OVERVIEW

FOR SEPTEMBER

Greece will have the Presidency of the Council in a month when the Council will have to manage not only a large number of mandate renewals (ten), but also high profile and politically charged issues such as the selection of the next Secretary-General, the Secretary-General’s proposals on Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear programme and Darfur. In addition Greece proposes to take up, in an open Council debate on 20 September chaired by its Foreign Minister, the subject of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.

Meanwhile, deterioration of three situations in Africa means that the Council will need to devote time to:
- Burundi (where tension is growing as a result of concerns that the recent coup allegations, human rights violations and arrests indicate a wider breakdown of the democratic process);
- DRC (where post election violence and a further round of presidential campaigning for the run-off election threaten to destabilise the peace process); and
- Côte d’Ivoire (where failure to meet the Council road map benchmarks makes a further postponement of elections inevitable. It also opens the possibility—and the Special Adviser on Genocide, Juan Méndez, has issued clear warnings—of resort to large scale violence).

High level visitors attending the General Debate of the UN General Assembly usually overshadow other issues in the UN in September. This September, however, the Security Council will be very much on the minds of many of those high level visitors. The reason for this is that:
- There are two hotly contested elections for seats in the Council. There will be a huge amount of high level lobbying by Guatemala and Venezuela (competing for the Latin American seat) and Indonesia, Nepal and Republic of Korea (competing for the Asian seat). (See our Special Research Report of 14 August 2006.)
- The Security Council will move into the next phase of its selection process for the next Secretary-General. With four candidates still in the race, and wide expectations that additional candidates will yet emerge, this will also be a major focus of attention and lobbying. (A number of Council members are disappointed at the first round of straw balloting in July and feel that it would have been more effective in achieving the goal of encouraging withdrawal of the less favoured candidates if the process had been more open.) It now seems that withdrawals will be unlikely until there is a clear trend established from a number of straw polls that a candidate cannot succeed. The other thing that might precipitate a

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Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council are:
- In October 2004 the Council requested a report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support for transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations. This has not been submitted.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential statement, has not been made public yet. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- A draft resolution on Small Arms circulated by Argentina in March 2006 has not been adopted. Argentina continues with bilateral consultations.
- The World Summit in September 2005 asked for “fair and clear procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions.” This issue remains to be addressed.
- Also in September 2005 the World Summit asked the Council to consider reforms to the Military Staff Committee. This has not yet been taken up by the Council.

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reduction in the field is for the position of the permanent members to become transparent. There is increasing talk amongst Council members that the process should now be adjusted to permit that. For their part, it seems that none of the four declared candidates see any reason to withdraw. To the contrary, it is possible that, for reasons of equity, all of them will insist on staying in the race until all potential candidates are declared. As for the timing, the Council is so far being cautious. But most observers seem to be expecting a number of straw polls to be conducted over a period of days in late September. Also there seems to be much less confidence that the process will be concluded in early October.

Lebanon

The Secretary-General’s current visit to the Middle East is in response to the Council’s request in resolution 1701 that he consult with “relevant international actors and the concerned parties” and come up with “proposals” to:

■ implement resolutions 1559 and 1680 (which call for the disbanding and disarmament of militias in Lebanon) and the Taif Accords reached by the Lebanese parties; and

■ delineate the Lebanese border, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area.

The Council will have these proposals on the table. In addition it expressed in 1701 its “intention to be actively involved” in the search for a “long term solution” and asked the Secretary-General to support that as well. No doubt he will also have observations on this.

Resolution 1701 in addition reminded everyone that the long term perspective also requires “a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on all its relevant resolutions.”

There was much criticism of the Council for its relative inaction as the recent crises, first in Gaza and then in Lebanon, unfolded. Historically, and certainly for the past two decades, this has largely been the default position, with the Council taking a back seat on Middle East issues to other processes and groups. In recent years (2004-05) Lebanon was an exception. In resolutions 1559 and 1595 and subsequent resolutions the Council demonstrated it could act effectively and decisively. In the post 1701 environment, where it seems that all parties have a vested interest in being able to show that 1701 was the right path, the opportunity may exist for the Council to take up a wider active role as it suggested in paragraph 9 of the resolution.

Our brief on Lebanon canvasses the range of very difficult substantive issues that this will involve and discusses some of the implications.

Darfur

It seems, as this Forecast goes to print, that the Council will adopt before the end of August a resolution on Darfur. It is important in two respects.

■ It establishes clearly the mandate for the desired UN presence in Darfur, which may remove some of the uncertainty and anxiety that the authorities in Khartoum seemed to harbour about the exact mission the UN would have. It should now be possible to discuss concrete, not only on the basis of abstract ideas.

■ It provides an innovative and generous approach to cooperation with the African Union in support of their mission in Darfur, AMIS. This is particularly important because AMIS is vulnerable, not only to an upsurge of violence directed against it, but also to increased disenchantment by the civilian population in Darfur and also because of serious funding problems. The resolution is a clear signal of international support for AMIS at this time. It serves as a trigger not only for UN assistance, but also as a rationale for donors to continue support for it so that there is a proper foundation on which transition to a UN operation can be based.

But the resolution does not of itself solve the underlying issue of securing consent from Khartoum. The brief on Darfur/Sudan outlines issues and problems associated with this. One new factor, which carried weight with many of Sudan’s friends and neighbours in recent weeks, is the strong support for the UN playing the lead role in peacekeeping in Lebanon. The reason for supporting the UN was that it would be impartial, fair and objective. The same logic could now be applied to the situation in Darfur.

But while there remains optimism that consent arrangements will be negotiated, the reality on the ground for civilians remains bleak and is deteriorating. Many observers sense a disaster looming and are looking for a Council “Plan B” if the resolution and follow-up diplomacy do not produce a result within a few weeks.

Iran

There is no doubt that the month of September will see a major focus on Iran and its response to the package of incentives regarding negotiations on its nuclear programme. Much of the action may play out in New York, especially at the high level in the margins of the General Assembly. But, as has been the case for most of this year, it seems that very little of the discussion will take place in the Council. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the only involvement of the ten elected Council members will be occasional informal briefings.

Against this background our Iran brief examines the options that the P5 plus Germany might bring back to the Council. It also discusses the conditions under which a basis might exist for proceeding to the negotiating stage, as well as a possible compromise “last chance” resolution.

Given the stakes involved, and the history of very lengthy negotiations on this issue to date, it seems unlikely that a Council decision will be made in September.

Other Issues

The Council will also have on its plate a range of other big issues:

■ Kosovo: an important briefing by Special Envoy Ahtisaari
■ UNIC: a briefing from Commissioner Brammertz
■ Somalia: important Contact Group and sanctions developments
■ Iraq: briefings on MNF, UNMOVIC and possibly UNAMI
■ Ethiopia/Eritrea: mandate renewal
■ Liberia: mandate renewal and sanctions issues
■ Review of Mandates: report of Working Group and possible phase out of certain mandates
■ Counter-terrorism: report on resolution 1624
Status Update since our August Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in our August Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in August (but not due for consideration by the Council in September) include:

- **Timor-Leste**: On 18 August the Council adopted a week-long technical rollover of UNOTIL (S/RES/1703). Upon its expiry, resolution 1704 established a new integrated mission (UNMIT) with a strengthened police component, up to 34 military liaison and staff officers, but no UN troops. The Secretary-General’s proposal, which was also Timor-Leste’s preference, for the international military force to be under UN command and control was strongly opposed by Australia, the US and UK, causing real bitterness in the Core Group. Compromise proposals by New Zealand and Japan failed. As a result, the Australian troops will remain without a specific UN mandate but with a supportive reference in the preamble. The Secretary-General is requested to undertake a review of the military arrangements by 25 October. In addition, the Council reaffirmed the need for credible accountability for the serious human rights violations of 1999 and incorporated relevant provisions into the UNMIT mandate.

- **Haiti**: The Council adopted resolution 1702 on 15 August extending MINUSTAH’s mandate for six months. (The Secretary-General’s report had recommended a year (S/2006/592)). The mandate slightly increased the mission’s troop and international police levels. The Council urged the completion of local elections.

- **Peace Consolidation in West Africa**: Ghana, the Council president for August, initiated a thematic debate on West African issues. The outcome was a presidential statement calling for cooperation between West African governments, the UN, ECOWAS and the AU in order to consolidate peace in West Africa by addressing illicit trafficking of small arms, the illegal exploitation of natural resources. It underlined the importance of DDR programmes (S/PRST/2006/38).

- **Cyprus**: Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari briefed the Council on 29 August about his recent visit to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. A brief press statement was issued by the Council (SC/8820).

- **Interpol**: Resolution 1699, sponsored by the US, UK and Denmark, was unanimously adopted on 8 August and called upon the Secretary-General to increase cooperation between the UN and the International Criminal Police Organization to better enable sanctions committees to fulfill their mandates.

### Lebanon

**Expected Council Action**

The Security Council will take up the Secretary-General’s proposals, requested in resolution 1701, for implementing the Taif Accords and resolutions 1559 and 1680 concerning the disbanding and disarmament of militias in Lebanon, as well as on the delineation of the Lebanese border, in particular the Sheb’a Farms area.

The Council will also be acutely interested in the wider aspects of implementation of 1701, including the Secretary-General’s observations flowing from paragraph 9 of the resolution, on the “long term solution” as well as the operational progress with the deployment of additional troops for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon II (UNIFIL II).

What is unclear is whether the Council will step into the leadership role in carrying forward the agenda of resolution 1701, or whether it will retreat to the minimalist approach which characterised its response to the crises in Gaza and Lebanon in 2006, and which attracted much criticism.

The Council is also expected to receive and note the fifth report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) which is due on 26 September. Serge Brammertz may brief the Council on the progress of the investigation. Due to the conflict little progress is expected.

**Key Recent Developments**

The cessation of hostilities took effect in Lebanon on 14 August.

The 33-day war resulted in over 1,150 civilian deaths, more than 4,000 civilians injured and approximately 1.5 million civilians displaced. The Secretary-General, requested by the Council to report on one particular incident (the 30 July bombing in Qana), concluded that there could be a pattern of violations of international law committed during the course of the hostilities.

On 7 August the Lebanese government, in an attempt to stimulate agreement on a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, announced a decision to deploy 15,000 troops in south Lebanon to prevent a security vacuum when the Israeli army withdrew behind the Blue Line. Lebanon also requested, as part of a seven-point plan adopted by the Lebanese Council of Ministers, that a counterpart international force be authorised to assist it.

On 11 August, the Council adopted resolution 1701, which:

- called for an immediate cessation of hostilities followed by the deployment of Lebanese troops;
- authorised an expanded UNIFIL (rather than a Chapter VII coalition which Israel had preferred) to assist the Lebanese forces and to be deployed in parallel with the progressive Israeli withdrawal;
- called for Israel and Lebanon to support a long-term political solution;
- requested the Secretary-General to make proposals within thirty days on disarmament of militias and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon (and especially in the Sheb’a Farms area);
- established an arms embargo on transfer of arms to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than the government;
- authorised UNIFIL, in addition to monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping ensure humanitarian access and the safe return of displaced people, to support the Lebanese armed forces to deploy in the south, and assist Lebanon with securing the border and establishing in the south an area free of armed personnel and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon; and
- authorised the use of force to prevent hostile activities and to resist threats to its mandate.

The Secretary-General subsequently revised the UNIFIL rules of engagement providing for more robust powers consistent with the new mandate.

In a report on implementation of resolution 1701 on 18 August, the Secretary-General said that the parties were generally complying with the cessation of hostilities. He also reported that the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces together with UNIFIL and the Israeli withdrawal were underway.
After a hesitant start, EU countries have pledged about 7,000 troops for UNIFIL II. Others, such as Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Nepal and Turkey, may also contribute. Israel has opposed the participation of countries with which it has no diplomatic relations, but it remains to be seen whether this position will prevail. France will keep the leadership of UNIFIL II until the end of February 2007. Then Italy will take over. It may be two to three months before the whole force is deployed. However, the Lebanese army has already deployed south of the Litani River, including in some areas vacated by the Israelis.

At press time, Kofi Annan is visiting the Middle East, undertaking consultations with a view to the proposals that resolution 1701 requires him to make. His itinerary includes Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories and perhaps Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iran.

Options

The Council has two strategic options at this stage.

First, it can take a reactive and essentially minimalist approach to its role in carrying forward the broad agenda set out in resolution 1701. This would entail leaving the primary role to major powers (or the Quartet), in conjunction with the Secretary-General, and only becoming engaged at the margins via briefings and the occasional formal action when one or another party sees a need to use the Council as an instrument for exerting pressure. This has essentially been the default setting for the Council for many years in the Middle East context. The only real exception has actually been Lebanon, in 2004/05, where the Council took a proactive policy role on resolutions 1559 and 1595.

The second option is for the Council to assume the leadership role envisaged in the Charter, and which it actually plays in many other conflicts on its agenda. The post 1701 environment, with its emphasis on “long term solutions”, is one which may require bringing together threads which go much wider than just the immediate situation in Lebanon. The challenges of this cannot be underestimated both in terms of the substantive issues themselves and the demands it would place on Council processes—especially to ensure that other agenda issues are not crowded out. Nevertheless, the post 1701 environment is also one which may be unique in the recent history of the Middle East situation. Israel seems to be in a position where, for domestic reasons, its government has a vested interest in seeing the UN and the Security Council succeed. The same is true of the Lebanese government. And, given the disillusionment with past mechanisms, it may be much easier for the parties, neighbouring states and other protagonists as well if the next phases are centred on the UN.

Key Issues

There are many key issues arising from resolution 1701.

First, the strategic choice for the Security Council about its future role in developing and leading the process for a “long term solution.”

Secondly, whether to approach the “long term solution” on an incremental basis or under a more comprehensive framework. A related issue is whether the latter should include, in addition to provisions on some or all of the issues outlined below, more detailed arrangements on a zone free of weapons and militia in the south, on the release of prisoners, on the respect for the Blue Line, and on confidence building and security arrangements designed to prevent the resumption of hostilities.

Thirdly, whether to include concrete steps to follow up paragraph 18 regarding a “comprehensive just and lasting peace,” which brings onto the table also the Golan issue, the occupation of the West Bank and the situation in Gaza. (There seems to be increasing pressure from EU members, as well as others, in this direction).

Fourthly, whether to take up Syria’s challenge to close the border with Lebanon (a measure sure to impose huge economic and humanitarian costs on Lebanon) if UNIFIL II assists in monitoring the border to prevent smuggling of weapons contrary to 1701. Already the Syrian position seems to be affecting Lebanon’s readiness to utilise UNIFIL II in this regard. A related question is whether this issue is linked to a requirement on Israel to lift the sea and air blockade. Another related issue, which may come into play as a balancing element, is whether the 1701 embargo should be reinforced via a sanctions committee and a panel of experts, and perhaps with an advisory input from UNIFIL II.

Fifthly, whether to address the issue of the Sheb’a Farms by a binding decision on the delineation of the border in this area. This would be hard for both Israel and Syria, but hugely helpful for Lebanon in helping it secure implementation of 1559 by political means. Whether this should be achieved as a “one-off early action measure” or as part of a larger framework is also a major issue.

Finally, the issue of the disbanding and disarmament of militias is at the heart of implementation of 1559. It seems clear that all parties now accept that transformation of Hezbollah cannot be achieved by force alone. A political process seems to be accepted as essential. The issue is what mix of incentives and disincentives are likely to be effective in that political process and over what period. Many of the above issues seem likely to have a major bearing on that question, as will the role of UNIFIL II in Lebanon, because the force is now mandated to assist the Lebanese in achieving this goal in the area of southern Lebanon.

The Council is unlikely to take up the issues raised by various potential troop contributing countries regarding the mandate and rules of engagement of UNIFIL II. It is unclear whether these issues were real problems or may have been misunderstandings. In any event, they seem to have been largely resolved and it would be unprecedented for the Council to formally take up rules of engagement.

In September the issue of the impact of the war on the Hariri investigation and on the establishment of the tribunal will also appear on the agenda. Clearly there have been impacts in the form of delay to the work of Commissioner Brammertz. Possibly issues relating to loss of evidence will be raised, as well as perhaps impacts on witnesses and their cooperation. The Council will want to ensure that the investigation does not fall off the radar screen.
### UN Documents on the Hariri Assassination

#### Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended UNIIIC’s mandate by one year.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of an international character.
- S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) authorised expanded technical assistance to Lebanon and requested reports on the progress of the investigation every three months.
- S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the Hariri killing.
- S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

#### Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.
- S/RES/1697 (31 July 2006) extended the UNIFIL mandate to 31 August 2006.
- S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425.
- S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called for strict respect for the international integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, urged Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, and established UNIFIL.

#### Selected Letters
- S/2006/675 (21 August 2006) was the annual report of the UNIFIL in Lebanon.
- S/2006/676 (21 August 2006) was the letter from Lebanon including the Lebanese prime minister’s seven-point plan to end the conflict.

### UN Documents on Israel/Lebanon

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.
- S/RES/1697 (31 July 2006) extended the UNIFIL mandate to 31 August 2006.
- S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425.
- S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called for strict respect for the international integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, urged Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, and established UNIFIL.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

#### Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/670 (18 August 2006) was the report on the implementation of resolution 1701.
- S/2006/626 (7 August 2006) was the report on the Qana incident.
- S/2006/560 (21 July 2006) was the latest report on UNIFIL.

#### Selected Letters
- S/2006/675 (21 August 2006) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the parties’ obligations with respect to the cessation of hostilities.
- S/2006/639 (14 August 2006) was the letter from Lebanon including the Lebanese prime minister’s seven-point plan to end the conflict.

For Historical Background and Other Relevant Facts, please refer to our:  
- Report on Lebanon/Israel in our August 2006 Forecast;  
- Update Report on Lebanon/Israel of 20 July;  
- Report on Lebanon (UNIIIC) in our June 2006 Forecast;  
- Report on Lebanon (resolution 1559) in our April 2006 Forecast; and  

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Current Troop Pledges to UNIFIL II
- France: leadership and 2,000 troops  
- Italy: 2,000 / 3,000 troops  
- Bangladesh: two battalions (up to 2,000 troops)  
- Malaysia: one battalion  
- Spain: one mechanised battalion  
- Indonesia: one battalion, an engineering company  
- Nepal: one battalion  
- Denmark: at least two ships  
- Poland: 500 troops  
- Finland: 250 troops  
- Belgium: 302 troops, later rising to 392  
- Germany: maritime and border patrols but no combat troops  
- Norway: 100 soldiers

### Useful Additional Sources

**Iran**

**Expected Council Action**

The report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 31 August assessing Iran’s compliance with resolution 1696 will provide a focus for the informal contacts which have already begun among the P5 plus Germany (P5 plus 1) on how to respond to the 22 August Iranian counter-proposals.

Intense and high profile interaction between the P5 plus 1 are expected. But formal decisions by the full Council seem unlikely in September. Indeed it seems possible that the issue may not come back to the Council at all. If the P5 plus 1 can reach agreement on an approach for negotiations leading to a diplomatic solution, it is probable that this would not involve a role for the Council. On the other hand, if discussions between the P5 plus 1 breakdown and there is no agreement on sanctions, the P3 may choose to keep the issue out of the Council if vetoes are inevitable. One situation in which further Council action might be expected, is if the P5 plus 1 agree on one last Council resolution responding to the Iranian proposals and setting a final deadline for Iran.

On 22 August, Iran presented a 21-page response to the P5 plus 1 package of incentives. Iran requested that the document remain confidential and at press time, the contents were still being “studied” by the P5 plus 1. It seems that it may contain some positive elements including specific Iranian proposals to resume negotiations on its nuclear programme. But, as foreshadowed in our August *Forecast*, it seems Iran is not prepared to accept the precondition that it should suspend uranium enrichment activities. In public, Iranian officials reiterated their rejection of suspension as a precondition. But it is unclear whether the confidential document left open the possibility that during the course of negotiations Iran might consider suspension or some other satisfactory alternative.

Since 22 August, P5 plus 1 reactions have been cautious and low-key. The US and Germany stated that the Iranian proposal was not satisfactory because it did not envisage a suspension of uranium enrichment and remained vague on transparency issues. But the US acknowledged that Iran considered its response as a serious offer. France reiterated its readiness to negotiate with Iran, but said that the return to negotiations was linked to uranium enrichment suspension. China urged further negotiation and Russia asked for a thorough examination of this proposal and said it was premature to talk of sanctions.

**Options**

The Council again faces the now familiar situation on this issue with the real discussion taking place outside the UN structures. Among the options which the P5 could bring back to the Council are:

- a “last chance” resolution responding affirmatively to the positive elements of the Iranian response but setting a final deadline for suspension or some alternative giving equivalent confidence that the enrichment would be capped during the negotiation phase;
- rejecting the Iranian response and deciding that Iran’s nuclear activities constitute a threat to international peace and security and imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions;
- endorsement of some compromise arrangement under which diplomatic negotiations are commenced; and
- stalling Council action in September and perhaps longer.

**Key Issues**

The main issue is whether the Iranian response now represents the end of the road in terms of a diplomatic solution and that resorting to coercive actions, such as sanctions, is now inevitable. Resolution 1696 stated that sanctions would be the next step in the event of a negative response by Iran. There are clearly negative aspects to Iran’s response but some P5 members are already pointing to positive elements including Iran’s willingness to resume negotiations.

A second issue, therefore, is whether a window of opportunity for negotiation still exists. In this regard, the issue is whether in the negotiating process Iran would accept limits on its nuclear programme which would establish international confidence that the programme is exclusively civilian and not military. It may be that this cannot be tested until negotiations are actually entered into. The question then becomes whether the preconditions can be adjusted a little in order to permit commencement of negotiations. A strictly verified cap on the number of centrifuges at existing levels and other operational limits and controls during negotiations is a possible example of a framework which might permit both sides to say that their essential requests had been met.

On the other hand, if the US, the UK and France decide that it is really the end of the road, the issue will be to convince Russia and China that sanctions are necessary. In that event, lengthy discussions throughout September—and probably longer—are likely to follow.

Another issue which may weigh in the minds of all involved is the impact on the nuclear issue of recent events in the Middle East and what elements of that situation to factor into decisions regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.

**Council Dynamics**

Russia and China are clearly reluctant to immediately move forward with sanctions. The position of the US, UK and France is less clear.

The ten elected members remain outside the loop. Some of them seem less comfortable with this situation than others. The three EU members Greece, Denmark and Slovakia seem more or less satisfied with the input they receive from France, Germany and the UK via EU coordination. Several other members, however, have expressed more frustration.
Underlying Problems

Iran is reported to be building more advanced P2 centrifuges that could speed up the production of nuclear fuel. In addition, Iran has inaugurated a new heavy water nuclear plant.

Iran has also stepped up military exercises and launches of missiles to introduce a new defensive doctrine.

Some observers have identified a possible link between the Iranian nuclear issue and the Lebanese conflict.

First, Iran’s confrontation with the West on its nuclear programme may have influenced Hezbollah’s decision to initiate a crisis in Lebanon through the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers (at the time the Security Council was considering resolution 1696).

Second, Iran’s potential for destabilisation in the Middle East through its link with the Hezbollah, as well as with Iraqi and other Shia, has become more transparent. On the other hand, if there were a successful resolution to the current nuclear issues with Iran, given its influence in the region, this could also play a stabilising role.

Third, the Lebanese war raised the stakes and risks of Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons given its alleged support to Hezbollah and its vow to destroy Israel if attacked.

Most Recent Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, requested a report from the IAEA by 31 August and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 of the UN charter in case of Iranian non-compliance.

Security Council Presidential Statement


Latest IAEA Reports

- GOV/2006/15 (4 February 2006)
- GOV/2006/38 (8 June 2006)
- GOV/2006/27 (28 April 2006)
- GOV/2006/15 (27 February 2006)

Security Council Presidential Statement

- S/2006/521 (13 July 2006) was a letter from France to the president of the Security Council enclosing the proposals of the P5 plus 1 for a comprehensive long-term arrangement with Iran.
- S/2006/305 (31 May 2006) was a letter from the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General enclosing a statement issued by Arab leaders on the question of making the Middle East region into a zone free of WMDs.

For Historical Background, Other Relevant Facts and Useful Additional Sources, please refer to our February 2006 Forecast.

Darfur/Sudan

Expected Council Action

At time of writing, it seems that a draft resolution establishing the mandate in Darfur for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and authorising UN assistance to the AU Mission to the Sudan (AMIS) will be adopted by 1 September. China, Russia and Qatar are uncomfortable with passing the resolution without prior consent from Sudan. However, it seems that at least the first two may abstain in view of the fact that Khartoum’s prior acceptance of the transition from AMIS to UNMIS is not essential for adoption and because implementation of the transition is not final and will require further negotiations to obtain consent from Sudan.

In September, therefore, the Council is expected to have on its plate two major issues:

- implementation of its decision to gradually replace AMIS by transition to UNMIS and applying strategies to secure consent from Khartoum; and
- alternative strategies (a “Plan B”) in the event that consent is not forthcoming.

At the practical level, the Council is also expected to:

- extend the mandate for UNMIS in south Sudan which expires on 24 September (The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on Sudan is expected by mid-September);
- renew the mandate of the sanctions Panel of Experts by 29 September and consider the Panel’s report;
- decide whether to change the Panel’s mandate to include violations of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); and
- decide whether to impose targeted sanctions measures.

The Council is also expected to pay close attention to the ongoing contribution that AMIS can make in Darfur. AMIS’ mandate will expire on 30 September and Council members are likely to be encouraging the AU to extend the mandate till December.

Key Recent Developments

Fighting in Darfur has escalated considerably since the signing of the DPA on 5 May, primarily between signatories and non-signatories. A complicating factor has been the expelling of non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission at the request of the government on 16 August. As a result of this round of violence, 50,000 civilians were displaced. Nine humanitarian workers as well as two AU peacekeepers were killed in recent weeks. There has been a sharp increase in gender-based violence, with 200 cases—up from four in previous months—reportedly documented in Kalma alone (Darfur’s largest camp) in the past five weeks.

Observers also note an increase in lack of confidence in and animosity against AMIS in camps.

Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland has warned of an impending humanitarian disaster in Darfur (there are now 1.6 million civilians cut off from aid and some NGOs have indicated that they may need to pull out of north Darfur on security grounds). AMIS is being increasingly constrained by limitations imposed by Khartoum and the rebels. Its ability to carry out its mission to protect civilians is being rapidly eroded.
The mission’s funds will run out by the end of September. Troops are due to rotate starting 1 September. At least one troop contributor has already indicated that it will not send new troops without assurances of new funding. In those circumstances, the AU seems reluctant to renew the mandate.

On 17 August, Assistant Secretary-General Hédi Annabi reportedly informed the Council that Khartoum is building up military forces in Darfur, possibly in preparation for a major offensive. This seems consistent with a document sent to the Secretary-General by the President of Sudan and circulated to the Council on 17 August detailing Khartoum’s Plan for Darfur.

The Sudanese plan is to send government troops to “stabilise” Darfur and implement the DPA. It has attracted sharp criticism, being interpreted as an attempt to delay the transition and impose a military solution prior to any transition to a UN force. An important development in the lead up to the draft resolution was the attempt to create room for quiet diplomacy. Although there remained some in the Council who championed a policy of continuing to apply public pressure, agreement was reached on holding a private meeting of the Council at which Sudan would have a privileged opportunity to discuss the issues associated with the transition, the implications of the draft resolution and assistance to AMIS.

These initiatives attracted criticism, especially from the NGO community, for not presenting a clear political path to achieving Sudan’s consent. In the end, however, Khartoum’s decision to spurn the 28 August private session probably reinforced the case for proceeding with adoption of the resolution.

Although at press time the draft was still being finalised, it seems that it will contain a mix of things that Khartoum wants (assistance to AMIS) with things the UN and the AU want (transition to the UN later in the year). It sets 1 October as the deadline for the beginning of assistance to AMIS with a view to a phased transition.

The draft mirrors UNMIS’ original mandate in resolution 1590. Both set out the Mission’s various responsibilities, and, in separate paragraphs, authorises UNMIS to protect civilians expressly under Chapter VII. It also authorises the opening of regional offices, particularly in Chad, but leaves open the question of how the regional dimension could be effectively addressed.

**Options**

The options before the Council in September seem to be:
- applying public pressure on Khartoum (and its friends and supporters) for consent, including signalling willingness to impose sanctions and rejecting Khartoum’s “stabilisation” plan;
- engaging Khartoum privately, perhaps offering some positive incentives and face-saving options such as imposing targeted sanctions against DPA non-signatories. This last option could mean that a more prominent role will be required from Arab states and China, for example. It may also imply a clear positioning of the Council against the rebels;
- concentrating efforts on guaranteeing that the full package of UN assistance to AMIS recommended by the Secretary-General is quickly implemented in order to reinforce the prospects for a positive AU decision on extending the mandate, encouraging UN members to commit funding to AMIS, perhaps with the intention that over time a gradual blending of UNMIS and AMIS will occur; and
- playing a larger role in force generation activities rather than leaving this task to the Secretariat (especially bearing in mind the recent problems over the troops to be sent to Lebanon).

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is how to devise a clear and coherent strategy for obtaining consent. If the conclusion is reached that consent will not be forthcoming, the key issue is then what strategy will the Council adopt.

The approach so far has been to engage the government but it has also involved a spectrum of positions articulated by Council members ranging from overt pressure to quiet diplomacy. One issue that has emerged is that there seems to be an incompatibility between, on the one hand, pressuring Khartoum, while, on the other hand, conceding that transition will not take place without consent.

Another issue seems to be the incompatibility between allowing room for diplomacy, on the one hand, and on the other hand having no clear positive incentives for Khartoum. A related issue is how to mobilise support from countries enjoying good relations with and access to the Sudanese government.

To date, AU members have given solid support to the need for and appropriateness of the transition. On the other hand, Arab countries seem uncomfortable with the direction the issue has taken. An aspect of this may be related to the overall Council dynamics during the recent Gaza and Lebanon crises. An issue, therefore, is whether recent developments since resolution 1701, which have shown the positive potential for impartial UN peacekeeping, can be portrayed in a manner which is convincing in Khartoum. It may be that the positive support in the region for a UN role in Lebanon may help encourage Sudan to rethink its scepticism about the UN in Darfur.

Time itself is an issue. For practical reasons, the Secretariat is already working with the scenario that transition will only take place in the first quarter of 2007. If the transition is authorised but consent is significantly delayed, not only does the humanitarian crisis persist, and possibly worsen, but Sudan may begin to implement its “stabilisation” plan and its military offensive. In those circumstances, even with the adoption of the UN assistance package, the position of AMIS may become untenable and it may need to be extracted.

Finally, there is the issue which is likely to play out in donor capitals rather than in the Council, of future financial assistance to AMIS. It seems that for some donors, committing funds for AMIS before September would play into Sudan’s hands and only encourage further delay in granting consent. The issue for the Council, however, is whether things have now reached a point that the overriding need is to keep AMIS in place so that there is something to transition from.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

There is consensus within the Council that the transition as currently envisaged will require consent. Nonetheless, divisions on how best to obtain Khartoum’s consent are likely to linger. Some favour continuing pressure on Khartoum until consent is obtained, perhaps with a threat of sanctions. They seem to consider that the language in the resolution and the invitation to the 28 August meeting already represented concessions to Khartoum.

Others, however, are likely to support the continuation of private talks with Khartoum in September, with a view towards finding
some face-saving options for the Government of Sudan. These members argue that it is unclear how pressure alone will bring about a change in Khartoum’s position in sufficient time to make a difference for the affected civilians.

Underlying Problems
There is an interest in the Council in devoting more attention to DPA implementation, but the consent issue crowds out the available space for this.

On the ground, implementation of the DPA continues at a slow pace and with little progress. It is unclear how pressure alone will bring about a change in Khartoum’s position in sufficient time to make a difference for the affected civilians.

Observers note that both government and rebels are preparing to consolidate gains before the situation is frozen by an eventual transition.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1679 (16 May 2006) was adopted under Chapter VII, setting new deadlines for the assessment mission and threatening sanctions.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS. Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/662 (17 August 2006) was a report on children and armed conflict in the Sudan.
- S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS. The report was complemented by an update, S/2006/645. Latest Panel of Experts’ Report
- S/2006/250 (19 April 2006)

Other

- S/2006/685 (23 August 2006) was Sudan’s request for the postponement of the 28 August Council meeting.
- S/2006/683 (22 August 2006) was a Sudanese letter requesting that the Council allow time for Khartoum to resolve the situation in Darfur.

Historical Background
16 August 2006 Non-signatories were expelled from the CFC.
8 August 2006 Sudan and Chad decided to normalise bilateral relations.
7 August 2006 Former rebel leader Minni Minawi was sworn in as Senior Assistant to the President.

For the full historical background, please see our February and July 2006 Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel
- Strength as of 30 June 2006: 10,224 uniformed personnel, including 9,573 military and 651 police
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $1,126.30 million (gross)

Duration
24 March 2005 to present, mandate expires 24 September 2006

UNMIS: Fatalities
- seven, including two military and five civilian staff

Head of AMIS
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

AMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel
- Strength as of 22 June 2006: 5,738 military and 1,458 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and The Gambia
- Cost: until 30 September 2006: about $181 million pledged

AMIS: Duration
25 May 2004 to present, mandate expires 30 September 2006

Democratic Republic of Congo

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which expires on 30 September. The issue of the long-term future of MONUC will linger in the background, but is unlikely to be seriously addressed until after the presidential run-off elections in October. A simple extension of the mandate seems likely, but it is still unclear for how long.

Renewal of the mandate of MONUC’s temporary reinforcements, along with that of the troops borrowed from the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and of the European Union Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) until after the second ballot is also expected.

The renewed potential for tension is likely to prompt the Council to continue to closely follow events in the DRC throughout September and October. In the event of further violence, a Council statement should be expected.

Other issues, such as foreign armed groups and security sector reform, are likely to be considered only after the run-off elections, possibly in the context of discussions on MONUC’s post-election strategy.

Listing individuals for targeted sanctions is also an issue that will continue to be on the minds of some Council members, but it is unclear whether progress will be achieved in September.

Key Recent Developments

Elections in the DRC took place on 30 July. President Joseph Kabila gained about 45 percent of the votes, and Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba 20 percent. The run-off is scheduled for 29 October.

The first presidential ballot showed a divide between eastern and western provinces of the DRC. Ethnicity and language seem to have been behind much of the support for Kabila in the more populous east and Bemba in the west, especially Kinshasa.
Tensions arose following logistical difficulties during the counting and following complaints of fraud from almost all contenders and hate messages in the media. This culminated in open fighting in Kinshasa between militias loyal to Bemba and Kabila when the result was announced. EUFOR RD Congo reserve forces, already pre-deployed in Gabon, were rushed to the Congolese capital on 22 August.

Eventually, under MONUC leadership, the situation was stabilised. But in response to this development, the Council adopted a press statement on 22 August expressing serious concern about the clashes and demanding restraint and immediate implementation of the ceasefire.

The final results of the parliamentary elections are expected by 4 September.

**Options**

Because of lingering tensions and the need for run-off elections, the options for the Council at this stage are limited. However, they could include:

- continue work on a list of individual violators; and
- start some preliminary thinking on a more integrated, forward-looking strategy that would include not just sanctions, MONUC’s mandate and costs, but a discussion of the spectrum of the DRC’s needs after the transitional phase and what role the Council could play in conjunction with MONUC, donors and stakeholders.

**Key Issues**

The key issue right now is how best to ensure that the transitional period is finalised, particularly given the renewed potential for election-related violence.

MONUC’s future is likely to become an issue after the election. But given the recent events in Kinshasa, and bearing in mind the Council’s recent experience with Burundi, there will be nervousness about acquiring too quickly in phasedown suggestions, whether from within the Council or from the newly elected government.

A further issue that may arise stems from uncertainty as to when the government will be able to be seated. There are problems with interpreting the constitution as to whether the national assembly alone or the full parliament—including the senate—is competent to appoint the prime minister, who will then appoint the cabinet. If it is the full parliament, the situation becomes much more complex since the senate will only be elected by provincial assemblies reportedly on 29 December.

A set of related concerns also looms large:

- security sector reform, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or repatriation of Congolese and foreign armed groups;
- good governance;
- conduct and discipline of Congolese and MONUC forces (especially after reports of child prostitution involving MONUC personnel);
- lists of targeted sanctions; and
- illegal exploitation of natural resources and sanctions enforcement.

**Council Dynamics**

The Council is not divided on the issue of renewing MONUC and other mandates until after the election process is finalised. Some members will be pushing for a six-month renewal, bearing in mind the precedent in Liberia.

Most members expect that the future of MONUC is likely to create divisions linked to pressures for containing peacekeeping costs.

Some are conscious that sustained commitment will be needed for the long-term. They believe that MONUC should only be modified after the transitional phase is over and are concerned with the possibility of pressure for downsizing MONUC too quickly. This view seems to have gained momentum since the experiences in Haiti and, more recently, in Timor-Leste.

Positions on the post-election period are still being formulated, especially given the current volatile situation and the potential for future violence. Should this trend continue, the position of members interested in reducing MONUC’s size and cost will become difficult. Council members are also likely to bear in mind the precedent in the less complex situation in Liberia, in which the Council displayed a significant degree of caution with downsizing and postponed any decisions until months after the conclusion of the transitional phase.

Other members are interested in the substance of MONUC’s future mandate and the mission’s post-election priorities. Key aspects would be MONUC’s role in security sector reform and curbing illegal armed groups. There is an interest in a re-configuration of MONUC’s operational priorities along those lines as soon as possible after the elections.

In general, members are sensitive to the view that decisions regarding MONUC’s future should be taken as part of a broad, coherent strategy for UN involvement in the DRC.

**Underlying Problems**

The 18 July report of the Group of Experts recommended that the Council declare illegal exploitation of natural resources a sanctionable act. It also noted difficulties with cooperation from Uganda.

The Council adopted a landmark resolution on sanctions on 31 July that, *inter alia*:

- strengthened targeted sanctions through the inclusion of political and military leaders responsible for recruiting children and individuals who target children in conflict;
- directed special attention to the financing of illegal armed groups and the illegal exploitation of natural resources; and
- expressly mentioned the issue of Uganda’s cooperation with the Group of Experts.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006) strengthened sanctions, expressed the intention to consider measures over natural resources, and renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 July 2007.
- S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised the borrowing of ONUB forces.
- S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) strengthened sanctions and requested the report on foreign armed groups.
- S/RES/1635 (28 October 2005) and 1621 (6 September 2006) authorised temporary increases in MONUC’s strength for the elections.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2006/36 (3 August 2006) welcomed the first round of elections.
Forces nouvelles

Elections and Security in Ituri: Stumbling Security Council Report round of presidential elections took place... child soldiers... tial leader Thomas Lubanga with recruiting... 10-12 June 2006
30 July 2006 20 August 2006
28 August 2006
Historical Background
28 August 2006 The International Criminal Court Prosecutor formally charged Ituri militia leader Thomas Lubanga with recruiting child soldiers.
20 August 2006 Final results of the first round of presidential elections were posted.
30 July 2006 Parliamentary polls and the first round of presidential elections took place.
For the full historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Forecast.

Other Relevant Facts

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The next Secretary-General’s report is expected to confirm that there has been insufficient progress in implementing the roadmap, established by the Council, for the elections to be held as scheduled on 31 October. The Council is likely to:
 awaited the proposed meeting in late September, during the General Assembly, between the Secretary-General, the Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and AU leaders before adopting a definitive response to the situation;
 signal in the interim the importance of maintaining calm and progress with the roadmap (perhaps in a presidential statement or perhaps in an early resolution adopting targeted sanctions against additional individuals responsible for blocking the roadmap’s progress and for spreading hate messages in the media; and renewing the mandate for the Group of Experts monitoring the sanctions regime, which will expire on 15 September).

Council members are also expected to begin discussing contingency plans for a definitive response to the anticipated formal postponement of the presidential elections.

Council members will also have in mind that the mandate of UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) will expire on 15 December.

Key Recent Developments
On 23 August the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire, Pierre Schori, advised the media that for technical reasons relating to non-compliance with the roadmap, it was no longer possible in practice to hold an election on 31 October.

Tensions between the Forces nouvelles rebels and government forces had already been mounting, anticipating that the 31 October election may be delayed. President Gbagbo—whose term has already expired and who is currently in office only on a transitional basis—claims that he and the parliament would remain in office until the next presidential and legislative elections. The leader of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, has rejected this assertion.

On 7 August the Council welcomed the progress made in implementing the roadmap but expressed concern at the lack of deployment throughout the country of the Independent Electoral Commission’s structures and condemned July’s violent protests directed at the mobile courts. The Council also set a benchmark for 150 mobile courts to be deployed throughout the country and the cantonment of combatants to be completed before the end of August.

Because too few weapons were being surrendered, the disarmament process for pro-government militia groups in the west was temporarily suspended on 4 August.

Options
The Council has the following options in early September:

• adopting a presidential statement keeping up the pressure on the parties in advance of the high-level meeting in New York in September;
• increasing deterrents against spoilers by imposing additional sanctions against individuals blocking the peace process and adopting a resolution transferring additional troops and police units from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to reinforce UNOCI; and
• beginning an open discussion of the consequential issues from postponement of the election, including the status of President Gbagbo.

Useful Additional Sources


Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

• S/2006/478 (29 June 2006) was the report on the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has operated in the DRC.
• S/2006/390 (13 June 2006) was the latest MONUC report.
• S/2006/389 (13 June 2006) was a report on children and armed conflict in the DRC.
• S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was the report on foreign armed groups in the DRC.

Other

• SC/8814 (22 August 2006) was a press statement expressing serious concern with the recent election-related violence.
• S/2006/525 (18 July 2006) was the latest report of the Group of Experts.
• S/PV.5482 (6 July 2006) was the report of a meeting on the report of the Council’s mission to the DRC.
• S/2006/390 (13 June 2006) was a report on the status of the Mission to Côte d’Ivoire.
• S/2006/389 (13 June 2006) was a report on the status of the Mission to Côte d’Ivoire.
• S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was the report of the mission to the DRC.

Historical Background
28 August 2006 The International Criminal Court Prosecutor formally charged Ituri militia leader Thomas Lubanga with recruiting child soldiers.
20 August 2006 Final results of the first round of presidential elections were posted.
30 July 2006 Parliamentary polls and the first round of presidential elections took place.
For the full historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Forecast.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
William Lacy Swing (US)
MONUC Force Commander
Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)
Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
• Authorised maximum strength: 17,000 military personnel, plus about 2,000 EUFOR RD Congo (with a reported strategic reserve of about 1,500 in Europe) and 800 ONUB forces
• Strength as of 30 June 2006: 16,587 military personnel
• Main troop contributors: Pakistan, India, Uruguay and South Africa
• Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: US$ 1.138 billion
• Duration
• 30 November 1999 to present, mandate expires on 30 September 2006

Fatalties
• 92, including 66 military personnel and nine military observers
Key Issues
The most significant issue is how to handle the practical reality that the elections will not be possible on 31 October. The dilemma for the Council is whether to act immediately to deter backwards movement, in light of the fact that implementation of the roadmap has been seriously compromised, or to defer to the outcome of the high-level meeting in late September. A related issue is how to maximise the incentives for positive outcomes from that meeting.

The issues involved if the Council moves quickly to undertake responsible contingency planning in light of the inevitable formal postponement of the election are complex.

- The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, has warned about the inherent fragility of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.
- In terms of setting a new date, an assessment of the time needed to complete identification and disarmament throughout the country will be necessary.
- There is a question of whether the current transitional political arrangements (made through resolution 1633 of 2005 and previous peace agreements) should remain the same or whether an adjustment of the power sharing will be needed. (If those responsible for obstruction of the roadmap are punished it would imply some further diminution of the executive powers of President Laurent Gbagbo and the influence of the current parliament.)
- The degree of involvement of the UN and the Council in future processes will need to be considered. The Security Council has, for most of 2006, tended to follow the recommendations of the AU and play a supportive role. The recent obstruction of the roadmap raises the issue of whether the Council should again play a more proactive role to avoid a further postponement of the elections.

Finally, an issue that might arise is a transfer of troops from UNMIL to UNOCI in order to support the disarmament programme once it is launched at the national level, as already recommended by the Secretary-General. The UNMIL mandate will expire on 30 September, and a battalion might be withdrawn by the end of the year. The Council might consider transferring these troops to Côte d’Ivoire.

Council Dynamics
Some Council members seem ready to begin discussion of contingency plans immediately, including on the period for postponement. There are views that the period should be long enough to complete the roadmap, but short enough to avoid giving the Ivorian parties a pretext to slow down the process, in any event significantly less than a year.

With respect to the renewal of President Gbagbo’s mandate there are various views. Some Council members are in favour of an alteration of the power equilibrium in favour of the prime minister, and perhaps some changes in the mediation. Other members prefer a simple rollover of the current arrangements with no modification, believing that any change could trigger a negative impact on the peace process.

On the issue of sanctions, even the most reluctant Council members are now coming to the view that additional targeted sanctions have proved to have some effectiveness for the political process. They remain wary, though, about targeting important political figures, believing that this would impair the peace process. There is unlikely to be any disagreement about renewing the mandate of the advisory Group of Experts.

There is growing support for an increased role for the Council in the management of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, with the International Working Group (IWG) playing more of a local monitoring role.

The US had been reluctant to shift troops from the UN Mission in Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire, because of destabilisation risks in Liberia, especially while Charles Taylor was still in Africa. With Taylor’s extradition to The Hague in June 2006, it remains to be seen what position the US will adopt on that issue.

Underlying Problems
An estimated 3.5 million people do not have identity papers in Côte d’Ivoire; this includes 1.8 million people of voting age who therefore cannot vote. In fact, the question of national identity is at the core of the conflict since many of those without papers are from the north and considered foreign.

Some of President Gbagbo’s followers oppose the identification process because they fear they could lose the next elections. The rebels, on their part, fear increasing insecurity after they disarm. Therefore, the Forces nouvelles have insisted that identification of the entire population be completed before the collection of weapons, while the national armed forces wanted the identification of combatants to be conducted during the pre-cantonment stage. On 9 August, Guillaume Soro said the rebel side was pulling out of disarmament talks in protest against Gbagbo’s position on disarmament and the handing out of identity papers.

One issue remaining to be addressed is the fact that there are not enough Ivorian judges to conduct the identification. Another lingering problem is the shortage of UN troops to perform disarmament operations.

Missing the 31 October deadline will increase the risk of renewed hostilities. The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, who visited Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2005, stated that the ethnic orientation of the conflict could lead to “massive and serious violations of human rights.”

UN Documents

Most Recent Council Resolution

- S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 personnel.
- S/RES/1633 (21 October 2005) endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council of 6 October 2005, extended President Gbagbo’s term by 12 months, established the roadmap to be supervised by the IWG, called for the designation of a prime minister and reaffirmed its readiness to impose sanctions.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2006/37 (7 August 2006) condemned the July disturbances, reaffirmed its support for the implementation of targeted sanctions, encouraged the prime minister to take action to deploy 150 mobile courts before the next IWG meeting and called on the IWG to monitor such progress.
S/PRST/2006/32 (19 July 2006) welcomed the Yamoussoukro meeting of Ivorian leaders, requested the Secretary-General to produce a report on the implementation of the parties’ commitments before a subsequent meeting in September, underlined the Council’s readiness to impose targeted measures and endorsed the eighth communiqué of the IWG.

Most Recent Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2006/532 (18 July 2006) was the latest report in which the Secretary-General stressed the need for targeted sanctions as a way for the international community to exercise pressure to move the peace process forward.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/584 (27 July 2006) was the ninth IWG communiqué

For Historical Background please refer to our 1 December 2005 Update Report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Pierre Schori (Sweden)

High Representative for the Elections
Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

Size and Composition of UNOCI
- Authorised strength since 2 June 2006: 8,115 military personnel and 1,200 police officers
- Current strength as of 6 July 2006: 6,896 military personnel and 728 police officers. The reinforcements authorised under resolution 1682 were deployed in July 2006.
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

Cost
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $438.17 million

UNOCI Mandate Expiration
15 December 2006 (S/RES/1652)

- President Gbagbo remaining in power for a maximum of twelve months after his term ended on 30 October 2005
- The appointment of a new prime minister acceptable to all parties with executive powers
- The establishment of a roadmap supervised by an International Working Group responsible for the evaluation and monitoring of the peace process
- A new type of mediation to be conducted daily by a subgroup of the IWG composed of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General’s High Representative for the elections, ECOWAS and the AU
- The implementation without delay of the disarmament and dismantling of government militias and of the rebels throughout the territory, and of the identification process
- The end to all incitement to hatred and violence in the media
- Investigation by Ivorian authorities of human rights violations
- The strengthening of the threat of sanctions against individual spoilers

Previous Agreements
- AU Peace and Security Council decision (6 October 2005)
- Pretoria Agreements (11 April 2005)
- Accra III Agreements (30 July 2004)

Somalia

Expected Council Action

The Council may moderate the tilt which it made in early August in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In the absence of an established peace process involving consent from all parties, it seems unlikely at this stage that the Council will support the proposed African Union/Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mission.

A resolution creating targeted sanctions against peace spoilers now seems likely. It is also expected to include modifications to the arms embargo to allow training and capacity-building to enable Somalia to develop its security sector, as well as non-lethal equipment.

The Council seems likely to seek to maintain balance in its approach by avoiding measures that may alienate the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and continuing to urge dialogue.

On the regional dimension, the most likely action is to continue with indirect warnings against Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, members may increase pressure on one or both should the situation continue to deteriorate.

The Sanctions Committee is expected to receive an oral midterm briefing from the Monitoring Group on the arms embargo by 6 September and there is a possibility that the Sanctions Committee Chairman will brief the Council on the Committee’s activities in September.

Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf is expected to visit New York for the General Assembly in September.

Key Recent Developments

After two postponements, talks between the UIC and the TFG are scheduled for 31 August.

Serious divisions emerged within the TFG, pitting President Yusuf and Parliament Speaker Sheikh Hassan Aden against Prime Minister Ali Mohammad Gedi over Gedi’s reluctance to attend the talks with the UIC.

The divisions were exacerbated by the resignation of 21 ministers in July and early August. An Ethiopia-mediated understanding within the TFG led to the appointment of a new cabinet on 21 August.

Continuing reports Ethiopian troops’ presence in Somalia have led to increasing tensions between the UIC and the TFG, and within the TFG itself, due to opposition to the prime minister’s reported reliance on Ethiopian military assistance.

Those tensions have also been aggravated by the controversial issue of an AU/IGAD mission to Somalia. On 18 August, IGAD members reportedly decided that the mission will comprise about 7,000 Sudanese and Ugandan troops, and should be
expressed concern about outside interference in Somalia by the end of September. Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether this plan will materialise. There are still questions relating to the concept of operations and funding.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Lonseny Fall briefed the Council on the recent developments in Somalia on 16 August. The Council president for the month of August, Ghanaian Ambassador Nana Effah-Apenteng, expressed concern about outside interference in Somalia in a statement to the media.

The Sanctions Committee held a meeting in early August as a follow-up to the 13 July presidential statement, in which the Council supported the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) “as the internationally recognised authorities to restore peace, stability and governance to Somalia” and indicated the possibility of a modification of the embargo to allow the building of the Somali security sector and of measures to strengthen the embargo.

At the meeting, members expressed support for case-by-case exemptions from the arms embargo for the TFG and for the establishment of targeted sanctions. Other options, such as an integrated sanctions regime with measures over fishing and charcoal exports (following the recommendations of the Monitoring Group) and exemptions for the AU/IGAD mission, were also discussed.

But a new trend may have emerged at a 29 August meeting of the International Contact Group for Somalia in Stockholm. Swedish State Secretary Anniqa Soder was quoted as saying that the TFG has been weakened and that aid will only be forthcoming when there is a legitimate and legal government in place. In that context, she reportedly noted that both sides will have to reach a power-sharing arrangement, given the increased public support enjoyed by the UIC.

Options

The most likely option is to reinforce the peace talks and a possible power-sharing process through the sanctions regime by:

- designing criteria for targeted sanctions (including a travel ban and/or an assets freeze) against individuals resisting a negotiated path to peace between the TFI and UIC;
- identifying a list of individuals based on that criteria; and
- modifying the arms embargo to support training for the Somali security sector, especially for non-lethal equipment on a case-by-case basis.

In order to maintain balance in its approach, the Council may also look at the option of neutral criteria that would apply to spoilers from the TFI side as well. (There are precedents for this sort of balanced approach in the Council’s actions against spoilers in Côte d’Ivoire). It may also consider the option of balancing the package with some political signals designed to encourage the UIC to cooperate. This could include more overt criticism of the Ethiopian presence. Specific threats of sanctions seem less likely.

There is also the option of deciding to lean decisively for the TFG and against the UIC, but this possibility seems to have decreased given the apparent results of the 29 August Contact Group meeting.

The option of taking up the Monitoring Group’s proposals for measures on charcoal and fishing seems less likely at this point.

Key Issues

The key issue is whether to maintain the Council’s stated support for the TFIs, and, in that context, what position to take vis-à-vis the UIC. A closely related issue is what position to take on the regional dimension, given Ethiopia’s support for the TFI, and the AU/IGAD mission which is perceived as support for the TFI.

The consequential issue is whether Council support for the AU/IGAD mission (and for TFI security sector capacity-building) would result in seriously alienating the UIC and, in the long run, be dangerously counterproductive.

The UIC’s possible intentions are also a key issue. Reports of its interest in making Somalia an Islamic state and its increasingly hard line lead some to question the genuineness of its willingness to negotiate. The position of Hassan Dahir Aweys (the UIC leader) is also an issue. Aweys is already on the Council’s targeted sanctions list established by resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999.

The question of whether to seriously act to curb Eritrean and Ethiopian activities is also an issue. There is the risk that a passive approach to external interference could stimulate further deterioration in relations between the UIC and TFG and undermine the peace talks. On the other hand, there is the issue that, without Ethiopian assistance, the TFG may collapse altogether.

The AU/IGAD request for exemptions from the arms embargo once the mission plan is submitted raises an equally complex issue. Criteria for consideration of this were set out in previous Council statements, including that the mission plan be detailed on funding and mandate and that it be based on the national security and stabilisation plan (NSSP). The NSSP is required to contain “a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire agreement, as well as plans for the restoration of public safety and security institutions and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.” Observers note, however, that the NSSP falls short of those criteria. Moreover, the dynamics on the ground have changed radically since these previous Council statements. In particular, the UIC has declared that it will treat the AU/IGAD mission as hostile. The issue therefore seems to be whether the mission should be an end product of a power-sharing agreement with the UIC, with the consent of the parties, rather than without consent.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Consensus on providing Somalia with the tools to strengthen its institutions and build its security sector while at the same time encouraging dialogue was consolidated in August. There is wide support for targeted sanctions and for a modification of the embargo to allow capacity-building on a case-by-case basis.

But divisions continue on the issue of the AU/IGAD mission. Some members—China, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo and Qatar in particular—are supportive of the mission and feel that, once the plan is presented, and given the TFIs’ support, the arms embargo exemptions should be granted.

Other members are more cautious, both because of the UIC’s reaction and the need to verify whether the NSSP and the plan conform to Council demands. This position may be reinforced by the results of the last Contact Group meeting.
Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?

Security Council Report

The ongoing consolidation of the UIC military position in southern Somalia and in parts of the north indicates that negotiation may not be the only option at this time.

The TFG, on the other hand, seems increasingly weaker with reported defections from existing security forces. And there is uncertainty over the prospects of the new cabinet.

UN sources on the ground have noted an increase in the flow of arms, which they read as a further risk of impending armed conflict.

Underlying Problems

Observers note that, despite the new date for talks between the TFG and the UIC, the negotiating process could very easily unravel. The Council expressed support for the TFIs and willingness to consider the AU’s request for an exemption to the arms embargo. The Council is expected to consider the establishment of a United Nations integrated office in Burundi to take over from the current peacekeeping mission when its mandate expires on 31 December, as recommended by the Secretary-General in the addendum to his June report on the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), published on 14 August. At the time of writing it was unclear whether this action would take place in September or October.

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is likely to have its first country-specific meeting on Burundi early October and the Council may wait until after that meeting. However, the recent tensions may prompt earlier consideration.

Key Recent Developments

Acting Special Representative Nureldin Satti briefed the Council on 25 August on the Secretary-General’s addendum. Council members expressed general agreement with the proposal, but requested more prioritisation with respect to the mandate and structure of the office. The Council also approved a press statement expressing its serious concerns about the reports of a possible coup attempt and called for the government to follow the rule of law in the investigations.

On 30 August the situation further deteriorated when the Burundian government made accusations against Satti and requested his removal.

The drawdown of ONUB’s military component has continued as scheduled and the number of military personnel currently stands at less than two-thirds of its authorised military strength of 5,650.

The Secretary-General’s June report recommended the establishment of a UN integrated office in Burundi to be known as Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB). The integrated office would consolidate and reinforce the human-
itarian and development activities currently undertaken by ONUB and would initially be established for 12 months, starting 1 January 2007.

The Secretary-General and Council members have expressed concern at recent developments in Burundi following the arrest of opposition political figures and allegations of a possible coup. Former President Domitien Ndayizeye was among those arrested.

The government of Burundi and the Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) signed the Agreement on Principles towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi on 18 June; however a ceasefire agreement has not yet been concluded.

Options
Council members have the following options:
- delay a decision on BINUB until there is greater clarity on the situation in the country with respect to the alleged coup attempt. Possibly, Council members would like to wait until the PBC has had its first meeting on Burundi;
- monitor the security situation more closely and, in the event of increasing tensions, adopt a presidential statement calling for calm and restraint;
- delay the downsizing of ONUB troops; and
- proceed in September and authorise the establishment of BINUB.

Delaying a decision on the transition from peacekeeping to an integrated office would allow the Council to monitor the political developments in Burundi and possibly reconsider the current speed of troop reduction. Since ONUB’s mandate does not expire until the end of this year, there is time for such a strategy.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is the maintenance of stability in Burundi so that the last stage of the peace process can be completed. The transformation of the UN presence in the country from a peacekeeping operation to an integrated office should facilitate this. A related issue is the government’s strong wish for the transition to take place as soon as possible. A second issue is the impact of the recent developments. Too rapid a transition could accelerate tensions, especially if there is a risk of the situation destabilising or for the democratic process to take an undesirable turn. On the other hand, unnecessary delay could lead to administrative problems for the transition from ONUB to BINUB.

The lack of an agreement between the Burundi government and FNL overshadows both the general stabilisation efforts and the Council’s decision on ONUB troop withdrawal as well as possibly the mandate of the integrated office.

Council Dynamics
There is wide agreement in the Council that an integrated office is an important step in the peace process and in the transition to a peacebuilding environment. However, some Council members would like to see in the plan for BINUB more prioritisation as well as a clearer coordination with current donor efforts on the ground to avoid duplications.

Underlying Problems
Burundi faces many challenges in the area of civilian disarmament, transitional justice and human rights violations. Key underlying problems are concerns about the rule of law and accountability. These have been a lead theme within the Council for some time, an example of which was resolution 1606, in which the Council requested negotiations on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Court Chamber. However, negotiations between the UN and Burundi government are still at an early stage while the recent developments show that a lot still needs to be done on these issues.

Historical Background
For a historical background and more details, please refer to our March 2006 Forecast.

Other Relevant Facts
ONUB Special Representative and Head of Mission
To be appointed; Nureldin Satti is Acting Special Representative

Force Commander
Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwwebi (South Africa)

Size and Composition of Mission
- Total authorised strength: 5,650 military personnel, including 200 military observers
- Strength as of 31 July: 3,478 total uniformed personnel
- Key military contributors: Nepal, Pakistan and South Africa

Cost
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $82.39 million (gross)

Duration
June 2004 to present, current mandate expires 31 December 2006

Mission Casualties
23
Useful Additional Sources
- Website of the Peacebuilding Commission http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/
- An appeal from Human Rights Watch to the government of Burundi of 4 August 2006 to stop torture of the suspects of the alleged coup attempt http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/04/burundi1918.htm

Kosovo

Expected Council Action

In the third week of September the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, is expected to brief the Council on the Kosovo status discussions at a closed meeting with some ministerial-level participation. No Council action is expected at this meeting. Ahtisaari is unlikely at this stage to present final recommendations on Kosovo’s eventual status, although his briefing may suggest some eventual parameters with a view to testing members’ reactions.

The Secretary-General’s periodic report on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) is expected in the first week of September but may not be taken up for discussion in the Council at this stage.

Key Recent Developments

Status talks moved into high gear on 24 July when the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia met in Vienna for the first time for specific discussions on status. The two delegations presented their diametrically opposed positions. Belgrade is willing to allow for everything but independence, and Pristina is holding out for full independence as the only option. While the meeting was an important step, no breakthrough was achieved.

Throughout August and into the middle of September, Ahtisaari and his team will be involved in a spate of meetings on decentralisation, minority rights and culture. Ahtisaari in late August met with international and local officials in Kosovo and visited Mitrovica in northern Kosovo in an attempt to push forward the negotiations and get clear positions on the key issues.

Tensions in the north prompted the Contact Group (the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) to issue a statement on 3 August calling on all parties to “take steps to ensure northern Kosovo remains a stable region.” However, the situation deteriorated on 26 August with a grenade attack on a Serb café in Mitrovica which injured nine people.

Three municipalities broke ties with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) on 13 June and organised parallel security structures using former Serb army officers. NATO troops recently reopened a military camp in the north.

At the time of writing, a Kosovo Contact Group meeting was expected to take place in September before Ahtisaari’s briefing.

Montenegro’s declaration of independence on 4 June and admission to the UN on 28 June had an impact in the region and was seen by Kosovo as a harbinger of its independence.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and head of UNMIK, Søren Jessen-Petersen, resigned on 12 June; Jessen-Petersen had been the longest-serving head of UNMIK. On 14 August, Joachim Ruckar was appointed as Special Representative and head of UNMIK and will take up the post on 1 September.

Options

Substantive options are unlikely to be formally on the table at the September meeting. But given the intensification of Ahtisaari’s work, it is possible that the Council may consider the option of a more regular focus on the Kosovo issue, perhaps instituting a cycle of monthly briefings on Kosovo’s status.

Key Issues

The key issue in the minds of Council members will be the timing for discussion of the final status decision. There are signs that a negotiated solution by the end of the year may not be possible. This timeframe was suggested by the Kosovo Contact Group in its 31 January ministerial statement, which said that “all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in the course of 2006.” Ahtisaari has made it clear that he is working towards finding a solution this year. But Serbian Prime Minis-
Council members not in the Contact Group, have little information about the state of the status talks. Regular briefings are therefore seen as important, especially if the Council is going to have to make the final decision on Kosovo.

Underlying Problems
The situation in the northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica is potentially explosive given ethnic divisions and high unemployment. Any solution for Kosovo needs to be sensitive to these problems. Serbs in the north have threatened to secede if Kosovo is given independence.

Another potential problem is the political scene in Belgrade. Serbia’s minority government faces pressure from the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, or SRS) which is the largest single force in parliament.

There is concern that a decision on the status of Kosovo may lead to unrest like that in March 2004 when riots killed 19 people and displaced 2,000 Serbs.

A future problem would be how to guarantee safety for the Serbian minority.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.
- S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaffirmed strong support for the policy of “standards before status.”

Secretary-General’s Reports / Letters

- S/2006/657 and S/2006/656 (16 August 2006) were letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council regarding the appointment of Joachim Rücker as the Special Representative and head of UNMIK.
- S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) noted that progress in the implementation of the standards was slower than all other reporting periods.

Key Recent Developments
On 12 July the Council authorised an increase in UNMIL’s civilian police component by 125 and decreased the military component by 125, reflecting the Secretary-General’s advice that police resources will better enable UNMIL to respond to security needs.

On 2 July the Secretary-General visited Liberia and reiterated the UN’s commitment to Liberia’s efforts to rebuild the country.

Liberia’s Humanitarian Mid-Year Appeal was launched on 18 July in Geneva by Jan Egeland, the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator.

At the time of writing, the forestry legislation proposed by the Liberian Forest Reform Monitoring Committee (FRMC) was expected to be considered by the country’s legislature in the last week of August.

Options
The Council has the following options with regard to UNMIL:
- maintain the current troop ceilings but authorise the Secretary-General to begin a phased drawdown at his discretion as the situation permits;
- insist on a concrete timetable and detailed security benchmarks for the drawdown with each step to be approved by the Council; and
- encourage a quicker drawdown and release of resources for neighbouring missions. (But this is unlikely as the Council is in a cautious mode particularly in the light of recent events in Timor-Leste.)

Longer-term options include:
- developing integrated approaches to peace consolidation, such as a sub-regional reserve force as previously suggested by the Secretary-General; and
- greater Council support for collaboration between UN missions in West Africa, especially following the Council debate on 9 August and presidential statement on West African issues.

Options for the timber sanctions will depend on whether key benchmarks have been met. If not, the following options are possible:
- extend the suspension for another ninety days; and
- reinstate the timber sanctions contained in resolution 1521. (The Council would prefer to avoid this given the importance of timber in developing Liberia’s economy.)

Key Issues
The key issue before the Council is the speed of the drawdown and the timing for the adjustment of UNMIL’s mandate. Given Liberia’s “stable but fragile” status, the Council is aware of the risks of moving the troops out too quickly. A related issue is that the Secretariat is reluctant to develop detailed drawdown plans at this stage, believing that any drawdown needs to be in tandem with actual improvements in the security situation.

Linked to this is the issue of progress on reforming the Liberian National Police (LNP) and Armed Forces of Liberia. So far UNMIL has trained 1,800 LNP officers. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Alan Doss, recently said that the aim is to have 3,500 officers trained, equipped and deployed throughout the country by August 2007. But as recent events in Timor-Leste have shown, even extensive police training is not of itself an indicator of progress in security-sector reform.

The issue on timber sanctions is likely to hinge on the extent of progress in revising the forestry legislation. A related issue will be the capacity for monitoring the implementation of the forestry reform package.
Council Dynamics
The US and the African members are clearly concerned with the long-term ramifications of winding down UNMIL too quickly. Even members like Japan, which in the past were keen to see UNMIL’s resources moved to either UNOCI or SCSL, are not currently pushing for an accelerated phase-down.

Underlying Problems
Security is still a problem in Liberia. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf recently admitted to “irregularities within the security apparatus.” In July there was a fire at the executive mansion, and in August a shoot-out at the residence of the newly appointed director of the Special Security Service.

The volatile political situation in region, particularly in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, could threaten stability and progress in Liberia. A future problem may be the lack of resources for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other key projects.

Other Relevant Facts

| Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Alan Doss (United Kingdom) |

| Size and Composition of Mission |
| • Total authorised strength (till September 2006): up to 15,250 military personnel and 1,115 police |
| • Strength as of 31 July 2006: 14,569 military personnel and 1,011 police |
| • Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria |

| Cost |
| 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $745.57 million |

| Duration |
| September 2003 to present, current mandate expires 30 September 2006 |

Expected Council Action
No formal Council action is expected. However, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Acting Executive Chairman, Demetrios Perricos, will brief the Council following the quarterly report of the Commission due 1 September; the quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is due by 8 September; and the Council will be briefed by US Ambassador John Bolton on the operations of the Multinational Force (MNF).

Key Recent Developments
On 10 August, UNAMI’s mandate was renewed for one year. The International Compact for Iraq, a five-year plan involving Iraq’s neighbours and foreign powers to revive the Iraqi economy, was launched on 27 July. The effort is co-chaired by the UN and the Iraqi government, but no significant developments are expected by September.

In August, US military leaders confirmed that sectarian violence in Iraq has been worsening.

The Council discussed a possible review of UNMOVIC’s mandate in consultations on 8 June. This process, however, drew no conclusions, beyond general agreement that the basis for UNMOVIC’s continued existence was tenuous and that the timeline for its conclusion would not be derived from the mandate review process.

Options
The Council could:
- respond positively to the Iraqi government’s desire for UNMOVIC’s conclusion, freeing for other uses the US$1 million per month taken from Iraq’s escrow account to cover UNMOVIC’s expenses;
- delay action—the Council’s preference for more than two years now; or
- adopt a concrete plan for concluding UNMOVIC and harnessing its expertise in a permanent form.

Key Issues
Many issues relating to the situation in Iraq will be on the minds of Council members as they listen to Ambassador Bolton’s MNF briefing. But formal proposals tend not to be raised at these briefings. Therefore it is unlikely that any issue will be on the table for decision.

The issue of UNMOVIC will likely come up at a separate briefing. The underlying issue seems to be whether action by the Council would open the possibility of public dispute in the Council regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. At worst, it could reawaken the intense divisions within the Council of March 2003. A final accounting of what UNMOVIC had—and had not—discovered could provoke a discussion that some Council members are eager to avoid.

Specifically, there is a question of whether it would be necessary for the Council to confirm the completion of Iraq’s WMD disarmament. While most Council members are content to accept the final report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and the statement by the current Iraqi government that disarmament has been achieved, others would like a multilateral confirmation of the ISG’s findings via an analysis of the report by UNMOVIC.
Some Council members are keen for the UN to maintain UNMOVIC’s expertise through either a subsidiary Council body or a unit in the Department of Disarmament Affairs that would maintain and manage UNMOVIC’s archives and roster of experts. A secondary issue is what, if any, regime is needed to ensure Iraq does not develop WMDs in the future, with Council members divided over whether to retain a strong, Council-based control mechanism or not.

In the absence of any proposals on this issue, which would have to be carefully crafted and consulted, it seems that the likely outcome in September will again be no decision.

With respect to UNAMI, the Council may decide that, given the recent mandate renewal, it is unnecessary to schedule consultations. The ongoing civil strife in Iraq and its effects on both UNAMI’s capabilities and the UN’s role in the Compact for Iraq are constant concerns. While the issue of improved airlift for UNAMI has been addressed, a larger UN role in Iraq depends on an improved security situation that has not yet materialised. In the background is the issue of how long resolution 1546, which was meant for the period of political transition in Iraq that has now concluded, should continue to serve as a framework for UN assistance. In the absence of new ideas or proposals, there is unlikely to be much appetite for taking this up at this time.

Council Dynamics

The US and UK appear to be hinting that they will take up the issue of UNMOVIC’s conclusion by the end of the year. Russia is reluctant to rubberstamp the ISG’s findings, and has previously supported greater examination of the ISG report by UNMOVIC. Russia is also more eager to maintain UNMOVIC’s capacity through a formal bureaucracy. The US opposes these measures and will want assurances via an agreement among the permanent members that no revisiting of the March 2003 debates will occur with UNMOVIC’s closure. France has proposed that UNMOVIC produce a final report presenting its views on the ISG report without raising questions about it.

UN Documents

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<th>Latest UNMOVIC Quarterly Report</th>
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<td>• S/2006/342 (30 May 2006)</td>
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<th>Latest UNAMI Quarterly Report</th>
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<th>Key Resolutions</th>
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<td>• S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) endorsed the formation of the interim government and the holding of elections by January 2005, welcomed the end of occupation by 30 June 2004, endorsed the proposed timetable for the political transition, detailed the mandate of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, UNAMI and the MNF, and requested quarterly reports.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1511 (16 October 2003) reaffirmed the temporary nature of the Coalition Provisional Authority, endorsed the interim administration, called for a political timetable, authorised the MNF to maintain security and stability. It also determined the status of the MNF and its relation to the UN, and asked the US to report every six months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1500 (14 August 2003) welcomed the establishment of the “broadly representative” Governing Council of Iraq and created UNAMI.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999) established UNMOVIC.</td>
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For more extensive background information & relevant UN documents, please see our February, June and August 2006 Forecasts.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council Action

A rollover of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) mandate is expected. The report of the Secretary-General on UNMEE is expected in mid-September.

In addition, the Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Working Group under Japan’s chairmanship may discuss UNMEE before the expiry of its mandate on 30 September.

Key Recent Developments

Eritrea boycotted the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) talks on 15 June after the Boundary Commission suggested possible amendments to the demarcation decisions of 2003. Eritrea, in a letter to the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, rejected the amendments as giving concessions to Ethiopia. The standoff continues. Ethiopia still refuses to accept the final decision of the EEBC on border demarcation. Eritrea is not willing to lift the restrictions on UNMEE until demarcation commences.

The Council received a midterm oral briefing on UNMEE on 27 July by Dmitry Titov, director of the Africa division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He reported on progress with the force drawdown and that the position of the two parties had not changed. At the time of writing, downsizing of the mission was expected to be completed by 31 August.

The EEBC talks scheduled for 24 August took place without Ethiopia and Eritrea since the two parties did not respond positively to the invitation.

Options

The most likely option is a simple rollover of UNMEE with language exhorting the parties to resolve the underlying issues. The Council is preoccupied with other events and there is little appetite to further reconfigure UNMEE.

Other possibilities are:
- extend UNMEE’s mandate for a short period as a possible stimulus for the parties to meet;
- set a deadline for resumption of demarcation with the understanding that harsher measures would then be a possible option. (Resolution 1640 indicated that the Council would consider “further appropriate measures” under article 41 of the UN Charter.)

Key Issues

A key issue in the minds of Council members is not only the risk of renewed conflict on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also the risk of their involvement either directly or by proxy in neighbouring Somalia.

The issue of finding a way to break the current deadlock remains critical. However, since the Council took the decision to downsizing UNMEE on 31 May there has been no progress on the border demarcation or lifting the restrictions on UNMEE. The US has continued its diplomatic initiative but with little impact. Eritrea is increasingly expressing unhappiness at a perceived bias towards Ethiopia.
Another pressing issue is how much longer the Council can afford to keep committing resources to this situation. With pressing needs for troop generation in other parts of the world, more Council members may become open to a further downsizing or withdrawing in order to free up resources. A related issue that may affect the size and mandate of UNMEE is the suggestion which has come up in discussions among Council members, that the three peace-keeping missions in the Horn of Africa should work together.

A possible future issue is the reaction of troop contributing countries (TCCs). Already curtailed, and possibly endangered by Eritrea's restrictions, some TCCs show increasing frustration with the Council's inability to change the situation.

Council Dynamics
Some pressure from the US, and perhaps from France, to further downsize UNMEE is possible. But most members do not feel the time is right for major changes to its size or mandate. Council members like Japan and the UK are keen to ensure that UNMEE is able to carry out its tasks effectively, particularly given the situation in neighbouring Somalia. Both China and Russia appear cautious about further downsizing. Greece, the lead country on this issue, is also keen to maintain the status quo for now.

The Council is therefore still divided on how to handle this situation in the long-term. The lack of movement has left many Council members reluctant to commit further energy and resources. Members have been waiting to see if the downsizing will affect the parties and also its impact on UNMEE’s ability to carry out its mandate. The latter issue, expected to be addressed by the Secretary-General, is likely to be the major factor in considering further changes.

Underlying Problems
The alleged involvement of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia’s internal conflict has led to concerns that the conflict in Somalia could escalate into a regional conflict. Proxy activities in Somalia may have kept Ethiopia and Eritrea occupied, perhaps creating the illusion that their border area is relatively calm. In the longer-term, however, it could mean greater instability for the Horn of Africa as a whole.

The combination of a smaller troop size with the continuing restrictions imposed on UNMEE could lead to difficulties in maintaining the security of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

| UN Documents |
| Selected Security Council Resolutions |
| • S/RES/1681 (31 May 2006) extended UNMEE until 30 September and downsized the mission to 2,300 troops. |
| • S/RES/1640 (23 November 2005) demanded border demarcation and the lifting of restrictions to UNMEE. |
| • S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000) increased UNMEE and authorised it to monitor the TSZ. |
| • S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE. |

| Selected Letters |
| • S/2006/362 (5 June 2006) was the letter from the president of the EEBC to the Secretary-General containing a report on the EEBC meeting of 17 May 2006. |
| • S/2006/328 (26 May 2006) was the letter from the Legal Council to Ethiopia to the president of the EEBC. |

| Selected Secretary-General’s Reports |
| • S/2006/140 (6 March 2006) was the latest report. |
| • S/2005/142 (7 March 2005) contained the EEBC’s appraisal of the stalling of the demarcation, a historical summary of the process, and the 2002 Demarcation Directions. |
| • S/2004/973 Add.1 (27 December 2004) contained the five-point Ethiopian proposal. |

| Other Relevant Facts |
| Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission |
| Vacant, pending appointment |

| Size and Composition of Mission |
| • Authorised maximum strength: 2,300 troops. |
| • Strength as of 31 July 2006: 2,014 military personnel. |
| • Key troop contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya. |

| Cost |
| Approved budget: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $182.24 million (gross) |

| Duration |
| 31 July 2000 to present; current mandate expires 30 September 2006 |

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
The Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to provide security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone will expire on 30 September. Council members are likely to renew it in the context of discussions on UNMIL’s mandate. (See our brief on Liberia in this issue.)

Key Recent Developments
The PBC has had a number of preliminary discussions on Sierra Leone and is likely to have a country-specific meeting in early October.

Charles Taylor has been transferred to the Netherlands, where he will be tried in a special outpost of the Special Court for Sierra Leone located at the International Criminal Court. The United Kingdom has agreed to provide prison facilities after his trial if he is convicted.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council will be whether the security situation on the ground remains stable. Provided the current calm continues, the Council is likely to prefer leaving the remaining issues in the hands of the PBC.

Underlying Problems
The Secretary-General’s April report mentions a number of potentially destabilising factors which include corruption, high unemployment rates and increasing tension in areas along the Sierra Leone-Guinea border. In light of the upcoming elections in 2007, the elimination of corruption in the police force is also likely to be a critical point.
Review of Security Council Mandates

In the July 2006 Forecast we outlined the criteria established by the Security Council’s Ad Hoc Committee in its review of Security Council mandates. At the end of June, consensus had been reached to recommend that the Secretary-General phase out the vacant position of Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Committee intends next to address two issues in September. Recommendations are likely to be put to the Security Council for action, covering:

- phasing out the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (see below for more detailed analysis of this issue which may become controversial); and
- the duplication of the functions of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa, based in Geneva, with other members of the Secretariat, including the Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa, based in New York.

A number of other issues are up for discussion.

- Possible adjustments to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that would allow the Secretariat to better utilise resources and take advantage of resources in the region. (The Committee had intended to carry out consultations with interested parties. However, the situation in the Middle East may have set back these consultations. The Committee received a detailed briefing on UNTSO from the Secretariat at its 26 June meeting.)

- Adjusting the frequency of reporting from the Secretary-General on the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIIS). (This coincided with a recommendation by the Secretary-General in his report (A/60/733).)

The Committee decided that it should not take up the issue of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), whose mandate is to verify that pre-invasion Iraq was rid of weapons of mass destruction. Due to the sensitivity of the issues surrounding this mandate, it was agreed that discussion of this should continue outside of the Committee. (See the brief on Iraq in this Forecast.)

The Committee expects to proceed with phase two of its review process between September and December.

Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

The Committee is expected to recommend that this mandate be phased out. However, there is no consensus as yet on the timing for this phase-out.

There appears to be frustration among some Council members that the preparation for the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (the second Summit) has taken too long, and a strong view that the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should be phased out. The Summit has already been postponed several times and it was most recently scheduled for September 2006. The Summit is now set to take place 14-15 December 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya.

In resolution 1653 the Council unanimously commended “the positive role played by the Secretary-General” and others “in organising and participating in the First Summit.” The Council also encouraged the countries of the Great Lakes region “in partnership with the Special Representative and other stakeholders to finalise the preparations for the second Summit...with a view to adopting a Security, Stability and Development Pact for the countries of the Great Lakes region.” In its earlier resolution 1493 of 2003 the Council reaffirmed that the international conference “should be organised at the appropriate time.” However, uncertainty in the region, in particular in the DRC, has contributed to the delay in the staging of the conference.

Other Council members share the view of the Secretary-General that significant progress has been made so far and that there is still important work to be done by the Office of the Special Representative. They argue that the future of the Office beyond the second Summit should be contingent on the Summit’s outcome and not just on the holding of the Summit itself. Hence, the mandate should be extended beyond the conclusion of the second Summit and assessed when there is a greater clarity on the direction of the entire process in the region.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1688 (30 June 2006) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the transfer of Charles Taylor to the Special Court’s special outpost in the Netherlands.
- S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) mandated UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court.
- S/RES/1620 (31 August 2005) established UNIOSIL.
- S/RES/1315 (14 August 2000) called for the Special Court for Sierra Leone

**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/269 (28 April 2006) was the first report of the Secretary-General on UNIOSIL.

**Selected Presidential Statement**
- S/PST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) was on peace consolidation in West Africa.

**Peacebuilding Commission**
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a letter from the president of the Security Council to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the Peacebuilding Commission.

**Historical Background**
For a complete historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Forecast.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNIOSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General**
Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Total budgeted staff of 298, comprising 82 international staff, 192 local staff and 24 UN volunteers

**Cost**
Estimated resource requirements for 2006 are $23.3 million

**Duration**
1 January 2006 to present, current mandate expires 1 January 2007

**Useful Additional Sources**
- Information on the Charles Taylor trial on the Special Court website http://www.scsi.org/Taylor.html
The Council’s concern was explicitly reflected in an exchange of notes between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in the past year. The reluctance to extend the mandate was apparent. On 15 November 2005, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council of his intention to extend the mandate of his Special Representative until 31 December 2006, and asked that the matter be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council (S/2005/793). The Secretary-General indicated that the core countries would continue to require the support of the international community up to and beyond the proposed second Summit.

In response, the President of the Council on 15 December 2005 informed the Secretary-General that the Council members requested further information and clarification in writing on the proposed extension of the mandate, detailing the activities expected to be performed by the Special Representative and the Office in 2006 to support the process of the proposed second Summit, based on an assessment of his role and performance over the past eight years (S/2005/794).

The Secretary-General’s January 2006 report (S/2006/46) provided details of the progress made. Among other things, he pointed out that the Special Representative had provided assistance to the core countries in preparing projects and plans of action in the fields of peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and humanitarian and social issues. In the meantime, the Secretary-General extended the mandate of the Special Representative only to 31 March 2006.

Following a further exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council in March 2006 the mandate of the Special Representative was extended to 30 September 2006. It was expected at that time that the second Summit would be held in September 2006. Members of the Security Council encouraged the Special Representative to focus on three priorities in fulfilling his mandate:

- assist the countries of the region to convene the second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region at the earliest opportunity and to include a clear focus on peace and security issues;
- facilitate adoption by the countries in the region of a security, stability and development pact; and
- support the core countries in ensuring that the planned, regionally led follow-up mechanism is fully operational by the time of the second Summit and to take the necessary steps to transfer residual United Nations responsibilities to the core countries.

The Council members also requested that there should be an opportunity to review the Special Representative’s mandate if the second Summit did not take place in September 2006.

Background

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was established in 1999.

- The idea to hold an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was first mooted in a Council presidential statement on Rwanda of 14 October 1994, and endorsed in subsequent statements and resolutions.
- The Office is headed by Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall and includes seven international staff, and is supported primarily through temporary secondment of staff by UNDP and UNIFEM, as well as other UN agencies, and by the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region.
- The cost of the Office for 2006, as estimated by the Secretary-General in a December 2005 report (A/60/585), was a little over two million dollars.
- The core countries launched the preparatory process for the Conference at the meeting of National Coordinators held at Nairobi, Kenya in June 2003.
- The eleven core countries are: Angola, Burundi, the DRC, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The Republic of the Congo and Tanzania are current members of the Security Council.
- It was decided that the Conference would include two Summits, with the anticipation that the first would be held June 2004.
- Together with the AU, the Office helped to organise the first Summit, held 19-20 November 2004 in Dar-es-Salaam, at which a landmark Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration) was adopted.
- The Office has submitted two reports so far:
  - November 2003 following the launch of the preparatory process; and
  - January 2006 on the progress achieved since the first report, and, in particular following the first Summit.
- Since the first Summit the Office has been helping the core countries to prepare the projects to be included in the Security, Stability, and Development Pact to be adopted at the second Summit.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1693 (27 January 2006) on the Great Lakes region
- S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003) on the DRC

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/1994/59 (14 October 1994) encouraged the Secretary-General to consult and prepare for a conference on the region; this was the first mention of an international conference on the Great Lakes region.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/193 and S/2006/192 (29 March 2006) was an exchange of letters between the president of the Security Council and the Secretary-General regarding the extension of the Special Representative’s mandate to 30 September 2006.
- S/2005/794 and S/2006/793 (16 December 2005) was an exchange of letters between the president of the Security Council and the Secretary-General regarding the extension of Special Representative’s mandate.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2006/46 (25 January 2006) was the second report on preparations for an international conference on the Great Lakes region.
- 17 November 2003 (S/2003/1099) was the first report on preparations for an international conference on the Great Lakes region.
Notable Dates for September

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<td>30 August</td>
<td>Final report of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Committee concerning the Sudan</td>
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<td>31 August</td>
<td>SG report on UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) (every four months)</td>
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<td>early September</td>
<td>Report of the IAEA Director General on Iranian compliance</td>
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<td>SG report on UNUB (UN Operation in Burundi) (quarterly)</td>
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<td>SG report on UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) (quarterly)</td>
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<td>SG proposals for the implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1680 and for delineation of Lebanon’s international borders</td>
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<td>14 September</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Committee report on states’ implementation of resolution 1624 (prohibition of incitement to commit a terrorist act)</td>
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<td>15 September</td>
<td>SG report outlining obstacles to the implementation of the road map in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>15 September</td>
<td>SG report on Somalia (every four months)</td>
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<td>SG report on MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC) (semi-annual)</td>
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<td>SG report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) (quarterly)</td>
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<td>15 September</td>
<td>SG report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) (every four months)</td>
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<td>23 September</td>
<td>SG report on UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) (semi-annual)</td>
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<td>Commissioner’s report on UNIIIC (UN International Independent Investigation Commission) (quarterly)</td>
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<td>September 2006</td>
<td>Other Important Dates</td>
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<td>12 September</td>
<td>The 61st General Assembly convenes, the General Debate commences on 19 September.</td>
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<td>18 September</td>
<td>The second regular session of the Human Rights Council is scheduled for 18 September to 6 October.</td>
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<td>20 September</td>
<td>A Security Council open debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations will be chaired by the Foreign Minister of Greece.</td>
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<td>20 September</td>
<td>The 1521 Committee will review the previous suspension of timber sanctions in Liberia as per resolution 1689.</td>
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Also expected in September:
- The Council will be briefed by US Ambassador John Bolton on the operations of the Multinational Force in Iraq.
- The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, is expected to brief the Council with some ministerial-level participation.
- The 1267 Committee concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, the Counter-terrorism Committee, and the 1540 Committee will brief the Council.
- Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland may brief the Council on the humanitarian situation in Africa.
- A high-level meeting on the recently postponed elections in Côte d’Ivoire is planned for late September in New York on the margins of the 61st General Assembly.
- Media reports indicate a possible ministerial-level meeting of the Council on the Israeli/Palestinian peace process, at the request of the Arab League, in late September.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The process for the appointment of next Secretary-General is expected to intensify in September and October.
- Elections for the 2007-2008 members of the Security Council are scheduled for 19 October.
- The first country-specific meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Sierra Leone is expected in early October. (delayed from 7-8 September)
- An open debate on women, peace and security following up on resolution 1325 is expected in October.
- Run-off elections in the DRC are scheduled for 29 October.
- The annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly is expected in October for debate in the General Assembly in November.
- A NATO summit will be held on 28-29 November in Latvia.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is expected in December.

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