
Our previous reports and updates issued during the months of November and December are available on our website, www.securitycouncilreport.org. This issue previews the month of January 2006. The United Republic of Tanzania, represented by Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, will have the Presidency.

Notable Dates in January

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Overview for January

Key issues to watch in January will be:

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Amazingly, Eritrea has managed in a few short weeks to squander the high moral ground it enjoyed as a result of the Boundary Commission ruling in its favor, by taking out its legitimate frustration over delays in implementation of the ruling against the UN peacekeeping operation on the border, UNMEE. (See our December Forecast for details)

Eritrea’s increasingly bellicose statements and actions against the UN, its failure so far to comply with resolution 1640 (2005) and its refusal to even talk to envoys, have proved counter-productive.

By contrast, Ethiopia has complied with Council demands to redeploy its troops.

The re-imposition of sanctions against Eritrea, once the 3 January deadline set by the Council in resolution 1640 has passed, is now likely.
Eritrea’s position is significantly further weakened by the decision released on 19 December 2005 by the Claims Commission set up under the 2000 Algiers Agreement, to arbitrate compensation claims in respect of the 1998 hostilities. The Commission has ruled that Eritrea had no lawful justification in terms of self defence for attacking Ethiopia and as a result must pay compensation to Ethiopia for the losses it incurred in the war. The extent of the compensation remains to be determined by the Commission as does the compensation which is payable by Ethiopia to Eritrea for breaches of international humanitarian law by Ethiopian forces on which the Commission also ruled.

At time of publication the Council was considering drastic revisions to the UNMEE mandate and deployment. Both the UN troop contributors and the Council are angry at Eritrea’s attempt to dictate which countries’ personnel may serve in UNMEE and are determined not to allow such a precedent to be set. Despite the Council’s very strong response in S/PRST/2005/62, Eritrea has remained obdurate, even refusing to meet with UN Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. However, withdrawal of the force altogether is most unlikely. Council members are apprehensive that this course could be enough to release the hair trigger currently restraining the parties from open war.

The net result is likely to be a withdrawal of UNMEE from current positions, which actually benefit Eritrea, to positions inside Ethiopia. The force will then serve as a preventative trip wire, essentially a benefit to Ethiopia.

In the short term, in light of recent events, Eritrea now runs the risk of being branded the aggressor should any hostilities occur. Looking to the long term, however, the Council is likely to want to try to keep doors open in Asmara for the Secretary-General at least. And it will not want Ethiopia to profit from its failure to comply with international legal obligations. Some reflection of these points is likely to be part of the mix as the Council works through this thorny problem in January.

**Great Lakes Initiative**

The regional dimensions of the security issues in the Great Lakes region have long been recognised but there seems to be a new energy and enthusiasm for integrating the Council’s approach.

Tanzania, as Council President in January, is promoting the idea of a Ministerial open Council meeting to develop some new thinking about the approach the Council should take to the DRC situation and related issues of concern to Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda.

In addition, this initiative is aimed at exploring some innovative ideas on how to develop this new interest in a regional approach. The practical implementation of resolutions 1625 (2005) “Conflict prevention in Africa” and 1631 (2005) “Cooperation between the UN and regional organisations” to the specific needs of the Great Lakes region is one possibility under serious examination. New ideas about integrating peacekeeping capacity and standby capacity also seem likely to be discussed.

Cross border situations involving groups like the LRA in northern Uganda and associated humanitarian and protection issues will also be addressed in the open debate. It will be sensitive. Uganda is opposed to a country specific focus. But the regional framework offers a potentially more pragmatic and productive approach to this issue, provided the process is given time, outcomes are well prepared and all concerned approach it with a willingness to compromise and resolve the issues. Various options have been proposed, including by Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland, and by Canada.

Finally, both the DRC and Uganda will be contemplating how to respond to the 19 December 2005 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in a case of regional importance, DRC v. Uganda. In its decision the Court found that Uganda’s military intervention in the DRC in the late 1990s and early 2000s had violated the principle of the non use of force in international relations and that its armed forces had committed serious viola-
Lebanon/Syria
The Council will be watching closely Syrian cooperation levels with the UNIIIC during January, especially in light of the transition to a new Commissioner. But there is no reason at this stage to expect any interim report. Next steps await recommendations from the Secretary-General under resolution 1644 (2005) on three issues relating to the Hariri investigation:
- the appointment of a new Commissioner to replace Detlev Mehlis;
- the options for UNIIIC assistance to Lebanon in respect of investigations of other recent terrorist assassinations in the country; and
- possibilities for international assistance with the trial of suspects.

With respect to assistance to Lebanon, the Council and the UN Secretariat are conscious that a major issue will be to find appropriate models that are genuinely supportive, but do not represent an open ended commitment. The UN is aware that Lebanon is not the only country that could justify claims for such assistance and it is concerned not to appear unbalanced or to become overly intrusive.

Liberia
Inauguration of the newly elected President is scheduled for 16 January. The defeated candidate George Weah has withdrawn threats to disrupt the process. But, given all that has been invested by the UN in Liberian peace and reconciliation, the Council will be ready to react very quickly if the situation deteriorates.

Côte d’Ivoire
Now that a Prime Minister has been appointed, the Council will be watching for real progress on the road map towards elections in 2006 as set out in resolution 1633 (2005). The mandate for UNOCI will be renewed, but the difficult issues for the Council to grapple with during January will be around the size of the force and the humanitarian/human rights context in which it must operate. The report of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, is likely to present some challenges which both the Council and the AU mediators will find uncomfortable. The expected recommendations from the Secretary-General that the force needs to be expanded may be unpopular with some members, particularly the US.

Afghanistan
The international conference in London on Afghanistan in late January, while offstage as far as the Council is concerned, will certainly not be out of mind. The conference will be will be an important prelude to Council consideration of the situation in February/March. And in addition the Council will receive in January the quarterly International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) report.

Timor-Leste
As reported in our December issue, a report of the Secretary-General is still awaited on Justice and Reconciliation. It remains unclear when this will appear.

The January Work Programme will also include a number of issues which are expected to proceed with relatively little controversy, such as:
- Georgia (renewal of UNOMIG mandate)
- Western Sahara (renewal of MINURSO mandate)
- Lebanon/Israel (renewal of UNIFIL mandate)
- Middle East Consultations (The Palestinian elections on 25 January is likely to make the regular monthly briefing of particular significance)

Various Sanctions related issues will arise, including:
- Somalia (report of Monitoring Group)
- DRC (renewal of mandate of Group of Experts)
- Appointment of new Chairs to various Committees
- Possible reviving of the activities of the Council’s Working Group on General Issues Related to Sanctions.

Great Lakes Initiative
Recent Developments
An international conference on the Great Lakes region, initially scheduled for December, has been postponed with no new date set yet. However, the idea is emerging, promoted by Tanzania as Council President for January, of a major focus in the Council in January on the regional dimensions of the Great Lakes situation.

A Council mission visited the Great Lakes region of Africa in early November. Four main themes came out of that visit:
- In Burundi, Council members were some what surprised at the government’s apparent desire to see the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) wound up quickly. But Council members remained concerned at the dangers posed to stability in the country by an early withdrawal. The regional dimension was an important element in this.
- In the DRC, the mission helped to clarify the need for the Council to take a firmer line against armed groups in eastern DRC provinces, particularly the Rwandan Hutu rebels Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Those groups continue to resist disarmament requirements and their presence gives rise to concerns by regional neighbours, and to justifications for violating the DRC arms embargo.
- A sharper appreciation of the regional dimensions of security and stability in the Great Lakes emerged. This includes risks from foreign fighters in the DRC and also the threats posed by the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), elements of which, after several months of activity in the DRC, recently crossed the border back into south Sudan.
- The Council mission seems to have clarified the inter-linkage between effective sanctions enforcement by neighbours, and the need for action within the DRC to redress regional security concerns.
Four main lines of activity consequently emerged in the Council:

- ONUB’s mandate was temporarily rolled over and finally renewed in late December in resolution 1650 (2005). This included a particularly interesting regional characteristic. Provisions were included to permit cooperation and transfer of forces between ONUB and the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC).

- With encouragement from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, Council members adopted resolution 1649 (2005) tightening sanctions against foreign militias in the DRC. The resolution also indicates that MONUC could play a role in forcibly disarming the militias.

- While the ONUB resolution strengthens the ability of the two UN forces in the region (MONUC and ONUB) to cooperate, that idea is also related to a trend of discussion in the Council that the Great Lakes could benefit significantly from a new kind of security partnership between the UN and the AU and the emerging proposal of some form of “regional ready response” capacity. In this regard it is noteworthy that the African Union (AU) has also signalled willingness to send troops to the DRC to help disarm militias.

- Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland briefed the Council on the situation in northern Uganda, among other issues, on 19 December. Mr. Egeland indicated that the LRA constitutes a threat to regional peace and security and recommended that the Council should appoint a panel of experts to examine the activities of and the sources of support for the group.

Parallel to the developments in the Council, in the DRC the constitutional referendum took place on 18 December, as part of the transitional process. The transition will be concluded with elections in June 2006.

Finally, on 19 December 2005, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a ruling in a case of regional importance, DRC v. Uganda. In its decision, the Court found that Uganda, during its intervention in DRC, had violated the principle of the non-use of force in international relations and that its armed forces had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law. Also, it found that the DRC had violated international law by attacking the Ugandan embassy.

**Expected Council Action**

The Council will want to listen to the open Ministerial level debate before finalising specific outcomes. The debate will be preceded by an “Arria style” meeting with NGOs.

Council outcomes are expected to include:

- a general resolution on the Great Lakes, which could cover the implementation at the regional level of resolution 1625 (2005) on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa, and of resolution 1631 (2005) on cooperation with regional organisations; and

- a decision on further harmonising (or regionalising) the mandates and effectiveness of UN peacekeepers in the region, possibly along lines of the approach adopted in resolution 1609 (2005) with respect to Côte d'Ivoire and other operations in West Africa.

The Council will also hear more about the regional implications of the situation in northern Uganda. In this context, Council members may follow up on Under Secretary-General Egeland’s briefing.

**Key Issues**

The perennial issue before the Council is to ensure that the transition process in the DRC is successfully completed and that stability in the Great Lakes region is reached. A related issue is the removal of the threats to regional stability posed by the existence of irregular armed groups, often of foreign origin.

The Council mission and the Tanzanian initiative have encouraged members to think more widely about opportunities for the Council to be more effective by acting in a more regional rather than purely country-specific mode.

The ambitious Council agenda on the Great Lakes in January is a very important development. But it will give rise to additional issues and political sensitivities.

- For the DRC, its constitutional referendum will be over. It may welcome the opportunity to demonstrate in public before the Council that it is meeting benchmarks in the peace process.

- Burundi may welcome the opportunity to showcase its progress, especially to encourage foreign investment. But the challenges posed by the DRC based rebel group Front national de libération (FNL) mean that it also has a strong interest in regional solutions to security issues.

- Rwanda will be enthusiastic about anything that pressures its enemies amongst the armed groups in the DRC, but will be looking for opportunities to expand its influence in the region.

- Both the DRC and Uganda will be contemplating how to respond to the ICJ ruling. The Great Lakes meeting in January has potential for both sides to demonstrate that that phase of regional history is past and that they are now committed to working out the implications of the ruling in a cooperative way. They will be conscious that there will be severe downsides for both if they seek to use the meeting to inflame the situation.

- The regional approach will inevitably also bring into focus the security issues often raised by Uganda concerning cross-border threats. Uganda has in the past made several suggestions for military cooperation and assistance on Congolese soil.

- Inevitably, the regional discussion will extend to the wider dimensions of the humanitarian situation in the north of the region, including the incursions from Sudan by the LRA into the DRC and Uganda. Uganda has argued, in a letter to the Council dated 13 December, that the security problem is essentially resolved and is now a purely internal matter. It criticised countries such as Canada for seeking the inclusion of the northern Uganda issue in the Council’s agenda. Canada, in a letter dated 16 December 2005, argues that the threat to regional peace and security remains real and that the humanitarian threat is grave.

- It seems that this whole set of issues will benefit from an open airing. The regional approach proposed by Tanzania may offer
all concerned a pragmatic and productive solution, provided the debate is well prepared and all concerned approach it with willingness to compromise and resolve these issues. In this regard the elaboration and application of the principles in resolution 1625 will be a helpful framework.

Council Dynamics

There is no division inside the Council on the need to approach the issues in the Great Lakes on a regional basis. There is recognition that this will help to ensure that the transitions in the DRC and Burundi are successfully concluded and to build international support for regional reconstruction and development.

Leadership in Great Lakes matters in the Council has traditionally been taken by France, in view of its commitments to francophone countries. More recently, Tanzania has also displayed willingness to take a key role in Great Lakes issues in the Council, particularly given its role in the Burundian peace process and its proximity to the troubled region.

In this context, action against foreign fighters has also been assisted by the concerted demands from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. They have been pressing even more strongly that foreign fighters in Congolese territory be disarmed.

Options

The Council is showing signs of an important evolution in its approach to handling issues with regional dimensions. This gives it a number of options not previously available, such as:

- substantively addressing, in the context of resolutions 1625 and 1631, not only the regional dimensions of the south and central parts of the region, but the northern sector as well. This would mean focussing on the security, humanitarian and IDP issues across the Uganda/DRC border and also within northern Uganda;

- extending the discussion of the LRA issue to include the Sudan dimension as well. This has the logic of following the approach of dealing with all the key linkages. However, this brings in issues associated with southern Sudan and a potential dimension for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as well. For both practical and political reasons this option would probably overstretch the possibilities for action in January, although as occurred in Under Secretary-General Egeland’s briefing, it is bound to be discussed. Action may be reserved for a later discussion; and

- establishing a process to sustain the proactive regional approach on these issues over several months so that the Ministerial meeting momentum does not fade.

Key Facts

In the early 1990s, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC all experienced political turmoil and instability. The conflicts in all four countries quickly developed inter-linkages through the cross-border movement of combatants and refugees, and a regional dimension emerged.

Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in Zaire (now DRC) faced increasing opposition after decades of a brutal and authoritarian regime in 1993-94. At the same time, ethnic turmoil escalated in Burundi and Rwanda, pitting Tutsis against Hutus. Kampala was fighting against rebels opposed to President Yoweri Museveni, largely the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) who also used bases in eastern Zaire.

Rwanda and Burundi suffered cross-border raids carried out by Hutu extremists from Zaire and ethnic Tutsi Rwandans were attacked in North Kivu by Rwandan Hutu extremists. Laurent-Desire Kabila seized the opportunity to overthrow Mobutu largely with Rwandan and Ugandan support in 1997.

However, relations between Kabila and his two main supporters, Rwanda and Uganda, began to sour in 1998. The crisis led to military intervention from both countries, but Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia came to Kabila’s aid. Kabila also turned to Hutu forces in the Kivus to counter Rwanda. Rwanda and Uganda responded by sending troops and supporting the creation of rebel groups.

International pressure finally succeeded in bringing about the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 among all six countries. Subsequently, fractures in the Rwanda-Uganda alliance resulted in clashes in the city of Kisangani. The assassination of Laurent-Desire Kabila in 2001 brought to power his son, Joseph Kabila.

A peace agreement on the Burundian conflict was signed in Arusha in August 2000, establishing a three-year transitional period. In the following years, virtually all Hutu armed groups joined the process, apart from the FNL. and the Council established MONUB in 2004 to assist with disarmament and demobilisation, patrol the borders and monitor the ceasefire.

The 2002 Sun City Agreement established a power-sharing mechanism in the DRC, a unified government and elections. Subsequent agreements on troop withdrawals were signed with Uganda and Rwanda in mid to late-2002. The war formally ended with the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in December 2002.

MONUC supports the Congolese government in the transition. It also supports the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) against irregular armed groups in the eastern provinces of the Kivus and in the Ituri region. It has also been involved in the voluntary disarmament and integration of former armed groups into the FARDC.

2002 also marked the emergence of a new crisis, the escalation of the longstanding conflict in the region of Ituri, in the Orientale province. The crisis once again exposed the regional dimensions of the conflict in the DRC with the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda. The conflict created such a humanitarian disaster that the Council authorised the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in 2003. Militia...
leaders eventually signed the May 2004 Kinshasa Act of Engagement.

In 2003, the Council imposed an arms embargo on all armed groups operating in the Ituri region and in the Kivus, as well as against armed groups not party to the Agreement. In 2004, it established a Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts. In 2005, the Council extended the embargo to any recipient in Congolese territory and adopted targeted travel and financial sanctions, now strengthened.

As identified by the ICJ and by the Council Group of Experts on DRC sanctions, there is an intimate connection between the illegal exploitation of resources, the presence of foreign fighters and the perpetuation of conflict in the Great Lakes region. The illegal exploitation of natural resources is channelled into funds for the purchase of arms and the maintenance of armed groups, which in turn guarantee that the exploitation continues. The process creates synergies between fighting and economic activity, which then prolong the conflict. Against this background, the fact that DRC borders have remained porous, despite Security Council sanctions measures, is understandable.

Rwanda and Uganda have continued to have security concerns for almost a decade, directly linked to the presence of fighters in the DRC. The failure to disarm the FDLR and the LRA prompted renewed threats of intervention from Kigali in 2004 and from Kampala in 2005.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/Res/1649 (21 December 2005) strengthened sanctions in the DRC against militias which refuse to disarm.
- S/Res/1650 (21 December 2005) renewed the ONUB mandate and permitted cooperation and force transfers between ONUB and MONUC.
- S/Res/1641 (30 November 2005) is a short technical rollover of ONUB’s mandate.
- S/Res/1631 (17 October 2005) addressed the cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.
- S/Res/1602 (31 May 2005) requested that the Secretary-General submit a plan for restructuring ONUB’s mandate and size.
- S/Res/1596 (3 May 2005) expanded the DRC arms embargo and added travel bans and assets freeze to the sanctions regime.
- S/Res/1565 (1 October 2004) further expanded MONUC’s mandate to include seizing arms, monitoring compliance with the arms embargo and assisting the government.
- S/Res/1545 (21 May 2004) established ONUB.
- S/Res/1493 (28 July 2003) imposed an arms embargo and authorised MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Kivus and in Ituri.
- S/Res/1445 (4 December 2002) welcomed the signing of peace agreements with DRC’s neighbours and further expanded MONUC with a new chapter of operations.
- S/Res/1291 (24 February 2002) added Chapter VII protective powers to MONUC’s mandate.
- S/Res/1279 (30 November 1999) established MONUC.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2005/728 (21 November 2005) is the latest report on Burundi.
- S/2005/603 (26 September 2005) is the latest report on the DRC.

Reports of Council Missions to the Region

- S/2001/521 and Add.1 (30 May 2001)
- S/1994/1039 (9 September 1994)

Reports of the DRC Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources

- S/2003/1027 (23 October 2003)
- S/2001/1072 (13 November 2001)
- S/2001/357 (12 April 2001)

Reports of the DRC Group of Experts


Selected Letters

- Letter dated 16 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the President of the Security Council.
- S/2005/785 (13 December 2005) is the letter from Uganda to the Council.

Historical Background

21 December 2005 The Council strengthened sanctions in the DRC and renewed ONUB’s mandate.

18 December 2005 Voting in the DRC constitutional referendum began.

1 November 2005 A list of individuals subject to targeted sanctions in the DRC was adopted.

September 2005 President Museveni of Uganda threatened to send troops into the DRC should MONUC and the FARDC fail to disarm the LRA.

August 2005 Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president of Burundi.

May 2005 The Council expanded the DRC arms embargo to include any recipient within the entire country’s territory, and imposed a travel ban and assets freeze.

February 2005 Referendum approved the Constitution of Burundi.
May 2004 ONUB was established.

March 2004 The Council established a DRC Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts.

July 2003 The Council imposed an arms embargo on armed groups in the Kivus and Ituri or those not party to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement.

May 2003 The Council authorised the deployment of a multinational force in Ituri.

April 2003 The final act of inter-Congolese political negotiation was signed. The interim constitution was adopted, establishing a transitional government until elections.

December 2002 The parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue signed a Global and All Inclusive Agreement.

September 2002 The DRC and Uganda signed the Luanda Agreement on troop withdrawals.

July 2002 The DRC and Rwanda signed the Pretoria Agreement on troop withdrawals.

April 2002 The Sun City Agreement was signed.

February 2001 Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawal began.

January 2001 Joseph Kabila was sworn in as president.

August 2000 The Burundian Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed; the transitional government was established in Burundi.

February 2000 Fighting continued in the DRC, largely for natural resources, pitting government against rebels and Rwandan against Ugandan forces. The Council added Chapter VII protective powers to MONUC’s mandate.

December 1999 The Council established MONUC.

July 1999 The DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

August 1998 Insurgents backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against President Laurent-Desire Kabila. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola sent troops to assist the government.

May 1997 Laurent-Desire Kabila, with support from Rwanda and Tutsi rebels, captured Kinshasa. He was sworn in as president. Zaire was renamed DRC.

1996 Zairian rebels asserted control over much of the eastern provinces.

1994-1996 Rwandan Hutu extremists carried out attacks against Rwanda and the civilian population of Zaire. A government of national unity was inaugurated in Rwanda. The Council partially lifted the arms embargo for the Rwandan government.


1993 Ethnic turmoil escalated in Rwanda and Burundi. The Council established the “UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) and UNAMIR.

1986 Museveni took power in Uganda and installed a no-party system; the LRA began fighting.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**MONUC: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

William Lacy Swing (US)

**MONUC: Force Commander**

Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

**MONUC: Size and Composition of Mission**

Authorised maximum strength: 17,000 military personnel; Current strength (31 October 2005): 16,221 total uniformed personnel, including 200 military observers; Main troop contributors: Pakistan, India, Uruguay, South Africa

**MONUC: Cost**


**Sudan/Darfur**

**Recent Developments**

The situation in the western Sudanese region of Darfur continues to deteriorate, with reports of spill over in neighbouring Chad and fragmentation in rebel leadership. Janjaweed Arab militias reportedly continue to operate in coordination with Khartoum in violation of Council demands. As a result, millions of civilians have suffered, and the delivery of humanitarian aid has been disrupted.

The ceasefire, monitored by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remains shaky. AMIS has suffered setbacks on the ground,
including the abduction and killing of troops. It has also struggled with underfunding and lack of expertise. There are reports of funding cutbacks from the EU and the US and indications from the African Union (AU) that funds will be exhausted by March or April.

An AU-UN assessment mission visited Darfur in December to consider the future of peacekeeping in the region, including the deployment of UN troops.

During his 19 December briefing to the Council, Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland asked for an expanded and more effective security presence.

The parties—Khartoum and rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)—resumed peace talks on the sharing of power and wealth in late November, under AU auspices. Some progress is reported on wealth-sharing, but there is still a considerable distance between the parties’ positions.

The Council was briefed on 13 December by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, on the Darfur investigations. The Prosecutor said that, so far, the security situation made trips to the region and witness protection impossible, and that future cooperation from Khartoum would be critical. But Khartoum has established a new specialised tribunal to try to eliminate the ICC jurisdiction and announced on the day of the Ocampo briefing that it would not cooperate with the ICC investigation.

At the time of writing, Council members are about to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts until March, when a review of the sanctions regime is due, and adopt a Presidential Statement welcoming the resumption of peace talks. The Sanctions Committee received the Panel of Experts’ final report on Darfur.

**Expected Council Action**

In January, the Council will receive the regular report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). It will also receive the monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur.

The Council will also receive the report from the joint AU-UN assessment mission. We expect that Council members will begin to focus on various options such as co-deployment possibilities between the UN and AU, and also the feasibility of the transfer or sharing of AMIS responsibilities with UNMIS.

Council Members will be conscious of the AU Summit in Khartoum (22-23 January) and will want to ensure that the AU members receive positive signals about the valuable contribution which AMIS has made and also a clear message about the need for a more robust presence in the future. At time of writing it is unclear whether this will be done by way of Council action or by members acting individually.

**Key Facts**

Civil war broke out in southern Sudan in 1962. It ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, which gave south Sudan autonomy and freedom of religion. The origins of the war are related to struggles between the largely Arab-Muslim north and the economically marginalised south.

In 1983, fighting broke out again with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the leadership of John Garang. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in particular Kenya, launched in 1993 mediation attempts that culminated in the Machakos Protocol in 2002, followed by five other protocols. The Council expressed support with an extraordinary meeting in Nairobi in November 2004.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 began the transitional process. The agreement established the sharing of public positions between incumbents and southern rebels. It also determined the equitable sharing of oil revenues.

A Government of National Unity (GNU) was inaugurated in July 2005, and John Garang became First Vice-President. With Garang’s sudden death in the same month, Salva Kiir was sworn-in in August. Other political groups in Sudan tried to take part in the process.

In the final weeks of 2005, the situation in south Sudan remained calm, but fragile. The implementation of the north-south CPA continues at a slow pace, with the adoption of a constitution for the region.

In March, the Council created UNMIS to support the implementation of the CPA. It is mandated to, inter alia, assist with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants as well as with security-sector reform. Sources of concern are delays in troop deployment and that, at the time of writing, Khartoum and the UN had not concluded a Status of Forces Agreement that will define the legal status of UNMIS in Sudan.

But Khartoum also faced a separate conflict in Darfur in 2003, against the SLM/A and the JEM. At the heart of the conflict are issues such as economic marginalisation and land rights. The Government of Sudan responded by sending troops and recruiting the Janjaweed, who engaged in brutal attacks against the civilian population.

A ceasefire was signed in April 2004 in N’djamena, Chad, and is monitored by AMIS with UNMIS support, mostly on planning and technical advice. Peace talks have dragged on for more than a year, over seven successive rounds, with no peace agreement.

The situation in Darfur poses risks to the transition. The Council has consistently called for a political solution to the conflict and, in particular, on Khartoum to protect civilians and to disarm the Janjaweed.

The Council imposed an arms embargo against non-state parties to the conflict in 2004. In March 2005, it extended the embargo to all parties, imposed a travel ban and assets freeze against violators, a ban on military flights over Darfur, and established a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor compliance.

Sanctions violations are ongoing, especially regarding the flights ban and Khartoum’s support to the Janjaweed. In addition, Darfur’s porous borders with Chad and with the rest of Sudan cannot counter the flow of arms.
The Committee has been inoperative in preparing a list of individual violators or adopting its own guidelines. Problems with gathering information, including the lack of cooperation from some members of the Sudanese government, marked the first Panel’s tenure.

The Council referred the situation to the ICC in March, per the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry (ICI).

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is how to support both the north-south transition and provide in addition – probably in conjunction with the AU – a more robust presence in Darfur involving UN forces.

A related issue is whether this can be done using UNMIS forces or whether additional forces will need to be generated by DPKO.

The discussions will involve complex technical issues relating to mandates, command and control, application of generic UN peacekeeping principles and not least funding. This will involve innovative thinking about the practical implementation of a partnership with a regional organisation.

The issue of applying pressure for compliance with sanctions will remain on the table. There are differences within the Council as whether this will be an effective lever in terms of promoting a solution to the conflict in Darfur.

**Council Dynamics**

Positions inside the Council on the future of AMIS and UNMIS in Darfur are still evolving. However, proposals are expected as soon as the report of the assessment mission is circulated. A sense of urgency is added by the deteriorating situation and by the fact that the Secretariat would need several months before it could generate forces for a large operation in Darfur.

There is some reluctance inside the Council to increasing UNMIS’ troop levels, with a preference to instead redeploy troops from the south into Darfur. Other members consider that the mandate in the south is already as much as can be managed with current force levels.

Dynamics are likely to be influenced by the signals the AU may send regarding its willingness to partner with or transfer responsibilities to the UN. Council members will be sensitive to the issue, particularly since great political capital was invested by the AU in its initiatives as a mediator and as a peacekeeper in the region.

Sensitivities on the part of Sudan will also play a role, but will probably be much less influential than in the past. AU members have seen the difficult experience AMIS has encountered in Darfur and are likely to be less supportive. And the dynamics in the Council will also be impacted by the departure of Algeria, Sudan’s closest ally on the Council during the entire period in which it has been seized of Darfur.

Some members of the Council are eager to start preparing a list of individual violators to be targeted for travel and financial measures. Due to the opposition from a few Council members, it is unlikely, however, that the Council will move at this point to impose individual sanctions.

Regarding any action with respect to Sudan’s non-cooperation with the ICC, the US opposition to the Court is likely to be an important but not necessarily overriding factor.

**Options**

In addition to beginning work on the future UN/AMIS partnership arrangements, the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on sanctions, some of the options laid out in our December issue continue to be plausible and include:

- action to approve the Sanctions Committee guidelines;
- an extension of the arms embargo to Sudan’s entire territory; and/or
- pressure, perhaps by way of a statement criticising the announcement by Khartoum of its decision not to cooperate with ICC, on Sudan to begin to cooperate with the Court.

Some of the options on the future of AMIS and UNMIS in Darfur include:

- incorporating AMIS’ responsibilities and troops into UNMIS with a new UN mandate; replacing AMIS with UNMIS, and expanding UNMIS’ mandate accordingly. This can be done by raising UNMIS troop levels and/or redeploying troops from south Sudan; or
- maintaining separate missions, while mandating increased cooperation including joint operations.

The range of options will be affected by the developments in the political negotiations in Abuja. The elements necessary to clinch a deal may play a role in determining the kind of force structure that will be required.

**Underlying Problems**

For UNMIS, it is clear that risks remain in the implementation of the CPA. Under the CPA, for example:

- the reshuffling of public positions threatens traditional power structures;
- the south will maintain a separate army, with its own chain of command;
- the south will be able to decide whether it desires to secede in 2011; and
- Abyei, a historically contested area on the north-south border, will become a separate political entity and will decide its fate in the 2011 referendum separately. Khartoum has, to date, failed to implement the decision of the Abyei Boundary Commission, which is final and binding.

The south is plagued by intertribal fighting and disgruntled armed groups that did not take part in the peace process. Furthermore, the region is in desperate need of economic development, but mines have hindered investment prospects. The division of ministries in the GNU left energy in the hands of the north, causing deep discontent in the south.

The activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the south also raise concerns over Sudan’s porous borders. Sudan and Uganda announced they would start cooperating in that regard in November, and Under Secretary-General Egeland urged the Council on 19 December to take up the matter.
Regarding Darfur, risks come from weak command structures among the rebels. The SLM/A, in particular, has broken up largely along ethnic lines. Even in the event of a peace agreement, fragmentation could offset any improvements in security on the ground in the absence of a more robust peacekeeping presence.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1591 (29 March 2005) strengthened sanctions in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1574 (19 November 2004, adopted in Nairobi) expressed support for peace processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1564 (18 September 2004) established the ICI.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1566 (30 July 2004) established an arms embargo in Darfur and requested monthly reports.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2005/48 (13 October 2005) expressed concern with the current situation in Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2005/719 (16 November 2005) is the latest report on Darfur at the time of writing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2005/579 (12 September 2005) is the latest regular report on Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/411 (23 June 2005) assessed UNMIS’ deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/285 (3 May 2005) reported on UNMIS’ assistance to AMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2005/57 (31 January 2005) assessed risks in the CPA implementation and proposed UNMIS.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Historical Background**

**13 December 2005** The ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo briefed the Council.

**29 November 2005** Darfur peace talks resumed.

**11 August 2005** Salva Kiir sworn in.

**30 July 2005** John Garang died.

**9 July 2005** GNU was inaugurated, John Garang sworn in.

**20 June 2005** Trials began at the special Darfur Sudanese court.

**28 April 2005** AMIS increased to 7,731 personnel.

**31 March 2005** The Council referred Darfur to the ICC.

**29 March 2005** Further sanctions imposed in Darfur.

**24 March 2005** UNMIS established.

**25 January 2005** ICI report concluded that international crimes had been committed in Darfur.

**9 January 2005** CPA signed.


**20 October 2004** AU expanded AMIS’ mandate to include civilian protection.

**18 September 2004** ICI established.

**1 September 2004** Parties to the Darfur conflict called for AU peacekeepers.

**30 July 2004** The Council imposed the first arms embargo on Darfur.

**April 2004** Darfur N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement signed.

**September 2003** Naivasha Agreement on Security Arrangements (ceasefire between north and south) signed.

**February 2003** Rebels rose up in Darfur.

**July 2002** Government of Sudan and SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol.

**Other Relevant Facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan Pronk (Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<th>UNMIS Force Commander</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar (Bangladesh)</td>
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<tr>
<th>UNMIS: Size and Composition of Mission</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel; Strength as of 31 October 2005: 3,519 troops and 228 military observers; Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India, Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<th>AMIS: Size and Composition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total authorised strength: 6,171 military and 1,560 police personnel; Strength as of 20 October 2005: 5,618 military personnel and 1,176 police personnel; Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Ghana</td>
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**AMIS: Cost**

$466 million ($290 million pledged); Largest donors: Canada, EU, US

**Lebanon/Syria**

**Recent Developments**

On 13 December, Detlev Mehlis, the Commissioner for the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, briefed the Council on his second report containing new findings and detailing progress of the investigation. The report noted Syrian “reluctance and procrastination” in its cooperation with UNIIIC and several Syrian attempts to “hinder the investigation internally and procedurally.” However, Mehlis also noted that Syria had made available for questioning
five Syrian officials suspected by the Commission. The interviews took place at the UN offices in Vienna. The second report reinforced the conclusions of the first report that members of Lebanese and Syrian intelligence and security services had been involved in the assassination.

Prior to the expiration of the UNIIIC mandate, the Lebanese government requested that:
- UNIIIC be extended by six months with the possibility of an additional extension;
- the mandate of UNIIIC be expanded to investigate all assassination attempts that took place in Lebanon since 1 October 2004;
- and an international tribunal be established to judge the perpetrators of the Hariri assassination.

On 15 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1644, under Chapter VII:
- expressing its ongoing concern about Syrian cooperation
- urging Syria to cooperate without delay
- extending the mandate of UNIIIC by six months and allowing the Commission to provide technical assistance to Lebanon for the investigation of other assassinations
- requesting the Secretary-General to work with the Lebanese authorities and report back to the Council on ways to expand the mandate and on the nature of the international assistance needed for the trial of the perpetrators
- requesting reports from UNIIIC on the progress of the inquiry every three months.

**Expected Council Action**

The issue is likely to be before the Council again in January because the Secretary-General has to appoint a new Commissioner to replace Detlev Mehlis, who is returning to his post in Germany.

There is also always the possibility of the Commissioner reporting to the Council if further difficulties arise with Syria.

A decision on the extension of the mandate and on the nature of international judicial assistance which may be provided will also be required. This will follow once the Secretary-General’s report is received.

The Council is also expected to consider the conclusions of the Terje Roed-Larsen report on the implementation of resolution 1559.

**Key Facts**

On 2 September 2004, by a majority vote, the Council approved resolution 1559, sponsored by the US and France, following allegations of Syrian support for an unconstitutional prolongation of the term of Lebanese President Émile Lahoud. The resolution called on all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to be disbanded and disarmed. It also supported the extension of the Government of Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory and a free and fair electoral process. Terje Roed-Larsen was appointed Special Envoy for Verification of the Implementation of Resolution 1559 with the task to produce semi-annual reports. Rafik Hariri was at that time prime minister and opposed the decision to extend Lahoud’s term. He resigned a few days later under pressure.

Following the 14 February bombing in Beirut that killed Hariri, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1595 establishing the UNIIIC to help the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of the murder. In parallel, Lebanese demonstrations against Syria’s 29-year presence in Lebanon, coupled with international pressure, led the Syrian government to withdraw its intelligence and military apparatus from Lebanon in April.

UNIIIC’s first report, made public on 20 October, concluded that Lebanese and Syrian officials had been involved in the assassination of Hariri. Upon request from the Lebanese Government, the Secretary-General agreed to extend the mandate of the UNIIIC to 15 December.

On 31 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1636 establishing a targeted sanctions regime, of travel bans and asset freezes, against individuals to be designated as suspects in the Hariri assassination. It also decided under Chapter VII that Syria must fully cooperate with UNIIIC. There was a clear threat of “further action” if the requirements of the resolution were not met. The resolution further specified that the initiative, both in terms of implementing the individual sanctions and triggering further Council consideration, lay with Mehlis. UNIIIC was requested to report to the Council at any time if its Commissioner considered that Syrian cooperation did not meet the requirements of resolution 1636.

With respect to the separate issues dealt with in resolution 1559, the second semi-annual report on its implementation was released on 24 October. Roed-Larsen indicated that a progressive approach to the disarmament of the militias by the Lebanese government should be seen as satisfactory, but mentioned that the transfer of weapons and personnel between Syria and Lebanon in connection with Palestinian militias was a problem.

Finally, there have been more than 15 bombings and assassination attempts, mostly against anti-Syrian voices in Lebanon since 1 October 2004. In an 11 October letter to the President of the Security Council, the Committee to Protect Journalists called on the Council to expand the probe to include attacks against Lebanese journalists that had occurred in recent months.

**Key Issues**

Approval of a replacement Commissioner is unlikely to be a controversial issue. Traditionally the Secretary-General, who makes the appointment, advises the Council in advance of his intended appointee and the Council, by letter, confirms its agreement. This is usually preceded by informal consultation with interested Council members.

Determining the nature of the international assistance to the Lebanese judicial system will be a major issue for the Council, especially bearing in mind its increasing reluctance in recent years to establish and fund international tribunals.

Regarding resolution 1559, the Roed-Larsen report is becoming increasingly stale. It may be an issue as to whether to take up this matter at all.
**Council Dynamics**

Consideration of the Roed-Larsen report will be complicated by the fact that some members are of the view that the problem of the Lebanese militias should probably be left to the Lebanese government at this stage. There will be concerns by some members that the history of Lebanon shows how foreign interference using sectarian divides can be catastrophic for Lebanese stability. They will argue therefore, that the Council should remain cautious, particularly with regard to the disarming of militias.

With respect to the UNIIIC investigation, however, the important fact in terms of Council dynamics is that all three resolutions—1595, 1636 and 1644—have been adopted by consensus.

In January, the absence of Algeria’s voice in the Council may change the dynamics in the Council on how to respond to possible future UNIIIC findings that Syria had hindered the investigation or had still not fully and unconditionally cooperated. However, Russia can be expected to continue to put proposals through a critical examination.

Expansion of the scope of the investigation to include all assassination attempts since 1 October 2004 will also be controversial. Much will depend on the Secretary-General's report.

**Underlying Problems**

The Lebanese Government does not yet fully exert control over all its territory, especially in the south. There is also a lack of progress on disbanding and disarming the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias as called for by resolution 1559. However, Hezbollah is an important component of Lebanese political life and still holds legitimacy to the eyes of many Lebanese as a liberation group against the Israeli presence in the Sheba’a farms area.

The security situation is also affected by regular cross-border incidents in the south. Hezbollah, the Israeli Defence Force and Palestinian armed elements continue to violate the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon.

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**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) extended UNIIIC’s mandate by six months and requested reports on the progress of the investigation every three months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the assassination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disbanding of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Presidential Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2005/26 (22 June 2005) welcomed the Lebanese parliamentary elections and supported the call for enhanced assistance and cooperation, in support of a credible governmental programme of political and economic reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2005/22 (7 June 2005) condemned the 2 June terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed Lebanese journalist Samir Qassir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005) reiterated its call for the full implementation of resolution 1559, acknowledged Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and welcomed the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to positions vacated by Syrian forces.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/2005/673 (26 October 2005) Second semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2005/393 (16 June 2005) Memorandum of Understanding between the government of Lebanon and the UN regarding the modalities of cooperation with the UNIIIC</td>
</tr>
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**Other**

- S/2005/783 (13 December 2005) Letter from Lebanon requesting an international tribunal and the expansion of UNIIIC’s mandate
- S/2005/762 (6 December 2005) Letter from Lebanon requesting an extension of the UNIIIC’s mandate
- S/2005/717 (15 November 2005) Letter from Syria regarding its cooperation with UNIIIC
- S/2004/706 (1 September 2004) Letter from Syria

**Historical Background**

13 December 2005 Mehlis presented his second report to the Council. On 15 December, the Council adopted resolution 1644.

12 December 2005 The journalist Gebran Tuéni was killed by a bomb in Beirut.

5 – 7 December 2005 Five Syrian officials were interviewed by UNIIIC in Vienna.

31 October 2005 The Council unanimously adopted resolution 1636.

29 October 2005 Following the recommendations made by Detlev Mehlis when he briefed the Council, Syria created a special judicial commission to deal with all matters relating to the mission of UNIIIC.
26 October 2005 The second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on implementation of resolution 1559 became public.

20 October 2005 The initial report of UNIIIC was published and its mandate was extended until 15 December. The report deplored the lack of Syrian cooperation with the commission and revealed that the assassination could not have occurred without the knowledge of Lebanese and Syrian security services.

12 September 2005 The Secretary-General agreed to extend the Commission’s mandate by 40 days.

29 April 2005 The Secretary-General, in his first semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559, advised that the withdrawal of troops, military assets and intelligence apparatus was underway. However, there was no progress on the implementation of the other provisions of the resolution.

26 April 2005 Syria confirmed the withdrawal of Syrian troops, apparatus and assets from Lebanon. The Secretary-General dispatched a UN mission to verify this.

7 April 2005 Passed unanimously, resolution 1595 established UNIIIC, based in Lebanon, to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of the assassination.

29 March 2005 Lebanon confirmed its full cooperation with the investigation commission in a letter to the Council.

24 March 2005 The report of the Fitzgerald Mission of Inquiry into the 14 February Beirut bombing concluded that an international investigation was needed.

15 February 2005 The Council requested from the Secretary-General to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences of the bombing.

14 February 2005 Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed by truck bomb in Beirut.

20 October 2004 Rafik Hariri, Prime Minister, resigned under pressure from Syria.

3 September 2004 President Lahoud’s term was extended by three years, thereby aborting the presidential electoral process.

2 September 2004 Following allegations of Syrian manipulation of the Lebanese electoral process, the Council passed resolution 1559 with six abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, Pakistan, Philippines and Russia).

Other Relevant Facts

| UN Special Envoy for Verification of the Implementation of Resolution 1559 |
| Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) |
| UNIIIC Commissioner |
| To be appointed |

Size and Composition of Commission

To be decided

Funding

The funding comes from the regular budget and was approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the General Assembly.

Appointment process

The task of recruiting the members was entrusted to DPA, in cooperation with DPKO (Office of Mission Support), UNIFIL and ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia) in Beirut also provided technical assistance and logistical support.

Activities

The modalities of cooperation with the Lebanese government are defined in a Memorandum of Understanding between Lebanon and the UN.

Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

Recent Developments

The November 30 Presidential Statement urging the Ivorian parties to reach an agreement on the appointment of a prime minister and indicating the Council’s readiness to impose targeted sanctions on individuals—broadly interpreted as the Council’s last warning—appears to have had an impact. On 4 December, Charles Konan Banny, the governor of the Central Bank of West African States, was appointed interim prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire.

The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, visited Côte d’Ivoire between 29 November and 3 December. After numerous interviews, he declared that the ethnic orientation of the conflict could lead to “massive and serious violations of human rights”.

On 15 December, sanctions imposed by resolution 1572 (2004) expired and, on the same day, the Council adopted a resolution extending those measures for a year and creating a new Group of Experts of five members. The resolution also contained provisions for an embargo on the export of Ivorian diamonds and requested the rebel Forces nouvelles to provide an inventory of their weapons. This resolution did not impose individual targeted measures stipulated by paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004). In light of the positive news of the appointment of the prime minister, Council members now appear to agree that the activation of these measures should wait and be considered in the light of progress with the establishment of the new government.

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is expected to receive the seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The mandate of UNOCI will expire on 24 January. The Council is expected to renew it and, depending on the Secretary-General’s recommendations, consider an increase in the troop level and a possible modification of the mandate.

Key Facts

The failure to conduct presidential elections before the end of President Laurent Gbagbo’s constitutional term of office on 30 October 2005 resulted in a crisis that led to action by both the African Union and the Security Council. It was decided in resolution 1633 (2005) that:

- President Gbagbo would remain in power for a maximum of 12 months after his term ended;
a new prime minister acceptable to all parties would be appointed to exercise executive powers;

- an International Working Group (IWG) responsible for the evaluation and monitoring of the peace process be set up and produce a road map leading to elections;

- a new type of mediation would be conducted daily by a subgroup of the IWG composed of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General’s High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, and representatives of ECOWAS and the African Union; and

- the threat of sanctions against individual spoilers would be strengthened.

At its 6 December meeting in Addis Ababa, the IWG decided to provide the prime minister with the right to enact legislation until the end of the transitional period arising from resolution 1633 (2005). The IWG will hold its next meeting on 15 January in Côte d’Ivoire.

Sanctions against individuals found to be obstructing the peace process, violating human rights, publicly inciting hatred and violence and violating the arms embargo provided for by resolution 1572 (2004) have not come into effect for specific individuals because of differences within the Sanctions Committee and because the AU mediator has believed that this might be counterproductive. The Group of Experts repeatedly recommended to the Council that it act on its earlier decisions in this regard.

Key Issues

Discussions are underway on whether an increase in the troop level of UNOCI would be necessary and feasible. The Secretary-General has been requesting a substantial increase in the troop level and is very likely to renew this recommendation in January, given the current needs in terms of security and with regard to the implementation of the roadmap. There is some opposition within the Council on this matter.

A further issue is the question of a possible mandate change to permit UNOCI troops to better monitor the arms embargo.

The progress of government formation will also be a possible issue. The designation of key ministries such as finance, defence and interior are likely to be controversial and could result in backsliding in the peace process.

And the issue of possible renewed violence will be closely monitored as the resolution is being prepared.

Finally there is the issue of past human rights violations, which simmers below the surface, notwithstanding the decision to defer any individual sanctions at this stage.

Council Dynamics

For the past year, the Council took its cue from the AU mediator and followed his recommendation to refrain from activating sanctions aimed at individuals. Frustrated by the parties’ failure to advance the political process, the Council by late November appeared ready to act on its earlier decisions. In light of the parties’ compliance with the demand to appoint a prime minister, however, the Council seems now to be willing once again to give the parties the benefit of the doubt and to postpone further the possibility of the imposition of these individual measures. For similar reasons, while some members of the Council have argued for inviting the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide for a briefing, others felt that such a briefing at this moment could be counterproductive for the political process.

Furthermore, Russia, China and Algeria have been opposed to sanctions against individuals violating human rights, as well as to additional measures related to the functioning of the arms embargo, such as the audit of the country’s cocoa revenues, recommended by the Group of Experts. China and Russia have also been opposed to an increase in troop levels of UNOCI and measures that would facilitate the tightening of the arms embargo.

Options

With regards to the renewal of UNOCI, the Council has the following options:

- increase the troop level and modify the mandate to allow the mission to better monitor the arms embargo and to protect the civilian population more effectively;

- consider the redeployment of troops from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to Côte d’Ivoire, as allowed by resolution 1609 (2005) “within the authorized personnel ceiling of a given mission”—an option that would require addressing various financial, procedural and political obstacles;

- a technical roll-over and continued discussions; and

- mandate renewal without change.

A further option would be for the Council to decide to consider the report of the international commission of inquiry on serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire from 19 September 2002. The report was requested by Presidential Statement of 25 May 2004 and transmitted to the Council in December 2004. The Council has not considered the report and, thus, the report has not yet officially been made public.

The Council may also decide to invite the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to brief on his recent trip to Côte d’Ivoire.

Depending on the developments on the ground, another option would be for the Council to activate the targeted sanctions against individuals found to be obstructing the peace process, violating human rights, publicly inciting hatred and violence and violating the arms embargo provided for by resolution 1572 (2004).

Underlying Problems

The lack of financial and human resources for UNOCI to help in the implementation of all components of the roadmap is a real problem and has been raised by the Secretary-General.

An Independent Electoral Commission was created in 2001 with the task of conducting the electoral process and clarifying questions regarding nationality, identification and naturalisation. According to the terms of the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, this commission’s composition was amended in order to achieve a better representation of all the parties. However, because of disagreements between the parties within the Commission over the election of its bureau,
the Commission is still not operational. Since 15 July, it has been headed by Antonio Monteiro, the High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, appointed by the UN Secretary-General. If the commission does not become quickly operational, it could jeopardize the elections due in October 2006.

Human rights violations have continued, and there has been little or no progress on disarming rebels in the northern half of the country.

The obstruction of the work of UN peacekeepers has also hindered the peace process. For this reason, the Council has emphasised in resolution 1643 (2005) that activities impeding the actions of UNOCI would not be tolerated.

The failure to consider and make public the 2004 report of the international commission of inquiry on serious violations of human rights has led to questions being raised on the ground, especially by members of civil society, about the value of UN investigations and UN’s commitment to transparency.

UNOCI does not have good intelligence and lacks technical skills to fulfil its mandate regarding the monitoring of arms embargo on land.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council resolutions
- **S/RES 1643 (15 December 2005)**: endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council of 6 October 2005, extended President Gbagbo’s term by 12 months, supported the creation of the IWG, called for the designation of a prime minister and reaffirmed its readiness to impose sanctions.
- **S/RES 1609 (24 June 2005)**: extended the mandate of UNOCI for seven months, further detailed the mandate and increased the contingents.
- **S/RES 1603 (3 June 2005)**: endorsed the Pretoria Agreements, established a High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire and renewed UNOCI’s mandate until 24 June.
- **S/RES/1600 (04 May 2005)**: welcomed the Pretoria Agreement and extended UNOCI’s mandate by one month.
- **S/RES/1584 (1 February 2005)**: authorised UNOCI to monitor the arms embargo and created a Group of Experts to provide information to the Sanctions Committee.
- **S/RES/1572 (15 November 2004)**: established an arms embargo and called for sanctions against individuals found to be obstructing the peace process, violating human rights, publicly inciting hatred and violence and violating the embargo.
- **S/RES/1528 (27 February 2004)**: established UNOCI.

#### Selected Presidential Statements
- **S/PRST/2005/60 (9 December 2005)**: endorsed the final communiqué of the IWG of 6 December 2005 and reaffirmed that the prime minister must have all the necessary powers described in resolution 1633.
- **S/PRST/2005/58 (30 November 2005)**: urged the parties in Côte d’Ivoire to find a candidate for the position of prime minister.
- **S/PRST/2004/17 (25 May 2004)**: asked the Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate all human rights violations committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 September 2002, and determine responsibility.

### Historical Background

**6 December 2005** The second meeting of the IWG was held in Abidjan.

**4 December 2005** Charles Konan Banny, the governor of the Central Bank of West Africa States, was appointed interim prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire.

**8 November 2005** The first meeting of the newly established International Working Group was held.

**30 October 2005** President Gbagbo’s constitutional term in office ended.

**18-21 October 2005** The chairman of the Sanctions Committee for Côte d’Ivoire led consultations in the country to determine if individuals could be subjected to sanctions.

**6 October 2005** The AU’s Peace and Security Council decided to extend Gbagbo’s mandate by 12 months. The Council endorsed this decision on 13 October.

**24 June 2005** The Council approved resolution 1609, which extended UNOCI’s mandate and increased the mission’s military and civilian police contingents.

**11 April 2005** The Pretoria Agreement was signed by all Ivorian parties. This peace agreement reinforced the terms of the previous two agreements and stipulated that elections would be held in October 2005.
15 November 2004 The Council approved resolution 1572, which imposed an arms embargo as well as sanctions restricting travel and freezing assets of all persons designated by the Sanctions Committee who pose a threat to the peace process.

9 November 2004 The AU mediation initiative led by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa began.

30 July 2004 The Accra III Agreement, which consolidated the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, was signed.

27 February 2004 The Council adopted resolution 1528 establishing UNOCI.

13 May 2003 The Council adopted resolution 1479 establishing the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) with a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

March 2003 A government of national reconciliation was formed.

24 January 2003 The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (S/2003/99) was signed between the Ivorian Government and all political forces, under a French initiative.

19 September 2002 A mutiny in Abidjan by army officers grew into full-scale rebellion.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

- Pierre Schori (Sweden)

#### High Representative for the Elections

- Antonio Monteiro (Portugal)

#### Size and Composition of Mission

**Authorised Strength:** (24 June 2005 - 24 January 2006) 7,090 military personnel and 725 police officers; **Current Strength** (31 October 2005): 7,558 total uniformed personnel, including 6,704 troops, 193 military observers, 661 police supported by 341 international civilian personnel, 385 local staff and 192 UN Volunteers; **Key Troop Contributing Countries:** Togo, Senegal

#### Cost

1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $438.17 million

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### Georgia (UNOMIG)

#### Expected Council Action

Following the receipt of the quarterly report from the Secretary-General, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which expires on January 31.

#### Key Facts

The conflict in Abkhazia started in the summer of 1992, when secessionist groups began to fight for independence from Georgia. The origins of the Abkhaz conflict are linked to Abkhazia’s incorporation into Georgia after the latter became part of the Soviet Union. Since independence in 1991, Georgia has faced multiple internal secessionist movements, notably in South Ossetia, Ajaria and Abkhazia. The Abkhaz have historically had close links with Russia and during the Soviet period sought, unsuccessfully, to be put under direct rule by Moscow.

International diplomatic efforts have followed the 1992 outbreak, mostly under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), comprised of former Soviet Republics and largely under Russian leadership), and the UN. A Group of Friends consisting of Russia, the US, Germany, France and the UK has been the main focal point for peace talks, with Russia being the main facilitator.

The parties signed a ceasefire in July 1993. The Council then created UNOMIG, but the collapse of the ceasefire led to interim reductions in UNOMIG’s activities. Georgia then joined the CIS.

The parties in late 1993 asked that international peacekeeping forces with Russian participation be deployed and in February 1994 signed a quadrupartite agreement recognising the right of voluntary return of displaced persons and a declaration on practical matters such as transport, energy and communications.

In May 1994, the parties agreed to the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement. The ceasefire provided for the creation of a demilitarised security zone and a restricted weapons zone. It also requested the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force and UN observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement. The Council then expanded the UNOMIG’s mandate accordingly.

While UNOMIG and CIS forces have parallel mandates, particularly regarding monitoring the ceasefire and patrolling the security zone, they are independent. The 2,000-strong CIS operation, comprised of Russian troops, provides security for UN personnel, while the 120 UNOMIG observers monitor CIS activities and can investigate violations of the agreement outside the buffer zones.

However, there has been no progress on the fundamental points of contention: the final political status of Abkhazia and the return of 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) driven out of the region in 1993. The ceasefire remains weak, with frequent reports of violations from both sides.

The Council has historically reaffirmed Georgia’s territorial integrity. Tbilisi’s position has emphasised the territorial integrity of Georgia, albeit with the possibility of increased autonomy for Abkhazia. The Abkhaz de facto authorities have consistently opposed any compromise on Abkhaz independence and have been fearful of ethnic imbalance after the return of Georgian IDPs.

At the initiative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Heidi Tagliavini, a paper on “Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi” was submitted to the parties as a basis for substantive negotiations in December 2001 after intense negotiations within the Group of Friends. The paper encountered strong opposition from the Abkhaz side, and this opposition was criticised by the Council.

Diplomatic efforts have focused mainly on containment issues such as building confidence and achieving agreement on the non-resumption of hostilities, and on the return of refugees instead of making progress towards substantive solutions such as...
the status of Abkhazia. A few positive prospects in that regard emerged with the Abkhaz acceptance of the return of Georgians to its Gali district. Outstanding points still linger, however, particularly on the adoption of a document on non-resumption of hostilities, the opening of a UN human rights office in Gali and the use of the Georgian language in schools in Abkhazia.

The emergence of new leadership in Georgia and Abkhazia in the past two years has contributed to a more optimistic environment. Observers have noted that Tbilisi now prefers a less confrontational approach, building upon common interests between the sides.

The relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi, on the other hand, has soured over recent months. Georgia has repeatedly accused Russia of partiality and support for the Abkhaz, and the Georgian parliament has threatened to vote to expel the peacekeepers Russia maintains in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia under a CIS mandate. Furthermore, Georgia has approached NATO for membership, which in turn may intensify Russian concerns.

Russia warns that exerting too much pressure on the Abkhaz could lead to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region. Those concerns, according to Moscow, have led it to extend benefits to the Abkhaz, such as passports and pensions, which according to observers would deepen Abkhazia’s de facto independence.

**Key Issues**

The immediate issue before the Council is the renewal of UNOMIG’s mandate. Nonetheless, the continuation of the de facto independence of Abkhazia begs the question as to whether the Council will explore any action to encourage effective peace talks.

**Council Dynamics**

Russia has been in the lead on issues related to UNOMIG for the duration of its operation. But several permanent members of the Council in addition to Russia—France, the UK and the US—have been engaged in the situation outside of a strict Council context, either as part of the Group of Friends or bilaterally.

Furthermore, in view of the stagnation of the operation and the situation on the ground, Council members have begun to raise questions about the wisdom of maintaining the status quo. Given the recent interest by the US in revitalising UN peacekeeping in situations where peace processes are stalled, the Council may begin to look into possible changes of that mandate.

**Options**

One option, which at this stage seems the most likely, is to renew the mandate of UNOMIG through the passage of a resolution that will be almost identical to the ones passed every six months during the last few years. Another option would be to renew the mandate for another period but contingent on specific political steps to be taken by the parties prior to a further extension. Any suggestion of the change in the status quo is likely, however, to encounter strong opposition from Russia.

**Underlying Problems**

Abkhazia has achieved the appearance of de facto independence. However, it has nonetheless been economically isolated from the rest of the world, apart from links with Russia. Widespread lawlessness, the activities of Georgian paramilitaries and the porosity of the border have raised concerns as to the future stability of the region.

One critical aspect is the geopolitical importance Georgia has enjoyed with its role in the delivery of Caspian Sea oil. Bilateral relations, particularly with the US, have improved significantly. US interests in the region stem mostly from its investments in oil extraction in the Caspian Sea and in counterterrorism. US-Georgian relations are boosted by Georgia’s participation in the coalition in Iraq, and the use of its ports to transport military equipment to Afghanistan.

Russia also has both economic and strategic interests in the region. Economic ties with Georgia are also prominent, given Russia’s position as the main supplier of natural gas and electricity. It is also keen on maintaining influence in the oil-rich Caspian region and countering the incursions of Chechen rebels in Georgia.

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**UN Documents**

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<td>• S/Res/1077 (22 October 1996) created a UN human rights office.</td>
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<td>• S/Res/937 (27 July 1994) expanded UNOMIG’s mandate.</td>
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<td>• S/Res/881 (04 November 1993) approved an interim reduction in UNOMIG’s mandate.</td>
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<td>• S/Res/858 (24 August 1993) established UNOMIG.</td>
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<td>• S/1994/80 (25 January 1994) contains options for UN presence on the ground, including the deployment of UNOMIG as an observer force together with a multinational peacekeeping operation.</td>
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<td>• S/1994/683 (17 May 1994) contains the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement.</td>
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<td>• S/1994/397 (05 April 1994) contains the declaration on measures for the settlement of the conflict and the quadrupartite agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/1994/32 (14 January 1994) contains a communiqué from the parties detailing their acceptance of the deployment of peacekeepers with a Russian contingent.</td>
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**Historical Background**

*July 2005* The Russian Federation began the phased handover of military facilities to Georgian authorities.

*May 2005* A protocol on strengthening the 1994 ceasefire was signed.

*January 2005* Sergei Bagapsh elected de facto president of Abkhazia.

*May-August 2004* Tensions increased with breakaway South Ossetia.

*March-May 2004* Tensions arose between Tbilisi and the de facto autonomous region of Ajaria, culminating with the resignation of Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze.

*January 2004* Mikhail Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia.

*August 2003* Georgia sent troops to Iraq.

*May 2003* Construction of the Georgian section of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline began.

*September-October 2002* Renewed tensions over Chechen fighters on Georgian soil emerged. The Russian Federation warned of possible military action. Russian special forces launched cross-border raids without approval from Tbilisi.

*December 2001* The “Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi” was submitted to the parties.

*October 2001* Renewed fighting between Abkhaz separatists and Georgian paramilitaries. Russia accused Georgia of harboring Chechen forces. A UN helicopter was shot down in the Kodori Valley, Abkhazia.

*February-May 1994* The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement and the quadripartite agreement were signed. As a result, CIS peacekeeping troops were deployed and UNOMIG’s mandate was expanded. Agreement was also reached on practical measures on topics such as transport and communications.

*September 1993* The ceasefire collapsed. Georgia became a member of the CIS and agreed to the establishment of three Russian military bases on its soil.

*August 1993* UNOMIG was established to monitor the ceasefire.

*July 1993* A new ceasefire was reached under the Sochi Agreement.

*October 1992* The ceasefire collapsed, and inter-ethnic fighting in the Russian North Caucasus erupted.

*September 1992* Both parties signed a ceasefire and peacekeeping plan.

*August 1992* Conflict between Georgian troops and Abkhaz separatist forces began.

*April 1991* Georgia became independent after a popular referendum. The Abkhaz population, however, voted to remain part of the Soviet Union.

*1990* South Ossetia declared independence, seeking unification with North Ossetia, Russia.

*1978* The Abkhaz Autonomous Socialist Republic sought unsuccessfully to secede from Georgia and join the Russian Republic.

*1931* Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia by Soviet authorities.

*1921* The Abkhaz Autonomous Region was created. The Abkhaz Autonomous Socialist Republic and the Abkhaz Autonomous Oblast of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic were united and renamed the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

*1921* Abkhazia was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

*1917* The Russian Revolution led to the collapse of the Russian Empire.

*1918* The Allies recognized the independence of Georgia.

*1918* Georgia became a member of the League of Nations.

*1919* Georgia sent troops to Iraq.

*1921* Georgia by Soviet authorities.

*1978* The Abkhaz Autonomous Socialist Republic sought unsuccessfully to secede from Georgia and join the Russian Republic.

*1931* Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia by Soviet authorities.

*1921* Georgia became part of the Soviet Union.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)

**UNOMIG: Size and Composition**

- 132 total uniformed personnel, including 120 military observers (31 October 2005); *Main military contributors: Germany, Pakistan, Jordan*

**Duration**

August 1993 to present.

**Cost**

1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $36.38 million (gross)

**Other Facts**

- Size of CIS troops: about 2,000; Contributors: Russia

**Western Sahara (MINURSO)**

**Expected Council Action**

In January, the Council will be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, as requested in Security Council resolution 1634 (28 October 2005), which also extended the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2006.

This is expected to begin a process of discussion about the future of MINURSO.

**Key Facts**

Between 1884 and 1976, Western Sahara was colonised by Spain. During the late period of Spanish administration, Sahrawi resistance movements, such as the Popular Front of Sagua el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, (or Frente Polisario), seeking self-determination, obtained support from the United Nations, including mention in successive General Assembly resolutions of the right to self-determination.

As Spanish control of the territory weakened, Morocco and Mauritania expressed claims over the territory. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in an Advisory Opinion requested by the General Assembly, ruled that there was no basis of territorial sovereignty on the part of Morocco or Mauritania which overrode the right of the inhabitants to self-determination.

Morocco moved forces into the Spanish Sahara in late 1975. As Franco was dying, Spain agreed to hand over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania without conducting a referendum on self-determination. Morocco’s movement into the territory was deplored by the Security Council in resolution 380 (6 November 1975).

The actual Spanish withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1976 was immediately followed by the founding of the “Saharan Arab Democratic Republic” (SADR) by the Polisario. Serious fighting broke out between the Moroccan and Mauritanian armies on one side, and the Polisario on the other side. In 1979, Mauritania dropped its claims on...
Western Sahara, and the Mauritanian sector was taken over by Moroccan troops.

In 1979, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) called for a referendum in support of the right of self-determination of the Saharans. In 1982, after 26 OAU member states recognised SADR, it was admitted to the OAU Council of Ministers. In protest, Morocco, a founding member of OAU, withdrew from the organisation.

After the establishment of a ceasefire in 1988, the parties agreed on a settlement proposal, including the holding of a referendum on self-determination. MINURSO was created in 1991 to implement this referendum, including a process of identification of eligible voters, and has been renewed regularly since 1991, for periods up to six months.

After several years of disagreement over the identification process, in 2001 James Baker, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy at the time, suggested a framework for the referendum. The Polisario rejected the terms of the referendum, because it would allow all settlers to vote, including Moroccan residents who by then outnumbered the Sahrawis. Baker then produced a revised plan, but this was rejected by Morocco.

Van Walsum recently characterised the situation as “quasi-irreconcilable.” Morocco and the Polisario agree on the desirability of a referendum. However, Morocco opposes including the option of independence. The Polisario position is based on long-established UN decolonisation principles, flowing from General Assembly resolution 1514 (1960), that the right of self-determination must include independence among other options. Morocco has signalled that it may be willing to accept some form of autonomy in Western Sahara, but the Polisario insists that a referendum as envisaged in the final Baker plan should be part of the process.

**Key Issues**

The first issue for the Council will be to determine whether there are any new options to bring the parties back to the negotiating table, including exploring any leverage that would affect their positions.

But a secondary issue is looming. Because the peace process has been stalled for so long, questions are likely to be raised about MINURSO’s future. Options include complete withdrawal or a change of mandate. In either case, Council members will also be weighing possible impacts on regional stability.

**Council Dynamics**

Leadership on the issue has traditionally been through a group of friends of Western Sahara composed of France, Spain, the US and Russia.

France has always supported Morocco. Although the US also has strong ties with Morocco, it has remained more neutral over the years and was a strong supporter of the Baker plan. At present, France and the US seem to support a solution based on the Moroccan idea of an extended autonomy for Western Sahara.

The US has been active in attempting to improve the atmosphere for future progress. US diplomats conducted negotiations that led to the liberation of Moroccan prisoners by the Polisario in August 2005. On the other hand, the US is keen to explore new options, including a rationalisation of peacekeeping operations where peace processes are stalled. The threat of MINURSO’s termination may be an option that Council members see as a lever to induce the parties to reach an agreement. However, there is bound to be controversy about this option.

Council dynamics are also likely to be impacted by wider considerations. Counter terrorism objectives, such as the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, point to the value of securing a lasting solution for Western Sahara sooner rather than later.

The Polisario also has allies, such as Algeria and Russia (as well as key AU members outside the Council, including South Africa and Nigeria). But Algeria is leaving the Council at the end of 2005.

Morocco’s refusal to consider independence as an option in the referendum stems from a fear that the loss of Western Sahara would create a deep political crisis. Moreover, the costs—both financially and in Moroccan lives as a result of the occupation—make it extremely difficult to give up the territory. But this must be set against the strong tide in the UN, and especially in African politics, in support of the right of self-determination of former colonised territories.

**Underlying Problems**

The main challenge to the process has long been the criteria for eligibility to vote. Originally, it was expected that all Saharans counted in a 1974 census and aged 18 years would have the right to vote. This solution met the Polisario’s demand for a limited voting pool excluding those it has regarded as foreign to the territory. Morocco, however, has wanted to expand this pool to make all residents eligible. The problem has become more acute with the growth of Moroccan residents eligible.

Human rights issues also lie in the background as Moroccan authorities still detain about 150 political prisoners, and there are around 500 Sahrawi civilians who have “disappeared.” Also, approximately 150,000 Saharais are living in refugee camps near the Algerian town of Tindouf, where allegations of human rights violations by Algeria have been reported. In his last report, the Secretary-General called on the parties to allow the High Commissioner for Human Rights to approach the parties. Morocco has also called for investigations with regards to the Polisario’s alleged torture of Moroccan prisoners it later released.
Historical Background

6 November 2005 The King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, announced the launching of a process of consultation with the parties on granting autonomy to Western Sahara.

11-17 October 2005 The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara visited the region and met with the parties.

18 August 2005 The last 404 Moroccan prisoners were released by the Polisario.

29 July 2005 The Secretary-General appointed Peter van Walsum as his Personal Envoy.

11 June 2004 James Baker resigned from his position as Personal Envoy to Western Sahara. Álvaro de Soto, Special Representative for Western Sahara at that time, took over the political process.

July 2003 Baker returned with a revised version of his plan, including safeguards that won Algerian and Polisario support. Moroccan settlers were able to vote, but Morocco rejected the plan.

23 May 2003 Baker proposed another plan (Baker Plan II) which provided for a referendum in four to five years time and offered the inhabitants a choice between independence, autonomy or complete integration with Morocco. The plan was accepted by Polisario, Algeria and the Security Council but was rejected by Morocco.

20 June 2001 Baker presented a “Framework Agreement” (Baker’s Plan I), in which the referendum would be replaced by a vote on limited autonomy. Morocco would control the territory while the Sahrawis would have had exclusive competence over local issues. The framework was accepted by Morocco but rejected by the Polisario.

September 1998 The process of identifying eligible voters was completed.

September 1997 The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, James Baker, conducted a successful round of talks between the parties which led to the adoption of the Houston Accords.

May 1996 The identification process was suspended. The civilian police component of MINURSO was withdrawn and the military component was reduced.

29 April 1991 Resolution 690 established MINURSO with the mandate to implement the settlement proposals during a transitional period in which the referendum would be organized. The plan also created an identification commission to determine voters.

30 August 1988 The two parties agreed on the UN “settlement proposals,” which pushed for a ceasefire and the holding of a referendum to enable the people of Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

1984 Morocco withdrew from the OAU to protest against the presence of the Polisario at the OAU summit.

1982 The SADR was admitted to the OAU.

1979 Mauritania renounced all claims on Western Sahara. Morocco took over the Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara.

27 February 1976 Morocco annexed Western Sahara. The SADR was founded and announced an armed struggle to achieve the right of self-determination. Fighting broke out between the Polisario and the Moroccan and Mauritanian armies. The population fled to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria.

26 February 1976 Spain withdrew from Western Sahara.

14 November 1975 Spain ceded Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania after the signature of the Madrid Accord.

6 November 1975 The “Green March” over the border between Western Sahara and Morocco moved around 350,000 Moroccans into the territory.

31 October 1975 Moroccan troops crossed the frontier and clashed with Polisario guerrillas.

16 October 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion was issued.

1973 Frente Polisario was formed and launched its first raids against Spanish colonisers.

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UN Documents

### Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1634 (28 October 2005) extended MINURSO until 30 April 2006 and requested the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to provide a briefing within three months.
- S/RES/1598 (28 April 2005) extended MINURSO’s mandate by six months.
- S/RES/1495 (31 July 2003) supported the peace plan proposed by Baker as an optimum solution on the basis of agreement between the parties.
- S/RES/690 (29 April 1991) established MINURSO.
- S/RES/689 (27 June 1990) endorsed the settlement proposals.
- S/RES/621 (20 September 1988) authorised the appointment of a Special Representative to Western Sahara.
- S/RES/380 (6 November 1975) deplored Morocco’s movement into the territory.
- S/RES/377 (22 October 1975) requested the Secretary-General to consult with the parties.

### Most Recent Secretary-General’s Reports

- A/60/116 (12 July 2005)
- S/2005/254 (19 April 2005)

### Selected Letters to the President of the Council


### Selected Exchange of Letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council

- S/2004/492 (15 June 2004) announced the resignation of Baker and charged Álvaro de Soto with the task to continue the political process.

### Other

- A/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
- Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (16 October 1975)
In retaliation for a PLO attack in March 1978, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and occupied the southern part of the country. A few days later, the Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), urging Israel to cease its military activities and withdraw its forces from Lebanon. It also decided to establish the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), with the mandate of:

- confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces;
- restoring international peace and security; and
- assisting the Government of Lebanon to regain its authority over the area.

Israel withdrew in June 1978. Control of the south was taken over by a militia allied to Israel, the South Lebanese Army (SLA).

In 1982, Israel invaded again, reaching Beirut. From 1982 until 1985, UNIFIL’s main role was to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population.

In 1985, Israel undertook a partial withdrawal, but retained a self-proclaimed “security zone” in South Lebanon, controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the SLA.

The armed group Hezbollah was founded in 1982 and quickly focused on expelling Israeli forces from Lebanon. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah fought a guerrilla war against Israel and the SLA. Despite the impasse, the Council kept renewing UNIFIL’s mandate on a regular basis, accompanied by Presidential Statements calling for the implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

In May 2000, Israel proceeded with the complete withdrawal from South Lebanon, in compliance with resolution 425 (1978). The SLA was dismantled. The UN crew a border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, known as the Blue Line. In the aftermath, UNIFIL’s mandate was renewed in order to verify the Israeli withdrawal and help the Lebanese forces to deploy into the area vacated by Israel. Because of violations of the Blue Line by the IDF, the deployment of UNIFIL and of the Lebanese forces in the south was halted. Hezbollah filled the vacuum, conducting militant activities and providing social services for the population. Today Hezbollah justifies its action against Israel based on the Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a farms, a small piece of land considered part of Syria by the UN but part of Lebanon by Hezbollah.

From June 2000 to January 2001, the troop strength of UNIFIL was increased in order to redeploy over the territory that Israel left. But the Secretary-General noted at the end of 2000 that, out of the three components of UNIFIL’s mandate, one only remained: the restoration of peace and security in the area, given recurrent incidents along the Blue Line. Therefore, the strength of the force was reduced following resolution 1337 (2001), and the mandate modified to one of monitoring.

The Council has continued to extend UNIFIL every six months. The Council requested the Secretary-General in January 2005 to make recommendations on a possible review of the UNIFIL mandate, and he concluded that nothing needed to be changed for the time being.

Key Issues

For the Council, an important issue is for Lebanon to be able to regain full control over all its territory. This was restated in resolution 1559 (2004) which called on all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to be disbanded and disarmed. Terje Roed-Larsen was appointed Special Envoy for Verification of the Implementation of Resolution 1559. This resolution was applied not only to the areas occupied by Syrian troops, but also in the south to replace Hezbollah. It is an issue, therefore, whether the UNIFIL mandate renewal would be the appropriate opportunity to take up the outstanding recommendations in the Roed-Larsen report.

Allegations that Hezbollah hampers the work of UNIFIL had been addressed in the
last consultations about UNIFIL in July 2005. It remains to be seen whether this issue will be addressed in the Secretary-General’s report.

A further relevant issue arises from the fact that both Lebanon and Israel have been actively keeping the Council apprised of incidents across the Blue Line. The incidents are not insubstantial.

Finally, in other circumstances the issue of the long duration and cost of UNIFIL might have been raised. However, because of the current situation in Lebanon and the level of Council support for Lebanon in other contexts at this time, it seems unlikely that any change in the size of UNIFIL or in the structure of its mandate would be considered.

Council Dynamics
Because of sensitivities about Council involvement in the substance of Middle East issues relating to Israel and its neighbours, Council members participating in the Quartet (a group leading the diplomatic effort on the Middle East and the Palestinian question and composed of the Secretary-General, the European Union, Russia and the US) are unlikely to want to link the implementation of resolution 1559 to the question of the UNIFIL mandate. Rather, it is more likely that they will prefer that renewal be seen as an essentially technical exercise.

Similarly, it seems unlikely that the Council will take up the substance of the cross border issues being raised by Lebanon and Israel. It would not be welcomed by the Quartet, on the grounds that it is not possible to see what concrete or practical measures the Council could take that would assist the situation.

It is likely therefore that a consensus will readily be found among Council members on the simple renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate.

Underlying Problems
The Lebanese government still does not have full control over South Lebanon. The 1989 Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war required the “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” and required the government to “deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel.” So did resolution 1559. The Lebanese government has not tried to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Prior to Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Lebanon justified its position by the fact that Hezbollah was fighting for the liberation of the south, then occupied by Israel. After 2000, Hezbollah focused on the Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a farms and became involved in Lebanese politics. Its electoral success as a political party now makes it difficult for the Lebanese government to implement the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and the Taif Agreements.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1614 (29 July 2005) extended the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 January 2006 with no change.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1583 (28 January 2005) extended the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 July 2005 and expressed intention to review the mandate and structure of UNIFIL.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1461 (30 January 2003) extended the mandate of UNIFIL and took note of the completion of the reconfiguration of UNIFIL.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1337 (30 January 2001) extended the mandate of UNIFIL by six months, reduced the level of its military personnel and endorsed the reconfiguration of UNIFIL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1310 (27 July 2000) extended the mandate of UNIFIL by six months and endorsed the understanding that the Force would redeploy in South Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/523 (18 October 1982) extended the mandate of UNIFIL by 3 months and authorised it to conduct humanitarian tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/520 (17 September 1982) condemned the Israeli incursions and demanded an Israeli withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/516 (1 August 1982) authorised the deployment of military observers in and around Beirut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called for strict respect for the international integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, urged Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, and established UNIFIL.</td>
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</table>

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2000/21 (18 June 2000) recognised that Israel withdrew from all of Lebanese territory.
- S/PRST/2000/13 (20 April 2000) welcomed the decision of Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.
- S/PRST/2000/3 (31 January 2000) called for the implementation of resolution 425 and expressed concern at the continuing violence in South Lebanon.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2001/423 (30 April 2001) Interim report on UNIFIL that proposed a plan for the reconfiguration of the force.

Other

Historical Background

21-22 November 2005 Hezbollah and the IDF engaged in a heavy exchange of fire along the Blue Line.

29 June 2005 Hezbollah and the IDF engaged in a heavy exchange of fire in the Sheb’a farms area.

19 June 2005 Hezbollah won all seats in Southern Lebanon in the parliamentary elections.

13 May 2005 Repeated shelling occurred across the Blue Line by both Israel and Hezbollah around the Sheb’a Farms.

26 April 2005 Syria pulled out from Lebanon.

2 September 2004 The Council approved resolution 1559, calling on all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, all Lebanese and non-Lebanese forces to disarm and support the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.

16 May – 7 June 2000 Israeli forces withdrew from South Lebanon.

26 April 1996 The US negotiated an understanding under which Hezbollah and Palestinian guerrillas agreed not to attack civilians in northern Israel, and which recognised Israel’s right to self-defence but also Hezbollah’s right to resist the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Although Lebanon and Syria did not sign the document, the Israeli-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG), with members from the US, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, was set up to monitor the truce.

18 April 1996 An Israeli attack on a UN base at Qana resulted in the death of over 100 Lebanese civilians seeking refuge there.

11 April 1996 Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath, bombing Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon, the southern district of Beirut and the Bekaa valley.

25 July 1993 Israel launched Operation Accountability, the heaviest attack since 1982, in an attempt to end the threat from Hezbollah and from the General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon.

22 October 1989 The Taif Agreement was adopted by members of the Lebanese National Assembly. It covered political reform, the end of the war in Lebanon, the establishment of special relations between Lebanon and Syria and a framework for complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

6 June 1985 Part of Israeli troops withdrew but some remained in a security zone in South Lebanon.

1982 Hezbollah was created.

15 September 1982 Israeli forces occupied West Beirut.

6 June 1982 After an assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to the UK, and intense exchange of fire across the Israel-Lebanese border, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon called Operation Peace for Galilee.

13 June 1978 Israeli forces had withdrawn from Southern Lebanon. However, the territory was not handed over to UNIFIL but to the SLA.

Other Relevant Facts

- Special Envoy to the Secretary-General for Implementation of Resolution 1559
  - Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

- Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to Lebanon
  - Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

- UNIFIL Force Commander
  - Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France)

- Size and Composition of Mission
  - (31 October 2005) 2,009 troops, assisted by some 50 military observers of UNTSO; and supported by 101 international civilian personnel and 294 local civilian staff
  - Troop contributing countries: France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Ukraine

- Cost (approved budget)
  - 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $99.23 million (gross)

- Useful Additional Sources
  - Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, ICG Middle East report No. 48, 5 December 2005

- Council Working Group on Sanctions
  - The lack of a settled, generic policy on both the implementation of targeted sanctions and the working methods of the sanctions committees is not surprising given the Council’s traditional situation-specific
approach to issues. But this approach has not precluded Council members in the past from establishing general principles to guide their approach to issues. In the sanctions context, an initial start in this regard was made in recommendations agreed by the Security Council’s Working Group on General Issues Related to Sanctions. The Working Group, first established by a Note of the President in 2000 (S/2000/319), was asked to examine a number of issues with a view to improving the effectiveness of sanctions and transparency in the work of the committees. A number of these issues were set out earlier in a Note by the President of the Council on 29 January 1999 enumerating practices to improve the work of the sanctions committees (S/1999/92). The issues before the Working Group included:

- the working methods of sanctions committees and inter-committee coordination;
- the design of sanctions resolutions, including the conditions for the maintaining/lifting of sanctions;
- monitoring and enforcement of sanctions;
- targeted sanctions;
- assisting member states in implementing sanctions;
- capacity of the UN Secretariat; and
- humanitarian exemptions

The Working Group’s (WG) mandate was expanded and extended to 31 December 2005 by a Note of the President of the Council, dated 23 December 2004 (S/2004/1014). This had followed a report by the then Chairman contained in a Note by the President of 21 December 2004 (S/2004/979), in which it was recommended that the WG continue its efforts to agree on the outstanding issues which had prevented the Council from adopting a comprehensive sanctions policy. The report also noted that the WG’s prior work had not taken into consideration the increased sanctions activity of the Security Council after 11 September 2001. Hence, the expanded mandate of the WG, inter alia, included the following issues:

- improving cooperation between sanctions committees and monitoring bodies, as well as assessing the possibility of reporting by regional organisations as an alternative to the reporting by individual states, and duration and lifting of sanctions (one of the issues on which the WG had great difficulty agreeing when in the context of time-bound sanctions);
- assessment of the unintended impact of sanctions and ways to assist affected untargeted states (an issue of major concern to a number of states);
- improving national implementation of sanctions (which aimed to address the issue of capacity-building assistance to states);
- enforcement of targeted sanctions (along the lines of recommendations that emerged from the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes); and
- de-listing procedures and the legal consequences of listing and de-listing secondary sanctions (which the Council is now threatening to use against violators of sanctions measures)

So far, a number of the recommendations in the draft paper prepared by the Working Group in 2002 are being implemented in an ad hoc manner by some sanctions committees. But they have never been reviewed, debated and approved by the Council itself. However, without a Council-endorsed policy, even at the level of guidelines, implementation is erratic and varies from committee to committee. These inconsistencies contribute in varying degrees to a lack of cooperation by some member states with the sanctions committees.

The Council has also benefited from the work on targeted sanctions facilitated in recent years by the Swiss, German and Swedish governments—the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes—in the design of its sanctions measures, including a requirement that the sanctions committees assist states in achieving optimum capacity to implement the sanctions measures.

While the Working Group had completed most of its work some time ago, it has been stymied in providing a final report to the Council for consideration due to disagreement among the five permanent members over a few outstanding issues. It seems that some members are reluctant to agree to a set policy which might limit their flexibility in dealing with emerging trends. Among the unresolved issues is whether, as a matter of policy, sanctions should be for a specific duration and renewable by a decision of the Council depending on whether the target of the sanctions has complied. There are strongly opposed views on this issue, partly due to experiences over the years in arriving at consensus in the Council as to when the target of sanctions has complied with the Council’s demands, and being able to reach agreement on the lifting of such sanctions. This problem is more acute when the action required of the target is not made sufficiently clear in the resolution.

There have been renewed efforts to reach agreement on the non-contentious issues in the Working Group. It would seem worthwhile for these agreed upon issues to be reported to the Council and subsequently approved. Not only will some guidelines facilitate more effective action by the Council, they will also create greater transparency in the work of sanctions committees and consistency in their procedures, foster greater coordination among them, and make the broader UN membership aware of what to expect when sanctions are violated. A course of action that includes the progressive establishment of a clearer sanctions policy would enhance the integrity of the sanctions process and help provide credibility to the Council’s stated resolve to enforce its own sanctions measures.

The current mandate of the Working Group expires at the end of 2005. At the time of writing, it appears that the Council will renew it for another year. In that context, the Council may also wish to address the need to improve the capacity of the UN Secretariat to facilitate the work of the sanctions committees and the monitoring mechanisms. In as much as there has been a significant increase in the work of the sanctions committees and of monitoring mechanisms in recent years, the Secretariat’s capacity has not kept pace.
Next Steps for the Security Council

Following the meeting in London, the Secretary-General will recommend to the Council the future shape of the UN presence in the country, and the mandate and size of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the mandate of which expires in March 2006. At present, UNAMA manages UN relief and reconstruction in coordination with the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and assists the latter with capacity-building and institution-building related to law and order, security and governance.

There will be support for retaining a central role for the UN in helping the Afghan government to coordinate international assistance. There is no agreement among Council members on whether there will be reductions in staff. UNAMA has fulfilled part of its mandate (including the elections), but the tasks ahead continue to be daunting. The security situation in Afghanistan as well as the safety of UN staff are major constraints.

UNAMA is only part of the international presence in Afghanistan, and this is reflected in substantial previous decisions by the Council. The Council’s involvement also includes a sanctions regime through resolution 1267 (1999) against the Taliban and al-Qaida. The military picture includes the NATO-commanded 9,200-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), initially authorised by resolution 1386 (2001) to provide security in Kabul, and by resolution 1510 (2003) to support the Afghan government in the maintenance of security country-wide, and the 20,000-strong US-led counter-insurgency coalition (Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF), present in the country with the consent of the Afghan government to fight particularly Taliban and al-Qaida elements.

On 8 December, NATO members decided to increase ISAF peacekeeping and reconstruction activities in the country. It is gradually expanding operations from the northeast to the entire country through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). It is expected that OEF will retain the most dangerous counter-insurgency activities while ISAF will assist Afghan forces with tasks such as disarming militias. NATO’s projected increase in troop levels from 9,000 to about 15,000 in 2006 could pave the way for a reduction in US military personnel.

The Council expects a quarterly report from ISAF for January, but this report is usually not taken up for discussion by the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/Res/1510 (13 October 2003) expanded ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul.
- S/Res/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.
- S/Res/1386 (20 December 2001) authorised ISAF to provide security in Kabul.
- S/Res/1373 (28 September 2001) created a comprehensive package of measures to curb terrorism.
- S/Res/1333 (19 December 2000) strengthened the sanctions against the Taliban and imposed sanctions against al-Qaida.
- S/Res/1267 (15 October 1999) imposed sanctions against the Taliban.

Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2005/525 (12 August 2005) is the latest report.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/56
Historical Background
18 September 2005 Parliamentary elections were held.

October 2004 Hamid Karzai was elected President.

March 2004 The Berlin pledging conference took place.

January 2004 The Loya Jirga adopted the new constitution.

August 2003 NATO took over ISAF’s command.

March 2002 The Council established UNAMA.

January 2002 The Tokyo pledging conference took place.

December 2001 The Bonn Compact was adopted. The Council authorised ISAF.

November 2001 US-supported forces marched into Kabul.

October 2001 The international offensive against the Taliban began.

September 2001 Al-Qaida carried out attacks on US soil.

August 1999 The Council imposed sanctions regime against the Taliban and al-Qaida.

1996 The Taliban seized control of Kabul.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission
Jean Arnault (France)

Size and Composition of Mission
Current strength: 199 international civilians, 729 local civilians, 12 military observers, 7 civilian police, 41 UN volunteers.

Duration
28 March 2002 to present.

Senior ISAF Civilian Representative in Afghanistan
Hikmet Çetin (Turkey)

ISAF: Size and composition
Current strength: 9,200 troops.
Contributors of military personnel: 35 NATO and non-NATO countries. Current top contributors: Germany, Italy, Canada, France, the UK, Spain.

ISAF: Duration
20 December 2001 to present

Somalia

Expected Council Action
The Council will receive the interim report of the Monitoring Group on the arms embargo currently in force in Somalia. At this stage, however, we do not expect any strengthening of the sanctions regime or immediate action against violators.

Key Facts
Since 1991, Somalia has had no effective central government and, despite efforts by the UN in the 1990s, virtually no end to continuous inter-clan warfare. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—comprised of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda—sponsored negotiations in 2004 that led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) under Abdullahi Yusuf. However, this arrangement cannot be considered a peace agreement in the regular sense.

Unresolved issues such as the location of the TFG and a unified national army continue to create tensions that have prevented the TFG from assuming an effective governmental role. Despite the formation of the TFG and of a National Assembly, virtually every political actor in Somalia is involved in factional politics and remains dependent on private militias.


In April 2005, IGAD decided to send a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), in response to the invitation of President Yusuf. However, capacity issues among IGAD members have prevented the practical realisation of this initiative. In an effort to assist IGAD, the African Union endorsed the mission in May. However, a major issue is the composition of such a force. Various Somali factions object to troops from neighbouring states and, given that most IGAD members are neighbouring states, this is a serious problem.

An arms embargo was also established in 1992, as well as a Sanctions Committee and a Monitoring Group. The embargo is ineffective, and no measures against violations have been imposed. Challenges in this context arise from the lack of functioning customs in Somalia. The TFG has nonetheless repeatedly asked for exemptions to the embargo to allow it to increase security in the country with the assistance of IGAD troops.

The Monitoring Group reported that Yemen and IGAD-member Ethiopia had provided arms to the TFG. Yemen publicly admitted to having done so at the request of President Yusuf, but Ethiopia denied the allegations. Another IGAD-member, Eritrea, has also been identified in media reports as breaching the embargo. Both TFG and opposition groups have imported arms in breach of the embargo, according to the Group, and a military build-up is currently taking place.

The Group identified individual violators and recommended sanctions on charcoal and fishing to curb financing of arms purchases. Regarding the humanitarian impact of the proposal, the Group stated that the majority of the revenues from those activities is diverted to arms purchases, and only a small percentage thus reaches the population at large. The Group also stated that enforcing the proposed sanctions would be easier, since it would require cooperation from non-Somali third parties involved in trading those commodities.

The Sanctions Committee Chairman, Ambassador Lauro L. Baja of the Philippines, visited
Kenya (where the Monitoring Group’s office is located), Ethiopia and Yemen in late November to discuss compliance with the embargo, but only in Yemen was the Chairman able to meet with senior authorities. He provided a briefing to the Sanctions Committee in mid-December.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is whether Council measures, in this case the arms embargo, can be permitted to be flouted so extensively. Another issue is whether to strengthen the arms embargo by targeting its financing from charcoal production and fishing.

**Council Dynamics**

Most Council members are concerned with the ongoing challenges to the arms embargo and see the risks to the integrity of future sanctions regimes if violators publicly and persistently flout obligations that are imposed by the Council and are binding under international law. However, there is an underlying resistance among some Council members against enforcing sanctions regimes in general. Council members as a whole will be very conscious that two of the alleged violators, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are the focus of even more difficult Council attempts at the present time to secure compliance with resolutions and commitments. There will therefore be some reluctance to press the Somalia sanctions issue too hard at this time.

But equally there will be no appetite for rewarding the Somali factions by any loosening of the arms embargo at this stage.

The expected focus of the Sanctions Committee will be on getting more information on individual violators. There is willingness to leave the customs aspect of sanctions to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).

On the issue of IGASOM, should it ever eventuate, there is willingness in principle in the Council to consider a limited exemption to the arms embargo for IGAD troops. But the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the mission leaves a degree of scepticism at this stage.

**Options**

The options that may be considered when the mandate of the Monitoring Group comes up for renewal in May include:

- targeting secondary sanctions against named individuals with specific responsibility for exports or imports of arms to Somalia;
- picking up the recommendations of the Monitoring Group on extending the sanctions regime to fishing and charcoal;
- concluding that, instead of acquiescing to Ethiopia and Eritrea for fear of adverse implications for the wider relationship with them, it is less dangerous to Council authority in general to send a clear message about the unacceptability of violating international law by establishing a secondary sanctions regime; and/or
- deciding that the risk of continuing with unenforced and regularly flouted sanctions exceeds that of removing them. Just as the Council withdrew UNOSOM in 1994, it could decide to step back from Somalia completely.

**Underlying Problems**

Conditions in Somalia remain dire. The humanitarian situation remains grave. Piracy, lawlessness, drug trafficking, militant Islamicists and Somaliland’s self-declared independence are important aspects of this picture.

Some Council members, and the US in particular, are concerned with the possibility that Somalia might become a safe haven for terrorists.

**UN Documents**

<table>
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<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1630 (14 October 2005) renewed the Monitoring Group’s mandate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/Res/1407 (03 May 2002) requested a panel of experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/954 (04 November 1994) determined UNOSOM II’s withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/897 (04 February 1994) revised UNOSOM II’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/Res/814 (26 March 1993) established UNOSOM II under Chapter VII.</td>
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</table>

**Background**

**September 2005** Somaliland held internationally monitored elections.

**June 2005** The TFG moved to Jowhar.

**May 2005** The AU authorised IGASOM.

**April 2005** IGAD decided to send troops to Somalia.

**10 October 2004** Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected president and the TFG was established.

**July 2002** The Panel of Experts was requested.
April 1995 UNPOS was established.


February 1994 UNOSOM’s troop levels were decreased.

October 1993 18 US Rangers were killed and their bodies mutilated, while 75 more were wounded. The US announced withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994.

June 1993 Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 were killed.

March 1993 UNOSOM II was established.

December 1992 The Council authorised UNITAF.

April 1992 UNOSOM I and a Sanctions Committee were established.


1991 Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence.

### Other Relevant Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS</th>
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<tr>
<td>François Lonsény Fall (Guinea)</td>
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<th>Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa</th>
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<td>Mohammed Sahnoun (Algeria)</td>
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<th>Size and Composition of Mission</th>
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<td>5 international civilians, 3 local civilians</td>
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