May will be an unusual month for the Security Council. The formal programme of work seems very light. But behind the scenes, Darfur and Iran will occupy a vast amount of time and energy. Congo has the presidency (along with the presidency of the AU). No new thematic debates are expected.

Iran
The Council statement of 29 March, calling for suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, was bluntly rejected by Tehran. The visit to Iran by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei seemed to produce no evidence of a softening in the Iranian position. ElBaradei’s report, requested by the Council upon expiry of the deadline on 28 April, will trigger a new phase of Council activity.

The US has also been blunt about the issue, emphasising both its importance and its urgency. Russia is signalling that it will not agree to UN sanctions at this time and that unilateral sanctions (i.e. withholding various commercial contracts) is inappropriate in the absence of UN sanctions.

The prospects are for another round of negotiations, such as occurred in March. It seems likely that most if not all of the action will take place outside the Council. The five permanent members and Germany will probably keep the issue under very close wraps. And some of the key action will take place outside New York.

The tortuous nature of the March negotiations concealed the fact that the eventual compromise outcomes were predictable. In May a similar situation could repeat itself.

If, as seems possible, a fully fledged sanctions resolution is still a bit further down the track, agreement in May on compromise wording on the implications for international peace and security is not inconceivable. Nor should it be impossible to find language translating the non-binding IAEA resolution and Council statement into an obligation binding under international law, while at the same time accommodating Russia’s concern that the text should not, of itself, be capable of interpretation as an authorisation for the use of force.

All parties seem genuinely interested in leaving some space for a “diplomatic” solution. But there seems to be a huge difference on how much time is appropriate.

Hints that there is interest in a further round of discussions in Vienna, and perhaps a new IAEA resolution, may be seen as reinforcing a “diplomatic” as opposed to a “coercive” track and providing time and space for negotiations. It will not fly if it becomes a delaying tactic, but perhaps parallel options may be discussed.

As the month unfolds, an interesting issue will be the level of patience of the ten elected Council members. In March they acquiesced in the eventual P5 draft statement, despite misgivings about the manner in which the discussions had been managed. The UK and France made various efforts in March to redress this problem with one-off briefings. It seems that for many of the E10 a more inclusive effort will be expected in May.

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Overview

Darfur
A very important turning point on Darfur seems to have been reached in late April. Quietly, but effectively, the African Council members have demonstrated leadership and enabled the Council to agree on both a statement giving a boost to the peace negotiations in Abuja and also a resolution imposing targeted sanctions on four individuals.

This development, and the sense that China and Russia are willing to be guided by the lead the AU is giving, suggests that the course may now be set for the transition to a UN force for Darfur.

The willingness of the Council in its April presidential statement to acknowledge the oft repeated AU position regarding the need for the UN force to have a partnership element may have played a positive role in this evolution.

The attack on Chad from Sudan, clearly facilitated by the ongoing instability in Darfur, may have also played a role in solidifying a new sense of direction in the Council.

The focus in May therefore is likely to be on:
- Developing the framework for the mandate of the new UN operation, based on the initial advice and guidance given by the Secretary-General and a more detailed report on options which is expected.
- Preparing for the Council Mission in early June, including the messages to be given to Khartoum (likely to be robust but not deliberately confrontational).
- Dealing with the consequences if the Abuja talks continue to stagger on (a more complex and robust UN force then becomes part of the equation).
- Managing the cross-border implications, in light of the complaint from Chad of aggression by Sudan from Darfur.

Some further discussion of targeted sanctions is possible. The Panel of Experts has set out a menu of options. However, final action may await the outcome of decisions on mandate and the mission visit to Khartoum.

For the Secretary-General an increasing focus will be on force generation for the new operation. He will be looking for a country or countries to step forward and give leadership, in fulfilment of the responsibility to protect, and commit to the core components for the new force. He will no doubt be looking not only for encouragement but also candidates from within the Council.

Ethiopia/Eritrea
This issue is coming down to the wire. The Council’s patience is almost exhausted and a decision to reduce UNMEE to a small observer mission now seems inevitable unless there is a breakthrough in early May. To a large extent the ball is in Ethiopia’s court. Despite harsh language, Eritrea seems to be signalling readiness to respond to a “genuine” initiative—but the test of that is a signal from Ethiopia that it will accept and implement the EEBC decision on the border.

Lebanon/Syria
There are no scheduled events to trigger discussion on issues relating to Lebanon/Syria. However, there is a sense in the UN that this could become an important issue in May. Reactions to the 18 April report on resolution 1559 from Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen seem to reinforce that possibility.

Other Issues
Council action on the following are expected:
- Côte d’Ivoire: a resolution to expand the force ceiling for UNOCI and continued support and encouragement for the IWG
- Timor-Leste: a difficult discussion on the need for a UN presence to follow on from UNOTIL is likely to result in a compromise on a small political mission, perhaps under the Secretary-General’s good offices mandate
- Sierra Leone: a resolution on Charles Taylor is expected
- Haiti: monitoring of the election process, but no substantive action unless problems emerge
- Somalia: renewal of the mandate of the sanctions Monitoring Group, but no action on the IGAD proposal for a partial lifting of the arms embargo

Status Update since our April Forecast

Recent developments on each of the above situations are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However some other interesting developments in April included:
- Protection of Civilians: after very lengthy negotiations a new draft resolution seems to be in final stages of preparation (see our 20 April Update Report).
- DRC: the resolution authorising an EU force deployment to provide additional capacity over the election period was adopted (S/RES/1671).
- Northern Uganda: various Council members in the closed session on 19 April indicated to the two Ugandan ministers that a political solution must be found in northern Uganda, that continued threats of unilateral action in the DRC were unacceptable and that regional mechanisms must be used. The message seemed to be that while others, including the UN, will do what they can; Uganda must address the root causes of the LRA problem.
- Anti-Terrorism Committees: as expected, the 1540 Committee mandate was extended. Progress in the 1267 Committee was slow and the discussion of the listing/delisting issue remains stalled.

Iran

Expected Council Action
Security Council members are expected to take up the Iranian issue in May after the report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is submitted to the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. Following a meeting of the P5 and Germany, planned in Paris on 2 May, France and the UK are likely to introduce a draft resolution. The March scenario of prolonged negotiations seems likely.

Options
The Council has several options, including:
- adopting a resolution identifying the Iranian behaviour as a threat to international peace and security but calling for further steps to find a diplomatic solution;
- adopting a resolution creating binding obligations on Iran to comply with the
suspension of enrichment measures requested by the IAEA;
- adopting a presidential statement calling on Iran to undertake defined confidence-building measures as part of a search for a diplomatic solution leading to suspension of enrichment and negotiations with the EU3 (France, UK and Germany); and
- requesting an urgent session of the IAEA to exert parallel pressure on Iran towards a diplomatic solution.

Council Dynamics
There seems to be agreement among Council members, as there was in March, that Iran's unwillingness to comply with IAEA Board resolutions is unreasonable and constitutes a serious problem for the international community. However, disagreement remains on the method for dealing with the problem. Russia and China seem to agree with a policy of incremental pressure but see a need to move in smaller and more cautious increments if the goal of a diplomatic solution is to be achieved.

France, the US and the UK (P3) would like to move ahead and adopt a resolution, defining Iran's nuclear activities as a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII. There is also an interest in translating the current request for suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment into a formal obligation legally binding on Iran under international law.

For the P3, time is an important factor, as they believe that substantial delay could lead to a point of no return regarding nuclear weapons (as may be the case with North Korea). Therefore, in their view, preventive measures are necessary sooner rather than later.

The P3 also seem ready to explore other alternatives if the Council fails to act, such as coordinated economic and diplomatic pressure and coordinated non-UN sanctions.

Russia and China have made it clear that, in their view, if a diplomatic solution is the goal, the threat of sanctions at this point is counterproductive. Russia, more specifically, argues that in the absence of better proof of Iran's non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) sanctions should be avoided. In addition, Russia and China seem to believe that the IAEA is still an important piece in the "diplomatic solution" jigsaw puzzle and therefore Vienna should remain a key institution in dealing with this issue.

Elected members of the Council (E10) have only been very loosely involved in the discussions in March. At various points their frustration at what they saw as being taken for granted by the P5 shone through. The UK and France, recognising the risks in this, made special efforts in March to keep the E10 briefed. It remains to be seen how this aspect will play itself out in May.

Recent Developments
For a full description of the background to this issue, please see our February and March 2006 Forecast Reports.

Talks between Iran and Russia on a proposal to create a joint venture for all Iranian uranium enrichment to take place in Russia did not reach a positive outcome. However, this option is still on the table and could be revived.

In the last IAEA report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, presented to the IAEA Board of Governors on 6 March, the Director General Mohamed ElBaradei noted that "the Agency was not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran." Because of uncertainties with regard to both the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme, he pointed out, full transparency was indispensable.

As requested by the Board in its last resolution adopted on 4 February (GOV/2006/14), the report was conveyed to the Security Council. A series of formal and informal consultations were held in New York, mainly among the P5, sometimes with the participation of Germany and on rare occasions the Council's non-permanent members. Three weeks of negotiations at the expert, ambassadorial and ministerial levels led to the adoption on 29 March of a presidential statement under the agenda item "non-proliferation". The statement urged Iran to suspend all activities related to nuclear enrichment and reprocessing, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA in a report due in thirty days (by 28 April). In the end compromise was reached on the following points:
- the enumeration of all measures required from Iran by the IAEA (resolved by a generic reference to the IAEA resolution);
- a determination that Iran's nuclear programme was a threat to international peace and security (resolved by language requiring a report to both the Council and the IAEA within 30 days).

Subsequent articles in the American press alleging that the US was planning military actions against Iran contributed to an escalation of tensions and rhetoric. In response the US has reaffirmed its commitment to a diplomatic solution but emphasised that military options also remain on the table.

On 11 April, Iran announced that it had managed to enrich uranium to 3.5 percent, the level needed to make reactor fuel. Iran also asserted that it is now pursuing a more sophisticated and speedy method of enrichment, using a “P2” centrifuge.

On 13 April, during a trip to Iran and following several meetings with Iranian senior officials, ElBaradei failed to secure agreement from the Iranian government on compliance with the 29 March Council statement.

During April, the US publicly canvassed a series of initiatives aimed both at advancing a diplomatic solution to the crisis and also at isolating Iran.
- Bilateral talks with Iran on ways to halt sectarian violence in Iraq (a possible bilateral track) were contemplated. After an initial agreement, Iran backed out arguing that the recent formation of a permanent Iraqi government meant external involvement was inappropriate.
The US raised the idea of an economic and political coalition involving members of the P5 and the G8 putting diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. (Russia declined on the basis that unilateral economic sanctions were not appropriate in the absence of UN measures.)

The US asked Russia to cancel a sale of air-defence missile systems and to end cooperation in the construction of the Bush-ehr nuclear power plant in Iran. (Russia declined this also on the basis that existing commercial contracts could not be cancelled in the absence of UN sanctions.)

Senior diplomats from the P5 and Germany met in Moscow from 18 to 20 April. However, the results of the talks were inconclusive.

More recently, Iran explicitly rejected the 29 March Council statement, reaffirmed its right to enrichment technology for civilian purposes, confirmed its intention not to suspend any nuclear activities, and hinted at the possibility of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even transferring nuclear technology to other countries (such as Sudan).

Key Issues

The role of the Council will be an issue. The argument has been raised that the IAEA intergovernmental machinery should also be involved in the next phase. The IAEA Board could consider ElBaradei’s report, but it doesn’t meet until June. This option is likely to be rejected by the P3 if it is seen just as a delaying tactic. However, perhaps as a parallel track it might be a possible option. Compromise positions, including an early IAEA meeting, may emerge as possible options.

On the issue of reference to Chapter VII, Russia says it is concerned to avoid language which, of itself, might be said to give a legal basis for the use of force. Careful drafting could resolve that concern while at the same time shifting the status of the demand on Iran from a non-binding to a binding character.

If the positions within the P5 harden and a further compromise to incrementally increase pressure cannot be agreed upon, the key issue for the P3 will be to decide whether a draft resolution should be put to the vote. Russia and China will then have to evaluate the political costs of using their veto. Both sides will have to weigh their chances to gather support among the non-permanent members.

Time is also an issue for the Council. While Russia and China appear to have a preference for creating time and space for a negotiated solution, the P3 consider that there is urgency. Any eventual diplomatic solution is likely to take time to negotiate, even through secret negotiations. If such a track were actually under way, some delay at the Council might in any event be needed. Balancing these differing perspectives is perhaps the hardest issue at present.

Underlying Problems

Tensions over Iran have pushed oil prices to record highs.

Various trade and economic commentators have questioned the effectiveness of economic sanctions on Iran, especially if imposed by a limited number of countries without Security Council backing.

Most Recent Documents

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<th>Last IAEA Board Resolution</th>
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<td>• GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006)</td>
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<th>Last IAEA Report</th>
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<td>• GOV/2006/15 (27 February 2006)</td>
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<th>Security Council Presidential Statement</th>
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<td>• S/PRST/2006/15 (29 March 2006)</td>
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<th>Other UN Documents</th>
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<td>• S/2006/178 (22 March 2006) Letter from Iran to the Secretary-General deploring US threats to resort to force against Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2006/80 (7 February 2006) Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council including the list of IAEA documents on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, communicated by the IAEA</td>
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<td>• Conclusions of the EU3 + 3 meeting on Iran in Berlin (30 March 2006)</td>
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<td>• Franco-Russian statement on nuclear issues (14 February 2006)</td>
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<td>• London Accord (31 January 2006)</td>
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<td>• EU3 Berlin statement (12 January 2006)</td>
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For historical background and a list of IAEA documents, please refer to our February 2006 Forecast Report.

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action

In May, the Council is expected to increase the level of attention to Darfur by:

- working on the options for the transition from an AU to a UN led force;
- preparing for a Council visiting mission to Sudan, Addis Ababa and possibly Abuja expected for 5-11 June;
- considering the expansion of the list of individuals for targeted sanctions (see the 19 April Panel of Experts report);
- continuing to press for progress in Chad and Abuja; and
- paying close attention to the situation facing Chad.

Depending on proposals for the transition presented by the Secretariat, and in particular, if a peace agreement emerges in Abuja, the Council may adopt a resolution establishing the framework for the future mandate and allowing the force generation process to begin in practice.

The Council also expects a report of the Secretary-General on how UN missions—in this case the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)—can assist governments with civilian protection against armed groups, especially the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Options

The transition options become much easier if a peace agreement emerges from Abuja. One possibility if the parties are still hesitating in May would be to reinforce the final proposals by the AU mediators presented to the parties by a specific Council statement or resolution.

A second option, especially bearing in mind the request of 13 April from the Government of Chad to the Secretary-General, is to formally include the situation on the Chad/Sudan border on the Council’s agenda and to request briefings.
On the LRA issue, an option is to expand UNMIS’ mandate to expressly include the LRA. The challenge is to clarify for UNMIS what this may mean in practice.

**Council Dynamics**

The Council displayed a considerable degree of consensus with the adoption of two presidential statements on the Abuja talks and a presidential and press statement on Chad in April.

The wider questions relating to the transition still loom large as members await the more detailed options report. The Secretary-General continues to give strong personal leadership, but sensitivities relating to the Council’s stance vis-à-vis the Government of Sudan, the potential costs of a new operation, the role of the AU in the transition, problems with force leadership and uncertainty about force generation figure prominently.

Some members remain sensitive about a too confrontational position with Khartoum and are concerned that this could hinder the prospects of a successful transition. Others focus on the possibility that this may derail the Abuja talks. But overall there now seems to be much greater acceptance of the need to take a quiet but firm approach to the transition and not to be unduly determined by Sudanese actions.

There are also sensitivities within the Council regarding the extent of the discussions on Chad. The Council’s focus on cross-border and spillover effects from Darfur is seen as appropriate. However, there is no support for getting the Council involved more than is necessary with situation in Chad itself. Members are concerned with the fact that Chad is not on the Council’s agenda at this point, and this may lead to discussion of an agenda item specifically focused on the cross-border issue.

On sanctions, a resolution imposing targeted sanctions on four individuals was adopted on 25 April together with a presidential statement on the Abuja talks, thereby sending a signal that the sanctions were not aimed at pressuring the talks per se, but in response to the ongoing violations of human rights and of the ceasefire currently in force.

The compromise bringing together these two drafts was made possible due to leadership from African members of the Council, who had initially wished to see the sanctions resolution adopted after the 30 April deadline for the Abuja talks, but, in the end, they helped pull the two together in a package.

As a result of this, as well as the recent willingness of the Council to include language in statements which better address AU concerns about the need for a partnership in the transition and support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), there seems to be a relaxation of the previous concerns and frustrations from AU members, and a greater willingness to move forward with the transition.

But the abstentions on the sanctions resolution by Russia, China and Qatar underline the ongoing divisions in the Council regarding sanctions in general, and the relative sympathy of those members for Khartoum’s perspective.

The possibility of forming a group of friends may also affect Council dynamics. The UK has expressed interest in following up on this.

**Key Facts**

No formal consent from Khartoum for the visit of the Secretariat assessment mission had been secured at the time of writing. The Secretariat is expected to continue to brief the Council on planning while the full options report is being completed.

The Secretary-General, the Under Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council on 26 April. The briefing provided some initial insights on the options for transition. ASG Hédi Annabi also reported that there was agreement with the AU on the establishment of joint transition mechanisms plus UN assistance to AMIS.

Developments on assisting AMIS in the interim period concentrated on securing pledges for additional funds. The EU seems particularly supportive. In Brussels, NATO formally decided to extend and expand its capacity-building efforts in support of AMIS, focusing on transport, logistics, communications and intelligence. But the prospects of an international pledging conference seem to have decreased, perhaps because it is now send as less necessary and an added complication.

A potentially complicating development came with the airing of a statement attributed to Usama Bin Laden, urging supporters to act against “crusaders in western Sudan.” It was very widely denounced including, interestingly, by Sudan.

Dr. Salim A. Salim, the AU’s Chief Mediator, briefed the Council on 18 April on the developments in Abuja. Besides the tabling of an enhanced ceasefire, the mediators finalised on 25 April a draft comprehensive peace agreement including power- and wealth-sharing, security arrangements (including disarming the Janjaweed), the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and implementation mechanisms and modalities.

The ceasefire monitoring commission—chaired by Chad—has not met in several months. An AU attempt to hold an emergency meeting in April failed, and no new date has been set. As a result, violations have not been reported and key ceasefire provisions, including full disclosure of military positions, have never been observed.

Council members have started discussing a Council visit to Sudan (potentially including Khartoum, Juba and el-Fasher), N’Djamena, Addis Ababa and possibly Abuja, scheduled for 5-11 June and to be headed by the UK. While the terms of reference have not yet been finalised, Council seem to want to try to establish a working relationship with Khartoum to ease the way for the transition to the UN force while at the same time signalling the Council’s real concerns with the cross-border situation with Chad.
Key Issues
As reported in our April Forecast, a number of issues still linger before Council members while the full options report is not available:
• the need for resources for AMIS in the interim period while supporting the AU’s efforts to obtain Khartoum’s acceptance;
• improving liaison with Khartoum;
• uncertainty in the absence of a peace agreement in Abuja;
• achieving some consensus on what a partnership with the AU will entail, particularly if the Abuja talks continue to drag along; and
• leadership in committing to participation in the transition process.

The Secretariat has presented three scenarios for planning: (i) a peace agreement and a credible ceasefire; (ii) the current status quo, with a shaky ceasefire; and (iii) collapse of the ceasefire. There is still lack of clarity within the Council as to how to proceed if a peace agreement is not reached. A critical point affecting all of those issues will thus be whether an agreement is reached in Abuja soon.

Another key issue affecting the transition are the developments in Chad. The Secretary-General has indicated that an assessment team should travel to Chad to “review the situation on that side of the border.”

Underlying Problems
The situation in Chad deteriorated considerably in April, with rebel advancements from the east along the border with Sudan to the south towards N’Djamena, culminating with an attack against the Chadian capital on 13 April.

The Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) condemned the attack the same day. France reportedly boosted its 1,200 troops currently stationed in Chad. Chad has accused Sudan of aggression and has been supported by the Central African Republic which closed its border with Sudan after the attack.

The Secretary-General briefed the Council on the developments in Chad, emphasising that the situation and rebels’ strength and sources of support remained unclear. The Council adopted a press statement on 25 April expressing concern with the situation and the spillover, and urging the parties to enter into dialogue.

Observers note that the Chadian rebels, keen on toppling President Idriss Deby, especially before the 3 May elections, took advantage of the redeployment of government troops to the east and the wave of defections from the Chadian army, and that there are indications that the rebels’ arms and supplies were obtained within Sudanese territory. The situation was further complicated by the Chadian opposition’s decision to boycott the elections.

N’Djamena cut diplomatic ties with Khartoum after the N’Djamena attack. An AU mission to investigate the attacks visited Chad on 21 April in preparation for an AU decision on Chad’s accusations.

The situation in the south of Sudan remains fragile. Besides the LRA, there are major concerns about redployments of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) troops under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as other armed groups such as the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which were to join either the SPLM or the northern troops.

A positive development came with the announcement that Eritrea will host talks between Khartoum and the eastern rebels, but no date had been set at the time of writing. This development comes as one aspect in improving relations between Sudan and Eritrea, with whom Khartoum cut diplomatic ties in 2002 for reported support for Sudanese insurgents. But fighting is ongoing in eastern Sudan, mainly due to the redeployment of government troops into rebel-controlled areas and the eastern rebels’ opposition to the withdrawal of SPLM forces mandated in the north-south peace agreement, now postponed until mid-June.

Selected Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1672 (25 April 2006) imposed targeted travel bans and assets freeze.
• S/RES/1665 (29 March 2006) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts.
• S/RES/1663 (24 March 2006) renewed UNMIS and set a thirty day deadline transition options.
• S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
• S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) strengthened sanctions in Darfur.
• S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.
• S/RES/1556 (30 July 2004) established an arms embargo and requested monthly reports.

Selected Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2006/19 (25 April 2006) expressed concern with the situation in Chad and the spillover, and urged Chad and Sudan to improve bilateral relations.
• S/PRST/2006/17 (25 April 2006) reiterated support for the Abuja peace talks.
• S/PRST/2006/16 (11 April 2006) regretted Khartoum’s denial of Egeland’s entry; endorsed the PSC’s 30 April deadline for the Abuja peace talks; and called on the transition assessment mission to visit Darfur by 30 April.
• S/PRST/2006/5/ (3 February 2006) mandated the Secretariat to start contingency planning.
• S/PRST/2005/67 (21 December 2005) expressed concern with the current situation, in particular the spillover effects in Chad.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
• S/2006/218 (5 April 2006) was the latest report on Darfur at the time of writing.
• S/2006/160 (14 March 2006) was the latest regular report on Sudan.
• S/2006/285 (3 May 2005) reported on UNMIS’ assistance to AMIS.
• S/2005/57 (31 January 2005) assessed risks in the CPA and proposed UNMIS.

Reports of the Panel of Experts
• S/2006/250 (19 April 2006)
• S/2006/65 (30 January 2006)
For historical background please see our February 2006 Forecast Report.

Other Relevant Facts

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

**UNMIS Force Commander**
Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh Lidder (India)

**UNMIS: Size and Composition of Mission**
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel
- Strength as of 4 March 2006: 7,697 military personnel
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India, Nepal

**UNMIS: Cost**
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $969.47 million (gross)

**AU’s Chief Mediator**
Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania)

**Head of AMIS**
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

**AMIS Force Commander**
Major General Collins Remy Umunakwe Ikekire (Nigeria)

**AMIS: Size and Composition**
- Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel
- Strength as of 20 March 2006: 5,475 military and 1,385 police personnel
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Ghana

**AMIS: Cost**
$208 million (budget estimate for 1 April-31 December 2006)

Useful Additional Sources


Ethiopia/Eritrea

**Expected Council Action**
Another technical rollover of the mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) now seems unlikely. The Council gave the parties a “last chance” in resolution 1670, which extended UNMEE until 15 May, and a major review of the size and mandate of UNMEE now seems inevitable.

At the time of writing, no substantive progress has been made on compliance with the requirements set by resolution 1640, including border demarcation and the lifting of restrictions on UNMEE. Unless there is a dramatic breakthrough in the coming days, options for reducing UNMEE will be on the table. Reducing UNMEE to an observer mission seems the most likely outcome.

**Options**
There is much support for reducing UNMEE should the parties fail to start demarcating the border and lift all restrictions on the UN mission. However, it is still possible that some progress may still be made. If so, Council members may once again feel that additional time should be granted for negotiations.

Another option, especially if there are some signs of movement, may be to send a Council mission to the region.

**Key Facts**
The Council renewed UNMEE’s mandate on 13 April in resolution 1670. But Council members also signalled that a further renewal would depend on the parties’ compliance with the demands in resolution 1640 by the beginning of May. Resolution 1640 demanded that:

- Eritrea “reverse, without further delay or preconditions, its decision to ban UNMEE helicopter flights, as well as additional restrictions imposed on the operations of UNMEE, and provide UNMEE with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties”; and
- Ethiopia “accept fully and without further delay the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and take immediately concrete steps to enable, without preconditions, the Commission to demarcate the border completely and promptly.”

Resolution 1670 gives the parties a last chance to comply and also maintains pressure on Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also strongly signalled that the Council’s patience was near an end. Finally, it conveyed members’ sense of urgency by giving the parties less than a month to make progress on both issues.

A further EEBC meeting has been scheduled for 28 April, but at the time of writing there were indications it may be delayed. Prospects for compliance remain unclear at this point.

Both sides gave a very lukewarm response to the EEBC meeting on 10 March. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reportedly stated that the EEBC was not a suitable forum for the border standoff. The legal advisor to the Ethiopian team at the EEBC meeting, Menilik Alemu, stated that “Ethiopia’s stand for the resolution of the border dispute is unchanged,” and that “[n]othing has been raised that obliged Ethiopia.”

Asmara remains frustrated with the continuation of the standoff, and with Ethiopia’s apparent freedom to flout international commitments. There is increasing concern that the Temporary Security Zone places an undue burden on Eritrea by keeping a large portion of Eritrean territory in a prolonged state of
uncertainty. UNMEE’s original purpose is seen by the Eritrean government as having been “unwittingly” distorted.

Eritrea circulated a letter to UN Member States on 10 April, criticising the Council in particular for abrogating its responsibilities to enforce the “final and binding” EEBC decision and expressing criticism of any diplomatic initiative since it feels that would result in the alteration of the EEBC decision. Eritrea is particularly critical of the idea of appointing a Special Envoy. The EEBC process is seen by Asmara as a technical procedure that does not require further dialogue.

Eritrea nevertheless hopes that the US will be the main driver of a solution by encouraging changes to the Ethiopian position.

Despite its harsh tone, Asmara’s 10 April letter for the first time expressed an interest in a “genuine initiative” that would:
- maintain respect for the EEBC decision first and foremost;
- secure agreement to a demarcation that implements the delimitation decision in its integrity; and
- establish details for the demarcation that would avoid delaying objections.

So far, however, there has been no signal from Addis Ababa as to its willingness to accept the EEBC decisions without conditions.

For historical background please refer to the February 2006 Forecast Report.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to adopt a resolution increasing the troop level of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

In late May, the Group of Experts is expected to report orally on the implementation of the arms and diamonds embargo to the Sanctions Committee. Unless there is information on clear violations of the embargo, it seems unlikely that the Council will adopt new sanctions.

Options
In May, the Council has the following options:
- adopting the resolution currently circulated by France to increase the level of UNOCI by 1,671 troops, including police units;
- adopting a resolution temporarily transferring troops from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI if security deteriorates;
- imposing additional sanctions on individuals responsible for spreading messages in the media to incite hatred and violence (if there are new reports of such activities); or
- imposing sanctions against individuals responsible for violating the arms and diamonds embargo.

Council Dynamics
France, which has taken the lead role on Côte d’Ivoire, is pushing for an increase in the troop level of UNOCI as well as additional police units. The French proposal involves a phased approach to reach the optimum level recommended by the Secretary-General, an increase of 4,000 troops.

During consultations prior to the 31 March adoption of resolution 1667, which extended the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United States resisted extending the presence in Côte d’Ivoire of the infantry company loaned from UNMIL in February. In exchange for the return of the company to Liberia, the US agreed to consider an increase in UNOCI’s troop level of between 1,500 and 2,000 troops, and to consider temporary deployment of some troops from UNMIL.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1640 (23 November 2005) demanded troop redeployment and the lifting of restrictions on UNMEE.
- S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000) increased UNMEE and authorised it to monitor the Temporary Security Zone.
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/10 (24 February 2006) welcomed the meeting of the Witnesses to the Algiers Peace Agreement.
- S/PRST/2005/62 (14 December 2005) agreed with the temporary relocation of part of UNMEE’s staff in Eritrea to Ethiopia.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/126 (24 February 2006) contained the Witnesses’ statement on the recent talks.
- S/2005/774 (9 December 2005) was a letter from Ethiopia’s foreign minister indicating Addis Ababa’s position on demarcation.

Selected Letters
- S/2006/140 (6 March 2006) was the latest report.
- S/2006/1 (3 January 2006) contained options for the future of UNMEE.
- S/2005/142 (7 March 2005) contained the EEBC’s appraisal of the stalling of the demarcation, a historical summary of the process and the 2002 Demarcation Directions.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission
Vacant, pending appointment

Size and Composition of Mission
- Authorised maximum strength: 4,200 troops.
- Strength as of 28 February 2006: 3,277 military personnel.
- Key troop contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya.

Cost

Duration
31 July 2000 to present
subsequently if the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorates. However, the necessary approval by the US Congress to commit more troops in Côte d’Ivoire is likely to determine the timing of the adoption of the draft resolution.

Recent Developments
The identification and registration of voters and the distribution of electoral identity cards, a priority highlighted by the Secretary-General in his latest report as well as by the IWG, has been delayed. Around three million Ivorians do not have nationality documents or voting cards. At the February meeting among Ivorian leaders, it had been decided that the identification process would go hand-in-hand with establishing voting cards. At the end of March, this decision seems to have been reversed by Gbagbo, who stated that the voters lists dating from the 2000 presidential elections could be used for the coming elections and that identification should be conducted after the polls.

The disarmament of pro-government militias in the south and rebels in the north is the other step required before the elections. Disarmament talks among rebels and army chiefs started at the beginning of April. The chairman of the AU, Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, acted as a mediator in these talks and proposed that both disarmament and identification be conducted in parallel. On 8 April, Banny, Gbagbo, rebel Forces Nouvelles leader Guillaume Soro and the two main opposition leaders approved this solution. But a week later, Gbagbo shifted ground and maintained that the Forces Nouvelles rebels had to hand in their guns before any voter cards would be issued.

In response to Gbagbo’s reversal of position the IWG issued a communiqué on 20 April confirming the agreement to conduct disarmament and voter identification in parallel and insisting also that electoral lists could only be established through the identification process. The communiqué also referred to the continuing obstruction of the movement of the impartial forces (which include the UN peacekeepers and the French forces), as was already noted in the most recent Secretary-General’s report. The IWG commented that this was in violation of Council resolutions 1633 and 1643, and it invited the Sanctions Committee to identify the individuals responsible. (At press time it was expected that the Council would adopt a presidential statement on 27 April expressing support for the IWG position.)

The disarmament of pro-government militias in the south and rebels in the north is the other step required before the elections. Indeed, Prime Minister Banny has already warned of the possibility the 31 October deadline will be missed.

Key Issues
The first issue for the Council is to decide on the draft resolution that France circulated to all Council members on 17 April. Defining the numbers and tasks of the additional troops for UNOCI will be key in reaching an agreement on the resolution. The proposed 1,671 additional uniformed personnel would include 475 police officers, gendarmes to protect the members of the government and members of the Ivorian Electoral Commission, an infantry battalion for Abidjan and an infantry company for the west.

Underlying Problems
In his latest report, the Secretary-General expressed concern at the delays in the preparations for the elections. Indeed, Prime Minister Banny has already warned of the possibility the 31 October deadline will be missed.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme will be difficult to implement given the rebels’ reluctance to give up arms. In addition, the Ivorian parties failed to agree on a timeline. The DDR programme targets about 42,000 former combatants of the rebel Forces Nouvelles, 5,000 soldiers in the national army, and 12,000 militia members loyal to President Gbagbo in the west.

The Council has held the view that the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire must remain inclusive of all parties. The 29 March presidential statement reflected the broad support among Council members for the role being played in the peace process by the new Ivorian prime minister, Charles Konan Banny. But there now seems to be a growing divergence between Banny and Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo. On issues such as extending the National
Assembly’s mandate and the simultaneity of disarmament and voter identification, Gbagbo appears to be moving in a different direction.

**Most Recent UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1667 (31 March 2006) extended the mandate of UNMIL, reaffirmed its intention to deploy troops between UNMIL and UNOCI and to review the tasks and troop level of UNOCI.
- S/RES/1657 (6 February 2006) authorised the deployment of an infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI until 31 March.
- S/RES/1652 (24 January 2006) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 15 December and expressed the intention to review troop levels in March 2006.

**Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2006/14 (29 March 2006) welcomed progress achieved in recent weeks and reiterated concern with the security situation.
- S/PRST/2006/9 (23 February 2006) reiterated full support for the IWG and the Ivorian prime minister, urged the Ivorian state to facilitate the return of humanitarian agencies in the west of the country, and expressed the intention to review the implementation of resolution 1633 in March.
- S/PRST/2006/2 (19 January 2006) strongly condemned the attacks against UNOCI.

**Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/222 (11 April 2006)
- S/2006/2 (3 January 2006)

**Sanctions Committee Reports**
- S/2006/204 (31 March 2006) was an update report pursuant to resolution 1632, requesting the Group of Experts to submit a brief written update to the Council on the implementation of the arms embargo before 1 December 2005.
- S/2006/790 (15 December 2005) report of the mission to Côte d’Ivoire by the Sanctions Committee chairman Adamantios Vassilakis (Greece).

**Letters to the President of the Council**
- S/2006/190 (29 March 2006) fifth IWG communiqué
- S/2006/184 (22 March 2006) letter from the Secretary-General reiterating the need for an increase in UNOCI’s strength.
- S/2006/71 (2 February 2006) letter from the Secretary-General noting his intention to temporarily redeploy troops and police units from UNMIL to UNOCI for an initial period of three months.
- S/2006/50 (26 January 2006) final communiqué of a meeting between Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Ivorian leaders.
- S/2006/43 (23 January 2006) letter from Côte d’Ivoire on various misunderstandings on the implementation of resolution 1633.

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
- Pierre Schori (Sweden)

**High Representative for the Elections**
- Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Authorised strength since June 2005: 7,090 military personnel and 725 police officers.
- Current strength as of 31 January 2006: 7,594 total uniformed personnel.
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan.

**Cost**

For key facts, historical background and a more comprehensive list of UN documents, please refer to our January 2006 Forecast Report.

**Review of Security Council Mandates**

At the 2005 UN World Summit last September, Heads of State called for:
- a review by member states of all UN mandates older than five years; and
- a report from the Secretary-General to provide analysis and recommendations in order to facilitate the review.

It is significant that the Summit Outcome Document referred not only to General Assembly mandates, but also to mandates from “other relevant organs”. This overview focuses on the mandates of the Security Council, which fall primarily into four categories:
- peacekeeping operations.
- international and special tribunals.
- sanctions committees and working groups.

As noted in discussions of Council subsidiary organs in prior issues of our Monthly Forecasts, the Secretariat is stretched in its capacity to service the sanctions committees and the expert teams assigned to a number of these committees. The indications from the Secretary-General’s report seem to be that these problems are equally pronounced when other mandates are considered, such as those for peacekeeping and peacebuilding and for the international and special tribunals.

**Secretary-General’s Response**

In response, Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 30 March issued his report, “Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates.” This report set out an analytical framework to guide the review of mandates by the General Assembly and other relevant organs, in particular, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Security Council. A registry of the mandates of the three principal organs was established on the UN website (http://www.un.org/mandatereview) to facilitate the review process.

In his presentation of the report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General drew attention to the large number of mandates and the...
limited resources available to the Secretariat in carrying them out. Currently, there are thousands of active mandates as a result of decisions and actions of the three principal organs, and they are distributed as follows:

- General Assembly – 79 percent
- Economic and Social Council – 12 percent
- Security Council – 9 percent

These mandates fall into three categories reflecting the timeframe within which the principal organs have acted on them:
- older than five years and renewed within the last five years – 59 percent
- older than five years and not renewed within the last five years – 19 percent
- newer than five years – 31 percent

**Need to Prioritise**

In his report, the Secretary-General pointed out that the UN must choose between urgent and less urgent mandates, and highlighted a number of problems associated with the management of these mandates.

- Burdensome reporting requirements on the part of the Secretariat, which in 2005 submitted a total of ninety written reports to the Council. These were primarily related to UN peacekeeping missions. (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.htm). Also, the Secretariat had to prepare three reports on Council missions to Haiti, Central Africa, and Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2005. (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports.html).
- Overlap between mandates of the Security Council with those of ECOSOC and the General Assembly, particularly on post-conflict situations during the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding phase. These situations often require the Secretary-General to provide separate but duplicative reports to the Council and other organs.
- In some cases, there is significant and burdensome overlap among mandates of the Council itself, such as is often found with its sanctions committees and, in particular, with its three counter-terrorism committees.
- There are gaps between mandates and resources, particularly with peacekeeping and peace-building missions. There are currently 15 peacekeeping operations, plus another three supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. These engage some 88,297 military and civilian personnel at an annual cost of about $5.03 billion. (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp). The oldest of these, which is also the first UN peacekeeping operation to be established in 1948, is the UN Truce Supervision Organization established to monitor Middle East ceasefires and supervise armistice agreements.

**Key Facts Relating to Council Mandates**

Council-approved mandates generally fall within the UN programme priorities of the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular:

- peacekeeping operations;
- peace enforcement activities;
- fact-finding missions;
- sanctions committees and working groups, as well as other subsidiary organs such as those aimed specifically at combating international terrorism; and
- promotion of justice and international law, including the establishment of international tribunals and special courts, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the proposed tribunal for Lebanon.

All told, the Council has a total of 865 active mandates requiring inputs from the Secretariat; of these:

- 313 are older than five years and renewed within the last five years;
- 47 are older than five years and not renewed within the last five years; and
- 505 are newer than five years.

In 2005, there were 71 Council mandates established by resolutions another 68 by presidential statements (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm). Council resolutions generally require action by the Secretariat to implement them or to support their implementation. They also require regular reports, including analyses and recommendations, on the programme priorities identified above. Furthermore, the Secretariat is also required to provide periodic reports on such thematic issues as small arms, women and peace and security, protection of civilians in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, HIV/AIDS in the context of peacekeeping operations, and a number of other issues.

**Key Issues**

It remains to be seen whether the Council will respond to the Summit Outcome in a systematic way and undertake a review of its mandates and take steps to ameliorate the problems identified in the Secretary-General’s report.

- Making mandates more specific, including in the meaning and legal effect of terms used in resolutions, and avoiding ambiguity and overlap especially as between pre-ambular and operative paragraphs.
- Establishing criteria for periodic review of mandates to determine whether the overall objectives and priorities of the Council and the UN as a whole in maintaining international peace and security are being met, and provide timely determination of whether a mandate’s relevance has expired.
- Eliminating overlapping mandates, including overlapping roles of committees and working groups, and overlapping reporting requirements and duplication of work by its subsidiary organs, particularly in sanctions and counter-terrorism. For example, the Council could explore ways to merge the three counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies (the 1267 Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1540 Committee) and reduce the...
reporting burden of which many states have complained. In addition, there is often significant overlap in the work of the sanctions committees.

- Eliminating the need for the Secretariat to brief both the Council and other UN organs on the same subject, in particular on issues such as small arms and other thematic issues where there is shared interest with other organs of the UN, e.g., by organising joint meetings of the Council and other bodies concerned.

Council Dynamics
Some Council members have expressed interest in how to respond to the Summit call for a review of its mandates. But so far, there has been no public collective response about the process; whether and how it will evolve; and whether the Council will establish a special working group to undertake such a review and report recommendations to guide further Council action.

It seems that for many Council members the pressure of day-to-day challenges dealing with active situations on the Council agenda leaves little or no time to stand back and reflect on more holistic issues such as mandate prioritisation.

As it becomes clearer how this issue may develop, Security Council Report will examine some of the mandates in more detail, particularly as to their relevance, effectiveness and possible duplication, and will follow and report on progress in the Council on these matters.

UN Documents

Secretary-General’s Report

- A/60/733 (30 March 2006) “Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates”

Other Relevant Documents

- A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome

Security Council Responses to Tasks Established by the 2005 World Summit

The World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1) tasks the Security Council with a number of specific follow up responsibilities. These include:

Terrorism (paragraph 90)

We encourage the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter-terrorism bodies.

Action Taken: The reviews of the work of the CTC, the CTED, and the 1267 and 1540 Committees, currently underway, respond in part to this task.

Peacebuilding (paragraph 101)

The Peacebuilding Commission should have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its procedures and organizational matters, comprising: (a) members of the Security Council, including permanent members.

Action Taken: This task was accomplished promptly in December 2005, in resolutions 1645 and 1646.

Sanctions (paragraphs 108 and 109)

We call upon the Security Council…to improve its monitoring of the implementation and effects of sanctions, to ensure that sanctions are implemented in an accountable manner, to review regularly the results of such monitoring and to develop a mechanism to address special economic problems arising from the application of sanctions in accordance with the Charter.

We also call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.

Action Taken: The Council and its Subsidiary Bodies are still to grapple fully with the tasks relating to sanctions, although some discussions have commenced. A report from the Office of Legal Affairs on listing and delisting on Council sanctions lists is awaited. (See our Update Report of 12 April 2006 on the listing/delisting of individuals by the 1267 Committee).

Responsibility to Protect (paragraph 139)

We are prepared to take collective action…through the Security Council … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Action Taken: A draft Council resolution on protection of civilians reaffirming this responsibility is at an advanced stage of preparation and is expected to be adopted soon. (See our Update Report of 20 April 2006).

Security Council Working Methods (paragraph 154)

We recommend that the Security Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involvement of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work.

Action Taken: Discussion of the issue of Council working methods has assumed renewed interest amongst a number of Council members in recent months. The Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions has revived its activities under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kenzo Oshima of Japan. It remains to be seen what specific proposals in this regard will emerge.

Prioritisation of Mandates (paragraph 163(b))

We resolve to strengthen and update the programme of work of the United Nations so that it responds to the contemporary requirements of Member States. To this end, the General Assembly and other relevant organs will review all mandates older than five years originating from resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs, which would be complementary to the existing periodic
reviews of activities. The General Assembly and the other organs should complete and take the necessary decisions arising from this review during 2006. We request the Secretary-General to facilitate this review with analysis and recommendations, including on the opportunities for programmatic shifts that could be considered for early General Assembly consideration.

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to discuss the future of the UN political presence in Timor-Leste prior to the expiry of the mandate of the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) on 20 May.

A report from the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation in Timor is also due. It may be issued in May, but it is unclear whether any Council decisions on this will emerge in the near future.

**Options**

The Council is divided on whether there should be a continuing UN political presence in Timor-Leste. Some of the options that may be considered are:

- recommending that the Secretary-General take responsibility for the UN presence as a smaller special political mission under his good-offices mandate;
- taking no action regarding the mandate, and perhaps expressing in a presidential statement congratulations to UNOTIL and noting that future assistance will be provided by the Secretariat’s electoral division and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); or
- maintaining the status quo by extending UNOTIL with an adjusted mandate.

Another option may be to maintain the status quo but specifically subject to a decision on referring Timor-Leste to the nascent Peace-building Commission.

On justice and reconciliation in Timor, some of the options are:

- requesting that the report of Timor-Leste’s Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), which was presented in January to the Secretary-General by Timorese President Xanana Gusmão, now be circulated as a Council document;
- delaying the decision, with a view to analysing the final report of the joint Indonesian-Timorese Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) to determine if the CTF process and recommendations are sufficient to ensure justice and reconciliation or if significant further steps are needed. Council members may also include consideration of the development of judicial systems in Indonesia and Timor, as well as the circulation of CTF’s final report as a Council document, as additional aspects of an eventual resolution;
- deciding that further action should be taken against perpetrators of serious crimes, and whether this should be undertaken with UN assistance or by an independent UN mechanism, bearing in mind recent Council decisions on assistance to Lebanon and trials of offenders in similar serious circumstances; or
- deciding to take no action.

**Council Dynamics**

The issue of winding up the UN political presence in Timor-Leste continues to cause considerable divisions inside the Council. This debate marked the successive renewals of UNMISET and the creation of UNOTIL.

Some Council members, especially the US, in recent months have expressed their desire to see the UN presence finalised with the expiry of UNOTIL’s current mandate. They believe that Timor-Leste is now prepared to move into a development framework after years of continuing Council-mandated assistance, and that those resources are much needed elsewhere.

Other members, particularly from Latin America, are keen on creating a follow-on mission on the grounds that gains in Timor-Leste would be at risk should the Council begin to wind up the UN political presence in the country.

The Council is also considerably divided on the issue of justice and reconciliation. Some members have no appetite for a decision at this point. There is a degree of sympathy among such members for not disturbing good relations between Dili and Jakarta, and recognition of the possible impact of the reactivation of the serious crimes process.

But other members, especially Western European ones as well as Argentina, also uphold accountability as a matter of principle and are particularly concerned about bringing to justice those most responsible for the gross human rights violations in Timor-Leste in 1999. It seems likely that those members would want to push for both a broad discussion of the matter and a closer look at the work of the CTF. In particular, some members have made it known that they reject the amnesty provisions in the CTF’s terms of reference, as well as their concern about its potential impact on Timor-Leste’s prospects for long-term stability.
Key Facts
The Council established UNOTIL as a follow-on UN political presence after the completion of the mandate of two Council-mandated operations in the country: the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMIST).

UNOTIL is not a peacekeeping mission. Instead, it is a special political mission funded from the regular budget. It was designed to provide assistance to the Timorese government and prepare the gradual ceasing of Council-mandated activities in key areas such as support for the development of the justice sector, elections, human rights and the police.

Resolution 1599, which established UNOTIL in April 2005, emphasised the limited nature of UNOTIL’s role and requested the Secretary-General to provide insights into “planning for a transition to a sustainable development assistance framework”.

Since January, three letters from the Timorese government have urged the Council to endorse a special political mission tasked with providing assistance particularly for the 2007 elections, the justice and defence sectors, police training and human rights, as well as providing military liaison personnel to prevent election-related tensions along the border with Indonesia.

The requests arose amid concerns with domestic stability following the dismissal of hundreds of Timorese soldiers who refused to return to their barracks after marching to the Presidential Palace in February. The soldiers’ grievances are reportedly mostly linked to allegations of favouritism towards those coming from the eastern part of Timor-Leste.

In response to the Timorese government’s request, the Council asked the Secretary-General for options on post-UNOTIL assistance to Timor-Leste. The Secretary-General recommended the establishment of an integrated UN Office for 12 months with an international staff of sixty. The office’s mandate would include:

- election support;
- support to state institutions, including the police and the justice sector;
- support to border patrol; and
- assistance in strengthening human rights and reconciliation.

The Council has also requested the Secretary-General provide his views on a “practical and feasible approach” to the issue of justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste. While the contents of his report are still unclear, it is not expected that the report will resolve the underlying differences between Council members on the issue. The Council requested that the Secretary-General especially take into account the views of the parties, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, which have reiterated their desire to close this chapter with the forthcoming CTF report and have opposed the reopening of the serious crimes process.

Key Issues
The immediate issue before the Council will be the future of the UN presence in Timor-Leste in view of the requests from the Timorese leadership for a new special political office. In the event that Council members are prepared to agree to an ongoing special political mission, a set of related issues would emerge, particularly:

- the financing of such an office, particularly as it would create additional commitments in the regular budget;
- whether the mandate would be determined by the Council and expressly limited chronologically to the forthcoming Timorese elections, with no further renewals, or determined by a decision of the Secretary-General; and
- the size of such a mission.

The issue of the future of justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste will remain significant for Council members. In this regard, the key issue for the Council is to find a way in which it can take into account Timorese and Indonesian concerns while also upholding its own decisions on the need for accountability.

Underlying Problems
The serious crimes process was created by UNTAET in 2000. It included the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which was jointly a unit of the UN operation and part of the Timorese state. The SCU was tasked with prosecuting solely those perpetrators of crimes committed in connection with the 1999 referendum.

In 2004, the Council determined that the SCU would finish its activities by May 2005. However:

- numerous indictments were left outstanding, and other cases were not even investigated or indicted;
- Timor-Leste does not have enough capacity to try returned offenders; and
- the cases of rank-and-file offenders were addressed by either the SCU or CAVR (when those amounted to ordinary crimes), while those most responsible escaped justice.

The Secretary-General decided to appoint a Commission of Experts (CoE) to prepare a report on the future of the serious crimes process in early 2005. Discussions on the appointment of the CoE began in late 2004, when it became clear that these issues would still remain unresolved after May 2005.

Meanwhile, Indonesia and Timor-Leste decided to create the Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF), operative since August 2005, to:

- produce a report on the violence, but only that surrounding the referendum. There is no deadline, and it may take one to two years; and
- present recommendations such as amnesty and ways to promote reconciliation.

But the CoE report, forwarded to the Council in June 2005, recommended that the serious crimes process be retained and that Indonesia step up its judicial capacity. If the parties failed to adopt these measures, the CoE recommended that an international tribunal be established or that the situation be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) under an extraordinary arrangement with the UN. The report was also critical of the CTF, stating that parts of its terms of reference contradict international standards on denial of impunity.
Both parties were very critical of the CoE report. Dili in particular opposes the reactivation of the process, which it sees as dangerous to its relations with Indonesia.

While the Council did not formally discuss the report, several Council members considered the recommendations unrealistic either politically or financially. Some members consider an international tribunal too expensive.

The CAVR handed over its final report to President Gusmão in October 2005. It makes several controversial recommendations, including the continuation of the serious crimes process under the UN and the payment to victims of reparations, including by permanent members of the Council.

President Gusmão presented the CAVR report to the Secretary-General in January 2006. The presentation focused on the lessons learned contained in the report, but no reference was made to any action against Indonesia. The report was not formally discussed by the Council, nor was it circulated as a Council document.

Historical Background
20 January 2006 President Gusmão presented the CAVR report to the Secretary-General.

28 October 2005 CAVR handed over its final report to President Gusmão.

28 September 2005 The CoE report was forwarded to the Council, who then requested recommendations from the Secretary-General.

5 August 2005 The CTF officially met for the first time.

May 2005 The CoE conducted its fact-finding mission, the SCU concluded its activities and UNTIL was established.

December 2004 Timor-Leste and Indonesia decided to establish the CTF.

November 2004 The SCU ceased all investigations.

May 2002 UNTAET withdrew and Timor achieved independence. UNMISET was established.

January 2002 CAVR was established.

June 2000 UNTAET established the serious crimes process.

October 1999 The Indonesian parliament recognised the referendum. UNTAET was established.

September 1999 Anti-independence violence was stepped up. The Council authorised the deployment of an international force.

August 1999 The referendum took place, showing 78 percent support for independence.

May 1999 Indonesia and Portugal agreed on modalities for a referendum under UN auspices. Anti-independence violence erupted.

January 1999 Indonesia decided to carry out the referendum.

1975-1999 The Indonesian occupation was marked by a bloody repression against civilians and armed resistance.

December 1975 Indonesia occupied East Timor.

May 1999 Indonesia and Portugal agreed on modalities for a referendum under UN auspices. Anti-independence violence erupted.

January 1999 Indonesia decided to carry out the referendum.

1975-1999 The Indonesian occupation was marked by a bloody repression against civilians and armed resistance.

December 1975 Indonesia occupied East Timor.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan)

Size and Composition of UNTIL

Up to 45 civilian advisers, up to sixty police advisers and up to ten human rights officers

Cost (requested budget)
US$ 22,027,700.00

Commission of Experts

Prafullachandra Bhagwati (India), Yozo Yokota (Japan), Shaista Shameem (Fiji)

Statistics of the Serious Crimes Process

- 74 convictions and two acquittals
- 95 indictments filed; 440 individuals charged
- approximately 200 outstanding arrest warrants against individuals believed to be in Indonesia
- of approximately 1,370 reported cases of murder, only 572 have been the subject of indictment

Useful Additional Sources

- The Indonesian Mission to the UN’s website (http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/IndToday/n031005_tor.htm) contains the terms of reference of the CTF
- SCU’s website (http://www.scu-dili.org) contains a list of indictments filed and their status
Recent Developments
Préval’s presidential inauguration depends on the successful conclusion of the 21 April parliamentary elections. Haiti’s constitution requires that the presidential inauguration occur in the presence of a sitting parliament.

The elections on 21 April were described by the spokesperson for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as “good, peaceful and democratic.” The Security Council issued a statement to the press on 25 April congratulating the Haitian population with the parliamentary elections. However, voter turnout was very low. Only an estimated 30 percent of Haiti’s 3.5 million registered voters participated in the elections. At press time, the official results of the elections had not been announced. But preliminary results indicate that Préval’s Léspwa party is likely to win the most seats but is unlikely to win a parliamentary majority. It will almost certainly need to form a coalition government.

Much will depend on the final outcome of the parliamentary elections. A parliamentary majority elects the prime minister, who will act as head of government and appoint both cabinet members and important administrative posts. The parliament must also approve all foreign loans and will play a crucial role in determining the country’s relationship with the international community.

Key Facts
Municipal and local elections are scheduled to be held on 18 June. However, there are considerable doubts about whether these elections will be held on time.

The Council has requested the Secretary-General to report, as soon as possible after the conclusion of Haiti’s electoral process and in consultations with Haiti’s new government, on whether and how to restructure MINUSTAH’s mandate. The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on MINUSTAH, originally due in late April, is likely to be postponed to include these recommendations and is expected to come out in time for consideration of the renewal of MINUSTAH’s mandate in August.

Options
The Council’s response will depend on the developments in the electoral process in Haiti. Options include:

- a presidential statement welcoming Préval’s inauguration and congratulating Haiti if the electoral process proceeds successfully;
- firm action to reinforce respect for the electoral process if unrest starts to emerge; and
- informal discussions on a revised mandate for the future UN role in Haiti.

Expected Council Action
René Préval is scheduled to be sworn in as Haiti’s president on 14 May. The Council is likely to welcome Préval’s inauguration in a presidential statement.

Council Dynamics
Given previous delays in Haiti’s electoral process, the Council will pay close attention both to the completion of the process and any potential signs of post-electoral violence. The Secretariat will give informal briefings to Council members on developments in Haiti. If the electoral process proceeds as planned, the Council is not likely to take further substantive action until it receives the Secretary-General’s report on the future role of MINUSTAH. Accordingly, discussions on the balance between security and development as MINUSTAH’s primary focus are unlikely in May.

Discussions in the Group of Friends of Haiti indicate that some Council members consider Haiti to be a good candidate for the new Peacebuilding Commission. However, given the complexity of the situation and the associated pitfalls other members believe that it would be too risky to choose Haiti as one of the early test cases for the Commission.

Several Council members stressed the need for a long-standing engagement in Haiti’s development, reinforcing the Council’s indication in February of its intention to authorise the continued extension of MINUSTAH’s mandate. During the debate, several countries also highlighted the multidimensional character of challenges to Haiti’s political, economic and security sectors. With respect to the security situation, members pointed to the connection between security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Recalling resolution 1608, Council members called for reform of the Haitian National Police and the judicial system.

The need for judicial reform was also highlighted last month by Thierry Fagart, the director of MINUSTAH’s human rights office in Haiti, who accused judicial officials and the interim government of illegally detaining most of the 4,000 people currently in jail. Fagart said most of the detainees had not been formally charged and called for the immediate...
The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Juan Gabriel Valdés, has emphasised Haiti’s need for an increased police force, particularly noting the severe insecurity in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhood of Cité Soleil. Reaching the goal of 20,000 police officers from today’s level of 6,000 will take several years, Valdés said in an interview with the media last month.

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please consult our January 2006 Monthly Forecast.

**Most Recent UN Documents**

**Selected Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1658 (14 February 2006) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 August.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2006/13 (27 March 2006) urged the Haitian government to ensure that elections will proceed and expressed willingness to cooperate with the newly elected authorities.
- S/PRST/2006/7 (9 February 2006) recommended Haiti for holding elections.
- S/PRST/2006/1 (6 January 2006) expressed concern over the more recent postponement of elections and urged the government to schedule new dates.

**Last Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/60 (2 February 2006) Security Council Meetings
- S/PV 5397 Resumption 1 (27 March 2006)

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)

**Force Commander**
Lieutenant General José Elito Carvalho Siquiera (Brazil)

**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**
The Somalia Sanctions Committee is due to receive the final report of the Monitoring Group on the arms embargo, but no new action on sanctions is expected. The current mandate of the Monitoring Group expires 12 May. The Council is expected to renew the Group’s mandate for another six months.

**Options**
The most likely option is that the Council will adopt a resolution renewing the Monitoring Group’s mandate and address the question of improving the sanctions regime at a later stage. Other options include:

- expanding the sanctions regime to include economic activities that generate revenue used to commit violations of the arms embargo;
- deciding on measures against individual violators on the draft list provided by the Monitoring Group;
- engaging actively with neighbouring countries with a view to finding a balance between security concerns and respect for the arms embargo; and
- accommodating the request by the AU and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for a waiver of the arms embargo for a proposed AU-IGAD peace support mission.

**Key Issues**
The arms embargo is not effective, and several neighbouring countries have been identified as being among the violators of the embargo. Yemen, citing regional security concerns and the Somali Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) legitimate need for military equipment, has officially defended its policy of assisting the TFG with weapons and uniforms. An issue for the Council is therefore how to confront explicit violations of the embargo.

The Monitoring Group has previously recommended expanding the embargo to include exports of Somali charcoal and fish to curb the financing of arms purchases. This issue is still before the Council. However, sustained drought and increased need for humanitarian assistance makes the civilian population in Somalia extremely vulnerable to any potential adverse humanitarian consequences of a trade embargo.

Since 2003, the Panel of Experts (subsequently the Monitoring Group) has prepared a draft list of individual embargo violators. It is likely that many current Somali leaders are on the draft list. The draft list is confidential, and the Council has so far decided not to adopt targeted sanctions by formally listing any individuals, but this issue is still on the table.

A further issue which has a high profile is the request from the AU and IGAD to provide an exemption from the arms embargo to facilitate the deployment of the proposed a joint AU-IGAD peace support mission. The Council has stated that a key condition for granting an exemption is that the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) first develop a national security and stabilisation plan, and that a mission plan is worked out with the broad consensus of the TFI. An issue for the Council is to evaluate whether these conditions have been satisfactorily met once IGAD and AU presents a mission plan.
Another issue may be the increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia.

**Council Dynamics**

There seems to be no controversy in the Council over a simple renewal of the Monitoring Group’s mandate. Not renewing its mandate might send undesirable signals at a time when sanctions are already being violated to an increasing extent. However, with the recent rise in hostilities involving Islamist militia groups, some Council members are furthermore worried that Somalia might become a safe haven for terrorists. Adding to this, the Secretary-General warned in his last report that some militants are suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda operatives and of having set up training camps in southeastern Somalia.

It is unclear whether, in light of this situation, proposals may be made to step up the sanctions. Russia and China, which are sceptical about sanctions in general, are likely to resist. Other members less negative toward sanctions also seem reluctant to step up the sanctions against Somalia due to enforcement problems. Porous borders and the 3,200-kilometre Somali coastline already pose tremendous challenges for the arms embargo, let alone potential additional measures.

Many Council members also seem cautious about prematurely granting a partial exemption from the embargo to accommodate the proposed AU-IGAD peace mission. Whereas IGAD and neighbouring countries seem more inclined to favour a partial lifting of the embargo to support the TFG and Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the Council has repeatedly insisted that a mission plan be coordinated with the broad consensus of the different parties in the TFI and be consistent with a national security and stabilisation plan.

China in recent years has been the lead nation on the Somalia issue in the Council. Qatar has recently taken over from the Philippines as the chair of the Somalia Sanctions Committee and will be drafting the resolution concerning the renewal of the Monitoring Group’s mandate. Troubled by neighbouring states’ continued embargo violations, Qatar has signalled an interest in strengthening the language in the resolution by calling for increased cooperation from neighbouring states.

The Council has not discussed Somalia since its presidential statement on March 15, despite the several days of heavy fighting and increased hostilities in March. With a heavy work load and many urgent matters before the Council, it is unclear whether the Council is likely to spend much energy on Somalia in the coming month.

**Recent Developments**

President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and the Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden agreed in the Aden Declaration of January 2005 to hold a parliamentary session inside the country. The Somali Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) met on 26 February inside Somalia, in the town of Baidoa, for the first time since 2004 when the parliament and president were sworn-in in Kenya. Preliminary reports suggest that the TFP is progressing in its work with the national security and stabilisation plan.

Representatives from AU and IGAD have recently met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lenseny Fall, to discuss the conditions for a waiver of the arms embargo. It nevertheless is still uncertain when a new AU-IGAD proposal will be presented to the Council.

Recent fighting in Mogadishu, characterised by some reports as the worst fighting since the early 1990s, has threatened to undermine the political progress of the TFI. The fighting has pitted Islamic court militias against the recently formed Forces of the Alliance for Peace and Fight Against International Terrorism. Reportedly, more than 100 people were killed and 300 wounded in March, and thousands were displaced. According to media reports, many of the Somalis killed were among those advocating a foreign peacekeeping force in Somalia—a proposal that has been strongly rejected by the Islamists.

Somalia is facing growing danger of a humanitarian disaster. The UN’s acting humanitarian coordinator for Somalia, Christian Balslev-Olesen, has warned that the country could experience a devastating famine like the one that claimed 300,000 lives in the early 1990s unless emergency relief arrives soon. He warned that the worst drought in a decade has left 2.1 million people in urgent need of aid, and that the political process of rebuilding Somalia will be immediately undermined if there is a humanitarian disaster.

The delivery of humanitarian aid has been hampered by increased hostilities. In March, a local militiaman was killed and several wounded after negotiations failed to obtain safe passage for a food convey contracted by the World Food Programme (WFP). On another occasion, a WFP charter ship managed to escape during an armed attack by pirates after unloading food at Somali port of Merka. In March, a UNICEF staff member was abducted in southern Somalia, but was released thirty hours later.

**Key Facts**

The political situation in Somalia has lately been characterised by a stalemate between Jawhar-based President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi on one side, and Mogadishu-based Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden and some ministers on the other. Issues include the seat of the government, security and the deployment of an AU-IGAD peace support mission. Several Mogadishu-based ministers and militia groups have previously objected to an international peacekeeping mission, particularly if comprised by soldiers from neighbouring states.

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please consult our January 2006 Monthly Forecast.
Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
By 30 April, the Council is due to receive the first regular report of the Secretary-General on the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNOSIL). The Secretary-General’s Executive Representative in Sierra Leone, Victor da Silva Ângelo, is expected to brief the Council in the first week of May. As reported in our April Forecast, there may be some preliminary discussion of the potential for the new Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to assist Sierra Leone. There is support among members for ensuring that international attention does not decrease in post-conflict situations considered to be a success in Africa, and it is possible that this will be reflected in a presidential statement or a press statement. Formal action relating to the PBC is not expected.

A resolution facilitating a shift of the venue of Charles Taylor’s trial from Freetown to The Hague seems likely. As reported in our Update Report on 7 April, the Special Court for Sierra Leone will likely try Taylor in the premises of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Key Facts
Following the completion of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UNOSIL started operating on 1 January. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has provided security for the Special Court since UNAMSIL completed its operations.

In April, the Council focused attention on the request that the venue of Charles Taylor’s trial should be shifted to The Hague. After some initial controversy regarding the adoption of the resolution under Chapter VII, as well as on the place of the references to the ICC in the text of the resolution, agreement is now close on all of the technical issues.

Difficulties remain with finding a state willing to receive Taylor after the trial, which was one of the preconditions that the Netherlands expressed in a 3 April letter for allowing the trial to be conducted in Dutch territory. The issue is not a precondition for Council action, and it seems that there is growing support in the Council for adopting the resolution in early May even if the outcome on that question remains uncertain.
Notable Dates for May

Reports Due for Consideration in May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report/Document Description</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>by 30 April</td>
<td>SG report on UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by late April/early May</td>
<td>SG report on DDRR in the DRC (delayed from 15 March)</td>
<td>S/RES/1649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by late April/early May</td>
<td>SG report on MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the DRC) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1635</td>
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<tr>
<td>in May</td>
<td>SG options for a UN operation in Darfur (delayed from 24 April)</td>
<td>S/RES/1663</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Group of Experts report to the 1572 Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>S/RES/1643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 31 May</td>
<td>SG report on Darfur (monthly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by late May/early June</td>
<td>SG report on UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) (delayed from April)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
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May 2006

Mandates Expire

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organisation/Committee</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Monitoring Group of the 751 Committee concerning Somalia</td>
<td>S/RES/1630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)</td>
<td>S/RES/1670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor-Leste)</td>
<td>S/RES/1599</td>
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May 2006

Other Important Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>Meeting of the P5 and Germany on the Iran nuclear issue in Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Presidential elections in Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Fourth round of Kosovo status talks in Vienna</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>The German parliament is expected to vote and confirm its leadership of an EU mission to support June elections in the DRC.</td>
<td>S/RES/1630</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>Members of the new Human Rights Council to be elected</td>
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<td>9 May</td>
<td>The Middle East Quartet to meet in New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>Haitian President-elect René Préval due to be installed subject to the finalisation of parliamentary election results.</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
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Important Dates over the Horizon

- A Council Mission to Sudan and Addis Ababa (and perhaps Abuja) is expected between 5-11 June.
- A review of the mandate of the multinational force in Iraq is likely by 15 June; the mandate is set to expire on 31 December. (S/RES/1637)
- UNIIIC’s mandate expires on 15 June and consideration of Lebanon/Syria is therefore expected. (S/RES/1644)
- More detailed discussions on the appointment of a new Secretary-General are expected in June and July; the selection process is expected between September and November.
- An open debate on Children and Armed Conflict is possible in July.
- A major focus on Haiti in the Council is likely in August.
- An open debate on Cooperation between the Council and Regional Organisations is possible in September.
- The mandate of UNMIS expires on 24 September (S/RES/1663) and the mandate of AMIS expires on 30 September (S/2006/156).
- Elections for the 2007-2009 members of the Security Council are expected in October.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646)

Also expected in May:
- The Georgian government is expected to present a proposal to its parliament for solving the Abkhaz conflict in mid-May.
- The Ugandan government and the Core Group (US, UK, the Netherlands and Norway) are expected to adopt a Plan of Action for northern Uganda in mid-May.