Overview for August

Ghana will have the Presidency of the Council in what promises to be an unusually busy month. A thematic debate on consolidation of peace in West Africa is expected.

Clearly the crisis in the Middle East will dominate the Council’s activity in August. However, other very serious situations will also need a substantial portion of the Council’s time, including Darfur, Timor-Leste and Haiti. Also it seems highly likely that Somalia and Iran will require attention.

The Council will also be following closely the situation in the DRC following the 30 July election and the situation in Côte d’Ivoire where increasing obstacles to the October election seem to be emerging.

The Council will also take up again the appointment of the Secretary-General. A further straw poll is possible but not certain. Some Council members seem keen to make changes in the process for the next straw poll.

Middle East

The division in the Council is becoming increasingly marked—and this has played out in the tense and difficult negotiations over the Council response to the death of four UN personnel in an Israeli attack on their observation post.

The main dividing line is whether the Council should call for a ceasefire in Lebanon now or wait until the situation on the battle field resolves itself either by the Israeli forces achieving their objectives or becoming a stalemate. Led by France, the vast majority of Council members believes that the Council can and should call for a ceasefire now. Most would agree that a long term ceasefire needs to be built on a sustainable foundation, i.e. a solution to the underlying problems, but would also argue that a call for a pause in the aerial bombardment, at least in selected areas, to permit humanitarian access and evacuation is appropriate and does not prejudice that objective.

Aide-Mémoire

Important matters awaited include:

- On Darfur, the report from the joint UN/AU assessment mission, requested by resolution 1679 within one week of the return of the report “on all relevant aspects of the mandate of the United Nations operation in Darfur, including force structure, additional force requirements, potential troop-contributing countries and a detailed financial evaluation of future costs” has not been issued even though the mission returned on 22 June. These recommendations are now expected to be incorporated into the monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, due before the end of July.

- A report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support for transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations, requested by an October 2004 Council presidential statement, has not been submitted yet.

- On Timor-Leste, the report requested by the Council in September 2005 on proposals for addressing cases of serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste is still awaited.

- On Côte d’Ivoire, the 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations, requested by the Council, have not been made public yet.

- On Small Arms, a draft resolution circulated by Argentina in March has not been adopted.

- Procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions remain to be addressed following the request from the World Summit in September 2005 for “fair and clear procedures”.

- The report requested in resolution 1653 on the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army, with the recommendations on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end” to such groups was published in early July. (At press time, the Council was set to discuss it in consultations on 28 July.)

- The 2005 World Summit requested the Council to consider reforms to the Military Staff Committee. The Council has yet to take up the task.

For the US, however, a call for a ceasefire would be at best a declaratory statement, since Israel has made its intentions clear. For Israel (and the US) the issue is that Hezbollah is seen as a terrorist organisation and therefore it is impossible to negotiate a...
ceasefire with it. It seems that they consider that any pause would be exploited by Hezbollah to consolidate positions and would therefore only prolong the battle.

The announcement, by an Israeli minister close to Prime Minister Olmert, that following Israel’s evacuation warnings, henceforth any persons in southern Lebanon must be considered combatants, has serious implications for the Council. It seems to herald a significant intensification of the air bombardment. If indeed there are still substantial concentrations of non-combatants in the area, some Council members may be even more inclined to call for a temporary protected evacuation corridor and perhaps a wider pause to facilitate evacuation. Secondly, if this announcement proves correct, it also has significant implications in terms of risks for the UN peacekeepers. It is currently expected that the Council will decide on 31 July to keep UNIFIL in place for a further month. However, if the risk level increases, inevitably the Secretary-General will be obliged to evacuate UN personnel to safer ground.

But apart from the ceasefire issue, as France points out, the Council has the opportunity to contribute to the resolution of the crisis by developing the elements that would make up a sustainable basis for cessation of hostilities. Many of these now seem widely agreed at the level of principle and include:

- implementation of resolution 1559;
- strengthening the Lebanese government’s capacity;
- return of the Israeli prisoners; and
- a robust stabilisation force under a Chapter VII mandate.

The 26 July Rome Conference agreed a list of principles for “lasting security”. These included the 1949 Armistice Agreement, as well as recent Security Council resolutions on Lebanon. Many observers suggest it is necessary to add to this list elements which will constitute an incentive to Hezbollah (and its backers in Syria) to cooperate because they believe that, even if Israel prevails in southern Lebanon, it will not be the sustainable solution which the US and Israel are seeking. A devastated and occupied southern Lebanon, in the absence of some new factor which really does produce a “new Middle East”, is thought more likely to produce lasting hostility than lasting security. In this regard, there have been suggestions that the Council will need to look at a wider framework with a regional dimension. Interestingly the Rome Conference statement also mentions that a “lasting solution…must be regional”.

In practical terms that may mean the Council will need to discuss including the Sheb’a Farms, the Golan and implementation of resolution 242 as part of an overall lasting solution. No doubt Council members will recall that as recently as 13 June, when reviewing the monitoring force in the Golan, the Council unanimously agreed in a presidential statement that tensions would not be removed until there was a “comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem…”

**Iran**

As this *Forecast* goes to print the Council was expected to adopt a resolution which would make the resolutions of the IAEA directed at Iran’s nuclear programme, which are currently only recommendations, binding obligations under international law. This is in response to the failure of Iran to respond substantively to the “incentives package” agreed by the P5 plus Germany in June. The resolution is also expected to specify that sanctions will follow if Iran does not commit to negotiations on the package.

The resolution will weaken Iran’s position, in the sense that one of its strongest cards hitherto—that everything it was doing was permitted under international law—will disappear. And Iran is particularly concerned about the current requirement of the P5 plus one that suspension of enrichment would be a condition for entering negotiations, as opposed to an eventual negotiated outcome. It insists on negotiations with no pre-conditions.

The optimistic scenario is that the Council will not have Iran on the agenda in August because Iran will respond to the package in good time for IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to review it and report to the Council in late August or early September. The less optimistic scenario involves an adverse Iranian response to the Council resolution or a rejection (or thinly veiled rejection) of the “incentives package”. In that case a heavy confrontation could be expected. Council members seem conscious of the possibility that both this issue and the situation in the Middle East could influence each other.

**Darfur**

Although the humanitarian situation continued to worsen in July, Darfur pretty much dropped off the Council radar screen. But the Council will face major decisions in August. The Secretary-General’s recommendations following the UN/AU assessment mission expected shortly. Based on public comments from Under Secretary-General Guéhenno, it seems that a transition strategy will emerge involving a very substantial strengthening of AMIS by the UN, which in effect allows the UN both to preposition a significant amount of mission resource and to enhance AMIS capacity at the same time. The Council will need to authorise this—a very innovative step in terms of building cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.

Because there is no precedent as yet for UN assessed contributions being used by another organisation, it will not be an easy decision. It seems possible the Council may also want to go some way in the resolution towards defining the eventual mandate for the UN mission in Darfur. This will assist in securing ACABQ and Fifth Committee budgetary support. It will also help to meet the concern of many Council members that it is important to continue to demonstrate to Khartoum the solidarity between the UN and the AU on the need for a transition of the peacekeeping force to the UN.

It seems likely that the issue of sanctions against violators of the Darfur Peace Agreement will also be on the table during August.

With respect to the regional aspects involving Chad and the Central African Republic, it seems that at this point there are no proposals for Council action.

**Timor-Leste**

A difficult problem seems to be brewing over the likely recommendations from the Secretariat for a new UN mission in Timor-
Status Update since our July Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in our July Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in July (but not due for consideration in August) include:

- **Appointment of the next Secretary-General:** The first “straw-poll” was held in the Council on 24 July with Ban Ki Moon of South Korea and Shashi Tharoor of India emerging as the current front-runners.

- **UNIIIC:** The Secretary-General extended Serge Brammertz’s term to 31 December 2006. The current crisis will likely push back any discussion of an expected draft agreement between the UN and the Lebanese government for an international tribunal.

- **Gaza:** A draft resolution on Gaza sponsored by Qatar was vetoed by the US on 13 July (S/2006/508). The draft resolution received a 10-1 vote with four abstentions (UK, Denmark, Peru and Slovakia).

- **North Korea:** The Council unanimously adopted resolution 1695 on 15 July. The resolution imposed limited economic sanctions and demanded that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program. The resolution also urged North Korea to return to the six-party talks without any pre-conditions.

- **Democratic Republic of Congo:** On 30 June the Council adopted resolution 1693 extending the temporary increase in MONUC’s military and civilian police strength through 30 September. The 1533 Committee’s Group of Experts issued its report (S/2006/525). The Council was scheduled to extend the Group’s mandate, the targeted sanctions and the arms embargo on 31 July.

- **Uganda:** The Secretary-General’s report on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end” to groups such as the LRA was released in July (S/2006/478). In the report he recommended the appointment of a Special Envoy. The Ugandan government’s response is in S/2006/558. The Council was scheduled to consider Uganda in consultations on 28 July.

- **Children and Armed Conflict:** There was an open Council debate on Children and Armed conflict on 24 July. A presidential statement reiterated the Council’s commitment to addressing the impact of armed conflict on children (S/PRST/2006/33).

- **Kosovo:** On 13 July the Council met with Serbia’s Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, Kosovo’s President Fatmir Sejdiu and was briefed by Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari announced a new high-level phase of status talks, the first of which took place in Vienna on 24 July.

- **Georgia:** The Secretary-General’s report on UNOMIG was issued on 26 June (S/2006/435). On 18 July Georgia’s parliament demanded that Russia withdraw its peacekeepers stationed Abkhazia and South Ossetia and be replaced with an international force. The Council held consultations on Georgia on 27 July.

- **Afghanistan:** The council was briefed by Tom Koenigs, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, on 26 July. A press statement welcoming further ISAF expansion and noting appreciation of efforts to implement the Afghan Compact was approved (SC/8787).

- **Burundi:** On 30 June the Council adopted resolution 1692 extending ONUB’s mandate to 31 December 2006 and welcomed the Secretary-General’s intention to establish a UN integrated office in Burundi in 2007.

- **Liberia:** On 13 July the Council authorised the increase in UNMIL’s police component by 125 personnel and decreased the military component by the same number (S/RES/1694).

- **Guinea-Bissau:** The Secretary-General’s UNOGBIS report was issued on 6 July and was considered on 20 July (S/2006/487). A press statement was issued welcoming President João Bernardo Vieira’s constructive dialogue with national actors (SC/8783).

- **Central African Republic:** The Secretary-General’s 27 June BONUCA report was considered by the Council on 7 July (S/2006/441). A press statement was issued expressing serious concern that deteriorating relations between Chad and Sudan might negatively affect the security and stability of CAR (SC/8771).


OVERVIEW continued

Leste. All Council members are agreed that there is a need to seriously reinforce the UN presence in the light of the recent outbreaks of violence. The disagreements seem likely to centre on:

- the need for a blue-helmeted military contingent comprising formed units; and
- the size and configuration of the UN police contingent.

With respect to the military contingent, Australia strongly favours the current arrangement whereby its forces are there with host country consent and under national command. By contrast, it seems that others (including the Government of Timor-Leste) prefer a traditional UN blue-helmet operation. But some Council members are asking whether the cost of a full UN military presence is really justified in all the circumstances.

Compromises are possible, including retaining the military units under national command but placing them under a UN mandate (as in Afghanistan) with defined reporting obligations to the Council and establishing in addition a small team of UN military observers. The Secretariat “one size fits all” planning template also seems to be part of the problem on this issue.

The inflexible planning template seems also to be a part of the problem regarding the proposed police contingent. To many observers, the proposal seems certain to repeat the “heavy footprint” problems of UNTAET, with huge numbers of indifferent quality personnel from very diverse backgrounds unable to meaningfully relate to the needs of a very small and fragile society. This was a major source of criticism of the UN by the Timor-Leste government. Again some Council members will be concerned about this from a cost perspective.

Finally a number of Council members, who have been concerned about justice and impunity issues in Timor for some time, are feeling that recent events have confirmed to some extent their misgivings about policy on those issues. They will be concerned to ensure appropriate reflection of these matters in the future mandate.

Haiti

August will also be an important month for Haiti in terms of the long term UN commitment. The Secretary-General’s recommendations seem likely to include continuing the UN operation in the present form, but with an additional focus in the
OVERVIEW continued
coming period on assistance to the justice and security sectors. There seems to be wide agreement, including within the core group, on these recommendations and the resolution should proceed without controversy. However, this conceals a wider disagreement within the Council which is not new, but which is currently raised by some in the case of Haiti, about the inability of the UN system as currently configured, to harness economic and social assistance effectively under a single operation within the assessed budget.

Israel/Lebanon

Expected Council Action
At press time, the Council is considering a one-month technical rollover of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in order to provide some time either to reconfigure UNIFIL or replace it with a stronger force.

The Council will continue to address the wider issue in early August, including:
- the humanitarian situation;
- conditions to establish a cessation of hostilities (including perhaps the mandate for a stabilisation force and implementation of resolution 1559);
- the future of UN forces in Lebanon, given that the rollover of the UNIFIL mandate will expire in August; and
- a political framework for long term peace.

Further discussion of the related events in Gaza is also expected as some delegations are likely to want to emphasise the linkages between the two situations (and also their assessments of the roles of Syria and Iran). The latter could bring discussion of the wider regional dimension including the Sheb’a Farms and the Golan, and implementation of resolutions 242 and 338, onto the table.

Recent Developments
On 25 June, Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier and killed two others. They demanded in exchange the release of Palestinian prisoners. Israel refused to negotiate, launched a military operation in Gaza in order to retrieve the soldier and arrested Palestinian leaders.

On 13 July, the Council debated a draft resolution (S/2006/508) sponsored by Qatar, but the US vetoed it, wanting more time to negotiate the text because it did not reflect important new developments (i.e. the emerging crisis in Lebanon), and because the draft was too “unbalanced”.

On 12 July, the south Lebanon based militia Hezbollah crossed the Blue Line, killed a number of Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two. Hezbollah then followed Hamas by announcing that the soldiers were being held hostage against the release of various prisoners detained in Israel. This latter action, widely recognised as a war crime, was denounced almost universally, including by the Secretary-General.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the Hezbollah actions as “an act of war”. Israel’s right to respond in self-defence was recognised by many members of the international community. An air and sea blockade was imposed on Lebanon complicating the evacuation of many thousands of foreign nationals, particularly following attacks on the Beirut airport.

The Government of Lebanon announced that it had been unaware of Hezbollah’s plans and did not endorse them.

Israeli planes and artillery have now bombarded Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon and elsewhere for 14 days. But because Hezbollah operates within civilian areas, there have been large numbers of civilian casualties.

Israeli troops have crossed into Lebanon and fierce ground fighting is underway. An Israeli Minister has said that all civilians should evacuate southern Lebanon as it intends to intensify its aerial bombardment.

Extensive Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli towns continue with many civilian casualties. Hezbollah has made no denial of the fact that its rockets are targeting civilians.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour has warned both sides that the impact on civilians may constitute war crimes.

On 12 July, Kofi Annan sent a mission to the Middle East.

A meeting of the Security Council was held on 14 July. The Council had a public briefing from senior Secretariat officials and heard statements from Lebanon and Israel.

Israel gave three conditions for a cessation of hostilities:
- the immediate and unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers;
- the cessation of rocket attacks into Israel;
- the full implementation of Council resolutions 1559 and 1680, including the disarming of Hezbollah and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah rejected those conditions.

The League of Arab States held an emergency summit meeting in Cairo on 15 July. There are media reports that several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and some Persian Gulf states find Hezbollah’s actions “unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible”. But as the crisis has deepened, the mood in Arab states has swung increasingly against Israel. The Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa called on the Security Council to tackle the crisis. He also stated that the conditions imposed by Israel for a ceasefire were impossible to meet.

The G8 countries, meeting in Saint Petersburg, issued a statement on the Middle East on 17 July:
- blaming Hamas and Hezbollah for triggering the crisis;
- recognising Israel’s right of self-defence;
- calling on Israel to exercise utmost restraint, avoid civilian casualties and refrain from destabilising the Lebanese government;
- calling for a cessation of violence; and
- urging the UN to implement resolutions 1559 and 1680.

However, G8 countries were divided over some aspects of the issue, with France, Russia and Italy believing that some of Israel’s actions are disproportionate. The US rejected this analysis and defended Israel’s right to self-defence.

At the margins of the G8 summit, Secretary-General Kofi Annan and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair developed the idea of an international stabilisation force in Lebanon as a part of a ceasefire package.

On 20 July, Kofi Annan briefed the Council and proposed a package of actions to stop the fighting. He also qualified Israel’s use of force as “excessive” but recognised that
there were serious obstacles to reaching a ceasefire, or even to diminishing the violence quickly.

The Council on 21 July held a public meeting at which many UN members expressed their concerns. Initial proposals for reaching a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire had been circulated by France, but the Council failed to adopt any text due to US reluctance to agree to any language referring to an immediate ceasefire.

On 21 July the Secretary-General advised the Council that the mandate of UNIFIL could not be fulfilled anymore. He recommended a one month technical rollover to allow the Council to decide on what to do with the force.

On 24 July, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Lebanon and Israel.

On 25 July, four UN observers were killed by an Israeli attack. Kofi Annan expressed shock over what he called an “apparently deliberate targeting” on the UN Observer post in southern Lebanon and called for a joint UN-Israeli investigation. Israel has apologised to the UN and promised an investigation but denied that the attack was deliberate. The Council adopted a presidential statement on 27 July expressing deep shock and distress.

On 26 July, a high-level meeting was convened in Rome, attended by 15 countries. The conference failed to call for a cessation of hostilities, but agreed on the urgent need to work towards a ceasefire and decided to work urgently on the mandate for a UN authorised force.

On 26 July, the Secretary-General requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to convene a meeting of potential troop contributors.

At press time, at least 433 people, mostly civilians, have died in Lebanon and 51 in Israel. More than 500,000 people have been displaced in Lebanon.

**Key Issues**

The first issue will be whether the Council can agree on a ceasefire, or even a pause to permit evacuations of refugees and humanitarian access, perhaps along with some understanding on protected corridors.

An important issue will be the concept of operations for an international force. There are several subsidiary issues.

- Should it be a UN force? The UN has particular strengths in peacekeeping, where the parties consent to the mandate, but is less experienced in managing enforcement operations. Nevertheless, if the mandate will require enforcement of resolution 1559, and there is a real risk that this will be contested with military force by Hezbollah, there will be pressure (including from Israel) for the operation to be conducted by a coalition under a Chapter VII mandate. However, others including Lebanon and regional neighbours seem likely to prefer a UN force. A related matter is funding. Under a coalition, troop contributors have to meet all their own costs, meaning that it will be very difficult for any but developed countries to participate.

- Who should participate? In the current situation participation by troops from moderate Muslim countries could be a very important balancing factor. Breadth of participation may therefore become an important political condition for brokering any eventual package.

- A major issue is the timing. Without an associated commitment to some form of ceasefire, it is highly unlikely that the Council will accept the deployment of a force. A related issue is whether some form of de-escalation can be agreed as an interim measure.

- While a mandate requiring implementation of resolution 1559 may be the key to unlocking agreement by Israel on a ceasefire, Hezbollah may prefer the status quo to continue for quite some time rather than accepting that an international force should be empowered to disarm it.

- The Lebanese government’s willingness and capacity to implement resolution 1559 will also be an issue.

A further issue for the Council is whether the Israel/Lebanon matter can or should be separated from the situation in Gaza. It is the view of some that these issues are intimately linked and that the Council should adopt a holistic approach to the current situation.

Finally, in the elaboration of a political framework, the issue of the wider regional context, including the Golan and resolution 242 seems likely to be raised.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members are divided.

- Delegations such as the US are unwilling to take action which would undercut Israel’s right to self-defence.

- Most other Council members seem to be willing to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

However, there is a consensus on the necessity to have, in the long run, a full implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1680.

There is also a wide consensus on the growing risks to civilians and civilian infrastructure and for wider escalation of the situation. But there are still divergences between Council members on the merits of the Council taking interim action—of an essentially declaratory nature—as opposed to waiting until it is in a position to adopt a resolution on a lasting solution.

The US has positioned itself in support of Israel, refusing to support a cessation of hostilities. It also seems that the US would want to have the Council recognise Israel’s right to self-defence and insist on an effective plan for the implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1680 as a condition for a ceasefire. Also, the US believes that an international force in south Lebanon must be empowered to combat Hezbollah if necessary. Finally, the US wants recognition of the direct link between Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah and the release of all three Israeli soldiers.

France is pressing to start discussions in the first week of August on a draft resolution looking towards a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire. France has circulated a non-paper that includes:

- a call on all parties to exercise utmost restraint;

- a condemnation of the extremist forces that are destabilising the region;
■ a call for a ceasefire with the following conditions (1) the release of the abducted Israeli soldiers (2) the implementation of resolutions 425, 426, 1559 and 1680 including the disarming and disbanding of all militias in Lebanon (3) support to the Lebanese government to deploy its authority over the whole Lebanese territory and (4) respect of the Blue Line;
■ expression of readiness to explore the possibility of a reinforced international security and monitoring presence in Lebanon.

At the Rome meeting, France also proposed a memorandum including further details on a political agreement and diplomatic steps, which will provide the basis for the draft resolution.

Frustrations are building among many Council members at the Council’s inability to act.

For Historical Background and Other Relevant Facts, please refer to our online
■ Update Report on Lebanon/Israel of 20 July;
■ Report on Lebanon in our April 2006 Forecast;

Darfur/Sudan

Expected Council Action
Contrary to expectations, the Council did not discuss Darfur in July, except for a report from the Chair of the 1591 Sanctions Committee in consultations on 27 July. Perhaps attention was diverted due to events in North Korea, Gaza and Lebanon. This diversion of attention is noteworthy because in the previous three months the Council had devoted on average three meetings each month to Darfur.

In early August the Secretariat report on transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur is expected. The Secretary-General will also likely ask the Council to authorise increased support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as a stop gap measure. A resolution is expected.

Recent Developments
In spite of many diplomatic initiatives in July, the international community has still not achieved consent from Khartoum for transition to a UN force in Darfur. Yet the crisis seems to be steadily worsening (on 21 July UNHCR confirmed attacks on aid workers and suspension of many international humanitarian operations).

Despite the position of Sudan, it is noteworthy that the AU at its Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting on 27 June reaffirmed its decision from the 15 May PSC meeting to:
■ endorse the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA);
■ pursue concrete steps to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN operation.

On 28 June the PSC decided that targeted sanctions measures, including a travel ban and assets freeze should be imposed on those undermining the DPA and requested that a list be sent to the Security Council. At press time the Security Council had not received the list.)

The PSC did not take a decision on expanding AMIS’ capability although it had recommendations before it on increasing the troop strength (from 7,000 to 10,500 military personnel with an additional 2,200 civilian police personnel.) However, it did decide to expand AMIS’ mandate to perform the additional monitoring and verification duties needed under the DPA, including protection of civilians “within existing strength and capacity.”

On 1-2 July, at the AU Summit, the Secretary-General held discussions with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on the need to strengthen AMIS, to consolidate the DPA and on the importance of the deployment of a UN force in Darfur. Bashir undertook to submit a plan to the Secretary-General by the end of July on the steps to be taken to fulfil the government’s commitments to the DPA over the next six months.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/2006/508 (12 July 2006) was the Qatar-sponsored draft resolution on the situation in Gaza, vetoed by the US.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encouraged Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border and called for further efforts to disarm Hezbollah and to restore the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarming and disbanding of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
- S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425.
- S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called for strict respect for the international integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, urged Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, and established UNIFIL.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2006/34 (27 July 2006) expressed shock and distress at the killing of four UN observers in South Lebanon
- S/PRST/2006/3 (23 January 2006) welcomed the second report on implementation of resolution 1559.
- S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005) welcomed the first report on implementation of resolution 1559.
- S/PRST/2004/36 (19 October 2004) requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of resolution 1559.
- S/PRST/2000/21 (18 June 2000) recognised that Israel withdrew from all of Lebanese territory.
On 12 July Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno told the press that the UN would be developing a transition plan based initially on strengthening AMIS and that the priority would be to “beef up its structure”.

On 18 July a pledging conference was held for AMIS in Brussels. The EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana and the UN Secretary-General together with donor countries like the US and UK again pressed the Sudanese government about the need for the UN force in Darfur. Solana expressed optimism that the Sudanese government would agree. The pledging conference raised sufficient donations for AMIS to continue till the end of its current mandate on 30 September 2006.

The UN-AU joint assessment mission took place from 9 to 21 June. The recommendations from this visit were available to the PSC (and are summarised in the PSC report circulated to the Council by AU Chair, Congo, as document S/2006/461 of 29 June.) It indicated that the most immediate need is to strengthen AMIS and adopt a unified plan for a transition to a UN operation.

On 20 July in a meeting with Salva Kiir Mayardit, Vice-President of Sudan and the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), US President George Bush pushed for Sudan to allow for a UN presence to stop the violence in Darfur and to allow the AU forces to be “blue-helmeted”.

Key Issues

The main issue is the continued resistance from Sudan to a transition from AMIS to a UN force in Darfur, despite clear evidence of a worsening security situation for the civilian population.

A related issue is whether (and when) to address the question of what to do to give effect to the “responsibility to protect” principle if it seems that Khartoum intends to stall indefinitely.

Another related issue is whether to return to the sanctions regime. Targeted sanctions against known violators of the DPA have already received support from the AU. Including high-level government officials could become an issue, especially if Khartoum reneges on President Bashir’s undertakings to Kofi Annan in Banjul regarding DPA implementation.

Yet another issue which will soon arise is how to keep AMIS in operation. There has been no formal extension of AMIS’ mandate. The AU has said it is willing to consider maintaining AMIS till the end of the year provided it has sufficient financial support and if the Sudanese government agrees to the deployment of a UN force to take over from AMIS.

A critical issue not yet being addressed is force generation. The UN is already reported to be taking the lead for a proposed stabilisation force in Lebanon. The question will be, if it can do so for Lebanon, why does it appear not to be willing to do so for Darfur at a similarly early stage in development of the concept of operations.

Finally, there is the looming issue of what it means in practice to give more support to AMIS in the next few months. Most assistance for AMIS is currently delivered bilaterally but concern about the inability of AMIS to arrest the situation on the ground means that funding beyond September is unlikely. The Secretary-General seems to be ready to ask the Council to formally approve the use of UN resources, including in communications, logistics, public information and command and control, as well as equipment such as helicopters and APCs. This would be practice create a hybrid force, never before tried by the UN, with UN assets and personnel placed under the command of another institution. A related issue will be financing of this measure from UN assessed peacekeeping funds. The Secretary-General will likely have to take his request to the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly (where every UN member state, in practice, has a veto). Given that issues of principle are involved and the slow pace of work in the General Assembly machinery, this proposal could become bogged down. On the other hand it is a proposal which fits neatly with the Council’s thematic work on the subject of “Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organisations”. In that regard, in October 2005, in resolution 1631 the Council:

- recognised the necessity to support capacity building at the regional level, in particular strengthening the capacity of African regional organisations;
- stressed the importance of developing the ability of regional forces to deploy; and

expressed determination to take appropriate steps to further develop cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security.

This theme also received strong support at the World Summit in 2005. General Assembly resolution 60/1 recognised the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the UN and regional organisations on peacekeeping, and placed particular emphasis on assistance to Africa.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The consensus in the Council demonstrated in resolution 1679, adopted under Chapter VII, on the need for a transition to a UN force in Darfur seems to be holding. The general mood is one of quiet optimism that Khartoum will eventually be brought round. While the Council has been remarkably united in its recent actions on Sudan, it is clear that some Council members would be uncomfortable with adopting a stronger position vis-à-vis Khartoum, especially if it includes targeted sanctions against the government. There are also concerns that some of the frustrations building in the Council on its inability to act on the Middle East could play out negatively on Darfur. A forceful resolution at this stage is likely to face opposition from China. In the past when strong action has been suggested against Sudan, China has either abstained or used the threat of its veto to delay or weaken action. Qatar has also abstained on resolutions like resolution 1672 imposing travel restrictions and financial sanctions on Sudanese individuals. However, in the end all members will be influenced by the sustained political support in Africa for the transition to a UN force.

Options

The Council has the following options for a resolution at this point.

- Agree on a narrowly focused resolution which in essence responds to the request of the Secretary-General to approve support for AMIS for a specified period of time.
In addition to the above, request the Secretary-General to follow-up resolution 1679 and the 27 June PSC decisions in Banjul by working actively with possible troop-contributing countries on force generation. (This might be thought to be a balanced approach in terms of the ongoing negotiations with the Sudanese government to secure consent for UN deployment, involving both some carrot and some stick).

In addition to the above, include in the section requesting the Secretary-General to work with troop contributing countries, some initial or provisional decisions on the mandate for a UN force in Darfur and an indicative concept of operations. (This option may respond to the concerns of members who feel that a stronger combination of incentives and threats are the best response at this time.)

In addition to the above, include in the resolution a travel ban and assets freeze against those blocking the implementation of the DPA.

Finally, affirm the Council’s intention to consider non-consensual deployment of troops if necessary. (This seems unlikely at this stage, given the difficulties of going into a potentially hostile as opposed to a permissive, i.e. peacekeeping, environment.) There is little support for such action from within the Secretariat. At present the Council is hoping not to have to seriously consider this option and some members are likely to be of the view that this would be premature.

Underlying Problems
The main underlying problem for the Council is the possibility that Khartoum may be simply buying time till the end of AMIS’ mandate. If the UN does provide temporary support for the AU as currently envisaged but the Sudanese opposition continues through to September, the Council could be facing a serious dilemma regarding what to do. A related issue is the possibility that taking the financing of this hybrid operation to the General Assembly may shift the debate about the presence of the UN in Darfur to a forum of 192 members and give added scope for delaying tactics.

If consent is not forthcoming, a UN intervention would face serious risks. In the absence of a permissive environment a force would have to be equipped to deter military attacks rather than keep the peace. Generally, such interventions involving hostile situations have been undertaken by coalitions of member states.

If the UN does provide temporary support for the AU as currently envisaged but the Sudanese opposition continues through to September, the issue would come back to the Council to respond to the situation and sanctions would be on the table in August.

For historical background, please see our February and July 2006 Monthly Forecasts.

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UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

Selected Presidential Statements

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/430 (21 June 2006) was the latest report on Darfur.

Latest Panel of Experts’ Report
- S/2006/250 (19 April 2006)

Other
- S/2006/461 (29 June) was the letter from the chairman of the African Union to the President of the Council.
- S/2006/433 (22 June 2006) was the report from the 4 – 10 June Council Mission to Sudan and Chad.
- S/PV.5462 (15 June 2006) was the briefing on the Council visiting mission to Sudan.

For historical background, please see our February and July 2006 Monthly Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

UNMIS: Size and Composition of Mission
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel
- Strength as of 30 June 2006: 8,895 military personnel
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan

UNMIS: Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $969.47 million (gross)

Head of AMIS
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel
- Strength as of 22 June 2006: 5,738 military and 1,458 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Ghana

AMIS: Cost
$170 million (budget until 30 September; does not include costs arising from the Peace Agreement)

Iran

Expected Council Action
At press time, the Council is poised to adopt a resolution on Iran. The resolution, implementing an agreement reached in Paris on 12 July by the P5 and Germany (P5+1), responds to concerns about ongoing delay in securing a response to the package of incentives proposed to Iran in June in order to persuade Iran to re-engage in negotiations over a peaceful nuclear programme and comply with previous resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors.

The Council expects that a response from Iran will be received in August. Under an optimistic scenario, following a report from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, this would lead to Council discussions in early September and then to negotiations with Iran.

Under a less optimistic scenario, particularly if Iran responds adversely to the resolution, the issue would come back to the Council to respond to the situation and sanctions would be on the table in August.

Options
The options for the Council in August largely depend on (1) the Iranian reaction to the resolution and (2) the Iranian response to the package proposal.

If Iran rejects the package (or withdraws or threatens to withdraw from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]), the Council could adopt another resolution calling upon it to reconsider its decision (following the 1993 precedent when North Korea said it would withdraw from the NPT). Alternatively, the Council could proceed immediately with the adoption of sanctions.

- An ambiguous response to the package proposal seems likely. In that event, the option for the Council is to await the ElBaradei report. However, many Council members (and the media) are likely to make their own assessments of the extent of Iranian compliance quite quickly, meaning that, in practice, comments on the issue are likely to emerge before the end of August, perhaps leading to Council members and others staking out their positions.

- The third option is a positive Iranian response, which is likely to lead, after the ElBaradei report, to a process for commencing negotiations.

Recent Developments

At the beginning of June a package of incentives was offered to Iran by the P5+1 in order to develop a cooperation framework on a peaceful nuclear civilian energy programme in Iran. This was linked to a demand for suspension of uranium enrichment activities as a pre-condition to engage in talks. Contrary to expectations, the P5+1 agreed to suspend putting immediate pressure on Iran and the draft resolution was not circulated formally in the Council. Instead, the P5+1 simply indicated publicly that if Iran did not agree to negotiate, further steps would be taken by the Council.

This suspension of pressure lasted for approximately one month, by which time the P5+1, concerned about delay, decided that the package should be sent to the rest of the Council and it was made public on 13 July (S/2006/521). It contains:

- Pre-conditions for the start of negotiations on a comprehensive agreement with Iran. In exchange for full cooperation with the IAEA, the suspension of uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities before and during negotiations, and for the implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran, the P5+1 offered to actively support the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme and to suspend discussions of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security Council.

- A list of areas of future nuclear, political and economic cooperation to be covered during the negotiations. The incentives include promoting Tehran’s membership in the World Trade Organization, the lifting of US and European restrictions on the export of civilian aircraft and telecommunications equipment, and help in building light water nuclear power reactors.

Iran said it would consider the offer seriously. But there have been indications that some in Iran are opposed to accepting the terms of the offer. In addition, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has declared his unwillingness to give up Iran’s nuclear fuel technology and the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Motaki has said Iran would only come to the negotiating table on its nuclear programme “without pre-conditions”.

The US and the EU concluded that a substantive response to the package of incentives should be given when Iranian chief negotiator Ali Larijani met with Javier Solana and the foreign ministers of the P5+1 in Brussels on 11 July. But Iran rebuffed the pressure for a response at that time and the meeting ended without result. In response, on 12 July, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy, on behalf of the P5+1, said that Iran had “failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin” and that the P5+1 had “no choice but to return to the UN Security Council and take forward the process that was suspended two months ago” and to seek a resolution that would make the IAEA required suspension mandatory.

President Ahmadinejad stated that Iran was ready for talks but also repeated threats that it might review cooperation with the IAEA as well as adherence to the NPT if the issue was brought back to the Council.

On 20 July, Iran announced it would formally respond to the offer on 22 August. Consultations between the P5+1 on a draft resolution resumed 19 July. The EU3 circulated a new draft on 20 July. In the text, the Council would:

- express concern about a threat to international peace and security;
- act under articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
- call upon Iran to comply with the last IAEA Board resolution (GOV/2006/14);
- decide that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and the construction of a heavy water reactor;
- endorse the package of incentives;
- request a report from the IAEA Director General on Iranian compliance with IAEA Board resolutions and with this resolution; and
- express its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 of the UN charter if Iran does not comply, but underlines that these would be subject to further decisions from the Council.

Some of these elements are still under discussion at press time.

Key Issues

The main issue for the Council is whether Iran will accept that it has more to gain than lose by re-engaging with the IAEA and with the international community.

A second key issue if Iran decides to respond negatively will be the integrity of its NPT commitments. Withdrawal would escalate the crisis significantly.

The third issue is how to respond in case of an ambiguous response by Iran to the package. Some consider that anything less than full and obvious compliance should result in strong Council action. Others tend to think that a non-rejection of the proposal should be seen as a window of opportunity for further talks.

A related issue is whether suspension of enrichment should be a condition for moving forward with talks. Iran wants negotiations without “pre-conditions” while the P5+1 want suspension of uranium enrichment as a condition before any talks are held. It remains to be seen whether there will be flexibility on either side, including willingness to look at phasing of the suspension according to various benchmarks.
A further issue is whether the framework for negotiations might leave open the possibility that Iran would be permitted to conduct some low-level enrichment activities over the longer term. (some believe it is unlikely that Iran will ever accept stopping enrichment and research activities completely).

Finally, an issue in the minds of the elected Council members will be what role the Council as a whole should have in overseeing the negotiating process and whether there will be any mechanism for reporting progress.

**Council Dynamics**

Although Russia and China were initially reluctant to have the Council take up the issue of Iranian nuclear activities, it seems that their positions have evolved following Iran’s refusal to respond promptly to the issue of Iranian nuclear activities, it seems that their positions have evolved following Iran’s refusal to respond promptly to the negotiations might leave open the possibility that Iran would be permitted to conduct some low-level enrichment activities over the longer term. (some believe it is unlikely that Iran will ever accept stopping enrichment and research activities completely).

There is now a general consensus on the necessity to adopt a resolution making suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory. However, disagreements have arisen on the language to be used. Russia especially is reluctant to adopt language which might subsequently be used as authority for the use of force. Accordingly, issues in dispute have included:

- whether there should be a direct reference to an existing threat to international peace and security;
- whether Chapter VII should be invoked;
- whether the Council should “decide” on the suspension of uranium enrichment or whether to “demand” that Iran do so would be sufficient; and
- whether the draft should specify that further measures under article 41 will be automatically considered by the Council if Iran does not comply or whether the Council would work toward the adoption of those measures.

China and Russia still seem to prefer the approach of stepped incremental pressure on Iran. In contrast, the P3 seem ready to move to the next step of sanctions. The P3 believe that at some point relatively soon all diplomatic means will have been exhausted and that sanctions will be inevitable. This seems to be the view of many other Council members.

The P3 also continue to believe that a full suspension of uranium enrichment activities is absolutely necessary during negotiations to create an atmosphere of trust.

The ten elected Council members remain outside the loop, with varying degrees of discomfort. But there is a sense that the Council will accept whatever the P5 agree.

**Most Recent Documents**

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<th>Latest IAEA Board Resolution</th>
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<td>• GOV/2006/15 (4 February 2006)</td>
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<th>Latest IAEA Reports</th>
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<td>• GOV/2006/38 (8 June 2006)</td>
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<td>• GOV/2006/27 (28 April 2006)</td>
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<th>Security Council Presidential Statement</th>
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<td>• S/PRST/2006/15 (29 March 2006)</td>
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<th>Selected Letters</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2006/521 (13 July 2006) was a letter from France to the President of the Council enclosing the proposals of the P5+1 for a comprehensive long-term arrangement with Iran.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2006/305 (31 May 2006) was a letter from the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General enclosing a statement issued by Arab leaders on the question of making the Middle East region into a zone free of WMDs.</td>
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**Other**

- Press statement on the P5+1 decision to bring the issue back to the Security Council (12 July 2006)
- US-EU Summit Declaration (21 June 2006)
- IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (12 June 2006)
- Statement from UK Foreign Secretary on P5+1 package of incentives to Iran (1 June 2006).

For Historical Background, Other Relevant Facts and Useful Additional Sources, please refer to our February 2006 Monthly Forecast.

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**Timor-Leste**

**Expected Council Action**

In August the Council will decide on the shape of a new UN mission in Timor-Leste. The Council is expecting a report from the Secretary-General with recommendations regarding the new mandate, based on the conclusions of an assessment mission led by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Timor-Leste, Ian Martin, as well as input from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in the country, Sukehiro Hasegawa.

**Options**

There appears to be consensus within the Council that a new, robust UN mission needs to be established in Timor-Leste. But important differences exist regarding the shape and style of the mission.

One option is a mission that would include a full range of components:

- civil affairs with an emphasis on good offices functions in the pre-election period;
- electoral assistance;
- human rights and justice;
- a large police assistance component (including both performing police functions in near future and training and rebuilding of the National Police Force of Timor-Leste);
- institutional capacity building; and
- a large military presence (with all the associated logistics and support components).

Another option is a UN operation composed of some of the above components, but with no formal military units and a light policing component. Australia and perhaps others outside the UN structure would provide a military “ready reaction” capability.

The initial duration of the mandate is also under discussion at time of writing.

One option would be to create an initial mandate which would extend well beyond the period of parliamentary and presidential elections, currently planned for May 2007.

Another option is to establish the mandate for an initial period of six months, as it is common for most peacekeeping mandates, but with clear indication of the intention to extend it, as in the case of Haiti.
Council and Wider Dynamics

Many Council members have acknowledged, some of them publicly, that the international community failed to provide the fledgling country with adequate support for a sufficient time and acted too quickly in significantly reducing UN presence on the ground. Thus, there is consensus within the Council and the Core Group (comprised of Australia, Brazil, New Zealand and Portugal, in addition to Council members France, Japan, the UK, and the US) about the need to establish a new, much more robust UN operation.

There are significant differences, however, regarding the shape of the future mission. While all agree on the need for UN policing, there seems to be differences over the numbers required, with some arguing that a small number of high-quality police personnel will better meet the needs than a large number of indifferent quality personnel with all the attendant problems of many diverse national origins. Another point of contention will be whether the operation should include a blue-helmeted military component. Some feel that the military component should be under UN command. However, Australia, currently with some 2,500 troops on the ground, has signalled its willingness to commit to a long-term presence, but not under UN command. Other troop contributing countries like Malaysia seem to prefer the UN route. Council members with particular concern about the cost of UN peacekeeping, the US and Japan especially, find the Australian position attractive.

Key Issues

In an address to an open meeting of the Council on 13 June, the Timorese government expressed its wish for a UN peacekeeping force to replace the multinational force. At the time, the government appeared eager for the peacekeeping force to be more diverse but continue to include some components from neighbouring countries. The government also asked for the presence of UN police, electoral assistance, and advisors on a number of administrative issues as well as assistance in capacity-building. At time of writing it is unclear what position the new Timorese leadership will take on the design of the UN presence.

A second issue is whether some middle ground may exist between the Australian position with those who support a blue-helmeted military component. It would be possible to place the Australian forces under clear Council authorisation and oversight, with specific reporting requirements as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, a small number of blue-helmeted military observers could be included as part of the UN mission to enable the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to form an independent view of the security situation. (This was the model employed by the Council in Haiti in resolution 940 in circumstances where there were similar disagreements in the Council.) And a beefed up Department of Safety and Security team could be used for mission security rather than military units.

A third issue, which may re-emerge, is the past criticism from the Timorese leadership of the “heavy footprint” of the previous UN presence and the dead hand of the UN bureaucracy, as manifested in particular by the huge diversity of international personnel and the inexperience of many UN staff.

Recent Developments

In light of April and May’s rapidly escalating violence, the Timorese government requested Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal to send troops to help calm the situation. The Council expressed support for the deployment of a multinational force in a presidential statement. In June, in resolution 1690, it decided to roll over the mandate of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) until 20 August and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council by 7 August with a report on the UN role in Timor-Leste following the expiration of UNOTIL’s mandate.

In Timor-Leste, several political changes occurred recently. In the period immediately following the violence in late May, the Timorese ministers of defence and interior resigned and were replaced, with the defence portfolio going to the foreign minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner, José Ramos-Horta. Numerous calls were made for the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. He resigned in late June, and Ramos-Horta took up the post. Ramos-Horta has kept the defence portfolio while the post of foreign minister went to the Timorese ambassador to the UN, José Luis Guterres.

The security situation appears to be stabilised, with different armed opposition leaders having surrendered their weapons voluntarily to members of the international forces or the Joint Task Force.

Underlying Problems

The violent incidents that occurred in the first half of 2006 have revealed deep political problems in Timor-Leste, and there are particularly deep rifts between and within the defence and police forces. The military, traditionally associated with the country’s president, Xanana Gusmão, has been accused by a large portion of its ranks of favouritism. The police, under the control of former interior minister, Rogerio Lobato, drew a number of its officers from the ranks of the former Indonesian police and was seen as strongly favouring individuals hailing from the west of the country. Observers agree that the underlying cause of the current crisis lies in the security sector and that the thorough rebuilding of this sector will be critical for any future success.

Some members of the Council have acknowledged their lack of appreciation, in the period leading up to the violent events of 2006, of the depth of the country’s political problems.
Another lingering serious problem, related in part to the problems in the security sector, is the issue of accountability for past serious crimes and human rights abuses. In 2000, the UN mission established a judicial mechanism, called the serious crimes process, to bring to justice those responsible for gross violations of human rights in Timor-Leste in 1999. It was brought to a closure in May 2005 by Council decision, after producing 95 indictments and charging 440 individuals. Numerous cases were left outstanding, including 200 arrest warrants. Of about 1,370 reported cases of murder, only 572 resulted in indictments.

In the aftermath of the 2006 violence, the government asked the Secretary-General to establish an independent mechanism to investigate all the recent incidents, perhaps understanding that it would be hard to expect political reconciliation without full accountability. But several observers, including members of the Council, have pointed out that in order to create an atmosphere of lasting trust and reconciliation within the Timorese society, accountability for past crimes against humanity and serious human rights violations is likely to prove just as important as accountability for the recent events.


**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1690 (20 June 2006) extended UNOTIL until 20 August and requested a report with recommendations for a future UN presence by 7 August.
- S/RES/1599 (28 April 2005) established UNOTIL.
- S/RES/1543 (14 May 2004) determined that the serious crimes process be concluded by 20 May 2005.

**Selected Presidential Statement**


**Selected Secretary-General Reports**

- S/2006/251 (20 April 2006) was UNOTIL’s end of mandate report.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2006/559 (20 July 2006) was the letter from the Ambassador of New Zealand to the Council’s president with an update on New Zealand’s security assistance presence in Timor-Leste.
- S/2006/440* (27 June 2006) was the letter from the Ambassador of Australia to the Council’s president with an update on Australia’s security assistance presence in Timor-Leste.
- S/2006/391 (13 June 2006) contained the 8 June request by Timor-Leste for a special inquiry.
- S/2006/383 (13 June 2006) contained the 11 June letter from the Timorese authorities to the Secretary-General regarding the future UN presence in Timor-Leste.
- S/2006/320, 325, 326 and 327 (24 and 25 May 2006) were letters from New Zealand, Australia and Portugal to the Council president regarding Timor-Leste.
- S/2006/319 (24 May 2006) was the letter from three Timor-Leste leaders informing the Secretary-General about the request to Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal for defence and security assistance.
- S/2006/196 (29 March 2006) contained the Council’s request for options for post-UNOTIL assistance.
- S/2005/613 (28 September 2005) was the Council’s request for recommendations on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste.

**Selected Press Statement**

- SC/6728 (24 May 2006) expressed deep concern over the deteriorating situation.

**Security Council Debates Transcripts**

- S/PV.5445 (25 May 2006)
- S/PV.5469 (20 June 2006)
- S/PV.5432 (5 May 2006)
- S/PV.5436 (12 May 2006)
- S/PV.5351 (23 January 2006)
- S/PV.5457 (1 January 2006)

**Other**

- ST/SG/SGB/2006/7 (31 May 2006) was the Secretary-General’s Bulletin establishing a regime for the management, care, preservation, storage and access to the complete copy of all the records compiled by the Serious Crimes Unit.
- ST/Al/2006/2* (31 May 2006) was the administrative instructions with detailed rules regarding the handling of the copies of the Serious Crimes Unit’s documents.

**Historical Background**

14 July 2006 José Luis Guterres, Timor-Leste’s ambassador to the UN, was appointed foreign minister.

10 July 2006 José Ramos-Horta was sworn in as the new prime minister.

28 June 2006 Protesters set fire to some twenty houses in Dili; Secretary-General Annan appointed a special inquiry commission to investigate the May and June violence.

26 June 2006 Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned.

20 June 2006 The Council extended UNOTIL’s mandate until 20 August and requested that the Secretary-General submit by 7 August a report with recommendations regarding strengthened UN presence in Timor-Leste.

13 June 2006 The Council held an open debate during which the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Timor-Leste, Ian Martin, provided a briefing.

6 June 2006 a rally of some 2000 called for prime minister’s resignation.

2 June 2006 Ramos-Horta was named minister of defence in addition to his post as foreign minister; Mari Alkatiri continued to reject calls for his resignation.
1 June 2006 Defence Minister Roque Rodrigues resigned.

25 May 2006 The Secretary-General sent Ian Martin, his representative in Timor-Leste in 1999, on a fact-finding mission to the country. The Council issued a presidential statement supporting the deployment of the multinational forces.

24 May 2006 The Timorese government requested security assistance from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal. The Council expressed deep concern over the deteriorating situation in a statement to the press.

23-25 May 2006 Violence continued, with several people killed and several dozen injured. Timorese politicians called on the prime minister to resign.

28-29 April 2006 Violent riots took place in Dili leading to the displacement of thousands of civilians.

Late March 2006 Numerous violent incidents occurred in Dili, leading to 48 arrests. Eight of those arrested were from among the 591 dismissed soldiers.

Mid-March 2006 Nearly 40 percent of the armed forces (591 soldiers) were dismissed by the commander of the armed forces.

8 February 2006 Some 400 members of the armed forces demonstrated in front of the president’s office in Dili demanding a response to their January petition alleging discrimination in promotion and ill-treatment against members of the military from outside the eastern part of the country.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
No Council decisions on Somalia are scheduled this month. However, given the very unstable situation on the ground, Somalia is likely to feature in some way on the Council programme of work. The talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) have collapsed. Eighteen TFG ministers have resigned and one has been assassinated. UIC troops made a provocative foray towards the seat of the TFG, Baidoa. Ethiopian troops have entered the country to support the TFG, leading to a declaration of “holy war” by the UIC and there are reports of Eritrean arms shipments to the UIC. Council action to head off a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia seems likely.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union may produce a detailed mission plan for the proposed peacekeeping mission now seems much less likely. However, if it does emerge the Council is likely to meet to consider the plan.

The Somalia Sanctions Committee is expected to receive a midterm briefing from the Monitoring Group on the arms embargo at the end of August, and the chairman of this Committee is due to brief the Council by 3 September.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is the increasingly fragile military and political situation with Ethiopian forces apparently in Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government now appear to be heading towards conflict, and the situation has taken on a clearly international character. Eritrea is suspected of arming the Islamists and therefore also risks becoming embroiled in the issue, perhaps exacerbating an already tense situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea on Ethiopia’s northern border.

Another issue for the Council is whether IGAD and the AU will deliver a peacekeeping mission plan soon. In a presidential statement issued on 13 July the Council put its support behind the TFG and Transitional Federal Parliament, and indicated a willingness to consider the AU Summit request for an exemption from the arms embargo in order to pave the way for an AU-IGAD Peace Support Mission (PSM).

Another immediate issue for the Council in any dealings with the UIC is the position of Hassan Dahir Aweys, the UIC leader. Aweys is on the targeted sanctions list established by resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999. The US has already made it clear that it will not deal with Aweys directly given his alleged links with terrorist organisations. Individuals on this list are subject to asset freezes and travel bans.

Options
In July, the Council took a small step away from its previous policy of essentially limiting its involvement to aspects of the sanctions regime. However, the Somalia situation has deteriorated dramatically. There seem to be essentially three options:

1. Opt decisively to support the Transitional Federal Government, and reject the Union of Islamic Courts, including possibly going as far as acknowledging (or legitimising) Ethiopian military support for the TFG and leaning even more towards a Peace Support Mission. But this would pit the Council irrevocably against the UIC and brings back memories of the failed Council policy in 1993 when it took an absolutist position against Somali leader Mohamed Farah Aideed.
2. Continue support for the TFG, but also continue to keep open the possibility of negotiated peace between the TFG and the UIC. (This could mean remaining silent in the short term on the Ethiopian dimension.)
3. Lean slightly more in favour of a balanced approach; keeping open the possibility of negotiations between the TFG and UIC, but also signalling disapproval of external interference either by criticising Ethiopia directly or indirectly and perhaps also Eritrea, which was named in the Somalia Monitoring Group’s report of 4 May 2005 and whose support has been publicly acknowledged by the Islamists.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan)
Size and Composition of UNOTIL
As many as 130 staff members
Cost
US$5.78 million, 6 June through 31 December 2006
Special Inquiry Commission
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Brazil), Chair
Zelda Holtzman (South Africa)
Ralph Zacklin (United Kingdom)
In addition, the Council may want to encourage the diplomatic mediation currently being pursued by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, François Lonseny Fall.

A further option is to bring back onto the table certain targeted sanctions measures, not only to regulate the flow of arms into Somalia, but influence their behaviour in negotiations.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Increasing concern about the growing influence of Islamists in Somali politics has led in June and July to a shift in the attitudes of some Council members. There was greater support for the need to provide the UN-backed TFG with the tools to strengthen its institutions and build its security sector while at the same time encouraging dialogue. However, recent events may mean that consensus is now uncertain.

The Council is not united on how fast it should move if a detailed peacekeeping mission plan appears. Members like China, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo and Qatar feel that once the detailed mission plan is presented the Council should automatically approve a Peace Support Mission and ease the arms embargo. A middle group is made up of members like the UK and Russia, which now feel that recent developments suggest that the Council should focus first on helping Somalia develop its security sector and national institutions. A third group of members is wary of granting a quick exemption from the arms embargo, and would need to be persuaded that the mission plan is a sound one and that there is a sustainable prospect of peace for the peacekeepers to keep.

Ethiopia’s involvement and the increasing weakness of the TFG are likely to impact on all these calculations.

**Recent Developments**

By early July the Union of Islamic Courts had seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar from the coalition of warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. The UIC now controls Mogadishu and the area south of the capital. It has set up nine new courts in these areas and two courts in the Bay and Bako area which is controlled by the Transitional Federal Government. At the time of writing there were reports that Ethiopian forces had entered the country to support the TFG (possibly in response to UIC troops moving towards the seat of the TFG, Baidoa). In response, the UIC issued strong statements declaring a holy war against Ethiopia and calling on Somalis to prepare for sustained combat. On 27 July, 18 ministers resigned and lawmakers started proceedings to oust the prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi. The ministers were opposed to having Ethiopian troops in the country and felt that the government was not interested in peace or reconciliation.

The first round of talks on 22 June between the TFG and UIC in Khartoum, facilitated by the Arab League, were promising, with both sides agreeing to a ceasefire, to recognise each other and engage in dialogue on security and political issues. However, the TFG boycotted the second round scheduled for 15 July accusing the UIC of breaking the agreed ceasefire. After being pressured by the Transitional Federal Parliament and the international community, the TFG agreed to attend the next round of talks scheduled for 22 July in Sudan. But the talks were boycotted by the Islamists after the Ethiopian troops crossed the border. At the time of writing, new talks have been proposed for 1 and 2 August. The TFG has said it will participate but the Islamists are not willing to attend the peace talks until the Ethiopian troops have left Somalia.

In July there was a flurry of diplomatic activity focused on Somalia. A joint fact-finding mission made up of the EU, the AU, IGAD and the Arab League visited Somalia from 5 to 9 July to assess the possibility of deploying a peacekeeping force to the country. The team met with leaders from the transitional government as well as the UIC. A UN team led by the UN chief security advisor for Somalia, Joe Gordon, also visited Somalia in early July to assess conditions for a possible increase in humanitarian operations. In late July, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Français Lonseny Fall went to Somalia to mediate between the two parties.

At its second meeting on 17 July in Brussels, the International Contact Group for Somalia called on the TFG and UIC to resume talks and to make them more inclusive by including other stakeholders. The Group was set up at the urging of the US and now includes Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK and the US as well as the AU, the EU, the Arab League and IGAD.

**Underlying Problems**

The underlying tensions between the weak Transitional Federal Government and the increasingly strong Union of Islamic Courts are likely to lead to a fragile security situation making a sustainable political process difficult. Some members fear that this instability may result in a fight for supremacy that could plunge Somalia into the type of political chaos that could be a breeding ground for terrorists. UN sources on the ground have noted an increase in the flow of arms from Ethiopia and Eritrea, which they read as a sign of impending armed conflict.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006) renewed the Monitoring Group’s mandate for six months.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2006/31 (13 July 2006) expressed support for the TFG and TFP and willingness to consider the AU’s request for an exemption to the arms embargo to allow for a PSM on the basis of a detailed mission plan.
- S/PRST/2006/11 (15 March 2006) expressed willingness to consider an exemption from the arms embargo once the National Security and Stabilisation Plan and the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia mission plan are finalised.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2006/486 (6 July 2006) was the letter including the EU statement on the agreement between the TFG and UIC.
- SC/2006/442 (29 June 2006) was the letter from the Arab League on the first meeting between the TFG and UIC on 22 June.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2006/418 (20 June 2006) was the latest report.

**Latest Report of the Monitoring Group**

- S/2006/229 (4 May 2006)
For the historical background and a more complete list of UN documents, please consult our January, May and July 2006 Monthly Forecasts.

Other Relevant Facts

<table>
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<th>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia</th>
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<td>François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)</td>
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<td>Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee</td>
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<td>Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (Qatar)</td>
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Haiti

Expected Council Action

The mandate for the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) expires on 15 August. The Council will review the Secretary-General’s recommendations for MINUSTAH. While not expected to advocate major changes in the mission’s structure, this report will likely suggest a shift in the way the mission implements its mandate to incorporate an increased focus on institution-building, particularly in the security and justice sectors.

The Council is expected to extend MINUSTAH and emphasise reform of the justice sector. The Haiti Core Group (the US, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile and France) is in broad agreement on these issues.

Because the security situation in Haiti remains fragile, a force level close to that authorised by resolution 1608, which included a temporary increase in MINUSTAH’s military and civilian police (CIIVPOL) contingents, is likely to be maintained.

Options

The Council could renew MINUSTAH for 12 months, but six months seems more likely. MINUSTAH’s force level could be maintained at or near-current levels, or be reduced to the force level in place before the electoral period. Increases in the authorised level of civilian police, while, theoretically, an option, will be difficult to fill with suitable international personnel.

As the US, France and others envisage, the Council could maintain a security and police focus for MINUSTAH, strengthening the mission’s mandate to undertake institution-building in the judicial sector and supporting robust efforts to restore order to unstable areas, such as Port-au-Prince’s slums. Under this model, MINUSTAH could be a coordinator for certain key sectors such as judicial reform and disarmament, while specialised agencies and bilateral donors could take the lead role in Haiti’s development.

An alternative would be to reshape MINUSTAH in accordance with proposals put forth by the Latin American states. These members, with Japan also leaning toward their perspective, continue to articulate the position of Brazil—a leading troop contributor, Core Group member and a recent Council member. These members view insecurity as symptomatic of a lack of progress on social and economic development. The Council could task MINUSTAH with doing more to promote development, including implementing more “quick impact” projects through increasing the number of military engineers in MINUSTAH, becoming more involved in a process of national reconciliation, or providing greater technical assistance to the Haitian government in development planning.

Council Dynamics

Council members expect to be engaged for a prolonged period of time, a fact reflected in the Council’s practice of proclaiming its intention to further renew MINUSTAH with each extension. China and Russia, though, dislike this practice, and it may not be continued. While some members would like a 12-month extension, China and Russia may insist on an extension of only six months.

Japan seems to be the Council member most eager to reduce MINUSTAH’s numbers. The US is likely to be open to maintaining the UN presence close to current levels but will want to see strong evidence that forces can be used effectively and that rapid progress can be achieved. China is sensitive about Haiti’s links with Taiwan, one of Haiti’s major donors. Russia has consistently been sceptical about whether Haiti constitutes a genuine threat to international peace and security.

Despite broad agreement on the need for a sustained UN effort in Haiti, Council members may take different approaches. The Latin American states tend to emphasise that providing security—heretofore MINUSTAH’s primary focus—will not stabilise Haiti until an effective development agenda is implemented. They are also more sensitive to avoiding the imposition of decisions on the Haitian government. Without disputing the importance of development (though unwilling to commit assessed peacekeeping funds toward this task), the US, France and others emphasise that security is a prerequisite for development and view MINUSTAH’s role as a guarantor of security. They are eager to underscore that MINUSTAH plays a supporting role for the Haitian government, which retains the primary responsibility for charting the country’s development.

Since the Secretary-General’s recommendations are expected to focus on security and institutional support for the justice sector, this divergence is unlikely to greatly impact the resolution extending MINUSTAH.

Recent Developments

President René Préval has expressed his desire that MINUSTAH be maintained for the rest of his tenure (through 2011), until a professional police force is fully trained and the judiciary is improved.

The second round of Haitian parliamentary elections occurred in April, drawing a turnout of below 20 percent. The vote had been delayed after the first round in February elicited complaints of irregularities. Voting was relatively peaceful, although one person was killed in Grande-Saline, in the north of the country.

Local elections, previously scheduled for 23 July, have been postponed indefinitely, though it is hoped that they can be held by the end of the year.

Préval was sworn in as President on 14 May. Préval’s investiture was followed on 10 June with the swearing in of a new government led by Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis, marking the formal transition from the interim government of Gérard la Tortue. The cabinet includes members of Préval’s Lespwa party along with suitable international personnel.
with five other parties, including Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas. With his Lespwa movement falling short of a majority in parliament, Préval’s ability to pursue his agenda will depend on his skill to forge alliances with political rivals.

The Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) in June lifted its suspension of Haiti’s membership, and an IMF team visited Haiti in July. President Préval recently secured a commitment from the EU for $293 million for the 2008-2013 period alongside $211 million set to cover 2002-2007. The funds are to be spent on education and infrastructure, with more aid to be pledged if Haiti meets targets on good governance. A donors’ conference took place in Port-au-Prince on 25 July at which the Haitian government was seeking $5 billion to finance government priorities.

While violence by armed gangs relented immediately after Préval’s election victory, it began to rise again in June and July, which were marked by many kidnappings. July saw gang violence in slum neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince that killed twenty people. Some observers have suggested that recent violence has been triggered by Préval’s reluctance to extend an amnesty to gang members.

Key Issues
Several key issues will persist in the post-election environment.

- The Haitian judicial sector still requires much reform. Pre-trial detention periods measured in years are of particular concern to Council members. The Haitian government, however, is ambivalent toward foreign involvement in judicial reform, having rejected a recent proposal by Edmond Mulet, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, to employ judges from other countries in local Haitian courts to replace corrupt judges.

- The 6,000-strong Haitian National Police remains far below the 20,000-member level thought to be necessary to enforce law and order throughout the country, and is often unreliable, with some officers having been implicated in serious human rights violations.

- Recruiting francophone policemen for MINUSTAH remains a challenge. MINUSTAH was unable to fill the mandated strength of its CIVPOL component with francophone policemen. Consequently, one-third of the mission’s civilian police are anglophone, which severely circumscribes their utility in Haiti. This situation is unlikely to change.

- While the election period was relatively calm, the security situation has deteriorated since.

Underlying Problems
Haitian civil society continues to voice the need for vastly improved disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes throughout the country. Yet, DDR remains an enormous challenge in a country where gun ownership is legal, and the conventional scenario that precedes DDR—the cantonment of clearly defined forces—does not exist. With armed violence being committed by criminal gangs and militia-type entities scattered throughout the country, any DDR program will necessarily be long-term, complex and will require partnership between MINUSTAH, other development organisations and Haitian authorities and civil society.

Meanwhile, as violent crime has engulfed neighbourhoods, MINUSTAH has come in for criticism among Haitians for its inability to prevent civilians from being victimised. Incidents of kidnapping have reportedly taken place in close proximity to MINUSTAH soldiers. MINUSTAH has also been criticised for heavy-handed tactics during its raids into poor areas. The existence of several spoiler groups (including criminal gangs and those attached to political movements, former military personnel and a business class eager to maintain its privileged position via tax evasion and economic monopolies) threatens the government’s ability to implement its programme.

Some observers note that large sums of assistance pledged to Haiti have not yet produced a commensurate impact on the ground in terms of infrastructure and social services improvements.

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please consult our January and May 2006 Monthly Forecasts.
Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The Council will keep under review prospects for holding the elections as scheduled on 31 October but final conclusions will probably not be drawn until September. Formal action in the form of further targeted sanctions is likely if the obstruction of the voter-identification process by supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo continues. A technical resolution to renew the mandate of the 1572 Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts until mid-December is expected before 27 August.

Options
At time of writing, it was unclear whether the ongoing obstacles to the voter-identification process would be resolved in July. The Council will be looking to the International Working Group in Côte d’Ivoire (IWG) to secure a resolution of the issue. But if a solution is not found by early August it will be looking at the following options:

- Imposing additional sanctions against individuals blocking the process.
- Adopting a resolution transferring additional troops and police units from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in order to provide more support for the identification of voters and disarmament programmes at the national level.
- Reflecting on a possible postponement of the election, with the consequential issues arising regarding the legitimacy of any further role for Gbagbo, whose legal tenure will have expired.

Recent Developments
At press time, the Council is considering imposing sanctions against the leadership of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). A statement issued by the FPI on 12 July calling for a boycott of the voter identification hearings has sparked bloody demonstrations by the Young Patriots leaving at least one person dead in southern Côte d’Ivoire. Both the IWG and Kofi Annan condemned those disturbances and the IWG brought this to the attention of the Sanctions Committee.

On 19 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement urging the Ivorian parties to implement their commitments and calling on the IWG to monitor their implementation. The Council also underlined its readiness to impose targeted measures against individuals found to be blocking the implementation of the peace process. Furthermore, it requested the Secretary-General to submit a report in September on any obstacles remaining to implement the roadmap for elections and those responsible for any delay.

On 18-19 July, despite the agreements reached with the Secretary-General, supporters of president Gbagbo blockaded various cities and towns in Côte d’Ivoire and prevented the UN from proceeding with the voter-identification process.

On 5 July, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan organised a meeting in Yamoussoukro with the Ivorian parties (President Laurent Gbagbo, Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, Forces Nouvelles leader Guillaume Soro, Alassane Ouattara and Djedje Mady), Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, South African President and mediator Thabo Mbeki and the foreign ministers of the Republic of Congo, Ghana and Burkina Faso. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and press ahead with the implementation of resolution 1633 and the roadmap to the elections. In addition to reaffirming previous commitments (especially the 6 April 2005 Pretoria Accord and the Yamoussoukro declaration of 28 February 2006), the parties decided that:

- At least fifty mobile courts would be established and deployed for voter-identification sessions by 15 July.
- A presidential decree would be issued by 15 July to allow the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to adjust the electoral code.
- The deployment of the IEC throughout the country would be completed by 31 July.
- A follow-up mechanism to monitor the disarmament process would be set up among all parties.
- The pre-cantonnement process and the disbandment of the militia would be completed by 31 July.
- Another meeting would be held in September on the margins of the UN General Assembly to assess what further decisions will be needed.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council, given the other pressures it is facing at this time, is how to keep the pressure on all parties to implement the roadmap and systematically identify those responsible for any obstruction of the process. There are suggestions for a biweekly review of the implementation of the roadmap to be made by the IWG followed by Council consultations on the findings.

Another issue is the decision to be made if, either in August or September, it becomes clear that elections cannot be held on time. On the one hand, if it appears that the disarmament and identification programmes have been successfully launched on a national level, the issue will be the length and conditions of extension of President Gbagbo’s mandate. If on the other hand, there is little progress, or a continuation of the kinds of obstacles seen in late July, an alternative strategy will be considered.

If the disarmament and identification processes are finally launched at the national level, the UN Secretary-General will likely request a reinforcement of UNOCI. Transfer of troops from UNMIL is likely to become an issue.

Council Dynamics
Three months before the elections deadline, Council members seem agreed that a tough stance against individuals blocking the political process is essential.

Although there seems to be a consensus on the necessity to reinforce UNOCI as the disarmament and identification processes are undertaken, the US has again expressed reluctance to increase UNOCI’s troop level. It is unclear whether the US would agree to an additional temporary transfer of troops from UNMIL.
Security Council Report
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org

UN Documents

Most Recent Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 personnel.

Selected Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2006/32 (19 July 2006) welcomed the Yamoussoukro meeting, requested the Secretary-General to produce a report on the implementation of the parties’ commitments before a subsequent meeting in September, underlined the Council’s readiness to impose targeted measures and endorsed the eighth final communiqué of the IWG.
• S/PRST/2006/23 (24 May 2006) endorsed the seventh final communiqué of the IWG; strongly condemned violence against civilians, political leaders and impartial forces; and underlined the targeted measures against those blocking the peace process and obstructing UNOCI.
• S/PRST/2006/20 (27 April 2006) endorsed the sixth IWG final communiqué; expressed concern at the delay in the DDR and voter-identification processes; and underlined the targeted measures against those blocking the peace process and obstructing UNOCI.

Most Recent Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2006/532 (18 July 2006) was the latest report in which the Secretary-General stressed the need for targeted sanctions as a way for the international community to exercise pressure to move the peace process forward.

Selected Letters
• S/2006/455 (29 June 2006) was the eighth IWG communiqué.
• S/2006/516 (12 July 2006) was the communiqué of the high-level meeting held between the Secretary-General and the Ivorian leaders at Yamoussoukro on 5 July 2006.
• S/2006/345 (30 May 2006) was a letter from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General on the reinforcement of UNOCI.
• S/2006/334 (26 May 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General calling for a reinforcement of UNOCI.
• S/2006/332 (26 May 2006) was the seventh IWG communiqué.
• S/2006/294 (11 May 2006) was a letter from Côte d’Ivoire referring to human rights violations committed by French Licorne troops against the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, including a statement made by the permanent representative to the Sanctions Committee on 12 April.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Pierre Schori (Sweden)

High Representative for the Elections
Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

Size and Composition of Mission
• Authorised strength since 2 June 2006: 8,115 military personnel and 1,200 police officers
• Current strength as of 6 July 2006: 6,896 military personnel and 728 police officers. The reinforcements authorised under resolution 1682 will be deployed in July 2006.
• Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $438.17 million

Iraq

Expected Council Action
On 11 August, the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will expire. The Council is expected to approve a technical renewal of UNAMI for an additional 12 months. Detailed substantive discussion is unlikely.

Council Dynamics
The Iraqi government would like the UN to play a more prominent role in Iraq. The US supports that objective. However, although most Council members agree, the Secretariat remains reluctant to commit more personnel in Iraq without better security guarantees.

Some Council members are concerned about issues such as the timetable for withdrawal of the Multinational Force (MNF) and issues of immunity. However these seem unlikely to be pushed.

The majority of Council members are keen to maintain a consensus and avoid the reappearance of tensions that were present within the Council in March 2003. It is therefore likely that the renewal of UNAMI in August will be uncontroversial.

Key Issues
One issue likely to be discussed is how to encourage the UN to boost its participation in the economic and social development of Iraq. Council members will want to hear the views of the Secretary-General.

The International Compact for Iraq, which is a five-year plan involving Iraq’s neighbours and foreign powers to revive the Iraqi economy, is loosely based on a similar arrangement for Afghanistan. In June 2006 the UN Secretary-General agreed to an Iraqi request for strong UN support for launching the compact. The compact process was launched on 27 July and is being co-chaired by the government and the UN. However, the compact has faced some disagreement over the size of its membership and the scope of its mandate (especially the incorporation of policy and security). It seems that the Council may include a reference to the compact in its resolution on UNAMI.

In June human rights NGOs called on the Security Council to ensure full accountability for international humanitarian law violations by the MNF and therefore reconsider its decision to extend the immunity from legal proceedings for abuses by the MNF. The Iraqi human rights minister also indicated recently that immunity from local law for coalition troops should end. Although that issue was not raised during the consultations in June, it seems some Council members may address it during the UNAMI mandate consultations in August.

Recent Developments
The death on 7 June, in a US air strike, of the prominent insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, believed to be the leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq, was widely reported as a success for the coalition forces. This followed on from other positive developments such as the Iraqi elections and the formation of the new government. However, in recent weeks the cycle of sectarian killing has intensified markedly.

In mid-June Italy started to withdraw troops from Iraq. Full withdrawal is scheduled for autumn. Japan also withdrew its forces.

On 15 June, in accordance with resolution 1637, the MNF mandate was reviewed by the Council, and authorised until 31 December 2006, as requested by Iraq’s government. The arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) were also reviewed and extended.
On 16 June, the Secretary-General agreed to provide support in developing the International Compact for Iraq. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch-Brown was designated as the point-person in New York for this issue. Malloch-Brown was in Baghdad on 5 and 6 July, where he met Iraq’s President, Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to discuss the international compact.

On 25 June four Russian diplomats, who had been abducted on 3 June, were killed by a terrorist group. Russia requested an emergency session of the Security Council and a presidential statement strongly condemning the killings was adopted on 29 June.

On 25 June, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a national reconciliation plan in order to reduce sectarian violence. The 24-point plan outlines:

- The disarmament of militias and strengthening of Iraqi security forces ahead of a takeover from coalition forces;
- Amnesty for some insurgents not involved in terrorist acts, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Hundreds of prisoners have already been released;
- A review of the treatment of Baath party members forced out of public life after the US-led invasion in 2003;
- Negotiations with the US-led coalition to prevent violations of human and civil rights in military operations;
- Compensation for those harmed by the violence and for victims of the Saddam Hussein’s regime;
- Measures to prevent human rights violations and to have a more efficient judiciary system;
- Measures to improve public services; and
- Formation of a National Council for the Reconciliation and National Dialogue Plan, including representatives of government and parliament as well as religious authorities and tribes.

Underlying Problems
Insurgent and sectarian militia attacks against civilians remains the largest problem in Iraq.

The UNAMI human rights report covering the period from 1 May to 30 June 2006 stated that the number of civilians killed every month keeps rising; now reaching around 100 per day. The report also pointed out that, despite considerable efforts by the security forces to foster peace, on occasion they have committed human rights violations. The report also described military operations performed by the MNF which resulted in the loss of civilian lives. Investigations by the US of the 19 November 2005 Haditha incident and other allegations of serious crimes by coalition military personnel are underway.

Although there is criticism of the immunity granted to coalition troops, the arrangements between the MNF and the Iraqi interim government on the legal status of MNF forces were set out in an exchange of letters. (These were annexed to resolution 1546.) It is common practice under Status of Forces Agreements that foreign troops cannot be tried under local law for criminal violations.

Although Maliki’s reconciliation plan has received immediate endorsement from the leader of the biggest Sunni coalition, Adnan al-Dulaimi, aspects of the plan remain uncertain, particularly regarding the extent of the proposed amnesty:

The Iranian government has been accused by the US of training, equipping and directing Shiite Muslim insurgents operating in Iraq.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1637 (8 November 2005) extended the mandate of the MNF, the arrangements for depositing proceeds of export sales from petroleum and natural gas in the DFI, and the arrangements of the IAMB until 31 December 2006.
- S/RES/1619 (11 August 2005) extended UNAMI for 12 months

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2006/29 (29 June 2006) condemned in the strongest possible terms the assassination by terrorists of the members of a Russian diplomatic mission in Iraq.
- S/PRST/2006/8 (14 February 2006) welcomed the results of the elections.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/512 (12 July 2006) was a letter from Russia including the decision and the statement of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly in connection with the killing of Russian citizens in Iraq.

• S/2006/505 (11 July 2006) was a letter from Iran to the Secretary-General enclosing the final communiqué of the ninth meeting of foreign ministers of Iraq’s neighbouring countries.
• S/2006/449 (28 June 2006) was a letter from Honduras to the Secretary-General enclosing a communiqué regarding the elections of the new government of Iraq.
• S/2006/394 (14 June 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council enclosing a letter from his representative on the IAMB.
• S/2006/377 (9 June 2006) was a letter from Iraq to the President of the Council requesting the prolongation of the MNF mandate and of the DFI and the IAMB.

Historical Background

For key facts and historical background on Iraq, please refer to our February 2006 Monthly Forecast.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)

Deputy Special Representative for Iraq
Jean-Marie Fakhouri (Lebanon)

Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs in Iraq
Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)

Useful Additional Sources

• Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 55, 11 July 2006.
• Iraq and the Kurds: the Brewing Battle over Kirkuk, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 56, 8 July 2006.
• Dispatches from the War Zones: Iraq and Afghanistan, MERIP, Report No. 239, Summer 2006.
### Upcoming Sanctions Issues

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| Counter-Terrorism Committee | S/RES/1373 (28 Sept 2001) | Resolution 1373 established obligations on all states to adopt a legal framework to:  
- prevent and suppress international terrorism;  
- establish cooperation between states;  
- implement mutual legal assistance;  
- share intelligence;  
- assist in tracing and freezing of assets related to terrorists and terrorism;  
- implement border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists, and access to weapons;  
- deny safe haven to terrorists; and  
- become parties to the then 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and to implement them fully. | The measures mandated by resolution 1373, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities. | Country Visits: The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Director (CTED) is expected to conduct country visits to the Philippines, India, Pakistan and possibly Bangladesh over the course of the next few months. Assisted by experts of relevant international and regional organisations, the purpose of these visits is to assess the level of implementation of the measures mandated in resolution 1373 by each of these countries. Determining the technical assistance needs of each country to fully implement the resolution will be on the agenda.  
The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) will continue to evaluate and follow-up on the reports of recent assessment visits to Jordan and Malaysia.  
The CTC will receive and consider a report from the Executive Director of the CTED on the results of his meetings in early July with government officials in Paraguay on the level of that country’s implementation of resolution 1373. In the past, the CTC had expressed concern about Paraguay, and this is the second visit of a delegation from the CTC/CTED to that country. The CTC could possibly follow-up with a referral of Paraguay to the Security Council, which would be the first such referral made on a country’s insufficient level of implementation of resolution 1373.  
Resolution 1624: Pursuant to paragraph 6(c) of the resolution, the CTC is required to provide a report to the Council by 14 September 2006 on the status of states’ implementation of paragraphs 1-3 of the resolution, which, inter alia, called on all states to report to the Committee and decide that the Committee should promote full implementation of the resolution by all states, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation.  
Annual CTED Review: The CTED is expected to begin preparing an assessment of its work to facilitate its review and evaluation by the Council at the end of 2006. This will be considered in the context of a decision to be taken by the Council pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 1535 on whether the mandate of the CTED should be extended beyond 31 December 2007. This comprehensive review, which was due at the end of 2005, was postponed because the CTED had only become operational in December 2005. |
| 1540 Committee | S/RES/1540 (28 Apr 2004) | Resolution 1540 established obligations to adopt legal and administrative frameworks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes. | While the measures mandated by resolution 1540, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities, states are required to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. | Guided by a group of experts, the Committee submitted a comprehensive report to the Council on 25 April 2006 (S/2006/257), which included a number of recommendations (in para 136) on the Committee’s future work. The Council endorsed a number of these recommendations in resolution 1673, including expanding the Committee’s mandate, with the assistance of experts, until 27 April 2008. |
|  | S/RES/1673 (27 Apr 2006) |  |  |  |

1540 Committee

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Resolution 1540 established obligations to adopt legal and administrative frameworks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes.

In resolution 1673, the Council called on all states to report to the Committee and decided that the Committee should promote full implementation of the resolution by all states, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation.

While the measures mandated by resolution 1540, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities, states are required to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Guided by a group of experts, the Committee submitted a comprehensive report to the Council on 25 April 2006 (S/2006/257), which included a number of recommendations (in para 136) on the Committee’s future work. The Council endorsed a number of these recommendations in resolution 1673, including expanding the Committee’s mandate, with the assistance of experts, until 27 April 2008.
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<tr>
<th>Subsidiary Bodies</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
<th>Target(s) / Designated List</th>
<th>Committees Forecast</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaida and Taliban S/RES/1267</td>
<td>S/RES/1267 (15 Oct 1999) S/RES/1333 (19 Dec 2000) S/RES/1390 (16 Jan 2002) S/RES/1455 (17 Jan 2003) S/RES/1526 (30 Jan 2004) S/RES/1617 (29 Jul 2005)</td>
<td>assets freeze; travel ban; arms embargo</td>
<td>Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, designated by the Committee on the Consolidated List. As of 25 April 2006, there were 354 individuals and 123 entities on the Consolidated List.</td>
<td>Reports: The Monitoring Team (MT) will submit its 5th Report (due 31 July) to the Committee. The report is expected to present new recommendations and a revision of prior recommendations based on evolving circumstances. The recommendations will focus on strengthening the Committee’s monitoring functions; improving states’ implementation of the sanctions measures; and include ways of assisting states in improving their level of implementation of the sanctions. Also due by the end of July, pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1617 and paragraph 13 of resolution 1526, is the Committee’s written analytical assessment on the implementation of the measures, including states’ successes and challenges in implementing them, with a view to recommending further measures for the Council’s consideration. The first report under this mandate was issued as document S/2005/761 dated 6 December 2005. Listing: Following weeks of discussions in the Committee on the issues surrounding the listing of targeted individuals and entities, the Chair is expected to circulate a non-paper setting out the conclusions reached so far on the listing process. The non-paper is expected to guide the Committee in updating listing guidelines. De-listing: The Committee is making slower progress on the de-listing process and on establishing new de-listing guidelines. So far the Committee has relied on papers presented by its members—Denmark, France, Japan, and the United States—as primary resources to guide its discussions. The Committee expects to complete discussions and issue new de-listing guidelines by the end of the summer. Country visit: The MT will participate in the CTED’s country visit to the Philippines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire S/RES/1572</td>
<td>S/RES/1572 (15 Nov 2004) S/RES/1584 (1 Feb 2005) S/RES/1632 (18 Oct 2005) S/RES/1643 (15 Dec 2005)</td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds</td>
<td>Designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list (last updated 30 May 2006).</td>
<td>Report: The next report by the Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the Committee will be due by mid-August. Action Pending: Following the GoE report, S/2006/204 of 31 March 2006, Committee and Council action on the GoE’s observations and recommendations contained in paragraphs 53-59 of the report is awaited. These recommendations are aimed primarily at improving the effectiveness of the arms embargo. The sanctions are due to expire 15 December 2006; and the GoE’s mandate will expire on 27 August 2006.</td>
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### Upcoming Sanctions Issues

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>S/RES/1493 (28 Jul 2003)</td>
<td>arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> any recipient in the DRC territory; excludes DRC army and police under certain conditions.</td>
<td><strong>Report:</strong> At the time of writing, the Committee and the Council were expected to consider the latest GoE report (S/2006/525). <strong>New Mandate:</strong> Also at the time of writing, partially in response to the new report of the GoE and the report of the Security Council Mission to Kinshasa on 10-12 June (S/2006/434), the Council was considering a new draft resolution, which, <em>inter alia</em>, would: • renew the sanctions measures until 31 July 2007; • subject to a humanitarian impact report and recommendations on the advantage of extending these measures in a regional framework to be provided by the Secretary-General, before 31 January 2007, to expand the sanctions measures to include a prohibition on the importation of certain minerals (colombo, tantalite, cassiterite and gold) from the DRC, except under a new government certification regime; and • extend the provisions of resolution 1596 to individuals designated by the Committee as recruiting or using children in armed forces groups or otherwise abusing children in the DRC, or violating the new trade embargo when imposed. <strong>Mandate Renewal:</strong> In addition, at press time, the Council is expected to extend the mandate of the Sanctions Committee and the GoE to 31 July 2007. <strong>Action Pending:</strong> In the meantime, neither the Committee nor the Council had acted on recommendations contained in the GoE’s 27 January report (S/2006/53) that would allow MONUC to assist in strengthening the monitoring of the sanctions measures. Specifically, the GoE requested: • a re-registering and re-marking system for all firearms legally held or imported in the DRC (para 48); • MONUC to assist customs officials in monitoring vehicles and goods from other countries (para 72); and • MONUC to assume responsibility for air traffic services in the eastern part of the country on an interim basis (paras 166 and 167). Guidance is needed from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the feasibility of these recommendations. In particular, on resource capabilities should MONUC undertake such additional activities.</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>S/RES/661 (6 Aug 1990)</td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> Iraqi territory</td>
<td><strong>No Committee action is expected.</strong></td>
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<td>S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003)</td>
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<td><strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005, there were 89 individuals, and as of 2 June 2004, there were 206 entities listed.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1518 (24 Nov 2003)</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>S/RES/1521 (22 Dec 2003)</td>
<td>arms embargo; export of rough diamonds, round logs and timber; travel ban and assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> any recipient in Liberian territory. <strong>Travel Ban:</strong> peace spoilers, violators of the embargo, as designated by the Committee; as of 30 November 2005, 59 individuals were listed. <strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> Charles Taylor and designated associates; 28 individuals and thirty entities were listed. <strong>Mandate review:</strong> The Security Council is expected to review the sanctions on Liberia diamonds in October; and will review the timber trade in September 2006; and perhaps modify the arms embargo and travel bans in Dec 2006. <strong>Report:</strong> The next report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) is due by 15 December 2006, and the PoE’s mandate will expire 20 December 2006</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>S/RES/918 (17 May 1994)</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states if the arms are to be used in Rwanda; restrictions on arms transfers by the government of Rwanda.</td>
<td><strong>No Committee action is expected.</strong></td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>S/RES/1132  (8 Oct 1997)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> non-governmental forces; restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone. <strong>Travel Ban:</strong> Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1171  (5 Jun 1998)</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>S/RES/733   (23 Jan 1992)</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td>Any recipient in Somali territory.</td>
<td><strong>Reports:</strong> A mid-term report by the Monitoring Group (MG) is due by 20 August 2006 and a final report is due by 6 November 2006. The MG’s mandate will expire 21 November 2006. <strong>Action Pending:</strong> In the meantime, the Committee has not yet acted on the recommendations made in its 4 May report (S/2006/229) to strengthen the sanctions regime to prevent violations of the arms embargo. This included a recommendation for the Council to impose an integrated arms embargo that would serve to reduce the availability of funds for the violators.</td>
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<td>S/RES/751   (24 Apr 1992)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1519   (16 Dec 2003)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1558  (17 Aug 2004)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1587  (15 Mar 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1630  (14 Oct 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1676  (10 May 2006)</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>S/RES/1556  (30 Jul 2004)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> all parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals. <strong>Assets Freeze and Travel Ban:</strong> as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. Four individuals were designated by resolution 1672. <strong>Aviation Restrictions:</strong> ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region.</td>
<td><strong>Report:</strong> A final report by the Panel of Experts (PoE) is due by 30 August 2006 and the PoE’s mandate will expire 29 September 2006. <strong>Action pending:</strong> Action by the Council is still pending on the recommendations made by the PoE in its 19 April report (S/2006/250).</td>
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<td>S/RES/1591  (29 Mar 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1655  (29 Mar 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1672  (25 Apr 2006)</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>S/RES/1636  (31 Oct 2005)</td>
<td>travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Assets Freeze and Travel Ban:</strong> individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing).</td>
<td>No Committee action expected prior to the next UNIIIC report.</td>
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### Notable Dates for August

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<th>Reports Due in August</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>late July/early August</td>
<td>The SG report on recommendations regarding the mandate of a UN operation in Darfur pursuant to resolution 1679 will be incorporated into the SG’s monthly report on Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>SG report on MINUSTAH (UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti) S/RES/1658</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 August</td>
<td>SG report on the role of the UN in Timor-Leste following the expiration of UNOTIL’s mandate (UN Office in Timor-Leste) S/RES/1665</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 August</td>
<td>final report of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Committee concerning the Sudan S/RES/1690</td>
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### Important Dates over the Horizon

- An open debate on Cooperation between the Council and Regional Organisations is possible in September.
- The mandate of UNMIS expires on 24 September (S/RES/1663) and the mandate of AMIS expires on 30 September (S/2006/156).
- The ICC is expected to confirm charges against Thomas Lubanga, a former militia leader from Ituri in the DRC on 28 September. (deferred from 27 June)
- The second session of the Human Rights Council is presently scheduled for 18 September to 6 October.
- The appointment of next Secretary-General is expected late September or early October.
- Elections for the 2007-2008 members of the Security Council are expected in October.
- Elections are due in Côte d’Ivoire by 31 October but a decision will be taken by the Council in September.
- The Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly is expected in October for debate in the General Assembly in November.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is expected in December.

### August 2006 Mandates Expire

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<tr>
<td>11 August</td>
<td>UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission in Iraq) S/RES/1619</td>
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<td>15 August</td>
<td>MINUSTAH S/RES/1658</td>
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<td>20 August</td>
<td>UNOTIL S/RES/1690</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 August</td>
<td>Group of Experts of the 1572 Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire S/RES/1643</td>
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### August 2006 Other Important Dates

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<th>August 2006</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>Security Council ministerial-level open debate on the consolidation of peace in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>Iran announced it would formally respond to the P5+Germany package of incentives</td>
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