**Notable Dates for March**

**February 2006 Reports Due**
- by 28 February: SG report on small arms (S/PRST/2005/7)

**March 2006 Reports Due**
- by 1 March: UNMOVIC/Iraq (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) (quarterly) (S/RES/1284)
- by 8 March: SG report on UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) (quarterly) and the US report to the Council on the multinational force in Iraq (quarterly) (S/RES/1637)
- by 14 March: SG report on UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) (S/RES/1589)
- by 15 March: UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) (quarterly) (S/RES/1644)
- by 24 March: SG report on UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) (quarterly) (S/RES/1580)
- by 17 March: SG report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) (S/RES/1590)
- by 31 March: SG report on Darfur (monthly) (S/RES/1589)
- by 31 March: SG report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) (S/RES/1626)
- by 31 March: SG report on UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) (quarterly) (S/RES/1603)

**March 2006 Mandates Expire**
- 17 March: UNMEE (S/RES/1622)
- 24 March: UNAMA (S/RES/1589)
- 24 March: UNMIS (S/RES/1627)
- 29 March: 1591 Panel of Experts (Darfur sanctions) (S/RES/1651)
- 31 March: UNMIL (S/RES/1626)
- 31 March: UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) (S/RES/1656)
- 31 March: Troop redeployment from UNMIL to UNOCI (S/RES/1657)
- 31 March: SRSG for the Great Lakes (S/2005/849)
- 31 March: AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan) (PSC/PR/Comm. (XLV))

**March 2006 Other Important Dates**
- early March: meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission
- early March: formation of a new government by the Palestinian Authority
- 3 March: AU Peace and Security Council meets at ministerial level to review AMIS and possible transition to a UN operation in Darfur
- 6 March: IAEA Board will consider the Director General’s report on Iran’s nuclear programme
- 19 March: second round of parliamentary elections in Haiti
- 28 March: legislative elections in Israel
- 29 March: new government installed in Haiti
- 31 March: Independent Inquiry Committee (Oil for Food) ends operation (S/2005/847)
- late March: formation of a new government in Iraq

**Contents of this Issue**
- Overview for March
- Darfur/Sudan
- Iran
- Ethiopia/Eritrea
- Georgia
- Lebanon/Syria
- Burundi
- Liberia
- Afghanistan
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Haiti
- Small Arms
- Sanctions Committees
- Iraq
- Overview for March
- Darfur/Sudan
- Iran
- Ethiopia/Eritrea
- Georgia
- Lebanon/Syria
- Burundi
- Liberia
- Afghanistan
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Haiti
- Small Arms
- Sanctions Committees
- Iraq

**Aide-Memoire**
- A few important matters that are awaiting action include:
  - The report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, on his visit to Côte d’Ivoire was “shared” with the Council, but has not yet been made public.
  - At the January Great Lakes meeting, the Council, in resolution 1653, requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations on “how best to support efforts by states in the region to put an end to the activities of illegal armed groups.” This will address the thorny issue of the Ugandan rebel group LRA’s activities.
  - The draft resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, expected in December, has still not been adopted and it has not been discussed recently in Council Consultations.
  - In September, the Council requested a report from the Secretary-General on proposals for addressing the outstanding cases of serious crimes committed in East Timor following the report of the Commission of Experts in July 2005.

---

In March the Council is likely to have three open debates which will focus on:

- Haiti: this will begin the discussion about the future role for the UN in Haiti once the electoral process is completed.
- Small Arms: a thematic discussion of an issue which critically affects almost all of the countries on the Council’s agenda and is a major problem for most peacekeeping missions.
- Afghanistan: This will approve the renewal of the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and will allow non-Council members to speak about the outcome of the London Conference including the much enhanced role envisioned for the UN.

**Darfur/Sudan**

The main focus will be on Darfur, although the mandate for the existing UN mission in southern Sudan, UNMIS, must also be renewed.

With respect to Darfur, all eyes will be on the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is meeting in Addis Ababa at ministerial level on 3 March. Endorsement by the PSC of a transition from AMIS to the UN would open the way to the next phase of Security Council consideration. In this regard the early commitment by the UK to provide ongoing funding for AMIS during the transition will be an important factor.

It is unclear exactly how much weight the AU will give to the need for the operation to be in “partnership” as opposed to the kind of UN takeover or “rehatting” that occurred in Burundi. There is AU concern that the outcome should not be one in which the AU role becomes negligible while NATO is given a leading position.

It seems likely that Council decision making will be sequenced. Indeed an initial Council resolution or statement following up the 3 February presidential statement is a possibility—even before the end of February.

After the PSC meeting the Council will focus on getting substantive agreement on the operational concept for the mission, building on the planning by the UN and AU Secretariats.

A major issue will be to establish whether the operation can proceed in the absence of a peace agreement in Abuja. This is likely to determine whether or not Sudan will consent to the operation. A quite different set of factors comes into play if consent cannot be assumed. This is likely to lead to either a flexible mandate capable of responding to either alternative or further sequencing of the decisions.

The issue of the robustness of the operation will have to be addressed. The Secretary-General has been clear that robust capability will be needed, but the implications of this need to be agreed upon. Will it involve enforcement of the “no fly” zone for instance?

There is also the question of timing of the transition. This will take at least six months. But suggestions are emerging that a longer period, perhaps involving a phased transition with overlap between AMIS and the new force, may be part of the eventual political solution.

Finally, there are sanctions issues also on the agenda.

**Iran**

The IAEA report to be considered on 6 March will lead to the first round of Council discussion on the Iranian nuclear programme. Initially there is likely to be a period of discussion about the procedure to be used. A period of briefing and orientation about the issues is also a possibility. No major divisions are expected at the outset, but there will inevitably be a desire by the US, the UK and France to wind up the pressure. Part of this may involve a strategy of progressive airing of the problem in public meetings. But early resort to Chapter VII is not expected.

**Georgia**

There are some positive signs from a recent meeting of the small group of “Friends” that the Russians may eventually compromise on the wording supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity in the resolution. But no deal has been reached and the issue could yet result in a major controversy in the Council. It is likely that negotiations will continue through the “Friends” rather than in the Council. A further “technical rollover” is not impossible.

**Ethiopia/Eritrea**

The US diplomatic initiative is now focused on the core of the problem—the border delimitation. While there is a prospect of progress Council members will be willing to give more time. A “technical rollover” for UNMEE is therefore a possibility.

**Lebanon/Syria**

The new UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz has had initial meetings with the Syrians. If his March report indicates problems in cooperation there will be pressure for vigorous Council action. But at this stage a more administratively focused report seems likely.

**Liberia** and Côte d’Ivoire will also demand significant time during the month. And the situation in Iraq is also almost certain to appear. A report is due on Guinea Bissau.
The Secretary-General has shown strong personal leadership on this issue, most recently pressing both the Council and potential troop contributors on the need to rise to the Darfur challenge. Having received the support he was looking for from the Council, he has:
- stepped up planning;
- carried forward consultations with the AU;
- initiated lobbying to ensure that any UN force has sufficiently robust capacity to carry out the mandate effectively (including a meeting with President Bush at the White House); and
- emphasised the need to secure funds for AMIS for the next few months (the UK has already confirmed that it will provide twenty million pounds.)

The Secretary-General will present his recommendations on the transition in March following the PSC meeting and further planning sessions with the AU. It is expected that the recommendations on mandate and force structure will be flexible enough to accommodate both the possibility that no peace agreement is reached and that the situation on the ground worsens, particularly regarding Chad.

The Sanctions Committee finally transmitted the report of the Panel of Experts to the Council. The Panel found that the parties, Libya, Chad and Eritrea violated the embargo. It recommends (i) strengthening the embargo with an arms inventory, and/or extending the embargo to the entire Sudan; (ii) adopting a list of violators; and (iii) establishing a no-fly zone over Darfur. Discussions on the list of violators are ongoing within the Committee. However, it has not yet adopted guidelines and thus it is unclear when it will approve any list.

Key Issues
Recent developments suggest that the main issues that need to be addressed by the Council are:
- Responding to outstanding issues from the PSC meeting, including the AU position on partnership and timing of the transition.
- Developing a mandate, command and political leadership framework that will give effect to the AU position. There are indications that, for the AU, this means retaining leadership on the political side, including in the Abuja talks and in the political aspects of the mandate, while perhaps leaving most aspects of peacekeeping to the UN.
- Obtaining support in the Council for a highly mobile and more robust force. The Secretary-General has made it plain that simply “rehatting” the existing AMIS force is not adequate. However, this does not mean that only western countries are being sought as troop contributors.
- Securing financial support is a key issue. Strong political support from the US (including Congress) and Japan will be essential. But it is also important to secure voluntary funding, particularly to AMIS for the near future.
- But in the absence of a peace agreement, the operational planning may need to include flexibility for a situation of tacit consent.

Another set of issues relates to the sanctions regime, particularly:
- the adoption of a list of individual violators;
- the recommendations made by the Panel of Experts, especially the imposition of a no-fly zone (currently, there is a ban on “offensive military flights,” but its terms are unclear and it is not enforced); and
- the relationship between lists of violators and those that may be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Council Dynamics
The 3 February statement showed an important consensus among members. But there are still considerable divisions.
- The US, the UK and others strongly support the transition, and have made consistent efforts to expedite the process.
But most Council members have rejected any firm decisions in advance of the AU finalising its position.

China and perhaps Qatar, will be sensitive to Khartoum’s position and this could result in pressure for delaying a decision even further.

It remains to be seen whether there will be US support for UN budget funding. However, President Bush’s support for a much larger force probably signals that the US will not allow financial issues to block a decision.

The overall costs of a UN operation in Darfur will be a factor in the minds of delegations such as France and Japan. However, in the face of the clear need for increased resources, this is unlikely to be a fatal obstacle.

Congolese President and AU Chairman Denis Nguesso has indicated that the transition should have a leadership role for the AU. African members of the Council will be particularly sensitive to this issue.

There is also US interest in an increased NATO role in providing extended logistical support, perhaps also enforcing a no-fly zone in Darfur. While there is strong opposition, particularly within the AU, to NATO-commanded troops on the ground in Darfur, it may be that an enhanced support (and perhaps a ready reaction reserve role outside Sudan) for NATO could be viewed more favourably.

The sanctions issue is likely to become a controversial element. Some members—the UK in particular—are expected to campaign for the adoption of a list of sanctions violators to step up pressure on the Abuja negotiations. Opposition from China, Qatar and Russia is likely on the basis that applying sanctions at this stage will complicate the UN’s position vis-à-vis Khartoum. They are also likely to oppose the Panel’s recommendations on strengthening the sanctions regime. It remains to be seen whether Council members supporting strengthening of the regime will continue to press on that front or whether, in light of the efforts being made to secure agreement on the transition, they will choose not to press at this time.

Options
Options for the mandate for a new mission include:

- monitoring a new, or the previous 2004, ceasefire;
- protecting civilians;
- maintaining a deterrent presence, particularly along the border with Chad;
- seizing arms;
- monitoring compliance with the sanctions regime;
- assisting with the implementation of a future peace agreement; and
- specific mandate provisions to confront LRA elements in the south.

Options to increase pressure in the Abuja negotiations include:

- sending a small Council mission to the talks; or
- strengthening the arms embargo, particularly by establishing a no-fly zone over Darfur.

Options on timing of decision-making include:

- early approval of a flexible mandate, capable of adjustment as events develop; or
- proceeding with a series of Council decisions starting with a general framework resolution followed by subsequent decisions as aspects in contention are resolved.

Underlying Problems
While the focus will remain on Darfur, the existing UNMIS mandate also faces problems:

- some armed groups are not participating in the process, especially in eastern Sudan where peace talks have been postponed indefinitely;
- implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may upset traditional power structures;
- the south will be able to decide whether it desires to secede in 2011, but the north’s ability to make unity attractive remains uncertain;
- the north still controls key ministries such as energy and defence;
- there are growing divisions between north and south over oil revenues; and
- regional factors threaten the peace, including the LRA.

The security situation between Sudan and Chad has been a persistent problem, including cross-border militia attacks and Chad’s increasing political instability. Libya hosted a mini-summit on 8 February to defuse the crisis. Both signed a declaration pledging to normalise their relations and to deny haven to rebels, but implementation remains uncertain.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1556 (30 July 2004) established an arms embargo and requested monthly reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2006/5 (3 February 2006) mandated the Secretariat to start contingency planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2005/67 (21 December 2005) expressed concern with the current situation, in particular the spillover effects in Chad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2006/59 (30 January 2006) was the latest report on Darfur at the time of writing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2005/821 (21 December 2005) was the latest regular report on Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2005/285 (3 May 2005) reported on UNMIS’ assistance to AMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2005/57 (31 January 2005) assessed risks in the CPA and proposed UNMIS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latest Report of the Panel of Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2006/65 (30 January 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) is the World Summit Outcome.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For historical background please refer to our February 2006 Forecast Report.
Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

UNMIS Force Commander
Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh Lidder (India)

UNMIS: Size and Composition of Mission
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel
- Strength as of 13 December 2005: 4,291 military personnel
- Key contributors: Bangladesh, India and Nepal

UNMIS: Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $969.47 million (gross)

AU’s Chief Mediator
Salam Ahmed Salim (Tanzania)

Head of AMIS
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

AMIS Force Commander
Major-General Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel
- Strength as of 20 December 2005: 5,579 military and 1,211 police personnel
- Key contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Ghana

AMIS: Cost
$466 million ($290 million pledged)

Useful Additional Sources
The Sudan Tribune lists documents from the peace process: http://www.sudantribune.com/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=4
AU website: www.africa-union.org

Iran

Expected Council Action
The 6 March session of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the IAEA report on the implementation by Iran of its Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Safeguards Agreement will be the trigger for the Council to take up the Iran issue. The Council’s handling of this issue at the initial stages is likely to be incremental and not overly contentious.

The initial question will be procedural—whether a new or an existing agenda item should be used.

Recent Developments
For a full description of the background to this issue please see our February 2006 Forecast Report.

Meeting in London on 31 January, the EU3, China, Russia and the US agreed that the IAEA should report Iran to the Council. China and Russia had been reluctant to precipitate this report to the Council. As a compromise, it was agreed that although the dossier would be reported to the Council, no Council action would be pursued before the Council receives the 6 March report of Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA Director General.

On 4 February, the IAEA Board at a special session adopted a resolution reporting the issue to the Security Council and also requesting Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency. There were 27 votes in favour of the resolution, three against (Cuba, Syria and Venezuela) and five abstentions (Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa).

Following the adoption of this resolution, Iran responded by resuming enrichment of uranium at its Natanz plant, threatening to withdraw from the NPT and postponing talks with Moscow.

Talks between Iran and Russia were finally scheduled for 20 February to explore a proposal to create a joint venture for uranium enrichment located in Russia.

The second issue, given the general view that the issue should be approached in an incremental way, is how to establish a meaningful series of steps which will send progressively stronger messages to Iran but leaving enough room for the resumption of negotiations. Action under Chapter VII is unlikely at this stage.

Council members may also want to deal with the issue that has arisen over the terminology used in the process of “referral.” That term seems to have been used in a non-technical sense and sometimes wrongly because it is absent from the IAEA Statute. Technically, the IAEA either “reports” a problem to the Council under article 12.C or “notifies” the Council under article 3.B.4. This seems to have led to uncertainty as to whether a new Board resolution is necessary to have a “referral.” (However, under the UN Charter the Council is not constrained in any matter of international peace and security by the need for a reference, report or notification from any other body. Nor is the Council bound to take up a situation even if the IAEA does pass a resolution—however that resolution may be styled. There is no legal linkage in this sense between the two bodies.)

Council Dynamics
It seems that the US, the UK and France, with support from most members of the Council, will want early consultations in the Council on Iran. China and Russia prefer that, at this stage at least, the Council play a limited role, with the IAEA keeping the lead. There may be periods in the future when this difference of emphasis will lead to tensions, but probably less so at the outset.

Options
ElBaradei’s report will play a role in framing the options. However, given the desire for an incremental approach, the following options seem possible for March.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is how, in tandem with the IAEA and leaving space for other appropriate opportunities for diplomacy and leverage, to establish with Iran a basis for resuming negotiations.

Options
ElBaradei’s report will play a role in framing the options. However, given the desire for an incremental approach, the following options seem possible for March.

AMB.2006 Monthly Forecast
Scheduling the issue for informal consultations in the March Programme of Work, using that occasion for some ambassadors to brief their colleagues and get them up to speed on what is a technically very complex issue and deciding to return to the issue for a further step either later in the month or in April.

Alternatively, in addition to the above, approving a press statement by the president expressing concern about the issues covered by the ElBaradei report, and confirming that the Council will be studying them seriously and returning to them shortly.

A higher profile step would be to schedule, in addition to the above, later in the month a formal meeting of the Council at which a new agenda item would be adopted, but not moving to any substantive action in March.

Finally, a range of substantive options may be possible depending on progress in discussions with Iran elsewhere, e.g. the Moscow talks, or contacts with the EU3. These might involve including in a formal presidential statement measures such as: reinforcing any progress that is achieved or if no progress is achieved calling for restored cooperation with the IAEA inspectors, urging Iran to implement confidence-building measures, demanding a return to negotiations on specified issues or requesting the IAEA to provide regular reports on specific issues and benchmarks.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council Action
The Council will renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) by mid-March. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether a technical rollover will be needed, or whether there will be radical changes to UNMEE’s size and mandate. Much now depends on the outcome of the US diplomatic initiative.

Key Facts
Since early January, Council action has been on hold for a US diplomatic initiative to defuse the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The initiative has mainly focused on organizing a meeting of the Boundary Commission (EEBC) with the parties scheduled for early March with a view of getting to the crux of the problem—Ethiopia’s non-compliance with the EEBC ruling. The EEBC has not met with the parties for over two years, having closed its field offices a year ago. Ethiopia has declined a previous attempt to organise a meeting with the EEBC in February 2005.

In preparation for that, a meeting of the “witnesses” to the 2000 Algiers Agreement—the US, the EU, the UN and the AU—was held on 22 February. The main purpose was to show the unity of the “witnesses” in supporting the EEBC and the final demarcation of the border. A statement accepted at that meeting was welcomed by the Security Council in a presidential statement which called on both sides to cooperate with the EEBC to implement its decisions without further delay.

In another ominous development, adding to tensions caused by previous Eritrean moves against UNMEE, the authorities arrested 25 national UNMEE staff in mid-February.

Key Issues
The key issue is how much time to give for the US initiative and the results of the EEBC meeting.

If no progress is made on the demarcation, it seems inevitable that Council members will have to reduce the size and make changes to the mandate of UNMEE. The Secretary-General’s January report framed the issues and available options.

Another key issue is how to respond to the restrictions Eritrea has placed on UNMEE, bearing in mind the fact that the Council had threatened measures in resolution 1640, even before the latest round of hostile acts by the authorities.

Council Dynamics
At this stage there is a good deal of support for the US approach of focusing on the substantive problem—the delimitation—rather than the symptoms, the Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE.

There is some willingness to adopt a technical rollover to allow some further room for the US diplomatic initiative. But Council members are aware that time is running and, if the initiative does not bear fruit, UNMEE’s mandate and size will have to be modified. They are very conscious in this regard of the concerns of troop contributing countries (TCCs).

As described in our February 2006 Forecast Report, a popular option, if downsizing becomes inevitable, is that UNMEE’s Asmara headquarters be transferred to Addis Ababa while maintaining troops in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer area along the border on the Eritrean side.

But some are concerned that this carries risks of further restrictions on UNMEE, especially if the Council overlooks Asmara’s previous actions and rejection of previous Council demands. In light of this, there will be strong advocacy for reducing UNMEE to a small observer mission. There will also be support for imposing deadlines on the parties which, if not observed, will lead to UNMEE’s reduction to a liaison mission or even withdrawal.

Options
Council members have the option to adopt a technical rollover to allow some room for the EEBC to develop. However, should there be no progress, the options outlined by the Secretary-General still stand:

- maintaining the status quo;
- relocating the Asmara UNMEE headquarters to Addis Ababa, while keeping troops in the TSZ and a liaison office in Asmara;
- reducing UNMEE to an observer mission, (a) either on both sides of the TSZ or (b) exclusively on the Ethiopian side;
- deploying a preventive force in Ethiopia;
- reducing UNMEE to a liaison mission; or
- withdrawing UNMEE.

Most Recent Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last IAEA Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2006/80 (7 February 2006) Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council including the list of IAEA documents on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, communicated by the IAEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Russian statement on nuclear issues (14 February 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Accord (31 January 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU3 Berlin statement (12 January 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Underlying Problems
It is unclear whether progress will be achieved at the EEBC meeting.

Eritrea has already questioned its usefulness, stating that what is needed is the implementation of the delimitation decision and not further dialogue. This is consistent with Eritrean reluctance to engage in anything that may be interpreted as willingness to revisit the decision.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, calls for dialogue on the demarcation, which it insists is not tantamount to revisiting the delimitation decision. It has presented a five-point proposal that includes acceptance, “in principle”, of the delimitation decision, but states that implementation should be made “in a manner consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace and brotherly ties between the two peoples”. But the concrete implications of this position on the demarcation are unclear.

The country has also come under intense international pressure after a recent crackdown on the opposition. Key donors, including traditional supporters of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi such as the UK, have cut back direct aid. Others, such as the US, have refrained from doing so given the importance of their ties with Ethiopia.

For historical background please refer to the February 2006 Forecast Report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Relevant Facts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size and Composition of Mission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Authorised maximum strength: 4,200 troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strength as of 28 December 2005: 3,249 military personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key troop-contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2000 to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Useful Additional Sources**
EEBC’s website: http://www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcarbitration/
The Claims Commission’s awards can be found at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/#Eritrea-Ethiopia%20Claims%20Commission%A0
Eritrean Ministry of Information website: www.shabait.com

The “Group of Friends” held a regular meeting in Geneva on 2-3 February as part of the peace process. The meeting also aimed at breaking the UNOMIG deadlock. The issue seemed to have taken a positive turn when the chairman’s statement restated the traditional UN language. (The “Friends” are comprised of the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia, and Slovakia in the Council.)

This development has been associated with the deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations. But Russian President Vladimir Putin also linked the issue to Kosovo, warning that Russia could recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The “Group of Friends” held a regular meeting in Geneva on 2-3 February as part of the peace process. The meeting also aimed at breaking the UNOMIG deadlock. The issue seemed to have taken a positive turn when the chairman’s statement restated the traditional UN language. (The “Friends” are comprised of the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia, and Slovakia in the Council.)

But on 15 February the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution recommending the replacement of peacekeepers in South Ossetia with an international force. It is widely seen as a preview of the position it may take when it reviews the status of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia (deployed through the Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS) by 15 July. However:

- The resolution is reportedly not binding on the Executive. The Georgian government...
has not indicated its final decision, and the Kremlin has indicated opposition to withdrawal. But Georgia has consistently voiced frustration with Russian policies, equating them to de facto annexation.

South Ossetians and Abkhazians signed a mutual defence pact and have opposed the replacement of Russian troops. The 2,000 CIS troops operate checkpoints in the demilitarised security zone and provide security for UN personnel, while the 122 UNOMIG observers patrol that zone, the restricted weapons zone and other areas. UNOMIG resolutions have highlighted that the mission is subject to review “in the event of changes in the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force”.

Key Issues
The key issue is achieving agreement on the language of the resolution so that UNOMIG has a sustainable basis for continued deployment.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus on the renewal of UNOMIG. The stumbling block is overcoming Russian objections to the language of the resolution.

There has never been any appetite to truly internationalise peacekeeping in the region, possibly in recognition of the sensitivity of Russian interests towards the former Soviet republics.

Because Tbilisi has tried to tone down the tension created by the parliamentary resolution after pressure from the “Friends” and because of the positive indications in the Geneva statement, there is some optimism in the Council that the crisis can be defused.

However, there are still uncertainties about the Russian position. A compromise on the UNOMIG resolution by 31 March may be difficult and another technical rollover may be needed. But there is anxiety, especially within the UN, about the possible lack of a regular mandate for an extended period of time.

Most members of the Council will support the traditional language reaffirming sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China will be concerned about the implications of Russia challenging traditional UN support for the territorial integrity of states.

Other Council members, particularly Greece, will be aware of the implications for other stalled situations before the Council such as Cyprus.

It is likely therefore that the issue will remain in the “Group of Friends” until a solution is found, rather than coming before the full Council.

Options
At the time of writing, the likely option is another technical rollover of UNOMIG, given the uncertainties surrounding the final Russian position on the matter. Another option, however, would be a regular resolution including some sort of compromise language that still indicates Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Underlying Problems
In the absence of progress on the final political status of Abkhazia, peace talks have focused on:

- adopting a package of decisions on the return of Georgian IDPs, particularly to the Gali sector in Abkhazia, and on the non-use of force;
- opening a UNOMIG human rights sub-office and the deployment of UNOMIG police in Gali, opposed by Abkhazia; and
- resuming the use of the Georgian-language in schools in Abkhazia.

Georgia is refraining from accepting a document on non-use of force until it sees guarantees on the return of IDPs to Abkhazia and improvements in human rights, particularly in the Gali sector. Abkhazia is keen on achieving progress on non-use of force before accepting the rest, and is anxious about Georgia’s bid to join NATO.

The last meeting of the “Friends” seems to have identified support for moving away from the paper on “Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi” as the basis for substantive negotiations.

For historical background please refer to the January 2006 Forecast Report.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1077 (22 October 1996) created a UN human rights office.
- S/RES/858 (24 August 1993) established UNOMIG.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/19 (13 January 2006) was the latest report.
- S/1994/80 (25 January 1994) contained options for UN presence on the ground, including the deployment of UNOMIG as an observer force together with a multinational peacekeeping operation.

Selected Letters
- S/1994/583 (17 May 1994) contained the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement.
- S/1994/397 (05 April 1994) contained the declaration on measures for the settlement of the conflict and the quadrupartite agreement.
- S/1994/32 (14 January 1994) contained a communiqué from the parties detailing their acceptance of the deployment of peacekeepers with a Russian contingent.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)

UNOMIG: Size and Composition
- Size as of 31 January 2006: 134 total uniformed personnel, including 122 military observers
- Main contributors: Germany, Pakistan, Jordan

Duration
August 1993 to present.

Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $36.38 million (gross)

Other Facts
Size of CIS troops: about 2,000 Russian troops
**Useful Additional Sources**


Georgiade, David (ed.), *Georgiade on Georgia and the South Caucasus* (London: Hurst, 2001)


UNOMIG website: http://www.unomig.org/


---

**Lebanon/Syria**

**Expected Council Action**

The first quarterly progress report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) is due on 15 March, and firm Council action can be expected if it reveals clear non-cooperation by Syria.

The Security Council may also receive the Secretary-General’s conclusions on:

- the nature and scope of an international tribunal for the trial of the perpetrators of the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; and
- a possible wider investigatory role for UNIIIC covering other recent terrorist attacks in Lebanon.

(See our February 2006 Forecast Report for discussions of tribunal options and recent terrorist attacks in Lebanon.)

The Council is likely to take some time to consider the Secretary-General’s reports regarding the tribunal and the wider UNIIIC role. A decision in March is unlikely.

**Recent Developments**

Serge Brammertz, a Belgian prosecutor, was appointed Commissioner of UNIIIC in December. Also in December, resolution 1644 authorised the Commission to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of other terrorist attacks in Lebanon since 1 October 2004. In order to collect information on these other cases, a separate unit has been created within the structure of UNIIIC. At a later stage, recommendations will be made on the possible expansion of UNIIIC’s mandate.

UNIIIC’s structure and staffing is being reviewed in light of its expanding roles. At press time, Brammertz is still putting together his expanded team.

Consultations with the Lebanese authorities over the international tribunal were undertaken by the Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Nicolas Michel and during a visit to New York by Lebanese judicial officers. Further consultations are expected on issues such as the choice of law, the location of the tribunal and its financing (financing for UNIIIC itself will be considered in March by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions).

In January, the Council finally adopted a presidential statement on the October 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Terje Røed-Larsen, on the implementation of resolution 1559. However, issues highlighted in the report reappeared in February with reports of new weapons transfers from Syria to the south of Lebanon.

**Key Issues**

Brammertz’s progress report is likely to tackle the recent restructuring and reinforcing of UNIIIC rather than the substance of the investigation. Accordingly, major developments in the Council are not expected. However, any comments on Syrian cooperation will be keenly awaited. The key issue for the Council is to assess Syrian cooperation with the investigation. Some disagreement over what constitutes full cooperation is possible.

Wider issues are expected to emerge regarding the options for the tribunal and expanding the UNIIIC mandate, including the cost of a tailor-made tribunal.

If UN investigations confirm that weapons continue to be shipped from Syria, then compliance with resolution 1559 is certain to return as a major issue.

**Council Dynamics**

Council cohesion on resolution 1644 issues has been strong. However, China and Russia consider Syrian moves towards cooperation as better than nothing. France, the UK and the US on the other hand are ready to sanction Syria for anything less than full cooperation. They believe that Syria’s behaviour is designed to frustrate the Security Council and is only buying time.

With respect to resolution 1559, the Council has been more divided. Negotiations over the January presidential statement on the Reed-Larsen report were lengthier than expected because of disagreements over the language used in the statement and the mention of issues like the flow of arms between Syria and Lebanon and the Lebanese presidential elections. In addition, new Council members may change the dynamic. It remains to be seen whether Qatar, representing the Arab region, will adopt Algeria’s cautious approach toward Syria or whether the departure of Brazil will result in more resolve towards implementing resolution 1559.

**Options**

In respect to UNIIIC’s progress report, the Council could:

- adopt a presidential statement welcoming the report and the new structure of UNIIIC, encouraging the investigation and emphasising the need for cooperation with it;
- adopt a resolution renewing calls on Syria to fully cooperate with UNIIIC;
- adopt a resolution condemning Syria for a lack of cooperation if this is reported by Brammertz; or
- trigger individual targeted sanctions if Brammertz reports names to the Sanctions Committee.

If the Secretary-General’s report on the tribunal and the extension of UNIIIC is received, the Council is unlikely to take final decisions in March, but it could consider:

- a presidential or press statement welcoming the results of the consultations with the Lebanese authorities; or
- a request to the Secretary-General for additional information on various aspects of the reports regarding the UNIIIC mandate and a possible tribunal.

---

**Useful Additional Sources**


UNOMIG website: http://www.unomig.org/


---

**Security Council Report**  One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017  **T.1 212 759 6327**  **F.1 212 759 4038**  www.securitycouncilreport.org **9**
### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions
- **S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005)** extended UNIIIC’s mandate by six months and requested reports on the progress of the investigation every three months.
- **S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005)** urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the Hariri killing.
- **S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005)** established UNIIIC.
- **S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004)** urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disbanding of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

#### Presidential Statements
- **S/PRST/2006/3 (23 January 2006)** welcomed the second report on implementation of resolution 1559, noted with regret that some aspects of the resolution were still not implemented, commended the Lebanese authorities for the inter-Lebanese dialogue that they initiated, called on Syria to take measures to prevent the flow of arms and people into Lebanese territory, and called for free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon.

#### Reports
- **S/2005/775 (12 December 2005)** second UNIIIC report
- **S/2005/673 (26 October 2005)** second semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559
- **S/2005/662 (20 October 2005)** first UNIIIC report
- **S/2005/272 (29 April 2005)** first semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559

#### Other
- **S/2006/67 (31 January 2006)** EU statement on Lebanon
- **S/2006/17 and S/2006/18 (13 January 2006)** letters on the nomination of Serge Brammertz
- **S/2005/783 (13 December 2005)** letter from Lebanon requesting an international tribunal and the expansion of UNIIIC’s mandate

### Burundi

#### Expected Council Action
The Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s drawdown plan for the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and possible adjustments to its mandate. The plan will be presented in a report from the Secretary-General due by 15 March.

In addition, the Council will discuss the redeployment of ONUB troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to reinforce the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC), as envisaged in resolution 1650 of 21 December 2005.

#### Key Facts
- **The Council established ONUB in May 2004**, to, *inter alia*:
  - patrol Burundi’s borders, with particular attention to combatants, and monitor the illegal flow of weapons in cooperation with MONUC and the DRC Group of Experts;
  - facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs);
  - monitor the ceasefire agreements between the government and rebel groups;
  - carry out the security sector reform; and
  - assist the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

In late 2005, following the adoption of a new constitution and the election of Pierre Nkurunziza as president, Council members were informed of the Burundian government’s desire to see ONUB withdrawn as soon as possible to signal the success of the peace process to the international community. Burundi’s request comes in line with its recent rejection of a proposal by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Carolyn McAske for the establishment of a donor forum comprised of Council members, the UN, the AU, neighbouring countries and key partners to help mobilise funds. The rejection came amidst fears that the forum would interfere with the government’s powers and justify an extension of ONUB’s mandate.

The resolution also included the possibility of a transfer of forces between ONUB and MONUC with the proviso that troops would remain under their original peacekeeping mission. But the sharing of troops needs prior agreement both from the Council and troop contributing countries, mainly Nepal, Pakistan and South Africa.

An assessment team visited Burundi in January to prepare the drawdown plan. It is expected that the Secretary-General will recommend final withdrawal of all troops by the end of the year.

It is also expected that the Secretary-General will submit a letter recommending the redeployment of some of ONUB’s troops to the DRC to provide security during the Congolese elections due by mid-2006. But difficulties with obtaining consent from troop-contributing countries have delayed the process.

#### Key Issues
- **The key issue is the adoption of a downsizing plan for ONUB while maintaining a stable situation on the ground. Another issue is the end-date for the mission, but given the divisions inside the Council on the matter, it is possible that a final decision will be taken by July, when ONUB’s mandate expires.**

A related issue will be the adoption of a new mandate for ONUB reflecting its current size and the situation on the ground.

Whether ONUB troops should be authorised to assist MONUC in general terms or whether complicated by the possibility that a ceasefire might be reached after ONUB is withdrawn.

The peace process has improved the security situation in the country, but there are still considerable challenges. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs still wait to return, and there are recent reports of new flows of Burundian refugees arriving in Tanzania due to insecurity and malnutrition. And despite a decrease in FNL numbers, analysts estimate that the group can still terrorise the population and that it has forged an alliance with Rwandan Hutu rebels present in the DRC.

The withdrawal of 40 percent of the UN troops nonetheless began in December 2005, following the Council’s decision to renew ONUB until 1 July 2006 in resolution 1650.

The key issue is the adoption of a downsizing plan for ONUB while maintaining a stable situation on the ground. Another issue is the end-date for the mission, but given the divisions inside the Council on the matter, it is possible that a final decision will be taken by July, when ONUB’s mandate expires.

A related issue will be the adoption of a new mandate for ONUB reflecting its current size and the situation on the ground.

Whether ONUB troops should be authorised to assist MONUC in general terms or whether
assistance will be confined to the electoral period is another issue, as is the costs of such assistance.

**Council Dynamics**

There is no significant division inside the Council on the need to balance ONUB’s withdrawal with the maintenance of stability in Burundi.

But resistance from some Council members against withdrawal by the end of the year is also expected, with indications that those countries may support ONUB’s continuing presence beyond December. Some Council members—especially France and Tanzania—still have concerns about the lack of a ceasefire with the FNL.

A continuation of ONUB, however, is likely to elicit resistance from the US and Japan, and from Burundi itself. On the issue of troop sharing, some members—particularly the US and Japan—are keen to establish a clear timeframe and purpose for the redeployment, namely the elections in the DRC. But there are no indications of divisions in the Council on the need for reinforcing MONUC during the elections. Troop-contributing countries have, nonetheless, voiced such concerns.

**Options**

Extending the drawdown beyond December 2006 is a possible option, but the decision could be deferred to July, when ONUB expires. Another option would be to redesign ONUB’s mandate concomitantly with the drawdown plan to reflect ONUB’s size and tasks ahead. Of particular importance to any new mandate will be the patrolling of borders, the completion of DDR programmes and the return of refugees.

Some initial Council discussions about Burundi as a candidate for the new Peacebuilding Commission would also be an option.

Council members may also want to follow up on the status of the establishment in Burundi of a truth and reconciliation commission, as well as a serious crimes chamber.

**Underlying Problems**

Regional relations have improved under the umbrella of the joint commission comprised of Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.

Challenges for Burundi include the FNL, strengthening the security sector, the reintegration of refugees and the strengthening of governance, democracy and rule of law. The situation is far from resolved, particularly on the issue of land ownership and accountability for past human rights crimes.

The Council has expressed support for the establishment of mechanisms to address impunity and reconciliation. Bujumbura has supported, in principle, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and of a serious crimes chamber in its court system. But there have been considerable delays in the process, and it is not clear whether the commission’s work will lead to amnesty for some of the perpetrators. The modalities of implementation are to be discussed with a UN team in early 2006.

**Background**

19 August 2005 Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president.

28 February 2005 A referendum approved the constitution.

21 May 2004 Resolution 1545 created ONUB, which incorporated forces under the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB).

November 2003 Forces under Nkurunziza joined the transition.

**February 2003** AMIB was deployed.

**December 2002** A ceasefire between the government and part of the rebels was signed.

2000 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed after years of regional mediation; the transitional government was established.

1996 Pierre Buyoya regained the presidency after a coup.

1994 Cyprien Ntaryamira was appointed president, but was killed two months after taking office.

**November-December 1993** Between 30,000 and 50,000 people were killed in ethnic massacres.

**October 1993** President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, initiating a wave of violence.

**June 1993** Ndadaye was elected president after defeating incumbent Buyoya.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of ONUB**
  - Carolyn McAskie (Canada)

- **Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi** (South Africa)

**Size and Composition of Mission**

- Total authorised strength: 5,650 military personnel, including 200 military observers.
- Strength as of 28 February 2006: about 4,600 total uniformed personnel.
- Key military contributors: Nepal, Pakistan and South Africa.

**Duration**

June 2004 to present.

**Cost**

1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $307.69 million (gross)
Liberia

Expected Council Action

The Council will renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which expires on 31 March.

Council members will also consider the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIL. Contrary to early expectations, the report will say that it is premature to present a drawdown plan. Instead it will focus on outstanding tasks for UNMIL in the post-transitional period.

The Council is also likely to discuss the status of UNMIL troops deployed in Côte d’Ivoire and in Sierra Leone, as well as possibly some changes to the mandate for UNMIL to reflect the new situation in the post-transitional period.

Key Facts

The inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the new president of Liberia in January marked the end of the transitional period.

First established in 2003, UNMIL’s mandate is to:

- support the transitional government;
- support the elections;
- develop an action plan for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR), and carry out voluntary disarmament;
- support the reform of the security sector, particularly by training the police;
- monitor Liberia’s borders and the flow of arms; and
- arrest and hand over former Liberian President Charles Taylor over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Many of these tasks have now been completed.

UNMIL troops are deployed in four sectors, each with a brigade-strength unit, covering (i) Monrovia and its environs; (ii) north-western provinces bordering Sierra Leone and Guinea; (iii) central provinces bordering Guinea and north-western Côte d’Ivoire; and (iv) eastern provinces bordering Côte d’Ivoire.

With the final withdrawal of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Council authorised in September 2005 the deployment of 250 UNMIL troops to provide security for the SCSL.

The Council also authorised the redeployment of 200 troops and 125 police officers from UNMIL to assist the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in February 2006. This was a compromise decision at a much lower level than recommended by the Secretary-General to offset the lack of support in Côte d’Ivoire.

Those decisions heralded a trend in inter-mission cooperation in West Africa. The idea was originally envisaged by the Secretary-General to contain costs and increase performance with improvements such as coordinated operations. But it has increasingly meant redeployments between missions to offset troop shortages.

In view of outstanding tasks in Liberia, it is perceived within the Secretariat that drawdown planning is premature at this stage. The report will instead present priority tasks, which could become the core of a new UNMIL mandate in the post-transitional period. They include:

- reintegration programmes and security sector reform;
- extending state authority;
- assisting with improvements in the control over natural resources; and
- rule of law and human rights.

Key Issues

The key issue before the Council is the adjustment of UNMIL’s mandate now that the transition is over, bearing in mind:

- the outstanding tasks above, especially considering that Liberia does not have standing armed forces;
- the situation in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire; and
- the potential need of support for UNOCI and the SCSL.

But drawdown will continue to be an issue in the minds of some Council members as it relates to containing peacekeeping costs and diverting resources, particularly to Côte d’Ivoire.

Council Dynamics

The completion of the peace process is seen as an opportunity to assess the ongoing needs and the drawdown options.

However, there is recognition (particularly from the US and African members) that complete withdrawal should not be contemplated for at least two to three years. Those members will welcome the Secretary-General’s support for maintaining the status quo at this time.

Other members, France and Japan in particular, will want to highlight the need to release UNMIL resources to meet other priorities and may be anxious to start discussing a plan. The issue could be quite contentious and it seems feasible that a compromise on the new UNMIL resolution will have at least some reference to eventual drawdown.

A related issue is the debate over increases in UNOCI through the deployment to Côte d’Ivoire of more UNMIL troops. France is likely to promote the idea, at least on a temporary basis, as a solution to difficulties in getting additional support for UNOCI. This will be attractive to many Council members.

Options

One option is to maintain UNMIL forces at existing levels but request a plan from the Secretary-General by mid-year. Another option would be to take a decision on a specific date when drawdown is to begin, perhaps January 2007.

Furthermore, given the possible future difficulties in balancing withdrawal and threats to stability in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the Council may start discussing other options.

- The Secretary-General has recommended the establishment of a sub-regional reserve force as a means of offsetting troop shortfalls. Linked with the intention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to form a standby force, this may offer a lower-cost option for ensuring support for UNMIL and allowing a larger drawdown from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire.
An early decision referring Liberia to the new Peacebuilding Commission could help enhance the level of confidence in that country, also facilitating earlier withdrawal.

Individual members may consider working to increase funding for reintegration and security sector reform also as a means of creating conditions for earlier withdrawal.

Underlying Problems
Considerable security challenges still remain ahead.

- Liberia still does not have a standing army. Training of the new forces is underway, but the first batch was cut to half the originally expected 4,000 due to budgetary constraints.
- Significant difficulties with DDRR programmes remain, particularly funding for the reintegration or retirement pays of former soldiers and police.
- Thousands of former combatants have not been included either in the new army, the police or reintegration programmes.
- 190,000 Liberian refugees scattered across West Africa await return.
- The violence in Côte d’Ivoire has increased the opportunities for cross-border recruitment and flows of refugees, and there is great potential for instability in Guinea if President Lansana Conté dies.
- The linkages between conflict and natural resources remain, highlighting the lack of public control over diamond and timber production.
- Basic services and infrastructure still need to be put in place, and corruption plagues the Liberian government.
- The political landscape in Liberia still includes former allies of Charles Taylor and could be destabilised with the disruption of existing power structures by the new government.

The Council mandated UNMIL to arrest Taylor if he returns to Liberia and hand him over to the SCSL, which has indicted him for his role in the Sierra Leonean war. Taylor is currently in exile in Nigeria, and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has indicated that he would consider surrendering Taylor upon request from the new Liberian government. President Johnson-Sirleaf has signalled that a request is possible, but not at this point. The SCSL expects to conclude its activities by early to mid-2007.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1657 (6 February 2006) autho-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rised the deployment of UNMIL troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Côte d’Ivoire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renewed the sanctions regime and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel of Experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1638 (11 November 2005) man-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dated UNMIL to apprehend Charles Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should he return to Liberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authorised a temporary redeployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Sierra Leone of UNMIL troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1609 (24 June 2005) authorised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>troop-sharing among UNMIL, UNAMSIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and UNOCI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an assets freeze against Taylor and his</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>associates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imposed the current sanctions regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established UNMIL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/2006/2 (3 January 2006) requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>additional troops for UNOCI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/764 (7 December 2005) was the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>latest UNMIL report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/135 (2 March 2005) was the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report on inter-mission cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2003/1175 (15 December 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detailed the DDRR programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2003/875 (11 September 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detailed the establishment of UNMIL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Letter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/2006/71 (2 February 2006) contained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Secretary-General’s request for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>troop-sharing between UNMIL and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historical Background
6 February 2006 The Council authorised the deployment of UNMIL troops in Côte d’Ivoire.

16 January 2006 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as Liberia’s new president.

October 2005 Presidential and legislative elections were held; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and George Weah qualified for a second presidential ballot.

September 2005 The Council increased UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

March 2004 The Council imposed sanctions on Charles Taylor and his associates.

December 2003 The Council imposed the current sanctions regime. UNMIL announced the launching of a countrywide DDRR programme.

October 2003 The National Transitional Government of Liberia was inaugurated.

September 2003 UNMIL was established.

August 2003 ECOWAS and US troops arrived, Taylor fled to Nigeria and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed.

Other Relevant Facts

<p>| Special Representative of the Secretary- |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alan Doss (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Size and Composition of Mission
• Total authorised strength: up to 15,250 military personnel and 1,115 police
• Strength as of 31 December 2005: 15,021 military personnel and 1,091 police
• Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria

Cost
1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $760.57 million

Duration
September 2003 to present.

Useful Additional Sources
from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-2004”.

Liberia: Staying Focused, International Crisis Group Africa Briefing, no. 36 (13 January 2006)


Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to review and extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) after it receives the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his March regular report. The report of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has yet to be presented to the Council.

Key Facts
On 15 February, the Council endorsed the Afghanistan Compact. The document, adopted at a donors’ conference in London on 1 February, outlines reconstruction benchmarks in the post-transitional period. International partners—especially the US, the UK, Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank—pledged approximately US$10.5 billion over the next five years.

The document further mandates that the UN, together with the Afghan government, will co-chair the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, designed to “ensure the overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact.” The Board’s secretariat will be staffed by the UN. Accordingly, the Secretary-General will recommend a future role for UNAMA to the Council.

UNAMA is currently mandated with:

- fulfilling the tasks conferred to the UN by the 2001 Bonn Agreement, particularly monitoring and assisting its implementation and assisting the elections;
- promoting national reconciliation; and
- managing all UN humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in coordination with the Afghan government.

Key Issues
The main issue facing the Council is the renewal of UNAMA with a new mandate that reflects the new tasks under the Afghanistan Compact. The Council has traditionally refrained from deep involvement in the security situation in Afghanistan. However, with the increasing role given to the UN under the Compact and the recent surge in attacks by Al-Qaida and Taliban-associated insurgents, the possibility of the Council paying closer attention to the security situation may become an issue.

Council Dynamics
The main thrust of the Council’s work on Afghanistan has been to focus on the UN’s role in managing reconstruction through UNAMA. There is consensus that the mission should be renewed with a mandate that includes the coordinating role envisaged in the Compact.

Options
In addition to renewing and adjusting UNAMA’s mandate to reflect the Compact’s tasks, other options may be:

- including additional provisions in the resolution on security aspects; and
- requesting more detailed and timely reporting on the security situation and the operations of ISAF.

Underlying Problems
The NATO-led ISAF and US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have had some notable successes. OEF was able to quickly sweep out the Taliban and disrupt Al-Qaida networks in 2001, but remnants still linger. Additionally, OEF established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2002 to assist reconstruction efforts, provide security and train the army and police. The teams were the main thrust of ISAF’s move from Kabul to the north in October 2003. ISAF and OEF now operate 23 such teams in the Afghan countryside.

ISAF will progressively take over peacekeeping and reconstruction from OEF by expanding southwards, thus paving the way for a drawdown in US forces.

However, the increase in violence from the Taliban and Al-Qaida indicates that the situation in the country is far from secure, particularly along the border with Pakistan. There has been increased use of suicide attacks and explosives, with financing particularly provided by the drug trade. Upsurges of violence associated with the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and between Sunnis and Shias have also further unsettled the security situation.

OEF’s initial goals of eliminating Al-Qaida in Afghanistan have thus far not been completely accomplished, and top Al-Qaida commanders, including Usama bin Laden,

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1617 (29 July 2005) strengthened sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1510 (13 October 2003) expanded ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1390 (28 January 2002) strengthened sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001) authorised ISAF to provide security in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

| S/2005/525 (12 August 2005) was the latest report. |

Latest Presidential Statement

remain on the loose. This, along with the readiness of the Afghan National Army, may influence withdrawal timetable for US troops.

Against this backdrop, some ISAF contributors have shown reluctance to engage their national contingents in efforts that go beyond reconstruction as their forces expand into the dangerous south. This led to recent delays in deployment and uncertainty surrounding troop contributions. Other countries, in particular the UK, the Netherlands and Canada, have shown more willingness to send troops to the south. Later this year, the UK is expected to take over ISAF’s command and send an additional 3,300 troops to Afghanistan.

For historical background please refer to the February 2006 Forecast Report.

Useful Additional Sources
London Conference website: www.afghanistanconference.gov.uk
UNAMA website: http://www.unama-afg.org/
ISAF website: http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm
Global Security: www.globalsecurity.org

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In early March the Council will review the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in light of a briefing from the Secretariat.

The future of an infantry company from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to Côte d’Ivoire, deployed in February, will also arise and these discussions may lead to a review of the tasks and the troop level of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) later in the month. A new resolution is possible.

Recent Developments
On 15 January the International Working Group on Côte d’Ivoire (IWG), the AU/UN mediating body, concluded that the Ivorian parliament, whose mandate had expired mid-December, should be dissolved as part of the transition to new elections. The ruling party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), accused the IWG and the UN of a “constitutional coup”.

A wave of violent protest against the UN followed, led by the Young Patriots (Jeunes patriotes) militia close to President Laurent Gbagbo. On 17 January, Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned what he called “orchestrated violence” against the UN. On 10 February, the UN sent Gbagbo a US$3.6 million bill for UN property and equipment damaged or lost during the January riots.

In January the Council condemned violence and attacks against the UN. It also dismissed the FPI objections and expressed support for the IWG decisions, ignoring representations from the Gbagbo government.

The mandate of UNOCI was extended until 15 December 2006. But no agreement was reached on increasing the troop level as recommended by the Secretary-General. The Council postponed discussions about possible reinforcement of UNOCI to coincide with those on the future of UNMIL, whose mandate expires on 31 March. Meanwhile, the Council authorised the redeployment of one infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI, until 31 March.

Also in response to the violence, the Council implemented individual sanctions against two followers of President Gbagbo and one commander of the rebel New Forces (Forces nouvelles).

Key Issues
UNOCI’s troop levels will be the focus of March consultations. Resistance to a further increase will continue and the issue of security in Liberia will also be raised as a reason for caution about shifting troops and police units to Côte d’Ivoire.

Council Dynamics
With Ghana and Congo as new non-permanent members of the Council, dynamics on Côte d’Ivoire will certainly change. As a regional neighbour, Ghana has close connections with Côte d’Ivoire and has played a role in the peace process. Congo, which now holds the AU chairmanship, may want to take a more proactive role. All three African members are likely to be cautious about undermining hard-won security in Liberia by moving contingents too soon.

The majority of Council members are inclined to accept the Secretary-General’s recommendations to reinforce UNOCI by four battalions.
and three police units. But some members, especially the US (and perhaps Japan), may remain reluctant. France, however, seems determined to seek an additional deployment from UNMIL, if, at a minimum, a battalion and a police unit. France is contributing some 4,000 troops in its national capacity authorised under Council resolutions to support UNOCI and is keen that the international community as a whole should bear more of the load.

Options
Other options may include:
- restoring the infantry company to UNMIL;
- authorising the presence of the infantry company lent to UNOCI for a longer period;
- authorising additional redeployments from Liberia; or
- increasing the UNOCI troop ceiling temporarily to cover the period ahead of elections scheduled for October 2006.

Underlying Problems
UNOCI’s lack of capacity to contain the January riots has been deplored by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission Pierre Schori.

The humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire has deteriorated dramatically, especially since the withdrawal of peacekeepers and destruction of humanitarian support services during the January riots.

Human rights violations have continued. It still remains to be seen whether the Council will publish and address the mission report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, on his visit to Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, the failure to consider and make public the 2004 report of a Council-mandated international commission of inquiry on serious violations of human rights has led to questions being raised on the ground, especially by members of civil society, about the value of UN investigations and the UN’s commitment to transparency.

Recent anonymous letters with threats of attacks on villages in the Zone of Confidence (dividing the government-controlled south and the rebel-held north) have been circulating in various parts of the country; the UN has been investigating.

With Congo now the new Chairman of the AU, the Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso will become part of the mediation though the Nigerian and South African presidents will most probably stay on to ensure continuity.

### Most Recent UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1657 (6 February 2006) authorised the deployment of an infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI until 31 March 2006.
- S/RES/1652 (24 January 2006) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 15 December 2006 and expressed the intention to review troop levels in March 2006.

#### Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/9 (23 February 2006) reiterated full support for the IWG and the Prime Minister, urged the Ivorian state to facilitate the return of humanitarian agencies in the west and expressed the intention to review the implementation of resolution 1633 in March.
- S/PRST/2006/2 (19 January 2006) strongly condemned the attacks against UNOCI.

#### Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2006/2 (3 January 2006)

#### Letters to the President of the Council
- S/2006/79 (7 February 2006) third IWG Communiqué
- S/2006/71 (2 February 2006) letter from the Secretary-General noting his intention to temporarily redeploy up to one mechanised battalion and one police unit from UNMIL to UNOCI for an initial period of three months
- S/2006/55 (30 January 2006) annual report of the 1572 sanctions committee
- S/2006/50 (26 January 2006) final communiqué of a meeting between Obasanjo and the Ivorian authorities
- S/2006/43 (23 January 2006) letter from Côte d’Ivoire on various misunderstandings on the implementation of resolution 1633
- S/2006/21 (16 January 2006) letter from Côte d’Ivoire including the list of members of the new government

### Other Relevant Facts

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
  - Pierre Schori (Sweden)

- **High Representative for the Elections**
  - António Monteiro (Portugal)

- **Size and Composition of Mission**
  - Authorised Strength (24 June 2005 - 24 January 2006): 7,090 military personnel and 725 police officers
  - Current Strength as of 31 January 2006: 7,594 total uniformed personnel
  - Key Troop Contributing Countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

- **Cost**

For historical background please refer to the January 2006 Forecast Report.

### Haiti

#### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to hold an open debate in March on the situation in Haiti and the future role for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). A presidential statement welcoming the results of the second round of parliamentary elections, to be held on 19 March, is also likely.

#### Recent Developments

After several postponements, on 7 February Haiti held its general elections. René Préval, former President and ally of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, emerged as the winner of the presidential elections following a week of confusion. The initial results of the elections, while showing a decisive lead by Préval (48.7 percent of the votes), suggested that a second round would still be required. The discovery of ballots in a garbage dump and a large number of cast blank ballots provoked anger by Préval’s supporters and accusations of electoral fraud. Increasing pressure from the street led the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to review the initial results. Eventually it was decided that the law permitted the CEP to modify the method of counting votes, especially the effect of the
The Security Council issued a presidential statement commending the Haitian people on the holding of elections, followed by a press statement congratulating Préval for his victory.

On 14 February, the Council also passed a resolution renewing the MINUSTAH mandate for six months (with the intention to renew it for further periods) and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council as soon as possible after the completion of the Haitian electoral process on ways to restructure MINUSTAH’s mandate in order to cope with longer-term challenges.

At the end of March, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Juan Gabriel Valdés is due to leave his post; he should be replaced in April. A new Principal Deputy, Larry Rossin of the US, was appointed on 20 February.

**Key Issues**

The main issue in March will be the post-electoral UN role in Haiti, and more specifically how MINUSTAH could contribute to reinforcing democracy, ensuring security and promoting development. However, the UN will also have to take into account the future government’s requests in this regard. It seems likely to be at least April before this decision can be taken in the Council. However, the proposed open meeting in March will provide an open and transparent basis for beginning this process.

**Council Dynamics**

There is a general consensus on the necessity to define a post-electoral strategy for MINUSTAH. The Council seems to agree that the successful holding of elections does not constitute an end in itself. However, it also seems that members of the Group of Friends hold different views on what the priorities are, for instance, whether the UN should first work on promoting development or security.

**Options**

In March, the Council could, in addition to the open meeting envisaged:
- start informal discussions on a draft mandate for the future UN role in Haiti;
- adopt a presidential statement before the second round of elections to encourage a smooth process if problems start to emerge; and/or
- adopt a presidential statement after the results of the elections are received in order to congratulate the Haitians on the completion of the electoral process.

**Underlying Problems**

The stakes are still high for the second round of parliamentary elections. It is realistic to assume that Préval’s supporters will be reluctant to accept a defeat in the Parliament since its composition will influence the choice of the Prime Minister. Therefore, there is still a risk of renewed tensions.

Recent signals from former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide hinting at his possible return to Haiti after two years of exile in South Africa have given rise to fears of renewed unrest since there is strong opposition to his return. However, René Préval has already indicated that he would not oppose it.

Long-term challenges to stability in Haiti remain, such as:
- reforming the Haitian National Police as well as the judicial system;
- promoting national reconciliation and inclusiveness;
- fostering economic and social development and respect for human rights; and
- implementing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

For historical background please refer to the December 2005 and February 2006 Forecast Reports.

**Small Arms**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s report on small arms in an open debate and it is expected to adopt a resolution or a presidential statement addressing the problem. An Arria formula meeting is also planned.

**Key Facts**

The Council, recognising the direct impact that small arms have on the maintenance of peace, has since 1999 addressed small arms as one of the thematic issues that regularly appear on its agenda. (An in-depth analysis of Council’s role on this issue is available on our website: www.securitycouncilreport.org). The Council has primarily focused its attention on four areas:
- the implementation of the UN 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA);
- Council-mandated sanctions and arms embargoes;
- conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants (DDR); and
- confidence-building measures.

In 2006, small arms will receive a great deal of attention from member states. In January at a General Assembly preparatory meeting there...
was wide support for doing more to stem the trade of illicit weapons at the upcoming UN Review Conference of the PoA in July. However, there was difficulty in agreeing to an agenda for the July Conference. Calls for more effective methods to reduce availability of arms have become increasingly vocal. For example, Dennis McNamara, Special Advisor to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, has repeatedly called on states to implement a voluntary cessation of small arms sales to Africa for the next four years, and urged more state responsibility, especially for those states involved in arms sales.

Key Issues
While the problem of small arms proliferation continues to be serious, and the Council has engaged the issue energetically, Council actions have yielded mixed results. One area of concern is the uneven effectiveness of the implementation of arms embargoes, a mechanism increasingly popular with the Council to reduce the supply of arms in areas of conflict. Recent reports on arms embargoes indicate that enforcement is patchy and sometimes non-existent.

Another area of concern for the Council is the DDR component of peacekeeping missions. DDR programmes have had varying levels of success, and the financing of the programmes frequently lag behind requirements.

Council Dynamics
While the members of the Council have been generally supportive of actions to tackle the proliferation of small arms across the globe, differences exist among member states as to the degree of support and to the robustness of actions considered appropriate. Some states, notably EU members (the UK, Greece, France, Denmark and Slovakia), have pressed for more accountability, and for legally binding instruments. Others, such as the US, favour non-binding instruments like the PoA.

Three of the top exporting countries—the US, Russia and China—are the source of a significant portion of the small arms and light weaponry. Thus addressing this issue at the Council level has been a sensitive matter. Arms-exporting countries have preferred to make the distinction between legal and illegal trade in arms, and press for greater control of illicit arms. However, most Council members tend to support the view that the highly portable nature of small arms, porous borders and cross-border arms trafficking make these distinctions largely immaterial, especially in conflicts on the Council’s agenda.

During its tenure on the Council in 2005-06, Argentina has been particularly active on this issue, having taken the lead in drafting the 2005 presidential statement and preparing to hold an open debate during its presidency in March 2006.

Options
One option is that the Council will adopt for the first time a resolution on the issue. This could:
- reaffirm earlier commitments and recommendations contained in the five presidential statements to date and express general support for the PoA;
- include provisions urging states to exercise responsibility in arms trade and in enforcing embargoes; and
- request regular periodic reporting on the matter from the Secretary-General.

Another option is that the Council will adopt a presidential statement on the above issues.

A further option would be for the Council to support the strengthening of measures to identify and trace small arms. However, given the dynamics described above, this would be difficult to negotiate.

Underlying Problems
More than 640 million small arms and light weapons are in circulation worldwide, and this is recognised as a significant threat to international peace and security. Small arms and light weapons have been sufficient to destabilise states and entire regions, increase the lethality and longevity of conflicts, obstruct relief programmes, undermine peace initia-
tives, exacerbate human rights abuses and hamper development.

Among all the tools of war, small arms are the most widespread, easily available and most difficult to control. As most countries affected by small arms violence are not arms producers themselves, attention has been focused on the supply of and trade in small arms. At the UN, concern has focused primarily on illegal arms sales, but the illicit trade is connected to the legal trade in small arms. The lack of transparency in even legitimate trade presents a significant challenge for the control of the trade.

Historical Background

11-15 July 2005 UN Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA

July 2003 UN Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA

August 2001 The Council held its first open debate on Small Arms.

July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held and states adopted the PoA.

Useful Additional Sources


Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action

In March the Council will receive the quarterly report by the Secretary-General on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).

The Council paid sustained attention to UNOGBIS during 2005 as a result of the passage of resolution 1580 in December 2004, which required quarterly reports and led to several briefings on and discussions of the situation. In December, the Council downgraded its involvement reflecting the improved situation, in particular the completion of the presidential election. Nevertheless, the Council will want to live up to its stated intention to “follow closely all developments”.

Key Facts

Guinea-Bissau has experienced frequent bouts of political violence since it won independence from Portugal in 1974.

After parliamentary elections in March 2004, violence flared up in October 2004, when a military mutiny resulted in the assassinations of two senior military officials. In July 2005, the country held a presidential election. João Bernardo Vieira won the election, defeating former president Malam Bacai Sanhá in a run-off.

Though the government transition was peaceful, the political situation has remained polarised. Sanhá rejected the results of the election, delaying the inauguration to 1 October. On 28 October Vieira dismissed the government of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the party of Sanhá and Gomes and also the country’s largest party, has challenged the constitutionality of Vieira’s move. In January, the Court ruled in Vieira’s favour; the opposition criticised the ruling.

The UN’s peacebuilding effort in Guinea-Bissau, through UNOGBIS, has been in place since April 1999. In a 21 November 2005 letter to the Secretary-General, President Vieira requested that the UN extend the mandate until 31 December 2006 stressing that UNOGBIS had a decisive role to play in the consolidation of lasting peace and stability.

Council Dynamics

Largely due to its ties to Guinea-Bissau through the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and its concern about the ongoing instability, Brazil played a leadership role in the Council in 2004 in seeking to upgrade the level of Council’s engagement with that situation. In December 2004 the Council was persuaded to take the unusual step of bringing UNOGBIS under a Council mandate. However, a number of Council members were unhappy with this outcome. Furthermore, even though the mandate of UNOGBIS came nominally from the Council, its funding was never shifted to the peacekeeping budget and all along has been provided instead from the special political missions’ part of the regular budget.

Although the situation has improved somewhat following the presidential election, there is still significant tension. African members of the Council, which have been eager to keep the issue on the Council’s agenda, have requested that the Secretariat continue to submit the quarterly reports. They are likely to ensure that it is on the Programme of Work for March.

Options

Should the situation in Guinea-Bissau deteriorate, the Council would be likely to come under pressure to reassert its role.

Council members may wish to urge the Secretary-General to upgrade the rank of his representative on the ground to Special Representative emphasising the need for synergies and complementarities with UN agencies, in particular UNDP, as well as with the African Union, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries.

Underlying Problems

The economic situation in Guinea-Bissau has been precarious, with the government having difficulty in paying salaries to government workers, schools being closed for months at a time and rising crime levels.
Historical Background

26 January 2005 The Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favour of President João Bernardo Vieira’s dismissal of the government of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior.

14 December 2005 The Council president announced the renewal of the UNOGBIS mandate up to the end of 2006.

21 November 2005 In a letter to the Secretary-General, President Vieira requested the extension of the mandate of UNOGBIS.

28 October 2005 Vieira dismissed the prime minister and the cabinet.

1 October 2005 Vieira was sworn in as president for a second time.

24 July 2005 Vieira won the presidential election run-off.

22 December 2004 The Security Council passed resolution 1580, extending the mandate of UNOGBIS to 22 December 2005.

6 October 2004 A military mutiny resulted in the assassinations of the Armed Forces’ chief of the general staff and its spokesman.

March 2004 The ruling party, PAIGC, won the legislative elections.

28 September 2003 The military and political parties signed the Transitional Charter, creating a transitional prime minister, president and council. Interim President Henrique Rosa and Interim Prime Minister António Artur Sanhá were sworn in.

14 September 2003 The military ousted President Kumba Ialá in a coup.

November 2002 Ialá dissolved the National Assembly.

November 2000 General Ansumane Mané was killed during a shootout with government forces, who claimed that he was attempting a coup.

17 February 2000 Ialá was sworn in as president.

January 2000 Ialá won the presidential election.

14 May 1999 Malam Bacai Sanhá became interim president.

6-7 May 1999 General Mané led a coup that ousted President Vieira.

6 April 1999 The Council passed resolution 1233, supporting the Secretary-General’s proposal to establish UNOGBIS.

3 April 1999 The Secretary-General proposed the establishment of UNOGBIS.

24 February 1999 The Government of National Unity, which included both government officials and military leaders, assumed power.

21 December 1998 The Council passed resolution 1216, requesting that the Secretary-General make recommendations on a possible UN role in Guinea-Bissau’s peace process.

1 November 1998 Government officials and the military junta signed a peace agreement in Abuja.

7 June 1998 Violence broke out after Vieira dismissed General Mané.

1994 Vieira won the first free presidential election in the country’s history.

1980 Vieira led a military coup that ousted Luís Cabral, the country’s first president.

10 September 1974 Guinea-Bissau won independence from Portugal. Cabral assumed the presidency as the leader of the PAIGC.

1973 The PAIGC declared independence.

1963 The PAIGC launched a war to gain independence from Portugal.

Other Relevant Facts

| Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, Head of UNOGBIS |
| João Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique) |

| Size of UNOGBIS Staff |
| 27, including 11 international civilians, two military advisers, one police adviser and 13 local civilians |

| Cost |
| $3.359 million (estimated) |

| Duration |
| 6 April 1999 to present |
Sanctions Committees

Under the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, in rule 28, the Council can “appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.”

Over the last sixty years, the Council has utilised this power to establish a very wide range of subsidiary bodies, including: committees, working groups, commissions, missions and international tribunals.

The most common form of subsidiary body is the sanctions committee. A later report will provide a comprehensive guide to all the subsidiary bodies. But because of the importance of the tasks and the wide uncertainty about the roles and functions of the different sanctions committees, we have developed a chart (pages 22-23) to provide readers with an easy reference guide.

There are currently eight sanctions committees focusing on specific conflict and post-conflict situations, as well as well an additional two: the 1267 (the so-called Al-Qaida/Taliban) and 1636 (Syria) Sanctions Committees.

All sanctions committees have the following structure.

- Their composition always includes representatives of all 15 members of the Council.
- The Council appoints as chair one of the permanent representatives selected from among the membership on the Council.
- Each sanctions committee is supported by the Sanctions Branch of the Department of Political Affairs in the UN Secretariat.
- Committees are also often supported by monitoring teams, groups of experts and/or panels of experts appointed by the Secretary-General.

In recent years, “comprehensive” economic sanctions have disappeared. The sanctions measures most commonly imposed by the Council now are targeted sanctions such as: arms embargos, asset freezes, travel bans, and trade restrictions on certain strategic commodities such as diamonds and timber from areas of conflict.

All sanctions measures are imposed under the Chapter VII powers of the Council, which make it mandatory for all states to implement the measures. In practice this means the adoption in domestic law of either legislation or subordinate regulatory measures imposing criminal sanctions on persons or enterprises that do not comply with the Council sanctions. It also usually means additional administrative action on the part of border officials, customs administrations, financial and banking regulators, and aviation security and immigration officers.

The Council traditionally empowers the committees to monitor the sanctions measures and compliance by states and individuals. They are sometimes delegated the power to make the sanctions regime effective in practice by taking the critical decision to designate, or name, the specific individuals or entities to which the targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, should apply. In addition, the Council at times also delegates to the committees the power to determine exemptions from the sanctions regime of particular individuals or commodities for humanitarian reasons.

In recent years, there have been several international initiatives that have addressed the issue of sanctions. The Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes helped the Council to develop draft models for targeted sanctions, and the Stockholm process helped it to develop modalities for effective implementation of targeted sanctions.

In an effort to improve its capacity to monitor implementation of targeted sanctions, the Council now employs the services of groups or panels of experts, appointed by the Secretary-General from a pool of experts proposed by member states. The experts tend to be specialists in customs, border control, arms, finance, civil aviation and, as appropriate, counter-terrorism and commodities like diamonds and timber. They operate by visiting the country to which the sanctions apply and neighbouring countries; by examining related customs and shipping documents as well as government records related to business ownership, bank accounts, travel manifests and financial sector communications; and by interviewing government officials and other relevant persons.

Each group or panel of experts generally operates as an investigative arm of the sanctions committee and provides reports and advice to the committee in carrying out its monitoring functions. The mandate of each group of experts is specifically provided in the resolution establishing it. Each group of experts is appointed for a limited period, not necessarily overlapping with the duration of the sanctions measures. The resolution also sets out the reporting requirements of the group of experts, including the channel for reporting, which is usually to the Council through the committee. Upon receipt of each group of experts’ report, the relevant committee considers its findings and recommendations, and then transmits the report to the Council. In most cases, the report then becomes public, although the Council has the authority to hold the report for further discussions or, in theory, a member or members may object to the publication of the report.

In certain situations, the Council adopts sanctions measures, but with a delay in the effective date. For example, in resolution 1343 of 7 March 2001, the Council made certain demands on the Government of Liberia. It also imposed a ban on the export of diamonds from Liberia as well as a travel ban on senior members of the Liberian government. At the same time, the Council decided that the measures would take effect two months later unless the Government of Liberia had complied with the demands outlined in the resolution. This usually happens when the Council wishes to allow more time for diplomatic and political efforts to bring about a change in the behaviour of the potential target before the sanctions take effect and may involve a delay in establishing a sanction committee.

Once established, each committee determines the procedures under which it will conduct its business. While there are no uniform rules of procedures for all the committees, there are ongoing efforts to streamline them. The following sanctions committees have posted their guidelines electronically:

- Sierra Leone http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/SierraLeone/SL_GUIDE.pdf

The guidelines for the DRC, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan Committees are not posted on their websites.

All sanctions committees take decisions by consensus. Unlike in the Council itself, all 15 members have vetoes. Frequently they employ a decision-making practice called the “no objection procedure”, under which the chair circulates proposed decisions, e.g. a humanitarian exemption application, with the proposal that unless objections are received within a defined number of days the application will be approved. This decision-making process is also used when designating individuals and entities to the list for the application of the targeted sanctions. Except in cases where a group of experts may identify sanctions violators, names are submitted to a sanction committee for possible placement on the designated list by member states.

We will be updating the following chart periodically on our website and will supplement it with more detailed information regarding each of the sanctions regimes.
## Chart of Sanctions Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions Committees</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Sanctions Measures</th>
<th>Target(s) / Designated List</th>
<th>Monitoring Mechanism</th>
<th>Next Report Due</th>
<th>Sanctions Expire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaida and Taliban</td>
<td>S/RES/1267</td>
<td>assets freeze;</td>
<td>Usama bin Laden, the Taliban</td>
<td>Analytical Support</td>
<td>by 31 July 2006</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15 Oct 1999)</td>
<td>travel ban; arms</td>
<td>and associated individuals</td>
<td>and Sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1333</td>
<td>embargo</td>
<td>and entities, designated</td>
<td>Monitoring Team –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19 Dec 2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>by the Committee on the</td>
<td>8 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1390</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidated List.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16 Jan 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td>As of 20 December 2005,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1455</td>
<td></td>
<td>there were 350 individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17 Jan 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>and 123 entities on the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1526</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidated List.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30 Jan 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1617</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29 Jul 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>S/RES/1572</td>
<td>arms embargo;</td>
<td>designated individuals,</td>
<td>Group of Experts –</td>
<td>within 90</td>
<td>6 Feb 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15 Nov 2004)</td>
<td>assets freeze;</td>
<td>including persons</td>
<td>no more than 5</td>
<td>days of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1584</td>
<td>travel ban;</td>
<td>impeding the peace</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td>date of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 Feb 2005)</td>
<td>export of rough</td>
<td>process, committing</td>
<td>diamonds</td>
<td>appointment;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1643</td>
<td>diamonds</td>
<td>violations of human</td>
<td>customs</td>
<td>regularly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15 Dec 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>rights, violating the</td>
<td>civil aviation</td>
<td>update the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>arms embargo, inciting</td>
<td></td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>public violence, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>obstructing the activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of UNOCI. There are three</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>individuals on the list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>as of February 2006.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic</td>
<td>S/RES/1493</td>
<td>arms embargo;</td>
<td>Arms Embargo: any recipient</td>
<td>Group of Experts –</td>
<td>update the</td>
<td>31 July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Congo</td>
<td>(28 Jul 2003)</td>
<td>targeted travel</td>
<td>in the DRC territory;</td>
<td>5 members</td>
<td>Committee by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1533</td>
<td>and financial</td>
<td>excludes DRC army and</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 April 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12 Mar 2004)</td>
<td>measures</td>
<td>police under certain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1596</td>
<td></td>
<td>conditions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18 Apr 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29 Jul 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21 Dec 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31 Jan 2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>S/RES/661</td>
<td>arms embargo;</td>
<td>Arms Embargo: Iraqi</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6 Aug 1990)</td>
<td>assets freeze</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1483</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assets Freeze: designated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22 May 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>individuals and entities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1518</td>
<td></td>
<td>associated with the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24 Nov 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>former regime of Saddam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hussein. As of 27 July 2005, there were 89 individuals, and as of 2 June 2004, there were 206 entities listed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22 Dec 2003)</td>
<td>export of rough</td>
<td>in Liberian territory</td>
<td>no more than 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1532</td>
<td>diamonds</td>
<td>Travel Ban: peace spoilers,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and timber)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12 Mar 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>violators of the embryo,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(arms embargo,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1647</td>
<td>round logs and</td>
<td>as designated by the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>travel ban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20 Dec 2005)</td>
<td>timbers; travel</td>
<td>Committee; as of 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ban and assets</td>
<td>November 2005, there are 59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>freeze</td>
<td>individuals and one entity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>listed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Monitoring Mechanism**

- **Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team –** 8 members
- **Group of Experts –** no more than 5
- **Panel of Experts –** no more than 5

**Expertise**

- counter-terrorism and related legislation; financing of terrorism and international financial transactions, including technical banking expertise; alternative remittance systems, charities, and use of couriers; border enforcement, including port security; arms embargoes and export controls; drug trafficking
- arms embargo; diamonds; customs; civil aviation
- arms embargo; diamonds; customs; finance
- arms embargo; diamonds; finance
- arms embargo; diamonds; finance; humanitarian and socio-economic issues

**Expires**

- 17 months from 29 July 2005
- six months from date of appointment (announcement expected in late February or early March)
- 31 July 2006
- 21 June 2006
- 7 June 2006
- open-ended, subject to review by 29 December 2006
- open-ended
- no more than 5 days of the date of appointment; regularly update the Committee
- vary
- 31 July 2006
- 6 Feb 2007
- 19 June 2006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sanctions Committees</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Sanctions Measures</th>
<th>Target(s) / Designated List</th>
<th>Monitoring Mechanism</th>
<th>Next Report Due</th>
<th>Sanctions Expire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>S/RES/918</td>
<td>S/RES/1011</td>
<td>arms embargo</td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo:</strong> non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states if the arms are to be used in Rwanda; restrictions on arms transfers by the government of Rwanda</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sierra Leone | S/RES/1132        | S/RES/1171  | arms embargo; travel ban | **Arms Embargo:** non-governmental forces, restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone  
**Travel Ban:** Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee | None                 | N/A            | open-ended       |
| Somalia    | S/RES/751            | S/RES/1519  | arms embargo       | Any recipient in Somali territory                                                              | Monitoring Group – 4 members | no later than 15 days before end of mandate of the Monitoring Group | open-ended       |
| Sudan      | S/RES/1591           | S/RES/155   | arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze | **Arms Embargo:** all parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals  
**Assets Freeze and Travel Ban:** as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. A list of targeted individuals is under discussion as of this writing.  
**Aviation Restrictions:** ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region. | Panel of Experts – 4 members | no later than 30 days prior to expiration of mandate, report to Council through the Committee | open-ended; to be reviewed by 29 March 2006 or earlier if the parties have complied |
| Syria      | S/RES/1636           | S/RES/1636  | travel ban; assets freeze | **Assets Freeze and Travel Ban:** individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by the UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing) | None                 | N/A            | open-ended       |

**Monitoring Mechanism:**
- **Expertise**
- **Expires**

**Next Report Due:**
- N/A

**Sanctions Expire:**
- open-ended
Iraq

Expected Council Action
In March the quarterly report of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is due. Also the US is expected to report to the Council on the activities of the multinational force.

The Council will be following developments in Iraq as the process of forming a new government proceeds. A statement in that context is likely as soon as the new government is in place.

The quarterly report of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is also due. The Council recognised in resolution 1483 that it was necessary to review the UNMOVIC mandate. However, it is not expected that the Council will take up that matter in March.

Recent Developments
Please see our February 2006 Forecast Report for a detailed review of the UN role in Iraq in recent years.

On 10 February the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq certified the results of the 15 December 2005 parliamentary elections. This was welcomed by the Security Council in a presidential statement on 14 February.

The Shia conservative United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) was confirmed as the winner, although it failed to gain an absolute majority. Sunnis obtained 58 of the 275 seats in parliament.

After weeks of heated debate, the incumbent Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari was reappointed by the new parliament. He now has to form his government, which will be a difficult task given the divisions within the UIA and tensions with the Sunnis and the Kurds. The government might not be completed before the end of March.

The Security Council, welcoming the results of the elections, stressed the importance of inclusiveness and called for the UN to play the fullest possible role in Iraq.

Key Issues
The Council is unlikely to be taking up any key issues in March. Resolution 1546 set a very broad mandate and an unspecified timeframe for UNAMI. Accordingly, there is unlikely to be pressure for any action.

A statement welcoming the formation of a new Iraqi government is almost certain, but is unlikely to become an issue.

However, once the government is established, the timing and the scope of the scheduled constitutional review process could quickly become a major issue. Although it is more likely to emerge as an issue in April, it is possible that the US and the UK may wish to press the Council to take a position.

A related issue for the Council is likely to be the nature of future UN involvement in Iraq. Clearly the wishes of the new Iraqi government will play a major role in consideration of this issue, as will the Secretariat’s concerns about security.

The question of UNMOVIC remains unsettled but currently there are no proposals on the table.

Council Dynamics
There is little debate within the Council and given the pressure of other business in March, Council members will be pleased not to have to focus on issues and options for Iraq.

Most Recent UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1637 (8 November 2005) extended the multinational force’s mandate, the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board until 31 December 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2006/8 (14 February 2006) welcomed the results of the elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretary-General’s Report on UNAMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/766 (7 December 2005) was the most recent periodic report.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/2006/93 and S/2006/94 (10 February 2006) on UNMOVIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>