France will have the Presidency of the Council in July and will be leading on four important issues.

- The framework for the Council process regarding the selection of the Secretary-General. (Probably discussion will also commence on the candidates nominated to date.)
- An open thematic debate on Children in Armed Conflict—France has the Chair of the Council Working Group on this subject and its foreign minister will chair the debate. (There will also be an Arria style meeting with NGOs on this issue.)
- Côte d’Ivoire (a report from the Secretary-General is expected); and
- DRC—where the Council will be watching very closely the evolution of the situation in the lead up to the historic election on 30 July.

A public meeting of the Council is expected on Kosovo. Special Envoy Martti Ahtissari will brief on the political status talks. (He will no doubt also brief the Council members in Informal Consultations). This is an interim update. Nothing has yet reached the stage where a Council decision is required.

The regular monthly open briefing from the Secretariat on the Middle East is also expected. Also the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is scheduled for consideration. This is expected to be a routine mandate roll-over. (No other mandate renewals are on the agenda.)

The three large issues looming over the Council in July will be Darfur, Somalia and Iran.

**Darfur/Sudan**

All eyes will be on the African Union Summit in Banjul on 1-2 July. The hope will be that African leaders can persuade Sudan to accept the transition from the AU force AMIS to a new UN mission in Darfur. The UN Secretary-General, who has shown leadership on this issue, will brief on the political status talks. (He will no doubt also brief the Council members in Informal Consultations). This is an interim update. Nothing has yet reached the stage where a Council decision is required.

On the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army, the recommendations requested in resolution 1653 on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end” to such groups are still outstanding. The most recent information suggests that the report has been drafted but its release has not been scheduled as yet.

A report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support for transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations, requested by an October 2004 Council presidential statement, has not been submitted yet.

On Timor-Leste, the report requested by the Council in September 2005 on proposals for addressing cases of serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste is not yet forthcoming.

On Côte d’Ivoire, the 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations, requested by the Council, have not been made public yet.

On Small Arms, a draft resolution circulated by Argentina in March has not been adopted.

Procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions remain to be addressed following the request from the World Summit in September 2005 for “fair and clear procedures”. A report from the UN Office of Legal Affairs is still awaited.
issue since the outset, will be present to explain to the President of Sudan that in this context Chapter VII powers for a UN mission are needed to defend the mission and defend civilians against the irregular forces which Sudan itself says it has no control over.

If these efforts are flatly rejected the Council seems likely to consider options including sanctions. But a more likely scenario is ongoing delay and further contradictory signals from Khartoum—seeking to spin out the situation as long as possible. In those circumstances, a firm Council response, reaffirming its support for a robust Chapter VII mandate and beginning work on a draft mandate resolution is likely. This line of action might also include some careful balancing of incentives and disincentives. The former might involve assurances to dispel suspicions and perhaps some fore-shadowing of measures against those who have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. Disunity in the Council is possible, but should not be assumed. There was remarkable unity during the visit to Khartoum, including for the invocation of Chapter VII. And all members are aware that if the current standoff is not resolved there are inevitable risks to the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Somalia has undergone a quite significant change in the past month, with the military success of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) against the Mogadishu warlords. The risk of wider conflict involving Ethiopia, which the ICU accuses of supporting various warlords, loomed over the region. At press time, Ethiopia was claiming that the ICU is a threat to its security.

The Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) seem ever more precarious. Previously the TFI was the only game in town, as far as becoming a potential source of legitimate authority. But now there is the question of the status of the ICU. The TFI and the ICU, meeting in Khartoum, have reached a provisional understanding involving mutual recognition that both sides have to be accommodated. But the understanding seems very fragile. And the ICU remains adamantly opposed to the TFI proposal for foreign peacekeepers. A risk has clearly emerged for the Council that supporting the TFI—whether in general political terms, or specifically by considering a variation of the arms embargo—could add to instability and give the ICU grounds for challenging the Council’s neutrality. The ICU’s alleged links to international terrorism add a further layer of complexity to the situation.

A careful reassessment by the Council of its traditional posture on Somalia is possible following the AU Summit in Banjul—at which Somalia will be a major issue.

Iran may not respond to the P5 plus Germany package in July. Delay in itself may lead to pressure to bring the issue back to the Council. On substance, Iran seems more likely to respond ambiguously than with a clear cut acceptance or rejection. This will raise a range of options for the Council to consider, depending on whether the ambiguity is assessed by members as reasonable in the circumstances or as an attempt at obfuscation and delay. The question of at least one further step of incremental pressure before reaching the application of sanctions may then come to the fore again.

Other Issues
Relatively brief discussion is expected in Informal Consultations on three further issues where reports from the Secretary General are expected.
- Georgia: unless there are major developments in the region, this is likely to be a straightforward discussion.
- Guinea-Bissau: the major dynamic on this issue is the readiness on the part of most Council members to discontinue active involvement with this country, contrasted with the desire of Guinea-Bissau itself that the UN not disengage too soon. It enjoys support from a small number of countries, including Argentina. But since no decision is required at this point, controversy will probably be avoided.
- Central African Republic: in addition to the report on progress by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) an important focus is likely to be the links between the situation in CAR and the situations in neighbouring Darfur and Chad.

North Korea is an issue being watched closely as this issue goes to press. If Pyongyang decides to launch a multi-stage ballistic missile a request for Council consideration is entirely possible.

Uganda will be discussed when the Secretary-General’s recommendations under resolutions 1653 and 1663 emerge. In addition to the issue of whether the UN missions in DRC and Sudan can play a forceful role in combating the Lord’s Resistance Army, the question of appointment of a special envoy is likely to be considered. In response to Ugandan views, the envoy is likely to have a regional mandate. But in return it seems likely that there will be an expectation that the mandate should directly, or indirectly, include, in practice, a focus also on the underlying reasons for the instability in northern Uganda and some interface with the existing Joint Monitoring Committee. On the military aspects, because of the difficult issues which the Council has on its plate with Sudan right now over Darfur, the recent reports that Sudan may have withdrawn consent for Ugandan forces to operate in Sudan against the LRA add a new dimension to the discussion and may reinforce the case for an envoy specifically focussed on the full range of LRA related issues in the region.

Sanctions Committees: we have included in this issue a revised Chart of the Sanctions Committees setting out their respective mandates, the status of their expert panels and the stage their decisions have reached on various issues. This chart was first published in our March Forecast Report.

Council Working Groups will continue operating in July, in particular the Group Co-Chaired by Ambassadors Bolton and Burian working on the review of mandates. Ambassador Oshima’s Working Group, which had been working on a review of Council working methods, made considerable progress in June and it is expected that the Council will approve a note from the President recording its new decisions on working methods in early July. In a related move the Council decided to extend Ambassador Oshima’s mandate as Chair of the Group until the end of 2006.
Recent developments on the situations covered in our June Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting developments in situations covered in our June issue (but not due for consideration by the Council in July) include:

- **Lebanon**: The mandate of the International Independent Investigation Commission was extended by one year to 15 June 2007 in resolution 1866. The resolution also expanded UNIIIC’s mandate to include jurisdiction over “other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004.” Commissioner Serge Brammertz’s report noted that Syrian cooperation had been generally satisfactory (S/2006/375).
- **Cyprus**: The Council renewed UNFICYP’s mandate until 15 December 2006 in resolution 1867.
- **Burundi**: The Council extended ONUB’s mandate until 31 December 2006. The Council separately requested that Burundi be included on the agenda of the new Peacebuilding Commission, along with Sierra Leone. And on 18 June the government and the rebel group FNL signed a provisional agreement to end hostilities — but the situation remains tenuous.
- **Charles Taylor**: Former Liberian president Charles Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 20 June shortly after the adoption of resolution 1688 on 16 June and the advice from the United Kingdom that Taylor would be allowed to enter the UK to serve any imposed sentence (S/2006/406). Taylor’s trial could begin as early as January 2007.
- **Timor-Leste**: In resolution 1690 the Council adopted a further rollover of the UNOTIL mandate until 20 August. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council by 7 August on the UN’s future role in Timor-Leste after the mandate expires.
- **Liberia**: Resolution 1683 adopted on 13 June eased the arms sanctions so that arms could enter Liberia strictly for use by the country’s police and security forces. On 20 June the Council lifted timber sanctions in Liberia in resolution 1689; however, the resolution also determined that this decision would be subject to review after ninety days. The same resolution renewed the diamond sanctions for six months (with a review after four months) and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts to 20 December 2006. 22 June marked the official start to Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- **Golan Heights**: Resolution 1685 renewed UNDOF by six months to 31 December 2006.
- **Iraq**: The Council reviewed the mandate of the Multinational Force on 15 June, which under resolution 1637 will continue as requested by a letter from the Iraqi government (S/2006/377). The Council also discussed UNMOVIC on 8 June. No Council action was taken.
- **Montenegro**: The Council recommended to the General Assembly that Montenegro be admitted as the 192nd UN member state (S/RES/1691).
- **Thematic Debates**: Two thematic debates were held. The 22 June debate on Strengthening International Law: Rule of Law and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (S/PV.5474 and resolution 1) concluded with a presidential statement affirming the Council’s commitment to promoting justice and the rule of law (S/PRST/2006/28). On 28 June the Council held an open debate on Protection of Civilians to discuss the implementation of resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006.

**Darfur/Sudan**

**Expected Council and Wider Action**

Discussion of the transition to a UN operation in Darfur is expected to continue in July. The Council expects a report from the Secretariat with the results of the AU/UN assessment mission and options for the transition. It is unclear what Council action will emerge, particularly since Khartoum continues to refuse to agree to the transition. But pressure for a firm and united Council response is likely if Sudan fails to respond positively at the AU Summit. The UN Secretary-General is scheduled to attend and to take up the transition issue personally with the President of Sudan.

AU members are expected to increase pressure on Sudan and to emphasise the results of the AU/UN June assessment mission. A new mandate for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) reflecting the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a likely outcome from the AU Summit that will take place on 1-2 July in Banjul, Gambia. It is unclear whether the AU Peace and Security Council will proceed to consider its threat of sanctions against rebels that refuse to sign the DPA, and whether there will be appetite in the Council for doing so as well.

An EU-sponsored pledging conference for Darfur’s reconstruction and AMIS’ additional requirements is now scheduled for 18 July.

**Options**

At the moment, members seem to hope that a solution to the impasse will be found at the AU Summit. Should this fail, an idea seems to be emerging that firm Council action will be required, but including a balance between pressure and incentives, and for this to be backed up by diplomatic pressure from both the AU and Arab countries.

The possibility of the Secretary-General sending a high-level envoy is a further option.

An option to delay consideration of the assessment report, in order to address the consent issue first, is possible. But it seems more likely that discussions on a draft resolution will begin.

Another option, as an interim measure, would be for the Council to authorise the UN to provide certain capabilities to AMIS during the transition period; thus strengthening the existing presence on the ground.

The option of sanctions is likely to be in the minds of some members should Sudan continue to refuse to consent to the transition, particularly in light of Sudan’s failure to meet its commitment under the DPA for a plan to disarm the Janjaweed by 23 June; but it almost certainly will face strong opposition from members such as China, Russia and Qatar. Others also consider that sanctions would do little for creating the necessary conditions for peacekeeping. An unlikely option is strengthening the overall sanctions.
regime, perhaps by taking into account the Sanctions Panel’s recommendations for a no-fly zone and extending the embargo to the whole of Sudan.

An option which many members are eager to avoid is the possibility that Sudanese consent may not be forthcoming and that the Council will then be faced with the need to decide whether or not non-consensual deployment needs to be discussed and planned for.

As for Chad, options include an AU or UN operation providing security for camps, or even a Council-authorised multinational force perhaps under EU command. But there seems to be little enthusiasm within the EU for a mandate to patrol the border. Most consider that the border is too long for ground patrol. Others are concerned that an operation in Chad may be perceived by the rebels as UN protection for the Chadian government. Chad seems not to favour an AU operation. Others have raised the option of aerial surveillance of the border.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

It is unclear whether there will be divisions inside the Council on the appropriate response to Sudan’s reluctance to consent to the transition. The adoption of resolution 1679 by consensus was an important landmark. And it is important to recall that the 15 Council members retained a remarkable unity during the mission to Sudan. While some seem to support pressure on Khartoum accompanied by real threats, a firm Council position supporting a Chapter VII mission coupled also with some positive signals that welcome Sudan’s cooperation and seek to dispel suspicions (perhaps with the adoption of sanctions against rebels) might attract wide support.

Members are aware of the critical importance of a resolution to the current standoff and the risks to the immediate implementation of the DPA if it continues.

Most members seem to favour a combination of pressure and incentives, highlighting that the transition is meant to facilitate an international burden-sharing in order to boost the prospects of success of the implementation of the DPA, and that Chapter VII powers would be aimed at protecting civilians rather than enabling offensive action.

As to the issue of Chapter VII, African members strongly supported a Chapter VII mandate in the discussions in Khartoum, and the AU has been increasingly more vocal about its support for the transition.

There is wide support for the need to incorporate Chad into the discussions, particularly in view of the risk posed to the implementation of the DPA and the strengthening of AMIS, but there is some reluctance to seeing the domestic political situation in Chad itself addressed in detail within the Council. The preference is for attention to the cross-border issues, protection of civilians, avoiding conflict between Sudan and Chad and urging domestic dialogue.

**Key Issues**

The following sets of issues have crystallised in the recent weeks.

- Obtaining consent for the transition. (Observers note that Khartoum’s reluctance is partially due to fears that a Chapter VII mandate would lead to the use of force to compel implementation of the DPA and to arrest Sudanese officials on behalf of the ICC.)

- When and how to elaborate on the mandate of a UN operation in Darfur, bearing in mind the expected new mandate for AMIS following the conclusion of the assessment mission. (There are concerns that delaying this work until there is consent plays into Sudan’s hands and gives Khartoum all the leverage. By contrast, beginning this work demonstrates an equal level of resolve on the part of the UN.)

- The timing of the transition has now become an issue, with some reports that, instead of September, December or January is now the best case. All along, civilians in Darfur and in camps have continued to suffer.

- Also important are the issues of troop generation (initial estimates are that 15,000 to 20,000 will be needed), identifying the lead nation(s) and maintaining an “African character” in the mission. Force generation is also difficult in the absence of a mandate. For some this is an additional argument in favour of getting a draft resolution with a clear mandate substantially developed soon. (Some countries have unofficially agreed to provide troops, but there have been difficulties with securing high mobility and intelligence assets the Secretary-General has called for.)

- The issue of strengthening AMIS and proceeding with the implementation of the DPA is important, but members are aware that strengthening will not produce concrete results for many months. Accordingly, improving AMIS within its current strength is also key and the revised mandate is important in that regard.

- The imposition of sanctions, most probably following a formal request from the AU against those that refused to sign the DPA, will also be an issue. An associated issue will arise if the government itself is found in continued breach of the DPA.

- Incorporating the regional dimensions into this picture, particularly the situation in Chad and in the Central African Republic is a particularly complex issue. Aspects include the relationship between the implementation of the DPA and possible spillover effects into Chad, particularly if more troops are deployed in Darfur, and the protection of camps in Chad. Another will be whether to include in the discussions the internal situation in Chad itself. The reported relations between Chadian and Sudanese fighters may require some attention to Chad’s domestic political situation. Another aspect is potential spillover to the Central African Republic.

**Recent Developments**

A series of high-level diplomatic initiatives aimed at eliciting Sudanese consent for the transition took place in June. None of them was successful. Khartoum has for weeks been giving numerous mixed signals ranging from hints at a possibility of eventual consent to outright refusal.

A Council mission visited Sudan, Chad and the AU Headquarters in early June. A briefing on the visiting mission took place on 15 June and the mission report was issued on 22 June.

The AU/UN assessment mission departed for Sudan in early June, co-headed by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno. The AU has reportedly started preliminary arrangements for troop generation and has officially requested NATO logistical support. Guéhenno
briefed the Council on the results of the mission on 27 June.

At the time of writing, an open meeting was scheduled for 29 June that would include a briefing from the Chadian foreign minister regarding the accusations against Sudan for fomenting instability in Chad, and a possible reply from Sudan. Chad and Sudan have repeatedly traded accusations of support for rebel movements. Chad requested in June a Council meeting on the subject under Charter articles 34 and 35, as well as on UN protection for camps.

Implementation of the DPA has fallen behind the agreed schedule. There have been delays in achieving fundamental points such as Khartoum’s presentation of a plan to disarm the Janjaweed and the launching of a Darfur Regional Authority.

Problems on the rebel side have continued as well. Some commanders from both SLM/A factions have defected, respectively joining or denouncing the DPA, but the Justice and Equality Movement and the SLM/A Wahid faction continue to refuse to sign the DPA. Observers note that mutual suspicion among warring factions in Darfur and the fragmentation in rebel movements have presented considerable challenges to the viability of the DPA.

The Ceasefire Commission was inaugurated and an advance SLM/A team from the Minnawi faction visited Khartoum to begin talks on the implementation of the DPA in mid-June.

Meanwhile, insecurity in camps on both sides of the Darfur/Chad border, attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers and protests against the DPA amongst supporters of the SLM/A Wahid faction increased considerably in June. A few military observers are currently deployed along the border, but this has clearly been insufficient to dispel bilateral suspicions or to contain cross-border incursions.

On 14 June, the Council received a briefing from International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the status of investigations in Darfur. The Prosecutor indicated that while his team has not been able to enter Darfur, evidence of large-scale violations had been gathered, and that it did not appear that Sudanese courts were prosecuting cases that were or would be the focus of ICC attention. Sudan indicated that it rejected the Court’s jurisdiction.

Underlying Problems

The key looming problem for the Council to face is the fact that a consensual deployment in Darfur may not be in the cards. Khartoum has for months used numerous means to try to avoid that possibility. Initially, it had hoped to persuade the African Union not to authorise the transition. When, after a considerable delay, the AU supported the transition, Khartoum for weeks delayed its authorisation for the AU/UN assessment mission. Shortly after it authorised the mission in June, it announced that it would not allow UN forces, despite the fact that it had permitted the mission to take place. The most recent signals from Khartoum appear less adamant, but further problems seem inevitable.

UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2006/19 (25 April 2006) expressed concern with the situation in Chad.
- S/PRST/2006/5 (3 February 2006) mandated the Secretariat to start contingency planning.

**Selected Secretary-General's Reports**
- S/2006/306 (19 May 2006) was the latest report on Darfur at the time of writing.
- S/2006/160 (14 March 2006) was the latest regular report on Sudan.

**Latest Panel of Experts’ Report**
- S/2006/250 (19 April 2006)

For historical background, please see our February 2006 Forecast Report.
Somalia

Expected Council Action

In the light of recent developments in Somalia it seems increasingly unclear whether or when the Council might consider the request of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for exemption from the arms embargo for its proposed peace support mission in Somalia (IGASOM). A wider and sober assessment of the security situation in Somalia is likely and the Council may deal with Somalia in both open and informal formats. Any decision is likely to be couched in conditional terms designed to encourage stabilisation of the overall situation and agreement between the Transitional Government and the Islamic Courts Union.

There may also be discussions on targeted sanctions. In addition, the quarterly report of the Secretary-General on Somalia is expected in early July.

Key Issues

The key issue is whether Council members will agree it is time for the Council to look beyond the limited, sanctions-focused role of recent years, and instead take a wider look at the international peace and security issues arising from the situation. In this regard, Somalia is expected to be one of the key issues at the AU Summit on 1-2 July.

These broader aspects include:

- the military advances by the Islamic Courts Union, which now competes with the already fragile status of the Transitional Federal Institutions;
- the allegations about an Al-Qaeda connection, bringing into the picture the Council’s counterterrorism focus;
- external security dimensions, including the fact that Ethiopia is reported to be massing troops on the border;
- the call by the African Union for measures against various Somali warlords; and
- renewed proposals for an African peacekeeping presence.

A subsidiary issue is whether and how to respond to the request for an arms embargo exemption for African peacekeepers. The Council has previously stated that a key condition for granting an exemption is that the Transitional Federal Institutions first develop a national security and stabilisation plan (NSSP), including “a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire agreement, as well as plans for the restoration of public safety and security institutions and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”, and that the peacekeeping mission plan be worked out with the broad consensus of the Transitional Federal Institutions and be consistent with the NSSP. Observers note that the NSSP is very generic and may not fulfil the Council’s conditions.

But recent developments suggest that there is now a more pressing issue. Even if these conditions can be satisfactorily met once IGAD and the African Union present a mission plan, which may emerge in July following a joint AU-IGAD assessment mission, the larger issue seems to be whether the Islamic Courts Union also accepts the NSSP, given their opposition to the deployment of IGASOM. A factor that will add to these concerns is that the Islamic Courts Union would likely view a premature lifting of the embargo as the Council’s taking sides as between them and the Transitional Federal Institutions.

The progress made at a meeting in Sudan between the Transitional Federal Institutions and Islamic Courts Union suggests that the two parties are at least willing to talk—but their agreement on mutual recognition, however fragile, suggests that in the future the Council is likely to have to weigh the interests of both sides.

The latter issue raises an associated question for IGASOM’s proposed deployment. In the current circumstances, it would seem that unless the Islamic Courts Union is a party to the NSSP and recalcitrant warlords are contained, there will in fact be no peace for IGAD to keep in Somalia.

Given the opposition of the Islamic Courts Union to the IGAD mission, a related challenge is how to create conditions for increased cooperation and confidence between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Islamic Courts Union.

Options

Options before Council members include:

- continuation of the previous Council policy of essentially limiting Council involvement to minor aspects of the sanctions regime;
- consideration of when and under what conditions to grant an exemption from the arms embargo;
- postponing any decision on Somalia pending greater clarity on the outcome of discussions between the Islamic Courts Union and the Transitional Federal Institutions on the issue of IGASOM’s deployment;
- adopting a presidential statement addressing the wider situation in Somalia with a focus on encouraging the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union to reach an accommodation, perhaps involving some form of a “road map”; and
- enhancing a presidential statement with incentives and disincentives, such as elements previewing a possible package with conditional exemption and measures against individual violators, perhaps with reference to the draft list provided by the Monitoring Group of the Somalia Sanctions Committee. An important option will then be the imposition of targeted sanctions.

Council and Wider Dynamics

There is unity within the Council on the need to avoid the collapse of the Transitional Federal Institutions’ process. But there is also growing support for encouraging dialogue between the Somali Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union.

The Council is divided on the wisdom of considering an arms embargo exemption at this time. Those divisions became clear during the briefing on 19 June by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative François Lonseny Fall and recent negotiations on a Council press statement regarding developments on the ground which has not been agreed. The initial draft contained a paragraph expressing intention to consider the exemption, which some members opposed. China, Russia and African members especially seem to be sympathetic to the AU-IGAD
request. The United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark and Qatar seem very cautious about prematurely granting the exemption.

Council dynamics are also likely to be influenced by the dynamics inside the recently formed, US-led Core Group on Somalia, which comprises the United States, the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania and the United Kingdom. Observers note that the Core Group has so far been unable to develop a comprehensive common position.

Some Council members still support the strengthening of the arms embargo, possibly taking into account the recommendations of the Monitoring Group for sanctions on charcoal and fisheries.

**Recent Developments**

The situation in Somalia has changed considerably over the past weeks. The Islamic Courts Union was able to successfully extend its territorial control to include key cities such as Mogadishu and Jowhar. The move ended years of warlord control over those areas. Most observers were taken by surprise at the speed at which the Islamic Courts Union was able to overcome the self-styled coalition of warlords, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism.

The situation remains fluid, and it is unclear whether the warlords still pose a threat.

It is also uncertain, in the light of the Transitional Federal Government’s calls for the Islamic Courts Union to lay down arms and retreat to Mogadishu, whether the Transitional Federal Government is open to serious negotiations with the Islamic Courts Union or whether international assistance or encouragement might facilitate reaching agreement between the two parties. At press time, talks under the mediation of Sudan and the Arab League appeared to have secured a ceasefire.

Comprised of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, IGAD on 13 June decided to make a list of individuals “involved in illegal use of arms” and to apply individual sanctions (such as asset freezes and travel bans) against “all warlords”.

The NSSP was adopted by the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament on 14 June, after months of internal divisions related to the nationality of IGASOM troops and the endorsement of the Council of Ministers. A consensus was achieved that Uganda and Sudan would contribute troops, thus avoiding participation from countries bordering Somalia.

The AU Peace and Security Council expressed support for the IGAD initiatives and on 15 June reiterated the request for an exemption for IGASOM.

The United States initiated preparations for the establishment of a Core Group. The first meeting took place on 15 June, in which the Group expressed support for the framework of the Transitional Federal Institutions and for dialogue.

**Underlying Problems**

There is a lack of clarity regarding the Islamic Courts Union. Some of its members were reported to have expressed interest in making Somalia an Islamic state. Other reports cite the presence of extremists and of internal clan divisions that may undermine the cohesiveness of the group, especially now that it controls a considerable portion of the Somali territory.

There were allegations of US support for the Mogadishu warlords against the Islamic Courts Union due to its concerns with Somalia under the Islamic Courts Union becoming a safe haven for terrorists, particularly Al-Qaida. Some observers claim the United States is the unnamed country in the Monitoring Group’s report considered to have provided support for warlords in addition to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Italy, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Whether or not that was the case, the United States seems to be taking a new direction with its efforts to promote the Core Group meeting and acceptance of a more open approach to the Islamic Courts Union. But prospects became less clear with the nomination of Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (who is reportedly on a US list of wanted terrorists) as head of a consultative council set up inside the Islamic Courts Union. The US has reportedly rejected any contact with Shaykh Aweys.

Observers have criticised the restricted membership of the Core Group, which currently does not include key actors such as the African Union, Yemen or Kenya.
In the event of an ambiguous Iranian response, a further option may be to request a report with a short deadline, on the technical aspects from the Director General of the IAEA.

Council Dynamics
At the US-EU Summit in June, the EU and the US in their joint summit declaration stated that if Iran does not engage in negotiations then further steps would be taken in the Council. However, the US appears to be viewing the package as an ultimatum that will either bring Tehran to the negotiating table and suspend enrichment activity or lead directly to sanctions. It is unclear whether the EU3 countries may be open to discussing at least one further step towards a diplomatic, negotiated solution, especially if Iran comes back with an ambiguous response or with counter-proposals. Although China and Russia agreed to the incentives/disincentives package and are therefore likely to support a stronger response than was on the table in May, they are also likely to continue to argue for a cautious approach and to be keen to proceed by way of further incremental pressure before agreeing to the imposition of sanctions.

The ten elected Council members remain outside the loop, with varying degrees of discomfort. But there is a sense that the Council, on this issue, will accept whatever the P5 agree.

Recent Developments
For a full description of the background of this issue please see our February, March, May and June 2006 Forecast Reports.

The P5 plus Germany on 1 June agreed to offer Iran a package of incentives as a basis for further discussion, as predicted in our June 2006 Forecast Report. On 6 June EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana took the incentives package, which included the suspension of action in the Council, to Tehran. The package is a mix of trade, security and technology benefits but it comes with the condition that Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In a departure from a foreign policy position held since the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis, the US has also agreed, as part of the incentives package, to participate in direct nuclear talks with Iran and to partially lift sanctions.

The details have not been publicly released but it is believed that the following incentives are included:

- assistance for Iran’s nuclear industry including provision of light water nuclear reactors and enriched fuel (perhaps via the earlier Russian proposal);
- permission to buy spare parts for civilian aircraft made by US manufacturers;
- help with modernising oil and gas industries;
- restrictions lifted on the use of US technology in agriculture; and
- support for Iranian membership of World Trade Organisation.

The 1 June statement from the P5 plus Germany also indicated that if Iran does not agree to negotiate, further steps would be taken by the Council. Possible disincentives include an embargo on the export to Iran of goods and technologies relevant to nuclear programmes, freezing of assets of organisations and people involved in the nuclear programmes, a visa and travel ban for senior Iranian officials and perhaps an embargo on exports to Iran of other strategically important products (e.g. refined petroleum products).

On timing, contrary to many expectations at the end of May (and contrary to the prediction in our June 2006 Forecast Report), the disincentives part of the package (i.e. the resolution) was not tabled in the Council. This was an important concession by the US, giving space and time for Tehran to work through the issue.

But, senior US officials have made it clear that they expect Iran to respond quickly. They have said that they would like to hear from Iran by the last week of June or by mid-July at the latest. The US time-frame appears to be related to the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow on 29 June and the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg on 15 July.
Iran has responded fairly constructively in public and has agreed to study the offer. But it seems to be working on a different time schedule. The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has said that Iran will respond by mid-August to the package of incentives. Ali Larijani, Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear issues, has said that while there are some positive steps in the proposals, the key issue of uranium enrichment was ambiguous and needed to be clarified.

At the 12 June meeting of the IAEA governors, the IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the package of measures offered to Iran and reiterated his belief that this issue can be resolved through dialogue and mutual accommodation.

On 22 June the Secretary-General met with the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Motaki who informed Annan that Iran was considering the package very seriously and was willing to negotiate if there were no preconditions. The Secretary-General indicated that his impression was that, on timing, a response before the middle of July was unlikely. A further meeting with the Secretary-General was held in New York on 28 June where Annan urged Iran to speed up its response to the proposals.

At the time of publication, Javier Solana was expected to meet with Ali Larijani at the end of June to clarify what Larijani has referred to as the "ambiguities" in the proposal.

**Key Issues**

The main issue now that the package of incentives has been offered is Iran's response. If Iran insists on long term uranium enrichment the Council will have to decide on how to respond.

A second issue is whether suspension should be a condition precedent for moving forward with talks. Iran wants negotiations without "pre-conditions" while the P5 and Germany want suspension of uranium enrichment as a condition before any talks are held.

A related issue arises if Iran offers counter-proposals rather than a straight yes or no. For example Iran could suggest restrictions on the number of uranium-spinning centrifuge machines it operates or refrain from industrial-scale uranium enrichment but not on small-scale enrichment projects.

**Underlying Problems**

There are reports that the delays in Tehran may be linked to an internal struggle between radical and pragmatic leaders. Whether Iran is able to accept a halt in uranium enrichment during negotiations may depend on the outcome.

**Most Recent UN Documents**

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**Children and Armed Conflict**

**Expected Council Action**

In July the Council is expected to have an open debate on children and armed conflict, chaired by the French foreign minister. It will consider a report from the chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the issue and a representative from UNICEF. The World Bank, UNDP and some regional organisations are likely to be invited to join in the discussion. A presidential statement is likely.

**Key Facts**

Children and Armed Conflict took on a high profile in the General Assembly after the World Summit for Children in 1990. In 1993 the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the impact of armed conflict on children. He appointed Graça Machel, formerly Minister of Education in Mozambique. Her 1996 report, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, laid the foundation for a comprehensive international agenda for action.

The Machel report led in September 1997 to the appointment of Olara Otunnu as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict. In 1998 he was invited to informally brief the Council for the first time. Concerned about the risk to peace and security posed by the growing problem of children and armed conflict, the Council held its first open debate and issued a presidential statement in June 1998 putting this issue on the international security agenda.

Since 1999 there have been six resolutions and regular open debates on the issue. The first two resolutions, 1261 of 1999 and 1314 of 2000, identified areas of concern such as the protection of children from sexual abuse, the linkage between small-arms proliferation and armed conflict, and the inclusion of children in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and peace agreements. At this early stage the resolutions contained generic statements, and they had little impact on groups recruiting and using children in armed conflict.

Starting in 2001, the resolutions began to include more concrete requests. One of the most groundbreaking and controversial was the request in resolution 1379 of November 2001 for the Secretary-General to attach to his report a “list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in violation of international obligations in situations” which were already on the Council’s agenda or could be brought to its attention as a matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with article 99 of the Charter.
But there continued to be a lack of real progress in getting armed groups using children in armed conflict to comply with international norms. As a result, resolution 1460 in 2003 endorsed the Secretary-General’s call to move the issue into an “era of application.”

The Secretary-General was asked to report on the progress made by parties in stopping the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict and to develop specific proposals for monitoring and reporting on the application of international norms on children and armed conflict. He was also asked to include the protection of children in armed conflict in all his country-specific reports.

In 2004, resolution 1539 requested the Secretary-General to “devise urgently” an action plan for a comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism that could provide accurate and timely information on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict. The resolution asked for parties listed in the Secretary-General’s reports to prepare concrete plans to stop the recruitment and use of children.

Most recently, resolution 1612 of 22 July 2005 created a formal monitoring and reporting (MNR) mechanism and a Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The MNR mechanism is a process for the systematic collection of information on violations against children in armed conflict and on progress made by parties in complying with international norms on children and armed conflict. The information is then channelled through various UN bodies and committees to the Working Group. Resolution 1612 also asked for an independent review of the MNR mechanism by 31 July 2006.

The Working Group, chaired by France, has held four meetings and adopted its terms of reference and a work programme. At its last meeting, on 26 June, the group considered the country report of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and an informal document listing the range of possible measures, referred to as a tool-kit, to be used against parties that continue to recruit child soldiers and commit crimes against children. The Working Group will consider Sudan and Sri Lanka in August; Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi in October; Somalia and possibly Nepal in December. At each meeting, the Working Group will also consider an overview of other situations involving parties that recruit or use children in armed conflict.

Two months after consideration of a country report, the Working Group will issue its recommendations on possible action to be taken against groups involved in using children in armed conflict in that particular country. The understanding is that the recommendations will be taken to the Council for formal approval by the chairman of the Working Group.

Please see www.securitycouncilreport.org for more detailed background material.

Key Issues

The main issue before the Council in 2006 is the question of what can be added at this stage to the work already being done on children and armed conflict. The review, called for in resolution 1612, of the MNR mechanism needs to be undertaken. However, it is perhaps too early to assess the MNR mechanism or the Working Group effectively. Delays both in the establishment of the Working Group and in appointing the current Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict meant that the process did not become fully operational until 2006.

An emerging issue is whether other actors like the World Bank can be persuaded to join forces and work closely with the MNR process.

A practical issue that may need to be addressed relates to the procedures of the Working Group and how it will make concrete recommendations to the Council, particularly in cases involving countries contained in Annex II of the Secretary-General’s 2005 report, that are not involved in situations with which the Council is seized.

Council Dynamics

While there is broad consensus that the UN should focus on the impact of children’s involvement in armed conflict, some members like Russia, China and the United States feel that this is largely a human rights issue that does not need to be regularly on the Council’s agenda. Russia and China have also made it clear that they are uncomfortable with Annex II, which was attached to the last three reports of the Secretary-General and lists parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in armed conflict from countries not on the Council’s agenda. (Russia and China may see this as a possible back door that could lead to these situations being put on the Council’s formal agenda.)

In the past, Russia and the United Kingdom had national reasons for being displeased with Annex II. Chechnya and Northern Ireland were listed in 2003 and 2004. They were excluded from the 2005 list after the United Kingdom and Russia successfully argued that these were not situations of armed conflict. Countries still on the list and some other members of the Council were unhappy as they felt that the lists had become politicised.

France, with the strong support of European countries like Denmark and African members like Benin (on the Council until the end of 2005), has been the driving force behind this issue. These countries see children and armed conflict as an important thematic issue with peace and security implications that fully deserves the Council’s attention.

Japan has taken a cautious position. Together with the United States, it maintains that results are needed before moving to the next stage and remains wary of potential budgetary implications. It has also been sensitive to the concerns of Asian countries on the list. In the past, South American countries like Argentina and Brazil were reluctant to support initiatives involving situations not on the Council’s agenda. (Colombia is regularly listed in Annex II). However, Argentina and Peru now appear more open to considering all situations where children are affected by armed conflict.
Options
The most likely option is that the Council will issue a presidential statement that would reinforce its commitment to improving the situation of children caught in armed conflict, highlight developments since the last debate, and reschedule the review called for in resolution 1612. The presidential statement may also refer to the need for partnerships with other international actors that are interested in working with the UN on this issue.

Other possible options include:
- Attaching as an annex to the presidential statement a list of possible measures to be used against groups that have shown no progress in stopping the use of children in armed conflict. (But this remains highly unlikely as neither the Working Group nor the Council have come to an agreement on the measures that could be used.)
- Deciding to draft a resolution for adoption later in the year. (This is unlikely as the general feeling is that it is too early for another resolution.)
- Initiating regular briefings from the chairman of the Working Group so that the group’s recommendations can be considered by the Council.

Underlying Problems
Despite the progress made, there are deep divisions among members. China, Russia and to some extent Japan and the United States are reluctant to have the Council become deeply involved in this issue. On the other hand, France, Denmark and possibly now the United Kingdom would like to see more action-oriented initiatives.

Further down the track, measures like targeted sanctions and restrictions on military assistance are likely to be identified as the kinds of tools the Council may need to apply to bring about real change in the attitudes of the groups involved in using children in armed conflict. But this will be a contentious area.

Another problem is that for the MNR mechanism to be effective there must be confidence in the accuracy and objectivity of the information collected and presented to the Working Group. The process is still at an early stage. The UN country teams and NGOs on the ground are often operating in difficult conditions in which it is not always possible to verify information.

A problem that could arise in the future is the need for greater resources if the MNR mechanism is to be fully implemented. It currently uses existing resources that may not be sufficient to properly monitor some situations and is likely to stretch the capacity of the UN country teams involved in monitoring.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005) requested the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring and reporting mechanism and set up the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.
- S/RES1539 (22 April 2004) asked for an action plan for a systematic and comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism.
- S/RES/1460 (30 January 2003) requested specific proposals to ensure more efficient and effective monitoring and reporting. It also requested the Secretary-General to include the issue in country-specific reports.
- S/RES/1379 (20 November 2001) requested the Secretary-General to attach to his report a list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children.
- S/RES/1261 (30 August 1999) condemned targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, urged parties to armed conflict to take into consideration protection of children and urged states to facilitate DDR.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2005/8 (23 February 2005) reiterated the Security Council’s intention to complete the process of setting up a monitoring and reporting mechanism and indicated that the Council had started work on a new resolution.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Expected Council Action
Council members’ attention will be focused on the general elections, scheduled for 30 July. In the lead up, depending on developments on the ground, members may want to adopt a statement reinforcing the election process.

Before the end of the month, the Council is expected to renew the targeted sanctions and the arms embargo under resolutions 1616 and 1649. Members are also expected to receive the final report of the Group of Experts under resolution 1654 by 10 July and to renew the Group’s mandate by 31 July.

Consideration of a list of individual violators under resolution 1649 by the Sanctions Committee is possible.
A post-election strategy for the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) will also be on the minds of Council members. But discussions on this, as well as on the Secretary-General’s report on MONUC’s role vis-à-vis the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), are likely to be postponed until after the elections.

Options
Options include:

- renewing the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts;
- extending the sanctions regime as recommended by the Group of Experts to establish a traceability system for precious minerals, but this option is unlikely at the moment;
- requesting further details on the traceability system from the Group; and
- adopting a list of individual violators under resolution 1649, bearing in mind the requests in this regard from neighbouring states and the Congolese government.

Key Issues
The key issue before the Council is how best to ensure that the Congolese elections are successfully concluded and the transition period finalised, particularly given the potential for election-motivated violence. With this in mind, the Council will be cautious about any steps that might destabilise the situation.

An emerging issue is the conduct and discipline of Congolese forces, in view of recent reports of serious and persistent abuses against civilians and some unconfirmed reports of inappropriate use of force by MONUC.

The issues of MONUC’s post-election mandate and size, security sector reform and the disarmament of foreign armed groups loom large as issues to be considered after the elections.

Key Facts
A Council mission visited the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 10-12 June. On 16 June, the mission’s head, Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière of France, briefed the Council. He expressed a positive view on the prospects for orderly and fair elections. But the briefing also highlighted the challenges in the security situation, particularly given the potential for post-election violence from groups dissatisfied with the results. And the recent abduction of Nepalese MONUC peacekeepers underlines the challenges ahead.

Ahead of likely future Council negotiations on MONUC’s post-election strategy, the Ambassador highlighted that the elections “are not an end in themselves; they are a phase.” And the briefing also stressed some key post-election tasks such as concluding security sector reform efforts, solving the problem of armed groups in the east, and managing the administration of resources.

Observers note the increase in hate speech and the manipulation of nationalist feelings against “foreigners,” particularly Europeans and Rwandophones. Other concerns include a boycott by the main opposition party, the Union pour la démocratie et progrès social (UDPS). The party has recently organised demonstrations calling for negotiations on its inclusion in the polls.

In addition to MONUC, security in the electoral period in the DRC will be assisted by forces borrowed from the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and by a Council-authorised European Union standby force (EUFOR DR Congo). EUFOR’s advance component is expected to be deployed by 15 July.

Council Dynamics
Regarding the sanctions regime, there is support in the Council for new individual sanctions against commanders of irregular armed groups in the DRC. This is seen as a response to a request from the DRC. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi under the Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission. Discussions are ongoing, and members are still working on their possible lists for submission to the sanctions committee.

But there is a sense that further action on armed groups, particularly in response to issues raised in the report of the Secretary-General under resolution 1649, should be postponed until after the elections. Members now seem to be primarily focused on the challenges surrounding the elections.

Some members appear to be interested in discussing the recommendations of the Group of Experts. However, others seem to feel that this issue should also be postponed so as not to divert efforts away from the elections.

But the potential for division in the Council regarding MONUC’s situation after the elections is already on the minds of members. Some have made clear that the UN should be present in the DRC for the long run, and that premature withdrawals would be unacceptable. This view seems to have gained momentum since the deterioration of the security situation in Timor-Leste.

But inevitably, the traditional concerns of some members, the United States in particular, about the overall costs of peacekeeping are expected to come to the fore at some point.

Underlying Problems
The Tripartite Commission has made several requests for MONUC and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to forcibly disarm armed groups in the DRC.

In his report on foreign armed groups in the DRC, the Secretary-General indicated that dealing with such groups is primarily a responsibility of governments. The Secretariat has also indicated that MONUC’s first priority is the Congolese elections, and thus forcibly disarming those armed groups in response to regional requests would not be possible at this time. It also indicated that UNMIS does not have enough capability to combat LRA forces, against which the preferred course of action would be to improve information-sharing (with MONUC and UNMIS support) and regional coordination.
Côte d'Ivoire

Expected Council Action

The Council will consider the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) due in the first half of July. There will be a discussion on the progress made toward the implementation of the roadmap to the 31 October elections as well as an anticipated recommendation for an additional reinforcement of UNOCI’s troop level. The Council will also review the outcome from the International Working Group (IWG) on Côte d’Ivoire. A presidential statement endorsing the work of the IWG is likely. Some discussion of additional targeted sanctions is also possible.

Options

The Council has the following options:

- adopting a presidential statement supporting the IWG, welcoming the Secretary-General’s report and warning that further targeted sanctions are possible;
- extending the list of individuals subject to sanctions for obstructing the political process;
- adopting a resolution increasing the UNOCI’s troop level as recommended by the Secretary-General; or
- adopting a resolution transferring troops and police units from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on a temporary basis to support the identification and disarmament processes.

Council Dynamics

The Council seems increasingly inclined to extend the list of individuals subject to sanctions for blocking the peace process. Recently the sanctions committee, despite the Ivorian government’s argument to the contrary, concluded that there was evidence that Ivorian forces were hindering the work of the international forces and that some local media were broadcasting hate messages. France may propose additional names, including perhaps those of influential politicians. Russia and China remain reluctant with regard to sanctions. However it seems they may be more willing to consider sanctions in cases involving hate media.

The other main dynamic that continues to divide the Council is UNOCI’s troop level. The United States is reluctant to increase the troop levels in the absence of progress on the roadmap. Other Council members seem ready to support an increase as recommended by the Secretary-General. There are differing views on the issue of a transfer of troops from UNMIL to UNOCI. Some members think that, because the situation in Côte d’Ivoire threatens to destabilise Liberia, a transfer is crucial, while others (especially the United States) are hesitant to reduce the strength of UNMIL because the situation is still precarious in Liberia.

Key Issues

The first issue to be considered by the Council is an assessment of the progress made toward the implementation of the roadmap. Council members will be keen to hear the views of the Secretariat on the recent developments in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and identification programmes. However, the Council will wait for the conclusions of the IWG in late July before taking action.

The second issue is additional sanctions against individuals found to be obstructing the political process, especially those spreading hate messages in the media or supporting the prolonging of the mandate of the National Assembly (in opposition to the IWG, which in January recommended that it be dissolved). A related issue is whether to discuss the list of names with the African Union before introducing it to the sanctions committee.

Looming in the background, a third issue is the role that the Council should play if it becomes clear that the October elections have to be postponed. Council members seem to be preparing to take this possibility into account and are hoping to find a common position on consequential issues, such as whether the mandate of President Laurent Gbagbo should be extended. But they are

For the historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Forecast Report.

also conscious of the risk of premature action that could result in shifting expectations on the ground and actually hamper the process leading to the elections. The Council will also be keen to hear the views of the IWG and the African Union at the occasion of the AU Summit on 1-2 July. Indeed, France had requested that this assessment be made as soon as possible, but other Council members seemed to prefer that discussions on a possible prolonging of President Gbagbo’s mandate start after the AU summit. In any case, the Council is likely to be guided by the AU’s recommendations. The Secretary-General will attend the AU Summit; on the margins of which he will hold a “mini-summit” on Côte d’Ivoire with President Gbagbo and other visiting heads of state.

It is expected that the Secretary-General will reiterate the need for additional troops in Côte d’Ivoire. However, new troops are not expected to be able to arrive in Côte d’Ivoire for some time and the current strength of UNOCI is not sufficient to handle the DDR and identification processes over the whole territory. While it seems unlikely that the United States will accept an additional troop-level increase, a temporary deployment to UNOCI of military and police units from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) will remain an important issue.

**Key Facts**
The IWG was mandated to draw up a roadmap leading to free, fair, open and transparent elections as soon as possible and no later than 31 October 2006. The roadmap, presented in November 2005, spelled out among other things the DDR of government ex-combatants and rebel militias, the process of voter identification and registration, the restoration of security throughout the country, respect for human rights, and the possibility of imposing sanctions against those blocking UNOCI’s freedom of movement and media-monitoring.

Since then, the Council has been closely following the progress toward the implementation of this roadmap through the systematic endorsement of the IWG’s monthly final communiqués.

**Recent Developments**
In April, Ivorian leaders under AU mediation agreed that the DDR programme would be conducted simultaneously with the identification process for up to three million disenfranchised Ivorians.

A one-week pilot programme aimed at giving identity papers and voting cards to around 5,000 Ivorians and immigrants aged 13 and over who did not have a birth certificate started on 18 May in seven towns throughout the country. In the government-controlled south, only a few people showed up to the local hearings of the programme because of disruptions by supporters of the president known as the Young Patriots (or Jeunes Patriotes). While the Young Patriots claimed that thousands of foreigners would fraudulently obtain Ivorian nationality, others suggested that the Patriots fear that President Gbagbo could lose the elections if the entire population could vote. In the rebel north, the hearings were successful.

The pre-cantonment of the government forces (FANCI) and rebel forces (Forces Nouvelles) started on 23 May. Some combatants and militias members returned to designated sites, but the cantonment process still has to be launched on a national scale, once the nationwide identification hearings are on track, which is scheduled for the end of June. Therefore the actual disarmament, set to begin on 8 June, has not begun at press time.

On 2 June, the Council adopted resolution 1682 increasing the troop level of UNOCI by 1,500, including a maximum of 1,025 military personnel and 475 civilian police personnel. This reinforcement had been discussed since April, but it seems that both France and the United States were linking the possible increase in UNOCI’s troop level to the downsizing of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which was finally authorised in resolution 1681 of 31 May. Benin and Jordan are to provide the military forces while Nigeria, Bangladesh and Jordan are to provide the police units.

**Underlying Problems**
A recent Human Rights Watch report pointed out that human rights violations and impunity were threatening to disturb the run-up to the elections, with a risk of renewed violence. UNOCI continues to receive threats against its personnel and keeps being obstructed.

The cantonment phase should include the gathering of combatants at 75 sites in the rebel north and south in the government south. But those facilities are not yet available due to a lack of UNOCI capabilities and funding.

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**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 personnel.

**Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2006/23 (24 May 2006) endorsed the sixth IWG final communiqué; expressed concern at the delay in the DDR and identification processes; and underlined the targeted measures against those blocking the peace process and obstructing UNOCI.
- S/PRST/2006/20 (27 April 2006) endorsed the seventh IWG final communiqué; confirmed that the DDR and identification processes; and underlined the targeted measures against those blocking the peace process and obstructing UNOCI.

**Last Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/222 (11 April 2006) was the latest report.

**Letters to/from the President of the Council**
- S/2006/345 (30 May 2006) letter from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General on the reinforcement of UNOCI.
- S/2006/334 (26 May 2006) letter from the Secretary-General calling for a reinforcement of UNOCI.
- S/2006/294 (11 May 2006) letter from Côte d’Ivoire referring to human rights violations committed by French Licorne troops against the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, including a statement made by the permanent representative to the Sanctions Committee on 12 April 2006.
Options

The most likely option would be the appointment of a special envoy under the Secretary-General’s good offices, with perhaps some Council action endorsing the initiative. The Council might also consider the option of issuing a letter from the Council President to the Secretary-General encouraging the appointment of an envoy.

It is unlikely that Council members will agree that the mandate of the envoy should be focused exclusively on northern Uganda. Kampala would oppose such a focus. It claims that the LRA is a regional problem that must be confronted in Sudan and the DRC as well. A regional dimension is therefore likely. A further option which is more likely is some role, direct or indirect, to help address the root causes of the LRA insurgency. Kampala is reluctant about this, but some note that without this aspect there would be challenges for the design of a meaningful mandate for an eventual envoy.

The option of formal action mandating the UN missions in the Sudan (UNMIS) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to engage the LRA is unlikely in July, given the imminent Congolese elections and the need, first of all, to take decisions with respect to Darfur, regarding UNMIS.

The options for appointment of a Panel of Experts (which Uganda opposes) or for the formal inclusion of northern Uganda on the Council’s agenda remain as fallback option but currently have no momentum.

Key Issues

The immediate issue for the Council will be its reaction to the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the LRA. It will be important to find new approaches while bearing in mind Kampala’s concerns. Within that context, a key aspect is the mandate of an eventual special envoy and who would be appointed to the post.

In this regard, most Council members are conscious that a long-term solution to the problem in northern Uganda entails not only military and political efforts regarding the LRA, but also a solution to the social, economic and political issues in Uganda itself.

A key issue is the relationship between the political track (such as talks with the LRA) and the need to execute International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants against LRA leaders. Closely associated with both is the need to find ways to lure rank-and-file fighters out of the bush in light of the influence of the LRA leadership and concerns with reintegration.

On the military track, the Secretary-General’s report is expected to give guidance on how best to support regional action, especially given the fact that Sudan seems to have withdrawn consent for Ugandan troops to pursue the LRA in Sudanese territory. This may be in response to Uganda’s repeated requests for a Chapter VII mandate for UNMIS to pursue the LRA in Sudan.

More complex, however, is the political issue, including the root causes of the LRA insurgency and the need to address the political and social marginalisation of northerners.

Key Facts

The recommendations by the Secretary-General requested under resolutions 1653 and 1663 have been delayed since March. The initial idea was to have recommendations and discussions on a special envoy as two separate tracks. But bilateral contacts between the Secretariat and Kampala seem to have been unsuccessful.

The Secretariat provided an oral briefing on the LRA to Council members on 26 April as a way of trying to meet the Council’s request. It highlighted the issue of root causes and stressed Kampala’s primary responsibility for ensuring that these are addressed. The briefing stressed that a solution would entail the arrest of LRA leaders and the establishment of a disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration programme. Key points would also be information-sharing and better regional coordination.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), launched a mediation attempt between Kampala and the LRA leadership. The initiative followed the Ugandan government’s announcement on 13 May, after a meeting with Sudanese officials, of a two-month ultimatum for the LRA to surrender, citing readiness to guarantee the safety of LRA leader Joseph Kony. Southern Sudanese Vice-President Riek Machar is reported to have recently called on the ICC to hold off and await the results of the negotiations. The ICC has stressed the obligation of the DRC, Sudan and Uganda to execute the warrants.

But Kampala seems to have limited expectations of this track given its commitments towards the ICC and the enforcement of pending arrest warrants, as well as its past experience in negotiating with the LRA leader Joseph Kony. Kampala has recently refused to participate in the talks.

On the military track, the Ugandan government has underlined the need for the establishment of a regional coordination mechanism and for action from UN peacekeeping operations against the LRA.

Together with Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, Uganda made a formal request that the African Union submit names to the Council for sanctions under resolution 1649. The DRC Sanctions Committee is currently considering the imposition of targeted sanctions on foreign armed groups in the DRC, but it is unclear when a list will emerge. The AU Summit taking place on 1-2 July in the Gambian capital Banjul may lead to some further developments on that front.

Council Dynamics
It appears that Council members have decided to wait for the Secretary-General’s recommendations and observe developments with the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) before taking any positions. For some, this is due to a degree of sympathy for the efforts by the Ugandan government as well as the government’s views on the appointment of a special envoy. For other Council members, however, a test will be whether the JMC initiative addresses the root causes of the formation of the LRA.

Several members seem intent on keeping the issue alive in the Council and moving along with proposals such as appointing a special envoy. Those members are likely to be concerned also with the execution of ICC arrest warrants.

The recent Council visit to Sudan seems to have reinforced the view among many members that it is essential to consider the overall regional context, including the LRA aspect, very seriously.

Underlying Problems
Kampala’s opposition to a UN role in addressing the root causes of the LRA and the overall problems in the north as well as its resistance to the possibility of limiting the mandate of a special envoy to northern Uganda is a looming problem.

Finding a balance between the government’s requirements and addressing what most actors consider the key causes of the long-festering conflict will be crucial if any proposal is to have real chances of success.

Furthermore, observers note there have been difficulties in following up on the JMC and Emergency Plan for northern Uganda, which was agreed between the government, the UN and the Core Group and launched on 4 May. In addition to capacity issues within some Ugandan ministries, some of the key steps in the Plan are not yet in place, particularly a more detailed arrangement in terms of expected action and assignment of responsibilities within the government. There also seems to be some scepticism and reluctance on the part of certain JMC participants.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1663 (24 March 2006) specified that the 1653 report should include recommendations on dealing with the LRA.
- S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) requested the Secretary-General’s report on UN missions’ assistance with civilian protection.
- S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) requested a “comprehensive and integrated strategy for the disarmament, repatriation and resettlement of foreign combatants, incorporating military, political, economic and justice-related aspects.”
- S/RES/1539 (22 April 2004) and 1265 (17 September 2005) expressed willingness to take measures to protect children and civilians in armed conflict.

Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.5415 (19 April 2006) contained the Ugandan briefing.

For historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Update Report.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In July the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, will give an assessment of talks between Belgrade and Pristina at a public meeting of the Council. No Council action is expected, but some probing questions in the Informal Consultations are likely. In September, Ahtisaari may return with an update.

Council Dynamics
The briefing and opportunity for questions are an important part of the dynamics surrounding the Kosovo issue. While the Contact Group (the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) remains the focal point for international diplomacy surrounding the status talks, the Council will ultimately need to approve any agreement on Kosovo’s final status. If the parties do not
reach an agreement, the Council will have to deal with the situation. Council members that are not part of the Contact Group have little information about and little influence over the status process. Ahtisaari, who has a very independent role in the process, has said he will remain in close consultation with the Contact Group and China. His briefing, while unlikely to surprise Council members who are Contact Group members, will be very important to the Council as a whole. He is known to strongly favour a thorough negotiation process that will secure the Contact Group’s support.

Despite recent progress in clarifying the parties’ respective positions on major issues, the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo remain far apart on the status of Kosovo. Most Council members seem to accept that seven years of international administration preclude any return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s control. As a result, many members want to maintain pressure on Pristina to fulfill commitments to establish adequate provisions for the minority population in Kosovo, as this is viewed as essential for any status resolution.

A major dynamic in the Council in the past has stemmed from the concern by some, Russia in particular, but others as well, that independence for Kosovo could stimulate separatist struggles elsewhere.

The Council has not previously discussed Ahtisaari’s approach to the talks and will be interested in his report.

**Key Facts**

Established by resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was tasked with “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.” On 23 May 2005, the Secretary-General asked Kai Eide of Norway to examine whether the situation in Kosovo warranted the start of formal status negotiations. Although Eide noted several areas of concern he recommended the commencement of status talks, which was supported by the Secretary-General. On 24 October, the Council endorsed this recommendation.

Ahtisaari was appointed to his post on 10 November. The start of negotiations was delayed by the death of Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova in January. Since then, there have been six rounds of talks in Vienna between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, focusing on technical issues such as decentralisation, the protection of religious heritage and the economy. The status process is expected to be completed by the end of 2006, although Ahtisaari has warned that talks may take longer.

**Key Issues**

Concern in the Council that Kosovo’s independence could encourage separatist movements elsewhere to escalate their struggles seems to have receded somewhat. But the issue has not gone away. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently suggested that the logic behind an independent Kosovo could apply to potential independent states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Contact Group representatives have said they will ensure that any Council resolution on final status will be so specific to Kosovo that it should avoid setting a legal precedent.

A related issue flows from the fact that Kosovo Albanians insist they will settle for nothing less than independence. Serbia has offered “conditional” independence that would restrict Kosovo’s autonomy for a twenty-year transition period in which Belgrade would maintain control over borders and Kosovo would be forbidden to develop military forces. Belgrade is particularly sensitive about Kosovo acquiring a UN seat, and this could presage a future issue in the Council should an admission application be put to it. While many experts believe Belgrade’s plan was proffered for domestic reasons and comes rather late in the process to influence the status outcome, resolution 1244 does recognize a role for Serbia in the process, perhaps a factor in Ahtisaari’s warning about possible delays.

Another issue, which Council members want to avoid, is a mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, 223,000 of whom have already left since 1999. Some Serbs have also raised the issue of a possible partition along the Ibar River, which would become the frontier between Serbia and Kosovo. In June, Kosovo Serb leaders broke off contact with UNMIK and Kosovo institutions, which some viewed as a step toward secession. Fearing an attempt by northern Serbs to succeed from Kosovo, Ahtisaari and others have repeatedly encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to participate in the Kosovo political institutions they have been boycotting, while appealing for Belgrade’s assistance toward this end, thus far with little success.

Meanwhile, Belgrade has warned that Kosovo’s independence could bring hard-line nationalists to power in Serbia.

**Recent Developments**

Ahtisaari adopted a “bottom-up” approach to status talks. Discussions began with technical, “status-neutral” issues such as decentralization, the economy and the protection of cultural heritage. In addition to the Vienna talks, eight expert missions have visited Belgrade and Pristina since November 2005 with two further such visits scheduled for the coming weeks. Over the summer, Ahtisaari is hoping to bring the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia together for direct talks, although some doubt that this is realistic.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo Søren Jessen-Petersen has postponed local elections, declaring that they will instead be held three to six months after a final status decision.

**Underlying Problems**

The memory of the violent riots of March 2004 and the potential for a renewed deterioration of the tense situation hang in the background. Ethnically divided areas such as Mitrovica remain flashpoints for violent conflict.
Kosovo remains one of the poorest regions in Europe, with over half its population living in poverty.

Recent Developments
Both sides introduced peace proposals in the past few weeks. The Abkhaz authorities reportedly agreed to discuss economic proposals without prior acceptance of independence from Tbilisi, but still insist on the need for eventual recognition. The Georgian proposal reportedly calls for autonomy for Abkhazia and the replacement of CIS troops by UN police, but the reactions from the Abkhaz leadership have not been very encouraging.

Together with Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia has recently reinvigorated a regional initiative (known by the acronym GUAM) aimed at increasing regional cooperation for solving internal conflicts. The governments of the GUAM countries particularly denounced “unresolved conflicts and illegal presence of foreign groups and armaments in GUAM States” as obstacles for development and democracy, and also opposed the illegality of separatism and outside interference.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The signals sent by Tbilisi in the coming weeks will be watched closely in Moscow. It is unclear whether recent bilateral contacts in St. Petersburg have made progress in improving relations between the countries.

Russian-Georgian dynamics are also affected by the developments regarding Georgia’s other breakaway region, South Ossetia. The Georgian Parliament has already favoured the pullout of Russian troops from that region. Recent disagreements over the rotation of Russian peacekeepers in the region seem to have contributed to the straining of bilateral relations. And Moscow has given repeated warnings that the outcome on Kosovo may influence its policies vis-à-vis the Caucasus.

Within the Group of Friends (comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and, also within the Council, Slovakia) some see hope in the recent increase in contacts between Tbilisi and the Abkhaz leadership. Some are also encouraged by the fact that the Georgian Parliament’s resolution on Russian troops in South Ossetia showed a degree of caution in its language and was not binding on the government. But there is recognition that the outcome of the initiative in the Georgian Parliament could still move things in a negative direction.

UN Documents

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/ Letters

- S/2006/361 (5 June 2006) noted that the parties remained far apart and compromise would be essential.

Other Relevant Documents

- Statement in London by the Contact Group on the Future of Kosovo (31 January 2006) called for all efforts to be made to achieve a negotiated settlement through 2006.
- The Contact Group’s Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo’s Status (14 November 2005) declared that there should be no return to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of any part of Kosovo with another country.

For historical background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our February and June 2006 Forecast Reports.

Georgia

Expected Council Action
The Council will receive the quarterly Secretary-General’s report on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Discussion is expected to be limited and is likely to focus on the developments in terms of peace proposals from both the Georgian government and the Abkhaz leadership.

No formal action is expected at this point. However, should the initiative in the Georgian Parliament which calls for the withdrawal of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) troops gain momentum, a more lively discussion may ensue.
Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
The Council will receive the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) as mandated by resolution 1580. Informal consultations are expected but no formal action is anticipated.

Council Dynamics
Guinea-Bissau is not a high priority for Council members. Since Brazil left the Council, no member is pushing for higher-profile attention to this Portuguese-speaking country, although Argentina supports keeping the issue on the agenda.

The United States and Japan are the most eager to see Guinea-Bissau off the agenda, with Japan having suggested that UNOGBIS be put on the list of mandates for the Council to review. A decision on the future of UNOGBIS is some way off, but the debate may sharpen closer to a potential renewal of the mission, which expires in December.

Key Facts
João Bernardo Vieira regained the presidency of Guinea-Bissau in the election of July 2005, defeating former president Malam Bacai Sanhá. Sanhá and his supporters disputed the outcome, but the government transition was peaceful. In December, the Council downgraded its involvement, reflecting the improved situation. However, the political situation remains polarised and fragile.

UNOGBIS has been in place since April 1999. On 21 November 2005, President Vieira requested that the UN extend its mandate through 2006, stressing that UNOGBIS had a decisive role to play in the consolidation of lasting peace and stability.

Recent Developments
Starting in March 2006, the Guinea-Bissau army engaged separatist rebels from the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance in a six-week campaign along the north-western border. A faction of the MDFC had supported a 1999 coup against President Vieira. The fighting isolated many villagers, while the rebels laid an unknown number of land mines. Consequently, farmers in the region are reluctant to harvest their cashew crops.

Underlying Problems
The heavily indebted government has had difficulty paying salaries to government workers, while schools have been closed for months at a time and crime has risen. The government plans to eliminate one-third of state employees including reductions in military personnel, which experts say could be destabilizing. Guinea-Bissau is the world’s fifth poorest country. Its subsistence agriculture-based economy is largely reliant on foreign aid.

Landmines have been scattered throughout the country since its war for independence.

For a list of relevant UN Documents, please consult our March 2006 Forecast Report.

Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Expected Council Action
On 31 July, the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will expire. The Council will receive the report of the Secretary-General around 20 July and is expected to adopt a routine resolution extending the mandate of UNIFIL by an additional six months.

Options
Although UNIFIL has now been in place for 28 years, and there is pressure to downsize or withdraw long-standing operations, it seems highly unlikely that any option other than a standard rollover will be considered due to the situation in the Middle East.

Council Dynamics
Ongoing incidents along the UN-demarcated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel seem likely to reinforce consensus among Council members on the utility of the role of UNIFIL. Few, if any, Council members seem inclined to raise political issues in discussions on UNIFIL’s mandate.

Similarly, it seems unlikely that the Council will take up the substance of the cross-border issues regularly raised by Lebanon and Israel.

Key Issues
The Secretary-General’s report will likely raise the following issues.

■ Cross-border incidents between armed Lebanese elements and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have not stopped.

■ The UNIFIL Force Commander in January proposed the creation of a joint planning cell composed of UNIFIL and members of the Lebanese armed forces. This proposal was aimed at drawing up a plan for the extension of Lebanese authority in the UNIFIL area of operation, including the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south.

In his January report, the Secretary-General recommended the creation of this cell. The Council in resolution 1655 urged the Lebanese government to take up this proposal. One issue for the Council may be the progress made towards the establishment of the cell. (Given the ongoing Lebanese National Dialogue, including Hezbollah, Lebanese officials may be cautious about proceeding too quickly.)

A possible third issue is Hezbollah’s reinforced presence and visibility in the south, and the fact that it sometimes limits the work of UNIFIL through denial of access.

Another issue is the status of implementation of resolution 1680, which strongly encourages Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area. This would have an impact on the activities of UNIFIL since an official recognition of the farms as being part of Lebanon would require a reshaping of the Blue Line and of the area that UNIFIL covers. The UNIFIL mandate and possibly the troop level would also have to be adjusted.
For key facts and historical background, please see our January 2006 Forecast Report.

**UN Documents**

**Last Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1655 (31 January 2006) extended the UNIFIL mandate to 31 July 2006 and urged Lebanon to take up the proposal to create a Joint Planning Cell.

**Secretary-General’s Reports**
- S/2006/26 (18 January 2006) was the latest report.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2006/346 (1 June 2006) letter from Lebanon referring to the 26 and 28 May incidents
- S/2006/348 (30 May 2006) letter from Israel expressing dismay at the terrorist attack perpetrated against Israel by Hezbollah on 26 May and holding the Lebanese government responsible, as well as the governments of Syria and Iran for supporting Hezbollah
- S/2006/245 (18 April 2006) letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council referring to the withdrawal of the Ukrainian unit within UNIFIL and its replacement by a Chinese contingent.
- S/2006/214 (4 April 2006) letter from Lebanon detailing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty during March 2006
- S/2006/81 (7 February 2006) letter from Lebanon detailing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty during January 2006
- S/2006/76 (3 February 2006) letter from Israel referring to the 1 February terrorist attack against Israel
- S/2006/74 (3 February 2006) letter from Lebanon referring to the 1 February incident

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to Lebanon**
Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**
Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Authorised strength as of 30 April 2006: 1,991 troops, assisted by some 50 military observers of UNTSO; and supported by 95 international civilian personnel and 295 local civilian staff
- Troop-contributing countries: China, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy and Poland

**Cost (approved budget)**
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $99.23 million (gross)

**Update on Review of Mandates**

The Security Council’s Ad-Hoc Committee on Mandate Review in June agreed on five clusters of mandates to be reviewed in phase one of its work. The five clusters, which were set out in the document *Criteria to Suggest Mandates for Consideration in Phase One*

- issues on which there are specific recommendations in the Secretary-General’s report (under this point, the Committee included the counterterrorism committees specifically with regard to the possible consolidation of reporting requirements and establishment of a single subsidiary body);
- mandates that have not been examined by the Security Council in the last five years;
- other instances of duplicative or unnecessary reporting requirements for the Secretary-General (including those with shorter reporting cycles than necessary);
- positions that have remained vacant or where the reason for appointment has changed; and

where there are two or more senior UN representatives in a particular area or with potentially overlapping or duplicative mandates.

In phase one, the Committee will examine mandates in those areas where problems have been identified and a solution may be reached in the coming weeks. In phase two, the Committee plans to consider groups of mandates that will require additional time for discussion and agreement.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Letters**
- S/2006/354 (31 May 2006) was the letter of the Council President to the Secretary-General informing him of the establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee and inviting a senior member of the Secretariat staff to participate in the relevant meeting.

**Update on Sanctions Committees**

In the month ahead, Council sanctions committees are expected to make progress on some of the recommendations of their expert panels, including:
- the Somalia Monitoring Group, which issued a report on 4 May 2006;
- the Sudan Panel of Experts, which issued a report on 19 April 2006;
- the Al-Qaida/Taliban 1267 Sanctions Committee, which is due to send the Monitoring Team its report before the end of July; and
- the Democratic Republic of Congo Group of Experts, whose final report to the Council is due before 10 July. Both the sanctions measures and the term of the Group of Experts are expected to be renewed.

**Somalia Sanctions Committee**

In the light of recent developments in Somalia, the Sanctions Committee’s work is likely to be the focus of much greater interest than usual.

The conclusions contained in the Somalia sanctions Monitoring Group’s last report to
the committee posed a number of challenges, both for the committee and the Council. The Group noted that the arms embargo violations comprised a number of different types and forms, including arms and ammunition, military advice and training, military materiel and equipment, and financial support.

Furthermore, the Group noted that a widening circle of states are providing arms and military-related support to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. It identified specifically Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Italy, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It also reported that groups, individuals, including dissident ministers of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, local warlords, and members of the private sector operating within and outside of Somalia are involved in providing financing and other support in violation of the arms embargo. The Group also identified Kenya as the one country in the region that has failed to cooperate with it.

The Council has yet to react to these findings. The Group has recommended an “integrated arms embargo” that would serve to reduce the funds available to certain sanctions violators. The concept of an integrated arms embargo involves:

- reaffirming and sustaining the arms embargo on Somalia, pursuant to resolution 733, paragraph 5;
- implementing a trade embargo on the export of charcoal originating in Somalia; and
- implementing a ban on foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters and a trade embargo on the export of fish taken in Somali waters.

The future activities of the Monitoring Group seem likely to include continuing to refine and update the information on the draft list of individuals and entities that violate the measures specified by resolution 733, as the Council requested in paragraph 3(d) of resolution 1630. The Group has recommended that the Council consider applying targeted sanctions in the form of asset freezes and travel bans on the individuals and entities already identified in the draft list.

**Sudan Sanctions Committee**

The Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts made a number of specific recommendations to the Council, aimed specifically at strengthening and enforcing the arms embargo. Those yet to be acted on include:

- the establishment of a verification component and a resultant arms inventory;
- modification of the existing arms embargo by complementing it with a verification component that would require end-user certification for the sale of all military goods and services to Sudan;
- expansion of the arms embargo to the entire country, with exemptions for the government of south Sudan similar to those in place for the government of Sudan;
- having states that engage in trade of military goods and services with Sudan play a more active role in enforcing the arms embargo by insisting on end-user certification;
- the preparation by the committee of a list of dual-use items and requiring the government of Sudan to apply to the committee for approval to transfer such equipment to Sudan; and
- providing technical assistance to states bordering on Sudan that demonstrate a willingness to enforce the arms.

Despite the signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, it seems that a number of Council members consider that the above recommendations should still be on the table. However, the Panel also made recommendations covering broader aspects of the peace process, which had not been acted upon by the Council before the peace agreement was signed. These included a possible air exclusion zone over the entire Darfur region for all Sudanese government aircraft and aircraft utilised by parties to the conflict in Darfur. If the Darfur Peace Agreement holds it seems unlikely that these particular recommendations will be pursued by the Panel. On the other hand, non-compliance could lead them to being raised again.

**Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee**

The Al-Qaida/Taliban Committee is expected to continue discussion of the delisting procedures and to conclude it by the end of July. The committee has not yet acted on a number of the Monitoring Team’s prior recommendations, and the Team’s fifth report is expected to contain fewer recommendations than in its past reports.

In the meantime, in an effort to avoid overlap and to improve collaboration and cooperation among the three antiterrorism committees (the 1267 Al-Qaida/Taliban Committee, the 1540 WMDs Committee, and the Counterterrorism Committee), it has been decided to do joint country visits in the future. But the issue of burdensome reporting by states to the three committees has not yet been resolved. Further work on this issue is expected upon completion of current rounds of reporting to the committees. Furthermore, during phase two of its work, the Council’s mandate review mechanism is expected to address the issue of consolidation of reporting requirements of the three antiterrorism committees and establishment of a single antiterrorism subsidiary body.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Documents**

- S/PRST/2006/28 (22 June 2006) contained the Council’s most recent statement on the “listing/delisting” issue.
## Chart of Sanctions Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions Committees</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Sanctions Measures</th>
<th>Target(s) / Designated List</th>
<th>Monitoring Mechanism</th>
<th>Next Report Due</th>
<th>Sanctions Expire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Côte d'Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>S/RES/1572 (15 Nov 2004) S/RES/1584 (1 Feb 2005) S/RES/1643 (15 Dec 2005)</td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds</td>
<td>designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list as of February 2006.</td>
<td><strong>Group of Experts</strong> – 3 members</td>
<td><strong>Expires</strong> 29 Sep 2006</td>
<td>15 Dec 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Republic of Congo</strong></td>
<td>S/RES/1493 (28 Jul 2003) S/RES/1533 (12 Mar 2004) S/RES/1596 (18 Apr 2005) S/RES/1616 (29 Jul 2005) S/RES/1649 (21 Dec 2005) S/RES/1654 (31 Jan 2006)</td>
<td>arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> any recipient in the DRC territory; excludes DRC army and police under certain conditions. <strong>Travel Ban and Assets Freeze:</strong> as designated by the Committee – individual violators of the arms embargo; political and military leaders of foreign armed groups; and political and military leaders of Congolese militias receiving support from outside the DRC. As of 14 December 2005, there were 15 individuals and one entity listed. <strong>Aviation Restrictions:</strong> on all aircraft entering and departing DRC territory</td>
<td><strong>Group of Experts</strong> – 5 members</td>
<td><strong>Expires</strong> 31 July 2006</td>
<td>31 July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>S/RES/661 (6 Aug 1990) S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) S/RES/1518 (24 Nov 2003)</td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> Iraqi territory <strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005, there were 89 individuals, and as of 2 June 2004, there were 206 entities listed.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td><strong>Expires</strong> N/A</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia</strong></td>
<td>S/RES/1521 (22 Dec 2003) S/RES/1532 (12 Mar 2004) S/RES/1607 (21 June 2005) S/RES/1647 (20 Dec 2005) S/RES/1683 (13 June 2006) S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006)</td>
<td>arms embargo; export of rough diamonds, round logs and timber; travel ban and assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> any recipient in Liberian territory (except for police and security forces) <strong>Travel Ban:</strong> peace spoilers, violators of the embargo, as designated by the Committee; as of 30 November 2005, there are 59 individuals listed. <strong>Assets Freeze:</strong> Charles Taylor and designated associates; as of 30 November 2005, there are 28 individuals and 30 entities listed.</td>
<td><strong>Panel of Experts</strong> – 5 members</td>
<td><strong>Expires</strong> 15 Dec 2006</td>
<td>20 Dec 2006 diamonds (with a review in Oct 2006); timber sanctions were lifted (with a review in Sep 2006) 13 Dec 2006 modified arms embargo open-ended travel ban and assets freeze</td>
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<td>Sanctions Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>S/RES/918 (17 May 1994) S/RES/1011 (16 Aug 1995) S/RES/1161 (9 Apr 1998)</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states if the arms are to be used in Rwanda; restrictions on arms transfers by the government of Rwanda</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1011 (16 Aug 1995)</td>
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<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1161 (9 Apr 1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expires</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>S/RES/1132 (8 Oct 1997) S/RES/1171 (5 Jun 1998)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: non-governmental forces; restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone <strong>Travel Ban</strong>: Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1132 (8 Oct 1997)</td>
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<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
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<td>S/RES/1171 (5 Jun 1998)</td>
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<td>Expires</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992)</td>
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<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/751 (24 Apr 1992)</td>
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<td>Expires</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>S/RES/1556 (30 Jul 2004) S/RES/1591 (29 Mar 2005) S/RES/1665 (29 Mar 2006) S/RES/1672 (25 Apr 2006)</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: all parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals <strong>Assets Freeze and Travel Ban</strong>: as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. There are four individuals designated by resolution 1672. <strong>Aviation Restrictions</strong>: ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region.</td>
<td><strong>Panel of Experts</strong> – 4 members</td>
<td>final report by 30 Aug 2006</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1556 (30 Jul 2004)</td>
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<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1591 (29 Mar 2005)</td>
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<td>Expires</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>S/RES/1636 (31 Oct 2005)</td>
<td>travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td><strong>Assets Freeze and Travel Ban</strong>: individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by the UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>will terminate when the Committee reports to the Council that all investigative and judicial proceedings have been completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notable Dates for July

Reports Due for Consideration in July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>SG report on UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>SG report on UNOGBIS (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>SG periodic report on the situation in Somalia</td>
<td>S/PRST/2001/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>Report of the 1533 Committee concerning the DRC</td>
<td>S/RES/1654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) (semi-annual)</td>
<td>S/RES/1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>Reports of the 1267 Committee concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban</td>
<td>S/RES/1617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>SG report on Darfur (monthly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 2006 Mandates Expire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>S/RES/1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>Group of Experts of the 1533 Committee concerning the DRC</td>
<td>S/RES/1654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 2006 Other Important Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 July</td>
<td>AU Summit in Banjul, Gambia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>Deployment of EUFOR DR Congo is expected to be complete in advance of the 30 July elections. (S/RES/1671)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15-17 July</td>
<td>G8 Summit in St. Petersburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>AMIS Pledging Conference in Brussels</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>General Assembly plenary debate on Security Council reform issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>Council debate on Children and Armed Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>Presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC (postponed from 18 June)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>DRC sanctions expire (S/RES/1616 and S/RES/1649)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also expected in July:
- More detailed discussions on the appointment of a new Secretary-General
- Recommendations from the Secretary-General regarding a UN operation in Darfur are expected in early July (S/RES/1679).
- An international donors’ conference for Liberia is reportedly planned for mid-July.
- An international donors’ conference for Haiti is expected for mid-July in Port-au-Prince.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- A major focus on Haiti in the Council is likely in August.
- Timor-Leste will also be a focus of the Council in August. Resolution 1690 requested a report from the Secretary-General by 7 August on the UN’s future role. Special Envoy Ian Martin’s assessment mission, which began on 26 June, will help determine the possible need for a larger UN presence when the current mandate expires on 20 August.
- An open debate on Cooperation between the Council and Regional Organisations is possible in September.
- The mandate of UNMIS expires on 24 September (S/RES/1663) and the mandate of AMIS expires on 30 September (S/2006/156).
- The selection process for the next Secretary-General is expected between September and November.
- Elections for the 2007-2008 members of the Security Council are expected in October.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is expected in December.