OVERVIEW FOR JUNE

June promises to be an extraordinarily busy month for the Council. Denmark has the presidency.

The programme of work (mission reviews, reports, briefings and mandate renewals) scheduled by previous decisions runs to at least twelve items. In addition the Council has:

- its annual retreat with the Secretary-General on 2-3 June;
- two difficult missions to undertake (to Sudan and DRC) from 4-13 June;
- to address the mandate for the UN force for Darfur;
- to continue its consideration of the increasingly serious situation with Iran; and
- to decide a programme of open meetings and associated Arria formula meetings.

It seems that at least one open thematic meeting—the standard six monthly Civilian in Armed Conflict Meeting—is expected, and that at least one other thematic meeting is likely.

Nor does the schedule fully reveal the extent of important work planned for June by Council working groups.

- Ambassador Oshima’s group on Council working methods is pushing to secure Council approval of an initial package of reforms by the end of June. These are likely to be recorded in a presidential note—and an option is to update and republish all of the key decisions on working methods. A decision also needs to be taken by the Council on extending Ambassador Oshima’s mandate for a further six months so that phase two of the project can be advanced.
- The new mechanism chaired by Ambassadors Burian and Bolton to review Council mandates in parallel to the work underway in the General Assembly on mandate reforms by the end of June. These are likely to be recorded in a presidential note—and an option is to update and republish all of the key decisions on working methods. A decision also needs to be taken by the Council on extending Ambassador Oshima’s mandate for a further six months so that phase two of the project can be advanced.

A report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support for transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations, requested by an October 2004 Council presidential statement, has not been submitted yet.

- On Timor-Leste, the report requested by the Council in September 2005 on proposals for addressing cases of serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste is not yet forthcoming.
- On Côte d’Ivoire, the 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations, requested by the Council, have not been made public yet.
- On Afghanistan, resolution 1623 requested quarterly reports on the activities of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The last ISAF report was circulated in October 2005.
- On Small Arms, a draft resolution circulated by Argentina in March has not been adopted.
- Procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions remain to be addressed following the request from the World Summit in September 2005 for “fair and clear procedures”. A report from the UN Office of Legal Affairs is still awaited.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters awaited include:

- On Charles Taylor, a draft resolution to facilitate a hearing of his case by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the International Criminal Court premises and for his detention in the Netherlands, first circulated in early April, has not yet been adopted.

- On the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army, the recommendations requested in resolution 1653 on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end” to such groups are still outstanding. The most recent information suggests that drafting of that report has not been started despite clarification from the Council that it expects a written report.

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Overview

- review will be in high gear in June.
- The Children in Armed Conflict Working Group will be active, looking ahead to an open thematic meeting on that subject in July.

Meetings which Will Involve Non-Council Members

In addition to the likely thematic open debates there are a large number of meetings likely to be open, either as briefings, as public meetings, or private meetings open only to invited member states.

- Sudan (open briefing on mission plus probable meeting to decide mandate of UN force)
- Iran (probable meetings on draft resolution)
- DRC (open briefing on mission)
- DRC (extension of 1 July deadline for repatriation of supplementary MONUC troops and police approved in 2005)
- ICTY and ICTR (Tribunal judges and prosecutors likely to be present)
- ICC (open briefing by prosecutor)
- Iraq (open briefings on UNAMI, MNF and DFI/IAMB)
- Iraq (private meeting rather than consultations—so Iraq can be present at Council discussion of the issues raised)
- Kosovo (briefing on UNMIK)
- Middle East (standard monthly briefing)
- Golan Heights/UNDOF (mandate renewal)
- Burundi (mandate renewal)
- Timor-Leste (future UN presence)
- Cyprus (mandate renewal)
- Lebanon (UNIIIC mandate)
- Liberia (sanctions and Panel of Experts)
- Terrorism (open briefing by the Chairs of the CTC, 1267 and 1540 Committees is likely)

Appointment of the Secretary-General

Council members have agreed that the next major phase of Council consideration will take place in July. France is preparing a working paper on past methodology, which is likely, after discussion, to evolve into guidelines for the decision making process later this year. The timeline still seems set for the real Council action to take place in September/October. It remains unclear to what extent the Council will respond to the Indian initiative in the General Assembly for a completely new approach whereby the Council recommendation would contain more than one name.

Darfur

The Abuja peace agreement is a major breakthrough. In a sense its acceptance by Sudan is a form of consent for the transition to a UN force. The political logic is that, after the Council Mission meetings in Khartoum, the Council will then proceed to work on the mandate for the mission. Sudan, however, may have in mind a process whereby it can control the pace by spinning out the “detailed and wide ranging” political consultations which it envisages having with the joint UN/AU assessment mission. This may present difficult issues which the Council will have to confront in June. In any event, the Darfur issue seems likely to consume a lot of Council time and energy during the month.

Iran

It is unclear whether the Council will in practice have any input to the package of “incentives and disincentives” under negotiation between the P5 plus Germany. The differences within that group—and not only with Russia and China—seem to be sufficiently complex that most if not all of the elected Council members will be reluctant to challenge any elements of the deal that is finally done.

The bigger question will be the timing and nature of the Council response once Iranian reaction to the package is known. There are a range of possible sanctions options if the reaction is outright rejection. And other options may need to be explored if there is any hint of an opening for meaningful negotiations. June seems to be shaping up to be a critical month on this issue as well.

Winding Down Council Operations

In June the Council will confront, in six quite different contexts, the varied problems associated with winding down operations. There is no doubt that, with the ever increasing demands and stretched resources, the release of troops from old missions to permit deployments to new ones is becoming increasingly necessary. But politics and risks of premature exit tend to complicate decision making in practice.

The Ethiopia/Eritrea situation has been staggering on for over three months under threat of phase-down due to the failure of both parties to live up to their obligations. But each time a crunch point has come the Council has found it hard to agree on a formula.

In Burundi, the exit strategy seems clear, if only because the government is so keen for it to happen. But ironically it is a case in which several members have residual worries about premature exit. Recent events in Timor-Leste will only reinforce those worries. Here again the exit strategy had seemed clear and the only unresolved issue was the size of the follow on UN role. But, the return of violence and instability to that country seems likely to reopen that issue. Perhaps it will also accentuate concerns by some members about relying just on “reconciliation” and burying the “justice” aspects.

The persistence of the political deadlock in Cyprus seems more or less to guarantee that UNFICYP will come under pressure for another phase down sooner or later.

There is an equally interesting dynamic at work with respect to the ICTY. The Council has established the so called “completion strategies”, yet no one expects the Tribunal will be wound up before Mladić and Karadžić are brought to trial. On the other hand there remains a clear determination by the Council not to allow the Tribunal bureaucracy to shelter behind this political necessity.

And lastly, with respect to UNMOVIC, although the inspection role is long over, political positions have delayed decision making. In part this is because there are no UN financial pressures driving the issue. However Iraq, which is effectively paying the bill, is becoming increasingly concerned about the issue.
Under-Secretary-General Security Council Report

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devastations in May included:

Ethiopia/Eritrea: A technical rollover of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) until 31 May was adopted in resolution 1678. There was no breakthrough at the 17 May Boundary Commission meeting in London and, at the time of writing, Council members were considering downsizing the mission.

Somalia: On 10 May, the Council adopted resolution 1676 which stressed the obligation of all member states to comply fully with the arms embargo and renewed the Somalia Monitoring Group’s mandate for another six months. Members also received the final report of the Monitoring Group which informed the Council about a “widening circle of states that clandestinely provide support to the antagonist of their choice.”

Haiti: The Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2006/22) on 15 May congratulating René Préval on his inauguration as President of Haiti. The statement also stressed the importance of the holding of timely local elections now scheduled for 23 July (postponed from 18 June).

Côte d’Ivoire: Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno briefed the Council on Côte d’Ivoire on 24 May. The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2006/23) the same day welcoming the public hearings on national unity but reiterating its grave concern at the serious delay in the implementation of the road map established by the International Working Group and expressed in the Secretary-General’s April 2006 report (S/2006/222). The draft resolution to expand the size of UNOCI previewed in our May Forecast was still under discussion at press time but was expected to be adopted by 31 May.

Sierra Leone: The Council held consultations on the regular report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/269) on UNOSIL.

Darfur/Sudan

Expected Council Action

Much of the Council’s attention and energy in June will be consumed by Sudan. Formulating the details of the future UN mandate in Darfur will be a focus.

- A Council mission will visit Sudan, Chad and the African Union (AU) Headquarters in early June. Details of the mandate will undoubtedly be discussed with interlocutors on the ground. A briefing, an open meeting and a report are expected to follow.

- The Secretary-General is expected to provide a detailed proposal for transition to a UN operation in Darfur and the AU’s estimates of additional troop and resource requirements for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

- A pledging conference in Brussels to secure funds for AMIS is expected.

- Continuing attention to the Sudanese-Chadian border is likely. An AU assessment of AMIS assistance in implementing the Tripoli Agreement and the April rebel attacks is also expected, but the AU delegation has reportedly not been able to visit Darfur, and Chad broke diplomatic relations with Sudan in April.

- The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, is expected to brief the Council on the status of investigations on Darfur.

- The regular report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the monthly report on Darfur are expected.

- The midterm briefing of the 1591 Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts is due. Council members are likely to focus on targeted sanctions against spoilers of the Peace Agreement rather than on the arms embargo, particularly after the 31 May AU deadline for additional signatures to the Peace Agreement.

Options

A lot will depend on whether Khartoum in practice now cooperates quickly and efficiently with the UN.

It seems that the UN/AU technical assessment mission will now proceed. And the Secretary-General will then have a week to present a report. Under these circumstances, the most likely option is that the Council adopts a resolution on the mandate. The current thinking is that UNMIS would have two regional commands—one in Darfur (under Chapter VII) to provide civilian protection, deter peace spoilers, monitor the Chadian border and assist with implementing the Agreement, and the second in the south (under Chapter VI) for the implementation of the north-south agreement.

If there is delay, one option is for the Council to adopt a first resolution setting out basic details of the mandate without waiting for the report of the technical assessment mission. A further resolution could follow specifying greater detail once the full concept of operations was available.

In the event of obstruction by Khartoum, a separate resolution threatening specific measures if cooperation does not materialise within a short period of time, seems a probable option. Members are likely to stress the need for full cooperation during the Council mission visit.

Regarding issues other than the decision on the UN mandate, one option will be targeted sanctions against members of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) that threaten the Agreement. It was mentioned in resolution 1679, after the AU Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) threat of submitting names to the Council.

There may be a need to amend the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts to include violations of the Peace Agreement.

An unlikely option is strengthening the sanctions regime, perhaps by taking into account the Panel’s recommendations for a no-fly

Status Update since our May Forecast

Recent developments on each of the above situations are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, some other interesting developments in May included:

- Ethiopia/Eritrea: A technical rollover of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) until 31 May was adopted in resolution 1678. There was no breakthrough at the 17 May Boundary Commission meeting in London and, at the time of writing, Council members were considering downsizing the mission.

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- Sierra Leone: The Council held consultations on the regular report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/269) on UNOSIL.
zone and extending the embargo to the whole of Sudan.

Another issue continues to be whether to expand UNMIS’ mandate to include the addressing the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

**Key Issues**

The visit to Khartoum by Assistant Secretary-General Hédi Annabi and the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi seems to have resulted in agreement on the visit by the technical assessment mission. Media reports suggest that important issues relating to mandates may also have been discussed, now leaving the way open for the Council to proceed with drafting a resolution.

A further issue for the Council will be monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and encouraging additional resources for AMIS. The future role of NATO is likely to be an important aspect, as is the possibility that AMIS is extended beyond September. It seems that the timing of the transition is becoming an issue with some reports that, instead of September, December may be more realistic, especially in the absence as yet of lead troop contributing countries.

The tensions between Sudan and Chad will also loom large. Reports of massacres of civilians in Chad are now emerging.

All this and the issue of new targeted sanctions against peace spoilers and the LRA are likely to be raised during the Council mission.

Also important will be troop generation (initial estimates are that 15,000 to 20,000 will be needed), identifying the lead nation(s) and maintaining an “African character” in the mission.

**Key Facts**

After much pressure, the Minni Minnawi SLM/A faction and the Government signed the Peace Agreement on 5 May.

Key points are the government’s submission of a plan to disarm the Janjaweed by early to mid-June, the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and the identification of military positions. AMIS’ envisaged role is to verify the new ceasefire (the 2004 N’Djamena Ceasefire continues in force), patrol demilitarised zones around IDP camps, and monitor disengagement, redeployment, arms control, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, _inter alia_.

The Council held a ministerial meeting on 9 May to welcome the Agreement. The PSC on 15 May endorsed the Agreement, gave the JEM and the al-Nur SLM/A faction until 31 May to sign, threatened potential peace spoilers with sanctions, and granted unconditional approval for the transition.

The Council adopted resolution 1679 under Chapter VII, confirming the AU threat and calling for the assessment mission.

Some initial thinking has started on AMIS’ additional needs. Observers note possible additional deployments from Rwanda and Nigeria. There will be a particular demand for external resources such as airlift and technical assistance, and NATO has indicated willingness to support.

A second pledging conference for Darfur’s reconstruction is expected for September.

**Council Dynamics**

On the transition, there is a growing sense of urgency in the minds of some Council members (particularly the US) as well as a feeling that acting decisively and in a timely manner in the aftermath of the long awaited peace accord is essential to maintain the Council’s credibility. The adoption of the most recent resolution on Sudan, by consensus, and under Chapter VII hints at a possibility of a growing Council resolve in this respect.

There is support among members for sanctions against rebel peace spoilers. Difficulties could arise if the government itself is found in breach of the Agreement.

**Underlying Problems**

The situation of civilians in Darfur remains grave. Indeed, according to the latest report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the human rights situation in the whole country is dire.

The situation in the south of Sudan remains fragile. Besides the LRA, there are serious concerns about SPLA redeployments, as well as other armed groups such as the South Sudan Defence Forces.

Another looming issue is eastern Sudan. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is due to withdraw from eastern positions in June, and, with that, UNMIS will not have a mandate in the east. The withdrawal may lead to an escalation of hostilities between rebels and northern forces. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jan Pronk has urged the Council to extend UNMIS’ mandate in the east.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2006/19 (25 April 2006) expressed concern with the situation in Chad.
- S/PRST/2006/5 (3 February 2006) mandated the Secretariat to start contingency planning.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2006/306 (19 May 2006) was the latest report on Darfur at the time of writing.
- S/2006/160 (14 March 2006) was the latest report on Sudan.

**Selected Panel of Experts’ Report**

- S/2006/250 (19 April 2006)

**Selected Meeting Record**

- S/PV.5439 (16 May 2006) was the record of the meeting in which resolution 1679 was adopted.

For historical background, please see our February 2006 Monthly Forecast.
Security Council Report

Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

UNMIS: Size and Composition of Mission
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel
- Strength as of 4 March 2006: 7,697 military personnel
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Nepal

UNMIS: Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $969.47 million (gross)

Head of AMIS
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel
- Strength as of 20 March 2006: 5,475 military and 1,385 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Ghana

AMIS: Cost
$170 million (budget until 30 September; does not include costs arising from the Peace Agreement)

Iran

Expected Council Action
In June, Iran will almost certainly be on the Council’s agenda again. As forecast last month, a draft resolution was introduced by France and the UK and, at press time, negotiations are still ongoing. Adoption in June now seems likely. Follow up action also seems likely in June.

The draft would establish a binding obligation on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment processes. The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be requested to verify compliance.

The Council is also expecting to be briefed, in conjunction with consideration of the draft resolution, about a separate package of “incentives and disincentives” being developed by the EU3 (Germany, France and the UK)—an approach which flowed out of P5 discussions earlier in May. The incentives, which seem likely to be presented to Iran before the Council meets, seem likely to include assistance with the Iranian nuclear programme. The disincentives—sanctions—would be clearly signalled but would require further Council action. It is expected that the draft will reflect the package and include an intention to consider further measures in case of non-compliance.

Options
With respect to the current negotiations over the draft resolution it seems that the Council itself will have few options when agreement is reached amongst the P5 and Germany. Most members seem ready to accept the outcome.

Depending on Iran’s response, however, the Council seems likely to have the following options.
- Impose various sanctions if Iran rejects the package outright. (The options in this regard include targeted sanctions against individuals or limited economic sanctions targeting specific commodities or a combination of both. Full economic sanctions, such as against Iraq in 1990, seem unlikely.)
- If, however, Iran signals some flexibility an option may be for the Council to call for a more inclusive negotiating process to flesh out the details, including not only the EU3, but perhaps also in some sort of innovative format include Russia and the US and even some other Council members, under a framework in which Iran suspends the uranium enrichment process and allows the resumption of full inspections under its safeguards agreement during the negotiations.

Council Dynamics
The US, France and the UK are seeking a legally binding resolution on Iran to comply with all confidence-building measures required by the IAEA and by the 29 March presidential statement. China and Russia seem to agree on the objective, but an underlying difference in approach remains.

The P3 consider that a Chapter VII resolution is essential to establish a legally binding character and that, in any case, it will provide a firmer political message to Iran. Also, because they consider uranium enrichment is a proliferation risk, and because there have been problems about transparency with Iran’s enrichment programme, the P3 argue that the international community has to act on the basis of prevention.

Russia and China had reservations on the initial draft. They argued that:
1. all Council resolutions are legally binding and not only the ones adopted under Chapter VII;
2. a Chapter VII resolution is only needed when concrete measures are to be taken to restore international peace and security; and
3. the current draft could pave the way to military intervention, about which they disagree unless there is a proof that Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons.

Although they agree with a policy of incremental pressure, they prefer to move in smaller and more cautious increments. They argued at the P5 plus Germany meetings on 2 and 8 May that the threat of sanctions at that point was counterproductive.

In response to these views the P3 agreed at the 8 May P5 plus Germany meeting, that before pushing ahead with language which might imply sanctions they would also develop a parallel package of incentives so that both could be on the table. This was an important compromise to Russian and Chinese views and, in return, the P3 will be expecting greater unity when the package is presented to the Council. (The package is likely to be presented to Tehran almost simultaneously with its presentation to the Council.)

The dynamics have been further complicated by the appearance towards the end of
May of divergences, not only with Russia and China, but also between the EU3 and the US on aspects of the “incentives” part of the package.

In May the UK and France continued their efforts to better share information on the progress of the draft resolution with elected Council members (E10) through the convening of more Council consultations. However, negotiations among the P5 outside New York have tended to exclude the E10 from participation in the process.

Key Issues
The first issue is whether the package of incentives and disincentives will secure the votes of certain reluctant Council members. It seems unlikely that any Council members will object or seek to argue that the package should be open to some negotiation before the resolution is adopted.

The main issue for June will be Iran’s response to both the package and the resolution because it will determine the next steps by the Council. If Iran rejects the package, the P3 have made it clear that they would then seek a further Council resolution including sanctions against Iran. If the current draft is adopted unanimously, opposition to the Council moving to the next steps will be more difficult to sustain.

Another issue is the timing of the IAEA report on Iran’s compliance to be requested in the resolution. There may be interest by some members in pushing out the compliance report deadline. A factor is that the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is scheduled for 12 June. A related issue is whether the report would need to be considered by the Board—which might become relevant if the Iranian response is not one of outright rejection and there are technical points to be resolved.

Recent Developments
On 28 April, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, submitted a report on the progress of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board in connection with the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements in Iran, as requested by the presidential statement adopted in March by the Council. The report noted that:

- the existing gaps in knowledge on Iran’s nuclear programme continued to be a matter of concern;
- Iran had not resumed cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol; and
- Iran had not implemented the confidence-building measures requested by the Board of Governors and the Security Council, such as the suspension of uranium enrichment.

On 2 May, the Political Directors of the P5 and Germany met in Paris. While it appeared that there was unity among the P5 and Germany on the fact that Iran should comply with the international demands to suspend uranium enrichment, differences of views about the approach remained.

France and the UK circulated the draft resolution to all Council members on 3 May. On 8 May, a ministerial meeting was held in New York among the P5 and Germany in order to find a common position on the draft. Russia and China expressed their reluctance to adopt a Chapter VII resolution. But the participants agreed to explore further possibilities for encouraging Iran to come back to the negotiating table. The Europeans agreed to develop a package of incentives and disincentives in order to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear programme and reinstate fuller inspections. The incentives seem likely to include civilian nuclear cooperation, including access to reactor technology and a revived version of the Russian proposal for enrichment to take place in Russia and various economic and trade partnerships. It seems that possible security guarantees and a wider negotiating team involving all the interested parties, including the US, have been discussed but the US is not ready to go so far.

The US, on 15 May, announced its intention to normalise relations with Libya, almost three years after Libya renounced to its illegal nuclear programme. The timing of this initiative has been largely interpreted as a hint to Iran.

On 18 May the Secretary of the League of Arab States wrote to the Security Council expressing “complete rejection” of nuclear weapons in the region and reactivated an earlier Arab proposal for a regional nuclear weapon free zone—an issue with implications for Israel as well as Iran.

Underlying Problems
Various experts are advocating for some role for the US in negotiations with Iran, bearing in mind that in 1994, following action in the Council against North Korea’s nuclear programme, multilateral talks including the US, had allowed room for successful negotiation between all the necessary players.

Reportedly ElBaradei also raised this question with the US. However, it seems the US is not ready for this as yet. The memory of the Iranian hostage crisis, Iran’s support for terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad against Israel no doubt contribute to US reluctance. Iran seems open to direct involvement with the US but there is uncertainty whether this is fully agreed in Tehran.

Most Recent Documents

- **Latest IAEA Board Resolution**
  - GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006)

- **Latest IAEA Reports**
  - S/2006/270 (28 April 2006)
  - GOV/2006/15 (27 February 2006)

- **Security Council Presidential Statement**

- **Other UN Documents**
  - S/2006/305 (18 May 2006) was the letter from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States.
  - S/2006/273 (1 May 2006) was the letter from Iran to the Secretary-General deploring recent US statements that “all options remain on the table” to deal with Iran.
  - S/2006/178 (22 March 2006) was the letter from Iran to the Secretary-General deploring US threats to resort to force against Iran.
  - S/2006/80 (7 February 2006) was the letter from the Secretary-General to the president of the Council including the
They include:

- adopting a resolution renewing calls on Syria to fully cooperate with UNIIIC;
- adopting a resolution condemning Syria for a lack of cooperation if this is reported by Brammertz; or
- triggering individual targeted sanctions if Brammertz reports names to the 1636 Sanctions Committee.

Council Dynamics
Consensus on the renewal of UNIIIC’s mandate for one year seems very likely. The Council would also like to maintain continuity and therefore is in favour of a prolongation of Brammertz’s role as Commissioner. At the time of writing, however, it is unclear whether Brammertz’s absence from the International Criminal Court can be extended.

Some members will be reluctant to adopt a resolution concerning Syria. Others will be keen to prevent a continuation of procrastination by Syria and may press for a resolution. The tone of Brammertz’s report is likely to influence the debate in the Council significantly. Given the cautious approach taken by Brammertz to date, his report is likely to be carefully nuanced.

Differences seem likely on two major issues concerning the tribunal.

- Lebanon is pushing for the process to move forward quickly. However, some Council members argue that, because its status will largely depend on the conclusions of the investigation, more time is needed. In addition, they argue, it seems certain that the investigation will not be completed for some time and as a result the UNIIIC report will therefore not contain sufficient details to progress the matter in June.

- Lebanon also seems keen that the jurisdiction of the tribunal should encompass all terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004. Some Council members will nevertheless want to see some evidence from the investigation of a clear link between the murder of Rafik Hariri and the other attacks.

So far, the Council has been keen to leave the matter to the Secretary-General but, given possible concerns on the proposed agreement (especially on the issues of location, jurisdiction, and timing of the creation and financing of the tribunal) Council members might want to initiate a discussion.

Key Issues
The first issue for Council members will be Brammertz’s assessment of the Syrian cooperation with the Commission. Syria initially asserted that it would only contribute to the investigation through its own special Judicial Commission, which it established in October 2005. But Brammertz signalled that his main interlocutors would only be the Syrian government, via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the only legal framework in which UNIIIC would operate is under the Council’s resolutions. It is unclear whether or to what extent this issue has presented problems for Brammertz in recent months.

The second issue will be the degree of connection between the Hariri assassination and the other attacks. Given that the last report by Brammertz already touched upon that subject, it is likely that the coming report will provide further details.

Another issue is the timing for commencing trials. Brammertz seems to consider that the process of establishing the tribunal should be carried out in parallel to the conduct of the investigation in order to have the necessary legal framework for the collection of evidence. On the other hand, the investigation will clarify the involvement of non-Lebanese nationals in the assassination, and this will impact the nature and scope of the tribunal and consequently the prospect for surrender of suspects by Syria for trial before the tribunal. A related issue is whether a two-stage approach may be necessary, not least because of the need in terms of due process to bring the five suspects currently in custody to trial in a reasonable timeframe.
The last issue is the possible replacement of Brammertz and whether his successor will be an interim investigator or continue through the trial phase as prosecutor.

**Key Facts**

Following the 14 February 2005 bombing in Beirut that killed Hariri, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1595 establishing UNIIIC for an initial period of three months (renewable by three more months), to help the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of the murder. Detlev Mehlis of Germany was appointed Commissioner of UNIIIC on 13 May 2005.

On 30 August, three suspects were arrested: Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed, the head of the Lebanese general security; General Ali Al-Hajj, the head of the former Lebanese internal security forces; and General Raymond Azar, former Lebanese military intelligence head. At the same time, Mustafa Hamdan, the head of the presidential guard handed himself in. A fifth former Lebanese security official, Ghassan Tufeil, was arrested in November after he was named in the Mehlis report. All five had close ties with Syria. To date, they are still detained in Lebanon.

UNIIIC’s first report, made public on 20 October, concluded, “There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services.” Upon request from the Lebanese government, the Secretary-General agreed to extend the mandate of the Commission until 15 December.

On 31 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1636 establishing a targeted sanctions regime, of travel bans and asset freezes, against individuals to be designated as suspects in the Hariri assassination. It also decided under Chapter VII that Syria must fully cooperate with UNIIIC. The resolution further specified that the initiative, both in terms of implementing the individual sanctions and triggering further Council consideration, lay with the head of UNIIIC. UNIIIC was requested to report to the Council at any time if its Commissioner considered that Syrian cooperation did not meet the requirements of resolution 1636.

In October 2005, Syria established by legislative decree a special judicial commission to deal with all matters relating to the mission of UNIIIC and imposed a travel ban on officials named in the report.

The second UNIIIC report submitted on 13 December reinforced the conclusions of the first report and noted Syrian “reluctance and procrastination” in its cooperation with UNIIIC and several Syrian attempts to “hinder the investigation Internally and procedurally.” But the Commissioner also noted that Syria had made available for questioning five Syrian officials suspected by the Commission. The interviews took place at UN offices in Vienna.

Upon request by the Lebanese government, UNIIIC was extended by six months (in resolution 1644), and a new Commissioner, Serge Brammertz of Belgium, was appointed.

Between October 2004 and December 2005, there were more than 14 bombings and assassination attempts in Lebanon. Following a Lebanese request, the Council in resolution 1644, authorised UNIIIC to extend its technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations of these terrorist attacks. Also, the Council requested the Secretary-General to work with the Lebanese authorities and report back to the Council on the nature of the international assistance needed for the trial of the perpetrators of the Hariri murder, in the view of the creation of a special tribunal, as requested by Lebanon.

Consultations with the Lebanese authorities over the international tribunal were undertaken by the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Nicolas Michel, to determine the choice of law, the location of the tribunal and its financing.

On 21 March, the Secretary-General submitted the report requested by the Council in resolution 1644 (2005) on international assistance to Lebanon to try those responsible for the Hariri assassination (please see our March Update Report for more details). The Council welcomed the report in resolution 1664 and requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese government in order to establish the tribunal. At press time, consultations between representatives from Lebanon and the UN Office of Legal Affairs are ongoing. The Lebanese Justice Minister came to New York in April. It also seems that Syria is very keen to provide some input and would like to see a high degree of international composition of the tribunal.

### UN Documents

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1664 (28 March 2006) requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese government aimed at establishing a tribunal of international character and submit a report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution.
- S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) extended UNIIIC’s mandate by six months, authorised expanded technical assistance to Lebanon and requested reports on the progress of the investigation every three months.
- S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the Hariri killing.
- S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.

**Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2005/22 (7 June 2005) condemned the 2 June terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed Lebanese journalist Samir Qassir.

**Reports**

- S/2006/176 (21 March 2006) pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644, this report identified the nature and scope of the international assistance needed to
try those eventually charged with the Hariri assassination before a tribunal of an international character.
- S/2006/161 (14 March 2006) third UNIIIC report
- S/2005/775 (12 December 2005) second UNIIIC report

Other
- S/2006/278 (5 May 2006) was a letter from Lebanon requesting the extension UNIIIC’s mandate for a period of up to one year and expressing hope that Brammertz would continue in his functions.
- S/2006/67 (31 January 2006) EU statement on Lebanon
- S/2006/17 and S/2006/18 (13 January 2006) letters on the nomination of Serge Brammertz as Commissioner
- S/2005/783 (13 December 2005) was a letter from Lebanon requesting an international tribunal and the extension and expansion of UNIIIC’s mandate.

Other Relevant Facts
UNIIIC Commissioner
Serge Brammertz (Belgium)

Size and Composition of Commission
As of December 2005 there are around 130 members including active investigators, translators, security guards, drivers and administrators of 14 different nationalities. The staff members are UN employees. More people are currently being hired to fulfil the expanded role of the Commission.

Funding
The funding comes from the regular budget and was approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the General Assembly.

Activities
The modalities of cooperation with the Lebanese government are defined in a Memorandum of Understanding between Lebanon and the UN (S/2005/393).

Uganda/LRA

Expected Council Action
The Council continues to expect the Secretary-General’s recommendations on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end to the activities of illegal armed groups.” The recommendations, requested by resolution 1653, have been the subject of delays and buck-passing within the Secretariat. But the Council seems determined that it does want a written report on the issue, including a possible role for UN missions in the region, particularly against the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

A Council visiting mission to Sudan in early June may also have exchanges of views on the LRA issue and be briefed on a reported recent meeting in southern Sudan between Sudanese officials and LRA leader Joseph Kony.

Uganda and the LRA are also expected to arise in briefings in late May and again in late June by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland. Further discussion on related developments in northern Uganda is likely, including on the implications of the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), which the Council may want to welcome. A carefully balanced presidential statement on this seems a likely outcome.

Discussions on various initiatives, such as a Special Envoy or the establishment of a Panel of Experts, are possible. Formal action mandating the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to take action against the LRA is unlikely in the near future.

Options
Council members seem to have reached a compromise to have ongoing briefings on the LRA and the situation in northern Uganda.

Options available for Council members include:
- presidential or press statements to mark important steps;
- the appointment of a Special Envoy, Special Adviser or Personal Representative of the Secretary-General; or
- a Panel of Experts on the LRA.

Taking up northern Uganda formally as a separate item on the Council’s agenda is unlikely but may remain as a fallback option, especially if progress with the JMC is not substantive.

The option of a formal decision to mandate UNMIS and MONUC to play a role seems unlikely in June.

Key Issues
The key issue that will be before the Council continues to be how to respond to the situation in northern Uganda, including the LRA, and its regional implications. Related to this is the mandate that could be given to an envoy, adviser, representative or panel of experts. Uganda has indicated a preference for an envoy to the region rather than a country-specific envoy, and is reluctant about the idea for a panel of experts.

For some members, a key issue is whether the Ugandan JMC initiative will address the root causes of the formation of the LRA, specifically the marginalisation of northerners politically and economically. Some members are concerned that, unless those causes are significantly addressed, progress on the regional security side will not be satisfactory.

A further issue is whether and when to mandate UNMIS and MONUC to engage the LRA, or to assist with executing arrest warrants for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Secretariat considers that UNMIS does not have the necessary capabilities to carry out operations against the LRA, and that MONUC’s first priority should be to provide security and assist with the Congolese elections.

Key Facts
The Council received a briefing from the Ugandan ministers of foreign affairs and defence on 19 April, and another briefing from Under-Secretary-General Egeland on...
20 April. Council members also received a briefing from the Secretariat on the LRA on 26 April. A further meeting took place at the UK Mission on 27 April.

Uganda then indicated that it is currently working on a peace, recovery and development strategy of which the Emergency Plan and the JMC (formally launched on 4 May) would be part. The Plan has faced some criticism for lack of clarity on how returns and recovery will be promoted and on how the political marginalisation of the north will be addressed.

On the LRA, the Ugandan government proposed a number of measures including the development of a joint operational plan and a regional mechanism involving MONUC, UNMIS, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the authorisation of an international enforcement operation against the LRA. Uganda once again insisted that UNMIS and MONUC should be explicitly mandated to fight the LRA and execute ICC arrest warrants.

Some Council members indicated after the briefing that, despite welcoming the initiative, a political solution must be found for northern Uganda, and that Uganda could not continue to threaten to intervene in the DRC.

Kampala has expressed concern with the possibility of the LRA beginning to regroup again in the DRC. Most recently, together with Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, Uganda made a formal request that the AU submit names to the Council for sanctions under resolution 1649.

Fresh complaints of Ugandan incursions in the DRC in late April, which Kampala denied, were considered “credible” by MONUC and led to a communication from Kinshasa to the Council.

The Secretariat’s briefing on the LRA on 26 April highlighted the crucial importance of the issue of root causes and stressed Kampala’s primary responsibility for ensuring that those are addressed. Besides reiterating the constraints in UNMIS and MONUC capabilities, the briefing also stressed that a solution would entail the arrest of LRA leaders and the establishment of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. Key points would also be information sharing and better regional coordination.

On 13 May, after a meeting with Sudanese officials, Uganda announced a two-month ultimatum for the LRA to surrender, citing readiness to guarantee the safety of LRA leader Joseph Kony. This initiative may or may not hint at wider political negotiations, its implications are unclear, particularly for ICC arrest warrants. ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo stressed that Sudan, the DRC and Uganda have international obligations to give effect to ICC arrest warrants.

On 25 May there were media reports of a meeting in Sudan between Sudanese officials and Joseph Kony, at which the LRA leader said he was “ready for peace”. Observers note with scepticism whether either side is fully committed to this.

Council Dynamics

Council members remain divided on the issue of including northern Uganda formally in the Council’s agenda but there seems to be an acceptance for ongoing discussion at the informal level. Within the Core Group (comprising the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Norway) and the Council at large, there is sympathy with the Ugandan JMC efforts, but also concern that the plan may prove insufficient for solving the conflict and its root causes. Some members seem to favour the appointment of a Special Envoy or even a Panel of Experts.

There is wide concern, however, with accommodating Ugandan positions as far as possible, provided existing agenda items can be utilised as necessary for some Council response to important developments.

Others—especially China—have indicated unqualified support for Kampala’s position.

For some African members, if the Council is to express itself on the situation, it would be important to do so in a way that is sensitive to Ugandan concerns about its sovereignty, such as by designing the mandate of a Special Envoy in a way that does not arouse these sensitivities. The LRA issue is also perceived to be an important topic in which the contribution of regional mechanisms, such as the Tripartite Commission and the Great Lakes Summit, can play an important role.

On the role of the UN with regard to the LRA, there has been a general lack of clarity as to how the Council should respond. Most Council members are sensitive about overstretching MONUC and UNMIS in the next few months, particularly with the upcoming Congolese elections and the transition to a UN operation in Darfur.

### UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1663 (24 March 2006) specified that the 1653 report should include recommendations on dealing with the LRA.
- S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) requested the Secretary-General’s report on UN mission’s assistance with civilian protection.
- S/RES/1539 (22 April 2004) and 1265 (17 September 2005) expressed willingness to take measures to protect children and civilians in armed conflict.

**Selected Meeting Records**

- S/PV.5359 (27 January 2006) detailed the Ugandan offer.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2006/274 (2 May 2006) was the Congolese letter on recent Ugandan incursions.
- S/2006/271 (28 April 2006) detailed the Ugandan proposals vis-à-vis the LRA.
- S/2006/13 (9 January 2006) was the Canadian response to Uganda.
- S/2005/785 (13 December 2005) was the Ugandan letter criticising attempts to bring the issue to the Council.

For the Historical Background, please refer to our April 2006 Update Report.

### Useful Additional Sources

**Human Rights Watch,** *In Hope and Fear: Uganda’s Presidential and Parliamentary Polls* (February 2006) and *Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda* (September 2005)
**Timor-Leste**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is likely to be devoting more attention to Timor-Leste in June than expected. In May, it postponed consideration of the UN political presence there until 20 June due to uncertainty about the security situation in the country. But in the days following that decision, violence rapidly escalated and the government requested Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal to send troops to help calm the situation. On 24 May a Council press statement expressed “deep concern” and “understanding” about the requests for military assistance. On 25 May the Council issued a presidential statement expressing deep concern about the situation and supporting the deployment of the multinational force.

The Council will expect briefings on developments in Timor Leste in June. (The Secretary-General has sent a Special Envoy, Ian Martin, to assess the situation.) It is now most unlikely that the Council will pursue its previous plans to wrap up the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). At this moment a further rollover is probable. The earlier divisions inside the Council, as outlined in our May 2006 Monthly Forecast, are likely to be muted in light of the current instability.

The Secretary-General’s report on prospects for addressing serious crimes is now expected for June. It is still unclear whether any Council decisions on this will emerge.

**Council Dynamics**

The growing instability in Timor-Leste in April led to a one-month rollover of UNOTIL’s mandate. It represented a compromise given the US reluctance to support a follow-on mission. Subsequent events seem likely to further complicate plans to terminate UNOTIL.

On the serious crimes issue, despite the appeals from civil society, there is no appetite within the Council or the Core Group (comprised of the US, Portugal, Brazil, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and France) either to create new mechanisms to prosecute serious violators of international criminal law or to pressure Timor-Leste to do so. Many Council members are sympathetic to Dili’s concerns about its relations with Jakarta. Some are also concerned about their own relations with Indonesia. But others believe it is important to uphold accountability as a matter of principle and are concerned about setting precedents for other post-conflict situations and especially other processes under negotiation. Rampant violence that erupted in April and May, resulting in numerous deaths and affecting thousands of civilians, will probably play a role in members’ approach to accountability.

**Key Facts**

The Council established UNOTIL in April 2005 as a follow-on UN presence. Since January, three letters from the Timorese government have urged the Council to endorse a follow-on special political mission. Key concerns are deficiencies in the security and justice sectors, as well as the potential for destabilisation prior to the 2007 elections.

The Secretary-General recommended the establishment of an integrated UN Office for 12 months for election assistance, support to the security and justice sectors, border patrol, and assistance with human rights and reconciliation.

**Underlying Problems**

Tensions in Timor increased when about 40 percent of the Timorese armed forces were dismissed in mid-March. The grievances of those soldiers, which led to protests and tensions with the government, were linked to complaints of discriminatory practices and ill-treatment. In turn, violent riots erupted on 28 April that led to the displacement of thousands of civilians. Observers note that other areas have also witnessed protests, including from groups not necessarily associated with the soldiers.

The security situation further deteriorated in late May with an outbreak of armed violence between former military police units and government troops resulting in several deaths and dozens of wounded.

The Secretary-General’s envoy Ian Martin was formerly his representative in Timor-Leste during the 1999 post-referendum violence. Martin is currently the head of the UN Human Rights Office in Nepal.

For more details and historical background, please consult our December 2005 and May 2006 Monthly Forecasts.

**UN Documents**

- **S/RES/1599 (28 April 2005)** established UNOTIL.
- **S/RES/1543 (14 May 2004)** determined that the serious crimes process be concluded by 20 May 2005.

**Security Council Presidential Statement**

- **S/PRST/2006/25 (25 May 2006)** supported the deployment of the multinational force.

**Security Council Press Statement**

- **SC/8728 (24 May 2006)** expressed deep concern over the deteriorating situation.

**Selected Secretary-General Reports**

- **S/2006/251 (20 April 2006)** was UNOTIL’s end of mandate report.

**Selected Letters**

- **S/2006/320, 325, 326 and 327 (24 and 25 May 2006)** letters from New Zealand, Australia and Portugal to the Council president regarding Timor-Leste.
- **S/2006/319 (24 May 2006)** was the letter from three Timor-Leste leaders informing the Secretary-General about the request to Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal for defence and security assistance.
- **S/2006/196 (29 March 2006)** contained the Council’s request for options for post-UNOTIL assistance.
- **S/2005/613 (28 September 2005)** was the Council’s request for recommendations on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste.
Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) until 31 December.

The Secretary-General’s proposal for an integrated UN office in Burundi to follow on from ONUB in 2007, covering security-sector reforms and human rights as well as transitional government, will also be discussed in light of the Secretary-General’s report on ONUB, which is due 15 June. In this context, some discussion of a possible Peacebuilding Commission role is likely.

It seems that the Council may also have a progress report of the joint UN-Burundi government committee which was set up to plan how the UN can help Burundi after the mandate of ONUB expires. UNDP Assistant Administrator Gilbert Fossoun Hungbo reportedly had successful meetings in Bujumbura on this in late May.

The Council will also discuss extending the redeployment of civilian and military personnel between ONUB and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) until 31 December.

The outstanding issue of the framework for a truth and reconciliation commission and a special chamber to try serious human rights violations is unlikely to be discussed because the Secretariat will not be ready to report to the Council in June with negotiations still underway.

Options

One option is to agree now on a mandate for an integrated office to commence on 1 January 2007.

A second option is to signal an intention to keep under review the possible extension of ONUB if the security situation deteriorates. However, this is unlikely given the Burundian government’s desire for ONUB’s disengagement and pressure from some Council members to reduce the size of the mission.

A third option is to delay a decision on the integrated office until closer to the end of the year, thereby implicitly keeping open the possibility of a wider review.

Key Issues

The main issue is whether to take an early decision on the proposal for an integrated office. Early approval of the structure would allow for a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Related issues are the size, duration, financing and tasks of the new structure, and the potential security risks if the situation in Burundi were to deteriorate.

Another issue is whether ONUB troops should continue to assist MONUC after June.

Given the regional dimension and the security situation in Burundi, it is likely that the Council will want to remain seized of the issue.

For background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our March 2006 Monthly Forecast.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised the Secretary-General to redeploy military and civilian personnel temporarily from ONUB to MONUC.
- S/RES/1650 (21 December 2005) extended ONUB until 1 July 2005 and authorised the sharing of troops between MONUC and ONUB.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/12 (23 March 2006) approved the recommendations in the Secretary-General’s sixth report.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2006/163 (21 March 2006) outlined a drawdown plan for ONUB’s military and civilian personnel.
- S/2005/728 (21 November 2005) proposed the phased withdrawal of ONUB.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/206 (31 March 2006) contained the Secretary-General’s intention to redeploy troops temporarily from ONUB to MONUC.
- S/2005/736 (23 November 2005) contained Bujumbura’s position on the future of ONUB.

Other Relevant Facts

Democratic Republic of Congo

Expected Council Action

A Council mission will visit the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June and reinforce the need for the 30 July elections to proceed smoothly and fairly. A briefing and a report are expected to follow.

Members are expected, at least in the period before the elections, to favour political solutions to the problem of foreign fighters in the DRC, rather than mandating the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to disarm foreign irregulars forcibly or conduct operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). But any discussions of the Secretary-General’s report under resolution 1649 are expected to be postponed til after the Council mission.

The Council is expected to confirm an extension for the additional MONUC police under resolution 1621 and troops under resolution 1635 and those from the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), all deployed in Katanga for the elections.
Discussions are also expected to include the possibility of targeted sanctions under resolution 1649.

MONUC’s post-election strategy is likely to be in the minds of Council members.

Options
A likely option is a list of individual violators for targeted sanctions under resolution 1649.

Other possible options, not necessarily under consideration at this point, include:

- Starting discussions on MONUC’s post-election strategy in the context of the upcoming visiting mission;
- Including in it discussions (i) on the future of security sector reform, and (ii) on Uganda’s request that MONUC conducts operations against the LRA and the request of the Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission (comprising the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) that the mission forcibly disarms irregular combatants; and
- Engaging Rwanda more closely in creating conditions for the return of rank-and-file fighters.

Key Issues
The key issues before the Council are:

- Support for the timely holding of the elections and the conclusion of the transitional period.
- The challenges faced by MONUC and the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) in effectively putting an end to foreign armed groups.
- MONUC’s post-election mandate and size. A key point is the challenge of security sector reform in creating an efficient FARDC.
- FARDC’s lack of capability and discipline, as well as widespread violations of human rights.
- The lack of incentives for foreign combatants, particularly the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), to repatriate. (Many commanders are either subject to sanctions or wanted for genocide. A related issue is Rwanda’s mixed signals regarding amnesty and reintegration. Combatants fear arrest back home and many have ties in the DRC.)
- Imposing sanctions under resolution 1649 against commanders of foreign and Congolese armed groups, a measure requested by the Tripartite Commission and recommended by the Secretary-General.

Key Facts
MONUC is mainly involved in election support and in action against irregular armed groups in the Kivus and Ituri, particularly through joint operations with the FARDC and voluntary disarmament. At the time of writing the regular MONUC report (due late May) was expected.

The additional police and troops approved in September and October 2005 are required under resolutions 1621 and 1635 to be repatriated by 1 July at the latest. (At the time the resolutions were adopted it was thought that the DRC elections would be in June.)

Uganda has made several requests for MONUC and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to take action specifically against the LRA. Uganda also threatened in October to intervene in the DRC. Kinshasa has rejected further Ugandan requests for entering Congolese territory, but there were complaints from the DRC in late April considered “credible” by MONUC that Ugandan forces had entered Congolese territory uninvited.

In his report on foreign armed groups in the DRC requested by resolution 1649, the Secretary-General indicated that dealing with such groups is primarily a responsibility of governments, with MONUC’s support particularly to the extension of Kinshasa’s authority and to regional cooperation. But the report also highlighted deficiencies in the FARDC that may have a significant impact over MONUC’s exit strategy.

The Secretariat has indicated that MONUC’s first priority is the Congolese elections, and thus forcibly disarming those armed groups in response to regional requests would not be possible at this time. It has also indicated that UNMIS does not have enough capability to combat LRA forces, against which the preferred course of action would be to improve information-sharing (with MONUC and UNMIS support) and regional coordination.

Council Dynamics
The issue of foreign armed groups is of particular concern to Council members, especially the UK, France and Tanzania. But members are also sensitive to the Secretariat’s concern with MONUC’s capabilities and the importance of concentrating on the elections right now. And African members seem to support a larger role for regional mechanisms such as the Great Lakes Summit, expected for after the DRC elections.

Regarding the sanctions regime, there is support in the Council for new individual sanctions against commanders of irregular armed groups in the DRC.

Underlying Problems
Current concerns in the DRC include the possibility of election-motivated violence. The activities of Congolese militias in the east and Katanga, as well as human rights violations by the FARDC also remain an important MONUC focus.

The main opposition party has boycotted the elections, and rebel field commanders are still operative despite militias being required to disarm and either reintegrate into civilian life or enter security forces. A positive signal came in May with the surrender of 250 Katangese Mayi-Mayi and their prominent leader Kyungu Mutanga, known as Gédéon.

Some commanders will be handed to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the violence in Ituri. Such was the case with Thomas Lubanga, who in March became the first-ever suspect in ICC custody when he was handed over by the Congolese government.

Berinu is considering referring the case of FDLR leader Ignace Murwanashyaka, arrested after the imposition of individual Council sanctions last year, to the ICC. The Court has moreover received a referral from the Central African Republic against Congolese Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba.
For the historical background, please refer to:

- S/RES/1671 (25 April 2006) authorised the deployment of EU forces in the DRC for the elections.
- S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised the deployment of ONUB forces in the DRC for the elections.
- S/RES/1650 (21 December 2005) permitted troop-sharing between ONUB and MONUC.
- S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) strengthened sanctions in the DRC and requested the report on foreign armed groups.
- S/RES/1621 (6 September 2005) and 1635 (28 October 2005) authorised additional contingents for MONUC until 1 July 2006.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was the report on foreign armed groups in the DRC.
- S/2005/832 (28 December 2005) was the latest MONUC report at press time.

Selected Letters
- S/2006/274 (2 May 2006) was the Congolese letter on recent Ugandan incursions.
- S/2005/667 (25 October 2005) contained the Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission’s request for MONUC to forcibly disarm foreign armed groups in the DRC.

Forecast

- S/RES/1631 of 15 December 2005 requested a report on foreign armed groups.
- S/RES/1621 (6 September 2005) and 1635 (28 October 2005) authorised additional contingents for MONUC until 1 July 2006.
- S/RES/1621 (6 September 2005) and 1635 (28 October 2005) authorised additional contingents for MONUC until 1 July 2006.

For the historical background, please refer to our April 2006 Forecast.

Useful Additional Sources

Liberia

Expected Council Action

The report from the Liberia Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts’ is due by 7 June. Sanctions on timber and diamonds expire 20 June. The arms embargo and travel ban expire 20 December. The Council has also imposed, on an indefinite basis, an asset freeze on a list of individuals with ties to former Liberian president Charles Taylor. The Council is expected to continue the sanctions on diamonds, but could lift or suspend the timber sanctions.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts expires 21 June. The Council is expected to renew the Panel’s mandate for another six months. The Council will also receive a quarterly report from the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) containing recommendations for a drawdown plan for the mission. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Alan Doss will probably brief the Council. There may be some discussion regarding UNMIL’s future size and composition, but no decision on this matter is expected in June.

Options

The most likely option is that the Council will renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts and the diamond sanctions, but suspend the timber sanctions. The Council may consider a suspension rather than a permanent lifting of timber sanctions, thereby retaining leverage to ensure continued effort by the Liberian government towards establishing a transparent and accountable timber sector. The option of lifting the diamond sanctions seems less likely.

A further option is for the Council to express satisfaction with the current Liberian government’s effort at meeting the conditions for lifting the sanctions. In addition, the Council may want to update the travel ban and asset freeze list in view of recent political progress, and a few of the individuals from the lists might be delisted by the Council for having severed their ties to former president Charles Taylor and for having improved their cooperation with the new government. However, none of the most significant individuals on the list are expected to be delisted.

Further options include:
- renewing both timber and diamond sanctions, but expressing readiness to review the sanctions regime as quickly as possible, and possibly renewing the sanctions for a period of three months rather than six;
- changing the composition of the Panel of Experts in response to changes in the sanctions regime;
- resuming the debate on the size and composition of the UNMIL force; and
- granting a waiver for the weapons embargo for the Liberian government.

Recent Developments

Overall, there has been more progress towards meeting the conditions for lifting the timber sanctions than there has been for lifting the diamond sanctions. An important condition for lifting the diamond sanctions as specified in resolution 1521 is for Liberia “to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable with a view to joining the Kimberley Process”. The Panel of Experts reported in its previous report of December 2005 that Liberia still had “some way to go” before it could participate in the Kimberley Process, and that much will therefore depend on the progress that the Panel of Experts will be able to report on in this area. Additionally, a Kimberley Process expert visited Liberia at the end of May and is expected to report by early June.

Liberia’s new president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, addressed the Council in an open debate 17 March expressing her commitment to fulfil the conditions for the lifting of timber and diamond sanctions. During the debate, the Danish Ambassador and...
Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, Ellen Margrethe Løj, welcomed the Liberian president’s resolve and stated, “If the current reform momentum is kept up, that goal [lifting the sanctions] should be within short reach.”

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to further encourage the Liberian government and key players in the Liberian peace process, while avoiding a premature lifting of sanctions that might be exploited by spoilers of the peace process. Given that the previous sanctions report in December 2005 stated that the Transitional Government’s lack of financial control would make it likely that “most Government revenues would fail to enter the budget process for the benefit of the people” if the sanctions were lifted, progress in the area of financial accountability and transparency will be an important determinant in finding an adequate solution to this dilemma.

A further issue is related to the travel ban and asset freeze imposed on the list of individuals who constitute a threat to the peace process in Liberia. The issue here will be how to signal the Council’s satisfaction with the peace process by delisting certain individuals, while keeping the major spoilers of the peace process on the list.

A request for a waiver from the arms embargo is possible. Resolution 1521 provides for an exemption from the embargo for arms and related material “intended solely for support of or use in an international training and reform programme for the Liberian armed forces and police.” An issue for the Council will be to decide if such a request is made whether it falls under the exemptions already provided for by this resolution, or if they wish to make an additional exemption.

Council Dynamics
There is widespread consensus in the Council that the sanctions should be lifted as soon as possible. But conditions set out by the Council must be met and some division over the pace can be expected, with some Council members being more cautious than others.

The Secretary-General’s recommendations for a drawdown plan for UNMIL are expected by mid-June. The Secretariat will be briefing the Council, but no new action on the matter is likely in June.

UN Documents
Recent Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1667 (31 March 2006) renewed UNMIL’s mandate for a period of six months.
- S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005) renewed the arms embargo and travel ban for a period of 12 months and renewed the diamond and timber sanctions for a period of six months.

Latest Secretary General’s Report
- S/2006/159 (14 March 2006)

Other Relevant Documents
- S/PV.5389 (17 March 2006) was a Council open debate with Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf addressing Council members.

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Kosovo
Expected Council Action
At the end of May, the Council will receive the periodic report from the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In June the Council will likely focus on the process of standards implementation, and perhaps discuss the ongoing decreases in the size of the mission and the future of the UN’s involvement in Kosovo. No formal Council action is expected.

Options
In theory the Council has the option to formally comment on and seek to steer the process of standards implementation, and signal to the parties and the Secretariat some long-range thinking on the future of UNMIK. However, the differing positions in the Council on each of these issues seem likely to cancel out the possibility of a collective position on either issue.

Council Dynamics
The desire to keep separate the discussion of the report on UNMIK from the briefing on the political status talks, which is expected in July from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Status Talks, Martti Ahtisaari, make it unlikely that the status issue will be discussed in June. But the status issue will figure prominently in some minds, especially given strong views held in the past on the related nature of the standards and status processes. (The outcome of the recent referendum in Montenegro may contribute to anxieties on that front.)

All members appear to agree on the need for the strong implementation of the standards. However, some European countries are concerned that the standards process is being rushed, with the risk that changes implemented in Kosovo will not be as durable in the long term. While the Council is divided on the desirable outcome of the political status talks, this division is unlikely to surface much during the discussion of the UNMIK report. Nevertheless, these differences will have an impact on discussions about the UN’s future role in Kosovo. Several Council members are concerned that premature action on this issue could predetermine a conclusion of the status talks themselves.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Alan Doss (United Kingdom)
Chairman of the 1521 Sanctions Committee concerning Liberia
Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

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Key Facts
Established by resolution 1244 in June 1999, UNMIK was tasked with re-establishing and running a complete transitional civil administration in Kosovo. While UNMIK still has a staff of significant sized, its role has shifted from an administrative function to a largely advisory one.

For a full background, please see our February 2006 Monthly Forecast and Update Report.
Key Issues
The issue which will receive the most attention from the Security Council is how well the standards, first outlined in the “Standards Implementation Plan” in 2004, are being implemented, particularly as they relate to minorities and human rights issues. The last report in January (S/2006/45) indicated that the implementation of the standards was falling behind, which was of great concern to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Søren Jessen-Petersen. However, by the time of his presentation to the Council on 14 February (S/PV 5373), some improvements had been made. Despite sporadic low-level violence targeting minority populations, it appears that over the past months the pace of progress on the standards has picked up.

While the progress towards achievements of standards is closely linked to the future political status of Kosovo, this second issue is unlikely to get a great deal of attention in the Council discussion in June. The status talks are not under the close oversight of the Security Council, or indeed the Secretariat. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari has an independent role. He is planning to brief the Council at the beginning of July.

Underlying Problems
The political landscape in Kosovo has been unsettled over the last three months. The death in January, on the eve of the start of the status talks, of Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, a political moderate known for his ability to achieve consensus, elicited concern regarding the success of the talks. He was succeeded by Fatmir Sejdiu. In March, Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi resigned and was replaced by Agim Ceku, former commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). These changes also diverted attention away from the progress on the standards.

Progress on certain standards, particularly concerning minorities, remains difficult to achieve. Minorities continue to be targets of violence within Kosovo, and remain in isolated enclaves.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.
- S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaffirmed strong support for the policy of “standards before status.”

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports / Letters
- S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) noted that progress in the implementation of the standards was slower than all other reporting periods.
- S/2005/635 (7 October 2005) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the report of Special Envoy Kai Eide.
- S/2005/335 and Corr. 1, (23 May 2005) was a report that included an annex outlining key achievements and priority challenges relating to the eight standards.
- S/2003/996 (15 October 2003) The Secretary-General’s new Special Representative, Harri Holkeri of Finland, reaffirmed the key priorities: improving rule of law and security; furthering returns and minority rights; and strengthening economic development to promote substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)

UNMIK
- Size of UNMIK mission: 797 international staff, 2,277 local staff
- Size of OSCE mission: 310 international staff, 990 local staff
- Size of EU mission: 114 international staff, 244 local staff

Iraq
Expected Council Action
The Council will review the mandate for the multinational force (MNF) and the mandates of the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board. Also in June, the quarterly report of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is due, and the US is expected to report to the Council on the activities of the MNF. No formal action is expected on these issues.

Options
In the absence of clearly articulated policy requests to the UN from the recently formed Iraqi government, and given the overall situation in Iraq, the Council will be reluctant to explore any new options at this stage.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members feel that the UN should play a more prominent role in Iraq. However, the Secretariat remains reluctant to commit more personnel in Iraq without security guarantees.

Discussion of underlying issues about the MNF is likely to be muted. France and Russia seemed in the past inclined towards a
Council members are keen to maintain a consensus to avoid the reappearance of tensions that were present within the Council before the US-led military campaign in March 2003 and thus the underlying issues are rarely raised. It is therefore likely that the review process in June will be uncontroversial.

Underlying Problems
According to the Secretary-General, “staff security remains the Mission’s overarching principle.” For UNAMI to become more engaged in Iraq in the long term, member states would have to provide operational support and security. The Secretary-General, for example, has called for the development of a new integrated UN complex in Iraq. However, despite the UN’s willingness to become more involved and broad agreement among Council members, UNAMI still lacks capacity and protection to undertake a wider role.

The constitutional review process is the next political step for Iraq. However, the risk that violence could increase during that process may lead to a conclusion that the time is not ripe for this review.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1637 (8 November 2005) extended the mandate of the MNF; the arrangements for depositing proceeds of export sales from petroleum and natural gas in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and the arrangements of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board until 31 December 2006.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2006/8 (14 February 2006) welcomed the results of the elections.

Secretary-General’s Latest Report on UNAMI

- S/2006/137 (3 March 2006)
Most of the debate centers on UNMOVIC’s future role. Some Council members have argued for a rapid conclusion of its mandate while others have claimed that important work still remains to be done ranging from presenting a final report taking into account the findings of the Duelfer report, to initiating a fresh round of UNMOVIC inspections on the ground in Iraq to monitor and secure previously identified WMD related sites and dual-use capabilities (although this last option seems increasingly unlikely).

UNMOVIC was created to monitor and enforce Iraq’s disarmament obligations determined by resolutions which are still in force. Ending UNMOVIC’s mandate would entail agreeing on whether Iraq has met these disarmament obligations. One issue, therefore, is whether to retain some international mechanism to monitor the Iraqi weapons programme and Iraqi sites known to have been involved in WMD production.

A further issue is unsecured Iraqi weapons materials. Satellite imagery analysed by the IAEA and UNMOVIC disclose that many WMD sites in Iraq subject to their monitoring have been looted or razed. UNMOVIC has investigated the fate of looted equipment out of concern that it could be used in clandestine WMD production, and has found material from Iraqi sites in Jordan and the Netherlands. A question before the Council is whether UNMOVIC should continue to monitor Iraqi dual-use capabilities or related items and material with a view to prevent their transfer to other countries or terrorist groups.

Finally, a major institutional issue arises from the fact that, through years of investigations, UNMOVIC has gained considerable and unique expertise in conducting weapons inspections and disarmament verification. An issue, as pointed out by the Secretary-General in his mandate review report, is “whether and how the United Nations could utilise certain areas of the Commission’s expertise,” separate from UNMOVIC’s future relationship to Iraq. Alternatives range from retaining its roster of trained technical experts to creating a standing UN monitoring, verification and inspection body to address WMD issues. Related to this is whether and how UNMOVIC’s records should be transferred to the UN archives since much of UNMOVIC’s material is proliferation sensitive. Some members are concerned that transferring UNMOVIC’s records to the UN archives could increase the risk of leaking sensitive information.

Iraq has expressed support for a rapid conclusion of UNMOVIC’s mandate, pointing out that the approximately $1 million taken from Iraq’s escrow account to cover UNMOVIC’s budget each month are resources much needed for the reconstruction of the country. Iraq further emphasises its clear commitment to comply with international weapons treaties, as evidenced by article 9, paragraph 1(e) of Iraq’s constitution, which provides that “the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated equipment, material, technologies and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons.” Rather than retaining an international monitoring mechanism, Iraq wants to develop national monitoring capabilities.

**Council Dynamics**

Most members have expressed a desire to bring UNMOVIC’s mandate to an end as soon as possible. Some members seem reluctant to foreclose on the option of international surveillance of Iraq’s military installations and weapon programmes. However, this debate will be significantly affected by the recent political developments in Iraq. Most Council members now prefer to revise the UNMOVIC mandate in consultation with a new Iraqi government. This would, among other things, allow the Council to evaluate the future Iraqi government’s adherence to existing international arms and non-proliferation treaties before deciding upon the future for UNMOVIC.

Russia has previously expressed concern over the validity of the Duelfer report. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko said in an interview that the Council cannot make a decision on its future involvement in disarmament of Iraq based on a report he said was prepared by a country strongly involved in Iraqi affairs at the time. UNMOVIC has not had access to the background material for the Duelfer report it says is needed to determine whether its findings match UNMOVIC’s existing knowledge or represent new findings. Pointing out that the Duelfer report and UNMOVIC’s findings diverge significantly, Russia has called for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to analyse the US background materials for the Duelfer report and submit its independent conclusions to the Council.

On the other hand, the US does not believe there is a need for UNMOVIC to produce a final report and rejects any calls for access to US intelligence data concerning WMDs in Iraq. The Council, in resolution 1483, encouraged the UK and US to keep the Council informed of disarmament activities in Iraq, normally done as part of the quarterly briefing by the US to the Council on the multinational force in Iraq. However, these countries consider they are under no obligation to do so.

The EU and the Secretary-General have expressed interest in retaining the verification and inspection experience of UNMOVIC, for example by setting up a roster of experts. The EU has previously discussed the possibility of an international inspection and verification capability to be established within the UN, but the proposal has met resistance among some of the other permanent members and is no longer discussed in the Council.

**Options**

The most likely scenario is that the Council resumes its discussion concerning the mandate of UNMOVIC without taking action at this point.

Further options include:
- starting discussion on whether and how to retain areas of UNMOVIC’s expertise;
- requesting a final report, incorporating and analysing the findings of the Duelfer report;
- deciding to terminate UNMOVIC’s mandate; and/or
- examining whether and how UNMOVIC’s records and archives should be transferred to the UN archive.
Members are likely to be reluctant to get into a discussion that might reignite tensions from the debate over the Iraq war and the alleged existence of Iraq WMDs. Continuation of the status quo may therefore be the path of least resistance. Up till now the Council has not considered the question important enough for the sustained attention that would be needed to resolve UNMOVIC’s future. However, with the formation of the new Iraqi government further deferral may not be so easy.

An additional underlying issue is the possibility that UNMOVIC’s records may contain details previously undisclosed about the role various Council members had in supplying Iraq with WMD-related materials. Although it is already widely known that several UN members helped Iraq to develop WMD capabilities, some members might be reluctant to transfer UNMOVIC’s records to UN archives.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) reaffirmed the Council’s intention to reconsider the UNMOVIC mandate.
- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) reaffirmed Iraq’s disarmament obligations and highlighted the Council’s intention to reconsider the UNMOVIC mandate.
- S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002) established an enhanced inspections regime.
- S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999) created UNMOVIC to replace UNSCOM.
- S/RES/687 (3 April 1991) established UNSCOM.

#### Selected Quarterly Reports
- S/2006/133 (28 February 2006) Latest quarterly report
- S/2000/516 (1 June 2000) First quarterly report

#### Other UN Documents
- S/2002/1034 (16 September 2002) was the letter from Iraq permitting the entry of UNMOVIC weapons inspectors to the country without conditions.
- S/2000/321 (17 April 2000) was the letter from the Russian delegation criticising UNMOVIC’s organisational plan for not clearly prescribing procedures for conducting inspections, and for failing to mention the need to reach an agreement on these procedures with Baghdad.
- S/2000/292 (6 April 2000) UNMOVIC Organisational Plan
- S/2000/207 (10 March 2000) Secretary-General’s appointment of the College of Commissioners
- S/2000/60 (27 January 2000) Secretary-General’s nomination of the Executive Chairman
- S/PV.4084 (17 December 1999) was the meeting record from the Council’s adoption of resolution 1284 (with China, France, Malaysia and Russia abstaining).

### Historical Background

1 July 2003 The Secretary-General appointed Dr. Demetrius Perricos as acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC.

30 June 2003 Dr. Hans Blix concluded his appointment as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC.


18 March 2003 UNMOVIC inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq.

5 February 2003 US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the Council claiming that Iraq possessed WMDs.

27 January 2003 Blix provided the Council with an update, as required by resolution 1441, sixty days after the resumption of inspections in Iraq.

7 December 2002 Iraq provided UNMOVIC and the IAEA in Baghdad with a declaration of its weapons programmes, required by Council resolution 1441.

27 November 2002 Inspections resumed in Iraq.

8 November 2002 The Council adopted resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and established an enhanced inspections regime.

### Expected Council Action

On 15 June, the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will expire. The Council is expected to renew the mandate for an additional six months, but pressure for a further downsizing of the mission is growing.

**Options**

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  - deciding in June to reduce the troop levels, perhaps by phasing out the formed units in favour of a small number of military observers;
  - delaying the decision on troop reduction for a short period, but requesting a report from the Secretary-General on the modalities; or
  - urging the Secretary-General to consider appointing a special envoy to explore options for resuming the political talks between the parties.
Council Dynamics
Interest in further downsizing UNFICYP is expected to continue. Replacing troops with military observers is likely to be the next proposal. A small number of observers would produce an overall saving—despite the fact that in general observers are more expensive. However, there will be supporters in the Council for retaining the status quo. It is likely to be a controversial issue.

By contrast, there is unlikely to be much appetite for discussion of the underlying political issue.

Recent Developments
The situation in Cyprus has been calm. It seems that the aerial incident on 23 May involving Greek and Turkish jet fighters has not affected the situation. In his last report, the Secretary-General stated that force reductions in 2005 had not led to any deterioration in the overall security situation.

Turkey presented a proposal in January for the lifting of restrictions on Cyprus. The proposal was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, saying that the concessions offered were already obligations Turkey had undertaken towards the European Union.

The US and the UK have both recently tried to test the water on Cyprus at high levels in the course of visits to the area by the UK Foreign Secretary and US Secretary of State. US Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza stated that the US hopes UN negotiations on Cyprus can resume soon. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is expected to visit Turkey on 31 May, recently warned against “attempts to gain advantage unilaterally” in the Cyprus conflict and advocated “practical steps to fine-tune normal daily ties between the two sides on the island [...] in the framework of the United Nations Security Council”.

Greek Cypriots seem to remain resistant to any initiatives on substantive issues by the UN or other third parties. The Secretary-General seems to believe that there would be no value in personally launching a new political reconciliation process at this point.

In May 2006, the Democratic Party of Tassos Papadopoulos strengthened its position in the parliament during the in the first parliamentary elections since the Annan plan was rejected in 2004. The biggest loser of the elections was the United Democrats party of George Vassiliou, who had openly supported the Annan Plan.

Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari is planning a trip to Cyprus, but the timing of the visit is not yet settled. This could present an opportunity for exploring reactions to the possibility of the Secretary-General appointing a Special Envoy.

The Secretary-General has previously stated that “if Greek Cypriots remain willing to resolve the Cyprus problem through a bicomunal, bizonal federation, this needs to be demonstrated” (S/2004/437). President Papadopoulos (the Greek Cypriot leader) recently insisted that his interpretation of this meant it would also need to provide for “reunification”. (A detailed explanation was sent to the Council on 15 May (S/2006/300).) The Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat complained, in a letter of 9 May to the Council by Turkey (S/2006/286), that the Greek Cypriot leadership was opposing settlement parameters outlined by the UN.

For historical background and more details, please consult our December 2005 Monthly Forecast.

UN Documents
Latest Security Council Resolution

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2006/315 (23 May 2006) recommended a six-month extension of UNFICYP and urged the parties to resume contact.

Letters to the Secretary-General
- S/2006/300 (15 May 2006) was the letter from Cyprus explaining the views of Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission
Michael Møller (Denmark)

Force Commander
Major General Rafael José Barni (Argentina)

Size and Composition of Mission
Total authorised strength as of 31 March 2006: 905 total uniformed personnel, including 836 troops and 69 police; supported by 37 international civilian personnel and 115 local civilian staff.

Cost (approved budget)
1 July 2005 – 30 June 2006: $46.51 million (gross), including voluntary contributions of a one-third share from Cyprus and $6.5 million from Greece

Golan Heights (UNDOF)
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to follow its standard practice and simply extend the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights for another six months.

It is also standard for the Council to call for implementation of resolution 338 of 22
October 1973, which refers to resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories.

Since 1976, the Council president has also issued a complementary statement on how the Middle East situation will remain tense until a comprehensive settlement is reached.

**Options**

The most likely option is a straightforward renewal of UNDOF’s mandate.

The Council has yet to discuss the impact on UNDOF if there is a new border demarcation in the Sheb’a Farms region. If real progress is made in resolving this issue, the Council may request the Secretary-General to report on how UNDOF’s tasks would be affected. However, despite the recent Council action on this subject, which resulted in May in resolution 1680 strongly encouraging Syria to respond positively to Lebanon’s request to delineate the common border, it is unlikely that there will be any developments by June that would affect the UNDOF discussion.

**Key Issues**

There is no real issue facing the Council regarding the renewal of the UNDOF mandate. All parties see the maintenance of UNDOF as being in their interest.

A possible issue could arise if Syria sought to use the UNDOF renewal to push for an end to Israel’s occupation of the Sheb’a Farms area—and the wider Golan Heights. Exploiting Israel’s history of non-compliance with resolution 242 is a possible response for Syria as it comes under pressure with respect to Lebanon’s request to delineate the border. However, Syria may decide that maintaining the status quo in the Golan Heights is more vital at this point.

For historical background and a more complete list of documents relating to UNDOF, please see our December 2005 Monthly Forecast, and to the issue of the Sheb’a Farms, please see our May 2006 Update Report on Lebanon.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to respond positively to Lebanon’s request to delineate the common border.

**Selected Presidential Statement**


**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2005/767 (7 December 2005) recommended extending the mandate for six months.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNDOF Force Commander**

Major General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)

**Size and Composition of Mission**

- Total authorised strength as of 31 March 2006: 1,033 troops assisted by 57 military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan; and supported by 38 international civilian personnel and 110 local civilian staff
- Key military contributors: Austria, Poland, India, Japan and Slovakia

**Approved Budget**

1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $43.71 million (gross)

**Duration**

May 1974 to present

**Review of Security Council Mandates**

As reported in our May 2006 Monthly Forecast, the Council was expected to begin to consider ways in which it would examine its mandates pursuant to the Secretary-General’s report on mandates review. The Council has now established a new mechanism to undertake this review, the Ad Hoc Council Mechanism on Mandate Review, which is co-chaired by the Permanent Representatives of Slovakia and the United States. It held its first meeting, at the Permanent Representatives level, on 17 May.

Neither the Council nor the “Review Mechanism” issued terms of reference. Hence, there is very little specific information available to the broader UN community on the intent of the Council with regard to the review of its mandates.

However, emerging from its first meeting, it appears the review will include all Council mandates, rather than only those over five years old. It is also expected that the co-chairs will present a proposal to the Council on the method of review to be employed and a timetable for completion of the review.

Since Council mandates ultimately impact all UN member states, there will be wider interest in the substance of the process and UN member states will be interested in whether the Council will consult more widely on its intentions. This is of particular importance with peacekeeping mandates as they affect not only the regional countries concerned but also troop-contributing countries (TCCs). In keeping with resolution 1353 and the mechanism established for consultations with TCCs, wider consultations may be seen as important. Also in this context, the Security Council established guidelines set out in resolution 1327.

One early objective of the review will be to make Council mandates more effective. This is of particular importance with regard to the effectiveness of targeted sanctions and their enforcement. The preliminary recommendations are in the 26 September 2002 report of the Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/Prop_out10.pdf).

A number of sanctions expert panels have also made recommendations to their respective sanctions committees to enhance the effectiveness of those sanctions which could be taken up by the new mechanism.

We will continue to follow the progress of the review process with a view to providing insights into Security Council mandates and prospects for review in future issues of Security Council Report’s Monthly Forecast.
UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1353 (13 June 2001) strengthened cooperation with TCCs.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) was on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (S/2000/809).

“Uniting Against Terrorism” — More Tasks for the Council?

The Secretary-General’s report *Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for Global Counterterrorism Strategy* of 27 April 2006 (A/60/825), is another in a series of subject-specific responses to the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The Summit Outcome Document asked the Secretary-General to submit proposals to strengthen the capacity of the UN system to assist states in combating terrorism. In this report, he is also acting on a recommendation by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that the Secretary-General take a leading role in promoting a comprehensive global strategy against terrorism and strengthen the ability of states to counter terrorism and promote the rule of law. Further, in December 2005, the president of the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General “for a report on capacity-building as well as for additional inputs of relevance for the forthcoming work of the General Assembly on a counterterrorism strategy.”

The Secretary-General was assisted in preparation of the report by the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, which he created in 2005.

The report highlighted the role of UN bodies in combating terrorism in the context of key principles which set out the elements of a counterterrorism strategy, earlier expounded by the Secretary-General in Madrid in March 2005. The five pillars are:

- dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;
- denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack;
- deterring states from supporting terrorism;
- developing state capacity to defeat terrorism; and
- defending human rights.

The Secretary-General made a number of observations and recommendations:

- the General Assembly should take action to support the strategy in fulfillment of the Summit Outcome;
- member states should adopt counterterrorism measures already required by existing international legal instruments and create new instruments to fill existing gaps in counterterrorism regimes;
- agencies and bodies of the UN system should assist states in counterterrorism capacity-building; and
- the Security Council should strengthen its antiterrorism and related regimes and assist states to fully implement them.

Implications for the Security Council

Several of the Secretary-General’s recommendations are specific to the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies.

- The Council should closely monitor the implementation of its resolutions and ensure that all states act in accordance with international law in order to find, deny safe haven to, and bring to justice all those connected to terrorist acts.
- Through its 1267 Committee, the Council must do more to ensure that the sanctions against Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities target the right people and are fully enforced.
- The Council should strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban under the sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban.
- The 1267 Committee should continue discussions of listing and delisting, including the issue of due process and the recommendations offered by the Monitoring Team.
- The Council should improve the accountability and transparency of sanctions regimes, ensure that the regimes of the 1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) are mutually reinforcing, and consider a more rigorous and expeditious use of arms embargoes.
- Through the CTC, the Council should continue to assist governments to build capacity in implementing resolution 1624, including by coordinating the identification of best practices and assessing priorities based on individual needs.
- The CTC should continue to work with states on their adoption of legislative and administrative measures to deny terrorists access to travel.
- Council bodies dealing with terrorism should develop standards of accountability and compliance against which efforts of individual states can be measured.
- The various UN and Council bodies should strive for shared assessment visits to help reduce the burden on states.
- The Council should undertake an assessment of the reporting requirements of the three counterterrorism committees in order to coordinate reporting requirements thereby reducing the reporting burden on states, streamlining reporting and avoiding duplication and overlap.
- The Council should maintain and strengthen its actions against states found to be harbouring and assisting terrorists.
- The Council should act promptly to take the necessary decisions, including under Chapter VII of the Charter, against those states or their nationals that incite or help to commit terrorist acts.
- Through the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), the Council should undertake certain tasks, including:
  - coordinate with relevant organizations within the UN system to respond to the assessments that result from the country visits by matching available human and financial resources to the technical assistance needs;
  - utilise its newly developed assessment tool in a systematic and transparent manner to establish priority areas within countries;
  - work closely with all technical assistance providers and share information that might be helpful for them in their assistance programmes; and
  - explore ways to facilitate the dissemination of best practices.
- The Council and the General Assembly may wish to consider adopting a resolution calling on all states to provide necessary cooperation and assistance in the event of...
a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

UN member states should examine the possibility of asking the Council to promote facilitation of technical assistance to counter terrorist development, acquisition and use of WMDs, through the CTED and the Group of Experts who assist the 1540 Committee.

While most of these recommendations are not new, by raising them in this report, the Secretary-General draws attention to gaps in the global antiterrorism efforts, the lack of coordination and also responds to a number of concerns of many states.

Council Options

The report points towards various options for dealing with the organisational fragmentation in the activities being undertaken by the UN as a whole. It highlighted the fact that the CTC should be at the core of UN efforts. In this regard, the Secretary-General infers that an option is to develop the central role intended for the CTED, which was to enhance the CTC’s capacity to identify and prioritise the technical assistance needs of states. He called for greater synergies between all relevant agencies and bodies within the UN system in this effort.

While the Council has been examining a number of the issues raised by the Secretary-General, the pace at which this is done has proved very slow. An option is for the Council to fast-track a review process, as it has done with a special mechanism on the mandates review. Some of these issues fall within the mandates of subsidiary bodies of the Council, such as the CTC, the Working Group on General Issues Related to Sanctions, and the Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1540.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) called upon states to prohibit incitement to commit terrorist acts and to deny safe haven to terrorists, and called upon the CTC assist states to implement the resolution.
- S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004) called upon states to fully cooperate in the fight against terrorism and established the 1566 Working Group.

Selected General Assembly Documents

- A/60/825 (27 April 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for Global Counterterrorism Strategy.
- A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
- A/59/665 (2 December 2004) was a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action

Council members expect in June a briefing from the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on the investigations into international crimes committed in Darfur.

The Council also expects briefings from the presidents and the prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) in the first week of June. They are expected to submit regular reports on their respective completion strategies by the end of May.

No formal Council action is expected.

Key Facts

The ICC initiated investigations on Darfur in June 2005. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo indicated in December that the investigations would focus on particularly grave crimes and those most responsible for them. It remains unclear when he will seek arrest warrants and against whom. Khartoum indicated in December that it would not cooperate with the ICC. There will be interest in the prosecutor’s update on this.

Council resolutions 1503 and 1534 called on the ICTY and the ICTR to complete all investigations by the end of 2004, all first-instance activities by the end of 2008, and all work by 2010. Both tribunals have so far managed to keep to this schedule.

The ICTY has indicated that, due to the filing of new indictments and the recent detention of new perpetrators, trials at first instance will probably not be completed before late 2009. (The failure so far to apprehend the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić suggests that even this date may be optimistic.)

Options for Future Council Action

A number of practical steps have been taken by the Council to support the timely conclusion of the tribunals’ activities. Some members have indicated that further options need to be explored, such as increasing the number of ad hoc judges as well as the number of judges in the Appeals Chamber (common to both tribunals). Others have suggested options such as funding the ICTY by voluntary contributions beyond 2008. But members are aware that the critical issue for the ICTY is progress with the arrest of fugitives. Winding up the ICTY before Mladić and Karadžić are brought to trial seems clearly not to be an option. Nevertheless, relaxing pressure on the tribunal regarding its current completion strategy is not likely.

Other Relevant Facts

ICTY

- six accused at large, including Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
- 34 accused at the pre-trial stage; eight referred to a national jurisdiction; 12 on trial; 14 at the appeal stage

ICTR

- 18 accused at large, including Félicien Kabuga
- 15 accused awaiting trial; 27 on trial; eight at the appeal stage

ICC

- Current investigations: Sudan/Darfur; Northern Uganda (five arrest warrants granted against leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (one accused person, militia leader Thomas Lubanga, at the pre-trial stage)
- Requests pending: Central African Republic
The Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict is expected to meet.

The ICC is expected to confirm charges against Thomas Lubanga, a former militia leader from Ituri in the DRC.

Also expected in June:
- In June there will be two Council Missions: one to Sudan, Chad and AU Headquarters; and the second to the DRC.
- The AU Peace and Security Council has given the two smaller factions of the SLM (JEM and al-Nur) until 31 May to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. Otherwise, the AU-PSC will consider measures against these factions, including sanctions.
- The Organisational Committee for the Peacebuilding Commission will meet for the first time in June in New York.
- The ICC Chief Prosecutor is expected to brief the Council on Darfur in June (S/RES/1593).
- A pledging conference to strengthen AMIS is expected to be held in Brussels in early June.
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in the Council is currently planned for 28 June. An Arria Meeting on the same topic is also expected in late June, prior to the debate.
- The Chairs of the 1267 Committee, 1540 Committee and the CTC will give a joint oral briefing in an open meeting of the Council.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- Recommendations from the Secretary-General regarding a UN operation in Darfur are expected a week after the proposed joint UN/AU assessment mission completes its task (S/RES/1679).
- The semi-annual AU Summit will be held 1-2 July in Banjul, Gambia; a focus on the Peacebuilding Commission is expected.
- More detailed discussions on the appointment of a new Secretary-General are expected in July; the selection process is expected between September and October.
- A Council debate on Children in Armed Conflict is scheduled for 17 July.
- The G8 Summit will be held in St. Petersburg, Russia from 15-17 July.
- Presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC are expected by 30 July (postponed from 18 June).
- An international donors’ conference for Haiti is planned for July in Port-au-Prince.
- A major focus on Haiti in the Council is likely in August.
- An open debate on Cooperation between the Council and Regional Organisations is possible in September.
- The mandate of UNMIS expires on 24 September (S/RES/1663) and the mandate of AMIS expires on 30 September (S/2006/156).
- Elections for the 2007-2009 members of the Security Council are expected in October.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)
- An open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is possible in December.

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