament’s non-binding request for withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, is possible.

The Council will also be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Georgia and Head of UNOMIG, succeeding Heidi Tagliavini of Switzerland.

**Options**

The most likely option is a six-month renewal of UNOMIG’s mandate.

A second option is for the mandate to be renewed for a short period contingent on a review of UNOMIG’s mandate. This is a possible option if the situation deteriorates further prior to Council consideration and perhaps also if Russia were to seek to utilise this option to secure leverage in negotiations of a resolution putting pressure on Georgia.

**Key Issues**

The main issue facing the Council is whether the increasingly tense situation will create incentives for Council action beyond a simple six-month renewal of UNOMIG in October. In this regard, the increasingly difficult relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi is likely to cloud the Council’s discussions.

A related issue is the apparent evolution in Russia’s position on breakaway regions. For the second time this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin on 9 September said that if Kosovo was given independence then the same could apply for other regions seeking self-rule. The recent referendum in Transdniestria in Moldova supporting

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**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the P5 will be on the Organisational Committee.
- S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.

**Selected Assembly Resolutions**

- A/RES/60/261 (16 September 2005) was the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
- S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.

**Selected Meeting Records**

- PBC/1 (23 June 2006) was report on Burundi and Sierra Leone to the PBC.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2006/25 (17 January 2006) communicated the Council’s election of Denmark and Tanzania to the Organisational Committee.
- S/PV.5335 and A/60/PV.66 (20 December 2005) were the records of the PBC’s creation.

**Historical Background**

19 July 2006 The first informal briefings on Burundi and Sierra Leone were held.

23 June 2006 The Organisational Committee held its first meeting.

For the full historical background, please see our 23 June 2006 Special Research Report.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**PBC Organisational Committee Members**

- From the Security Council: the P5, Denmark and Tanzania
- From the top ten financial contributors: Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway
- From the top ten military and police contributors: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan

- From ECOSOC: Angola, Belgium, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Poland and Sri Lanka
- From the General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and Jamaica

**Chairman of the PBC Organisational Committee**

- Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins (Angola)

**Peacebuilding Support Office Head**

- Carolyn McAskie (Canada)

**Peacebuilding Support Office Budget**

- US$1,571,300

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In his speech to the General Assembly on 22 September, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said that the current framework for negotiation and peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South Ossetia needed to be replaced. He also proposed a new “road-map” that would include the demilitarisation of the conflict zone, direct dialogue between parties on the ground, and the establishment of an international police presence.

The Coordinating Council, which is made up of Abkhaz and Georgian representatives and was established in 1997 to discuss practical issues, cancelled its August meeting due to the upper Kodori Gorge incident. (It had only just resumed its sessions after a five-year suspension.) The working groups on security, on refugees and internally displaced persons have each met once since May.

In mid-September, Georgian authorities charged 14 opposition leaders with treason, alleging they were planning a Moscow-backed coup d’état.

In July, Jean Arnault of France was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Georgia and Head of UNOMIG, succeeding Heidi Tagliavini of Switzerland.

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**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the P5 will be on the Organisational Committee.
- S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.

**Selected Assembly Resolutions**

- A/RES/60/261 (8 May 2006) decided on the General Assembly’s Organisational Committee seats.
- A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005) was the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

**Selected Meeting Records**

- PBC/1 (23 June 2006) was the record of the Organisational Committee’s first meeting.
- S/PV.5335 and A/60/PV.66 (20 December 2005) were the records of the PBC’s creation.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2006/25 (17 January 2006) communicated the Council’s election of Denmark and Tanzania to the Organisational Committee.
- S/PV.5335 and A/60/PV.66 (20 December 2005) were the records of the PBC’s creation.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2006/695 (29 August 2006) was the latest report on Sierra Leone.

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India, Nigeria and Pakistan

- From ECOSOC: Angola, Belgium, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Poland and Sri Lanka
- From the General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and Jamaica
independence and future unification with Russia, along with the upcoming South Ossetia referendum on 12 November, are no doubt related to Moscow’s position on this.

In this regard it is important to note that resolution 1666 extended UNOMIG’s mandate subject to review if there were changes in security conditions, including changes in the mandate of the CIS force. If Tbilisi insists on a withdrawal of the CIS Russian peacekeepers, a review will be needed.

An issue on the minds of Council members is likely to be the need to revitalise the negotiation process between the parties. The Coordinating Committee has not met since re-establishing the political dialogue in May, although it had agreed to meet every two months. In early September the Georgian government produced a non-paper that focused on the need to change the current peacekeeping arrangements and argued that the Russian peacekeeping presence was one of the main obstacles to progress.

Council Dynamics
There is a general consensus in the Council on the need to renew UNOMIG’s mandate. However, tense relations between Moscow and Tbilisi may affect Council discussions. Earlier this year UNOMIG’s mandate renewal ran into problems when Russia objected to traditional language reaffirming sovereignty and territorial integrity used in all previous resolutions. (See our March 2006 Forecast for details.) The Group of Friends continues to lead on this issue and will be working on ironing out any issues with the resolution ahead of the Council meeting in October. The Group consists of the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia; Slovakia, as the Eastern European representative on the Council, is included when they meet in New York.

UN Documents
Latest Security Council Resolution

Selected Letters
- S/2006/739 (13 September 2006) was a letter from Georgia to the president of the Security Council on the situation in upper Abkhazia and the upper Kodori Gorge, urging the resumption of UN monitoring in the upper Kodori Gorge, suspended three years earlier.

- S/2006/577 (26 July 2006) was a letter from Georgia explaining that its Kodori Gorge operation was not in violation of the ceasefire agreement.
- S/2006/576 (26 July 2006) was a letter from Georgia explaining developments in the Kodori Gorge.
- S/2006/555 (20 July 2006) was a letter detailing the Russian reaction to the Georgian parliament’s decision on peacekeeping forces in conflict zones.
- S/2006/539 (19 July 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Council of his intention to appoint Jean Arnault as his Special Representative for Georgia.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2006/435 (26 June 2006) was the latest Secretary-General’s report.

For the historical background, please see our January, March and July 2006 Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jean Arnault (France)

UNOMIG: Size and Composition
- Authorised strength as of 31 August 2006: 133 total uniformed personnel, including 121 military observers and 12 police
- Key troop contributors: Germany, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea

Duration
August 1993 to present

Cost
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $36.83 million (gross)

Other Facts
Size of CIS troops: about 1,800 Russian troops

Timor-Leste
Expected Council Action
No formal action on Timor-Leste is expected for October at press time. But the Council will receive two reports:
- the report of the Special Commission of Inquiry on facts and circumstances leading to the recent crisis, due by 7 October; and
- the Secretary-General’s report on arrangements between the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the international security forces, due 25 October (but it may be discussed only in November).

A statement following discussions on the Commission’s findings is possible.

Preliminary discussions are also underway on a possible Council mission to Timor-Leste in October.

The proposal for a military component for UNMIT and the ongoing potential for further instability will still be on the minds of members as they discuss the reports. UNMIT’s mandate expires in February 2007.

Key Recent Developments
The Council created UNMIT on 25 August through resolution 1704. UNMIT is composed of 1,608 police and 34 military liaison officers.

The resolution did not include a military component for UNMIT—as recommended by the Secretary-General—nor did it authorise the continuation of the Australia-led multinational force. And there is no formal mechanism to review the operations of the Australia-led international forces and no set deadline for their mandate. The forces are deployed in Timor-Leste under a bilateral understanding with the government.

Disagreement resulted in a split within the Core Group, with Brazil and Portugal favouring a UN component and Australia, the US and the UK backing the continuation of the multinational force. Japan (with a degree of sympathy for the latter position, largely on financial grounds) and France assumed a more conciliatory role in the Council.

Timor-Leste eventually acquiesced to the continuation of the multinational force after formally conveying several times its wish for the military component to be under UN command and control.

After a one-week rollover, the Council eventually decided to authorise neither a UN military component nor an Australia-led force. This was indicative of the lack of support within the Council for pushing the issue further. Resolution 1704, however, requested...
a report on arrangements between UNMIT and the international forces, and it left open the possibility of considering adjustments to the mandate.

UNMIT started activities in September with the “blue-hatting” of international police, mostly Australian, deployed in Timor-Leste as part of the existing multinational force.

A jailbreak in late August—in which 57 inmates escaped, including some convicted for the 1999 violence and one of the leaders of the unrest in April and May of this year—contributed to the perception that matters in Timor-Leste remain far from resolved.

Options
The Council may continue with the present situation in October and leave the discussion of possible adjustments to the mandate, including the possibility of the establishment of an UNMIT military component, for later. An option favoured by some members is to keep the issue alive through preliminary discussions in October.

The prospects for action are limited given the divisions inside the Council on this issue. There is also a perceived need to allow some time between the adoption of resolution 1704 and a review of the current arrangements.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to make sure that the country returns to stability.

For some members, an issue is the status of the military component, based on the concern that an Australia-led force may exacerbate divisions among the Timorese. A related concern is whether it is appropriate for Australia to provide the bulk of police contingents for UNMIT.

On the other hand, all members are conscious that the current pressure on troop and police generation for UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, and possibly Darfur, will pose limitations. And there is also concern about creating parallel chains of command.

These issues are expected to be considered in the Secretary-General’s report due 25 October. Key to Council members’ assessment will be the evolution of the situation on the ground and the ability of multinational forces and UNMIT to provide security.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The divisions inside the Council and the Core Group on the military component issue are likely to continue, largely as a reflection of the way in which UNMIT’s creation was handled in August.

However, most members are sceptical about the need to revisit the current arrangements too quickly. Strong reluctance especially from the US and the UK would be expected. Other members are waiting for the Secretary-General’s report so as to form a position on the issue, especially if the report reiterates the recommendation that UNMIT takes over the military aspect.

Underlying Problems
A lingering problem, related in part to the violence in April and May, is accountability for past serious crimes and human rights abuses. So far, the Council has authorised the provision of international investigators through UNMIT, but the prospects vis-à-vis the Timorese government’s capacity to conduct trials for serious crimes is unclear. Dili has in the past expressed a preference for focusing solely on the bilaterial Commission of Truth and Friendship, but the Council has indicated that a formal judicial mechanism should also be part of the solution.

Historical Background
14 September 2006 UNMIT officially took over policing activities in Timor-Leste with the “blue-hatting” of Australian, Portuguese and Malaysian police contingents.

25 August 2006 The Council created UNMIT.

For the full background, please see our May and August 2006 Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

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UNMIT: Size and Composition

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,608 police and 34 military liaison and staff officers
- Size as of 31 August 2006: 589 police and 15 military officers
- Key police contributors: Australia, Malaysia and Portugal

UNMIT: Duration

- 25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 25 February 2007

Special Inquiry Commission

- Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Brazil), Chair
- Zelda Holtzman (South Africa)
- Ralph Zacklin (United Kingdom)

Western Sahara

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which expires on 31 October. Referred to in the Secretary-General’s report of 19 April (S/2006/249), the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, on a political solution are still on the table and may be reiterated in the upcoming report. However, given the other pressures on the Council’s time at present, major new developments seem unlikely.

Key Recent Developments
In the last six months, there has been no progress toward the resumption of negotiations between the parties on the status of Western Sahara. (Please see our Update Report of 17 May on Western Sahara for more details about the new approach by the Secretary-General, the reaction of the parties and the last Security Council action.)
The Secretary-General, in a letter addressed to the president of the Security Council in June, recalled that the temptation to consider the status quo as a more tolerable approach than any possible solution should not guide the behaviour of the Council. He mentioned that, although resolution 1675 did not refer to his recommendations with regard to the political process, several Council members had emphasised the necessity that the parties work to end the impasse over the next six months. The Secretary-General also hinted that the Council should avoid approving once again a purely technical rollover in October.

Some members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (which is comprised of France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) have been in touch on a bilateral basis with the parties urging them to resume direct negotiations without preconditions.

Peter van Walsum recently toured the region. He went to Rabat, Tindouf and Nouakchott. He met with officials of some members of the Group of Friends in Paris, Madrid and Washington. He also met with Algerian officials in New York, on the margins of the General Assembly.

At the time of writing, there was still no sign of the anticipated proposals from Morocco for a plan of extended autonomy for Western Sahara. Negotiations over the content of this plan are reportedly still ongoing in Morocco at the national and local levels.

**Options**

If the Moroccan plan does emerge, one option is for the Council to enter into serious discussions to determine whether it may be seen as a new basis for negotiations.

If Morocco again fails to produce the plan, the Council’s options are less substantive:
- simply renew the MINURSO mandate;
- renew MINURSO for less than six months and ask the mandate review working group to consider the long-term future of the mandate; and
- request the Secretary-General to prepare proposals for a drawdown or a termination of MINURSO.

**Key Issues**

The Council has been expecting a proposed Moroccan plan on extended autonomy for Western Sahara for almost all of 2006. Whether the plan will be flexible enough to be considered by the Polisario and, therefore, constitute a new basis for negotiations among the parties remains to be seen.

A related issue is whether the Council will, this time, consider the Secretary-General’s proposals to end the stalemate. The Secretary-General considers that the question of Western Sahara is at an impasse, but that the indefinite prolongation of the status quo is not an option. Under this argument, the UN should “step back” to allow direct negotiations between the parties without preconditions, with the goal of working out a compromise.

Progress was impossible over the last six months because of the parties’ reluctance to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions. Their positions have not changed.
- Although the Polisario does not reject in principle the idea of negotiations, it wants a clear objective. For the Polisario, the fulfilment of the right to self-determination as granted to it by the General Assembly resolution A/1514(XV) of 14 December 1960 in the context of decolonisation remains a major principle. For them a referendum including independence as an option, as envisaged in Baker Plan II, introduced in 2003, is the preferred framework.
- Morocco, for its part, had rejected Baker Plan II. According to a government website, it now considers that the only solution would be for the parties to agree on a “transfer of competences to the local populations […] within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom.” In this regard, Morocco declared its readiness to submit an autonomy plan with provisions for consultation of the population. For Morocco, therefore, negotiations are only conceivable if they do not include the option of independence. Morocco also supports the Van Walsum approach and has stated its readiness to present a plan to end the impasse. On the issue of direct negotiations, Morocco is willing to engage but wants Algeria to participate.
- Algeria fully supports the Polisario, but has refused to take part in direct negotiations as it does not consider itself a party.

**Council Dynamics**

The Council is reluctant to try to impose any solution or even any real pressure on the parties. In the absence of any evolution in the position of the parties, the situation seems likely to remain stalled.

There has been very little support within the Council for MINURSO’s termination, as most members believe that the force still has a deterrent effect and preserves the ceasefire. However, this may change as some members grow increasingly impatient.

In this regard, the position that the US adopts with regard to the future of MINURSO will be important. The US has already indicated that in the absence of progress on the political side, the mandate of MINURSO should be reviewed. Increasingly it seems this will be used as leverage over the parties to find a compromise.

For its part, the Group of Friends now seems to accept that Baker Plan II cannot be revived. The Group now seems to consider that the Moroccan plan for extended autonomy may be worth exploring, provided that it is serious and substantive.

**Underlying Problems**

Talk of threatening to reduce or withdraw MINURSO seems unlikely to have an impact on the parties at this stage. This threat has been used in the past and the parties do not seem to consider it a credible outcome anymore (something much more concrete seems necessary). Moreover, preserving MINURSO is the only point of convergence between Morocco and the Polisario. The Secretary-General is also very reluctant to withdraw MINURSO believing that there is a real risk of renewed violence. It is acknowledged by the Secretary-General as well as by Council members that MINURSO plays a stabilising role in the region.

Defining who would be the recipient of an autonomy plan is problematic. If Morocco offers to provide extended autonomy to the territory of Western Sahara, as opposed to the Sahrawi population, it may be rejected as it would include the Moroccan “settlers” (viewed as such by the Polisario, but as legitimate inhabitants of the area by Morocco). The current settler population is thought to outnumber the indigenous Sahrawis. On the other hand, because of the
movements of population in the area, it would be very difficult to define the recipients of the autonomy.

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
No formal Council action on the Central African Republic (CAR) in October is expected at press time. Given the potential for further regional instability, however, Council members may see a need for a statement. The Secretary-General’s report is expected in October, but discussions may carry on into November depending on when it is issued. It is unclear whether the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the CAR, Lamine Cissé, will brief the Council. Discussions may also include the possibility of a larger UN presence in the CAR pursuant to resolution 1706 (there is a possibility that the Secretariat will conduct an assessment mission in the coming weeks).

Key Recent Developments
Reports of rebel activity in the north have continued in the past months. Observers are concerned that the crisis in Darfur could spread into the CAR, largely as a result of an increase in the regional flow of arms and the cooperation among CAR rebel groups, Chadian anti-government forces and pro-Khartoum Sudanese militias known as the Janjaweed. Those foreign militias regularly operate from northern CAR into Chad and Darfur.

A largely ineffective CAR army is responsible for fighting the rebels. The CAR army is assisted by the Multinational Force in Central Africa (Force multinationale en Centrafrique, or FOMUC) composed of forces from Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) member countries.

On 31 August the Council expanded the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur, mandating UNMIS to monitor cross-border rebel activity and to establish a multidimensional presence in key locations in Chad and, if possible, in the CAR.

Options
An option before Council members is to look into the establishment of a stronger UN presence in the CAR, perhaps mandating UNMIS in unequivocal terms to establish a presence and to cooperate with FOMUC.

Another option is to authorise military contingents to assist FOMUC and the CAR army, but this seems unlikely given the recent commitments in Lebanon and Darfur.

Key Issues
At this point, the key issue for the Council is the regional dimension and the containment of the crisis in Darfur. Members are aware of the linkages between the further deterioration of the domestic situation in the CAR and cooperation among rebels.

Council Dynamics
The Council had relatively little interest in the CAR in previous months. But concerns with the regional dimension have led to an increase in interest from some members, to the point that in July there was a request for an early Secretary-General’s report. At this stage, however, Council members do not seem prepared to consider a larger UN presence in the CAR. Commitments to Lebanon, Timor-Leste and Darfur have placed large strains on UN capacity in the coming months.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) expanded UNMIS’ mandate into Darfur, indicated the possibility of a UNMIS office in the CAR and mandated UNMIS to monitor cross-border rebel activity.

Selected Presidential Statement

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur, indicating the possibility of opening a UNMIS office in the CAR.
- S/2006/441 (27 June 2006) was the latest report on the UN Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BONUCA).

Other
- SC/8771 (7 July 2006) was a press statement requesting a Secretary-General’s report by October.

Historical Background
30 August 2006 Former President Ange-Félix Patassé was condemned in absentia to 20 years imprisonment.

7 August 2006 CEMAC heads of state attended a summit in Chad to discuss regional security issues.

July 2006 France reportedly announced that it would provide military aid to help defuse the crisis in northern CAR.

For the full historical background, please refer to our 5 July 2006 Update Report.
by placing US troops in the east under NATO command. The Council renewed ISAF’s authorisation a month earlier than required, on 12 September, in response to a logistics-related request from NATO.

The security situation seems to have put on hold plans for the progressive withdrawal of US forces and increased opposition against the continuation of troops in Afghanistan in key ISAF-contributing countries such as Canada.

The regional dimension has also re-emerged. Afghan-Pakistani relations have soured over the issue of cross-border combatants and the countries’ national efforts to curb the activities of extremist insurgents. Diplomatic work is underway to improve bilateral relations.

Options
Available options include:
- increasing the Council’s involvement on security issues, perhaps by requesting more detailed and timely reporting from ISAF (the Council has traditionally limited its involvement to reconstruction efforts) and supporting an increase in troops;
- taking on the regional dimension, perhaps by supporting Afghan-Pakistani cooperation in counterinsurgency efforts; and
- deciding to send a Council mission to Afghanistan.

Key Issues
The key issue is to preserve the political process and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. But the deterioration in the security situation seems to have emerged as the key immediate issue.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There seems to be no appetite among members to increase the Council’s involvement in the security situation. But members are aware that the recent deterioration could require a reassessment of strategies so far.
### Notable Dates for October

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| **October 2006**       | **Other Important Dates** |
| 4 October              | ECOWAS will hold a summit in Abuja on Côte d’Ivoire. |
| 11 October             | The Peacebuilding Commission Trust Fund will be launched. |
| 12-13 October          | The Peacebuilding Commission will meet on Sierra Leone and Burundi, respectively. |
| 13 October             | An Arria formula meeting on Sierra Leone is scheduled. |
| 16 October             | Elections for the 2007-2008 members of the Security Council |
| 19 October             | The Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention is due to meet with the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan E. Méndez. |
| 20 October             | The 1521 Committee concerning Liberia is due to review the diamond sanctions which will expire on 20 December 2006. (S/RES/1689) |
| 27 October             | The Council will hold its annual open debate on women, peace and security, following up on resolution 1325. The UK is expected to host an Arria formula meeting prior to the debate. |
| 29 October             | Run-off elections in the DRC are scheduled. |
| 30 October             | The third round of talks between Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts are expected to resume in Khartoum. |

Also expected in October:
- Media reports indicate that Iran’s deadline to suspend its enrichment activities has been extended to early October.
- The process for the appointment of next Secretary-General is expected to intensify in October.
- The annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly is expected in October for debate in the General Assembly in November.

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