
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Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution 2276 (2016), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).





Annex

Letter dated 17 February 2017 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2276 (2016), the final report on its work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 30 January 2017 and was considered by the Committee on 16 February 2017.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Benoit Camguilhem
Expert

(Signed) Dmitry **Kiku** Expert

(Signed) Youngwan **Kim** Expert

(Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt Expert

> (Signed) Maiko **Takeuchi** Expert

> > (Signed) Neil Watts Expert

(Signed) Jiahu **Zong** Expert

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Enclosure

Letter dated 30 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2276 (2016), the final report on its work.

The Panel would appreciate it if this letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths Coordinator Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) (Signed) Benoit Camguilhem Expert (Signed) Dmitry Kiku Expert (Signed) Youngwan Kim (Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt Expert (Signed) Maiko Takeuchi Expert (Signed) Neil Watts Expert (Signed) Jiahu Zong **Expert**

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Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

Summary

During the period under review, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has intensified its prohibited activity by engaging in an unprecedented number of nuclear and ballistic missile-related tests. In response, the Security Council adopted resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), in which it significantly strengthened the sanctions regime against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While these measures impose new obligations on Member States, the Panel's investigations show that implementation remains insufficient and highly inconsistent. All Member States should reaffirm their commitment to rigorous enforcement of United Nations sanctions.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is flouting sanctions through trade in prohibited goods, with evasion techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication. The Panel investigated new interdictions, one of which highlighted the country's ability to manufacture and trade in sophisticated and lucrative military technologies using overseas networks. Another interdiction, of the vessel *Jie Shun*, was the largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and showed the country's use of concealment techniques, as well as an emerging nexus between entities trading in arms and minerals. The Panel's investigations further revealed previous arms trading by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and cooperation in Africa, including hitherto unreported types of cooperation on a large scale.

Designated entities and banks have continued to operate in the sanctioned environment by using agents who are highly experienced and well trained in moving money, people and goods, including arms and related materiel, across borders. These agents use non-nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as facilitators, and rely on numerous front companies. Diplomats, missions and trade representatives of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea systematically play key roles in prohibited sales, procurement, finance and logistics. In particular, designated entities are trading in banned minerals, showing the interconnection between trade of different types of prohibited materials.

Behind these illicit activities is the continued access of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the international banking system. Despite strengthened financial sanctions in 2016, the country's networks are adapting by using greater ingenuity in accessing formal banking channels, as well as bulk cash and gold transfers. Banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintain correspondent bank accounts and representative offices abroad and partner with foreign companies in joint ventures. Banks and designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea make use of broad interwoven networks to undertake procurement and banking activity. Their ability to conceal financial activity by using foreign nationals and entities allows them to continue to transact through top global financial centres.

Despite the new sectoral bans adopted for the first time in 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to export banned minerals to generate revenue. This is complicated by the fact that Member States have different interpretations of the minerals listed in the 2016 resolutions and construe their exemption clauses differently in practice.

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By blocking the vessels listed in resolution 2270 (2016) as assets of Ocean Maritime Management, Member States successfully prevented their access to foreign ports. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has since adapted to these measures through various tactics, including identity fraud.

The Panel's report shows that, despite the support of Member States for strengthened sanctions by the Security Council through two new resolutions adopted in 2016, this effort has not yet been matched by the requisite political will, prioritization and resource allocation to ensure effective implementation. The Panel recommends a series of designations and practical measures in order to offer the Security Council, the Committee and Member States additional tools by which to address current challenges and shortcomings.

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^{*} The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

Glossary

The following words and phrases are used in this report with the following specific meanings:

"The country" The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

"The Committee" The Security Council Committee established pursuant

to resolution 1718 (2006)

"The resolutions" Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321

(2016)

"The Panel" The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution

1874 (2009)

"The sanctions" The measures set out in the resolutions

"Interdiction" The inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo as

defined by paragraphs 11 to 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013) and

paragraph 16 of resolution 2094 (2013)

"Designate/Designation" Action taken by the Security Council or the Committee

under paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) (as amended by subsequent resolutions, including paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013)) against individuals or entities (asset freeze and/or

travel ban)

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I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2276 (2016), the Security Council extended the Panel's mandate until 24 April 2017. The present report covers the period from 6 February 2016 to 1 February 2017. (For the Panel's methodology, see annex 1-1.)

II. Background and political context

- 2. During the reporting period, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea undertook two nuclear tests and a series of ballistic missile tests, showing the country's ongoing resolve to develop prohibited programmes in defiance of United Nations resolutions. Kim Jong Un continued to emphasize his policy of simultaneous development of nuclear capability and the economy, including during his address to the Seventh Congress of the Workers Party. ¹
- 3. Domestically, Kim Jong Un focused on reinforcing his power base in the party, the military and society through enhanced military supervision and internal control over society. He revised the constitution at the Thirteenth Supreme People's Assembly in June 2016 to cement his position as the Chairman of "the State Affairs Commission", the supreme leader of the country. The country continues to upgrade its national defence industry with a renewed emphasis on the science and technology sector, including by developing weapons systems and building weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
- 4. The regime's ongoing violations of United Nations resolutions continued to deepen its international isolation, with the exception of several traditional relationships with countries in Asia and Africa. In international forums, including the seventeenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and high-level United Nations meetings, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rejected resolution 2270 (2016) in an attempt to legitimize its nuclear and ballistic missile tests as part of a broader strategy of gaining acceptance as a nuclear State. The country also continued to condemn actions by the United Nations on its human rights situation, including General Assembly resolution 71/202 of 19 December 2016, in which the Assembly welcomed the decision by the Security Council to include the situation in the list of issues. The inter-Korean relationship deteriorated further following the January 2016 nuclear test and subsequent ballistic missile launches.
- 5. The unprecedented frequency and intensity of the nuclear and ballistic missile tests conducted during the reporting period helped the country to achieve technological milestones in weapons of mass destruction capability, and all indications are that this pace will continue. The country has indicated its intention to complete its nuclear capability by claiming that it has "developed [an] H-bomb and had access to [a] standardized nuclear warhead" and "entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of [an] intercontinental ballistic missile". The stated

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¹ "Work report at 7th WPK Congress", Rodong Sinmun, 8 May 2016.

² "Fourth session of 13th SPA held in DPRK in presence of Kim Jong Un, *Rodong Sinmun*, 30 June 2016.

^{3 &}quot;Work report at 7th WPK Congress", and "Kim Jong Un's new year address", Rodong Sinmun, 2 January 2017.

⁴ "Kim Yong Nam refers to stand of DPRK Government on NAM position and role" 20 September 2016 and "DPRK FM speaks at general debate of 71st UN General Assembly", *Rodong Sinmun*, 26 September 2016.

⁵ General Assembly resolution 71/202.

⁶ "DPRK's ICBM development is to cope with US Nuclear War Threat: FM spokesman", Korean Central News Agency, 8 January 2017.

⁷ "Kim Jong Un's new year address", *Rodong Sinmun*, 2 January 2017.

goals of the resolutions of achieving denuclearization and a peaceful solution to the situation seem increasingly remote.

III. Reports by Member States

National implementation reports


- 6. Following the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel noted a significant increase in the number of national implementation reports by Member States compared with much lower reporting levels under resolution 2094 (2013). Since the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), 76 Member States have submitted reports (see figure 1) compared with 31 Member States for the 11-month period following the adoption of resolution 2094 (2013). Of the reporting States, 10 submitted their first reports since the introduction of sanctions in 2006.
- 7. The Panel's contribution to this improvement was through significant outreach to Member States. Following the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel sent reminders to 90 Member States that had never submitted national implementation reports. Six months later, reminders were sent to 134 non-reporting Member States under resolution 2270 (2016). Particular attention was paid to Security Council members and co-sponsors of the resolution to invite them to lead by example. The Panel encouraged non-reporting Member States to use the updated guidelines on the preparation and submission of national implementation reports. In contrast to the previous period, all Security Council Members submitted their national implementation reports in 2016. Despite increased reporting for resolution 2270 (2016) as compared with previous resolutions, the Panel notes that the number of non-reporting States (116) remains significant (see annex 2-1).
- 8. The Panel notes an improvement in the quality of some of the reports submitted, for example by providing information on delisted vessels, expelled individuals working for designated entities and non-renewal of contracts violating the resolutions. The Panel encourages Member States to enhance the level of detailed information in their reports, showing the extent to which their domestic legislation and practices address the measures contained in resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016).
- 9. The Panel recalls that Member States are to submit their reports in a timely manner as per paragraph 36 of resolution 2321 (2016).

⁸ See S/2014/147, para. 14.

10 Ibid

⁹ See S/2016/157, para. 11.

Figure 1
Overview of reporting by region



IV. Continuing violations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its obligation to abandon nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes

A. Recent nuclear-related activities

1. Nuclear test of 9 September 2016

10. On 9 September 2016, the Nuclear Weapons Institute of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that the country had conducted a "nuclear explosion test for the judgment of the power of a nuclear warhead newly studied and manufactured". ¹¹ The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) detected "an unusual seismic event" near the location of the previous test. ¹² The magnitude of 5.1 ¹³ is the largest among the tests conducted by the country (see figure 2). The waveform characteristics were similar to those from the 6 January 2016 test. ¹⁴ The type of device used has yet to be confirmed.

¹¹ "DPRK Succeeds in Nuclear Warhead Explosion Test", KCNA, 9 September 2016.


¹⁴ Technical findings of CTBTO (9 September 2016).

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^{12 &}quot;CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo on the unusual seismic event detected in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", CTBTO, 9 September 2016.

¹³ Magnitude of past tests (CTBTO): 4.82 (January 2016), 4.92 (2013), 4.51 (2009) and 4.08 (2006).

Figure 2 Location estimates for the tests conducted in 2006 (blue), 2009 (green), 2013 (yellow), January 2016 (orange) and September 2016 (red)



Source: CTBTO.

2. Continuing activities and expansion of infrastructure

11. On 9 March 2016, state media announced that Kim Jong Un had inspected a spherically shaped object and been briefed on "specifications and the mechanism of the miniaturized powerful nuclear warheads with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge" (see figure 3). The report claimed that "the nuclear warheads [have] been standardized to be fit for ballistic rockets". According to a Member State, the device lacks the physical characteristics typically associated with a thermonuclear device, and its plates, which can be seen on the surface, do not hide explosive lenses. To

^{15 &}quot;Kim Jong Un guides work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets", Rodong Sinmun, 9 March 2016.

A standard thermonuclear device features two stages, not featured in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea device.

Distributing explosive lenses on the surface at regular intervals may achieve a higher degree of implosion symmetry and, hence, higher yield.

Figure 3
Object inspected by Kim Jong Un



Source: Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

- 12. On 17 August 2016, the Atomic Energy Institute of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant, the 5 MW(e) reactor and the radiochemical laboratory were in normal operation, and plutonium production had been resumed by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor. Further, the uranium enrichment facility was operating at normal production capacity. Information obtained and satellite imagery analysis by the Panel appears to be consistent with some of the reported activities.
- 13. The August 2016 report by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attested to indications consistent with the operation of the 5 MW(e) reactor for the entire reporting period, except for between mid-October and early December 2015. IAEA also noted that this inactive period would be sufficient for the reactor to have been defuelled and refuelled. ¹⁹
- 14. Construction was completed on what appears to be an electrical switchyard adjacent to the light water reactor with ongoing construction on a nearby sandbar (see annex 3-1 and 3-2).²⁰ The radiochemical laboratory and associated steam plant appear to have operated from early 2016 to early July given the plumes of smoke and fluctuating amounts of coal observed at the steam plant stockpiles (see annex 3-3). Construction work continues at the fuel rod fabrication plant area, including the new building on the east side.²¹ Academic analysis postulates that the new building is for an isotope separation plant for thermonuclear and/or boosted fission weapons development.²²
- 15. The satellite images of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site also show construction work and other activities, in particular at the "North Portal" and "West Portal" (see annex 3-4 and 3-5).

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¹⁸ Written interview, Kyodo News, 17 August 2016.

¹⁹ IAEA, GOV/2016/45-GC(60)/16.

²⁰ See S/2016/157, para. 21.

²¹ Ibid., para. 21 and annex 5.

David Albright and others, "September 2016: monitoring activities at Yongbyon nuclear site", Institute for Science and International Security, 20 September 2016.

16. IAEA also observed mining and milling-related activities at the Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant.²³

3. Nuclear programme-related entities and individuals

Nuclear Weapons Institute

17. The Panel notes the emergence of the Nuclear Weapons Institute, which was reportedly a key actor in the September 2016 nuclear test. Kim Jong Un also met with members of the Institute and with Hong Sung Mu²⁴ during the "object's" inspection. ²⁵ This provides evidence of Mr. Hong's key role in the country's nuclear programme.

Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation

18. The Panel's investigation reveals that Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation (Kumsan) shares a phone and fax number and an e-mail address with the designated General Bureau of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry. The Panel previously determined that the Ministry and the Bureau are the same entity. The Panel further notes that Kumsan's address is identical to that of the sanctioned entities (see figure 4 or annex 4-1).

Figure 4 **Identifier comparison**



Source: The Panel and Naenara (www.naenara.com.kp) (bottom right).

19. Two Member States announced that Kumsan is controlled by General Bureau of Atomic Energy, procures supplies for the Bureau, is a cash route to Pyongyang, is utilized by the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry to produce sensitive materials and collect nuclear technology-related data and acted as the Ministry's overseas representative. The Panel found that the president of Kumsan is Mr. Kim Chol Nam, which was corroborated by several Member States.

²³ IAEA document GOV/2016/45-GC (60)/16.

²⁴ Vice-director of the Munitions Industry Department (see para. 52 below). He attended the 9 September nuclear test celebration.

²⁵ "Kim Jong Un guides work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets", *Rodong Sinmun*, 9 March 2016.

²⁶ See S/2015/131, paras. 27-28.

United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury sanctions individuals and entities supporting the North Korean Government and its nuclear and weapons proliferation efforts" (2 December 2016); and Republic of Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance, "Public announcement 2016-4" (8 March 2016).

- 20. Multiple online commercial sources advertise Kumsan's business activities in Moscow and Dandong, highlighting dealings in "metal minerals and mineral ore, including vanadium ore", which is prohibited by the resolutions (see annex 4-2). Kumsan's sales address is the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Moscow (see annex 4-3). According to an official website, Kumsan controls mines and chemical factories that extract and refine prohibited minerals, including vanadium, gold, zinc, copper and iron, with its main export being vanadium pentoxide.
- 21. Russia informed the Panel that Kumsan was not officially registered and that no vanadium trade had occurred since March 2016. The Panel considers the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be abusing its diplomatic status by operating as a front for its clandestine vanadium sale operations without providing official notification to the Russian Federation.
- 22. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate Kumsan for attempted sale of prohibited minerals and use of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Moscow for commercial activities. Alternatively, the Committee could update the Committee's sanctions list by adding Kumsan as an alias of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry/General Bureau of Atomic Energy.
- 23. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise heightened vigilance over diplomatic agents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who are engaging in professional or commercial activities, particularly in prohibited items.²⁸

General Precious Metal

- 24. The Panel investigated the 2016 attempted online sale of lithium metal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. ²⁹ The enriched lithium-6 isotope, and products or devices containing it, are on the list of prohibited nuclear-related items adopted by the Security Council (see annex 4-4). According to IAEA, lithium-6 is used to produce tritium, an isotope found in boosted nuclear devices. ³⁰ This sales attempt suggests that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has access to remaining quantities of the material.
- 25. Li-6 is advertised for sale by a company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, General Precious Metal, which the European Union has identified as an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Mr. Chol Yun was listed as the contact person of General Precious Metal for sale of the mineral and has an address and phone numbers in Beijing (see annex 4-5). The same name appeared as third secretary of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing on an official diplomatic list dated 24 September 2012 (see annex 4-6). The Panel notes a pattern whereby the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has accredited Green Pine overseas representatives as diplomats. The Panel continues to investigate this diplomat's involvement in prohibited activities and his possible connection with another prohibited activity (see para. 91).

²⁸ See Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), para. 17.

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²⁹ "North Korea's proliferation and illicit procurement apparatus", Project Alpha, Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London.

³⁰ See IAEA document GC(XXXVII)/1075, 9 September 1993. Available from www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC37/GC37/Documents/English/gc37-1075_en.pdf.

B. Recent activities related to the ballistic missile programme

1. Ballistic missile launches

26. In 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to defy the resolutions by launching a record 26 ballistic missiles or other systems using ballistic missile technology (see table 1). The Panel has identified two significant trends in the country's ballistic missile programme which demonstrate major technological progress within a short period of time: significantly increased range through the introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and a shift to solid-fuel technology in its submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Table 1 **2016 ballistic missile launches**

Date	Туре	Number	Reported launch area	Reported range (km)	Remark
7 February	Kwangmyongsong	1	Sohae		
10 March	Scud	2	Nampo	500	
16 March	KN-11	1	Sinpo		Ejection test
18 March	Nodong	2	Sukchon	800	One failure
15 April	Musudan	1	Wonsan		Failure
23 April	KN-11	1	Sinpo		Failure after 30 km
28 April	Musudan	2	Wonsan		Failure
31 May	Musudan	1	Wonsan		Failure
22 June	Musudan	2	Wonsan	400	One failure
9 July	KN-11	1	Sinpo		Failure
19 July	Scud	1	Hwangju	500	
19 July	Nodong	2	Hwangju	600	One failure
3 August	Nodong	2	Hwangju	1 000	One failure
24 August	KN-11	1	Sinpo	500	
5 September	Scud	3	Hwangju	1 000	
15 October	Musudan	1	Kusong		Failure
20 October	Musudan	1	Kusong		Failure
December	KN-11	1	Sinpo		Ejection test

Space launches using ballistic missile technology

27. Having alerted international organizations³¹ of an impending satellite launch (see annex 5-1), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched a three-stage rocket from the Sohae satellite launching station on 7 February 2016. The stages and fairing fell in previously announced locations (see annex 5-2) and, according to the Office for Outer Space Affairs, the rocket successfully placed a satellite into orbit.³² The Democratic People's Republic of Korea subsequently registered it as an earth observation satellite, named "Kwangmyongsong 4" (see annex 5-3). A designated entity (see para. 48) supervised the launch, which was condemned by the

³¹ International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization and International Telecommunication Union.

The satellite was assigned Committee on Space Research designator 2016-009A. A Member State informed the Panel that the satellite emitted a signal only during the first few days, indicating that the satellite launch was a cover for a ballistic missile test.

Security Council. According to a Member State, this launch is part of an effort to develop a missile with a theoretical maximum range of 12,000 km.

28. Similarly to the 12 December 2012 launch, debris was retrieved. This included parts of the first stage and the fairing (see annex 5-4). 33 According to a Member State, it indicates that the rocket was identical to the December 2012 Unha-3 rocket (see figure 5), as shown by the painted blue number "3" of Unha-3 underneath the overpaint (see annex 5-4). Analysis of the fuel tank indicates that, unlike in the 2012 launch, hydrogen fluoride was added to prevent corrosion. Furthermore, an explosion occurred following first-stage separation that was intended to destroy and scatter debris in order to prevent collection and analysis. 34

Figure 5
Rockets launched on 12 December 2012 (left) and 7 February 2016 (right)





Source: KCNA (left) and KCTV (right).

29. Although the fairing contained some insulation materials (see annex 5-5), according to a Member State, it showed traces of explosives inconsistent with peaceful space launch applications.

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles

- 30. The Musudan was flight-tested eight times in 2016; one launch was apparently successful, among repeated failures. These failures highlight engine malfunctions and call into question the operational status of the missile. The rapid pace of missile testing indicates the importance that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attaches to attaining greater ranges.
- 31. On 22 June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea flight tested the "Hwasong-10" (Musudan), 35 which was also condemned by the Security Council. Member States reported it to the Committee as part of a salvo of two mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

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³³ See S/2013/337, paras. 30-33.

³⁴ The first stage disintegrated into more than 270 fragments.

^{35 &}quot;Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of Hwasong-10", Rodong Sinmun, 23 June 2016.

- 32. The missile was launched on a lofted trajectory and "targeted waters 400 km away after flying to the maximum altitude of 1413.6 km". ³⁶ This trajectory, confirmed by a Member State, allowed testing without overflying another Member State (see annex 5-6). The missiles were launched from an area near Wonsan, where reportedly a launch pad was recently constructed (see annex 5-7). ³⁷
- 33. Images of the 22 June 2016 launch confirm that it was the same road-mobile ballistic missile displayed for the first time at the 10 October 2010 parade (see figure 6). ³⁸ According to a Member State, it is based on the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics R27 and has a range of 3,500 km with a payload of 650 kg. It uses liquid fuel and has a detachable warhead. ³⁹

Figure 6
Musudan ballistic missiles at 15 April 2012 parade (left) and 22 June 2016 launch (right)





Source: KCNA.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles

- 34. Kim Jong Un oversaw the 10 March launches, which state media described as designed to "simulate the conditions of exploding a nuclear device from [a] pre-set altitude". The launches occurred one day after the exhibition of the purported "miniaturized nuclear device" (see para. 11). On 5 September, three Scud-class short-range ballistic missiles were launched, and reportedly flew approximately 1,000 km. Kim Jong Un again witnessed the drill, the aim of which was to examine the "guided accuracy of the improved ballistic rockets". They appear to be a new type of Scud-class ballistic missile with an extended range near that of medium-range ballistic missiles. The second results of the second res
- 35. The 19 July launches, again overseen by Kim Jong Un, were publicized as having been made "under the simulated conditions of making pre-emptive strikes at ports and airfields in the operational theatre in South Korea". 43 On 3 August, one of the missiles reportedly flew 1,000 km (almost its maximum range of 1,300 km) before falling in the exclusive economic zone of Japan.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "Geolocating the June 22 Hwasong-10 test: the Kalma firing position", 38 North (5 August 2016).

³⁸ KCNA Musudan images indicate a diameter of around 1.5 m and a length of around 12 m.

³⁹ It uses a combination of nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine.

^{40 &}quot;Kim Jong Un watches ballistic rocket launch drill of Strategic Force of KPA", Rodong Sinmun, 11 March 2016.

⁴¹ "Kim Jong Un guides fire drill of ballistic rockets", Rodong Sinmun, 6 September 2016.


⁴² KCNA images suggest a diameter of 1 m and length of 12.5 m for this new missile.

^{43 &}quot;Kim Jong Un guides drill for ballistic rocket fire", Rodong Sinmun, 20 July 2016.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

36. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continued its development of the Pukgeukseong-1 (in Korean 부국장-1) submarine-launched ballistic missile, also known as the KN-11. Four KN-11 tests occurred within five months from the Sinpo area, showing rapid development. A land-based ejection test on 16 March was shortly followed by a sea-based test on 23 April 2016. Images from the latter demonstrate a successful cold-launch of the KN-11 emerging from the water, igniting just above the sea surface and entering the boost phase, flying for 30 km. While externally resembling the 8 May 2015 missile, it used solid instead of liquid propellant, evidenced by differences in the exhaust plume and smoke (see figures 7 and 8).⁴⁴

Figure 7
Exhaust plumes of 8 May 2015 test (top) and 23 April 2016 test (bottom), showing transition from liquid- to solid-fuel engines



Source: Rodong Sinmun, 9 May 2015 (top) and 25 April 2016 (bottom).


37. Rapid technological developments have taken place over a short period, resulting in significant progress towards an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile system. The shift from liquid- to a solid-fuel engine for the KN-11 is a major technological development, affording greater stability, quicker preparation and longer fuel storage. The country has also developed a gas generator attached to the missile to eject it from its tube (see figures 8 and 9). Imagery from the 24 August test revealed that the KN-11 is a two stage rocket (see annex 5-8).

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
⁴⁴ The solid propellant nature of the missile is indicated by the bright and white plume instead of the orange and yellow colour associated with liquid fuel propellants.

Figure 8
Exhaust control vanes for 24 March ground test (left) and 23 April launch test (right)



Source: Rodong Sinmun, 24 March (left); and Rodong Sinmun, 25 April 2016 (right).

Figure 9
Gas generator for 24 March test (left) shown fitted to base of submarine-launched ballistic missile (right)



Source: KCNA.

- 38. The development of the KN-11 continued with a sea-based test on 9 July, in which the submarine-launched ballistic missile successfully ejected underwater and flew a short distance before exploding at an altitude of approximately 10 km.
- 39. The test of 24 August, by successfully going through ejection, boost and flight phases, was unprecedented in demonstrating the country's capabilities with regard to submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The lofted trajectory of the missile attained a reported range of 500 km (see figure 10).

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Figure 10 Lofted trajectory of 24 August 2016 KN-11 test




Source: KCNA.

Launch platform

40. The Gorae-class submarine launch platform has been modified to solve ejection and stability problems. To this end, vents were added on either side of the launch tube (see figure 11). These improvements are notable given that this vessel will likely serve as the basis for future submarine-launched ballistic missile submarines with multiple tubes. 45

Figure 11 **Open hatch and the vent modifications**



Source: KCNA.

41. Member States should be vigilant regarding the export of dual-use commercial items that could contribute to the submarine programme, in particular for launch-capable submarines, in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 2094 (2013) and paragraph 8 of resolution 2270 (2016).⁴⁶ The Committee also introduced a list of dual-use items with conventional arms applications which contained naval-related items.

⁴⁵ The presence of the vents and the hatch confirm that there is only a single launch tube in the submarine, confirming that this is a still a prototype.

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⁴⁶ See S/2016/157, recommendation 10 (c). For a watch list of 60 such items, see Republic of Korea, "Tailored watch list for submarine parts", press release of 8 December 2016.


Facilities for ballistic missile-related activities

42. Two new sites have been used for ballistic missile activity, Chamjin (southwest of Pyongyang) and Hamhung (on the east coast). The Sohae and Chamjin test sites have been used for tests related to intercontinental ballistic missiles while the Hamhung and Sinpo facilities have been used for activities relating to submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Sohae and Chamjin

43. The Panel previously noted that the upgrade of the engine test pad at Sohae was an indication that the site could be used to test larger engines. ⁴⁷ On 20 September 2016, state media reported the test of a "new-type high-power engine of carrier rocket for geostationary satellite" at the Sohae engine test pad, with a thrust of 80 tons. ⁴⁸ Engine images (see figure 12) are consistent with this statement and indicate the use of liquid propellants. One Member State has designated two individuals for cooperating with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the development of an "80-ton rocket booster". ⁴⁹ The test also shows the ongoing development of a space launch vehicle that is larger than the Unha-3. ⁵⁰

Figure 12 **The "80 tons" engine test**





Source: KCTV (left) and KCNA (right).

44. On 9 April 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced the Sohae test of "a new type high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic rocket" (see figure 13).⁵¹ According to a Member State, the engine was a cluster of two Hwasong-10 (a.k.a Musudan) engines and is for the Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile (a.k.a KN-08).⁵²

⁴⁷ See S/2015/131, para. 40.

⁴⁸ "Kim Jong Un guides ground jet test of new-type high-power engine of carrier rocket for geostationary satellite", *Rodong Sinmun*, 20 September 2016.


⁴⁹ United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury sanctions those involved in ballistic missile procurement for Iran", 17 January 2016.

⁵⁰ The Panel previously linked the launch pad gantry tower upgrade to the development of a larger rocket (see S/2015/131, para. 43).

⁵¹ "Kim Jong Un guides ground jet test of new-type high-power engine of intercontinental ballistic rocket", *Rodong Sinmun*, 9 April 2016.

⁵² Consistent with test images showing a rocket plume appearing to originate from two main nozzles. Images of the Hwasong-13 also indicate that the missile is powered by a two-engine cluster (see annex 5-9).

Figure 13 Intercontinental ballistic missile engine test





Source: KCNA.

45. On 15 March 2016, state media reported on an experiment involving a ballistic missile re-entry vehicle nose cone placed within the plume of a Nodong engine (see figure 14), which was designed to verify "heat-resisting materials" and guarantee "the reliability of the intercontinental ballistic rocket warhead re-entry". According to a Member State, the experiment was performed at the Chamjin test site (see annex 5-10). The nose cone is similar to that of the Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile blunt warhead paraded on 10 October 2015 (see annex 5-9). See annex 5-9).

Figure 14 **Images of re-entry vehicle test**





Source: KCNA.

53 "Kim Jong Un guides ballistic rocket's re-entry environmental simulation", Rodong Sinmun, 15 March 2016.

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The test site is part of the Chamjin complex, where Scud, Nodong and Musudan ballistic missiles are manufactured. Aliases of the Chamjin missile factory are "Thaesong Machine Plant" and "Thaesong Machine Factory".

Despite claims of "heat-flow five times stronger than the condition caused at the time of ballistic rocket re-entry", the temperature within the Nodong plume is much lower than those experienced by intercontinental ballistic missile warheads during re-entry, underlining the limits of "re-entry vehicle testing". Proving the reliability of an intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry vehicle would ultimately require several flight tests.

Hamhung and Sinpo complex

46. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea reported the 24 March test of a "high-power solid-fuel rocket engine" (see figures 8 and 15). Image analysis indicates that the plume colour is consistent with solid propellants and that the engine diameter is similar to the KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile. A gas generator attached at the engine-base suggests possible use by the Gorae class submarine to eject the submarine-launched ballistic missile from its launch tube (see para. 37). According to a Member State, the test was conducted in a facility near Hamhung (see annex 5-11).

Figure 15
Solid fuel engine test with gas generator





Source: KCNA.

47. Infrastructure improvement at Sinpo shipyard includes a nearly complete main (fabrication) hall, in addition to the construction of a second hall nearby (see annex 5-12). The main hall may be used to construct additional, larger submarines that are capable of carrying more than one submarine-launched ballistic missile. The second hall, which has since been partially covered (hardened) and potentially could be fully covered, may serve as a future loading and unloading facility for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (see annex 5-13). ⁵⁶

2. Ballistic missile programme-related entities and individuals

National Aerospace Development Administration

- 48. According to an 8 February report by the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), "Scientists and technicians of the NADA succeeded in putting the newly developed earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 into its orbit" using a "carrier rocket Kwangmyongsong" launched from Sohae. ⁵⁷ The Administration also stated that it would "in the future, too, launch more satellites". Kim Jong Un's 6 February launch order underlines the key role played by NADA in the launch. Additionally, NADA was responsible for an engine test of an engine for a larger rocket than the Unha-3 (see para. 43 and annex 6-1).
- 49. In its national implementation report on resolution 2270 (2016), Malaysia stated it "had declined the offer made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 to transfer its satellite-launching technology". The Panel is investigating whether this offer implicated NADA, given its responsibility for all space-related activities.

⁵⁶ Analysis of the notches for the new halls' dock indicates that a larger submersible dry dock than the existing one will be necessary to launch larger submarine-launched ballistic missile submarines (annex 5-13).

⁵⁷ "DPRK NADA releases report on satellite launch", *Rodong Sinmun*, 8 February 2016.

Munitions Industry Department

- 50. Resolution 2270 (2016) designated the Munitions Industry Department and its director Mr. Ri Man Gon, for overseeing weapons production and research and development programmes, including ballistic missile programmes. Throughout 2016, the Department continued to play a pivotal role in developing these programmes. Key Department officials have monitored and controlled key nuclear and ballistic missile test activities and provided briefings directly to Kim Jong Un.
- 51. The Panel previously reported on the key role of the first vice-director of the Department, Ri Pyong Chol,⁵⁸ in the nuclear programme and recommended his designation.⁵⁹ This year, in addition to his continued nuclear role, he occupies the pivotal position within the ballistic missile programme. Confirmed by information from Member States and state media, Mr. Ri has also provided briefings to Kim Jong Un at almost every test site and launch (see table 2 and annex 6-2).
- 52. Other key Department officials, including Mr. Hong Sung Mu, Mr. Hong Yong Chil and Mr. Kim Jong Sik, were also seen standing next to Kim Jong Un and providing him briefings throughout 2016 (see table 2 and annex 6-3). Mr. Hong Sung Mu, a key nuclear weapon expert, has consistently participated in nuclear warhead simulation tests. Both Mr. Hong Sung Mu and Mr. Hong Yong Chil were designated by multiple Member States and the European Union, having been identified as vice-directors of the Munitions Industry Department.

Strategic Force Command

- 53. The corresponding military entity responsible for ballistic missiles is the Strategic Force Command. State media have stated that the Command was responsible for the launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles throughout 2016. These roles were also reconfirmed by a map studied by Kim Jong Un bearing the Command's name (see annex 6-4). The Command has been designated by multiple Member States.
- 54. The commander of the Strategic Force Command, Mr. Kim Rak Gyom, ⁶² controlled and commanded ballistic missile tests and provided Kim Jong Un with briefings (see table 2). The Panel previously recommended him for designation to the Committee. He was also designated by multiple Member States.
- 55. The Panel recalls its previous recommendation to designate the following entity and individuals for their role in and support for the country's prohibited programme:
 - Strategic Force Command⁶³
 - Ri Pyong Chol, First Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department
 - Hong Sung Mu, Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department
 - Hong Yong Chil, Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department

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⁵⁸ A.k.a. Ri Pyong Chol (리병철).

⁵⁹ See S/2016/157, para. 24.

^{60 &}quot;Kim Jong Un watches ballistic rocket launch drill of Strategic Force of KPA", Rodong Sinmun, 11 March 2016.

⁶¹ The United States on 8 December 2015 and the Republic of Korea on 8 March 2016, as well as the European Union on 19 May 2016.

⁶² A.k.a. Kim Rak Kyom (in Korean: 김락겸).

⁶³ A.k.a. Strategic Forces, Strategic Rocket Force, Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People's Army and the Strategic Rocket Force Command of the Korean People's Army and Strategic Force.

- Kim Jong Sik, Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department
- Kim Rak Gyom, Commander of the Strategic Force Command.

Table 2
Munitions Industry Department and Strategic Force Command officials present at nuclear and ballistic missile-related events in 2016

Events (based on Rodong Sinmun reports)		Strategic Force Command			
	Ri Pyong Chol	Hong Yong Chil	Hong Sung Mu	Kim Jong Sik	Kim Rak Gyom
Nuclear test and ceremony (6-7 Jan.)	•	•	•		
Long-range rocket launch (7 Feb.)		•			•
"Miniaturized nuclear device" (9 Mar.)		•	•	•	•
Scud launches with nuclear warhead simulation (10-11 Mar.)	•		•	•	•
Re-entry vehicle simulation (15 Mar.)	•			•	•
Solid-fuel engine test (24 Mar.)	•	•			
Long-range rocket engine ground test (9 Apr.)		•		•	•
Submarine-launched ballistic missile test (23 Apr.)	•				
Two mobile Musudan missile tests (23 June)	•			•	•
Nodong-class medium- range ballistic missile test with nuclear warhead simulation (20 July)	•		•	•	•
Scud-class short-range ballistic missile test (6 Sept.)	•			•	•
Long-range rocket engine ground test (20 Sept.)	•			•	
Photo after nuclear test (22 Sept.)			•		

V. Embargoes

56. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to trade in arms and related materiel, exploiting markets and procurement services in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Panel investigations in 2016 highlighted the country's trade in hitherto unreported items such as encrypted military communications, man-portable air defence systems, air defence systems and satellite-guided missiles that may

involve large teams of the country's technicians deployed to assemble or service the banned items. The country also uses its construction companies that are active in Africa to build arms-related, military and security facilities.

A. Implementation of the embargo on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related items

Kwangmyongsong foreign sourced items

- 57. Debris from the 7 February 2016 rocket contained several foreign-sourced commercial items, including components similar to those from the 2012 Unha-3 rocket debris.⁶⁴ These include a camera electromagnetic interference (EMI) filter, ball bearings and pressure transmitters.
- 58. The ball bearings and engraved Cyrillic characters were identical to those from the 2012 Unha-3. Based upon the serial number and manufacturer of the camera EMI filter, the Panel contacted the Chinese manufacturer, Beijing East Exhibition High-Tech Technology Co. Ltd., for the procurement route. The Panel has not received a reply.
- 59. The pressure transmitters that were manufactured in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were the same model as those retrieved from the 2012 Unha-3 (see figure 16), but this time had gone through other intermediaries than the company based in Taiwan Province of China as reported on by the Panel in the 2006 and 2010 acquisition. ⁶⁵ In that case, they were sold by the manufacturer's distributor in China to a Beijing-based company, which sold them on to Beijing Xinjianteng Century Technical Technology. This company was unable to provide the identity of the purchaser and indicated that the pressure transmitters had been sold in an electronics market.

Figure 16
100 bar pressure transmitter in 2012 rocket (left) and 2016 rocket (right)





Source: The Panel.

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⁶⁴ See S/2013/337, para. 33; and S/2014/147, paras. 55-59.

⁶⁵ See S/2015/131, paras 58-59.

60. That case demonstrates the continuing critical importance of high-end, foreign-sourced components in manufacturing the Unha-3, and the ability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to diversify its procurement channels, even for the same components. Member States should rigorously implement the now legally binding "catch-all" provision for items which could contribute to the country's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes (paragraph 27 of resolution 2270 (2016)).

B. Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Interdiction of ammunition aboard the vessel Jie Shun by Egypt

61. On 11 August 2016, Egypt intercepted the *Jie Shun* (International Maritime Organization (IMO) No. 8518780), a vessel commanded by a Democratic People's Republic of Korea captain that was en route from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards the Suez Canal. A search revealed a cargo containing 30,000 PG-7 rocket propelled grenades and related subcomponents in wooden crates concealed under about 2,300 tonnes of limonite (iron ore), ⁶⁶ the largest interdicted ammunition consignment in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figures 17 and 18). The transfer of iron ore is prohibited unless exempted under paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016). This shipment of arms and iron ore highlights the nexus in trade by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a variety of illicit goods, from small arms and light weapons ammunition (banned in 2009) to the trade in minerals banned under resolution 2270 (2016).

Figure 17 **Interdicted** *Jie Shun*



Source: Egypt.

Figure 18

Cargo with limonite concealing arms




Source: Egypt.

⁶⁶ The ammunition placed under limonite was a concealment technique deterring cursory inspection at sea or in port, similar to the *Chong Chon Gang* case in 2013 (see S/2014/147).

Voyage

62. Departing Haeju port on 23 July 2016, the vessel passed through the Straits of Malacca and was interdicted in Egyptian territorial waters south of the Suez Canal (see figure 19). The vessel's automatic identification system was off for the majority of the voyage except in busy sea lanes, where such behaviour could be noticed and assessed as a safety threat.


Figure 19 Jie Shun voyage



Cargo

63. The 132-ton arms cargo consisted of 79 crates containing 24,384 disassembled PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades and materials for an additional 4,616 rocketpropelled grenades, all manufactured in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, according to Egypt. The markings indicated that they were manufactured in February 2016, but the Panel's on-site analysis revealed that they were not of recent production but rather had been stockpiled for some time. The bill of lading contained a false description of items as "assembly parts of the underwater pump", loaded in Nanjing, China, on 31 March 2016 (see figure 20). On the bill of lading, the address of the shipper, "Dalian Haoda Petroleum Chemical Co. Ltd", is that of a hotel in Dalian. Large nailed canvas patches concealed the destination and consignee stencilled on the crates. The destination and end user of the equipment was investigated by the Egyptian general prosecutor. 67

Figure 20 False description as "assembly parts for underwater pump"



64. Unlike previous arms interdiction cases, the components' plastic tubes bore no markings from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, indicating an additional layer of obfuscation (see figures 21 and 22). The Panel witnessed the destruction of part of the ammunition by the Egyptian Army on 7 and 8 November 2016 through controlled explosions, in compliance with the resolutions.

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⁶⁷ National authorities closed the private company and revoked its licence.

Figure 21
Assembled PG-7 from shipment



Source: Egypt.

Figure 22 **PG-7 components before destruction**



Source: Egypt.

65. For the limonite, there were two different bills of lading, one listing 1,998 tons from a consignor in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to a Dandong company,⁶⁸ to be discharged in a "China port" and the other for 2,300 tons from a different consignor in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Egypt (see annex 7-1).⁶⁹ Both share the same reference number HJ-1, were dated 22 June 2016 and had certificates of origin from Haeju. The Egyptian authorities did not exempt the cargo under paragraph 29 (b) of resolution 2270 (2016) and stated they were investigating the consignee.

Jie Shun: crew, management and vessel operation

66. The *Jie Shun* sailed under a Cambodian flag of convenience with a captain from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and 22 crew that had been certified by the Maritime Administration of that country. The Panel had previously reported on three individuals and their companies which subsequently reappeared as playing a key role in this vessel's operation. The first was the holder of the vessel's document of compliance, Mr. Fan Mintian (范民田), who used the e-mail address of Dalian Sea Glory, which was linked to the *Light*, a vessel suspected of carrying

⁶⁸ Korea Solbongsan Trading Company to Dandong Jinchang Industrials Trade Co. Ltd.

⁶⁹ Korea Suyangsan Trading Corporation.

prohibited arms.⁷⁰ While Mr. Fan claimed that he was only a "consultant" for the *Jie Shun*, he confirmed K-Brothers Marine Ltd. as the vessel's operator (see annex 7-2).⁷¹

- 67. The second individual, Mr. Zhang Qiao (张桥), a.k.a Jack, served at least three functions for the *Jie Shun*: he was its emergency contact (see annex 7-3); he arranged the protection and indemnity insurance (see annex 7-4); and, through his company, Bene Star Shipping Ltd., he registered the vessel's operator, K-Brothers, in the Marshall Islands. K-Brothers and Bene Star share a fax number. Bene Star is a key node connecting multiple companies linked to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and vessels associated with the Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM) (see annex 7-5). Mr. Zhang also claimed to be a "consultant" instead of the vessel's operator and stated that K-Brothers was "separate from myself". The Panel notes that individuals listed as K-Brothers emergency contacts have been involved with OMM-associated vessels.
- 68. With regard to the limonite used to hide the arms shipment, the Panel notes that, in addition to the *Jie Shun*, Mr. Zhang's companies managed, operated or owned other vessels and companies that had been involved in the export of coal and iron ore from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 7-7). Another vessel associated with Mr. Zhang reportedly transported coal in 2016 for a company affiliated to the military of that country. Mr. Zhang provided bills of lading to refute the Member State's report to the Panel; these documents bear the letterhead of the owner of the *Light*, Ever Ocean Shipping Agency Co. Ltd., which was dissolved from the Hong Kong, China, registry on 2 March 2012 (see annex 7-7).
- 69. The third individual, Mr. Li Anshan (李安山), was named in previous Panel reports, together with his companies, for his association with OMM. When Mr. Li first registered the *Jie Shun* in 2012 under the Cambodian flag, officers and crew from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea took over the vessel. The IMO company registration process, after first registering the vessel under his company, Mr. Li transferred it two months later to another of his companies, Hua Heng Shipping Ltd., which Egyptian authorities stated is the de facto owner of the *Jie Shun*. This company also served as manager/international safety management

⁷⁰ sea_glory@163.com. Dalian Sea Glory was international safety management manager of the *Light*, commanded by a Democratic People's Republic of Korea captain and crew (see S/2014/147, paras. 135-136).

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⁷¹ K-Brothers engaged in business dealings with Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsugu, an individual known for acting on behalf of the designated company Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM), in the acquisition of two OMM vessels: the *Ocean Galaxy* and *Ocean Dawning* (see S/2016/157, table 7).

He used benestar@byocean.com, ops@byocean.com, tech@byocean.com and jack@byocean.com.

⁷³ Bene Star was transliterated into Jixing Ship Trading Co. Ltd. (operating in Taiwan Province of China). In addition, Mr. Zhang runs several other businesses which have been investigated by the Panel, including Baili Shipping and Trading Ltd, and which had business dealings involving OMM-associated vessels (see annexes 7-5 and 7-6).

Ms. Gu Min, Director of Bene Star; Mr. Pan Wei Chao, Director of Pantech Shipping Ltd.; and Mr. Li Qi, vice-president of Dalian Shenghao International Trade Ltd., registered by the maritime administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and also involved in the country's imports of coal and iron ore (see annex 7-7).

⁷⁵ The bills of lading inspected by the Panel on-board confirm that these were the main types of cargo.

According to a Member State, the *Bright Star* made at least three voyages shipping coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on behalf of Korea Kangbong Trading Corp., which is affiliated to the country's Ministry of the People's Armed Forces.

⁷⁷ The vessel was delisted by Cambodia on 28 August 2016.

⁷⁸ Liaoning International Trade Foodstuffs Shipping Company.

manager for two vessels designated as OMM assets.⁷⁹ The Panel has not received replies from Mr. Li, *Jie Shun* owner Vast Win Trading Ltd., Cambodia or the Marshall Islands.

- 70. This case demonstrates not only how the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abuses flag of convenience cover, but also how it uses vessels managed by third-country nationals to transfer different types of prohibited goods.
- 71. The Panel recalls paragraph 23 of resolution 2321 (2016), by which the Security Council decided to prohibit the procurement of crewing services from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and recommends that the Council prohibit all flag registries from registering vessels commanded by officers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or operated by crews from that country.

2. Shipment of military communications materiel to Eritrea

72. The Panel investigated the July 2016 interdiction reported by a Member State of an air shipment suspected to be in violation of the resolutions. The shipment originated in China and was destined for a company in Eritrea, Eritech Computer Assembly & Communications Technology PLC (see annex 8-1), according to airway bills. ⁸⁰ Given the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the cargo's manufacture and logistics, the Panel concluded that it had violated the arms embargo (paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009)).

Inspection

73. The Panel inspected the consignment of 45 boxes and determined that the contents were military radio communications products and related accessories, including high-frequency software-defined radios, crypto-speaker microphones, GPS antennas, high-frequency whip antennas, clone cables, camouflaged rucksacks and carry-pouch (see figure 23 and annex 8-2). Certain boxes and articles were labelled "Glocom", and almost all of the items had been advertised by the company Global Communications Co (Glocom) on its website⁸¹ (see annex 8-2).

⁷⁹ Mr. Li is the sole director and shareholder of Petrel Shipping, a British Virgin Islands company also associated with OMM.

Based on information from the Panel, Chinese authorities thoroughly searched cargo manifest, air transport and customs clearance data for June and July 2016 and could not find any corresponding cargo from the Chinese mainland. The consignee is yet to reply to the Panel.

⁸¹ The Glocom website was shut down shortly after the Panel sent letters to Glocom front companies in Malaysia.

Figure 23 Crypto-speaker microphone (top right) with box (top left) and software-defined radio (bottom)







Source: The Panel.

74. Inside the rucksacks, the Panel discovered reinforcement material consisting of cigarette packaging with Korean script and "made in DPR Korea" labels (see figure 24).

Figure 24

Markings inside the rucksacks





Source: The Panel.

Shipper

75. The air waybills listed the shipper as Beijing Chengxing Trading Co. Ltd. 82 According to the Chinese business registry, the company is still active, mainly

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⁸² In Chinese: 北京成兴贸易有限公司.

trading in electronics, mining equipment and machinery (see annex 8-3). Mr. Pei Minhao (裴民浩) was listed as a legal representative until 26 February 2016 and still owns most shares in the company (see para. 164).

76. The same individual has been listed in several online commercial databases as director of at least two other Beijing-based entities, including Guangcaiweixing Trading Co., Ltd. 83 (see annex 8-3). Guangcaiweixing was listed as the shipper of a suspect shipment interdicted en route to Eritrea aboard the *Kota Karim* and reported to the Committee in August 2012. The container cargo manifest listed mostly dualuse items (see annex 8-4), including "numerical control" machine tools and related equipment, which had been inspected and detained by a Member State. The 2016 interdiction is the second documented interception of military-related items exported from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Eritrea and confirms ongoing arms-related cooperation between the two countries. 84

Manufacturer

- 77. Glocom is a Malaysia-based company which advertises radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations. Glocom claims a presence in more than 10 countries and a prominent international reputation gained through participating, according to its website, in three biennial "Defense Service Asia" arms exhibitions since 2006.
- 78. While Glocom is not officially registered and has no presence at its listed physical address, two other Malaysia-based companies acted on its behalf: International Golden Services Sdn Bhd and International Global Systems Sdn Bhd. International Golden Services was listed as the contact point for Glocom on the latter's website, while International Global Systems is the entity that registered Glocom's website (see annex 8-5).
- 79. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that Glocom is a front company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea company Pan Systems Pyongyang Branch (Pan Systems Pyongyang), which is linked to a Singaporean company named Pan Systems (S) Pte Ltd (Pan Systems Singapore). The address on an invoice to a Glocom supplier is that of Pan Systems Pyongyang (see annex 8-6). Other facts confirm Glocom's link with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: its stamp features the acronym "NKPY-PAN". and its catalogue features Korean characters that have been deliberately blurred or blackened (see annex 8-7). Its director is a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Pyon Won Gun.
- 80. Pan Systems Pyongyang is operated by the following nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Ms. Ryang Su Nyo (director), Mr. Pyon Won Gun, Mr. Pae Won Chol, Mr. Ri Sin Song, Mr. Kim Pyong Chol, Mr. Kim Sung Su (representative in China) and Mr. Kim Chang Hyok (representative in Malaysia) (see annex 8-8).

Modus operandi

81. Financial aspects of the operations of Pan Systems Pyongyang showed that the network utilized bank accounts, front companies and agents, mostly located in China and Malaysia, to procure components and sell completed systems (see

⁸³ In Chinese: 光彩伟兴贸易(北京)有限公司.

⁸⁴ See S/2016/157, paras. 94-95.

The Pyongyang branch of Pan Systems Pte Ltd. was unilaterally designated by a Member State on 8 March 2016.

⁸⁶ NKPY-PAN is likely an acronym for North Korea Pyongyang-Pan Systems.

paras. 232-241). Suppliers were mostly located in China (in particular in Hong Kong, China), and many of them were selling widely available electronic products. Components were sent to Beijing or Dandong, with Mr. Pyon apparently directly responsible for all acquisition matters. ⁸⁷ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea procured relatively inexpensive components for the purpose of assembling and selling very expensive tactical military radio communications material (see annex 8-9). ⁸⁸

- 82. Regarding its relationship with its office in Pyongyang, the director of Pan Systems Singapore informed the Panel that it had started doing business in 1996 and "after doing business for almost two years, [Ryang Su Nyo] suggested setting up a Pan Systems 'representative office' (unofficial) to help her in sales and logistics. At that time I think it was a good idea and agreed". 89 Over the next 10 years, the two offices engaged in joint projects to procure information technology items for shipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Pan Systems Singapore director visited Pyongyang several times. The Pan Systems Singapore director also claims that, for the past 10 years, he had no knowledge of the activities undertaken by Ms. Ryang.
- 83. However, the Panel's investigation has shown that in recent years Ms. Ryang regularly travelled to Singapore, where she met with the director of Pan Systems Singapore. During her travels to Singapore, Ms. Ryang was accompanied by her staff, including Mr. Pyon Won Gun, Mr. Pae Won Chol and Mr. Kim Pyong Chol, and also met with its representative in Malaysia, Mr. Kim Chang Hyok. Information indicates that the director of Pan Systems Singapore kept in regular contact with Mr. Kim Chang Hyok. The Panel notes that Singapore informed the Committee, in its national report on the implementation of resolution 2270 (2016), of its decision to cancel the visa waiver for nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which should assist in limiting the capacity of such networks to engage in and coordinate illicit activities abroad. Singapore
- 84. Pan Systems Pyongyang used Malaysia as a base for its key representative abroad and for the companies that have acted on its behalf (see paras. 77-78). The Panel sent a request for information to Malaysia asking whether it intended to expel Kim Chang Hyok from its territory for the purpose of repatriation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2094 (2013), and to freeze the assets or resources of International Golden Services and International Global Systems on its territory or that were subject to its jurisdiction pursuant paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013). The Panel has yet to receive an answer.

⁸⁷ An address used in Beijing was "Mr. Jin, Room 1203, Shuimutiangcheng 2nd building, Qinghe, Haidian district".

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A software-defined radio model GR-150 was sold by Glocom for around \$8,000 (with accessories), containing five electronic cards together valued at around \$15.

According to the director of Pan Systems Singapore, "Pan Systems Pyongyang is not a branch of Pan Systems (S) Ltd".

Ms. Ryang undertook one trip in 2016, three in 2015, three in 2014 and one in 2010. The director of Pan Systems Singapore stated that her trips to Singapore were related to medical issues.

The Panel notes that Mr. Kim Chang Hyok has undertaken 58 trips to Singapore since 2012 (mostly overland) and is investigating the purpose of the travels.


The director of Pan Systems Singapore stated "I hardly see or meet him, let alone have [a] meeting with him. I may [have] seen or met him on one or two occasions". However, the Panel has information that the director of Pan Systems Singapore made sure that Mr. Kim would participate in an annual Pan Systems staff dinner.

This measure took effect on 1 October 2016.

Links with designated entities

85. According to information obtained by the Panel, Pan Systems Pyongyang is operated by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the country's premier intelligence agency, designated under resolution 2270 (2016). This shows how the Bureau enables its key agents to generate revenues for its operations through such networks. Additionally, the Panel determined that "Wonbang Trading Co." is an alias of Pan Systems Pyongyang. The Panel is investigating whether this company is actually Wonbong Trading Co., which, according to two Member States, is controlled by the Bureau and is a lead exporter of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Information shows that Pan Systems Pyongyang also regularly received funds from the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) (see figure 25 and para. 237 below).

Figure 25
Pan Systems Pyongyang network



86. In the light of the above, the Panel recommends that the Committee designate Pan Systems Pyongyang for its involvement in the sales of arms and related materiel.

Name: Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. (Pyongyang branch)

A.k.a: Wonbang Trading Co.

Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district,

Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Director: Ryang Su Nyo;

Employees: Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang

Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol;

Telephone: +850-218-111 (ext. 8636).

87. This case demonstrates the increasingly sophisticated nature of evasion of sanctions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and illustrates important and previously unknown trends. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was able to establish a company in a third country, building up significant international recognition, including through participation in prominent regional arms fairs and by selling high-end arms and related materiel in multiple countries. It shows how the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has accessed a very lucrative niche market, representing a significant shift from the former focus on refurbishment of Soviet-era arms. In addition, this revenue-generating activity was coordinated by a network affiliated with the Reconnaissance General Bureau that utilizes different countries in the region for the purpose of purchasing components, locating its front companies and managing its illicit activities. Finally, the route followed by the interdicted cargo indicates that multiple regional or global freight forwarders and transportation modes were utilized to obfuscate the origin of the goods.

3. Shipment of Scud spare parts to Egypt

- 88. The Panel continued its investigation into the shipment of Scud spare parts to Egypt by focusing on the shipper, Ryongsong Trading Co. Ltd (Ryongsong); the seller, Rungrado General Trading Corporation (Rungrado); and the consignee, MODA Authority International Optronic. 94
- 89. The Panel identified the intermediary companies and individuals involved in the shipment and determined that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was operating out of its Beijing embassy, using cash to remit payment for shipping. The seller is a major company in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that is under the control of the Workers' Party of Korea which, among other activities, earns money by dispatching migrant workers overseas.

Shipper

- 90. The carrier's agent as listed on the airway bill (see annex 9-1), New Times International Transport Service Co. Ltd. (NTS), indicated it had had no direct contact with Ryongsong and that the freight forwarder, a Beijing-based company, BLH Global Cargo Co. Ltd., had acted on behalf of the shipper. BLH informed the Panel that it had indeed reserved aircraft space for the shipment, according to an agreement with NTS, but had acted on behalf of Mr. Liu Zhen Ren (刘振仁), who personally requested, in a telephone call a few days prior to the shipment, assistance in handling a consignment.
- 91. Mr. Liu informed the Panel that he had handled the transaction in Beijing near the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with an individual called Mr. "Yin" (尹), whom he believes is a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 95 There was no documentation for this transaction, as Mr. "Yin" paid 7,500 renminbi in cash for the shipment. The Panel is investigating whether Mr. "Yin" was from the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 96

Seller

92. Rungrado is operated by the Workers' Party of Korea and has over 10,000 employees (see annex 9-2). It has branches abroad, as well as partners in 40 countries and regions. It describes itself as dealing in "various kinds of heavy

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⁹⁴ See S/2016/157, paras. 71-77.

⁹⁵ Ryongsong listed the address of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing as its address on the airway bill.

⁹⁶ The corresponding name in Korean for Mr. Yin would be Mr. Yun.

machines, vehicle, light industry and electronic goods and seafood, as well as trade cargo service, passenger and freight transport" (see annex 9-3). ⁹⁷ The Panel determined that Rungrado's activities included dispatch of workers abroad, including in Poland under an agreement with a Polish company, covering work on construction sites and at naval yards (see annex 9-4). ⁹⁸ In paragraph 34 of resolution 2321 (2016), the Security Council expressed "concern that Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over this practice".

93. In light of its involvement in the sale of arms and related materiel, the Panel recommends that the Committee designate Rungrado Trading Co. 99

Name: Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

A.k.a.: Rungrado Trading Corporation

Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, Democratic

People's Republic of Korea

Director: Pak Kyu Hong (a.k.a. Pak Gyu Hong);

Telephone: +850-2-18111-3818022, Fax: +850-2-3814507;

E-mail address: rrd@co.chesin.com

Consignee

94. The contract associated with Scud spare parts mentioned an entity based in Egypt, "MODA Authority International Optronic", also listed as consignee in the airway bill (see annex 9-1). Although no company under that exact name exists in the Egyptian registry, ¹⁰⁰ the Panel determined that the address and fax numbers of that entity were the same as those of another Egyptian company, "Arab International Optronics" (see annex 9-5). The majority shareholder is the National Service Organization under the Ministry of Defence and Military Production of Egypt. Its activities include general contracting to satisfy the needs of the armed forces as first priority. Arab International Optronics also regularly used the name "MODA Authority — Arab International Optronics" when purchasing military equipment, which bears obvious similarities to "MODA Authority International Optronic" (see annex 9-6). ¹⁰¹

95. The Panel subsequently enquired with Egypt as to any involvement by Arab International Optronics in the acquisition of the Scud spare parts. Egypt replied that "The company Arab International Optronics has no connection with that transaction and has no connection with the North Korean companies mentioned in the memorandum from the Panel of Experts. The fact that the names of the companies mentioned in the memorandum from the Panel of Experts are similar does not mean that they are identical" (see annex 9-7).

⁹⁷ In an Italian economic forum in March 2007, Rungrado was presented as specializing in "overseas construction".

⁹⁸ In 2012, Rungrado sent at least 29 workers to Poland. Rungrado's workers in Poland have reportedly been involved in forced labour.

On 8 March, the Republic of Korea designated Rungrado Trading Corp as an alias of Ryongsong Trading Co. Ltd.

¹⁰⁰ Fax of 15 February 2016 from Egypt to the Panel.

Egypt informed the Panel that it had undertaken several measures to guarantee the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including the establishment of a national committee to oversee the implementation (inter-agency mechanism), and revision and streamlining any commercial or investment transactions with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

4. Military vehicles observed at parade and missile launch

96. The Panel investigated a three-axle military vehicle transporting an anti-air guided missile system which was tested during a military drill, and reported by state media on 2 April 2016. The guided missile system is identical to a strategic surface-to-air missile system (KN-06) displayed during the October 2015 military parade (see figure 26).

97. The surface-to-air missile system and radar transporter vehicles at the parade were labelled "Taebaeksan-96" in Korean script and strongly resemble a series of Russian-manufactured trucks (see annex 10-1). The Panel confirmed that a Russian Federation truck company had been operating an assembly line in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 2007 and that medium-sized trucks with the name "Taebaeksan-96" had been produced and licensed by that company at the Pyongsong Auto assembly plant. The Panel concludes that these "Taebaeksan-96" trucks were produced at the plant and were copies of the company's specific truck model.

Figure 26 KN-06 launch during the 2016 military drill (left) and trucks on parade in 2012 (middle) and 2015 (right)



Source: Rodong Sinmun, anonymous and KCTV.

98. In its reply, the Russian Federation stated that the truck company had established a joint venture with Korea "Pusen" corporation involving an assembly plant for manufacturing trucks in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from November 2006 to December 2010, during which time 156 truck kits were delivered to the country. The joint agreement consisted of two components: a licensing agreement, including technical specifications for assembly and production; and a commercial contract on truck kit deliveries. The Russian Federation clarified that, under the contract and end user certificate, "Pusen" corporation was not authorized to utilize the model for military purposes, and resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) did not prohibit shipments of trucks to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the period when the joint venture contract was in force.

99. The Panel notes that no company named "Pusen" exists in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but that a similarly named "Korea Pusong Corporation" manufactures vehicle-related machinery parts like grinders and bearings, and considers "Pusen" to be a derivative pronunciation of "Pusong". Norea Pusong was designated by a Member State in March 2016 for its role in military logistics and the procurement of weapons of mass destruction. Another Member State

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[&]quot;DPRK products popular at Pyongyang Spring Int'1 Trade Fair", KCNA, 21 May 2013; and "Corundum-made products widely used", KCNA, 22 July 2013.

¹⁰³ 8 March 2016, Republic of Korea designation.

stated that Pusong's alias, "Elite Surveying Instruments", had been involved in illicit shipments of dual-use items to an entity in the Syrian Arab Republic, "Megatrade", a front company of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre, that had previously been involved in prohibited activities. ¹⁰⁴ According to the truck's brochure, Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation markets this truck and provides repair and technical services (see annex 10-2). The Panel identified Ryongwang as an alias of a designated entity, Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. ¹⁰⁵

100. Spare parts almost certainly would have had to have been imported for vehicles such as "Taebaeksan-96". Given that resolution 2270 (2016) extends the arms embargo to any item that could directly contribute to the development of the country's operational capabilities of its armed forces, the Panel reiterates that Member States should prevent the export to the country of any commercial vehicles or spare parts thereof that could be used for military purposes. Furthermore, paragraphs 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to the transfer of "truck chassis with 6 or more axles", listed in annex III of resolution 2321 (2016).

5. Reported supply of man-portable air defence systems, surface-to-air missiles and radar to Mozambique

101. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea supplied arms and arms-related materiel to a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique, "Monte Binga". In a contract dated 28 November 2013, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed to supply man-portable air defence system components and training equipment and P-18 early warning radar components, and to refurbish T-55 tanks and modernize the surface-to-air Pechora missile system of Mozambique (see annex 11-1).

102. The \$6 million contract was signed by Mr. Choe Kwang Su, the representative of Haegeumgang Trading Corporation in Mozambique. Mr. Choe is also third secretary at the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pretoria. In addition to the contract itself, a Member State showed the Panel photographs of the activities, including technicians of the Korean People's Army standing in front of refurbished tanks. Mozambique has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

6. Patrol boat refurbishment in Angola and ship-building plans for Sri Lanka

103. The Panel continued its investigation into the refurbishment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Angolan naval patrol boats through Green Pine. The Panel requested information from Angola and China about shipment of conventional arms dual-use exports to Angola by a front company linked to Green Pine (see para. 175). The Panel established that the representative of Green Pine in Angola, a diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea named Mr. Kim Hyok Chan, and another Angola-based diplomat named as a Green Pine representative, Mr. Jon Chol Young, travelled together to Sri Lanka three times (between 2014 and 2016) to discuss shipbuilding projects. Described as boat-building experts, they reportedly met with the State Minister of Defence of Sri Lanka on 5 November 2015 to discuss building naval patrol vessels at a Sri Lankan shipyard prior to sale to its navy. The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Sri Lanka.

¹⁰⁴ See S/2014/147, paras. 51-54.

¹⁰⁵ See S/2016/157 para. 162.

7. Provision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of small arms and training of the Presidential Guard to the Democratic Republic of Congo

104. According to information from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), the Democratic Republic of the Congo received automatic pistols and other small arms shipped from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea bearing characteristics similar to those manufactured there. The pistols were issued to the Presidential Guard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as to special units of the Congolese national police, some of whom were deployed in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The Group of Experts reported that the pistols were part of a larger series of transfers of arms and related materiel in 2014 and 2015, including assault rifles, and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

105. The Group stated that the pistols and other arms were used in training by instructors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Kibomango military base outside Kinshasa, access to which is controlled by the Presidential Guard. The Group stated that training recipients included the Presidential Guard and special police. The instructors were housed at the former Gulf Oil Company premises in the Binza district of Kinshasa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

8. Reported supply of 122-mm guided rockets and aerial missiles to the Sudan

106. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea supplied 100 122-mm precision guided rocket control sections and 80 air attack satellite guided missiles (AGP-250, for ground attack) to Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company in two contracts of 29 August 2013, worth €5,144,075 and signed by reported KOMID president Mr. Kang Myong Chol (alias Pak Han Se), using a reported KOMID front company, Chosun Keuncheon Technology Trade Company. The Member State provided travel information on KOMID officials responsible for the contracts (see table 3). The Sudan has not responded to the Panel's enquiries.

Table 3
Travel of representatives of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation to the Sudan

Name	Arrival	Number of accompanying KOMID staff
Mr. Kang Myong Chol (aka Pak Han Se)	28 August 2013 and 15 December 2013	2 and 5, respectively
Mr. Kim Song Chol	29 August 2013, 22 March 2014 and 4 December 2014	9, 11 and 4, respectively
Mr. Jang Song Chol	10 June 2014	13
Mr. Ryu Mong Chol	4 April 2014	

¹⁰⁶ See S/2016/466, paras. 221 and 230-231.

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Contract numbers KS-EW-8100 and KS-EW-8002. Contact details for Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company were listed as Khartoum North, Kafori Area, PO Box 13189 Khartoum, Sudan, fax +249 185 336631, mobile +249 123007824.

9. Unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage retrieved from the Republic of Korea

107. In its continued investigation 108 of wreckage of unmanned aerial vehicles from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that were recovered in 2014, the Panel confirmed that at least one of the vehicles was manufactured abroad and identified some of the intermediaries involved in the procurement. The Baengnyeong-do Island vehicle was part of a set of seven UV10 unmanned aerial vehicles manufactured by the Beijing-based company Microfly Engineering & Technology and acquired by another Beijing-based company RedChina Geosystem Co Ltd. According to the latter company, Mr. Zhao De Wen (赵德文) acquired the vehicles to sell them to Mr. Zhu Zhong Xian (朱忠贤). Mr. Zhao's account of the transaction contradicts the company's version of events. Mr. Zhao stated that Mr. Zhu purchased the seven UV10 vehicles directly from the company and denied any involvement in the transaction. The Panel inquired with China as to how the vehicle was transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has yet to receive a reply.

108. This case illustrates the continued reliance on Chinese middlemen and cash transactions to procure commercial items for military purposes. **Member States should rigorously implement the now legally binding "catch-all" provision on arms and related materiel in resolution 2270 (2016).**

10. Interdiction of arms-related materiel by the Russian Federation

109. The Panel investigated a reported seizure on 7 December 2016 by Russian Federation customs officers of an eight-coil, 40 kg shipment of Aramid fibre (used for bullet-proof vests) at Vladivostok International Airport, organized by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for shipment to that country (see figure 27). According to the customs service of the Russian Federation, criminal proceedings are under way for this illicit transport of dual-use goods. The Panel has written to the Russian Federation to determine whether this material falls under the Committee's prohibited goods criteria. 110

Figure 27 **Seized Aramid fibre coil**



Source: http://dvtu.customs.ru.

¹⁰⁸ See S/2016/157, paras. 78-86; and S/2015/131, paras. 61-68.

¹⁰⁹ The seized materiel was non-oriented fibre comprising 10 strands without torsion, made from aromatic polyamides (Aramid or Kevlar) with a specific tensile strength of 31.9×10^4 m.

The Panel is yet to determine whether this material falls under the Committee's determination according to S/2009/364, section B.2, and S/2016/308, annex, para. 6 (a).

C. Technical training, advice, services or assistance

1. Mansudae Overseas Projects in Africa

Construction of a munitions factory in Namibia

110. In its continued investigation of the involvement of KOMID in Mansudae's construction of a munitions factory in Namibia, the Panel confirmed that KOMID had provided key components to the Oamites munitions factory and that Mansudae had used labourers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Satellite imagery also shows that construction at the military base at Oamites continued until at least 2014 (see annex 12-1). Namibia admitted that KOMID and Mansudae were involved in the project, and that it had been started by Mansudae in 2010 with labour from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, until it was discontinued in April 2015.

111. According to a document issued by KOMID in Namibia, a shipment under contract number "STNK-010305" was destined for the Namibian Defence Force and arrived in Walvis Bay, Namibia (see figure 28 and annex 12-2). Boxes with the stencilled KOMID contract number, together with multiple pressure tanks, were seen at Walvis Bay in October 2012, before reportedly being trucked to Oamites military base. The packing list included various types of pressure tanks and machinery that could be used for military explosives and production of propellants (see annex 12-3). 111

112. Namibia announced in June 2016 that, further to resolution 2270 (2016), it had decided to terminate the services of KOMID and Mansudae, including the involvement of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in current or future projects. The Panel requested confirmation of this termination and information on any repatriation of labourers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but has yet to receive a reply.

Figure 28
Shipment from the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation at Walvis Bay



Source: John Grobler.

Other military construction in Namibia and transfer of related profits

113. Namibia informed the Panel in July 2015 of the involvement of Mansudae in the construction of monuments and government buildings. Additionally, insurance

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It includes but is not limited to ethyl acetate storage/pressure tanks, granulators, mixing tanks, ball powder feeding tanks, control agent heating/pressure boxes and tanks, concentration tanks, absorption machines and mixed-acid pressure tanks.

documents show the company's involvement in construction at military bases under Ministry of Defence contracts. The construction included the "UBM" centre at Leopard Valley military base, a new central office at the Tsmeb base, the Lafrenze building and the renovation of a guest house (see annex 12-4). The guest house contract stipulates that work will continue until February 2017.

114. Namibia informed the Panel that Mansudae had withdrawn United States dollars in cash from its account at a local Namibian bank for labourers to transport on their return to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In January 2015, Mansudae requested the bank to pay \$280,000 to its 14 employees for "travel expenses", which was divided into \$20,000 increments for each individual to carry (see annex 12-5).

Exports by Mansudae of statues to Africa

115. Mansudae exported statues and other monuments to at least 15 African Member States, including liberation memorials, independence statues and statues of leaders (see table 4). Namibia and Angola both confirmed that Mansudae had constructed statues and monuments for them and continued to do business there. Additionally, Angola confirmed that Mansudae had undertaken more than 56 construction projects until February 2015 (see annex 12-6). The Angola business registry shows that Mansudae-Angola is affiliated with Mansudae-Namibia, with 90 per cent of its shares owned by Mansudae-Namibia (see annex 12-7). Other African States have not yet replied to the Panel's enquiries regarding Mansudae and its construction activities.

Table 4
Selected statues, monuments and other buildings by Mansudae

Member State	Statues/monuments
Angola	Memorial Tower, Peace Park and Praia Park statues
Benin	Statue of Behanzin
Botswana	Three Dikgosi monument
Congo	Monument of Independence, Statue of the President
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Statue of Patrice Lumumba, monument to Laurent Kabila
Equatorial Guinea	Stadium, Conference Hall
Ethiopia	Tiglachin monument
Mali	Bronze of General Abdoulaye Soumaré
Mozambique	Samora Machel statue
Madagascar	Government buildings
Namibia	Hero's Acre, Independence Hall, statue of Sam Nujoma, State House
Senegal	African Renaissance Monument
Zimbabwe	Hero's Acre, statue of Joshua Nkomo

Source: The Panel, Mansudae and media reports.

116. The Panel's mission to Angola in September 2016 confirmed that Mansudae continued to provide management and repair services at the mausoleum complex it had constructed. At the site, the Panel observed Mansudae personnel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating heavy equipment for site renovation and maintenance (see figure 29).

Figure 29

Mansudae personnel at mausoleum complex





Source: The Panel.

117. In paragraph 29 of resolution 2321 (2016), the Security Council prohibited States from procuring statues from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, directly or indirectly provided by the country or its nationals, whether or not the items originated in the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (unless there had been prior approval by the Committee). Furthermore, the Panel considers the maintenance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of prohibited items to also be prohibited. Therefore, any services or assistance relating to the manufacture and maintenance of statues are also prohibited.

118. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies for having violated the resolutions, assisting in the evasion of sanctions by providing services and assistance related to the manufacture and maintenance of arms and related materiel, working on behalf of KOMID through construction of a munitions factory, and the transfer of bulk cash via its workers.

119. The Panel recommends that Member States annul any contracts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or its nationals concerning the direct or indirect supply or transfer of statues, or services related to the maintenance of statues.

2. Training of the Presidential Guard of Angola

120. The Panel travelled to Angola in September 2016 to continue its investigation into the training by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Presidential Guard. Angola informed the Panel that the training had been initiated around 1990 and that, at the time of the Panel's visit, 12 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were providing martial arts and parade ground training. The Panel informed Angolan agencies that continuation of the training would constitute a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 2270 (2016), which clarified the prohibition on the hosting of personnel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for security force training, established under resolution 1874 (2009). On 24 October

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2016, the Panel enquired with the Government of Angola as to whether they had departed the country. The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

3. Military and police cooperation with Uganda

121. The Panel continued its investigation into the training by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Ugandan military and police forces. In its national implementation report, Uganda confirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was training its air force pilots and technicians as part of a contract which would expire in March 2018. Uganda also reported that two police training contracts involving 45 personnel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would expire in June 2016 and that, in the light of resolution 2270 (2016), it would not be renewed. The Panel has advised Uganda that the ongoing air force training constitutes a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 2270 (2016).

122. The Panel is continuing its investigations into the activities of KOMID officials travelling to Uganda and is awaiting a response from the authorities of that country. The Panel remains concerned over the activities of the military attaché office at the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Kampala and their attempts to generate military cooperation projects in third countries, such as South Sudan, which would violate the provisions of resolution 2270 (2016) (see annex 12-8).

4. International military technical forum in the Russian Federation

123. According to a September 2016 social media post by the embassy of the Russian Federation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a military delegation led by Colonel-General Yun Tong Hyon, Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces, was invited by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation to "participate in the activities of the International Military Technical Forum 'Army 2016'". The Panel wrote to the Russian Federation to express concern over the possibility that the military delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might exploit the event to contact foreign entities or countries for military-related cooperation or to obtain technical information (such as catalogues and datasheets for the purpose of reverse engineering, which are prohibited under paragraphs 8¹¹⁴ and 9 of resolution 2270 (2016), and requested additional information. The Russian Federation replied that the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the forum did not fall under the current sanctions regime (see annex 12-9).

D. Implementation of the luxury goods ban

1. Masikryong ski resort¹¹⁵

124. The Panel continued to investigate the supply of ski equipment used at Masikryong ski resort. In January 2016, media reports showed photographs of a cable-car system produced by an Austrian company, Doppelmayr Seilbahnen GmbH (see figure 30), which has yet to reply to inquiries from the Panel. Austria informed the Panel it did not consider ski lifts to be covered by Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 of 27 March 2007, implementing legislation for Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). In order to close the gap, Austria stated that "ski-gondolas"

Letter dated 3 June 2016 from the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations to the Panel of Experts.

Facebook page of the embassy of the Russian Federation in Pyongyang.

¹¹⁴ Exemptions in paragraph 8 include food and medicine.

¹¹⁵ See S/2015/131, paras. 99-101; and S/2014/147, paras. 118-119.

will be added explicitly to the European Union's North Korea list of luxury goods". 116 On 29 April 2016, the Council regulation was updated to include "teleferics, chairlifts, ski-draglines, traction mechanisms for funiculars" and their parts and accessories. 117

Figure 30 Masikryong ski resort cable car system



Source: NK News.

Limousine seized by Bangladesh

125. On 8 January 2017, Bangladesh Customs Intelligence seized a falsely declared luxury vehicle (see figure 31) brought into the country for resale by a diplomat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who had been expelled from Bangladesh five months earlier for involvement in another smuggling case. Such transfer by a diplomat could contravene paragraph 17 of resolution 2321 (2016). The Panel continues its investigation.

Figure 31 Vehicle seized by Bangladesh



Source: Bangladesh Customs Intelligence.

116 Reply of Austria to the Panel, 31 March 2016.

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Council Regulation (European Union) No. 2016/682 of 29 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007. European Union combined nomenclature codes now provide simplified means for exporters to check whether the export of these products and others to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would violate the ban on luxury goods.

3. Wonsan air show aircraft

126. The Panel investigated the operation of a P-750 XSTOL aircraft manufactured by Pacific Aerospace Ltd. (New Zealand) and an aircraft manufactured by an Italian company at the "Wonsan Air Festival" (see figure 32), held in September 2016 as violations of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006), as implemented by New Zealand and the European Union.

Figure 32
Aircraft at the Wonsan air show



Source: NK News (left) and Aleksandr Pak (right).

127. The Panel determined that both aircraft had been indirectly brought to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The P-750 XSTOL aircraft had been sold to a Chinese company¹¹⁸ and delivered to China in September 2015. Ownership had then been transferred in October 2015 to a company describing itself as "Beijing Freesky Aviation Co., Ltd". The aircraft had been brought to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by December 2015 (see annex 12-10). Both New Zealand and Italy confirmed that aircraft fell into their luxury goods category. China stated that "Member States have [a] different definition [of] luxury goods", emphasizing that aircraft are not included in the prohibited luxury goods list in the resolutions.

128. This case highlights a trend whereby luxury items in manufacturers' countries are transferred to third countries with different criteria for luxury goods prior to their end use in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

4. Sportswear produced in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

129. The Panel investigated reported manufacture of an Australian brand of ski clothing at Taedonggang Clothing Factory in Pyongsong, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The company publicly stated it was aware of the issue, which related to its winter 2015 mountain-wear line, but had become aware of it only after the production had been completed and been shipped to retail customers. The company also stated that two styles, totalling 4,000 units of ski wear, did slip through and had been shipped to customers.

130. The ski wear has been produced in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since at least 2014. Despite a 2014 web blog that included ski wear production images, the company did not sever its production line for two years. The Panel is investigating the factory in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the reported production of military uniforms for export. The investigation highlights joint ventures by foreign companies that utilize cheap labour to produce luxury sportswear in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, thereby generating foreign currency for that country.

The New Zealand and Chinese companies established a joint-venture factory in 2016.

¹¹⁹ According to the manufacturer.

E. Implementation of other embargoes

1. Specialized teaching and training

131. Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), complemented by paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2016), introduced a ban on "specialized teaching or training" of disciplines that could contribute to prohibited programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

132. Regarding the participation of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in courses at the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, host country India informed the Panel that it had "taken measures to prevent any future [participation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] in courses offered by [the Centre] which could be used by" programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 120

133. The Panel also investigated two Italian institutions, the International Centre for Theoretical Physics and the International School for Advanced Studies, with students from the department of physics of Kim II Sung University. The International Centre in particular has enjoyed the support and partnership of IAEA since the 1960s and the Institute frequently organizes joint IAEA nuclear-related workshops. Students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were enrolled in PhD courses or postgraduate diploma programmes, including on high energy physics, which could fall into the category of disciplines banned by resolution 2270 (2016). Upon the Panel's recommendation, both institutions redirected current and future students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to mathematics.

134. The Panel investigated four students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the faculties of material science and engineering, and electronic telecommunications technology at the Politehnica University of Bucharest in Romania. Romania indicated that, following the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), all four students had transferred to the faculty of biotechnical systems engineering in the field of specialized machinery for agriculture and food. The Panel is also investigating two students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at Uppsala University in Sweden reportedly studying biology at the PhD level.

135. According to a Member State, Kim II Sung University, the Kim Chaek University of Technology, the Pyongsong College of Science and the National Defense University are the main institutions feeding the nuclear or ballistic missile programmes of the country. The Panel determined that some of those institutions had bilateral agreements with at least four universities in China and two in the Russian Federation (Far Eastern Federal University and Pacific National University). The Panel enquired as to how paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016) had been implemented in practice. Far Eastern Federal University stated that all students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were attending training in humanitarian disciplines. Pacific National University stated that it was acting "according to the resolutions" and there "there are no courses and researches which have become prohibited to the [nationals of DPRK] following the implementation of resolution 2270". The Panel has yet to receive information from the universities in China. The Panel is investigating whether there are agreements with universities in other countries, including in North America, the Middle East and Europe.

¹²⁰ See S/2016/157, paras. 46-51.

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Primarily Russian language and literature.

2. Aviation fuel

136. Paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016) prohibits the sale or supply of certain aviation-related fuels to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with specific exceptions. The Panel sent baseline surveys on the aviation fuel procurement methods of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as quantities and agents, to 12 Member States, 8 of which responded. The Russian Federation stated that the types of fuel designated by the Security Council in resolution 2270 (2016) had not been supplied to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since March 2016. Chinese customs data obtained from a subscription database showed exports of fuel to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea labelled as "air transport" valued at only \$90,211 for the period 1 July-2 October 2016. Other Member States that had previously sold aviation fuel to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicated they had temporarily suspended the technical landings of Air Koryo flights.

137. The Panel notes that, despite the measures introduced in resolution 2270 (2016), the activities of the air force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued with no reduction in air sorties. In addition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held its first-ever air show at Wonsan on 24 and 25 September 2016 featuring military and Air Koryo aircraft. These investigations continue.

VI. Transportation

A. Maritime

1. OMM vessels

138. Following resolution 2270 (2016), Member States prohibited OMM vessels from entering their ports, which led to OMM vessels limiting their voyages to between ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While some vessels became inactive, others continued sailing, including the *Ji Hye San*, *Kang Gye*, *Song Jin* and *Thae Phyong San*. Notably, 8 of the 31 vessels designated in annex III to resolution 2270 (2016) were involved in identity deception (annex 13-1).

139. Since July 2016, this deception has involved renaming and allocating new Maritime Mobile Service identity numbers and call signs (see table 5).

Table 5 **Vessel identity changes**

	_		Deception	
Original name ^a	IMO No.	Name	MMSI	Call-sign
Chol Ryong	8606173	Pukchong 33	445548000	HMZA5
Hui Chon	8405270	Song Phyong 7	445554000	HMZB7
Ji Hye San	8018900	Ri Won 105	445549000	HMZA8
O Rang	8829555	Song Phyong 1		
Ryong Rim	8018912	Sin Pho 99	445546000	HMZB2
Se Pho	8819017	Buryong3		HMEG

¹²² This was not a violation of paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016).

			Deception			
Original name ^a	IMO No.	Name	MMSI	Call-sign		
Song Jin	8133530	Hongwon88	445366000	HMZE		
Chong Rim 2	8916293	Saebyol	445143000	HMAA		

^a As listed in resolution 2270 (2016), annex III.

140. One of the above cases involved the Song Phyong 7, which omitted its obligatory IMO number when transmitting its Automatic Identification System data from 13 November 2016, violating shipping regulations (see figure 33). 123 This vessel is listed in the database of the Maritime Administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the exact characteristics of the designated OMM vessel Hui Chon (IMO 8405270) (see annex 13-2). The Panel further confirmed that it is the only vessel of those dimensions built at that shippard in 1984, that it is the only existing ship of its class and that there is no pending IMO number request. The vessel was detained following a Port State Control inspection between 18 and 23 November 2016 owing to a lack of documentation (see annex 13-3). There was no mandatory Continuous Synopsis Record describing the vessel's history, nor were there any IMO numbers on the vessel's certificates or in a visible place on the ship's hull, superstructure or the interior, as required by the IMO. 124 The Panel concludes that the maritime administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea falsified the identity of the Hui Chon by providing fake certificates and allocating a new Maritime Mobile Service identity number, in evasion of paragraphs 12, 22 and 23 of resolution 2270 (2016), which would have required a Member State to seize the vessel or deny it entry into port.

Figure 33

Song Phyong 7 Automatic Identification System transmission



Source: Marinetraffic.com.

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These regulations include International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea regulation XI/3, which came into force on 1 January 1996, according to which the IMO number must remain unchanged upon flag transfer and be included in a ship's certificates.

Safety of Life at Sea Convention, regulations XI/3 and XI-1/3.

141. The Panel monitored the 31 vessels listed in annex III of resolution 2270 (2016), 9 of which were subsequently delisted. 125 All were foreign-flagged except for the *South Hill 5*, which was reregistered under the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and renamed the *Nam Dae Chon*. 126 The *South Hill 2* and *Hu Chang* were reported scrapped as of March 2016. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged *Mu Du Bong* was seized in 2015 as an asset of OMM by Mexico and scrapped in July 2016.

Reflagging

142. Following resolution 2270 (2016), flag States deregistered a number of vessels that were linked to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These included 15 vessels deregistered by Mongolia. Six of those vessels moved to the United Republic of Tanzania (Zanzibar) flag registry, only to be delisted on 29 June by that country, along with five other vessels. Three of the fifteen (E.Morning, Jinming 1 and Northern Luck) were then reregistered under the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, three under Fiji and three under the Republic of Moldova. Panama deregistered five vessels; one moved to the registry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, of the two that moved to the United Republic of Tanzania, one later moved to Fiji. Despite official deregistration, many of the vessels continue to sail under the flag of the United Republic of Tanzania. Overall, there is a trend towards vessels associated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being reflagged with the United Republic of Tanzania, and of holding companies that are associated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea registering in the Marshall Islands. The Panel has yet to receive responses from the United Republic of Tanzania and the Marshall Islands. Paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016) strengthened paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016) by requiring Member States to deregister any vessel that is owned, controlled or operated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and prohibiting reregistration of any vessel that had been deregistered pursuant to that paragraph.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels

143. The Panel found that 30 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels were owned or operated by 37 foreign companies (in seven countries), in violation of paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016). Nine of these vessels have changed their flag and six have been sold. The remaining vessels and companies are listed in annex 13-4. These vessels are also now in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016).

2. Maritime insurance: DGS Marine

144. The Panel obtained evidence that two Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels, the *Min Hae* (IMO 8672897) and the *Dong Nam 1* (IMO 8503735), were insured by what became a defunct and unlicensed offshore entity, DGS Marine (a.k.a British European and Overseas P&I), controlled by a national of the United Kingdom, David Skinner. In addition to the possible violation of paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016), reports have suggested that DGS Marine previously insured vessels subject to the European Union sanctions regime against the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex 13-5).

125 Ever Bright 88, Firstgleam (former Dawnlight), Gold Star 3, Grand Karo, JH 86, Jin Tai, Jin Teng, Orion Star, and South Hill 5.

Reregistered by the Maritime Administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in July 2016. Susam Shipping Co. is the owner/operator.

145. The Panel notes previous widespread use by Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels of other foreign insurance entities subsequently liquidated by court order for being unable to perform their obligations to the insured, including the South of England Protection and Indemnity Association. 127 This is enabled by some flag and port States not verifying the insurance credentials of vessels. The Panel recommends that flag and port States verify the origin and legal validity of insurance of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels or vessels suspected of being crewed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

146. The Panel recommends that the Committee establish a list of designated vessels (subject to seizure as economic resources pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 23 of resolution 2270 (2016)), which includes vessel-identifying characteristics, and maintain the list as for designated individuals. In addition, the aliases of OMM vessels contained in table 5 should be added to the list.

147. The Panel recommends to the Security Council that "chartering" should be added to paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016).

B. Air

Air Koryo

148. The Panel has continued to collect information on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea military command of Air Koryo and the airline's military nature; the absence of boundaries between Air Koryo and the Korean People's Army Air Force and the role of Air Koryo in incidents of non-compliance. Military command over Air Koryo was further demonstrated in 2016 when KCNA released images of Mr. Kang Ki Sop, the Chief of the Civil Aviation Bureau, which controls Air Koryo, wearing a military uniform and visiting Korean People's Army Air Force bases together with Kim Jong Un. Mr. Kang Ki Sop was also filmed in civilian clothing with Kim Jong Un during visits to the new terminal at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see figure 34).

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^{127 &}quot;US Treasury fines American Company for insuring N. Korean vessels", NK News, 7 August 2015.

-OS
-OS
-KENA

Figure 34

Civil Aviation Bureau Chief Kang Ki Sop¹²⁸

Source: KCNA and the Panel.

149. The Panel previously indicated that Air Koryo and all airports and airfields in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are controlled by the Korean People's Army Air Force. 129 The Panel documented the use of these aircraft for transporting Korean People's Army paratroopers during military exercises 130 and at military parades, one of which featured three aircraft painted in camouflage. 131 The above information confirms that Air Koryo is integrated into the military of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that the airline's assets are actively utilized for military purposes.

150. Air Koryo has also been involved in two shipments of prohibited goods that were interdicted by Member States. In 2013, it transported a cargo of Scud missile spare parts from Pyongyang. ¹³² In 2009, an Air Koryo airway bill was used as the official transportation document to falsely label as "mechanical parts" 35 tons of conventional arms and munitions, including 240-mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and man-portable air defence systems valued at over \$16 million. ¹³³

151. Given the preponderance of evidence showing the absence of boundaries between the Korean People's Army Air Force and Air Koryo, the Panel considers that the "catch-all" provision of paragraph 8 of resolution 2270 (2016) should apply to items 134 destined for Air Koryo aircraft.

¹²⁸ According to state media, Mr. Kang has passed away.

¹²⁹ See S/2014/147, para. 141.

¹³⁰ See S/2015/131, para. 118.

¹³¹ See S/2014/147, para. 141.

¹³² See S/2016/157, paras. 71-76.

³³ See S/2013/337, annex XIII, sect. L.

¹³⁴ Including aviation-related technology, software, and test, inspection and production equipment listed in S/2016/1069.

VII. Activities of designated entities and individuals

152. The Panel investigated the activities of key designated entities and individuals, with a focus on those which had recently been added. The Panel's findings are that designated entities have intensified their business dealings via commercial online sources through complex networks of front companies, gradually disappearing in public business registries, which shows their adaptability and survivability in the sanctioned environment. Key trusted individuals continue to operate multiple companies at different addresses, allocating each company to trade in a specific type of business.

153. The Panel's investigations have found widespread evidence that designated entities and/or entities involved in prohibited activities have also traded in minerals listed in the resolutions, a lucrative business which also draws in more clients to facilitate their business dealings. Despite their affiliation with different state organizations, the procurement networks of certain designated entities are interconnected, with the most appropriate networks chosen for specific business dealings. Foreign embassies and trade offices are frequently exploited for their activities, and diplomatic status and embassy compounds utilized for the sale of prohibited items. The networks still boil down to a limited number of individuals and intermediaries; and those at an embassy or at trading companies are likely to be appointed as representatives of the designated entities.

154. Designated entities continue to exploit time lags between Security Council designations and Member State implementation by changing names, directors and addresses, and compartmentalizing their businesses to minimize the impact of sanctions. The Panel considers it essential that Member States monitor key individuals in designated entities, including directors, keeping records of their business activities and strengthening international cooperation to that end. The Panel also recommends that Member States communicate to the Committee available information on designated entities or entities owned or controlled by individuals acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated entities or individuals, or those which have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or violation of the resolutions.

A. Activities of designated entities

1. Namchongang Trading Corporation

155. Resolution 2270 (2016) designated Namhung Trading Corporation as an alias of Namchongang Trading Corporation and Mr. Kang Mun Kil (a.k.a. Jiang Wen-ji) for his nuclear procurement activities as a representative of Namchongang and/or Namhung.

156. According to the Chinese business registry, 137 an entity named "Beijing Representative Office of Korea Namhung Trading Corporation (朝鲜南兴贸易会社 北京代表处)" was established in October 2005 (see annex 14-1). Although its business license was revoked on 12 October 2012, some Chinese commercial websites still show branches of this company as active in Beijing and Dandong with Mr. Kang Mun Kil as its representative. Another company director is Mr. Hyon

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Namchongang was designated on 16 July 2009 for its role and involvement in the procurement of nuclear-related items from the late 1990s.

¹³⁶ In Korean: 강문길, in Chinese: **姜文吉**.

¹³⁷ Its official name is the national enterprise credit information publicity system.

Byong Chol. 138 China stated that the Dandong representative office licence was revoked on 10 April 2015.

Taeryonggang Trading Corporation

157. Mr. Kang Mun Kil has also been registered as a legal representative of a Dalian-based entity named "Taeryonggang Trading Corporation" (朝鲜大玲江贸易会社), 139 a fact that was published in Chinese newspapers in August 2013 (see annex 14-2). A Member State identified Taeryonggang as an alias of Namchongang and designated it on 2 December 2016. 140 The Panel confirmed through a comparison of both letterheads that Taeryonggang shares telephone and fax numbers with Namchongang (see annex 14-3). 141

Namchongang's connection with other entities

158. Namhung's address on several commercial websites is identical to that of Korea Sobaeksu United Corporation (朝鲜小白水联合会社) in the Chinese business registry. Both companies' registrations were revoked on 12 October 2012 but Namhung appears to have taken over Sobaeksu's office and business network and is using Sobaeksu's address to promote its business activities (see annex 14-4). Sobaeksu was designated by the European Union for its involvement in the research and acquisition of sensitive products and equipment in December 2010. He Branch offices of this company are listed in several commercial online sources as still active in Beijing, Yingkou and Dandong (see annex 14-5).

159. The Panel's investigation revealed possible links between the networks of Sobaeksu, Namchongang and KOMID. Sobaeksu's director before its licence was revoked, Mr. Yun Ho-Jin¹⁴³ (see figure 35 and annex 14-6), has the same name as the individual designated by the Committee in July 2009 as director of Namchongang. An individual named Mr. Kim Chol Nam¹⁴⁴ who, according to a commercial business registry, is director of Sobaeksu's Dandong branch (see annex 14-7), had been listed in the official business registry as a representative of the Beijing branch of "Korea Changgwang Trading Corporation (朝鲜昌光贸易总会社)", which the Panel previously identified as an alias of KOMID. 145

138 In Korean: 현병철, in Chinese: 玄炳哲.

¹³⁹ A.k.a Daeryonggang Trading Corporation.

Republic of Korea designations of 2 December 2016.

¹⁴¹ According to the bank's ledger, funds were transferred to Tanchon Commercial Bank for the account of Taeryonggang for the purchase of control pads.

The Republic of Korea has designated Sobaeksu.

¹⁴³ In Korean: 윤호진, in Chinese: 尹浩真.

¹⁴⁴ In Korean: 김철남, in Chinese: 金哲南.

¹⁴⁵ See S/2010/571, para. 56.




Figure 35 **Entities and individuals related to Namchongang**

160. The Panel recommends that the Committee update its sanctions list by adding the following information on Namchongang Trading Corporation as an a.k.a. to KPe.004:

A.k.a: Korea Tearyonggang/or Daeryonggang Trading Corporation (조선대령강무역회사, 朝鲜大玲江贸易会社)

Address: Sengujadong 11-2/(or Kwangbok-dong), Mangyongdae District,

Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Telephone number: +850-2-18111, 18222 (ext. 8573)

Facsimile number: +850-2-381-4687.

2. Tanchon Commercial Bank

161. Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated on 24 April 2009, and two of its representatives in Viet Nam, Mr. Choe Song II and Mr. Kim Jung Jong were designated on 2 March 2016.

162. In its national implementation report under resolution 2270 (2016), Viet Nam stated that those individuals were the third secretary and staff member of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Hanoi, but that they and their families had departed Viet Nam: in one instance before, and in one instance after the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016). Viet Nam stated it had never authorized Tanchon Commercial Bank to open a branch or subsidiary and that it had found no information on that entity. The Panel has previously noted the practice of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of assigning diplomats to serve as representatives of designated entities without notifying the State in which they are accredited.

3. Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation

Beijing New Technology Trading Company

163. KOMID has reportedly utilized an entity named Beijing New Technology Trading Company as a key vehicle for circumventing sanctions measures. Information provided by a Member State confirms that Beijing New Technology is a front company of KOMID.

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164. The Hong Kong, China, company registry shows that the director of Beijing New Technology, Mr. Pei Minhao, is also the owner of Beijing Chengxing (see figure 36 and annex 14-8), which was involved in a prohibited arms-related transfer to Eritrea in 2016 (see para. 75-76). Another director of Beijing New Technology, Mr. Park Young Han, ¹⁴⁶ also serves as legal representative of the company Guangcaiweixing, ¹⁴⁷ which was involved in another intercepted shipment to Eritrea reported to the Committee in 2012 (see annex 14-9).

165. According to several sources in the Chinese commercial coal and iron market, Beijing Chengxing has been listed as a supplier of Democratic People's Republic of Korea anthracite, iron ore and other minerals, and Guangcaiweixing is also listed as a supplier of Democratic People's Republic of Korea anthracite and minerals after the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016) (annex 14-10).

Figure 36
Entities and individuals related to Beijing New Technology

4. Green Pine Associated Corporation

Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation

166. The Committee designated Green Pine Associated Corporation in May 2012 and listed its aliases as "Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation" (NDIC) and "Chosun Chawo'n Kaebal Túja Hoesa".

167. The Chinese official business registry has listed a Beijing-based entity with the name "Beijing Representative Office of Korea NDIC" (朝鲜资源开发投资会社 北京代表处). The Chinese script 朝鲜资源开发投资会社 phonetically translates into Korean as "Chosun Chawo'n Kaebal Túja Hoesa". 148

168. According to the business registry, this alias of Green Pine is still active (with its licence expiring in May 2031). "Korea NDIC" also has a branch office in

148 In Korean: 조선자원개발투자회사.

¹⁴⁶ In Korean: 박영한, in Chinese: 朴永汉.

¹⁴⁷ The name of the company as it appears in the official Chinese business registry.

Shenyang and its registration was renewed in June 2014, according to several commercial online sources (see annex 14-11). 149

NDIC joint ventures with foreign companies

169. The Panel investigated an attempt by NDIC to use a joint venture to obtain offshore investment for mining in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. ¹⁵⁰ On 8 August 2012, NDIC established a joint venture with an entity registered in the British Virgin Islands, TTS Resources Limited. An Australian company announced on the Australian Securities Exchange its intention to acquire a joint venture sublicense in March 2013 for the Kumwha Deposit, but actions taken by the Exchange led to it being annulled by the company in September 2014 without any mining having taken place. ¹⁵¹

170. A separate, similarly named Democratic People's Republic of Korea entity, National Resources Development and Investment Corporation (NRDIC, as opposed to NDIC) also attempted to establish a similar type of joint venture for the same purpose, using companies based in the same countries and territories. Furthermore a Member State confirmed to the Panel that NRDIC is an alias for Green Pine.

171. The Panel also found NDIC letterhead from 2010 that shows a different address from that of Green Pine contained in the Committee's sanctions list and previously mentioned in the 2016 final report (see annex 14-12). The Panel therefore recommends that the Committee update its sanctions list on Green Pine as follows:

Add the alias of "National Resources Development and Investment Corporation" (NRDIC) as an a.k.a. to KPe.010;

Add addresses to KPe.010:

Rakrang No. 1 Rakrang District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Chilgol-1 dong, Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

Telephone number: +850-2-18111 (ext. 8327)

Facsimile number: +850-2-3814685 and +850-2-3813372 E-mail: pac@silibank.com and kndic@co.chesin.com

Greenpine International Corporation Ltd.

172. Greenpine International Corporation Ltd. ("Greenpine International") is listed in the Hong Kong, China, company registry as active, with Mr. Kim Song II as director. He is also registered in China as director of two other Beijing-based trading companies (see annex 14-13). According to the Chinese business registry, Greenpine International is a major shareholder of the two trading companies. The reply of China to the Panel stated the companies "have moved away from their registry address". He Hong Kong, China,

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¹⁴⁹ China investigated and stated that the relationship between this entity and Green Pine was unknown.

The joint venture was for the mining and sale of minerals from the Kumwha Mine, North Hwanghae province of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

EHG Corporation Limited, "EHG Corporation to acquire mineral licences", 8 March 2013; and "Cancellation of Kumwha deposit transaction", 19 September 2014.

¹⁵² In Korean: 김성일, in Chinese: 金成日.

⁵³ Beijing Dingyuan Dasong Trading Co., Ltd. (北京鼎元大松贸易有限公司) and Dingyuan Zhencheng (Beijing) Trading Co., Ltd. (鼎元贞盛(北京)贸易有限公司).

China also stated that "Mr. Kim is not a shareholder of any other enterprise and does not hold a position in any representative agency or office in China mainland".

registry is the same as the registered address of these two Chinese companies (see annex 14-14).

173. These two Beijing-registered companies and the Beijing branch office of Greenpine International have taken over the former addresses of entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that had their licenses revoked. Several employees and representatives of these companies overlap and are connected through various roles in each company (see figure 37). These links with Democratic People's Republic of Korea-associated entities and co-located office space clearly demonstrate a relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 14-15). The Panel has obtained information underlining its connection with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation and its procurement role for the country (see para. 237).

en (高福南) oung-pil (李英裕 Utah-Arrest ns smuggling Director Directo Link ← Head representativ DPRK Folk Art United Co. B Zibo Branch Greenpine(HK) branch office Kim Song IL revoked in Dec. 17, 2013 DireLink Istrade@163.com Angola

Figure 37
Entities and individuals related to Kim Song II and Greenpine

174. Mr. Kim Song II was arrested and indicted in a United States court for attempting to purchase United States-manufactured and controlled military goods, including night-vision googles, and illicitly transfer them to his residential address in China, followed by possible transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His signature in the plea bargain is identical to those in his Hong Kong, China, company registration documents (see annex 14-16).

175. In 2015, Angola reported to the Committee that Green Pine had delivered military patrol boats to the country until 2012. 156 Chinese customs records from a subscription database 157 show that one of Kim Song II's Beijing-based companies exported maritime-related dual-use products to Angola, including boat engines and motors, and radar systems (see annex 14-17). The Panel is of the view that Mr. Kim Song II has worked at the direction of Green Pine and that his companies, including Greenpine International, are front companies of Green Pine.

^{155 &}quot;Beijing representative office of DPRK Folk Art United Corporation" (朝鲜民艺联合商社北京代表处) and "Korea Folk Art (Beijing) Food Service Co., Ltd." (高丽民艺(北京)餐饮有限公司) (annex 14-15).

¹⁵⁶ See S/2016/157, para. 108 and annex 1.

¹⁵⁷ Panjiva is a commercial, subscription-based database providing authoritative customs data for a limited number of countries.


King Helong Company Limited

176. The Panel continued its investigation of two individuals registered as former legal representatives of Green Pine: Mr. Choe Kwang Hyok ¹⁵⁸ and Mr. Pak Won II. ¹⁵⁹ Mr. Choe is listed as chief executive of Beijing King Helong International Trading Ltd. ¹⁶⁰ ("Beijing King Helong") in the Chinese business registry, and also registered as a director of Hong Kong King Helong Int'l Trading Ltd. ¹⁶¹ in the Hong Kong, China, company registry (see figure 38 and annex 14-18). ¹⁶² The Chinese characters of King Helong "金海龙" phonetically translate into "Ku'mhaeryong" in Korean, and Ku'mhaeryong Company Ltd. ¹⁶³ is listed as an alias of Green Pine in the Committee's sanctions list.

177. Several Chinese commercial online sources advertise Hong Kong King Helong and Dandong King Helong International Trading Co., Ltd as subsidiaries of Beijing King Helong (see annex 14-19). Beijing King Helong has at least three front companies based in Hong Kong, China, 164 and shareholders of Beijing King Helong, Yang Jianmin (杨坚民) and Yang Ning (杨宁), are registered as directors of the companies (see annex 14-20).

178. According to the Chinese business registry, Mr. Choe has operated another entity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea named "Beijing representative office of Korea Unhasu Trading Company". The Panel noted that the offices of King Helong, Korea Unhasu and Green Pine in Beijing were all located in the same building and, in the case of the latter two, on the same floor before Green Pine was dissolved (see fig. 38) (see annex 14-21).

Figure 38
Entities and individuals related to Mr. Choe and King Helong



¹⁵⁸ In Korean: 최광혁, in Chinese: 崔光赫.

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¹⁵⁹ In Korean: 박원일, in Chinese: 朴元日, S/2015/131, paras 183-184.

In Chinese: 北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司.

¹⁶¹ In Chinese: **香港金海**龙国际贸易有限公司.

¹⁶² Mr. Choe was previously listed as a director of a revoked entity named the Beijing branch of Hong Kong King Helong Int'l Trading Limited ("**香港金海**龙国际贸易有限公司北京代表处").

¹⁶³ In Korean: 금해룡 and 금해룡회사.

¹⁶⁴ King Helong Group (Hong Kong) International Trading Co., Limited; H&Y Global Industry Ltd.; and Austen International Trading Co., Limited.

¹⁶⁵ In Chinese: 朝鲜银河水贸易会社北京代表处.

¹⁶⁶ China investigated and stated that the relationship between these entities and Green Pine was unknown.

Korea Unsong Trading Corporation

179. Another former legal representative of Green Pine, Mr. Pak Won II, ¹⁶⁷ is listed as chief representative of the "Beijing Branch of Korea Unsong Trading Corporation Limited" (see annex 14-22). The Chinese business registry shows that Korea Unsung, established on 10 January 2014, is still active, with an address next to the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing. ¹⁶⁹

180. Korea Unsong established an office in Shenyang on 19 October 2016. Mr. Lim Young Hwan¹⁷⁰ and Mr. Kim Young Hwan¹⁷¹ are directors of the Beijing and Shenyang offices (see annex 14-23). According to commercial online sources, Korea Unsong exports prohibited minerals, including ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

Saeng Pil Trading Corporation

181. Saeingpi'l company was identified as an alias of Green Pine by the Committee in May 2012. The Panel confirms that Saeng Pil Trading Corporation is also an alias of Saeingpi'l company and Green Pine. A Saeng Pil Trading Corporation brochure lists the same address, telephone and fax number as those given in a letter issued by the President of Green Pine (see annex 14-24). The company specializes in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment, which is consistent with the description of Green Pine in the Committee's sanctions list.

182. A diplomatic note indicates that Saeng Pil Trading Corporation has been active in Cairo (see annex 14-25). Mr. An Jong Hyuk (Hyok) was authorized on 18 December 2013 to conduct all types of business on behalf of the Corporation. His activities include signing and implementing contracts and banking business. When he was appointed as the representative of the Corporation, Mr. An was serving as a diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Egypt.

183. The Panel recommends the Committee update its sanctions list by adding the following information as an a.k.a. to KPe.010 (Green Pine):

A.k.a.: Saeng Pil Trading Corporation

5. Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation

184. The Security Council designated Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation on 30 November 2016 for its affiliation with Office 39. While the Qingdao branch of the Corporation remains active as a registered company, with Mr. Kim Yong Sok as a representative, the Panel notes that the designation was only two months prior to the time of writing. ¹⁷² The Corporation also has branches in Shenyang, Yanji and Dandong, according to several commercial online sources (see annex 14-26). The Committee's sanctions list indicates that the Corporation exports minerals and metals, including gold.

6. Korea United Development Bank

185. The Security Council designated Korea United Development Bank on 30 November 2016. Information shows that Mr. Choe Un Hyuk, as a representative,

¹⁶⁷ In Korean: 박원일, in Chinese: 朴元日.

¹⁶⁸ In Chinese: 朝鲜银星贸易会社北京代表处.

¹⁶⁹ China investigated and stated that the relationship with Green Pine was unknown.

¹⁷⁰ In Korean: 김영환, in Chinese: (林永煥).

¹⁷¹ In Korean: 김영환, in Chinese: (金永煥).

¹⁷² In Chinese: 朝鲜大圣贸易总商社青岛代表处.

appears to operate the Bank in Moscow through the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 14-27). The Panel continues to investigate Mr. Choe's status and his relationship with the Bank.

7. Korea Heungjin Trading Company

186. On 2 May 2012, the Committee designated Korea Heungjin Trading Company. The sanctions list noted that the Company had been associated with KOMID and, specifically, the procurement office of KOMID.

187. The Panel has noted that an office of Korea Heungjin¹⁷⁵ was registered in Dandong, ¹⁷⁶ according to commercial online sources, with its director listed as Mr. Choe Chan II¹⁷⁷ (see annex 14-28).

188. Commercial websites show that an individual with the same name was listed as a director of "Dalian Office of Korea Mining Development General Corporation" (朝鲜矿业开发总公司大连代表处), which a Chinese local newspaper publicly announced in June 2005 (see annex 14-29). The Panel has noted that this name is very similar to that of KOMID (朝鲜矿业开发贸易公司), with a slight difference through the inclusion of "trading (贸易)". The Panel previously reported that designated entities exploited alternative ways to transliterate Korean names. ¹⁷⁸ The connection of the Korea Heungjin Trading Company with KOMID through its director, Mr. Choe, is also consistent with the description on the Korea Heungjin Trading Company and KOMID in the Committee's sanctions list.

189. The Panel also noted that the same name, Mr. Choe Chan II (崔灿日), was listed as a first secretary of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing on 25 September 2012 (see annex 14-30), and further noted the country's widespread exploitation of diplomatic status as a cover for designated entity representatives. The uncommon name and exact match of Chinese characters show that the directors of both entities and a listed diplomat could be the same person. The Panel continues to investigate the diplomat's involvement in prohibited activities.

8. Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation

Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd.

190. On 2 March 2016, the Security Council designated an entity named Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation for providing financial services in support of other designated entities.

191. The Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation has been listed as one of two major shareholders of a Chinese company named Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Logistics Co., Ltd., ¹⁷⁹ the registration of which was recently revoked (see annex 14-31). Its affiliated company, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. (Dandong Hongxiang) was designated by multiple Member States for acting for or on behalf of the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC). ¹⁸⁰ According to the Department of the Treasury of the United States, "Dandong Hongxiang used an

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¹⁷³ In Chinese: 朝鲜兴进贸易公司/**会社**.

¹⁷⁴ In Chinese: 朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司 or 朝鲜矿业开发贸易公司.

¹⁷⁵ In Chinese: 朝鲜兴进贸易会社丹东代表处.

¹⁷⁶ China investigated and stated that the Korea Heungjin licence was revoked in 2006, and the Dandong licence revoked on 10 April 2015.

¹⁷⁷ In Korean: 최찬일, in Chinese: 崔灿日.

¹⁷⁸ See S/2016/157, para. 181.

¹⁷⁹ In Chinese: 丹东鸿祥实业物流有限公司.

¹⁸⁰ The United States of America, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

illicit network of front companies, financial facilitators, and trade representatives to facilitate transactions on behalf of KKBC". ¹⁸¹ The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey document also shows that the Corporation guaranteed or financed Dandong Hongxiang sales transactions through its ledger arrangement from December 2009 until at least September 2015 (see annex 14-32).

192. According to commercial online sources, the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation had a branch office in Dandong, with Lee Gwangju¹⁸² as a representative, and remained active until July 2016 (see annex 14-33). Address listings for the Corporation in Dandong on commercial websites are consistent with the address of the Corporation provided in the United States court document.

Joint Venture with Dandong Hongxiang

193. The Chinese business registry shows that several entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established joint venture companies with Dandong Hongxiang. These include Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation and Korea National Insurance Corporation, which have been designated by multiple Member States. Korea Taeyang (or Daeyang) Corporation¹⁸³ had also been listed as a partner of Dandong Hongxiang for several joint ventures until it was replaced in 2015 by Korea Pyongyang Economic Exchange Company. The document shows that Korea Taeyang is controlled by the "Directors Committee" of the Korea Worker's Party. Recording to its official website, it owns several mines and conducts joint ventures to extract minerals, including molybdenum. It exports metallic and non-metallic minerals through its subsidiary, Korea Taeyang Trading Company.

9. Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation

194. On 10 August 2016, State media reported Kim Jong Un's field guidance at the January 18 General Machinery Factory, where many computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines of Ryonha Machinery have been displayed. ¹⁸⁵ This was his second visit to the factory following the 2013 visit when he ordered the remodel and upgrade of the factory with computer numerically controlled machine tools and robots. The factory is known for manufacture of military products, including missiles, and images show the production of engines with a computer numerically controlled machine (see figure 39).

United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury imposes sanctions on supporters of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction proliferation", 26 September 2016.

¹⁸² In Korean: 이광주, in Chinese: 李光主.

¹⁸³ In Korean: 조선대양회사.

¹⁸⁴ "Route to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for European Companies", Asia-Invest EuropeAid Cooperation Office (2006).

¹⁸⁵ See S/2016/157, para. 165.

Figure 39
Engine production with a computer numerically controlled machine at the January 18 General Machinery Factory



Source: KCNA.

195. Certain computer numerically controlled technology or machine tools are included in the nuclear and ballistic-missile prohibited items list. ¹⁸⁶ Other computer numerically controlled machines and technology for the production of conventional arms dual-use items are also on the list of prohibited items under resolution 2321 (2016).

196. The Panel noted that a Chinese company 187 had exported several computer numerically controlled machine tools to the country, and investigated the possible involvement of Ryonha Machinery Corporation. According to the company's website, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea company ordered computer numerically controlled machines and visited its workshop to inspect computer numerically controlled machine tools before purchasing them (see annex 14-34). The Panel also noted that company's computer numerically controlled machine tools for sale bore similarities to those of Ryonha Machinery in design (see annex 14-35). The Panel has not received a reply from the company.

B. Participation of designated entities in the Pyongyang International Trade Fair

197. The Korea International Exhibition Corporation has facilitated trade and marketing for designated entities, through its hosting of the Pyongyang International Trade Fair since 2000.¹⁸⁸ The main purpose of the Corporation is to facilitate business opportunities for participants through networking and the exchange of participants' contact profiles and products for future projects of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 14-36).

198. Designated entities have repeatedly participated in the trade fair, both before and after designation (see table 6 and annex 14-37). In addition, companies identified as aliases of designated entities, as well as entities unilaterally designated by Member States, have also participated (see annex 14-38).

¹⁸⁶ See S/2013/337, paras. 59-65.

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¹⁸⁷ In Chinese: 滕州市科永达数控机床有限公司.

¹⁸⁸ Held biannually since at least 2012.

Table 6 **Participation of designated entities**

Designated entities	Designation date	Pyongyang International Trade Fair date ^a
Ryonha (Ryonhwa) Machinery Corp.	22 Jan. 2013	15th, 16th, 17th Spring, and 8th, 9th Autumn
Hyoksin Trading Corp.	16 Jul. 2009	15th Spring and 9th Autumn
Natural Resources Development & Investment Co.	2 May 2012	18th Spring and 11th Autumn
Pugang Trading Corp.	30 Nov. 2016	15th Spring and 9th Autumn

Source: The Panel.

1. Foreign recruitment and display of dual-use and prohibited items at the Pyongyang International Trade Fair

199. Foreign participants were previously recruited through embassy trade representatives, but since at least 2014 this role has been played by regional foreign partners. These partners are responsible for identifying, inviting and organizing the participation of foreign companies (see annex 14-39). The Panel notes that the foreign partner of the Korea International Exhibition Corporation in Taiwan Province of China, Royal Team Corporation, was previously investigated by the Panel. 189

200. The brochure and images from the Pyongyang International Trade Fair show that both products and various types of technology have been exhibited, along with images of proliferation-sensitive technologies. During the 2013 spring fair, Ryonha Machinery Corporation displayed computer numerically controlled machinery at centrally located booths (see figure 40). Booth posters at the 2016 spring fair also featured such machines. According to state media and other open sources, there was high foreign customer demand for computer numerically controlled machine and related technologies (see annex 14-40).

Figure 40 Computer numerically controlled machinery at the 2013 spring Pyongyang International Trade Fair



Source: KCTV and KCNA.

201. At the 2016 spring trade fair, a Romanian company displayed and demonstrated "high vacuum furnaces" and an "electron beam welding system". According to the company's website, these high-end technologies, combined with other exhibited equipment, possess nuclear engineering and air and space

¹⁸⁹ See S/2016/157, paras. 182-186.

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^a The 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th Spring Fairs were held in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively, and the 8th, 9th, and 11th Autumn Fairs in 2012, 2013 and 2015.

technology applications (see annex 14-41). The Panel notes that more sophisticated vacuum furnaces and power welding equipment are on the list of prohibited nuclear-related items (see annex 14-42).

202. A former trade fair participant informed the Panel that entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had approached its display booth, offering a joint venture, including in jewellery processing and an alluvial gold project, requesting the supply of gemstones for processing (see annex 14-43). Under resolution 2094 (2013), jewellery is a luxury good. This case shows that the trade fair is a platform for marketing and acquisition of prohibited items and technologies to both designated entities and participating foreign trading companies.

2. Participation of local trading companies handling prohibited minerals

203. Trade fair brochures have also shown local trading companies that export prohibited minerals, including gold, silver, vanadium, titanium, zinc, anthracite and iron ore (see table 7). The brochure indicates that these minerals are marketed and traded at the fair, demonstrating that the fair has also been used as a venue for trade in minerals listed in the resolutions (annex 14-44).

Table 7
Mineral-trading companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that have participated in the Pyongyang International Trade Fair

Trading companies	Minerals	Fair date
Kwangmyong Joint Venture Co.	Non-metallic minerals	16th and 17th spring fairs, and 9th and 11th autumn fairs
Suhaeng J.V. Co.	Gold, molybdenum and anthracite	16th spring fair
Yonghung Trading Co.	Gold concentrate	15th, 16th and 18th spring fairs, and 8th and 11th autumn fairs
Kumsan Trading Co.	Vanadium and molybdenum ore	16th spring fair
Korea Ferrous Metals Export & Import Co. ^a	Iron ore and steel	16th spring fair, and 8th and 9th autumn fairs

Source: Korea International Exhibition Corporation brochure and Naenara.

204. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate Korea International Exhibition Corporation for having assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions through the Pyongyang International Trade Fair and providing a platform to transfer, sell or supply prohibited items to or from the country.

205. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise enhanced vigilance over their companies participating in the Pyongyang International Trade Fair and alert them that any form of engagement with designated entities or those undertaking prohibited activities is a violation of the resolutions.

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^a Manufacturer of nuclear-related items. See S/2016/157, para. 60.

C. Travel of individuals reportedly linked to designated entities

206. The Panel continues to investigate the travel activities of designated individuals and individuals designated by Member States, as depicted in table 8 for 2012-2016. The Panel notes that certain individuals are required to be expelled under paragraphs 14 and 15 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016). 190

Table 8 **Travel of reported KOMID officials**

Name	Date of birth	Passport number	Country of residence/title	Countries visited	Countries transited	Countries where tickets purchased
Mr. Jo Yong Chol	30 Sept. 1973	745110086	Syrian Arab Republic		China, Lebanon, Singapore and United Arab Emirates	
Mr. Kang Ryong	21 Aug. 1968	472410192	Syrian Arab Republic	Egypt, ^a Namibia and Uganda	China, Lebanon, Singapore and United Arab Emirates	
Mr. Kim Song Chol	26 Mar. 1968	381420565	Egypt ^b	Syrian Arab Republic	China and United Arab Emirates	Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. Ri Jong Chol	12 Apr. 1970	654220197	Democratic People's Republic of Korea/Chief of KOMID 1st office ^c	Islamic Republic of Iran, Namibia and Uganda	China, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates	China and Namibia
Mr. Ri Won Ho	17 Jul. 1964	381310014	Syrian Arab Republic	Egypt and Oman	Lebanon	Egypt
Mr. Ryu Jin	7 Aug. 1965	563410081	Syrian Arab Republic	Uganda	China, Lebanon and United Arab Emirates	China and United Arab Emirates
Mr. Kang Myong Chol	18 Nov. 1954	563210074	Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chairman of KOMID ^d	Islamic Republic of Iran, Uganda and Vietnam	China, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates	China and Malaysia

¹⁹⁰ The Panel investigated the travel of these individuals for the period 2012-2016. A number of these individuals were subsequently designated under resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016).

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Name	Date of birth	Passport number	Country of residence/title	Countries visited	Countries transited	Countries where tickets purchased
Mr. Jang Yong Son	20 Feb. 1957	563110024	Islamic Republic of Iran ^e	United Arab Emirates	China and United Arab Emirates	China, Islamic Republic of Iran and United Arab Emirates
Mr. Kim Yong Chol	18 Feb. 1962	472310168	Islamic Republic of Iran ^f	Myanmar and United Arab Emirates	China, Singapore and United Arab Emirates	China and Islamic Republic of Iran
Mr. Hwang Su Man	6 Apr. 1955	472220033	Egypt		China and United Arab Emirates	Egypt

^a Egypt informed the Panel that it had undertaken several measures, including accurately monitoring all activities by citizens of the Democratic People's Republic in Egypt (visitors and residents), which recently had led to the departure of many citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Table 9
Travel of reported Green Pine Associated Corporation representatives

Name	Date of birth	Passport number	Country of residence/title	Countries visited	Countries transited	Countries where tickets purchased
Mr. Kim Hyok Chan	9 Jun. 1970	563410191	Angola	Sri Lanka	United Arab Emirates	Angola and Sri Lanka
Mr. Jon Chol Yong	30 Apr. 1975	563410192	Angola	Sri Lanka	United Arab Emirates	Angola and Sri Lanka
Mr. Ri Hak Chol	19 Jan. 1963	563410163	Democratic People's Republic of Korea/ President of Green Pine Associated Corporation ^a	Angola, Egypt and Islamic Republic of Iran	China, Singapore and United Arab Emirates	Angola, China and Egypt

^a According to the Republic of Korea designation.

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The United States stated that Mr. Kim Song Chol was a KOMID official "located in Egypt" who has "conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests" (Department of the Treasury, 3 March 2016). Resolution 2321 (2016) designating Mr. Kim Song Chol does not name Egypt, stating that "Mr. Kim Song Chol is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests".

^c According to United States designation.

^d According to Republic of Korea designation.

^e Following the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel was informed that Mr. Jang had departed the Islamic Republic of Iran

^f Following the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel was informed Mr. Kim had departed the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Table 10
Travel of reported Tanchon Commercial Bank representatives

Name	Date of birth	Passport number	Country of residence/title	Countries visited	Countries transited	Countries where tickets purchased
Mr. Kim Jung Jong	7 Nov. 1966	563210184	Viet Nam ^a			
Mr. Ko Tae Hun ^b	25 May 1972	563120360		Sudan	China, Ethiopia and United Arab Emirates	Sudan

^a National implementation report of Viet Nam.

Table 11
Travel of individuals reported as working in support of the Reconnaissance General Bureau

Name	Date of birth	Passport number	Country of residence/title	Countries visited	Countries transited	Countries where tickets purchased
Ms. Kim Su Gyong ^a	16 Jan. 1973	745120374			Russian Federation ^b and United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates

^a Ms. Kim was identified by a Member State as working for the RGB.

Representatives of Green Pine Associated Corporation in Angola

207. The Panel travelled to Angola in September 2016 to investigate diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working as representatives of Green Pine. Angola had previously provided evidence that Mr. Kim Hyok Chan, a diplomat and representative of Green Pine (see figure 41), had negotiated contracts, sourced spare parts and overseen the refurbishment of Angolan navy patrol boats.

208. The Panel discussed with the Angolan authorities Mr. Kim's travel to third countries for prohibited activities, further recommending in writing that he be expelled pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel raised with Angola the case of a second diplomat, Mr. Jon Chol Young (passport number 563410192), another Green Pine representative who had travelled abroad with Mr. Kim for related business (see para. 103). The President of Green Pine, Mr. Ri Hak Chol, also travelled to Angola between 22 and 27 January 2014. The Panel has yet to receive replies to its enquiries regarding these individuals.

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^b Kim Myong Gi is an alias for Mr. Ko Tae Hun.

^b The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were "not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory".

Figure 41

Mr. Kim Hyok Chan's signature on Green Pine contracts for patrol boat refurbishment



209. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate Mr. Kim Hyok Chan as a Green Pine representative.

Name: Mr. Kim Hyok Chan

Title: Secretary, Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy, Luanda

Nationality: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Passport No.: 563410191 Date of birth: 9 June 1970

VIII. Finance

210. Despite expanded financial sanctions adopted by the Security Council in resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continued to access the international financial system to support its activities. Financial networks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have adapted to these sanctions, using evasive methods to maintain access to formal banking channels and bulk cash transfers to facilitate prohibited activities. At the time of writing, Democratic People's Republic of Korea circumvention techniques and inadequate compliance by Member States are combining to significantly negate the impact of the resolutions.

- 211. The Panel has identified multiple ways in which the financial institutions and networks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea access the international banking system to engage in activities in violation and/or evasion of the provisions of the resolutions:
 - Banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including designated banks, hold correspondent or payable-through accounts with foreign banks
 - Banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea form joint ventures with foreign companies
 - Foreign companies establish banks inside the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
 - Banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain representative offices abroad

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During the period under review, no Member State(s) reported to the Committee actions taken in accordance with the asset freeze. Belarus reported on a bank that "had a client whose accounts fell under the scope of the resolution". While it stated that, pursuant to paragraph 32 of resolution 2270 (2016), "this bank has prohibited outgoing transactions", it did not report on compliance with paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), requiring it to freeze assets that could be used for prohibited activities.

- Trading companies linked to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including designated entities, open bank accounts that perform the same financial services as banks (including by using banks where the companies maintain funds on deposit, to provide indirect correspondent bank account services)
- Diplomatic missions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provide financial support to that country's networks. 192
- 212. In addition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also uses bulk cash and gold to entirely circumvent the formal financial sector.
- 213. The networks behind this activity consist of a core of agents who are highly experienced and well trained in mobilizing money, people and goods, including arms and related materiel, across borders. These agents use non-nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as facilitators with varying degrees of complicity, and rely on numerous front companies bearing no paper trail that leads to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The business conducted by some of these networks generates significant revenue for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Most of the financial activity investigated by the Panel was denominated in United States dollars, euros and renminbi.
- 214. Owing to the transnational nature of financial transactions, a single transaction may impose obligations on multiple Member States. Thus, one State may have to enforce the resolutions with respect to the activities of its nationals operating abroad, a second State may be obligated to enforce sanctions measures with regard to banks domiciled or operating within its jurisdiction and a third State may be obligated to enforce the expulsion or exclusion of agents of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from its territory. Another State, such as the issuer of a convertible currency, may be required to use its regulatory jurisdiction to designate persons, or to block or prohibit financial transactions that are cleared by correspondent banks within its jurisdiction. Another State may be obligated to prohibit other financial services that facilitate transactions by designated persons. A key challenge to these obligations is that Member States need to have mechanisms for effective information exchange and coordination with strategic trade and export control, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although financial institutions can detect illicit financial flows through due diligence and investigations, intelligence shared by Governments remains a critical enabler of compliance with financial sector sanctions.

A. Banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea holding correspondent or payable-through accounts with foreign banks

215. The Panel found evidence that financial institutions in several Member States continue to provide both direct and indirect correspondent banking services to banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 31 of resolution 2321 (2016). The Panel notes that the Committee has received only two exemption requests pursuant to these provisions, from the Russian Federation. One request was for its account at the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its

¹⁹² The Panel views such arrangements as an evasion of the ban on correspondent accounts contained in paragraph 32 of resolution 2270 (2016). To the extent that designated persons, or persons associated with activities contrary to the resolutions, have an interest in these accounts, ownership or controlling interests in the persons or entities holding those accounts on deposit, the Panel also views them as evasion of resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (d); resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 11; and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 32.

Pyongyang embassy and Chongjin consulate general, while the other was for an account for arrears on loans from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ¹⁹³ Since 26 other countries also maintain diplomatic missions or offices in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, those which still have bank accounts in the country are encouraged to request an exemption from the Committee.

216. The Panel obtained information showing that the International Bank of Martial Arts in Pyongyang (국제早至台灣/国际武道银行, see annex 15-1) has served foreign clients with renminbi savings, loan, and transfer services; has undertaken transactions in China; and has issued guidelines in Chinese and English to foreign clients on how to transfer renminbi from China (see annex 15-2). Pursuant to resolution 2270 (2016), Member States were to have closed existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by 2 June 2016, and to report such actions in their national implementation reports.

B. Foreign companies or joint ventures establish banks in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or provide financial services to that country

217. The Panel investigated banks in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established as subsidiaries or joint ventures of foreign companies to support bilateral trade and investment as possible violations of paragraph 13 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 31 of resolution 2321 (2016). 194

218. The International Consortium Bank in Pyongyang is a subsidiary of a Malaysia-Democratic People's Republic of Korea joint venture, the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies. ¹⁹⁵ This Bank is situated within the Group's "Service Division". Licensed by the Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and registered with the Pyongyang Municipal People's Committee, the bank provides financial services, including deposit, loan, trade finance, contracting, remittances and financing of small and medium enterprises, for which it states: "Preference will be given to existing bank's customers who have been awarded contracts by government bodies" (see annex 15-3). The bank claims to "help(s) over 52 million people worldwide". The Panel has inquired with Malaysia and the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies and has yet to receive a reply.

¹⁹³ In May 2016, the central bank of the Russian Federation issued guidance on obtaining approval from the Committee regarding paragraphs 33 and 35 of resolution 2270 (2016) and, in December 2016, regarding paragraph 31 of resolution 2321 (2016).

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Financial institutions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with foreign partners benefit from correspondent banking relationships with financial institutions in the country of their joint-venture partner. Past cases have shown that foreign companies are used by networks and banks in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to collect fees, hold money, strip information and forge documents. They also facilitate evasion through the layering and co-mingling funds involved in prohibited conduct with funds derived from licit activities.

Established in 1964, Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies lists as one of its main activities overseas construction, including of statues, in Africa. The company's promotional video states that its "formula for success is a powerful mix of Malaysian products and Korean labour and technology". One of the company's construction projects is the renovation of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Nigeria. The company's Service Division includes a financial leasing company based in Zambia, Commercial Capital Corporation Ltd., which provides lease finance and manages a remittance business, which the Panel is investigating for possible connections with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

219. A bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea named Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行) in Rason was established on 18 January 2013 by China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Co., Ltd. (金贸易货交易 (大连) 有限公司, annex 15-4). A Chinese official gave a speech at the ribbon-cutting ceremony, in which he emphasized the financial support to trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be provided by the bank (annex 15-5). If ongoing, such support would violate paragraph 36 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 32 of resolution 2321 (2016). The Director of China Gold Trade Exchange (also director of its Dandong branch) simultaneously served as Chair of the bank's board, demonstrating joint management by the bank in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a foreign company. On 23 August 2013, when Junling Holdings (君领控股) acquired a 60 per cent stake in Chinese Commercial Bank, the company praised the agreement as a milestone for Chinese private capital entering the overseas financial industry which would play an active role in promoting bilateral economic and trade cooperation (see annex 15-6).

220. Kumgyo International Commercial Bank is a bank in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea run jointly with the China Inner Mongolia Horizon (Hong Yuan) International Trade Corporation, Ltd. (中国内蒙古泓元国际贸易有限责任公司) and affiliated with Korea Chongsong Mining Company (see annex 15-7). Kumgyo Bank states that it "conducts brisk business transactions with foreign investors and companies", including "counterparts at home as well as in the Russian Federation, China and other countries". The China Inner Mongolia Horizon International Trade Corporation is registered with the Ministry of Commerce of China as a joint venture which is 49 per cent owned by a company of the Russian Federation, 俄罗斯联邦图 瓦共和国 《**蒙戈列克》有限**责任公司¹⁹⁸ (phonetic translation: "Menggelyk" LLC, Tuva Republic, Russian Federation, see annex 15-8). The venture engages in the import of various items from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including pearls and magnesium, showing possible links between trade and finance as addressed by paragraph 32 of resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex 15-9). It recently participated in a 2016 e-banking conference in Hohhot (see annex 15-10). The Panel sent letters to China and the Russian Federation, the latter when it could not locate the registration of the company in the Russian Federation. ¹⁹⁹ The Russian Federation replied that: "The letter fails to mention a single designated entity. Consequently, we do not see grounds to carry out investigation on the matter." The Panel's investigation continues.

221. A Hong Kong, China, company, Unaforte (香港旺福特有限公司), with a Yanbian branch (延边旺福特) established the First Eastern Bank (东大银行) in Rason in 2014 as a subordinate enterprise to provide financial support and loans to Chinese investors in mining and real estate projects in Rason (see annex 15-11). The bank is licensed by the Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 15-12) and provides loans to Chinese individuals and companies in the Rason area. In its promotional materials, Unaforte claims: "The [First Eastern] Bank is fully independent and does not require proof of identity. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of China or [the] Democratic People's Republic of Korea and is not required to report to the Chinese government or the Democratic People's Republic

investigate the company for the reason stated above.

199 Unified State Register of Legal Entities of the Russian Federation.

These provisions require Member States to prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, except as approved in advance by the Committee.

The company's Hunchun branch is registered with the Yanbian Trade and Industry Bureau.
 The Panel has obtained the name of the Russian Federation company only in Chinese because it was registered in the Chinese business registry and the Russian Federation declined to

of Korea government!" (see annex 15-13). The Panel notes that foreign nationals holding accounts in banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be a violation under resolution 2321 (2016).

222. The Panel wrote to China on all the above cases and continues its investigation.

C. Designated banks maintain representative offices and agents abroad

223. Several banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to operate abroad subsequent to designation by setting up representative offices as corporate entities rather than as financial institutions. The Panel emphasizes that the expulsion and asset-freeze provisions of the resolutions also apply to persons and entities acting "on behalf of or at the direction of" designated entities. The Panel further notes that, under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016), Member States are required to expel any individual determined to be working on behalf of or at the direction of a bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

224. Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) has operated a branch from Dandong and used the company Dandong Hongxiang to undertake financial transactions in United States dollars on its behalf through multiple front companies established in the British Virgin Islands, Seychelles and Hong Kong, China (see para. 191). This case, along with Chinpo Shipping Singapore and others below, illustrates the pattern of entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using foreign companies to undertake financial services while evading regulations governing financial institutions. The Panel believes that companies that perform financial services commensurate with those provided by banks should be considered to be financial institutions for the purposes of the resolutions.

225. The Panel has obtained information showing that two designated banks, Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank (KDB), are both operating on Chinese territory, through representative offices in Dalian, Dandong and Shenyang. The Dalian-based representative since 2006 has been Mr. Kim Chol-sam, designated in resolution 2321 (2016). To secure a work permit and residence status, he established a company, Dalian Daxin Electronics (大连大信 电子有限公司), as a "foreign natural person" on 8 August 2006, using a Chinese name, 金铁三 (see annex 15-14).

226. Mr. Kim also served as a director of a designated company, DCB Finance Ltd., registered in the British Virgin Islands on 27 June 2006 (see annex 15-15). DCB Finance shared several officers with DCB and the same address as four of the front companies used by Dandong Hongxiang to process transactions on behalf of KKBC. When the DCB correspondent accounts were closed in 2005, DCB

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²⁰⁰ See resolution 2321 (2016), para. 33.

Unless the presence of the individual is required for the fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined otherwise.

²⁰² Case number 16-mj-06602, District of New Jersey, filed 3 August 2016.

²⁰³ See S/2016/157, paras. 190-192.

²⁰⁴ Before moving to China, Mr. Kim had worked as Treasurer of DCB, assigned by KDB, which is the DCB joint venture partner and 30 per cent owner. A Member State confirmed that Mr. Kim had served as Treasurer.

Success Target Group, Ltd., Best Famous Ltd., Fully Max Trading Ltd. and Sheen Fair Trading Ltd. See paragraphs 13 to 18 of the verified complaint for forfeiture in rem, *United States of America v. All Funds in the Accounts of Blue Sea Business Co., Ltd., et al.*, 16-vo-1954 (District of New Jersey, filed 26 September 2016).

Finance was set up to undertake wire transfers and business transactions on its behalf.²⁰⁶

- 227. As the representative in Dalian of DCB and DCB Finance, Mr. Kim undertook transactions worth millions of United States dollars, including several of \$1 million or more. He also facilitated payments and loans between companies linked to DCB and exchanged large quantities of bulk cash transferred to China from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into newer and larger denomination United States dollar notes. 207 He also regularly undertook foreign exchange between United States dollars and euros and transferred balances between DCB and its shareholder, Korea Daesong Bank. When DCB established representative offices in Shenyang in late 2012, and Dandong in 2014, the three offices cooperated in managing the activities of foreign exchange, transfer, bulk cash exchange and loans. The Panel also obtained information indicating that Ryugyong Commercial Bank (柳商银行,柳京商业银行) has been operating as another representative of DCB from Beijing. 208 DCB has processed transactions for designated entities and for a company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea selling arms and related materials (see paras. 232-241).
- 228. Mr. Kim established other companies, including Hongdae International Ltd. (see annex 15-16), a company that he registered in Hong Kong, China, using fraudulent personal information to pose as a citizen of the Republic of Korea. ²⁰⁹ He also paid the Beijing office of a company from Hong Kong, China, to help to set up several other companies in Hong Kong, China, including Pan Ocean Investments Ltd. and Win Talent International Ltd. Lastly, the last-known sale of the 60 per cent foreign share of DCB was to a Chinese company on 14 July 2011, meaning that it is possible that a designated bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains majority Chinese-owned.
- 229. DCB thus effectively accesses the international financial system through a network of offshore accounts and representative offices in China. This case shows how representatives of banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea manage to operate abroad through the establishment of front companies that are not registered as financial institutions but function as such.
- 230. In compliance with the financial provisions of the resolutions, Member States are obligated to expel Mr. Kim Chol-sam, and to freeze all property, assets and other economic resources owned or controlled by him, DCB, DCB Finance, Korea Daesong Bank, Hongdae International Ltd., and any other of his companies in its territory acting on their behalf or at their direction.

Alias of designated bank

231. Acting under paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), a Member State inspected a misrouted package in transit from the designated Bank of East Land in Pyongyang destined for a company in a third country. Along with a holiday gift traditionally sent by banks to business partners, the package contained a greeting

Mr. Kim has held at least eight accounts in Chinese banks in United States dollars, euros, yen and Hong Kong dollars in his name and the name of front companies.

²⁰⁷ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has an abundance of low denomination and highly worn or damaged United States dollar notes.


Ryugyong Commercial Bank maintained several accounts in Chinese banks and undertook numerous cash transfers to accounts in China controlled by DCB representative offices.

Mr. Kim listed a false residential address in Seoul, recording his country of residence as "Korea", which he re-entered next to his Democratic People's Republic of Korea passport number.

card from the President of "Haedong Bank", Mr. Pak Yong Hwa (see figure 42). The Panel is investigating whether Haedong Bank is an alias for the Bank of East Land.

Figure 42

Bank of East Land airway bill (left) and Haedong Bank card (right)



Source: Member State.

D. Financial operations of Glocom/Pan Systems Pyongyang

232. Following an interdiction of arms and related materiel pertaining to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see paras. 72-87), the Panel investigated the network's financial operations.

233. In its banking operations, Pan Systems Pyongyang and its front companies used an extensive network of individuals, companies and offshore bank accounts to procure and market arms and related materiel. The global network consisted of individuals, companies and bank accounts in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Middle East. Pan Systems Pyongyang used the name of its foreign investment partner (Pan Systems Singapore) not only to obscure its activities, but also to gain access to foreign currency accounts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which otherwise would not be available to local companies under domestic banking rules. Specifically, the director of Pan Systems Pyongyang, Ms. Ryang Su Nyo, established accounts at DCB in the names of both Pan Systems and its front company, International Global Systems, both of which she used to move money in and out of the country.

234. Since 1998, Pan Systems Pyongyang and International Global Systems have used accounts in United States dollars and euros at DCB to gain access to the international financial system, including through bank accounts in China, as described above. These accounts were used to transfer funds to a supply chain of more than 20 companies located primarily on the Chinese mainland; in Hong Kong, China; and in Singapore. In recent years, procurement shifted almost entirely to companies in China and Hong Kong, China. Most of these companies supplied electronic products, radio components and casings consistent with Glocom's advertised military communications equipment, while others were transport companies. The network also made regular transfers to various facilitators with Chinese, Korean, foreign and code names working in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Middle East.

210 In particular, €36,939 was transferred to International Global Systems in 2008 from an account at the Damascus branch of a Middle Eastern bank.

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According to information obtained by the Panel, procurement shifted to companies on the Chinese mainland and in Hong Kong, China, owing to lower prices, stringent Singaporean regulations and more direct logistics.

- 235. Bank records show that payments to suppliers were made by International Golden Services and multiple other front companies to accounts at banks in Singapore, on the Chinese mainland and in Hong Kong, China. The Panel obtained evidence of a series of transactions by Glocom initiated by companies registered in Hong Kong, China, and cleared through several United States correspondent banks in New York.
- 236. In terms of incoming transfers, Pan Systems Pyongyang received large remittances from an account at a major bank in Malaysia, as well as from numerous companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including Hungbal Trading Co., Kumbong Trading Co. and Mubong Trading Co., the activities of which are being investigated by the Panel. Transfers were also made from the Shenyang consulate of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the Panel continues to investigate. Pan Systems Pyongyang also regularly used bulk cash transfers.
- 237. In addition, Pan Systems Pyongyang received funds from two designated entities, KOMID and Hyoksin Trading Corporation. Between 2011 and 2013, Hyoksin made multiple euro-denominated transfers to Pan Systems Pyongyang, as did KOMID between 2011 and 2015. Given the links of Pan Systems Pyongyang to RGB, this further demonstrates how designated entities' networks are interconnected. 212
- 238. Ms. Ryang Su Nyo made frequent cash deposits into the accounts of both Pan Systems Pyongyang and International Global Systems in both United States dollars and euros. Pan Systems Pyongyang also used Malaysia as a platform for the purpose of repatriating cash. The Panel previously reported on the arrest, on 17 February 2014, of three nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Malaysian police on suspicion of attempting to smuggle \$450,000 in cash out of Malaysia. The three nationals identified themselves as representatives of Pan Systems Pyongyang, including Ms. Ryang, who claimed that the funds belonged to the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Kuala Lumpur. Panel Pa
- 239. Stronger sanctions have led networks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to employ greater ingenuity in using formal banking channels and bulk cash transfers to facilitate their illicit endeavours. At the same time, Member States that host nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that control the movement of persons across their borders, that regulate banks and that regulate correspondent banks have not made a commensurate investment in their own capacity to enforce the strengthened sanctions. Consequently, agents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been able to mask both their illicit activities and their links to the country.
- 240. There is a trend towards the use of agents who are not from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and companies registered by facilitators, again not from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in various countries. The Panel's financial investigations have shown that, while this occurs in many parts of Asia, there is a trend towards greater use of front companies in Hong Kong, China, and other cities on the Chinese mainland that show no trace of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in registration documents.

²¹² In 2010 and 2013, Pan Systems Pyongyang made transfers in Hong Kong, China, to Greenpine International, a front company of Green Pine (see paras. 172-175).

In 2015, the International Global Systems account was changed to International Golden Services.
 The Panel obtained information showing that, two days earlier, the three individuals had entered Singapore through Malaysia by car, implying that the cash may have been collected in Singapore.

241. This case also shows that companies and diplomatic missions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea open accounts that, in effect, perform the services that a financial institution would. The Shenyang consulate was providing a supporting financial role, contrary to the prohibition in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations against commercial activities by consular facilities (see para. 17 of resolution 2321 (2016)). 215

E. Bulk cash and gold

242. Bulk cash and gold are used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to transfer value by circumventing the formal financial sector entirely. The Panel investigated such smuggling in the evasion of sanctions, as proscribed in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 37 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 35 of resolution 2321 (2016). In addition to the transit of bulk cash through DCB for processing and the use of bulk cash by Pan Systems Pyongyang, the Panel investigated three other cases.

243. On 6 March 2015, Bangladesh seized 26.7 kg of gold bars and jewellery (worth \$1.4 million) from the hand luggage of the First Secretary of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Dhaka, Mr. Son Young-nam. The invoice had been issued by AMM Middle East General Trading in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the goods collected from Singapore. Mr. Son had flown into and out of Singapore from Dhaka on the same day, leaving the airport for three hours. He had undertaken on average one such trip a month to Singapore over the previous 15 months from both Dhaka and Beijing (ranging from a few hours to two days on the ground), suggesting that he was serving as a regular diplomatic courier smuggling gold and other items in evasion of sanctions. He was accompanied by other diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on some of the trips. This was the only case investigated by the Panel involving the smuggling of bulk cash or gold in which the Member State seized the contraband, as required under the resolutions.

244. On 17 March 2016 in Sri Lanka, an overseas worker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Kim Song Chol, was arrested at the airport in Colombo carrying \$167,000 in cash, gold jewellery and watches. He was en route from Oman to Beijing and made no customs declaration. He was accompanied by five other individuals from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who were working in Oman for a construction company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea based in Dubai with a post office box address. He produced a list with 311 names of workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea whose families in Pyongyang he was to pay (with amounts varying from \$200 to \$1,500, with an average of around \$300 per family). In addition to reiterating its concern that bulk cash could be used to evade sanctions, in paragraph 34 of resolution 2321 (2016) the Security Council expressed concern about the proceeds of overseas labour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being used in prohibited programmes.

245. The Panel investigated another case of bulk cash transported by workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea returning from Namibia after working there for Mansudae, which the Panel has recommended for designation (see para. 114). 216

²¹⁶ See S/2016/157, paras. 101-106.

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²¹⁵ The Panel found evidence that agents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have engaged in multiple deceptive financial practices, including creating accounts under family members' names, creating multiple accounts to compartmentalize transactions and frustrate the tracing of business activities and opening accounts in various countries to exploit international gaps in transaction reporting requirements.

F. Payments by designated banks for financial messaging services

246. The Panel investigated the provision of financial messaging services to designated banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) provides financial messaging services to seven such banks, three of which are designated: Bank of East Land, KKBC and Korea Daesong Bank. SWIFT stopped providing services to four designated banks when those banks themselves requested SWIFT to do so: Amroggang Development Banking Corporation, DCB, Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea United Development Bank.

247. To become a SWIFT user, a bank must sign an "undertaking" outlining the terms and conditions governing the provision of financial messaging services. Several banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have signed such agreements (see table 12).

Table 12 **Designated banks and SWIFT undertakings**

Designated bank	SWIFT code	Date of signature of "undertaking"	Date SWIFT access granted	Date of designation	Date of termination (resignation)
Amroggang Development Bank	ADBKKPPYXXX	11 September 2006	28 October 2006	2 May 2012	1 September 2012
Bank of East Land ^a	BOELKPPY	27 May 2004	4 December 2004	22 January 2013	_
Korea Daesong Bank ^a	KDBKKPPY	9 April 2001	1 September 2001	30 November 2016	-
Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. ^a	KKBCKPPY	18 October 2001	2 March 2002	2 March 2016	-
Korea United Development Bank	KUDBKPPY	9 April 2001	1 September 2001	30 November 2016	3 December 2016

^a Bank still in the SWIFT network.

248. In response to inquiries by the Panel, SWIFT confirmed to the Belgian authorities that it provided financial messaging services to designated banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As part of its procedure for doing so, SWIFT requests authorization from the Government to receive the moneys owed for the services. Upon receipt of such authorization, SWIFT receives payment for its services from the designated banks. ²¹⁷ The payments are then entered in its books and recorded as revenue. The Belgian authorities have authorized SWIFT to receive the amounts set out in tables 13 and 14 from designated banks in exchange for the provision of financial messaging services, the provision of the SWIFT handbook, training in the use of the SWIFT network and maintenance costs.

²¹⁷ The payments are made into the SWIFT accounts in Belgium.

Table 13 Fees from designated banks invoiced and received by SWIFT since 22 January 2013

Designated bank	Year	Fees invoiced and r	eceived (euros)	Estimated amounts to be invoiced (euros)
Bank of East Land	2013	6 456.68	5 685.94	
(designated on 22 January 2013)	2014	5 517.18	5 587.96	
	2015	5 603.76	6 497.08	
	2016	5 447.88	-	To be invoiced until December 2016: 8,616 (not yet approved)
Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. (designated on 2 March 2016)	2016	1 954.00	-	To be invoiced until December 2016: 7,212 (not yet approved)

Table 14 Fees invoiced for SWIFT services for banks designated under resolution 2321 (2016)

Designated bank	Dates of service	Fees invoiced (euros)
Korea Daesong Bank	30 November-31 December 2016	432.00
Korea United Development Bank	30 November-3 December 2016 ^a	219.30

Source: Belgium.

249. Belgium informed the Panel that, "under national and European law, the receipt of fees from a designated bank can be authorized provided the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 329/2007 are complied with" and that the authorizations related to amounts of less than €15,000. The Panel notes that, in the absence of a determination by the Committee that these payments fall under the exemptions in paragraphs 9 (a) and/or (b) of resolution 1718 (2006), the receipt of funds from a designated entity is a violation of the asset freeze pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013). The Panel also notes that, in addition to SWIFT fees, banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pay separate fees to a third-party "service bureau" located outside of European Union jurisdiction in order to connect to the SWIFT network, which would also be a violation of the asset freeze. ²¹⁸

Financial Action Task Force

250. The Panel continued to work closely with the Financial Action Task Force and engage in outreach with the corresponding regional bodies to promote and support the implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Mutual evaluations to date show many countries failing to implement the targeted financial sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel attended sessions discussing and adopting mutual evaluations on proliferation financing issues and reviewed draft legislation on proliferation finance for conformity with the resolutions.

251. Given the continuing activities by designated banks and their representatives, the Panel recalls Member States' obligation to freeze all assets controlled by them and those acting on their behalf, and to report such actions to the Committee and to share relevant information with the Panel.

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^a Korea United Development Bank resigned from SWIFT on 3 December 2016.

Belgium further informed the Panel that, after the Service Bureau, the related messages were then routed either to a European Union or United States operation centre, depending on the zone to which the other sender or receiver was connected.

- 252. In the light of the use by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of foreign companies to perform financial services, the Panel recommends that the Committee clarify that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered to be financial institutions for the purposes of the resolutions.
- 253. The Panel recommends that, when Member States freeze bulk cash or gold smuggled by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they immediately inform the Committee and ensure that they cannot be used for prohibited activities or evasion of sanctions before releasing them.
- 254. The Panel recommends that the Security Council extend the prohibition on establishing joint ventures with banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to include companies as well as financial institutions.
- 255. The Panel recommends that Member States strengthen informationsharing on transnational network evasion cases and typologies to assist banks and financial institutions in determining whether certain transactions involve activities prohibited under the resolutions.

IX. Sectoral sanctions

256. To monitor exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of minerals falling under paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016), the Panel utilized Member State customs data as reported to the United Nations (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database/International Trade Centre (ITC)) or obtained from a subscription database. The Panel had to rely entirely on statistics from importing States (mirror statistics) because the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not provide export or customs data.

257. In its resolutions, the Security Council did not specify the categories and subcategories corresponding to the listed minerals, meaning that they are left to the interpretation of each Member State. To develop a global frame of reference to monitor the relevant listed mineral imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Panel decided to utilize the classifications in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System elaborated by the World Customs Organization (WCO)²¹⁹ (see annex 16-1).

258. Some countries issued their own harmonized code lists for the prohibited minerals for the purpose of the implementation of resolution 2270 (2016). These countries include the Russian Federation, 220 the States members of the European Union and China. The Panel compared these codes with the WCO recommendations and noticed discrepancies (see table 15).

²¹⁹ WCO is an intergovernmental institution representing 180 customs administrations responsible for processing 98 per cent of all international trade.

Classification of goods according to the foreign economic activity commodity nomenclature of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Union is an economic union of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation.

Council Regulation (EU) 2016/682 of 29 April 2016; Ministry of Commerce of China,
 "MOFCOM Announcement No. 11 of 2016 Announcement on List of Mineral Products Embargo against the DPRK", 5 April 2016; Ministry of Commerce of China Announcement No. 81 of 23 December 2016 (see annex 16-2).

Table 15
Harmonized System codes assigned by WCO and Member States for minerals listed in resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016)

Mineral	WCO	Member State and regional organization interpretations
Coal	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal (2701)	European Union : Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal (2701), lignite (2702), peat (2703), coke and semi-coke of coal, lignite or peat (2704)
		China: For resolution 2270 (2016): anthracite coal (2701110010, 2701110090, 2701121000, 2701129000, 2701129000); for resolution 2321 (2016): coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels (2701) and lignite (2702)
		Russian Federation : Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal (2701); lignite, or brown coal, whether or not agglomerated, except jet coal (2702)
Iron	Iron and steel (codes of chapter 72 (7201-7229))	European Union : Iron in the following forms: pig iron, ferro-alloys, ferrous products, granules, powders, ingots, waste and scrap of cast iron, tinned iron or steel, other waste and scrap, semi-finished and flat-rolled products of iron and non-alloy steel, other bars and rods of iron and non-alloy steel, angles shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel, wire of iron or non-alloy steel (7201-7212, 7214-7217)
		China : Pig iron (7201100010, 7201100090, 7201200000, 7201500010, 7201500090)
		Russian Federation : Iron and steel (72); articles of iron or steel (73)
Iron ore	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	European Union: Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites (2601)
	(2601)	China : Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites (2601111000, 2601112000, 2601119000, 2601120000, 2601200000)
		Russian Federation : Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites (2601)
Gold	Gold ores and concentrates	European Union: Gold (26169000)
	(2616.90) Gold (including gold plated	China : Gold ores and concentrates (2616900009; 261690001)
	with platinum), unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms, or in powder form (7108, 7108.11, 7108.12, 7108.13, 7108.20)	Russian Federation: Gold (including gold plated with platinum) unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms, or in powder form (7108); waste and scrap of gold, including metal clad with gold but excluding sweepings containing other precious metals (7112910000)

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Mineral	WCO	Member State and regional organization interpretations
Titanium	Titanium ores and	European Union: Titanium ores (26140000)
	concentrates (2614)	China: Titanium ores and concentrates (2614000000)
		Russian Federation : Titanium ores and concentrates (2614000000)
Vanadium	Vanadium ores and	European Union: Vanadium ores (26159000)
	concentrates (2615)	China: Vanadium ores and concentrates (2615909090)
		Russian Federation : Vanadium ores and concentrates (2615900009)
Rare earth	Rare earth minerals covered by codes 2617 (ores and concentrates not elsewhere specified or indicated), 2805	European Union : Ores of the rare earth metals (25309000), monazites and other ores used solely or principally for the extraction of uranium or thorium (2612)
	(alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals, etc., mercury) and	China: Other rare earth metal (2530902000)
	2844 (radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes and their compounds, etc.)	Russian Federation: Mixtures or alloys (2805301000); radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes and their compounds etc.) (2844); compounds, inorganic or organic, of rareearth metals; of yttrium or of scandium or of mixtures of these metals (2846); ferro-cerium and other pyrophoric alloys in all forms; articles of combustible materials (3606)
Copper	Harmonized codes of chapter 74 (7401-7419)	China: Harmonized codes of chapter 74
	Copper ores and concentrates (2603)	Copper ores and concentrates (26030000)
Zinc	Harmonized codes of chapter 79 (7901-7907)	China: Harmonized codes of chapter 79
	Zinc ores and concentrates (2608)	Zinc ores and concentrates (26080000)
Nickel	Harmonized codes of chapter 75 (7501-7508)	China: Harmonized codes of chapter 75
	Zinc ores and concentrates (2604)	Zinc ores and concentrates (2604)

259. An analysis of the above codes shows variances, some of which were due to a narrower interpretation of the resolutions with regard to the form of the mineral and identification of the minerals, some of which were broader than the WCO recommendations. For example, China and the Russian Federation included lignite as part of the coal ban. In other cases, Member States considered the relevant minerals only in the form of bars or concentrated form and not in other forms such as powdered or unwrought.²²² There were also differing views with regard to which metals and minerals fell into the category of rare earth minerals.

260. The above inconsistencies with regard to the codes assigned to the minerals in the resolutions allow the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to exploit this in its exports. In this regard, the Panel notes that a study by a university in the country recommended that, to evade the mineral bans, the country should focus its efforts on decreasing exports of raw materials and increasing exports of processed products. The Panel considers that items made from the listed minerals, as well as listed minerals in non-concentrated forms (including semi-manufactured, alloys, unwrought, powdered and pulverized), should be considered prohibited. 223

261. To ensure consistency as to which actual items are considered prohibited, the Panel recommends that the Committee issue an implementation assistance notice containing the Harmonized System codes that correspond to the minerals listed in resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016).

Exports of resources with exemptions (coal, iron and iron ore)

262. During the reporting period, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to export coal, iron and iron ore to generate substantial revenue.

Iron

263. Table 16 shows the countries that imported iron and steel products from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2016.

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The Chinese code classification for gold includes only ores and concentrated form, excluding certain types that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exports.

For example, the Russian Federation considers that the ban on iron and steel also includes articles of iron or steel (code 73).

Table 16
Importing countries for product 72 (iron and steel) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, April-September 2016

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	April	May	June	July	August	September	Total
Barbados					104		104
China	3 683	3 713	4 497	4 636	3 536	2 084	22 149
El Salvador				125	94	72	291
Germany ^a		139	138	273		138	688
India	186	26	38			21	271
Indonesia	15	65	38				118
Pakistan	19	87	155				261
Philippines	1 098	763	617	1 102	57	711	4 348
Slovakia		77					77
$Others^b$							43
Total							28 350

Source: ITC Trade Map, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.

264. The Panel sent inquiries to the above-mentioned countries requesting information on the number of shipments containing iron inspected under paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) and whether the shipments were considered under the "livelihood" exemption in paragraph 29 (b) of resolution 2270 (2016), and, if they were, what procedures were required by the companies to import the items and which verification measures were employed by the authorities in order to confirm that the revenue generated was exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to the prohibited programmes or other activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prohibited under the resolutions.

Coal and iron ore

265. Data obtained from ITC show that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported all recorded coal and iron ore only to Chinese companies in 2016. With regard to iron ore, the data show that the country exported \$60,124,401 from April to November.

266. With regard to coal, the data show that the country exported \$761,079,233 of coal from April to November 2016. Most of the entities that imported it are based in the north-east region (Jilin, Liaoning and Shandong).

267. Given that exports of minerals by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been going on for years when resolution 2270 (2016) was adopted, an impartial method to measure the implementation of the mineral bans is to use data from the same period in 2015 as a baseline against which statistics for 2016 can be compared.

^a Germany indicated to the Panel that the ferro-silicon (Harmonized System code 720221) had originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but had been imported to Germany from China. The Panel notes that, in paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016), the Security Council decided that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not to supply, sell or transfer iron, directly or indirectly, from its territory.

^b Member States reporting relatively insignificant amounts of iron and steel imports have been aggregated.

268. Tables 17 and 18 compare exports of coal and iron ore from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to China from April to November 2015 and 2016, respectively, and were devised using data obtained from subscription databases.

Table 17 Coal exports (Harmonized System code 2701) to China in 2015 and 2016

(United States dollars)

Year	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	Total
2015	117 202 530	104 336 183	107 114 890	101 040 810	88 193 311	82 288 972	59 783 135	66 001 609	725 961 440
2016	72 271 400	74 749 688	88 181 071	89 467 790	112 458 258	83 107 015	101 467 754	139 376 257	761 079 233

Source: Panjiva.

Table 18
Iron ore exports (Harmonized System code 2601) to China in 2015 and 2016

(United States dollars)

Year	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	Total
2015	3 814 787	6 888 618	4 335 533	6 204 680	6 813 684	8 213 835	7 120 048	4 266 165	47 657 350
2016	4 554 115	10 076 723	11 758 651	10 389 470	8 546 083	6 668 698	2 249 885	5 880 776	60 124 401

Source: Panjiva.

269. As shown, the total value of the export of coal and iron and iron ore for April to November 2016, after the adoption of the resolution, was higher than for the same period in 2015, before the adoption of the resolution. It is therefore clear that the resolution had no impact on the revenue acquired from coal and iron ore exports since 2015.

Exports of resources without exemptions: gold

270. According to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, in 2016 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported \$1,565,000 of gold (Harmonized System code 261690), in violation of paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016).

Member States' implementation of the exemption clauses

271. The Panel monitored Member States' implementation of the exemptions to the ban on coal, provided for in paragraphs 29 (a) and 29 (b) of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraphs 26 (a) and (b) of resolution 2321 (2016).

Trans-shipment exemption

272. The Russian Federation made 11 notifications to the Committee, China 25 and Switzerland 1 under paragraph 29 (a) of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel notes that, in resolution 2321 (2016), the identical paragraph 26 (a) replaces paragraph 29 (a) of resolution 2270 (2016) and offers in annex V a standard form for notification of import of coal.

Livelihood exemption

273. While the implementation of the trans-shipment exemption in resolution 2270 (2016) was relatively straightforward, Member States had differing views on the interpretation of the livelihood exemption in paragraph 29 (b) of the resolution,

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which the Panel considers to be the reason for the inconsistent implementation evidenced in the data above. The Panel noted that only one Member State had issued instructions to its companies on how to implement paragraph 29 (b). China issued announcement No. 11 of 5 April 2016, which stated that imports of coal, iron and iron ores from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were forbidden, with two exceptions. With regard to the exception in paragraph 29 (b), it clarified that importers who wished to use the exemption were required to submit a letter of commitment (see annex 16-3), "if it is confirmed by solid information that the imports are not for the people's livelihood, or are related to the nuclear program or the ballistic missile program of the DPRK the customs authority will not clear such imports". The Panel requested information, including the number of applications for exemption and whether due diligence was required. In its reply to the Panel, China reconfirmed the foregoing.

274. The Panel investigated the activities of entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of paragraph 29 (b) of resolution 2270 (2016), superseded by paragraph 26 (b) of resolution 2321 (2016). The Panel found widespread evidence that designated entities and/or entities involved in prohibited activities had also traded in minerals listed in resolutions (see paras. 20-21, 153, 165, 180, 184 and 193). The Panel also received information from Member States on shipments of coal from companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea linked to a designated entity or the military, including Wonbong Trading Corporation (affiliated with a designated entity, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, according to that Member State) and Korea Kangbong Trading Corporation (affiliated with the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces). China replied to the Panel that those two companies were "not in the list of designated DPRK entities". Another key case of illegal export by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of banned minerals included the shipment of limonite aboard the *Jie Shun* (discussed in paras. 61-65). The Panel continues its investigations.

275. Paragraph 26 of resolution 2321 (2016) replaced paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016), with the Security Council applying a more deliberate and rigorous approach. In addition to a new cap on coal exports of \$53,495,894 or 1,000,866 tons, the Council provided additional criteria for the livelihood exemption, requiring that all procurements under the cap:

- (a) Do not involve individuals or entities associated with the country's prohibited programmes or other activities prohibited under the resolutions, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions;
- (b) Are exclusively for the livelihood purposes of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and are unrelated to generating revenue for the prohibited programmes or other activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prohibited under the resolutions. 224

276. In its implementation of resolution 2321 (2016), China announced, on 10 December 2016, a suspension of coal imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for that month. On 23 December, it issued announcement No. 81, by which it took into account the above additional criteria, with the system requiring companies to submit letters of commitment as in announcement No. 11 (see annex 16-3).

²²⁴ The livelihood exemption with regard to iron and iron ore remains and is contained in paragraph 26 (c).

277. The Panel draws attention to the continued export by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of prohibited minerals and calls upon Member States to effectively implement paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016) by ceasing the import of all banned minerals, adhering to the caps established for coal and ensuring that all the listed conditions are met for coal shipments falling under the cap.

Unintended impact of the sanctions

278. United Nations agencies operating in the country report that the population continues to suffer from food insecurity and limited access to sanitation and hygiene, resulting in chronic malnutrition and poor health. An estimated 18 million people are in need of some form of assistance. Malnutrition is particularly affecting women and children under 5 years of age and is a major cause of maternal and child mortality and morbidity. Extreme flooding in the north in August and September 2016 has further exacerbated vulnerabilities, in particular in North Hamgyong Province.

279. This humanitarian situation is largely the result of priority being accorded to the military and defence industry, which has significantly distorted economic resource allocation. Member States' strengthening of unilateral and United Nations sanctions following the nuclear tests may also have had an unintended impact on the country's trade and distribution system. Nevertheless, the Panel has been unable to obtain evidence of a direct link between the humanitarian situation in the country and United Nations resolutions. Member States' and private sector measures have also been reported as seriously affecting the ability of humanitarian agencies to procure some goods for their operations.

280. Strengthened financial sanctions in 2016 also challenged the ability of United Nations agencies to transfer funds into the country for their activities. Most agencies use the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for this purpose, but corresponding banking relationships became prohibited under paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Committee's approval is now necessary to maintain corresponding banking relationships with banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In August 2016, the Committee approved a Russian banking channel, allowing United Nations agencies to resume the transfer of funds for their work in the country.

X. Recommendations

281. The Panel reiterates that the recommendations made in its previous reports remain valid and should be reconsidered in the light of the additional information that it has gathered.

A. Recommendations of the Panel to the Committee

Recommendation 1

In accordance with paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013) and paragraph 43 of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel recommends that the Committee designate the entities and individuals listed in annex 17 to the present report.

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Recommendation 2

The Panel recommends that the Committee update the existing list of designated individuals and entities as follows:

(a) Namchongang Trading Corporation as an a.k.a. to KPe.004:

A.k.a: Korea Tearyonggang/or Daeryonggang Trading Corporation (조선대령강무역회사, 朝鲜大玲江贸易**会**社)

Address: Sengujadong 11-2/(or Kwangbok-dong), Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Other information:

Tel.: +850-2-18111, 18222 (ext. 8573); fax: +850-2-381-4687

(b) Green Pine Associated Corporation as an a.k.a. to KPe.010:

A.k.a. "National Resources Development and Investment Corporation" and "Saeng Pil Trading Corporation"

Address: Rakrang No. 1 Rakrang District Pyongyang Korea, Chilgol-1 dong, Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

Other information:

Tel.: +850-2-18111 (ext. 8327); fax: +850-2-3814685; +850-2-3813372; e-mail: pac@silibank.com; kndic@co.chesin.com.

Recommendation 3

The Panel recommends that the Committee establish a list of designated vessels (subject to seizure as economic resources pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 23 of resolution 2270 (2016)), which includes vessel-identifying characteristics, and maintain the list as for designated individuals. In addition, the aliases of OMM vessels contained in table 5 should be added to the list.

Recommendation 4

The Panel recalls paragraph 23 of resolution 2321 (2016), by which the Security Council decided to prohibit the procurement of crewing services from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and recommends that the Council prohibit all flag registries from registering vessels commanded by officers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or operated by crews from that country.

Recommendation 5

The Panel recommends that the Committee propose to the Security Council that "chartering" be added to paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016).

Recommendation 6

In the light of the use by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of foreign companies to perform financial services, the Panel recommends that the Committee clarify that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered to be financial institutions for the purposes of the resolutions.

Recommendation 7

The Panel recommends that the Committee propose that the Security Council extend the prohibition on establishing joint ventures with banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to include companies as well as financial institutions.

Recommendation 8

To ensure consistency as to which actual items are considered prohibited, the Panel recommends that the Committee issue an implementation assistance notice containing the Harmonized System codes that correspond to the minerals listed in resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016).

B. Recommendations of the Panel to Member States

Recommendation 1

Member States should exercise heightened vigilance over diplomatic agents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who are engaging in professional or commercial activities, particularly in prohibited items.

Recommendation 2

Member States should annul any contracts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or its nationals concerning the direct or indirect supply or transfer of statues, or services related to the maintenance of statues.

Recommendation 3

Flag and port States should verify the origin and legal validity of insurance of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels or vessels suspected of being crewed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Recommendation 4

Member States should communicate to the Committee available information on designated entities or entities owned or controlled by individuals acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated entities or individuals, or those which have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or violation of the resolutions.

Recommendation 5

Member States should exercise enhanced vigilance over their companies participating in the Pyongyang International Trade Fair and alert them that any form of engagement with designated entities or those undertaking prohibited activities is a violation of the resolutions.

Recommendation 6

Given the continuing activities by designated banks and their representatives, the Panel recalls Member States' obligation to freeze all assets controlled by them and those acting on their behalf, and to report such actions to the Committee and to share relevant information with the Panel.

Recommendation 7

When Member States freeze bulk cash or gold smuggled by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they should immediately inform the Committee and ensure that they cannot be used for prohibited activities or evasion of sanctions before releasing them.

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Recommendation 8

Member States should strengthen information-sharing on transnational network evasion cases and typologies to assist banks and financial institutions in determining whether certain transactions involve activities prohibited under the resolutions.

Recommendation 9

The Panel draws attention to the continued export by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of prohibited minerals and calls upon Member States to effectively implement paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016) by ceasing the import of all banned minerals, adhering to the caps established for coal and ensuring that all the listed conditions are met for coal shipments falling under the cap.

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Annex 1-1: The Panel of Experts and its methodology

The Panel adheres to its mandate to gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in the resolutions, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and to make recommendations on actions that the Security Council, the 1718 Committee or Member States may consider to improve the implementation of the measures imposed by the resolutions

The Panel conducts its work in line with the methodological standards of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). It maintains high evidentiary standards by consistently seeking corroboration and keeping in mind the identity and role of sources. It relies on verified documentation, correspondence and photographic evidence wherever possible and ensures that information provided on a confidential or restricted basis is handled consistently with the responsibilities of the Panel.

During the reporting period from 6 February 2016 to 5 February 2017, the Panel submitted two incident reports to the Committee. The Panel held consultations with six Member States, one United Nations bodies and three other interested parties. It has also continued to cooperate with other United Nations Sanctions Panels of Experts and Groups. The Panel sent a total of 1,070 letters, including 732 requests for information relating to investigations.

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Annex 2-1: Member States yet to submit NIR under resolution 2270 (2016)

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- 2. Botswana
- 3. Burkina Faso
- 4. Cameroon
- 5. Cabo Verde
- 6. Central African Republic
- 7. Chad
- 8. Congo
- 9. Côte D'Ivoire
- 10. Democratic Republic of the Congo
- 11. Equatorial Guinea
- 12. Eritrea
- 13. Ethiopia (UNSC nonpermanent member 2017-2018)
- 14. Gabon
- 15. Gambia
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- 17. Guinea
- 18. Guinea Bissau
- 19. Kenya
- 20. Lesotho
- 21. Liberia (Co-Sponsor)
- 22. Libya
- 23. Madagascar
- 24. Malawi
- 25. Mali
- 26. Mauritania
- 27. Morocco
- 28. Mozambique
- 29. Niger
- 30. Nigeria
- 31. Rwanda
- 32. Sao Tome and Principe
- 33. Seychelles
- 34. Sierra Leone
- 35. Somalia
- 36. South Sudan
- 37. Sudan
- 38. Swaziland
- 39. Tanzania
- 40. Togo
- 41. Tunisia
- 42. Zambia
- 43. Zimbabwe

Americas

- 44. Antigua and Barbuda
- 45. Bahamas
- 46. Barbados
- 47. Belize
- 48. Bolivia (UNSC nonpermanent member 2017-2018)
- 49. Cuba
- 50. Dominica
- 51. Dominican Republic
- 52. Ecuador
- 53. El Salvador
- 54. Grenada
- 55. Guatemala
- 56. Guyana
- 57. Haiti
- 58. Honduras
- 59. Jamaica
- 60. Nicaragua
- 61. Paraguay
- 62. Peru
- 63. Saint Kitts and Nevis
- 64. Saint Lucia
- 65. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- 66. Suriname
- 67. Trinidad and Tobago

<u>Asia</u>

- 68. Afghanistan
- 69. Bahrain
- 70. Bangladesh
- 71. Bhutan
- 72. Brunei Darussalam
- 73. Cambodia
- 74. India
- 75. Indonesia
- 76. Kuwait
- 77. Kyrgyzstan
- 78. Maldives
- 79. Myanmar
- 80. Nepal
- 81. Oman
- 82. Oatar
- 83. Saudi Arabia
- 84. Sri Lanka

- 85. Syria
- 86. Tajikistan
- 87. Thailand
- 88. Timor-Leste
- 89. Turkmenistan
- 90. Uzbekistan91. Yemen

1 CITICII

- 92. Albania (*Co-Sponsor*)
- 93. Andorra
- 94. Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 95. Croatia (Co-Sponsor)
- 96. Estonia (Co-Sponsor)
- 97. Georgia
- 98. Iceland (Co-Sponsor)
- 99. Montenegro
- 100. Portugal (*Co-Sponsor*)
- 101. Republic of Moldova
- 102. Slovakia (*Co-Sponsor*)
- 103. Slovenia (*Co-Sponsor*)
- 104. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Oceania

- 105. Fiji
- 106. Kiribati
- 107. Marshall Islands
- 108. Micronesia
- 109. Nauru
- 110. Palau (Co-Sponsor)
- 111. Papua New Guinea
- 112. Samoa
- 113. Solomon Islands
- 114. Tonga
- 115. Tuvalu
- 116. Vanuatu (*Co-Sponsor*)

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Annex 3-1: Yongbyon Nuclear Complex Overview



Map No. 4566.4 United Nations January 2017


Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 3-2: Yongbyon Light Water Reactor



Map No. 4566.5 United Nations January 2017 Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 3-3: Yongbyon Steam Plant



Map No. 4566.6 United Nations January 2017

Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

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
Annex 3-4: Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Overview



Map No. 4566.7 United Nations January 2017

Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)


Annex 3-5: Punggye-ri North and West Portal Area



Map No. 4566.8 United Nations January 2017 Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)


17-01388 **105/326**

Annex 4-1: Comparison of identifier information between Kumsan and GBAE/MAEI



Source: The Panel

Annex 4-2: Commercial advertisement of Korea Kumsan Trading Co. in Moscow



Source: https://www.gmdu.net/corp-367519.html

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5/18/2016

Kumsan Trading Co., North Korea

Suppliers .com Home Categories Regions Search Member

Global Suppliers Minerals & Metallurgy Kumsan Trading Co. Profile

Kumsan Trading Co.



The Complete Guide To DayTrading Click Here To Download

Company Name: Kumsan Trading Co.

About Us: Kumsan Trading Co. manufacturing and selling Petoxide Vanadium to the other contries. Main products are pentoxide vanadium, catalist, Mo V concentrate Metal mineral ore Please contact to us if you are interested in our products.

Product/Service: Pentoxide Vanadium, V Mo Ore And Concentrate Metal And Chemical Products

Country/Region : North Korea > Category: Minerals & Metallurgy

Contact Person: Mr. kim sg | | | Director/CEO/General Manager Link More: North Korea Minerals & Metallurgy, North Korea Alloy

Telephone: 850-495-1476603

Fax: 850-495-1476603 Address: Mosfilmovskaya

Website:

Business Type: Trading Company

Source: http://www.supplierss.com/kumsan_trading_co_e1350673.html

(Commercial advertisement of Korea Kumsan Trading Co. in Dandong)




Source: http://compnay.gongchang.com/info/60276564 aeaa/



Source: http://20826804.11315.com

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Annex 4-3: Kumsan's address connected to the DPRK Embassy in Moscow



Source: https://embassy-finder.com/north-korea in moscow russia

Annex 4-4: Lithium-6 in prohibited nuclear-related items list in resolutions (INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part2)



Information Circular

INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2^a Date: T3 November 2013

> General Distribution Original: English

2.C.8. Hafnium metal, alloys containing more than 60% hafnium by weight, hafnium compounds containing more than 60% hafnium by weight, manufactures thereof, and waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

2.C.9. Lithium enriched in the lithium-6 (⁶Li) isotope to greater than its natural isotopic abundance and products or devices containing enriched lithium, as follows: elemental lithium, alloys, compounds, mixtures containing lithium, manufactures thereof, waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.9. does not control thermoluminescent dosimeters.

<u>Technical Note:</u> The natural isotopic abundance of lithium-6 is approximately 6.5 weight percent (7.5 atom percent).

2.C.10. Magnesium having both of the following characteristics:

- Containing less than 200 parts per million by weight of metallic impurities other than calcium; and
- b. Containing less than 10 parts per million by weight of boron.

Source: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/infcirc 254 rev.9 part2.pdf

(The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)'s control list showing lithium-6 in UK FCO website)

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The NSG was established in 1975 when the international community became concerned that conditions of nuclear supply needed strengthening to better meet nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

To see the countries that are currently signed up to the NSG you can download list of non-proliferation regime members (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-international-non-proliferation-regime-members).

The NSG agreed a set of guidelines, published in 1978, for handling nuclear exports to reduce the possibility that such transfers could be diverted to nuclear explosive or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities. The guidelines have been updated at intervals to include goods especially designed or prepared for nuclear purposes (similar to those items listed by the Zangger Committee). These high-risk goods are referred to as 'trigger list' items. The NSG has also produced separate guidelines to cover nuclear-related dual-use goods.

The NSG Control List encompass a wider array of nuclear dual-use equipment, materials and technology. Find out more about the export of nuclear equipment, material and technology: 'Trigger List' requirements (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/export-of-nuclear-equipment-material-and-technology-trigger-list-requirements).

The following list indicates the kinds of dual-use items controlled by NSG:

- · capacitors (high energy)
- machine tools
- · cold cathodes, triggered spark gaps and similar devices
- isostatic presses
- lithium enriched in the lithium-6 isotope


https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes

4/7

Source: UK government public announcement at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes

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Annex 4-5: GPM advertisement showing sales relationship with Dandong and Beijing




Source: www.companiess.com/general_precious_metal_complex_gpm_info1283565.html



Source: http://tradehelps.com/Phone-Lookup/86-13911594809

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Annex 4-6: DPRK Diplomatic List registered in China's Foreign Ministry showing Chol Yun registered as Third Secretary in the DPRK's Embassy in China



Source: Diplomatic List registered in DPRK Embassy in China at http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/ziliao/wjgmc/t527236.htm

Annex 5-1: Extract of DPRK notifications to international organizations

Extract of the DPRK notification to the International Maritime Organization

Satellite launch state	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	
2. Launch schedule	
Reserved date: 8 - 25 February 2016	
Time: 07:00 ~ 12:00 (Pyongyang Time) daily	
3. Falling area coordinates	
First stage	
36° 04° N	124° 30′ E
36° 04° N	124° 54′ E
35° 19' N	124° 30' E
35° 19° N	124° 54' E
— Fairing	
33° 16′ N	124° 11′ E
33° 16' N	125° 09' E
32° 22' N	124° 11' E
32° 21' N	125° 08° E
 Second stage 	
19° 44° N	123° 53′ E
19° 43′ N	124° 51' E
17° 01' N	123° 52′ E
17° 00° N	124° 48° E

Source: The Panel

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Extract of the DPRK notification to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU):

Annex

Data for the space object to be launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea


- Name of satellite: "Kwangmyongsong"
- 2. Launch State: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- 3. General function of satellite: Earth observation
- 4. Duration of function: 4 years
- 5. Remote data transmission band : UHF(1), (2), S

Video transmission band: X

6. Service country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Source: The Panel

Annex 5-2: Kwangmyongsong flight path



Source: The Panel

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Annex 5-3: Extract of DPRK note verbale to UNOOSA registering the satellite

Annex

Registration data on space object launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Name of launching State: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

National designator: "KWANGMYONGSONG - 4"

Date and territory or

location of launch

Launch date: 7 February 2016

Launch site: Sohae satellite launch site of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Launch vehicle: "KWANGMYONGSONG"

Basic orbital parameters

Nodal period: 94 minutes 24 seconds

Inclination: 97.4 degrees

Apogee: 500 kilometres

Perigee: 494.6 kilometres

General function of the space object: Earth observation

Source: The Panel

Annex 5-4: 2016 Kwangmyongsong rocket debris photographs

Bottom of the fuel tank

Engine and nozzle





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1-2 interstage

Airframe with the blue number 3





Source: The Panel

Annex 5-5: 2016 Kwangmyongsong fairing

Half of the fairing was retrieved by the ROK navy while the second half of which was retrieved from Japan's coast in June 2016 (figure 1). The fairing was found to have a length of 1.95m, a diameter of 1.25m and a weight of 149kg. It was composed of an aluminium exterior with a foam core that utilized insulation materials made of micro scale hollow glass spheres.

Figure 1: Part of the fairing retrieved by the ROK Navy (left) and part of the fairing recovered in Japan (right)





Source: The Panel

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Annex 5-6: 22 June 2016 Musudan Trajectory



Green values (likely expected values):

20:15 (likely total flight time in min and second)

4212.5 (likely maximum speed in m/s)

400 (likely maximum distance in km)

1400 (likely maximum altitude in km)

Red values (likely current values):

12:3? (likely current flight time in min and second)

272.? (likely current speed in m/s)

203.? (likely current distance in km)

1413.? (likely current altitude in km)

Source: KCNA

Annex 5-7: Wonsan firing position




Map No. 4566.3 United Nations January 2017

Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Source: The Panel

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Annex 5-8: Image of the KN-11 being loaded into its launch tube showing the stages



Source: KCNA

Annex 5-9: Hwasong-13 engine and re-entry vehicle





Source: KCTV

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Annex 5-10: Chamjin complex and ballistic missile test site



Map No.4566.1 United Nations January 2017

Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) Reference: GeoEye-1 image, 18 September 2014 Hamhung D.P.R.K Reference: GeoEye-1 image, 17 May 2016 Facility reportedly used for the solid-fuel engine test of 24 March 2016

Annex 5-11: Hamhung ballistic missile engine test site

Map No. 4566.2 United Nations January 2017 Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

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Annex 5-12: Sinpo shipyard overview



Map No. 4566.9 United Nations January 2017 Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 5-13: Sinpo submarine fabrication halls

Submarines constructed or maintained in the Sinpo fabrication halls are launched by moving the submarines on cradles from the halls onto a submersible drydock. To align the drydock with the cradle rails, there are notches cut into the side of the dock walls. Satellite imagery shows that the alignment notches used prior to the upgrading (2013) were narrower than the notches in the docks constructed for the upgraded and new halls. Since the docks for new halls have been built for a wider, larger dock, and not the current submersible drydock, it suggests that newly constructed submarines will be larger. The appearance of a larger floating dock at Sinpo will thus likely indicate the impending launch of a new, larger SLBM submarine.




Map No. 4566.10 United Nations January 2017

Department of Field Support Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

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Annex 6-1: DPRK state media article showing NADA's key role in the launch



*KJU's handwriting reads: "Central committee of the Party approves a satellite launch. It launches at 9 am on the 7th of February, 2016."; and "Kim Jong Un /sgd/ February 6, 2016".

Annex 6-2: Photos showing Ri Pyong Chol's role in the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs





Source: Rodong Sinmun

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Annex 6-3: Images showing MID key officials' role in the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs including Hong Sung Mu and Hong Yong Chil



"miniaturized nuclear device" exhibition(9 March 2016) (left) and Scud launch with nuclear warhead Simulation (10-11 March 2016) (right)



Ballistic missile re-entry vehicle test (15 March 2016) (left) and Solid fuel engine test (24 March 2016) (right)



ICBM engine ground test (9 April 2016) (left) and SLBM test of 23 April 2016 (right) Source: KCNA


Two mobile Musudan Test (23 June, 2016) (left) and MRBM Testwith nuclear simulation (20 July 2016) (right)




Source: KCNA

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Annex 6-4: Pictures showing SFC' role in ballistic-missile launches with nuclear warhead simulation



Scud launches with nuclear warhead Simulation in March 10 and 11(up) and MRBM test with nuclear warhead simulation in July 20 (down)




Source: KCNA

Annex 7-1: Certificate of origin and bills of lading of 22 June 2016 for the limonite cargo onboard the *Jie Shun* used to conceal the arms shipment

Korea Suyangsan Trading Corporation

[주주의인민공화국 정당시 보 g-] Dong, Moraniong District, Py	한봉구의 인흥 1 ongyang DPR Ka	to the second	Tels	850-2-381-4480 850-2-18111(381-89 mail:::sagm@co.chosin
	산지	중명서 TE OF OR	IGIN	No13/004 Date JIN. 22, 2016
관매자 Consigner KOR	EA SHYANGSAN	TRADIND CORE		
수송수단 Means of Tr	anspertation g	I/A TIEZHIM		
*			3	****
용 경 Description	수 당. Quantity	정미중망 N.W.	충충망 G. W.	王分, 亚4 Packing & Marking
Description	Quintary			
LINONITE		. 230	30 H/T	IN BUTK
	<u> </u>			<u> </u>
제품은 조선민주주의인' is is to certify that the a	pose mentione	정산 및 가공* ed commodities	i 되었음문 중명 were produce	हो. d and/or manufactur

Korea Solbongsan Trading Company



Korea Suyangsan Trading Corporation

/1603:31PM INFAX Pages	
REA SUYAHSSAN TRADING CORP.,	BILL OF LADING HJ - 1
Notify Adress AME AS CONSIGNEE Pre-carriage by Pro-	
Ocean Versol Port of Loading JIESHUN HAEJU	endorsed must be suffered to the carrier or his Agen delivery order. In wisness whereof, the carrier or his Agen has signed 801s of
And of Dischare	Description of the second of t
shippens's decreption of stigots	Cracensing IHRFF
	Gracines 11
shippine's decription of stools	Cracensing IHRFF
Shipper's decription of stoods LINONITE Freight and charge	IN BULK 2300 W/I


Source: Egypt

Annex 7-2: Document issued by the Cambodia Flag Register of 23 March 2016 showing K Brothers Marine Co. Ltd as the operator of the *Jie Shun*

		THE OFFICE OF TI	oom of Cambodia anne ganger HE COUNCIL OF MINI SROC P Registry of Camb			
	PERM.		E SHUN	REGISTRY		
Call Sign		IMO No.	CONTROL OF THE SAME OF THE SAME	Official No.	ADMINISTRAÇÃO VALUE A PROPERTOR DE	
XI	UTS3	and the second second second	8518780		386009	
R 30	VAST WIN TRADING LIMITED RM A 20/F KIU FU COMMERCIAL BUILDING 300-306 LOCKHART ROAD WAN CHAI HK ompany Responsible for Operation		100000 100000	(DR NO. 03)		
	NATIONAL ENGINEERING STATE	K BROTHEF	RS MARINE CO., I	TD	THE RESIDENCE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON OF T	
Type of Vessel		GENERAL DESCI	Net Tonnage	Material of Hull	FARTH MINISTER SQUARES STREET,	
DRY	DRY CARGO		1554	STEEL		
	vious Name of Vessel VELOX mber of Decks Number of Masts		Previous Nationality of Vessel PANAMA Number of Fonnels Length		BEIJING MARINE COMMUNICATION NAVIGATION CO. (CN03) Breadth	
ONE Name of Builder	TWO	ONE Place / Year of Build	89,98 M	18,50 M	6.15 M	
	URUSHIMA DOCKYARD CO., LTD. MATSUYAMA JAPAN/1986			Radio Equipment GMDSS A1+A2+A3		
	o./ Type / Model of Engine		Name of Engine Maker		Horsepawer	
ONE / D	IESEL/A-38	A	KASAKA	12. 0 KNOTS	2,058KW	
	WALLES WARREN TO SERVE	-	CONTRACTOR OF STREET	TO SERVICE STATE OF THE SERVIC	POTENTIAL TRACE MORNOCONDUCTOR	
KAOHSIUNG,	TAIWAN / MARCH 2	Date of Expiration 23, 2016 AU	GUST 28,2016	Port of Registry PHNOI	MPENH	
Cambodia, by the por permanent certificate	wers vested thereupon by	the Registration of Mercha	at Shipping Act, 1994 and a	WANG SH Deputy Registry	APFUN	

Source: Document of compliance (DOC) holder

Annex 7-3: Emergency contact persons of the Jie Shun's operator K Brothers Marine Co. Ltd.



Source: Document of compliance holder for the Jie Shun

Ship Manager: The company designated by the ship owner or charterer to be responsible for the day to day commercial running of the ship and the best contact for the ship regarding commercial matters. Including post fixture responsibilities, such as laytime, demurrage, insurance and charter clauses. This company may be an owner related company, or a third-party manager, whose purpose is primarily the management of ships for their ship-owning clients.

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<u>Technical Manager:</u> The company designated by the ship owner or operator or ship manager to be specifically responsible for the technical operation and technical superintendancy of a ship. This company may also be responsible for purchases regarding the fleet, such as repairs, spares, re-engining, surveys, dry-docking, etc.

Source: IHS Fairplay

Annex 7-4: Emails showing Mr. Zhang Qiao (Jack) arranging insurance for the Jie Shun



Source: The Panel


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Annex 7-5: Individuals and companies associated with K-Brothers Marine and Bene Star Shipping

Bene Star also registered the *Bright Star* (formerly DPRK-flagged *Kwang Song* and *Kun Ja Ri*) and its owner/operator T-Sisters Co. Ltd., using the same email address on 8 December 2015. T-Sisters is the operator of the Galaxy 1 and "care of" address for Sinotug Shipping Ltd., Sinotug Shipping is the registered owner of the *Firstgleam* which was de-listed by Mongolia (26 August 2015) and Tanzania (29 June 2016) respectively, and was purchased from OMM associated Senat Shipping by Bene Star. Sinotug shares a fax number with both K-Brothers and T-Sisters, and is also registered in the Marshall Islands (Annex 7-5).

Documents of K-Brothers Marine Ltd. confirm the same fax number as Bene Star. Mr. Zhang, the director and sole shareholder of Bene Star, is also the director of Haofeng Shipping & Trading Ltd., which sold the DPRK-flagged *Chong Bong* (listed on Annex III of resolution 2270 (2016)) to Mr. Li Anshan's Petrel Shipping Ltd. K-Brothers also engaged in business dealings with Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsugu, an individual known for acting on behalf of the designated company OMM, in the acquisition of two OMM vessels: the *Ocean Galaxy* and *Ocean Dawning* (see S/2016/157).

Annex 7-6: Records from specialized maritime databases showing the shared contact information for K Brothers Marine Co. Ltd., T Sisters Co Ltd and Sinotug Shipping Ltd.




Sources: IHS Maritime and Tokyo MOU

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Annex 7-7: Open-source extracts showing Mr. Zhang Qiao's coal and iron ore export activities and links to the DPRK



Source: https://www.1688.com/company/detail/contact/dlshenghao.html accessed 17 November 2016



Source: jack0307583x.member.shippingchina.com/companyintro/index.html



Source: Ecoal China - http://www.nacec.com.cn/

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
Annex 7-8: Bills of lading for the vessel Bright Star under the letterhead of Ever Ocean Shipping Agency Co. Ltd., owner of the MV Light

EVER	OCEAN S	HIPPING A	GENCY C	O,LTD
	BII	LL OF LADI	NG	9
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	IT STAR CHONGSONG MININ	NATIONALITY G CORP.	TANZANIA	
PORT OF LOADING: PORT OF DISCHARGE CONSIGNEE. TO	NAMPO D.P.R. KOR CHINA PORT ORDER		NATION OF GOODS	
NOTIFY PARTY		parent good order and condition,	unhos atherwise indicated t	be another michael
specified herein and to be always afloat, unto the Owner hereof, in exchange for this B	o be discharged at the above of goods or to his, or the sill of Lading.	ave mentioned port of discharge of ir assigns, subject to conditions an contents and value, being particul	r so near thereto as the vess id exceptions enumerated he	el may safely get and reon and on the back
	PARTICI	LARS FURNISHED BY	SHIPPER	
Marks & Numbers	Packages	Description of goods	Weight	Mensuremen
N/M	IN BULK	ANTHRACITE COAL	14,303M/T	


EVER OCEAN SHIPPING AGENCY CO,LTD **BILL OF LADING** BRIGHT STAR VESSEL: NATIONALITY: TANZANIA SHIPPER: KOREA CHONGSONG MINING CORP. PORT OF LOADING: NAMPO D.P.R. KOREA PORT OF DISCHARGE CHINA PORT DESTINATION OF GOODS CONSIGNEE: TO ORDER NOTIFY PARTY: Shipped on board the vessel named above in apparent good order and condition, unless otherwise indicated, the goods or packages specified herein and to be discharged at the above mentioned port of discharge or so near thereto as the vessel may safely get and affoat, unto the Owner of goods or to his, or their assigns, subject to conditions and exceptions enumerated hereon and on the back in exchange for this Bill of Lading. The weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value, being particulars furnished by the shipper on loading. PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER Marks & Numbers Packages Description of goods Weight Measurement N/M IN BULK ANTHRACITE COAL 14,103 MT

Source: Mr. Zhang Qiao

Annex 8-1: Airway bills associated with the shipment



17-01388 147/326



Source: The Panel

Annex 8-2: Items in the shipment compared to products advertised by Glocom

Item found in the shipment:



HF software defined radio model GR-150 advertised by Glocom:



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Item found in the shipment:



Crypto speaker microphone model GR-621 advertised by Glocom



Other items found in the shipment (left) and items advertised by Glocom (right)

HF whip antenna





HF 2.4m Whip Antenna: GA-111A

This antenna is vertically polarized omnidirectional antenna. The antenna is composed of three parts as plug, direction changing parts, and antenna sections. The antenna sections are made of high elasticity allow steel pipe, and are connected to each other by high strength elastic rope. The soft direction changing device can realize 0-90 arbitrarily direction change. The antenna is foldable and easy for operation and carrying.

Rucksack





Rucksack:GA-122A

This is a rucksack for GR series manpack radio system. It is very compatible for soldier to carry radio with all accessories. It can keep antenna, batteries, handset, headset etc... It is designed to support the use during on movement, so very comfortable in battlefield environment.

GPS antenna





GPS Antenna: GA-50A

This is high gain, low loss, active, extra low current consumption, small size GPS antenna. It supports SMA plug and magnetic mounting or screw mounting. It's useful for mobile application with GR series radios.

Source: The Panel and glocom.com.my

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Annex 8-3: Beijing Chengxing Trading Co. Ltd. in Chinese business registry




Source: http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing



Source: http://www.cnfeol.com/price/quote_20141120105400879324.aspx

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Annex 8-4: Kota Karim's 'cargo manifesto' showing Guangcaiweixing Trading listed as shipper and "numerically controlled" steel plate shear from the cargo



Source: The Panel

Annex 8-5: Documents showing International Golden Services and International Global Systems acted on behalf of Glocom

Extract of Glocom website listing International Golden Services as its contact



Document showing International Global System registered Glocom website




Source: glocom.com.my and glocom.com.my.ipaddress.com

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Annex 8-6: Invoice showing Glocom's address in Pyongyang

Invoice of a Glocom's supplier



Korea Pusong Corp. (조선부성회사) (a.k.a. Elite Surveying Instruments Corporation), Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Mariner's Shipping & Trading (MST) (a.k.a. THANAPAT 558), 662/33 Rama Road Yan Nawa, Bangkok, Thailand.

PAN Systems Pyongyang Branch (Pan Systems 평양지사), Pothonggang Hotel Room No. 818, Ansan-1-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Royal Team Corporation, 2F-3, No. 422, Guang Fu South Road, Taipei, Taiwan.

Rungrado Trading Corp. (능라도무역회사) (a.k.a Ryongsong Trading Co., Ltd.), DPRK.

Choe, Chol Hwa (최철화); DOB 27 Nov 1966; Nationality DPRK; the Second Academy of Natural Sciences official (individual).

Choe, Yong Jun (최영준); DOB 13 Mar 1954; Nationality DPRK; the Second Academy of Natural Sciences officia l(individual).

Source: The Panel and list of entities unilaterally designated by the ROK on 8 March 2016

Annex 8-7: Stamp of Glocom and extract of its catalogue

Stamp of Glocom



Extract of a Glocom product catalogue featuring deliberately blurred Korean characters and a portion of the demilitarized zone between the ROK and the DPRK.



Source: The Panel and glocom.com.my

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Annex 8-8: Personal information of Pan Systems Pyongyang staff

Ryang Su Nyo

Email address: iris.lhr2015@yandex.com


Passport information:



Pyon Won Gun

Email address: wg.pyon@glocom.com.my

Passport information:



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Pae Won Chol


Passport information:



Kim Chang Hyok

Aliases: "James Jin" and "James Kim"

Tel: +6 0126519266




Source: The Panel

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Annex 8-9: Photograph of an electronic card of Glocom's radio and associated price

The HF software defined radios were made of a case and five electronic cards such as the one in figure 1.


Figure 1: Electronic card named 150ATU30 from the radio manufactured by Glocom



The Panel has identified Glocom's supplier of the electronic cards and was able to obtain the price of the cards contained in the radio (see figure 2)

Atten	: W. G. Pyon							SHIP TO: D	andong by t	rain/car		
Tel:	. W. G. Lyon	/						Tel:				
No.	model	y'n	specification (mm)	quantity (PCS)	unit price/pcs (USD)	Engineering cost (USD)	Deep slot (USD)	Test fixture (USD)	silver cost(USD)	Estimated weight(KG)	Shipping cost to Beijing in 3days (USD)	total price for 1950pcs (USD)
1	150DSP30	T- 5C4711A0	199.3*93,3 mm	1,950	\$4,18	\$250,00		\$400.00		145.2kg	\$96.80	\$8,897.80
2	150FCU40	T- 4C4712A0	199*92,9 mm	1,950	\$2.92	\$200.00		\$300,00		144kg	\$96.00	\$6,290.00
3	150FRONT 0	T- 4C4713A0	189.5*76.1mm	1,950	\$2.27	\$200.00		\$300.00		128.4kg	\$85,60	\$5,012.10
4	150AM/30	T- 4C4714A0	216*76.2mm	1,950	\$2.60	\$200.00		\$300,00		112.5kg	\$75.00	\$5,645,00
5	150ATU30	T- 2C4715A0	208.1*103mm	1,950	\$1.85	\$70,00		\$230,00		167.2kg	\$111.47	\$4,018.97
6	150KEY10	T- 2C4716A0	96mm*77mm	1,950	\$0.68	\$70,00		\$200,00		57,6kg	\$87.00	\$1,683.00
7	GA-32A60	T- 2C4717A0	60.5mm*70.5mm	1,950	\$0.39	\$70.00		\$200.00		34kg	\$45.00	\$1,075.50
contra	(USD)	53	2,622.37				Tota	al cost in RME				¥200,627.56


Source: The Panel



Annex 9-1: Airway bill associated with the shipment interdicted by a Member State

Source: The Panel

Annex 9-2: Rungrado's affiliation to the Korean Worker's Party



Source: "Route to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for European Companies: a guidebook for European Investors in DPRK", Asia-Invest Europe Aid Cooperation Office (a European initiative).

Annex 9-3: Rungrado activities

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

This corporation inaugurated in Juche 62 (1973) deals with production of various kinds of heavy machines, vehicles, light industry and electronic goods and seafood, as well as trade cargo service, passenger and freight transport and other transactions and conducts economic and technical cooperation with foreign partners.

It has under its control dozens of companies such as Ryongak Trading Company, Hwanggumbol Trading Company, Sosan JV Company and Rungrado IT Company.

Other affiliates are Choe Jong Rak Aeguk Clothes Factory, Onchon Rungrado Sindok Mineral Water Factory, Rangnang Rungrado Filling Station, external technical personnel and service workers training institutes, etc.



The Ryongak Trading Company engages mainly in production and marketing of vehicles including bikes and trimotorcycles and electronic goods and foodstuffs, commercial service and repair of vehicles.

The Rungrado IT Company staffed with able program developers has several branches at home and abroad, all of which specialize in the development and marketing of programs as well as service related to computer and its accessories and consultation for technological exchange and investment.

The Sindok-brand mineral water from the Onchon Rungrado Sindok Mineral Water Factory has been registered as a natural living monument as it is rich in various kinds of minerals and nutritive oil necessary for the growth of children. It is highly efficacious for the treatment of hypertension, cerebral hemorrhage and apoplexy, colitis and other diseases.

The corporation sets it as its management strategy to intensify technical force, introduce cuttingedge scientific and technological achievements, improve the quality of products and develop new products.

It also has branches, economic and technical cooperation agencies and missions in several countries around the world to promote contact and exchanges with its counterparts.

Source: www.naenara.com.kp

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
Annex 9-4: Rungrado dispatch of workers to Poland and agreement with a local company

KOREA RUNGRADO GENERAL TRADING CORP. ADD: Segori Dong, Dist. Potonggang Pyongyang, DPR Korea Tel: 850-2-18-111 Fax: 810-850-238-14507

2012-08-01

ODDELEGOWANIE

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation z siedzibą Segori-dong Dist. Potonggang "Pyongyang DPR Korea oddelegowuje nw. pracowników naszej firmy do realizacji usługi eksportowej w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w ramach zawartej umowy z firmą Armex Sp. z o. o. z siedzibą przy ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96 w Gdańsku:





Translated from Polish

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

1 August 2012

Secondment

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation	on, with headquarters in Segori-dong, Potonggang District, Pyongyang			
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, shall assign the workers of our company listed below to the performance of				
export services in the Republic of Poland, under the	he terms of the contract concluded with , which has its			
headquarters at	Gdańsk:			

FIRST NAME AND SURNAME

PASSPORT No.

Nos 1-29 [redacted]

The monthly remuneration of the aforementioned workers shall be [redacted] Polish zloty.

(Signed) [redacted]

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Korpcenie no 12 (5 oderna)

1

UMOWA

Na usługi kooperacyjne w zakresie demontażu, montażu i spawania konstrukcji stalowych z dnia 2012-07-01 zawarta pomiędzy:

Armex Sp. z o, o.

z siedzibą: 80-955 Gdańsk, ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96

NIP:584-025-17-29

reprezentowanym przez:

- 1.
- Zwanym dalej Zamawiającym

a

KOREA RUNGRADO GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION

reprezentowanym przez:

Zwanym dalej WYKONAWCĄ

§ 1 Definicje

O ile w dalszej części Umowy będzie występować określenie ZLECAJĄCY należy przez to rozumieć firmę kontraktującą sekcje/bloki statków.

§ 2 Przedmiot Umowy

- Zamawiający zleca, a Wykonawca przyjmuje do wykonania spawanie prefabrykowanych i montowanych sekcji oraz błoków statków na jedn. NB142/2, B68/1-4, NB38/1-2 wg załączonego harmonogramu.
- Wykonywanie prac będzie odbywało się na jednostkach w oparciu o dostarczoną dokumentację i zgodnie ze standardami i normami obowiązującymi.
- Nadzór nad wykonywanymi pracami będą pełnili przedstawiciele Zamawiającego, lub wyznaczeni przez niego ludzie, wspólnie z przedstawicielem Wykonawcy.
- Wykonawca zobowiązuje się do wykonania zleconej pracy zgodnie z obowiązującą technologią, zgodnie z wymogami i przepisami BHP oraz ppoż.





1

§ 3 Cena umowna

- Za wykonane prace Zamawiający zapłaci Wykonawcy jedynie kwotę wynikającą ze stawki umownej, pod warunkiem, iż Zamawiający i Zlecający przyjmą bez zastrzeżeń wykonany przez Wykonawcę zakres prac, a powyższe znajdzie potwierdzenie w protokole zdawczo-odbiorczym podpisanym pomiędzy Wykonawcą i Zamawiającym, na warunkach określonych poniżej.
- W przypadku prac w systemie godzinowym stawka będzie wynosić PLN (dwadzieścia 00/100) za roboczogodzinę.

§ 4 Nadzór i Koordynacja prac

- 1. Prace należy wykonywać w oparciu o dostarczone przez Zamawiającego:
 - a. dokumentację techniczną i technologiczną
 - b. ramowy wykaz odbiorów kadłuba
 - c. ramowa technologię remontu i budowy kadłuba poszczególnych jednostek
 - d. plan kontroli spoin

.

- e. plan prób szczelności
- f. książkę odbiorów prac
- g. poleceń nadzoru Zamawiającego

§ 5 Obowiązki Wykonawcy

- W celu realizacji Umowy Wykonawca zgodnie z procedurą prawną obowiązującą przy zatrudnianiu obcokrajowców, oddeleguje do siedziby Zamawiającego wykwalifikowanych pracowników w zawodzie spawaczy, posiadających:
 - a. stosowne kwalifikacje i uprawnienia
 - b. praktykę stoczniową
 - dodatkowo Wykonawca oddeleguje minimum 1 pracownika do nadzoru nad pracami prowadzonymi przez Wykonawcę na terenie Zamawiającego
- 2. Wykonawca gwarantuje:
 - a. dobrą jakość prac wykonywanych przez swoich pracowników
 - b. odpowiednią wydajność pracy
 - podporządkowanie się pracowników Wykonawcy wszelkim przepisom, normom i zasadom obowiązującym na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej



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W przypadku niespełnienia któregokolwiek z ww. punktów przez pracowników Wykonawcy Zamawiający ma prawo do:

- a. żądania zadośćuczynienia
- żadania przysłania innego pracownika na koszt Wykonawcy
- odstąpienia od Umowy, bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia.
- Nieuzasadnione przekroczenia zużycia ilościowego i asortymentowego materiałów obciąża finansowo Wykonawce.
- 4. Wykonawca od momentu przekazania materiałów, jak również udostępnienia mienia Zamawiającego, Zlecającego lub osób trzecich, do czasu odbioru prac lub zdania mienia ponosi pełną odpowiedzialność materialną za ich uszkodzenie, zagubienie lub zniszczenie wynikłe tylko z winy Wykonawcy.
- W przypadku niespełnienia wymogów jakościowych i terminowych przez pracowników Wykonawcy, wynikłych z winy Wykonawcy, Zamawiający zastrzega sobie prawo do odstąpienia od Umowy bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia.
- Kierownicy remontu, kierownicy wydziałowi, mistrzowie, inspektorzy Bhp i ppoż. i inni uprawnieni przez Zamawiającego lub Zlecającego mają prawo do kontroli pracowników Wykonawcy pod względem przestrzegania przepisów, norm i zasad:
 - a. prawnych obowiązujących w Polsce
 - b. przepisów Bhp i ppoż.
 - c. współżycia społecznego

Przedstawiciele wyznaczeni do ww kontroli są uprawnieni do wydawania wskazówek dotyczących respektowania ww. przepisów. W przypadku nie podporządkowania się pracowników Wykonawcy ww. zaleceniom Zamawiający ma prawo do odesłania pracownika łamiącego przepisy do Wykonawcy a nawet ma prawo do odesłania od niniejszej Umowy bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia. Prawo do odesłania pracownika do Wykonawcy przysługuje również w przypadku niespełnienia przez Wykonawcę gwarancji omówionych w punkcie 2 niniejszego paragrafu.

- Zamawiający nie ponosi winy za zdarzenia (w tym wypadki) zaistniałe przy pracy pracowników Wykonawcy, wynikłe z nieprzestrzegania stosownych przepisów.
- Wykonawca pokryje wszelkie szkody osobowe i majątkowe spowodowane przez swoich pracowników osobom trzecim i Zamawiającemu.





2

§ 6 Czas trwania Umowy

- Umowa zostaje zawarta na czas określony od
- Zamawiającemu przysługuje prawo do wcześniejszego rozwiązania niniejszej Umowy z 3miesięcznym okresem wypowiedzenia.
- W przypadku naruszenia postanowień Umowy Zamawiającemu, tak jak i Wykonawcy przysługuje prawo do odstapienia od Umowy ze skutkiem natychmiastowym.
- Przy rozwiązaniu Umowy wymaga się pisemnego powiadomienia drugiej strony z miesięcznym wyprzedzeniem.

§ 7 Warunki płatności

- Wykonanie prac zapisuje się w protokole prac wykonywanych, co miesiąc zgodnie z postępem wykonywanych prac. Obliczenia wykonuje się co miesiąc.
- Wartość prac ujętych w kontrakcie uwzględnia wynagrodzenie Wykonawcy i wszystkie
 jego koszty związane z wykonaniem tej Umowy: utrzymywanie pracowników, koszt prac
 itd., jak również wszystkie podatki i opłaty obowiązkowe do zapłacenia przez Wykonawcę.

§ 8 Postanowienia końcowe

- Do wykonania Umowy i rozstrzygania sporów z nią związanych oraz w sprawach nieuregulowanych niniejszą Umową mają zastosowanie przepisy prawa polskiego.
- Wszelkie spory wynikłe w trakcie realizacji Umowy rozstrzygać będzie Sąd Powszechny w Gdańsku
- Wszelkie zmiany do niniejszej Umowy mogą być wprowadzone w formie aneksu pod rygorem nieważności.
- Strony nie ponoszą odpowiedzialności za częściowe lub całkowite niewykonanie zobowiązań Umowy, jeżeli to niewykonanie nastąpiło na skutek okoliczności siły wyższej.

Za okoliczności siły wyższej poczytuje się okoliczności, które powstały po zawarciu Umowy, na skutek nieprzewidzianych przez Stronę zdarzeń o charakterze nadzwyczajnym, jak: wojnę, klęski żywiołowe, strajki oraz działania rządowe i administracyjne uniemożliwiające wykonanie zobowiązań Umowy.





V

17-01388

Strona dotknięta siłą wyższą niezwłocznie powiadomi na piśmie drugą Stronę o zaistniałym przypadku siły wyższej. Świadectwem wystąpienia okoliczności siły wyższej i okresu jej trwania będzie dokument Izby Handlowej Kraju Strony powołującej się na te okoliczności.

Jeżeli na skutek wystąpienia siły wyższej lub innej nieprzewidzianej przez strony sytuacji wykonanie Umowy byłoby prawnie lub faktycznie niemożliwe, to kaźda ze Stron będzie uprawniona do zawieszenia wykonania niniejszej Umowy.

W takim wypadku Strony w terminie dwóch tygodni podejmą decyzję co do dalszego obowiązywania Umowy lub odstąpienia od Umowy.

W przypadku gdyby okoliczność siły wyższej trwała dłużej niż 30 dni, każda ze Stron będzie miała prawo do rozwiązania niniejszej Umowy z 2-tygodniowym wyprzedzeniem.

ZAMAWIAJĄCY:


Armex sp. z o.o. ul, Marynarki Polskiej 96 80-955 Gdańsk

WYKONAWCA:

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corp. ADD: Segori Dong, Dist. Potonggang Pyongyang, DPR Korea



ARMEX Spólica z O.O. 80-855 Gantek, al. blammarti Patabal 95 100-100-17-25 REGON 193957577 tel. kom. 509 020 447; 509 019 300



KOREA RUNGRADO GENERAL TRADING CORP. ADD: Segori Dong, Dist. Potonggang Pyongyang, DPR Korea Tel: 850-2-18-111 Fax: 810-850-238-14507

172/326

Translated from Polish

Agreement

on cooperation with regard to the dismantling, assembly and welding of steel structures,

starting 1 January 2012, concluded between:

Headquarters:

NIP [tax identity number]:

Represented by:

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

Hereinafter referred to as "the Employer"

 $\quad \text{and} \quad$

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

Represented by: [redacted]

Hereinafter referred to as "the Contractor"

Article 1 Definitions

Wherever the term "the Employer" appears below, it shall mean the company contracting sections/blocks of ships.

Article 2 Objects of the Agreement

1. The Employer shall order and the Contractor shall agree to carry out the welding of prefabricated and assembled sections and blocks of ships at units NB142/2, B68/1-4, NB38/1-2, in accordance with the attached schedule.

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- 2. The work shall be carried out at the units on the basis of the documentation submitted and in accordance with mandatory standards and regulations.
- 3. The work shall be supervised by representatives of the Employer or by persons appointed by the Employer, together with a representative of the Contractor.
- 4. The Contractor undertakes to carry out the work commissioned in accordance with the necessary technology and in compliance with the health and safety and fire safety requirements and regulations.

Article 3 Agreed price

- The Employer shall pay the Contractor for the work carried out solely in accordance with an
 agreed rate, provided that the Employer and the Commissioning Party accept the scope of the
 work carried out by the Contractor without restrictions, and that this is also confirmed in the
 acceptance report signed by the Contractor and the Employer, according to the conditions
 described below.
- 2. In the case of work to be paid by the hour, the rate shall be [redacted] Polish zloty per working hour.

Article 4 Supervision and coordination of work

- 1. The work shall be carried out on the basis of provision by the Employer of:
 - (a) Technical and technological documentation;
 - (b) An indicative list of hulls received;
 - (c) An indicative list of technology for the repair and construction of the hulls of specific units;
 - (d) A welding inspection schedule;
 - (e) A tightness test schedule;
 - (f) A work acceptance log;
 - (g) Instructions for the supervision of the Employer.
 - 5. Article 5 Obligations of the Contractor
- To comply with the Agreement in accordance with the mandatory legal procedure for the employment of foreign nationals, the Contractor shall send to the Employer's headquarters qualified welding workers who have:
 - (a) Relevant qualifications and skills;

- (b) Shipbuilding experience;
- (c) In addition, the Contractor shall assign at least one worker to supervise the work carried out by the Contractor at the site of the Employer.
- 2. The Contractor shall guarantee:
 - (a) The good quality of the work carried out by its workers;
 - (b) Reasonable labour productivity;
 - (c) The compliance of the Contractor's workers with all rules, regulations, and standards mandatory in Poland.

Should any of the above-mentioned points not be observed by the Contractor's workers, the Employer shall have the right to:

- (a) Demand compensation;
- (b) Demand that another worker be assigned, at the Contractor's own expense;
- (c) Withdraw from the Agreement without prior notice.
- 3. The Contractor shall be financially liable for unjustifiable excesses in the variety and quantity of materials used.
- 4. From the moment that materials are delivered and the property of the Employer, the Commissioning Party or any third parties is made available, until the moment when the work is accepted or the property is returned, the Contractor shall bear full material liability for any damage, loss or destruction arising solely from a fault of the Contractor.
- 5. If the quality and deadline requirements are not met by the Contractor's workers, and the Contractor is at fault, the Employer reserves the right to withdraw from the Agreement without prior notice.
- 6. Repair foremen, heads of departments, experts, as well as health and safety and fire safety inspectors and other persons authorized by the Employer or the Commissioning Party shall have the right to monitor compliance by the Contractor's workers with the following rules, regulations and standards:
 - (a) Legal obligations in Poland;
 - (b) Health and safety and fire regulations;

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- (c) Harmonious relations between workers.
- 6. Persons designated to conduct the inspections mentioned above are authorized to issue advice regarding compliance with the above-mentioned regulations. If the Contractor's workers fail to comply with this guidance, the Employer shall have the right to send any worker who violates the regulations back to the Contractor and even to withdraw from the present Agreement without prior notice. The right to send the worker back to the Contractor shall also apply if the guarantees set out in paragraph 2 of this article are not honoured.
 - 7. The Employer shall not be liable for events (including accidents) which occur as a result of a failure to observe the relevant regulations while the Contractor's workers are working.
 - 8. The Contractor shall cover the cost to third parties or to the Employer for all damage to persons and property caused by the Contractor's workers.
 - 7. Article 6 Duration of the Agreement
 - 1. The Agreement has been concluded for a fixed period from [redacted].
 - 2. The Employer has the right to terminate the present Agreement subject to three months' notice.
 - 3. If the provisions of the Agreement are violated, both the Employer and the Contractor shall have the right to withdraw from the Agreement with immediate effect.
 - 4. Termination of the Agreement shall require one month's written notice to be served on the other Party.
 - 8. Article 7 Terms of payment
 - 1. The execution of works shall be noted in the work log every month as the work progresses. The calculations shall be made every month.
 - 2. The value of the work included in the contract shall take into account the remuneration of the Contractor and all of the Contractor's costs relating to the execution of this Agreement: the maintenance of the workers, the cost of the work, etc. and also all mandatory taxes and charges to be paid by the Contractor.
 - 9. Article 8 Final provisions
 - 1. For the execution of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes relating thereto and of any matters not regulated by the present Agreement, the provisions of Polish law shall apply.
 - All disputes arising during the execution of this Agreement shall be settled by the Court of General Jurisdiction in Gdańsk.

3. Any amendments to the present Agreement must be made in the form of an annex in order to be

deemed valid.

4. The Parties shall bear no responsibility for a partial or total failure to execute the obligations of

the Agreement if such non-execution is attributable to force majeure events.

Force majeure events are deemed to be those arising after the conclusion of the Agreement as a result of events of an

extraordinary nature which are unforeseeable for either Party, such as: war, natural disasters, strikes or governmental or

administrative actions which make it impossible to perform the obligations of the Agreement.

A Party affected by force majeure events shall immediately inform the other Party in writing of the occurrence of the force

majeure event. A document from the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the Party invoking force majeure

circumstances shall attest to the occurrence of the force majeure incident and its duration.

If, as a result of the occurrence of force majeure events or some other situation which is not foreseen by the Parties, the

execution of the Agreement should prove legally or effectively impossible, both Parties shall be entitled to suspend the

execution of the present Agreement.

In such case, the Parties shall take a decision within two weeks as to whether they shall continue to be bound by the

Agreement or to withdraw from it.

Should the situation of force majeure last for more than 30 days, both Parties shall have the right to terminate the present

Agreement with two weeks' notice.

THE EMPLOYER:

[signatures redacted]

THE CONTRACTOR:

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation [signature redacted]

Segori dong, Potonggang district

Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Source: The Panel

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Annex 9-5: Fax number and address of Arab International Optronic



http://aioegy.com accessed on 17 February 2016

COMPANY STATUS REPORT

CO. NAME : ARAB INTERNATIONAL OPTRONICS (Correct)

A.R.E. MOD A. AUTHORITY (Requested)

ADDRESS

Street : El Salam Road (infront of Ring Road)

Area : 11371 El Salam City

P.O. Box: 8182

Town : Cairo 11491 Country : Egypt

Telephone: (20 2) 2280 6075 : (20 2) 2280 6077 Fax

Source: www.icpcredit.com

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Shipper's Name and Address Shipper's Account Number Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by Consigners Name and Address A.R. EGYPT Consignan's Account Number MODA AUTHORITY ARAB INTERNATIONAL OPTRONIC EL SALAM CITY CAIRO EGYPT suing Carrier's Agent Name and City Agent's IATA Code Account No Optional Shipping Information By First Gamer | Routing and Description CAI CAIRO INTERNATION Rate Class Gross Chargeable Weight Nature and Ouantity of Goods (Incl. Dimensions or Volume) Total Charge Prepaid Weight Charge Collect Other Charges Total Other Charges Due Agent Total Other Charges Due Carrier Signature of Shipper or his Agent Total Collect Executed on (date) et (place) Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent Charges at Destination * Total Collect Charges For Carners Use only at Destination

Annex 9-6: AIO use of the name "MODA Authority Arab International Optronics" on a shipping document

Source: The Panel

Annex 9-7: Egypt letter to the Panel of 2 September 2016

نص الرد

١- الشركة العربية العالمية للبصريات لا علاقة لها بتلك الصفقة، وليس لها أي علاقة بالشركتين الكوريتين الشماليتين المذكورتين بخطاب فربق الخبراء.

٢ - تشابه اسم الشركتين الوارد بخطاب فريق الخبراء لا يعني تطابقهما (similar but not identical)، فضلاً عن أن البيانات (العنوان / رقم الهاتف / رقم الفاكس) ذات الصلة بـ "الشركة العربية العالمية للبصريات" متوافرة على شبكة المعلومات الدولية، أي إنها متاحة للجميع.

07/09/2016 1615484E 1

Translated from Arabic

Reply

- The company Arab International Optronics has no connection with that transaction, and has no connection with the two North Korean companies mentioned in the memorandum from the Panel of Experts.
- 2. The fact that the names of the companies mentioned in the memorandum from the Panel of Experts are similar does not mean that they are identical. Moreover, the information regarding the company Arab International Optronics (address, telephone number and fax number) can be found on the Internet, and is therefore available to anyone.

Source: Egypt

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Source: DPRK Foreign Trade and the Panel

Annex 10-2: Taebaeksan 96's commercial catalogue mentioning Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation



Source: The Panel

Korea Ryongwang/Ryengwang Trading Corporation

Address: Red Street 2 dong, Pothonggang District

Pyongyang, DPRK

Tel: 425-7678, 425-7643, 425-7583

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Annex 11-1: DPRK – Mozambique military cooperation contract¹

Ref. No. KMN-056 2013.11.28 Maputo

[Names of DPRK people]

윤동현(Yun Dong Hyun) 위원장 국방 위원회 (National Defence Commission) 인민무력부 (KPA) 부부장

성학철 서기장 국방 위원회 (NDC) 인민무력부 (KPA) 군자 현조총국 총국장 대리

(Sung Hak Cheol)

박경호 국방 위원회 (NDC) 인민무력부 (KPA)군자 현조총국 부총국장

(Park Kyung Ho)

장광철 위원 총참모부 (KPA General Staff) 땅크국 처장 (Tank Division)

(Jang Kwang Cheol)

안영일(Ahn Young II) 위원 국방 위원회 (NDC) 인민무력부 (KPA) 군자 협조 총국 처장 (Military Cooperation

General Bureau)

문학면 위원 항공 및 반항공사령부 로케트 연구소 소장

(Mun Hak Myun)(Air and Anti Air Command Force Rocket Research Maj. General/Director)

김석룡 위원 총참모부 탐지전자전연구소 부소장

(Kim Seok Ryong) (KPA General Staff Electronic Warfare Detection Laboratory/ Assist. Director)

공군밑 반항공부문 [Air Force & Anti-Air Defense Areas]

1. 반항공고사로케트 종합체 <뻬초라> 현대화

Anti Air Test Rocket Total Body/System "Pecchora" Modernization

2. 현대화된 고사로케트 <뻬초라>검열차 및 훈련기재

Modernized Test Rocket "Pechhora" Screening Car & Training Base

3. 이전 쏘련산 IT 계렬 탐지기 개조 현대화 (11,12,14,15,18,19,35)

Old Soviet-Produce IT type Detector – Remodeling & Modernization (11, 12, 14, 15, 15, 18, 19, 35)

4. 반항공고사로케트 <이글라> 사격 훈련 기재

Anti Air Test Rocket "Igla" /"Eagle LA" Fire Training Materials/Base

5. 반항공고사로케트 <이글라> 자동사격지휘 조총체계

Anti Air Test Rocket "Igla"/Eagle LA" Automatic Shoot & Command Volley System

6. 250kg 항공폭탄을 활공유로 폭탄으로 개조

250 kg Aviation Bomb/Aerial Bomb - converted into glide-induced bomb

7. GPS/GLONASS에 의한 비행사항법체계

GPS/GLONASS used for Flight Details Method/System

¹ Unofficial translation of contract that the Panel viewed during a mission to a Member State capital

8. (Tank) 이전 쏘련산 Tank 떼-54 (T-54), 떼 55 (T-55), 수리 및 현대화

Old Soviet-Produced Tank T-54, T-55 – repair and modernization of...

9. 땅크 종합 훈련 기재 <TSC-1>

Tank (complete) Training Support Center

포병부문 (Artillery Areas)

- 10. 각종 포무기 수리 (Various artillery weapons Repair)
- 11. 방땅크로케트 <AT-3>(말류뜨까) 조종부 개조현대화

(Anti-Tank Rocket "AT-3" (ATGM) "Malyutka" – remodelling & modernization of its operations/control)

12. 포위치발견 탐지기

(Artillery-position Detector/Radar)

COMMS (Communication(s) Areas)

13. 수자식 단파, 초단파, 극초단파 무선기

(Vertical Short Wave, High Frequency, Ultrahigh Frequency Radio Receiver)

14. DS-SS 통신기술을 리용한 무선수자자료 전송체계 <MDS-U3>

Modular Dissemination System using DS-SS telecomm technology

15. 자료/음성 말단모뎀 <RI-5000>

Routing Indicator "RI-5000"

16. 쌍안격식레이자 통신기

Binocular-style Laser communicator

탐지 전자전 부문 (Electronic Detection Areas)

17. 전략적 단파 통신장비체계 (오성산-1)

Strategic Short Wave Telecommunications Equipment System (Ohsungsan-1)

18. 전술적 광대역 통신장비체계 (오성산-2)

Tactical Broadband Telecommunications Equipment System (Ohsungsan-2)

19 X-대역 비행기 탐지기장애체계 (구름)

X-Broadband Radar Obstacle Detection Plane (Kooreum = Cloud)

19. I-18 GHz 3차원 탐지기 정찰종합체 (방패)

Three Dimensional I-18 GHz Radar Reconnaissance System (Bangpae = Shield)

20. L-대역 위성통상장애체계

L Broadband Satellite Communication Obstacle Detection System

21. GPS/GLONASS/GALILEO 통합장애체계

GPS/GLONASS/GALILEO Global Navigation Satellite System

22. SAR 3차원 감시 및 장애종합체계

SAR 3-Dimensional Surveillance and Obstacle Detection System

정보전 부문 (Information Area)

23. 정부전 기술일군 양성 및 각종 망 및 정보보안체계 납입

Information Technology (Staff) Training and Acquiring various safety nets and information safety systems

병기부문 (Weapons Area)

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24. 폐화약재생공장

Rehabilitation of Gunpowder Processing Factory

화학부문 (Chemical Area)

25. 화학경보지휘차

Chemical Warfare Monitoring Command Car

26. 방사정찰기재 (PRA-907)

Permanent Restriction Area (PRA-907) Station

27. 방독면, 방독복 납입

Anti-Gas Mask, Anti-Gas Clothes

기타부문 (Other)

28. 소부대 지휘관용 군용 컴퓨터 Computer for military command

29. 소부대용 조종 낙하산

Parachute w/ controls for military use

Annex 12-1: Satellite Imagery of Oamites military base



(Satellite imagery of October 2011)



(Satellite imagery of March 2013)



(Satellite imagery of May 2014)

Source: Google Earth

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Annex 12-2: Communication document of KOMID in Namibia relating the shipment with the contract number "STNK-010305"

The address of Approval document on Namibia (final) 삼차 표시 (FOR PACKING HOX) MOD/NDF (로운 작년분칙포시) CONTRACT NO:STMK-HIOSHS BOX NO: BOX SIZE: A X B X C Cm NFT WEIGHT, GROSS WERGHT The Marking of Box (markings for every shipment of arrival)

3 국문자 방송주소

CONSIGNEE: NDF, REPBLIC OF NAMIBIA.

WINDHOEK, REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA.

TEL: 264-61-2042055/6 FAX: 264-61-220523

CONSIGNEER: 資計數劃外

SHIPPING MARK: MOD/NDF

KOMID DHL Address

최종 도착함 이름: WALVIS VAY PORT, Name Port

팡인개발 대표부 DHL 주소

No.17, Kickbusch Estate, Kickbusch Street, Klein WINDHOEK, WHK, WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA

TEL: 264-61-303017

CELL: 264-81-2197939,264-81-2197938 P.O.BOX: 86719 EROS, WHK, NAMIBIA.

 상품율하후 M/L 및 포장면서서 가각 1 부세 후에서 지러된 광업개발대표부로 즉시장지체주여 B/L 정본 2 부.포광년재시 정본 2 부,부본 3 부분 우리에게 즉시보내주기타입니다.

*After the shipment, notify immediately B/L and Packing list to the above address of KOMID, and send us two original copies of B/L and two original copies and three carbon copies of packing list immediately.

Source: The Panel

(Comparison of marking between boxes and the document)



CONTRACT NO:STNK-100308

BOX NO:

BOX SIZE; AXBX C Cm

NET WEIGHT GROSS WEIGHT

SHIPPING MARK: MOD/NDF


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Annex 12-3: The part of Packing Lists of the shipment at Walvis Bay in October 2012

	110000000000000000000000000000000000000	Unit	Qty	weight	Net weight	Box No.	Packing size	Volumo
1	Ethyl acetate storage	100	100	(kg)	(10)	1	7 30000 3201	(m)) X
-	Recovered acetate	bc	1	1305	615	E-A-1/44	2700*2200*2245	13.34
2	storage tank	bc	1	682	572	E-A-2/44	2700.5500.5360	14.02
3	Recovered acetate storage tank	pc	1	682	572	E-A-3/44	2700*2200*2360	14.02
4	Ethyl acetate pressure tank	pc	1	1495	920	E-A-4/44	4000*1400*2145	12
5	Ethyl acetate condenser	рс	2	3540	2920	E-A-5/44	2950*2200*1345	8.73
6	Granulator	рс	1	4808	4390	E-A-6/44	2420*3000*3050	22.14
7	Granulator	pc	1	4808	4390	E-A-7/44	2420*3000*3050	22.14
8	Salt melting tank	рс	1	1535	720	E-A-8/44	3500*2330*1945	15.86
9	Wet-screen	pc	-0	1827	1107	E-A-9/44	3400*1600*2345	12.76
10	Mixing tank	рс	1	3386	1705	E-A- 10/44	5550°2650°2845	41.84
11	Mixing tank	рс	1	3386	1705	E-A- 11/44	5550*2650*2845	41.84
12	Ball powder feeding tank-2	рс	1	1895	1483	E-A- 12/44	3600*1200*1245	5.38
13	Control agent heating box	рс	1	2026	1480	E-A-	3100*1670*1720	8.9
14	Control agent pressure tank	pc	1	1411	758	E-A- 14/44	3000*2300*1500	10.35
15	Vaseline pressure tank	pc	1	266	139	E-A-	1350°700°1145	1.08
16	Hot water pressure tank	pc	1	590	280	E-A- 16/44	2050*1300*1345	3,58
17	Concentration tank	рс	1	3400	2800	E-A- 17/44	4800*2800*2955	39.72
18	Concentration tank	рс	1	3400	2800	E-A- 18/44	4800*2800*2955	39.72
19	Absorption machine	рс	1	1925	1160	E-A- 19/44	3400*2100*2145	15,32
20	Mixed acid pressure tank	pc	1	649	300	E-A- 20/44	2816*1236*1278	4,45

Source: John Grobler

(Military Explosives and Propellants Production process)



Source: National Service Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP) - State-of-the-Art: Military Explosives and Propellants Production Industry: Volume I - the Military Explosives and Propellants Industry at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe

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Annex 12-4: Other military-related construction by Mansudae

Client Details		6
Principal	Contractor	
Name of Main Contractor	MOP Arch & Technical Services	
Name of Principal/Employ	ver: Ministry of Defence.	
Name of Sub Contractors		_
Postal address:	Box 81229, Olympia	\exists
Contact Person:	Mr. T-C Kim	
Company Registration No:		=
1. FULL DESCRIPTION OF CONTRACT: (i.e. Single Double /Story, private Dwelling, Standard Construction Brick Under tile, thatch Risk, Erf/Stand No Etc.)	Ending of works for the UBM Centre at responds Valley Milit Base.	lary
Ĺ	* *	
SITE LOCATION:	Leopords Valley Military Ba	zse.

Client Details	
Principal	Contractor
Name of Main Contractor:	MANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT AND INTESTORE
Name of Principal/Employe	
Name of Sub Contractors:	
Postal address:	PO BOX 81229 WHK
	10 80 8/201 201/10
Contact Person:	PAK 0816287449
Company Registration No:	2001044 VAT No: 273025/8/5
FULL DESCRIPTION OF CONTRACT:	
(i.e. Single Double /Story, private Dwelling, Standard Construction Brick Under tile, thatch Risk, Erf/Stand No	construction of the new conved office in Tsumes.
Etc.)	3
SITE LOCATION:	

Clients Name: MOP Group of Companies

Broker: Sebion Amupolo Quote Number: 628524440

Date: 05/07/2016

Short Period Construction Risks & Public Liability Quote

Conditions of Quotation:

- All monetary amounts are VAT Inclusive
- All premiums quoted are based on sums insured provided by yourselves and may change should sums insured change
- The terms of this quotation is based on the Underwriting Information provided. Should there be any
 deviation in such information at the time of attachment of risk, OMSIC reserves the right to modify the
 terms as appropriate to the change in risk
- OMSIC reserves the right to undertake technical and/or commercial surveys of the risk
- The terms quoted hold good for a period of 30 (thirty) days unless the insurer confirms in writing an
 extension of this period
- On acceptance of this quotation, kindly complete the last page and return to OMSIC
- The premium is based on a deposit and is subject to declaration adjustment as per the policy wording.
 We will require the actual construction value within 30 days of completion.

Territorial Limits:

The Republic of South Africa and to the extent permitted by the applicable insurance act the territories of Botswana Lesotho Namibia and Swaziland

Principal : Ministry of Defence

Description of Construction Project : Alteration and Additions to Existing Guest House

Construction Site : Erf 414, Jasper Street, Academia

Period of Construction : 22/06/2016 - 22/02/2017

Defects Liability Period : per conditions of contract but not exceeding 03 months

Testing & Commissioning Period : 30 days (new equipment only)


Estimated Construction Value : N\$12 827 259.60 (includes free issue materials & labour)

Removal of Debris : N\$50 000 Professional Fees : N\$50 000

Source: The Panel

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Annex 12-5: Mansudae's cash withdraw request for bulk cash courier to the DPRK



Mr. Kim Tong Chol Managing Director M.O.P Arch & Tech Services Ltd





Registered Bank Reg. No. 2002/0180

APPLICATION

Branch: Commercial / 281972

Reference: T.N.A

20/2015

27 January 2015

The Manager, Exchange Control Division Bank of Namibia, Windhoek

Applicant and domicile:

M.O.P Architectural & Technical Services Pty Ltd (Reg. No 2001/044) - Namibla

Amount: Foreign/Namibla:

USD 280,000.00 (Approx. NAD 3,305,792.00)

Beneficiary and domicile:

Applicant

Purpose:

Permission to avail of omnibus facilities.

Previous correspondence:

239/2012 & 58/2013 - Related

Reference is made to the above captioned ECA's and the Control's reply thereto.

The applicant approached our branch seeking the Control's urgent approval to avail of omnibus the approant approached our prench seeking the Control's urgent approval to avail or omnious travel facilities amounting to USD 280,000.00 to their foreign expatriales returning home to the

The applicant advised they require USD 20,000.00 cash notes to be paid to each of the fourteen travelling expatriates. We await the Control's favourable reply.

ANASTASIA BLACK

EXCHANGE CONTROL CONSULTANT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CENTRE

Source: Namibia

17-01388 195/326


Annex 12-6: Mansudae's construction works in Angola till February 2015

) PÚB	MINSTÉRIO DA COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE IN PROJECTISTAS DE OBRAS PÚ LICAS,INDUSTRIAIS DE CONS	BLICAS, EMPRETTI STRUÇÃO CIVIL E OBRAS	SIFICAÇÃO DOS EIROS DE OBRAS FORNECEDORES DE
	RELAÇÃO NOMINAL DA FO		
	Empresa: MANSUDAE Group	Construção Civil e O	oras ruoneas Boar
		Гинсао на	Data de validade
No	Nome	Empresa	de Contrato
1	Pedro Simão	Trabalhador	20/ Novembro./2016
2	Francisco Gomes	Trabalbador	idem
3	Mauricio Chitoco Casimiro	Trabalhador	idem
4	Francisco	Trabalhador	idem
5	Eugenio	Trabalhador	idem
6	Masambo	Trabalhador	idem
7	Sebastião	Trabalhador	idem
8	Pedro	Trabalhador	ídem
9	Elias Estevão	Trabalhador	ídem
10	António Paulo	Trabalhador	idem
11	Mavando	Trabalhador	idem
12	João António Futi	Trabalhador	idem
13	Rutti Boanda Sebastião	Trabalhador	ídem
14	Fernando Muanda	Trabalhador	idem
15	Bento Matondo Deodato	Trabalhador	idem
16	José Maria	Trabalhador	idem
17	Silvestre Mbenza	Trabalhador	idem
18	Ciracilia Nzau	Trabalhador	idem
	João Fernando	Trabalhador	ídem
19		Trabalbador	idem
19	Simão Tomás		
	Tomás Bumba	Trabalhador	idem
20		Trabalhador Trabalhador Trabalhador	idem idem idem

Nome	Função na Empresa	Data de validade de Contrato	
João Maria Salo	Trabalhador	20/ Novembro./2016	3
		idem	
		idem	1
		ídem	
		ídem	1
		idem	_
			٦.
			_
			_
			\neg
			_
Joaquim Nunvo de Moris Barros			-1-
			_
José Maria Tati			_
Boca Baki Bissimbo			_
Simão Batista			-
Ventura Barros			\neg
Joaquim Mbodo			-1
Silva Zau			-
Adão antonio andré			
	Trabalhador		-
	Trabalhador		-
	Trabalhador		
	Trabalhador		_
	Trabalhador		
Torge losé luis	Trabalhador		\rightarrow
Docas i domingos	Trabalhador		\rightarrow
A fonce erneste serafim	Trabalhador		
	Trabalhador		_
	Trabalbador	idem	
	Pedro Lendo Manuel Buati Victor Daniel Estanislau Goma Victor Simba André José Bingo Almeida João Capita Mataia Adolf Brás I Lamba Tari Simão Marcos Mabiata Zacarias Buiti Silvestre Muanda Joaquim Nunvo de Moris Barros Panfilo Nguimbi José Maria Tati Boca Baki Bissimbo Simão Batista Ventura Barros Joaquim Modo Silva Zau Adão antonio andré Eduardo augusto pelo Fernando francisco cafele cuba segunda domingos Fonseca joão manuel manueleis p gonsalues Jorge josé luis Docas ji domingos Afonso ernesto seratim	Pedro Lendo Manuel Buati Victor Daniel Trabalhador Daniel Estarislau Goma Victor Simba André José Bingo Almeida Trabalhador Trabalhador João Capita Mataia Adolf Brás Trabalhador	Pedro Lendo

Source: Angola

Annex 12-7: Mansudae-Angola in Angola business registry



1616573E

Republic of Angola Ministry of Justice

Commercial Registry Office of Luanda

Certificate

I, Andrade Manuel Neto, graduate in law and Registrar of the Commercial Registry Office of Luanda,

Acting pursuant to a request submitted under number one hundred and one in the Daily Journal dated the twenty-fourth day of February two thousand and six, which is kept at this Registry Office,

Hereby certify that the limited liability company named <u>Mansudae</u> Group — Civil Construction and Public Works Limited, which is headquartered in Luanda, at number eighteen/twenty, Francisco <u>Sottomayor</u> Street, <u>Bairro</u> Azul, is registered under number one hundred and sixty five dash zero six.

I further certify that the company in question has a shareholder capital of KZ. 4,450,000.00 (four million, four hundred and fifty thousand kwanzas). Its shareholders are as follows: Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural and Technical Services (Proprietary), Limited, headquartered in Windhoek, Namibia, with a share with the nominal value of KZ. 4,404,500.00 (four million, four hundred and four thousand, five hundred kwanzas), and Kim Kwang Hyok, with another share with the nominal value of KZ. 44,500.00 (forty-four thousand five hundred kwanzas). The manager, who is not a shareholder, is Ri Won Chol.


In witness whereof, I have reviewed, corrected and signed the present certificate

 $Done\ at\ the\ Commercial\ Registry\ Office\ of\ Luanda,\ in\ Luanda,\ this\ fifteenth\ day\ of\ March,\ two\ thousand\ and$

 $(Seal)\,(Signed)\,{\rm The}\,{\rm Registrar}$

Source: Angola

six.



Source: The Panel

Annex 12-9: International Military Technical Forum in Russia- Russia's Correspondence to the Panel of 21 December 2016

Постоянное представительство Permanent Mission Российской Федерации of the Russian Federation при Организации to the United Nations Объединенных Цашій Phone: (212) 861-4900 136 East of Street Fax: [2/2] 628 0252 New York NY 10063 New York, W December 2016 Dear Mr. Griffiths, With reference to your letter S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.949 dated 11 November 2016 the Russian Mission to the UN reiterates its previously expressed position that the participation of North Korean representatives in the «Army-2016» Forum did not fall under current sanctions regime against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Yours (Alexander Volgarev Senior Counsellor Political Coordinator Mr. Hugh Griffiths Coordinator Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) United Nations New York

Source: Russian Federation


17-01388 **199/326**

Annex 12-10: Wonsan air show aircraft – chain of three emails

(1) Chinese counterpart request to PAL (top), and (2) PAL's technical advice on aircraft in DPRK (lower)

From: Sent: Wednesday, 6 January 2016 7:39 p.m.
To CC
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Customer Support - Engineer Training for Reassembly Team - PAL Factory
Hello S
now the aircraft in North Korea, the lasted news from BGAC market people: the flap motor could not work
now.
Chinese engineer could not to maintain that aircraft without qualified maintenance engineer followed (before, the engineer from Shandong followed our work, but they could not go to North Korea)
2) the montor did not deliver to us now.
 please prepare the materials and special tools for this work, BPAT's purchase procedure is longer now, it is difficult to promise the aircraft requirement now.
4) others doubts from customer about engineer oil and hydraulic fluid check and maintenance, we have check the MM and deliver to them, could you check the maintenance engineer training for this new customer. I think they should been trained ASAP for this aircdaft operating.
for you as reference.
thank you very much.
发件人:"S 发送时间:2016-01-06 11:22:48 (星期三)
收件。
抄送:
*AMis 主題: RE: RE: Customer Support - Engineer Training for Reassembly Team - PAL Factory
Helio IIII
We have extensively researched the problem, the flap issue is definitely related and have checked the material used in the state of the
Initially we need to coat with with and suggest the engineers at BPAT remove the one at a time soak for few minutes for similar then reinstall. Longer term we will have our design department review and change to an improved.

(3) Reply from PAL to Chinese counterpart



PAL – Pacific Aerospace Ltd.

Source: The Panel

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Annex 13-1: Extracts of maritime databases showing identity deception

Ri Won 105 (Ji Hye San)

Chong Jin 14 (Gold Star 3*)



Source: www.vesselfinder.com

202/326


NAME OF SHIP HUI CHON SONG PHYONG NAME OF SHIP 국가해사감독국 ORT OF REGISTRY NAMPHO 국가해사감독국 PORT OF REGISTRY NAMPHO REG No 3406577 REG No 5405850 **(3)** 340,000 Ship Date HISTORY HISTORY CALL SIGN HMZI CALLSIGN HMZB? TARITIME LAWS mpNew Her Ch IMO No MARITIME LAWS IMO No 8405270 GT 3453 NT NT 2085 LENGTH 104 LENGTH BREADTH 15 BREADTH E 55 DEPTH TYPE OF SHIP GENERAL CARGO SHIP TYPE OF SHIP GENERAL CARGO SHIP ENGINE POWER ENGINE POWER BUILT 19\$4 BUILT SHIP BUILDER IMABASHI SHIPYARD SHIP BUILDER DALABASHI SHIPYARD SHIP OWNER SONOPHYONG FORWARDING CO. LID SHIP OWNER HUICHON SHIPPING CO. LTD. REGISTRY CONDITION REGISTRY CONDITION

Annex 13-2: Extracts from the DPRK Maritime Administration database showing the same characteristics as the *Hui Chon*

Source: DPRK Maritime Administration available at http://ma.gov.kp/index.php?lang=en

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Annex 13-3: Extracts from the IMO database for the port state control inspection of the Song Phyong 7



Source: IMO available at https://gisis.imo.org/Members/PSC/Search.aspx

Annex 13-4: DPRK-flagged vessels owned, operated or certified by foreign companies

Vessel name	IMO No	Operator	Country	Owner	Country	Technical Manager	Country
Dong Nam No. 1	8503735	Dongnam Transport JV Co	DPRK	Korpen Shipping Co Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Dongnam Transport JV Co	DPRK
E. Morning	8717910	Ryusong Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK	Seastar Hong Kong Shipping	Hong Kong China*	Ryusong Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK
Fatima 1	7303279	Barakat Al- Ashoor Marine Serv	Iraq	Barakat Al- Ashoor Marine Serv	Iraq	Barakat Al- Ashoor Marine Services	Iraq
Hae Bang San	8518962	Korea Haegumgang Shipping Co	DPRK	Hongkong Complant Intl Trans	Hong Kong China*	Korea Haegumgang Shpg Co	DPRK
Hung Tae 1	8604541	Xingtai International Trading	Hong Kong China*	Flourish Maritime Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Xingtai International Trading	Hong Kong China*
Jin Ming 1	8303290	Chonghae Shipping Co	DPRK	Hongkong Jinming Co Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Chonghae Shipping Co	DPRK
Jung Gang 5	8925012	Korea Namsan Shpg Corp	DPRK	China Dandong Liaodong	China	Aprokgang Shipping & Trading	DPRK
K. Morning	9021576	Ryusong Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK	Seastar Hong Kong Shipping	Hong Kong China*	Ryusong Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK
Kang An 1	8032683	Korea Kangan Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK	Universal Imp & Exp Trading Co	Hong Kong China*	Korea Kangan Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK
Kum Hae	8904824	Korea Yanggakdo Shipping Co	DPRK	HongKong Cheong Song Shipping	Hong Kong China*	Korea Yanggakdo Shipping Co	DPRK
Kum San Bong	8810384	Korea Namsan Shpg Corp	DPRK	Xin Sea Shipping Co Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Korea Tanphung Trading Co	DPRK
Man Chung 1	8406858	Manchung Shipping Co	DPRK	Jiajia Holdings Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Manchung Shipping Co	DPRK
Mi Yang 7	8303214	Korea Miyang Shipping Co	DPRK	Dongcheng HK Shipping Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Korea Miyang Shipping Co	DPRK
O Ka San	8735924	Korea Ryonghung Shipping Co	DPRK	Chinko Shipping Trading Co Ltd	Hong Kong China*	Korea Sonbong General Trading	DPRK
Ryu Gyong	9036533	Chonnyon Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK	Hongkong Song U Trading Group	Hong Kong China*	Chonnyon Shipping Co Ltd	DPRK
Shaima	8922709	Mohammad Katani Zadeh	UAE	Mohammad Katani Zadeh	UAE	Mohammad Katani Zadeh	UAE
Yekta	9103635	Mehdi Shanbadi Nia	UAE	Mehdi Shanbadi Nia	UAE	Mehdi Shanbadi Nia	UAE

^{*} In their reply to the Panel, China stated that its authorities investigated the companies in Hong Kong and found that their premises were unoccupied or occupied by other businesses. Further, that no records could be found of any substantial business being carried out by the companies in Hong Kong, China.

Source: IHS Maritime

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Annex 13-5: DGS Marine/British European & Overseas Protection and Indemnity insurance (P&I)

Until July 2012 DGS Marine was a Liechtenstein-registered offshore business company located at a fiduciary's office in Vaduz. Following June 2012 media reports that DGS's director, David Skinner had issued insurance certificates for Iranian-owned oil tankers transporting oil from Syria allegedly in contravention of European Union sanctions, ² the Liechtenstein Financial Authority issued a July 2012 warning notice stating that DGS Marine was not licensed to issue insurance in Liechtenstein.³ Following the Liechtenstein warning notice, Mr. Skinner registered DGS Marine as a BVI business company in August 2012. The Panel was able to confirm that DGS Marine was not licensed or authorized to issue insurance in the BVI either.⁴

In addition, the 2009 DGS Marine annual report contained false information regarding the identity of an individual described as DGS Marine's "independent auditor" calling into question the certification of DGS Marine's annual financial statements. DGS Marine did not respond to the Panel's enquiries and during the course of the Panel's investigation the death of Mr. Skinner was announced and shortly afterwards the DGS website was shut down. Media reporting subsequently indicated that DGS Marine was an elaborate insurance scam that while maintaining offices in the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Denmark, Vietnam, India, China and the United Arab Emirates did not possess the millions of pounds in securities alleged in its annual reports.⁵

² "British businessman accused of insuring oil tankers "undermining the sanctions against Syria", Sunday Telegraph, 22 June 2012.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9351309/British-businessman-accused-of-insuring-oil-tankers-involved-in-undermining-sanctions-against-Syria.html

³ "Warning notice concerning DGS Marine Group/British European & Overseas P&I", Financial Market Authority, Liechtenstein, 23 July 2012, https://www.fma-li.li/en/news/20120723-warning-notice-concerning-dgs-marine-group-british-european-overseas-pi.html

⁴ British Virgin Islands Financial Services email to the Panel, 9 September 2016

⁵ "British European & Overseas Insurance Scheme sinks without trace", Tradewinds, 10 November 2016

Annex 14-1: Namhung Trading Corporation registered in Chinese business registry

a. Official Business registry



Source: Chinese national enterprise credit information publicity system at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/sydq/loginSydqAction!sydq.dhtml

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b. Examples of Commercial Business registry



Source: http://www.71p.net/c2365538.html



Source: http://127697/czvv/com

c. Dandong Branch




Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company

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
Annex 14-2: Korea Taeryonggang (or Tae Ryong Gang) Trading Corporation (朝鲜大玲江贸易会社) in local Chinese newspaper and commercial websites with a designated individual as representative

a. Chinese local newspaper




Source: http://szb.dlxww.com/dlrb/html/2013-08/23/content 892198.htm?div=-1

b. Commercial website



Source: gongshang.mingluji.com/Liaoning/node/179688

Annex 14-3: Official letterhead of Taeryonggang (or Tae Ryong Gang) and Namchongang



Source: The Panel

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Annex 14-4: The same address used by Namhung and Sobaeksu



Source: Chinese business registry at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/ and commercial online sources at http://1593171.71ab.com/contact.asp

Annex 14-5: Sobaeksu's branches in Beijing, Yingkou and Dandong

A. Dandong Branch




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B. Lingkou Branch



Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company

Annex 14-6: Yun Ho-jin as Beijing Sobaeksu's director and Namchongang's director




Source: The 1718 Committee Sanctions List at

https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/dprk.xsl

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Annex 14-7: Kim Chol Nam as Beijing Korea Changgwang's director and Dandong Sobaeku's director



Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company

Annex 14-8: Beijing New Technology in Hong Kong Company registry

CP	周年申報表			
	Annual Return			
公司註冊處			表格	IAR1
Companies Registry			Form •	1711
		公司	編號 Compa	ny Number
		-	20332	92
1 公司名稱 Compan	y Name			
ВЕІЈ	北京新技術貿易有 ING NEW TECHNOLOGY TE		LIMITED	
2 商業名稱(如有的記	舌) Business Name (If any)			
	(無)			
3 公司類別 Type of C 請在適用的查格內加上 ✓	Company M. Please tick the relevant box		AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER	
✓ 私人公司	公聚公司	擔保有限公司		
Private company	Public company	Company limited	d by guarante	e
4 本申報表的結算日		30	1	2015
Date to which this R	Return is Made Up	∃DD	月MM	年 YYYY
	人・請用續頁 B 塡報 Use Continuation Please tick the relevant box(es) ☑ 董事	代替 AI	ternate to	熙)
中文姓名 Name in Chinese		裴民浩		
英文姓名 姓氏		PEI		
Name in English Surname 名字 Other Name:		Minhao	ne energia di civi, dine di materia di cut un	
前用姓名 中文 Previous Names Chineso		(無)		
英文 English		(無)		
別名 中文		(無)		
Afias Chinese 英文 English	Service and a supplied and a supplie	(無)		
住址	黑龍江省			
Residential Address	五常市五常鎭			
	盡朝暉街一委一組			
嬴家/地區 Country/Region				
電郵地址 Email Address		(Nil)		
多分證明 Identification	4	中國身份證號碼:5	10107197608	252655

Source: The Hong Kong company registration records

Annex 14-9: Mr. Park Young Han and his relationship with Beijing New Technology Company

(Guangcaiweixing Trading Company showing Park Young Han (Chinese: 朴永汉) as representative)



Source: http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing

(Park Young Han's business cared showing his relationship with Beijing New Technology)






Source: The Panel

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Annex 14-10: Beijing Chengxing and Guangcaiweixing's mineral trade with the DPRK

(Beijing Chengxing)



http://www.intlmining.com.cn/sell/list.php?catid=145

国际贸易			更多
超细石墨粉	采购90-95超细石墨粉,硫的含量要低,长期采购	河南新华炉料科技有限公司	买
石墨电极	废旧石墨电极 价格优惠 长期大量采购 能开发票者优先	河南新华炉料科技有限公司	买
石墨板	废旧石墨板 价格便宜 长期大量采购 能提供发票者优先	河南新华炉料科技有限公司	买
风靡全球可替代木	本公司代理国外进口金属硅生产用洗精煤 ,这种煤被挪威等硅厂广泛使用。 特点	东方环球冶金材料 (大连)有限公司	卖
增碳剂 , 喷吹煤(P	固定碳.83% min(typical 85%) 灰分 10% max(typical 8.62%) 挥发份 8%	东方环球冶金材料 (大连)有限公司	卖
Indonesian coal	CV: 6300, 6000, 5800, 5500 KCAL	Optrex Inc	卖
朝鲜无烟煤	热量6200大卡,硫含量0.3%,灰分11%	北京成兴贸易有限公司	卖
朝鲜无烟煤	热量6200大卡,硫含量0.3%,灰分含量11%,水分6%。	北京成兴贸易有限公司	- 卖
Steam Coal	Sibcoal founded in 1995. The main activity is export Russian steam coal, i	Sibcoal	卖
我想买	•	我想卖	

Source: http://www.asiametal.cn/product/data/466.html

(Guangcaiweixing Trading)



Source: http://www.cnfeol.com/series/01000200000000.aspx



Source: http://www.10s1.com/html/201407/175463.html

Annex 14-11: NDIC in Chinese business registry



Source: Chinese Official Company Registry at http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn

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
(Shenyang Branch office on a commercial online source)



Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/

Annex 14-12: Letters of NDIC and Green Pine showing identifiers

(NDIC's termination notice letter)



Source: The Panel

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(Green Pine invitation letter)



LETTER OF INVITATION

Date: 19th March 2010

To: Government Garage Center

Att: Col. Woldu G/Yesus

Dear Sir;

We are delighted to issue an official invitation to your delegation headed by Mr. Tzahaye Mokonen Zerom.

We are planning to receive your delegation for 1-week period during April 2010. We hope that your visit would be of great importance in starting substantial co-operation between two sides.

All of your visa will be prepared at Pyongyang Airport.

We will send necessary information for arranging your flight schedule.

Sincerely Yours.

Ri Hak Chol

8/3/4

President/GPA



ADD: RAKRANG NO. 1 RAKRANG DISTRICT PYONGYANG KOREA

TEL: 008502-18111-8327 E-MAIL: PAC@5ILIBANK.COM FAX: 008502-3814685 P.B. NO: 2465

Source: The Panel

Annex 14-13: Mr. Kim Song II's Beijing-registered trading companies and Greenpine International (Beijing Dingyuan Dasong Trading Co., Ltd.- 北京鼎元大松贸易有限公司)



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(Dingyuan Zhencheng (Beijing) Trading Co., Ltd. - 鼎元贞盛(北京)贸易有限公司)



Source: Chinese business registry at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/sydq/loginSydqAction!sydq.dhtml

Excerpts of Hong Kong Company registry information on Greenpine International Co., Limited



Form NAR1					1326524	
12 董事 Directors						
A. 董事(自然人)Dire (如超過一名董事腦自然人,	ctor (Natural Per <i>調用線頁B 填報 U</i> s	rson) se Continus	ation Sheet B if more than	n 1 directo	r is a natural person)	
請在適用的空格內加上 Y 號 Plea						
身 分 Capacity	✓ 董事 Director		前董事 rnate Director	代替 Alt	ernate to	
中文姓名 Name in Chinese						
英文姓名 姓氏 Name in English Surname			KIN	Л		
名字 Other Names			SONO	3 IL		
前用姓名 中文 Previous Names Chinese	an are reason.					
英文 English	-37-				A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A	
別名 中文						
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English 住址						
Residential		Vorld T	rade Center Of E	Dalian,	111 II 1870	
身份證明 Identification a 香港身份證號碼 Hong Kong Identity C				N/A	4	
b 護順						
Passport		l '	gdom Of Cambo	ļ	N0630354	
	簽發國家 Issuing Country 號码 Number					
			Advisory Note			
的最新版本, All directors o 'Non-Statutory	並熟悉該指引 of the compar Guidelines of cquaint thems	川所概 ny are n Direc	述的董事一般页 advised to read ctors' Duties' pu	任。 the la blished	責任的非法定指引) atest version of the d by the Companies of directors outlined	
出任董事職位同意	掛 Consent to	Act as	Director			
本人同意在公司成 I consent to act as: attained the age of 1	a director of the				F滿 18 歲。 on and confirm that I have	
簽署 Signed:	/wr sa	V(4 20				

Source: Hong Kong Company registry at https://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/

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Annex 14-14: The same address used by Mr. Kin Song Il's Beijing and Hong Kong-based company




Sources: Hong Kong Company registry at https://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/ and Chinese official business registry at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/sydq/loginSydqAction!sydq.dhtml

Annex 14-15: Mr. Kim's Beijing-registered trading companies links to the former addresses of DPRK entities



Source: Chinese official business registry at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/sydq/loginSydqAction!sydq.dhtml

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1 高温南 外籍自然人 非公示项 非 Source: Chinese official business registry at http://bj.gsxt.gov.cn/sydq/loginSydqAction!sydq.dhtml

Annex 14-16: US court indictment document on KIM Song IL and comparison of Mr. Kim's signatures

		ES DISTRIC CENTRAL D					
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC	ca,	STATEMEN	15 CR 417 DB				
vs.		AND PLEA	OF PLEA OF GUILTY AGREEMENT PURSUANT CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C)				
KIM SONG IL,							
Defendant. Judge Dee Benson							
I hereby acknowledge and the following facts and rights, and explaining, and entering into this	l that I have	had the assist	dvised of and that I understand tance of counsel in reviewing,				
1. As part of this agreement with the United States, I intend to plead guilty to Count I of the Indictment. My attorney has explained the nature of the charge against me, and I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charge with my attorney. I understand the charge and what the government is required to prove in order to convict me. The elements of Count I, a violation of the Arms Export Control Act at 22 U.S.C. 2778(c) are:							
1) That the defendant did	willfully at	empt to expor	rt from the United States;				
2) Defense articles listed on the United States Munitions list;							
66. 5.		1 0 1	n consent from the Department				
7. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful thought; with the advice of counsel; and with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants when I made the decision to enter the plea, and I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants.							
8. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.							
9. I understand and ag or delete anything contained in tagreement because I agree with DATED this day or	this stateme the terms a	nt. I do not wind all of the sta	atements are correct.				
			Rly BULL				
		KIM SON Defendant					
身份證明 Identification			7				
a 香港身份證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			N/A				
b 護照 Passport	l -	Of Cambodia	N0630354 號 恕 Number				
	提示 Advis						
所有公司董事均應閱讀公司 的最新版本,並熟悉該指引 All directors of the compan 'Non-Statutory Guidelines of Registry and acquaint thems in the Guidelines.	引註冊處編9 所概述的1 y are advis n Directors'	製的《有關查》 董事一般设任 ed to read the Duties' publis	e latest version of the				
出任董事職位同意書 Consent to	Act as Direc	tor /	/				
本人同意在公司成立爲法團時出 I consent to act as a director of th attained the age of 18 years.							
簽署 Signed:	yg u	<u> </u>					

Source: US Utah District Court and HK Company registry document

China Exports Customs Record Trade Direction Export
Shipment Month 2013-06-01 Company
Admin Region Tongzhou County,Belling
- Company Address hicks w Crempany Marro 原元点底(北京)贸易有限公司 Shoper Ding Yuan Zhen Sheng (Beijing) Trading Co., Ltd. Being, Beijing, China FEMOURE Femals Trading Company, Wholesale Jestimator Country Angola Province Being Municiparty Femance Country Angola Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof: Pumps for liquids, whether or not fated with a measuring device; injurid elevators; part thereof: Fuel, lubricating or cooling measurin pumps for internal combustion piston onglines:

HTS Code Deac Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof: Pumps for liquids, whether or not fated with a measuring device; liquid elevators; part thereof: Fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engines:

Value USD \$6,000 Product ticae Other China Exports Customs Record Trade Direction: Export Superiord Month: 2013-06-01 Company


Activit Bullion | Tongzhou County, Beijing

Company Address

Company Address 開元点性(北京)変要有限公司 Ding Yuan Zhen Sheng (Beijing) Trading Co., Litt Beijing, Beijing, China Destination Country
Proteins Country
Proteins Country
Proteins Country
Proteins Country
Angola
Proteins Country
Angola Discrete and reproducers, and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, belevison image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, belevison image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles: Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits, or for making connections to or in electrical circuits (by example, switchins, relays, tuses, surge suppressors, plugs, sockors, tamp-holders and other connectors, junction boxes, for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V; connectors for optical fibers, circuits and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles: Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting suppressors, plugs, sockets, temp-holders and other connectors, junction boxes), for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V; connectors for optical fibers, optical fiber bundles or cables: Other switches:

Containented Yes
Teade Type Ordinary Trade
Transport Type River-Sea Transportation

Annex 14-17: Examples of Chinese customs records of Greenpine International's export to Angola



Source: Chinese Customs record through Panjiva at http://www.panjiva.com

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
Annex 14-18: Mr. Choe Kwang Hyok's Companies in Chinese business registry and Hong Kong compnay registry.

a. "北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司" (Beijing King Helong International Trading Limited)



Address has been changed from "北京市朝阳区朝阳北路99号楼13层2单元1603" to "北京市朝阳区朝阳北路99号楼9层2单元1004" on 25 February 2016.

(Commercial advertisement with its English name)



Source: http://www.kinghelong.com/en/plus/list.php?tid=7

b. "香港金海龙国际贸易有限公司北京代表处"(Beijing branch of Hong Kong King Helong Int'l Trading Limited)



Source: Official Chinese Company registry at http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing

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c.	Hong Kong	g company regis	try information or	i Choe's K	ing Helor	ıg	
	R E #F sit sies Registry		周年申報表 Annual Return (公司數例第107(1)的 paries Ordinance s. 107	(1))		[®] A	R1
 規算 Pice 	T 馬色墨水列	塩安無知) - 即 - companying notes be	fore completing this form.			Compan 015437	y Number
1 207	可名稱 Com	pany Name					
			推查斯撒國際貿易 G HELONG INT'L TR		IITED		
2 (153	業名稱 Bus	iness Name					
L							
		e of Company					
_	有股本的私		_ ;	10 他			
4 7KH		pany having a share ate of this Return		Others			
*	中報波列載分	公司裁至右列日发 n this Return is mad	胃肾止的資料		22	12	2007
			6 Up 10		E3 00	д мы	\$E YYYY
		dual Director ・野宗祖真の 現扉 Us	e Continuation Shoel C If a	nore than 2 indi	édual directors	đ	
1 APE	acity	✓ m as Director	較細度事 Alternate Director	ft & Alle	mate to		
					N	/A	
	推名 se in Chinese			(Nil)			
	(姓名 se in English	Choe			wang Hyol		
		始 氏 Suma	atte	- 6	† Other Nam	es	
	性名 rious Names			(NiI)			
知名 Alias				(NiD			
	-						
fit to Resi Add	idential		4 East District In'tl N ng District, Beijing, C		19 調金 0	Chir	ta
	1				jak sa. C	-J-11	
	电准 all Address			(Nil)			
æ⊕ °	證明 Identific 存為身份應り Hong Kong Ide			(N	ii)		
ь	資外護期 Overseas Pass	anort .	Korea		,	5454204	73
	OTCIDGES FES	age./ft	事發回家 Intuing	Country		R 45 Numb	

Source: Hong Kong Company registry at www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci

Annex 14-19: Beijing King Helong's relationship with Hong Kong King Helong and Dandong King Helong International Trading Co., Ltd.

(Commercial websites information on relationship between Hong Kong King Helong and Beijing King Helong)



企业搜索

当前位置: 中国产品网 » 企业名录 » 安防企业名录 » 防弹器材企业名录

北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司

北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司,主要经营电动工具;安全防护用品,公司属于北京防弹器材行业,公司坚持城信、互利,为客户提供最好的服务和最实惠的价格,我公司的办公地址设在位于风景秀丽,交通便利的北京-中国 北京 北京市 朝阳区十里堡都会国际A座25N,如果您对我们的产品服务有兴趣,请拨打我们的电话,联系电话是86-010-65563829 点城欢迎各界朋友前来洽谈业务。

北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司坐落在繁华大都市北京朝阳区十里堡甲3号都会国际大厦a座25n,是经北京市外经贸委批准,享有进出口经营权的有限责任公司。旗下拥香港金海龙国际贸易有限公司,丹东金海龙国际贸易有限公司等子公司。

目前公司经营方式多样,有代理进出口、对销、转口进出口贸易等,经营范围广泛,包括医药化工、工艺产品、土畜产品、五金矿产、机械设备、电子产品、家用电器、安全防护产品,服装贸易产品出口三十多个国家和地区,其中主要为:美国、韩国,香港和英国。

公司秉承"以质量为本,以服务取胜"的经营宗旨,积极开拓中国市场领域,公司以质量高,货期准,价格合理在国内外客户中广泛赢得好评

世界经济的大潮已经到来。面对新的机遇和挑战、北京金光海龙将永远保持在人员,货源,资金方便的活力,在稳定现有国内外老客户的同时,继续扩大世界各地的市场,

公司始终本着"团结进取、严谨高效"的企业精神,贯彻"以人为本"的原则,在富有活力的员工队伍中,提出思考,鼓励参与,充分发挥每一个员工的主动性和创造性,以此在日趋激烈的市场竞争中不断发展壮大。

最后感谢我们的客户不断的支持和努力,让我们一起创造新的价值。

Source: http://www.pe168.com/qiye/info/593466.html

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公司介绍 北京金光海龙国际贸易有限公司坐落在繁华大都市北京朝阳区十里堡甲3号都会国际大厦a座25n,是经北京市外经贸委批准,享有进出 口经营权的有限责任公司。旗下拥香港金海龙国际贸易有限公司,丹东金海龙国际贸易有限公司等子公司。 日前公司经言方式多件,有代理近山口、刈销、转口进山口贝汤等,经言池园广泛,已拾区约化工、工艺广朗、工亩广丽、卫业矿广 机械设备、电子产品、家用电器、安全防护产品,服装贸易产品出口三十多个国家和地区,其中主要为:美国、韩国,香港和英国。 公司秉承"以质量为本,以服务取胜"的经营宗旨,积极开拓中国市场领域,公司以质量高,货期准,价格合理在国内外客户中广泛赢得 好评 世界经济的大潮已经到来。面对新的机遇和挑战。北京金光海龙将永远保持在人员,货源,资金方便的活力,在稳定现有国内外老客户 的同时,继续扩大世界各地的市场, 公司始终本着"团结进取、严谨高效"的企业精神,贯彻"以人为本"的原则,在富有活力的员工队伍中,提出思考,鼓励参与,充分发挥每一个 员工的主动性和创造性,以此在日趋激烈的市场竞争中不断发展壮大。 最后感谢我们的客户不断的支持和努力,让我们一起创造新的价值。 1 免费网站建设 3 丹东住宿 5 贸易公司名字 7 朝鲜贸易公司 9 选股公式 11 丹东贸易 13 浮选机 2 自己建网站 4 贸易公司起名 6 贸易公司命名 8 进出口外贸公司 10 在线客服系统 12 html 网站模板 14 电商贷款 基本资料 主营产品 电动工具、安全防护用品等 公司注册地址 中国 北京 北京市 朝阳区 十里堡都会国际A座25N 邮政编码 100026 86-010-65563829 (温馨提示:请核实资质,谨防诈骗) 业务经理手机 13501362044 非诚勿扰

Source: http://www.11467.com/beijing/co/98806.htm

Annex 14-20: Hong Kong front companies of Beijing King Helong's directors A. King Helong Group (Hong Kong) International Trading Co., Ltd.

● 娯安前 簡用照 ● Please	egistry (Comportant Notes Important Votes L	法團成立表格 (股份有限公司) Incorporation Form ompany Limited by Shares) ((公可條例) 第 14A 條) (Companies Ordinance s. 14A)	表格 Form	存案 Filed 公司編號 CR No. 1386791
		tended Company Name		
К	ing Helong Gr	roup (Hong Kong) International Tra		Limited
		金光海龍(香港)國際貿易有限公司	ก	
	任董事 First Dire 個人董事 Individ (如有超過一名個人數理 中文姓名 Name In Chinese		an 1 individual dir	rector)
	英文姓名 Name in English	YANG	Jianmi	in
		姓氏 Surname	名字 Other N	lames
	前用姓名 Previous Names	-		
	別名 Alias	-		
(註 Note19)	Residentiai	京市朝陽區十里堡甲3號都會國際大廈	25N	
	Address		國家 Co	中國

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B. H&Y Global Industry Limited



C. Austen International Trading Co., Limited



(註 Note 4)	接署 Signed: 大心 接響 YANG Ning 姓名 制辦成员 Founder Member (如公司只有一名創辦成员,請酬去其餘的簽署欄 Please delete one sig	Name:
指	明編號 1/2008 (2008 年 7 月)	第六頁 Page 6
S	ecification No. 1/2008 (July 2008)	6 そ 10

Source: Hong Kong Company registry at www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci

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Annex 14-21: Mr. Choe's companies links with Green Pine in address





1	全 国	企业信用信息	公示系	系统(北京	₹)		
明鲜	青松联合会社北京代表处					全国首页	地方局首页
	登记信息 备案信息 行	政处罚信息					
I			基本信息				
商公	注册号	0012069		名称	朝鲜青松联合	会社北京代表处	
亦	类型	外国(地区)企业常驻代表机构		负责人	朴元日		
信息	营业场所	北京市朝阳区朝阳路十里堡都会国际大师	£20G				
	营业期限自	2003年02月13日		营业期限至	2016年02月10	H	
П	经营范围	有关进出口、投资市场调查及业务取络。	不得开展经营活动	收取费用。			
3	登记机关	北京市工商行政管理局	i i	发照日期	1期 2006年02月22日		
	成立日期	2003年02月13日		经营状态	吊销企业		
			投资人信息				
	投资人类型	投资人		证照类型	- 1	证照	号码
			变更信息			-	
	变更事项	变更前内容		变更后	5内容		变更日期
		版权所有,北京市工 地址,北京市海沿		技术支持电话,010- 邮政编码: 100080	-82691768		

Source: Official Chinese Company registry at http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing



Source: http://www.pe168.com/qiye/info/593466.html

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Annex 14-22: Korea Unsong Trading Corporation in Chinese Business registry 全国首页 地方局首页 全国企业信用信息公示系统(北京) 朝鲜银星贸易会社北京代表处 注册号: 110000450251214 登记信息 备案信息 动产抵押登记信息 股权出质登记信息 行政处罚信息 经营异常信息 严重违法信息 抽查检查信息 基本信息 注册号 110000450251214 名称 朝鲜银星贸易会社北京代表处 类型 外国(地区)企业常驻代表机构 负责人 朴元日 营业场所 北京市朝阳区日坛北路17号院2号楼-01层(-1)097-17 **营业期限自** 2014年01月10日 营业期限至 2018年12月31日 经营范围 从事与隶属外国(地区 企业有关的非营利性业务活动。 登记机关 北京市工商行政管理局 核准日期 2014年01月10日 成立日期 2014年01月10日 登记状态 在营(开业)企业 投资人信息 业业公 股东类型 证照/证件类型 证照/证件号码 股东 示信 变更信息 变更事项 变更后内容 变更日期 变更前内容

Business Address: 北京市朝阳区日坛北路17号院2号楼-01层(-1)097-17



Source: Chinese Business registry and the Panel

Annex 14-23: Official business registry information on Shenyang Branch of Korea Unsong




Source: Chinese Business registry at http://gsxt.lngs.gov.cn/saicpub/

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松联合会社北京代表处	5			1	医苗贝 地方局首。
登记信息 备案信息 行政	攻处罚信息				
		基本信息			
注册号	0012069		名称	朝鲜青松联合会社	土北京代表处
类型	外国(地区)企业常驻代表机构		负责人	朴元日	
营业场所 北京市朝冈区朝阳路十里後都会国际大厦206					
营业期限自	2003年02月13日		营业期限至	2016年02月10日	1 T
经营范围	有关进出口、投资市场调查及业务	5联络。不得开展经营活动收取	7费用。		
登记机关	北京市工商行政管理局		发照日期	2006年02月22日	
成立日期	2003年02月13日		经营状态	吊销企业	
		投资人信息			
投资人类型	投资人	Ç = = _	证照类型		证照号码
11 = 1			1 - 10 1 -		
- 李更事項	变更前内			5内容	
	登记信息	登记信息 各案信息 行政处罚信息 注册号 0012069 类型 外国(地区)企业常驻代表机构	登记信息	登记信息 各案信息 行政处罚信息 注册号 0012069 名称 类型 外围(地区)企业常驻代表机构 负责人 营业场所 北京市朝间区朝阳路+里堡都会国际大厦206 营业期限自 2003年02月13日 营业期限至 经营范围 有关进出口、投资市场调查及业务联络、不得开展经营活动收取费用。 登记机关 北京市工商行政管理局 发照日期 成立日期 2003年02月13日 经营状态 投资人信息 投资人 证照类型 交更信息	登记信息 各案信息 行政处罚信息 注册号 0012069 名称 编辑直经联合会核 类型 外围(地区)企业常驻代表机构 负责人 并元日 营业场所 业东市朝阳区朝阳路+里度都会国际大厦206 营业期限自 2003年02月13日 营业期限至 2016年02月10日 经营范围 有关进出口、投资市场调查及业务联络、不得开展经营活动收取费用。 发照日期 2006年02月22日 成立日期 2003年02月13日 经营状态 吊统企业 投资人信息 投资人 证照类型

Source: Official Chinese Company registry at http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing

Annex 14-24: Saeng Pil Trading Corporation's brochure



Source: The Panel

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Annex 14-25: DPRK's Diplomatic note of appointing Saeng Pil representative in Cairo

MINISTRY OF MILITARY EQUI'PMENT D P R OF KOREA

Date: 18 December, 2013

Ref, No: PYC-120712-005

شهادة

تشهد وزارة التسليح الحربي في جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية ان السيد ان جونغ هيوك السكرتيرفي سفارة جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية لدي القاهرة (رقم جواز السفر 563410155) هو الممثل العام لوزارتنا في الشرق الاوسط والقارة الافريقية كما لديه الصلاحية الكاملة لجميع المعاملات مثل التعاقد والتنفيذ والاعمال المصرفية باسم شركة سانغفيل التجارية



Rakrang 2Dong, Rakrang District, Pyongyang D P R of Korea

Tel: 00850-2-18111-8327 Fax: 00850-2-3814685 E-mail: pac@silibank.net.kp

1621676E

Translated from Arabic

Ministry of Military Equipment Democratic People's Republic of Korea

> Date: 18 December 2013 Ref. No.: PYC-120712-005

Certification

The Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hereby certifies that Mr. An Jong Hyuk, Secretary at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Cairo (passport No. 563410155), is the Ministry's general representative for the Middle East and Africa, and is also authorized to conduct all types of business, such as entering into contracts, fulfilment and banking, on behalf of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation.

Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

[Stamp of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation]

Source: The Panel

Annex 14-26: Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation in Chinese Company registry and a business card of its representative



Source: Chinese Business registry

(business card of Korea Daesong's representative)





Source: The Panel

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(Other branch offices of Korea Daesong)

Yanji-based branch




Shenyang-based branch



Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com

Annex 14-27: Korea United Development Bank with Mr. Choe Un Hyuk as its representative






Source: https://www.embassypages.com/missions/embassy23153/ and the Panel

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
Annex 14-28: Korea Heungjin Trading Company in commercial company registry



Source: Commercial Chinese Company registry at http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/6F5C2618C1CC4CD68FCDDE060E0B1FCB/index.html


Annex 14-29: "Dalian Office of Korea Mining Development General Company" in Chinese local newspaper and commercial websites

(Excerpts of Chinese local Newspaper)




Source: Dalian Daily at http://www.dlxww.com/gb/daliandaily/2005-06/19/content 797876.htm

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Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/

Annex 14-30: Diplomatic List registered in Chinese Foreign Ministry showing Mr. Choe Chan II (崔灿日) as a First Secretary in DPRK Embassy in China



Source: Diplomatic List registered in DPRK Embassy in China at http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/ziliao/wjgmc/t527236.htm

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股东

朝鲜光鲜银行金

融合社

认缴额 (万元)

980

Annex 14-31: Dandong Hongxiang's relationship with KKBC in Chinese business registry 全国首页 地方局首页 国家企业信用信息公示系统(辽宁) 丹东鸿祥实业物流有限公司 统一社会信用代码/注册号: 210600400023339 登记信息 备案信息 动产抵押登记信息 股权出质登记信息 行政处罚信息 经营异常信息 严重违法信息 抽查检查信息 基本信息 统一社会信用代码/注册号 210600400023339 名称 丹东鸿祥实业物流有限公司 **类型** 有限责任公司(中外合资) 法定代表人 马晓红 注册资本 2000 万美元 成立日期 2010年06月22日 住所 丹东边境经济合作区安民镇中和村10幢二层202室 营业期限至 2030年06月22日 营业期限自 2010年06月22日 经营范围 仓储。(筹建,筹建期间不得开展经营活动。)(依法须经批准的项目,经相关部门批准后方可开展经营活动。) 登记机关 丹东市工商行政管理局 核准日期 2015年04月03日 企 登记状态 注销 1 公 股东信息 示 股东的出资信息截止2014年1月1日,2014年1月1日之后工商只公示股东基本信息,其他出资信息由企业自主公示。 信 详情 股东类型 股东 证照/证件类型 证照/证件号码 息 企业法人 朝鲜光鲜银行金融会社 内资企业法人 10165 详情 变更信息 其 变更事项 变更前内容 变更后内容 变更日期 他 部 分公司备案 2106001000151009 2106002015001486 2015年03月16日 门 投资人信息变更(包括投资人、 公 朝鲜光鲜银行金融会社:2丹东鸿祎买业发展有限公司 朝鲜光鲜银行金融会社:2丹东坞种头业发展有限公司 示 投资人名称等) 信 投资总额变更 9800,0000 4000,0000 2010年09月20日 息 注册资本变更(注册资本、注册 2010年09月20日 国家企业信用信息公示系统(辽宁) 丹东鸿祥实业物流有限公司 统一社会信用代码/注册号: 210600400023339

股东及出资信息 认验明期

认缴出资额

(万元)

认缴出资方式

货币

Source: Chinese official Company registry at http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/gjjbj/

980

突缴额 (万元)

256/326 17-01388

认组出资日期

2010年09月04日

头狼明甜

实级出资日期

2010年09月20日

2010年09月20日

实缴出资额

(万元)

实缴出资方式

货币

Annex 14-32: Excerpt of US court document showing KKBC's business relationship with Dandong Hongxiang

United States District Court District of New Jersey

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. Joseph A. Dickson

V.

Mag. No. 16-6602 (JAD)

DANDONG HONGXIANG INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD...

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (UNDER SEAL)

MA XIAOHONG, ZHOU JIANSHU, LUO CHUANXU, and HONG JINHUA

I, Bryan R. Greene, being duly sworn, state the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:

=

SEE ATTACHMENT A

I further state that I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that this complaint is based on the following facts:

SEE ATTACHMENT B

continued on the attached pages and made a part hereof.

Bryan R. Greene, Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation

DANDONG HONGXIANG INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD.,
MA XIAOHONG,
ZHOU JIANSHU,
LUO CHUANXU, and
HONG JINHUA,

and others did knowingly and intentionally conspire and agree: (a) to violate,

Regulations, Section 544.101, et seq., by providing services on behalf of and for the benefit of a Specially Designated National, to wit, Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. ("KKBC"), without first having obtained a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and (b) to defraud the United States government by

Korea Kwangson [ICST: Kwangso'n] Banking Corp., Dandong Office, China

Guarantee of Payment

To: Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., Ltd

ADD:11F No.A Jiadi Square No.66 Binjiang MID Road Dangdong City Liaoning Pro., China
TEL: 0086-0415-3459781 FAX: 0086-0415-3459783

Regarding the contract (Contract No: SPA NO. NCA-18112009-222, Price: 548.00USD/MT) between and state of the Spanish state of the Spani

Dandong Representative Office of Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation

12/DD/2009

ADD: DEVELOPMENT ZONE HUIYOU BUILDING 1603, DANDONG, CHINA MAIL:KBCDBANK@163.COM TEL: 0086-0415-3127495 FAX: 0086-0415-3125363

Source: The Panel

Annex 14-33: Dandong branch of KKBC in commercial company database



Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/



Source: http://card.qianjiwang.cn/page.aspx?c=F7E13C098C8A1057&s=4

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
Annex 14-34: 滕州市科永达数控机床有限公司's website advertising its sales of CNC machine to the DPRK



Source: Company official website at http://www.juchuang160.com/news_show-694.html


Annex 14-35: Comparison of CNC machines between Ryonha Machinery and the Chinese Company







(Ryonha Machinery)



(滕州市科永达数控机床有限公司)



(Ryonha Machinery)



(滕州市科永达数控机床有限公司)



(Ryonha Machinery)

 $Source: https://tzkydsk.1688.com/, KCNA\ through\ https://proof.dirty.ru/stanki-s-chpu-iz-kndr-9-foto-663994/\#\&gid=1\&pid=3\ and\ the\ Panel$

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Annex 14-36: KIEC brochure with PITF's purposes and its role in the Fair

KIEC has been registered as an official member of Bureau des International Expositions(BIE) on Nov 19, 2007.

Today PITF is ensuring the wide-ranging and many-sided commodity & technical exchanges, marketing and investment attraction through the advertisement of companies & commodities, trading consultations, symposium on the investment and joint venture policy of DPRK and tours etc.

Especially, before and after the fair, KIEC publishes exhibitors' profile, contact details, and items of interest in local network so as to promote continuous business between enterprises.

PITF holding amid worldwide concern will be further expanded and developed into an assemblage of international trade to strengthen friendship, cooperation and unity between countries and develop economic relations between them, and will creditably perform its mission as a centre of contributing to the development of science & technology and foreign trade of the country.



Source: 2016 Spring PITF official brochure

Annex 14-37: Selected parts of Official PITF brochure showing the participation of designated entities

A. Excerpts of 15th Spring PITF (2012) participant list




C. Excerpts of the 17th Spring PITF (2014) participant list




D. Excerpts of the 18th Spring PITF (2015) participant list

iui		
The state of the s	전람회침	달 기 호[사 (세기술혁산판)
		ew Technology and Innovation Hall)
	EARITAINAS	ew recinology and innovation Hall)
K23 - 24	련합무역회사 🗸	RYONHAP TRADING CO.
12	영 흥무 역회사	YONGHUNG TRADING CO.
P20	라선대흥무역회사	RASON TAEHUNG TRADING CO.
J4	푸른하늘전자합영회사	PHURUN HANUL ELECTRONICS JV CO.
M19 - 20	스위스파라젤써스회사	PARAZELSUSONGSU CO.LTD
I15	미래과학기술교류사	MIRAE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGY AGENCY
K17	자원개발투자회사	NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT & INVESTMENT CO.





F. Excerpts of the 9th Autumn PITF (2013) participation list



Source: Official brochure of the PITF (The Panel)

Annex 14-38: List of entities as aliases of designated entities and unilaterally designated by Member States

A. List of entities identified by the Panel as aliases of designated entities

Alias of designated	Identification and Date of	PITF Date
Entities	Designation	
Equipment & Plant	Alias of Korea Complex Equipment	15 th , 16 th Spring
Corp.	Import Corporation designated in	PITF
•	March 2013	
Ryengwang	A subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong	15 th , 16 th , 18 th
(Ryongwang) Trading	General Corporation designated in April	Spring PITF
Corp.	2009	
Ferrous Metals Export	Manufacturer of aluminum alloy rods	16 th Spring, 8 th , 9 th
and Import Corp.	seized by Japan as nuclear-related items	Autumn PITF

Source: The Panel

B. List of entities unilaterally designated by Member States

Unilaterally designated Entities	Date of Unilateral Designation	PITF Date
Kumsan Trading	XX December 2016 (US)	16 th Spring PITF
Corporation	8 March 2016 (ROK)	
Sobaeksu United Corporation	22 December 2010 (EU)	15 th , 16 th , 17 th , 18 th Spring PITF, and 9 th , 11 th Autumn PITF
Kangbong Trading Corp.	XX December (US)	16 th , 17 th , 18 th Spring, 8 th , 9 th , 11 th Autumn PITF
Kuryonggang Trading Co.	8 March 2016 (ROK)	18 th Spring, and 11 th Autumn PITF
Rungrado Trading Corp.	XX December (US)	18 th Spring and 11 th Autumn PITF

Source: The Panel

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Annex 14-39: Foreign Partners of KIEC in official brochure of PITF

European Business Association (EBA) Tel: +850-2-3817344 EUROPE Fax: +850-2-3817355 E-mail: barbara.unterbeck@yahoo.com Contact Person: Ms. Barbara Unterbeck Es Event Management Sdn Bhd Tel: +60-123320310 MALAYSIA E-mail:esevent@esevent.com.my md@eseent.com.my esther@esvent.com.my Contact Person: Mr. Dato Chong Chong Tik Jentech Asia Pte Ltd. SINGAPORE Tel: +65-98891343 6790639 VIETNAM E-mail: edwin@ientechasia.com info@jentechasia.com INDONESIA Contact Person: Mr. Edwin Lee Liaonina Sub-Council, CCPIT Tel: +86-24-83210516 Fax: +86-24-83210505 E-mail: 13504054369@163.com CHINA Contact Person: Ms. Yang Liu 13504054369 Beijing Huamao Times International Exhibition Co., Ltd. Tel: +86-010-67657334 Fax: +86-010-67652448 E-mail: expowang@163.com Contact Person: Ms. Wang Xiao Yan 13661286286 Royal Team Corporation Tel: +886-2-27028632 TAIWAN Fax: +886-2-27017534 27017202 E-mail: rtcorp@ms18.hinet.net Contact Person: Ms. Kristen Tay 930996686

Source: 2016 Spring PITF official brochure

Annex 14-40: State media and academic articles with the highlighting the high demand for CNC machinery at the Fair



Source: Naenara at http://naenara.com.kp/ko/book/new window.php?10+10141+28

(Articles of Kim Il Sung University posted on June 2011)

오늘 우리 나라에서 CNC기술은 신비한 기술이 아니며 그를 대대적으로 보급할수 있는 자체의 과학기술력량도 이미 준비되여 있다. 현대과학기술에 기초한 우리 공업의 위력의 산물인 련하기계설비들은 지금 발전되었다고 하는 나라들의 기계제품들과 나란히 국제시장에도 당당히 진출하고있다. 2009년 평양에서 진행된 제5차 가을철국제상품전람회에 참가한 수많은 외국인들은 런하기계공장에서 만든 CNC설비들인 수직가공중심반 RV-35와 선반RT-125를 보고 저저마다 그 제품을 경쟁적으로 요구하였다. 유럽의 한 회사사장은 《조선에서 이런 기계설비를 생산한다니 도무지 믿어지지 않는다, 성능이 대단히 좋다. 런하기계설비남 입을 자기가 직접 나서서 실현시키겠다.》 고 하였으며 네데를란드의 한 회사성원은 조선의 과학기술력량이 막강하다. 조선은 국제시장진출능력이 매우 크다. 이런 수준이면 국제시장에 나가서도 능히 다른 나라 제품들을 압도할수 있다. 우리 회사와 협력하여 국제콤퓨터프로그람시장을 장악하면 좋겠다고 런속 감탄과 찬사를 아끼지 않았다.


지금 우리 조국땅 그 어디에서나 《돌파하라 최첨단을》의 노래가 시대의 진군가마냥 높이 울리돼지고있으며 CNC화의 불길은 군수분야에서뿐아니라 민수분야에서도, 기계공업부문뿐아니라 급속공업과 화학공업, 경공업과 농업을 비롯한 인민경제 모든 부문에서 세차게 다오르고있다.

앞으로도 우리 공업의 CNC화는 더욱 본격적으로 추진될것이다.

Source: Kim Il Sung University Library at http://www.ournation-school.com/

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Annex 14-41: Romanian company's homepage with its "High Vacuum Furnaces", "Electron Beam Welding System" showing its application for nuclear engineering and air/space technology



Source: http://www.advtech.ro/

Annex 14-42: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)'s control list of vacuum furnaces and related equipment

- 1.B.7. Vacuum or other controlled atmosphere metallurgical melting and casting furnaces and related equipment, as follows:
 - a. Arc remelt and casting furnaces having both of the following characteristics:
 1-8

NSG Part 2 June 2013

- 1. Consumable electrode capacities between 1000 and 20000 cm³; and
- 2. Capable of operating with melting temperatures above 1973 K (1700 °C);
- b. Electron beam melting furnaces and plasma atomization and melting furnaces, having both of the following characteristics:
 - 1. A power of 50 kW or greater; and
 - 2. Capable of operating with melting temperatures above 1473 K (1200 °C);
- Computer control and monitoring systems specially configured for any of the furnaces specified in Item 1.B.7.a. or 1.B.7.b.

Source: IAEA Control List

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Annex 14-43: Excerpts of business proposal on prohibited goods by a DPRK trading company

조 선 보 천 무 역 회 사

KOREA POCHON TRADING COMPANY

Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, D. P. R. of Korea

Tel: 8502-381-18111(18222) Ex - 8177

E-mail:bcmi 14 @star-co.net.kp

- △ Jewellery project
- Our company is now seeking an opportunity to co-operate with certain business entities that are willing to take processed jewelleries like diamond, including but not limited to, in DPRK.
 - The abovementioned business entity will supply rough stones of gem to our affiliated processing factories together with providing us with designs of finished gem products and technicians specializing in gem processing.

For your reference, one of our factory can process 1 500ct of diamond and 20 000ct of divine per a month respectively.

In case of introduce of some facilities and equipments, this would double our production capacity, and then we can even produce brand-new jewelries.

- · Our company is also capable of processing handiworks made of gold.
- With the help of rough stones of divine and Iceland spa of superior quality that are now being extracted from several mines of our company, we guarantee the gem processing of various sizes in
- △ Alluvial gold project (for the production of gold handicrafts)

Our company has already secured tracts of development zone that has favorable mining conditions, and is now seeking investors (investment by extracting facilities) to introduce the investment into this area

It is desirable for us to introduce a digging vessel that weighs around 100 tons(depth of water ranges from 13m to 17m) and extracting facilities as an initial investment.

The alluvial gold mining project can be proceeded by contractual joint venture.

Source: A participant company in 2016 Spring PITF

Annex 14-44: Examples of PITF brochure advertising prohibited minerals sales by the DPRK companies.



(Yonghung Trading Corporation)



(Suhaeng J.V. Co.)



Source: The Panel

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Annex 15-1: Door plaque of International Bank of Martial Arts in Pyongyang

Name: International Bank of Martial Arts / Bank of International Martial Art

Korean:국제무도은행Chinese:国际武道银行

Address: RM. NO 312, F/3, Potonggong Hotel

PYONGCHON DIST, PYONGYANG, DPRK OF KOREA

TEL: 00850 2 18888 EXT 8358

Email: Intermab@star-co.net.kp



Source: The Panel

Annex 15-2: Instructions issued by International Bank of Martial Arts to clients on how to transfer RMB to DPRK through Chinese bank

INTERNATIONAL BANK OF MARTIAL ARTS

RM. NO 312, F/3, POTONGGONG HOTEL, TEL: 00850 2 18888 EXT 8358 PYONGCHON DIST, PYONGYANG, DPRK OF KOREA Email: intermab@star-co.net.kp

2
[IN THE BODY OF THE LETTER]
Please request the remitter to instruct the remitting bank to route the payment as follows:
Intermediary bank 56A:
Account with institution 57A:
BANK NAME AND ADDRESS:
Beneficiary customer: [REDACTED] (Account number)
Name Great Star International LTD (Name)
Dandong city Liaoning Pro. China
AM 9:00 to 11:30 - PM 1-4:30
BEFORE TRANSFERRING MONEY THIS PHONE NO HAS TO BE CALLED: 13050387713 Jong Yong Su

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Annex 15-3: Documents on International Consortium Bank (ICB) and MKP Group of Companies

Contact information

Name: International Consortium Bank (ICB)

Korean: 하이펀드국제은행련합

AKA/FKA: Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank, Sungri Economic Group

Hi-Fund International Consortium Bank (ICB)

SWIFT Code: FHIBKPPY

Address: Sungri Exhibition Hall

Sohong-Dong Morabong District Pyongyang

DPRK

Website: http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php

Name: MKP Group of Companies

Address: Lot 5 Jalan Satu

Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya


43200 Balakong Selangor Darul Ehsan

Malaysia

Tel: 603-9076-9678 Fax: 603-9075- 9678

Email: enquiries@mkpholdings.com.my
Website: http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/index.php

Map of International Consortium Bank (ICB) Headquarters in Pyongyang



Source: MKP Website, http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php

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MKP website description of International Consortium Bank



Source: MKP Website, http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php

ICB claims to help over 5.2 million people worldwide




Source: MKP Website, http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php

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International Consortium Bank financing services for Small and Medium Enterprises

See section 11 below:

"Preference will be given to existing bank's customers who have been awarded contracts by government bodies"



Source: MKP Website, http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php

Annex 15-4: Photographs of Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行)



Source: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b5aa2dd0102wyrn.h

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Information on Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行) from DPRK Foreign Languages Publishing House



Source: www.naenara.com.kp

Registration of China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Co., Ltd. (金贸易货交易 (大连) 有限公司)

		基本位	息			
统一社会信用代码/注册号	91210200759909746P	名称 金贸易货交易 (大连			(连)有限公司	
类型	有限责任公司(自然人投	法定代表人 王羽				
注册资本	1000 万人民币	成立日期 2004年12月08日				
住所	辽宁省大连市西岗区香秀					
营业期限自	2004年12月08日		营业期限至	长期		
经营范围	提供易货交易场所;易货交易开发、咨询、技术服务;会议服务;展览展示服务;货物、技术进出日除外;法律、法规限制的项目取得许可证后方可经营);经营海上、航空、陆路国际货物运输代现的项目,经相关部门批准后方可开展经营活动。)					
登记机关	大连市工商行政管理局			核准日期	2016年02月14日	
登记状态	存续(在营、开业、在册)					
股东类型	资信息截止2014年1月1日。 股东	股东信 2014年1月1日之后工商 证照/证	新只公示股东基	本信息, 其他出 证照/证		公示。 详情
自然人股东	世 祝利	中华人民共和国	1000	ell.//(c) fil	.1) 3143	71.00
自然人股东	杨新海	中华人民共和国居民身份证				
自然人股东	王樹	中华人民共和国	17,476,496,45			
		变更值	自息			
变更事项	变更)	前内容		变更后	5内容	变更日期
投资人信息变更(包括投资 人、出资额、出资方式、出资	1曹美娜;2曹祝利;		1曹祝利;2王羽;3杨新海;		2016年02月14日	
日期、投资人名称等)	曹祝利		王靭			
日期、投资人名称等) 负责人变更(法定代表人、负 责人、首席代表、个体户经营 者、投资人、合伙事务执行人 等变更)	曹祝利		王羽			2016年02月14日

Source: Chinese regional business registry (Liaoning)

(Shows shareholder and director Cao Zhu Li (曹祝利) passed directorship to Wang Yu (王羽) on 14 Feb 2016 but remains shareholder)

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Information on Hunchun branch of China Gold Trade Exchange (Dalian) Co., Ltd. (金 贸易货交易所(大连)有限公司珲春分公司)



Source: http://m.71p.net/c5844420.htm

Annex 15-5: Information on Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行)

Hunchun News Network, "North Korea establishes first wholly-foreign owned China Commercial Bank", 21 January 2013

朝鲜首家独资银行中华商业银行成立

来源:**珲春新闻网** 作者:安波 时间:2013-01-21 13:47:32编辑:安波

0

[**导读**]朝鲜中央政府批准成立的第一家独资银行——中华商业银行正式建立,作为中朝合作前沿的罗先经济特区也正准备迎接新一轮的腾飞。中华商业银行剪彩仪式在朝鲜罗先经济特区举行,珲春副市长任 璞玉出席剪彩仪式并讲话。

罗先经济特区以图们江(豆满江)为界与中国、俄罗斯为邻,并靠着朝鲜东部海域,地理位置优越。地缘相近、人缘相亲、文化相通,友好交往的历史源远流长。随着朝鲜重视经济建设以及中朝经济合作的进一步深入推进,1月18日,作为朝鲜中央政府批准成立的第一家独资银行——中华商业银行正式建立,标志着中朝合作前沿的罗先经济特区也正准备迎接新一轮的腾飞。

珲春副市长任璞玉出席剪彩仪式并讲话。任璞玉指出,中华商业银行的建立,是落实中朝 两国政府《关于共同开发、共同管理罗先经济互贸区协议》的重要举措,是服务中、朝两国金 融合作,贸易往来的桥梁和纽带,为今后更好的促进中朝、两国的经贸往来和经济繁荣,必将 发挥积极作用。

据了解,中华商业银行由中国金贸易货交易所(大连)有限公司筹备建立。银行主营人民币结算业务,为人民币跨境业务办理信用证、汇票、保函和担保,办理存款贷款、金融理财等业务。中华商业银行建立的宗旨是为了适应当前中、朝经济贸易大发展的需求和中朝两国签订的《关于共同开发并管理罗先经济贸易地带和黄金坪经济地带的总体计划纲要》的需求,为中、朝两国的经济贸易发展起到桥梁和纽带的作用,服务于中、朝两国的经济贸易,并为之保驾护航。

您觉得这篇文章: 不错0 一般0

Source: http://news.365jilin.com/xinwen/20130121/481323.ht

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Annex 15-6: Junling Holdings (君领控股) acquires Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行) to enter overseas banking

君领控股收购中华商业银行 进军海外银行业

评论 邮件 纠错 2013年08月23日15:36 来源: 和讯理财

中国民企斥资上亿美金收购海外银行

君领控股收购朝鲜中华商业银行拉开了中国民营资本进军海外大序幕

2013年8月23日, 君领控股收购朝鲜中华商业银行60%的股权, 成为第一家控股海外银行的中国民营企业。

中华商业银行是朝鲜首家外商独资银行,是服务中朝两国金融合作,贸易往来的桥梁和纽带,为今后更好地 促进中朝两国经贸往来和经济繁荣,必将发挥积极作用。此次君领控股与中华商业银行合作,更是中国民营资本 进军海外市场的里程碑事件,同时也是君领控股做"新金融服务专家"的跨国理念体现。



中华商业银行代表团与君领控股高层洽谈中



中华商业银行董事长曹祝利先生、董事王建禄先生出席会议



君领控股董事长与中华商业银行高层

收购朝鲜中华商业银行,君领控股投入近一亿美元。股权转让完成后,原中华商业银行将更换法人代表和 董事长。除在中朝罗先开发区开展业务外,还将在朝鲜首都平壤设立分支机构。

Source s: http://money.hexun.com/2013-08-23/157381824.html http://www.cdjrw.com/news/show.php?itemid=252

http://msn.wenzhuan.me/889992.html

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Junning Holdings (君领控股) acquires Chinese Commercial Bank (中华商业银行)

投资朝鲜 www.idprkorea.com 中朝经贯合作网	投资朝鲜 新超音	我们留
	詳经济「朝鮮经贸」朝鮮旅游「诚信企业」出口产品「朝鮮法規」朝鮮企业」经济动态「商务考察」经贸展会」交易市场「成功故事」专家視点 晴合作」中朝合作「投资向导「涉朝規章」中朝口岸」投资咨询「招商项目」驻朝机构」人才职场「朝鮮特区」行业资讯「贸易代理」今日朝鮮	
	成功战事	
□站内搜索□	君领控股收购朝鲜中华银行	
请输入查询的字符串:	发布时间: 2013-9-11 7:36:50 被阅览数: 1054 次	_
==> 综合查询 <==	据报道,8月23日,(北京)君领控股收购朝鲜中华商业银行60%的股权,成为第一家控股海外银行的中国民营企业。 为收购朝鲜中华商业银行,君领控股投入近一亿美元。股权转让完成后,原中华商业银行将更换法人代表和董事长。除在中朝罗先开发区开展业务外,还将在朝鲜首都平壤设立分支机构。 君领控股的股权收购,为民营企业进军海外金融市场开创了先例,中国的大型企业到海外发展尤其是发展金融业务,往往受制于对方对中资企业背景的考量,而纯粹的民营资本则 更受海外市场的青睐。另一方面,对于拓展海外金融市场,中资企业往往更喜欢将目光放在纽约、伦敦等欧美发达地区,而君领控股此次的收购举动告诉我们可以将目光放在其他地区。" 君领控股董事长李东说:"收购朝鲜中华商业银行,拉开了中国民营资本进军海外市场的序幕,同时也承载着君领进军海外金融业的光荣与梦想!"银行业内分析人士在接受记者采访时表示:"君领控股收购中华商业银行具有相当积极的意义。中华商业银行是朝鲜首家外商独资银行,是服务中朝两国金融合作,贸易往来的桥梁和纽带,为今后更好地促进中朝两国经贸往来和经济繁荣,必将发挥积极作用。此次君领控股与中华商业银行合作,更是中国民营资本进军海外市场的里程碑事件,同时也是君领控股份"新金融服务专家"的跨国理念体现。中华商业银行董事长曹祝利先生、董事王建禄先生出席会议。	
	控股做"新金融服务专家"的跨国理念体现。	

Source: http://www.idprkorea.com/cggs/news/view.asp?id

Publishing House Politics Economy & Trade Society & Culture History & Folk Customs Korea Is One Tourism www.naenara.com.kp NEWS Korea Chongsong Mining Company [2016-12-03] * Total Korea Chongsong Mining Company Statement & Commentary Established in January Juche 104 (2015), this · Politics company gives priority to the credit-first principle. Economy It invests in high-grade coal production and the Education modernization of fish farming and mushroom Public Health cultivation. · Art and Literature It satisfies the needs of customers as it keeps the principle of correctness, promptness and convenience. Science It is affiliated by the Kumgyo International Commercial Bank and Chonggwang Shop. Nature, Environment Sports · Life, Food Culture National Reunification From south Korea History · Tourism External Relations As a bank run jointly by China Inner Mongolia Hongyuan International Trade Overseas Corporation. Ltd, it has its counterparts at home as well as in Russia, China and other Koreans countries. Red Cross The Chonggwang Shop, located in Mirae Scientists Street, Pyongyang, deals in various kinds of garments, household electronic appliances, sports and physical exercise facilities and groceries. It conducts brisk business transactions with foreign investors and companies. Contents Deceptive Statement [2016-12-03] S. Korean Opposition Parties Denounce Park Geun Hye's "Talk to People" [2016-12-03] Public Protests to Remove Park Geun Hye from Power Launched across S. Korea [2016-12-03] For Happy Life of Persons with Disabilities [2016-12-03] Turning Misfortune into Blessing [2016-12-02] Four Packs of Cigarettes [2016-12-02] News Politics Economy/Trade Society/Culture History/Folk Customs Korea Is One Tourism TOP O TOP

Annex 15-7: Information on Kumgyo International Commercial Bank from DPRK Foreign Languages

Source: www.naenara.com.kp

17-01388 287/326

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Annex 15-8: Registration of Inner Mongolia Horizon International Trade Co. Ltd (内蒙古泓元国际贸易有限责任公司)



Source: Chinese regional business registry (Inner Mongolia)

Annex 15-9: Information on Inner Mongolia Horizon International Trade Co. Ltd showing DPRK imports and exports



Source: http://nmghygjmyyx.cn.biz72.com

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Annex 15-10: Article in Chinese Ministry of Commerce e-newsletter showing participation of Inner Mongolia Horizon International Trade Co. Ltd in e-business conference on 21 June 2016 in Huhhot



Source: www.comnews.cn

Annex 15-11: Information on UNAFORTE Hong Kong and Mainland branches

1. <u>UNAFORTE Hong Kong</u>

Chinese name: 香港旺福特公司

Registered Hong Kong address:

Unit 04, 7/F Bright Way tower No. 33

Mong Kok Rd Kln Hong Kong

Date of incorporation: 18 October 2012

Director: Zhao Chunhui, 招春晖 (in English, "William Zhao"),

holds Dominican passport.

2. <u>UNAFORTE's branch in Yanbian, China</u> (延边旺福特)

Name: 延边旺福特进出口贸易有限公司 / 延边旺福特

Same Director: Zhao Chunhui, 招春晖

Address: 吉林省延吉市河南街站前路13号北侧

吉林省延边朝鲜族自治州珲春市矿泉胡同93号

Tel: 18613028800 Date of incorporation: 10 January 2014

Information from Registry in Rason, DPRK (see Annex 13)

Name of Company:Rason Una Forte Limited CoChinese name:罗先旺福特贸易有限公司Location:Rason City, An Hwa Dong

Legal Representative: Cho Soo Choon Hee

Nationality: Dominica (Dominican Republic)

Capital: 4, 500,000 euros Type of Company: Foreign Company

Parties: DPRK Side: Blank; Other Side: Italy Unaforte Limited Co

Operation time period: 50 years

Dated: Juche 1011 2012 November

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UNAFORTE Hong Kong registration documents

https://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/cps_module.do?



CR's annotation: This is the amended Form SC1for the incorrect one filed on 23/04/2014. 股份分配申報表 Return of Allotments (公司條例第 45(1)條) 公司註冊處 (Companies Ordinance s. 45(1)) Companies Registry Form 重要專項 Important Notes 填表前請参閱(填表須知)・ 請用黑色墨水列印。 公司编號 Company Number Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form. Please print in black ink. 1813809 1 公司名稱 Company Name UNAFORTE LIMITED 香港旺福特有限公司 (駐 Note 7) 2 分配股份的日期或始末日期 Date or Period during which Shares were Allotted 至 To 02 03 2014 E DD 月 MM 年 YYYY E DD 月 MM 3 本次股份分配的總款額 Totals of this Allotment 貨幣單位 軟額 Currency Amount (註 Note 8) 已缴及應繳的總面額 Total Nominal Amount Paid and Payable HK\$ 5,000,000.00 已嵌及應缴的溢價總額 [第5A(a) + 5B(a)項] Total Premium Amount Paid and Payable [Sections 5A(a) + 5B(a)] **HKS** N/A 4 公司自成立為法團當日起計,累積的已繳股款 貨幣單位 軟額 總額(包括本次分配但不包括溢價) Currency Amount Cumulative Total of Paid-up Share Capital of the HK\$ 10,000,000.00 Company since Incorporation (Including this Allotment but Excluding Premium) HK\$ N/A **HKS** N/A (註 Note 3) 提交人的資料 Presentor's Reference 請勿填寫本欄 For Official Use 姓名 Name: PROLIVE CONSULTANTS LIMITED 地址 Address: Room 1406, 14/F., Wing Tuck Commercial Centre, 177-183 Wing Lok Street, Sheung Wan, Hong Kong. 22201105139 AD 24/10/2014 1813809 電話 Tel: 34805220 **傳真** Fax: 収作日期 KEUEIVEU 電郵地址 E-mail Address: 2 4 OCT 2014 极號 Reference: 文件管司组 Document Manageme Section 报明编號 2/2004 (超新) (2004 年 2 月) Specification No. 2/2004 (Revision) (Feb. 2004) 0041



股份配發申報書 Return of Allotment

存案 Filed

表格 NSC1

公司編號 Company Number

註 Note

1813809

	公司名稱 Company Name	
,	UNAFORTE LIMITED	
	香港旺福特有限公司	
	Everal and Advanced	

2	配發股份	}的日期	Date of A	llotment	-			
	由 From	11	02	2016	至 To			
	L	∃ DD	Я ММ	年 YYYY		∃ DD	月 MM	年 YYYY

3 是次股份配發的總款額 Totals of this Allotment

請在適用的空格内加上 / 號 Please tick the relevant box

✓ 上遞公司的已發行股本因是次配發股份而增加的款額如下: As a result of this allotment, the company's issued share capital is increased by the following amount:

貨幣單位 Currency	款額 Amount
HKD	150,000
	6202

- □ 上述公司的已發行股本並未因是次配發股份而增加(在此情況不用申報第 4 項)
 The company's issued share capital is not increased as a result of this allotment. (No need to complete Section 4 in this situation)
- 4 配發股份的詳情 Details of Shares Allotted
- A. 以金錢代價配發的股份 Shares Allotted for Cash Consideration

股份的類別 (如普通股/ 優先股等) Class of Shares (e.g. Ordinary/ Preference etc.)	貨幣單位 Currency	所配發的 股份數目 Number of Shares Allotted	已為或視作已為 每一股份繳付的款額 Amount Paid or Regarded as Paid on Each Share	尚未為或視作尚未為 每一股份繳付的款額 Amount Unpaid or Regarded as Unpaid on Each Share
Ordinary	HKD	150,000	1	0
			222	

0	提交	人資料ト	resentor's Reference
	姓名	Name:	Prolive Consultants Limited
	地址	Address:	Room 2103B, 21/F.,
			Easey Commercial Building,
			253-261 Hennessy Raod.

Wan Chai, Hong Kong. CR 效件日期 RECEIVED

電話 Tel: 852-3480 5220 傳真 Faxt 1 FEB 2016

電郵 Email: 文件管理相 Document Managemen As Reference: 推明编號 1/2014 (2014年 3月) Specification No. 1/2014 (March 2014) 請勿填寫本欄 For Official Use



22201309910 NSC1 11/02/2016

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9198

2	公司註冊處	nual Return			
C	Companies Registry			表格 form	NAR1
	72		公司	編號 Comp	pany Number
				1813	809
1	公司名稱 Company Name				
		NAFORTE LIMITED 香港旺福特有限公司			
2	簡業名稱(如有的話) Business Name	e (If any)			
3	公司類別 Type of Company				
	鹏在適用的空格內加上 / 號 Please tick the relevant	box			
	✓ 私人公司 公眾公司	擔保有限	公司		
	Private company Public compa		limited by gua	arantee	
4	本申報表的結算日期			1	1
	Date to which this Return is Made Up		18 H DD	10 月 MM	2015 年YYYY
	For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the for a public company, the return should be made up to the for a company limited by guarantee, the return should be period.) 随本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的	uld be made up to the anniversary the date that is 6 months after the ie made up to the date that is 9 m 計劃	8月組織之日。 of the date of its end of its accoun onths after the e		
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Source: Hong Kong companies registry

Photographs of First Eastern bank (东大银; F Bank)





Source: http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_71335df10102v8r8.html?type=-1

Chinese government authorization documents for UNAFORTE's Yanbian branch, 延边旺福特 进出口贸易有限公司

(Document No. 4 shows company registered address).

- 1. Certificate for a Chinese company to invest outside the mainland
- 2. License for business entity
- 3. Customs registration
- 4. Certificate of organization code issued by General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (shows full address)

二、延边旺福特进出口贸易有限公司









延边旺福特进出口贸易有限公司主要起到双边贸易的作用,境外投资受国家商务部批准

Source: www.unaforte.net

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Certificate of Company Registry (Rason City)



Unofficial translation

Name of Company: Rason Una Forte

Limited Co

Location: Rason City, An Hwa Dong Legal Representative: Cho Soo Choon

Hee

Nationality: Dominica (Dominican

Republic)

Capital: 4, 500,000 euros

Type of Company: Foreign Company Parties: DPRK Side: Blank; Other Side: Italy Unaforte Limited Co Type of Industry: hard to read

(unclear).

Operation time period: 50 years Dated: Juche 1011 2012 November

Source: www.unaforte.net

Authorization to use land in Rason City, An Hwa Dong



Source: www.unaforte.net

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Annex 15-12: First Eastern Bank registration documents from DPRK authorities including DPRK Central Bank









东大银行经朝鲜中央银行特批

Source: www.unaforte.net


Article announcing First Eastern Bank (东大银行) Rason Branch approval by DPRK Central Bank



Source: http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_71335df10102v8r8.html?type=-1

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Annex 15-13: UNFORTE Information on First Eastern Bank (东大银) in Rason



Source: http://mds.worldcfc.cn/index.php?c=Game&a=detail&id=1707

Full Translation:

3. Strengths of First Eastern Bank (FBank)

The first branch of FBank was opened a year ago. Its deposit and lending business has been in good shape.

- Local businesses may need funds, and FBank can provide loans to local investors.
- These Loans have an annual interest rate of 25% -30%!
- FBank is fully independent and doesn't require proof of identity. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of China or DPRK and is not required to report to the Chinese government or the DPRK government!

UNAFORTE

UNFORTE Company Introduction of First Eastern Bank in Rason



Source: http://mds.worldcfc.cn/index.php?c=Game&a=detail&id=1707

Translation:

UNAFORTE - First Eastern Bank

Rason, DPRK

In recent years, the Workers' Party of Korea and the Korean people, under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, have made significant strides in developing the economy and improving people's livelihood.

In particular, profound changes have taken place in the special economic zone, Rason!

[Words in the photo]

Terminal 1 and 2 are on a 50-year lease with China.

Terminal 3 is on a 50-year lease with Russia.

UNAFORTE

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UNAFORTE

朝鲜·罗先

5.管理优势:

我们在比较早的时间进入罗先,我们其中一股东3年来一直在当地经营管理 所以对罗先比较熟悉。所以对当地的政策很了解,包括进出口贸易,包括招人。 别人很难办成的牌照,我们很快完成! 所以我们是有中国南北方的融汇,以及 中西方的背景优势!

- 我们的一个企业是在那里经营一家珠宝加工厂。我们非常熟悉贸易的地方规则和政策,包括进出口贸易,就业,许可证和许可证。
- 我们跟当地的政府关系非常好,例如开赌场牌照。该许可证是1000万人民币,但是我们可以以160万人民币办理。

为了发展我们的业务,我们有来自中国北方和南中国,意大利和美国的联合技术。

(Unofficial translation)
FBank is fully independent and doesn't require proof of identity. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of China or DPRK and

is not required to report to the Chinese government or the DPRK government!



UNAFORTE

Source: http://mds.worldcfc.cn/index.php?c=Game&a=detail&id=1707

Full translation

Managerial strengths:

We established our presence in Rason long ago. One of our shareholders has been doing business there for 3 years and knows Rason well. We therefore have profound knowledge of local policies, including those relating to import & export and employment. We are able to obtain hard-to-get operating licenses in a short timeframe! We combine networks of South and North China, as well as expertise of China and the West!

- One of our subsidiaries runs a jewellery factory in Rason. We fully understand local trading rules and policies, including those covering import and export, employment and licenses.
- We have established a very robust relationship with the local government. For example, it
 normally takes 10 million RMB to get a casino operating license, but we are able to get it for only
 1.6 million RMB.
- In order to grow our business, we also have at our disposal a mix of techniques and technologies from North and South China, Italy and the United States. UNAFORTE

Description of First Eastern Bank in UNAFORTE Rason Vacancy announcement for assistant to Chairman of the Board in Rason



(Company Information)

UNAFORTE has invested in three projects in the DPRK, including First Eastern Bank, Industrial Park and Gold Mining and First Eastern Bank. The company invested in and set up the First Eastern Bank in Rason, which was exceptionally authorized by the DPRK Central Bank. Extensive banking experiences and Professional training of employees provide great prospects for the bank. The bank is advantageously located in the downtown area."

Requirements for the Job:

We are looking for candidates to fill one vacancy of Assistant to Chairman of the Board, in light of the needs of these projects. Candidates should speak Korean and are responsible, able to travel, proficient in computer and diligent at work. The salary will be RMB 4,000 during probationary period and over RMB 5,000 upon becoming a full employee. Applicants shall send resumes by 11 Apr to: jiuyezhongxin@ybu.edu.cn.

Source: http://www.yingjiesheng.com/job-001-779-123.html

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Investment proposal by UNAFORTE Yanbian (旺福特-东大银行) for Chinese investors in DPRK real estate



Source: http://mds.worldcfc.cn/index.php?c=game&a=show&id=1707

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Annex 15-14: Passport of Kim Chol Sam



Source: The Panel

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Chinese business registration of Dalian Daxin (大连大信 电子有限公司) showing Kim Chol Sam as sole shareholder

金铁三 (Kim Chol Sam's Chinese name)

辽宁省大连市中山区港湾街20B1106号

1106, 20B Gangwan street, Zhongshan district, Dalian, Liaoning province

Registered capital: 20,000 USD Establishment date: 8 August 2006 One shareholder: Kim Chol Sam

Type of shareholder: foreign natural person

Type of ID: foreign passport

Address from 8 August 2006 to 25 September 2007:

大连市中山区海景园6号2-5-4

Change in registered capital to 184,000



Source: Chinese regional business registry (Liaoning)

Chinese official business registry of Dalian Daxin (大连大信 电子有限公司) showing Kim Chol Sam as sole managing president

Title: Managing President / Chairman

Name: Kim Chol Sam金铁三



Source: Chinese regional business registry (Liaoning)

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Annual Report for Dalian Daxin in 2015 showing two employees



Source: Chinese regional business registry (Liaoning)

Annual reports for Dalian Daxin in 2013 and 2014 showing company declined to reveal number of employees 2013




2014



Source: Chinese regional business registry (Liaoning)

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Annex 15-15: BVI Registration information for DCB Finance



Source: The Panel

Register of directors: DCB Finance

Mr. Kim Chol Sam 6-4 Sochang-Dong 23 Ban Central District, Pyongyang City DPR of Korea

Mr. [Redacted] No. 902 International House of Culture Central District, Pyongyang City DPR of Korea


	DCB Finance Limited (Incorporated in B.V.I) REGISTER OF DIRECTORS		
FULL NAME (Any Former Names or Alias)	ADDRESS		
KIM CHOL SAM	NO. 902, INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF CULTURE, CENTRAL DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY, D.P.R. OF KOREA 6-4, SOCHANG-DONG, 23 BAN, CENTRAL DISTRICT,		

				Incorpor	nance Limited ated in the B.V. ER OF MEM	.I.)
	Date Entered			Trai	nsfer / Exchan	ge
MEMBERS Name & Address	Cert. N°	N° & Class of Shares	(Registered Shares) / Date Issued (Bearer Shares)	Date	N°& Class of Shares	NO
No. 902, Int'l House of Culture, Central District, Pyongyang City, D.P.R. of Korea.	- 1 -	*ONE*	27 June 2006			
Kim Chol Sam 6-4, Sochang-dong, 23 ban, Central District, Pyongyang City, D.P.R. of Korea.	- 2 -	*ONE*	27 June 2006			

Source: The Panel

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Kim Chol Sam Consent to Act as Director of DCB Finance



Source: The Panel

Date 27 June 2006

To: DCB Finance Limited
Akara Building
24 de Castro Street
Wickhams Cay I
Road Town,
Tortola,
British Virgin Islands

Dear Sir,

I, Kim Chol Sam, hereby give my consent to act as Director of your company with immediate effect.

Yours faithfully, Kim Chol Sam [Korean passport no.

[Korean passport no. 6451203782]

Annex 15-16: Hongdae International Limited Registration



法團成立表格 (股份有限公司)

存案 Filed

公司編號 CR No. 1283890

Companies Registry

Incorporation Form (Company Limited by Shares)

((公司條例)第14A條) (Companies Ordinance s. 14A)

表格 Form

重要事項 Important Notes

- 填表前請参閱〈填表須知〉・ 請用黑色墨水列印·
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form. Please print in black ink.
- 擬採用的公司名稱 Intended Company Name

擬採用的公司英文名称 Intended English Company Name

HONGDAE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

擬採用的公司中文名稱 Intended Chinese Company Name

NIL

- 2 公司類別 Type of Company 請在適用的空格內加上 / 號 Please tick the relevant box
 - 图 私人 Private

☐ 非私人 Non-private

公司在香港的註冊辦事處擬採用的地址 3 The Intended Address of the Company's Registered Office in Hong Kong

UNIT 802, 8/F, 99 HENNESSY ROAD, WANCHAI, HONGKONG

(「轉交」地址及郵政信箱號碼恕不接受 'Care of' addresses and post office box numbers are not acceptable)

電郵地址 E-mail Address 0) 4

提交人的資料 Presentor's Reference

姓名 Name:

ATA CORPORATE FORMATION & MANAGEMENT LIMITED

地址 Address: UNIT 1001, FOURSEAS BUILDING.

208-212 NATHAN ROAD, KOWLOON, HONG KONG.

電話 Tel: 2783 7818

体真 Fax: 2783 7918

電郵地址 E-mail Address:

請勿塡寫本欄 For Official Use



NC1 28/10/2008

表格 AR1

公司編號 Company Number

1283890

10 有股本公司的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) of a Company Having a Share Capital (有股本的公司必須獎和此項。如未能查錄於下列表格內、請用和頁A 模榜。 Company having a share capital must complete this section. Use Continuation Sheet A if there is insufficient space.)

截至本申報农日期的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) as at the Date of this Return

股份類別 Class of Shares

ORDINARY

		股	份 Shares	s			
姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	現時持有量 Current Holding	轉雜* Transferred *		Current Transferred * Re		備註 Remarks
			數目 Number	日期 Date			
COWIE NIGEL RICHARD JAMES	2/F PYONGCHANG-DONG 492-32, JONGRO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA	-55-	-15-	12 TH JUNE 2009	TRANSFERRED FROM JO KUN CHAN		
KIM CHOL SAM	2/F PYONGCHANG-DONG 492-32, JONGRO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA	-45-	-15-	12 TH JUNE 2009	TRANSFERRED FROM JO KUN CHAN		

Source: The Hong Kong companies registry

Annex 16-1 - HS Codes recommended by World Customs Organization for resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321(2016)

HS Codes		Description	Resolutions 2270 and 2321
Coal	2701	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para 26 of Res. 2321 applies cap on exports and conditions for procurements under the cap.
Iron Ore	2601	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	Livelihood exemption remains for Iron and Iron ore
Iron	Chapter 72	Iron and steel products (7201-7229)	
Iron and Steel products	7301-7326	Iron and steel products	
Gold	261690	Gold ores and concentrates	All exports from DPRK prohibited
	7108	Gold (incl put plated), unwr, semimfr or powder	
	710811	Gold Powder, Unwrought	
	710812	Gold in Other Unwrought Forms	
	710813	Gold in Other Semi-manufactured Forms	
	710820	Monetary Gold	
Titanium	2614	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	2615	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	2612	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [261210 and 261220]	
	2617	ores and concentrates nesoi [261790 - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	alkali metals etc, rare-earth metals etc, mercury	
	2844	radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc	

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Copper	7401-7419 2603	Copper ores and concentrates	New minerals added in para 28 of resolution 2321 (2016)
Zinc	7901-7907 2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	7501-7508	Zine cres and concentrates	
Silver	2604 7106, 7107	Nickel ores and concentrates Silver ores and concentrates	
	7114	articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	

Annex 16-2: HS Codes issued by Member States

1) China Ministry of Commerce List of mineral products embargoed for the DPRK issued with Announcement No. 11 regarding Resolution 2270 (English translation)

No.	Embargoed product name	Customs commodity code for embargoed product	Customs code product description	Notes
		2701110010	Anthracite coal	Powdered or non-powdered, but non-moulded
		2701110090	Anthracite filtration media	
1	Coal	2701121000	Non-moulded coking coal	Powdered or non-powdered
		2701129000	Other bituminous coal	Powdered or non-powdered, but non-moulded
		2701190000	Other coal	Powdered or non-powdered, but non-moulded
		2601111000	Non-sintered iron ores and concentrates	Average grain size less than 0.8mm, calcined pyrites [fly ash] excepted
		2601112000	Non-sintered iron ores and concentrates	Average grain size not less than 0.8mm, but not greater than 6.3mm; calcined pyrites [fly ash] excepted
2	Iron ore	2601119000	Non-sintered iron ores and concentrates with average grain size greater than 6.3mm	Calcined pyrites [fly ash] excepted
		2601120000	Sintered iron ores and concentrates	Calcined pyrites [fly ash] excepted
		2601200000	Calcined pyrites (fly ash)	
3	Pig iron	7201100010	High purity pig iron (<0.08% manganese, <0.03% phosphorus, <0.02% sulphur, <0.03% titanium content)	

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		7201100090	Non-alloy pig iron, phosphorus ≤0.5% (<0.08% manganese, <0.03% phosphorus, <0.02% sulphur, <0.03% titanium content high- purity pig iron excepted)	
		7201200000	Non-alloy pig iron, by weight— >0.5% phosphorus content	
		7201500010	Non-alloy pig iron	
		7201500090	Spiegeleisen [specular pig iron]	
4	Gold	2616900001	Gold ore	Gold ore conforming to Ministry of Industry and Information Technology YS/T3004-2011 gold concentrate standard
		2616900009	Other precious-metal ores and concentrates	Only gold ore and concentrate not conforming to Ministry of Industry and Information Technology YS/T3004-2011 gold concentrate standard
5	Titanium	2614000000	Titanium ore and concentrate	
6	Vanadium	2615909090	Vanadium ore and concentrate	
7	Rare earths	2530902000	Other rare-earth metal ores	
	Aviation gasoline [avgas]	2710121000	Motor gasoline and aviation gasoline; does not include biodiesel	Only aviation gasoline; does not include motor gasoline
8	Naphtha-type aviation fuels	2710122000	Naphtha, not including biodiesel	
	Kerosene-type aviation fuels	2710191100	Aviation kerosene, not including biodiesel	

	Kerosene-type rocket fuels	2710191910	Normal paraffin (C9- C13), not including biodiesel	Only kerosene-type rocket fuels
		2710191990	Other kerosene distillates and products, not including biodiesel	

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "MOFCOM Announcement No. 11 of 2016 Announcement on List of Mineral Products Embargo against the DPRK, 5 April 2016

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2) China Ministry of Commerce List of mineral products embargoed for the DPRK issued with *Announcement No. 81* regarding Resolution 2321

Partial list of goods embargoed for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Embargoed	Tax		
goods item	reference	Product reference	
name	no.		
Coal	2701	Coal; coal briquettes, charcoal briquettes and similar solid fuels made from coal	
	2702	Lignite, whether shaped or not, but not including jet lignite	
	26030000	Copper ore and its refined forms	
Copper	Chapter 74	Copper and copper products	
	26040000	Nickel ore and its refined forms	
Nickel	Chapter 75	Nickel and nickel products	
	26080000	Zinc ore and its refined forms	
Zinc	Chapter 76	Zinc and zinc products	
	26161000	Silver ore and its refined forms	
Silver	7106	Silver (including gold- and platinum-plated silver); unforged, semi-finished and powdered forms	
	71070000	Silver materials plated on non- precious-metal bases	
	88021100	Helicopters weighing 2 tons or less unloaded	
Helicopters	88021210	Helicopters weighing between 2 and 7 tons unloaded	
	88021220	Helicopters weighing more than 7 tons unloaded	
Marine vessels	Chapter 89	Ships and floating structures	
Statuary	9703	Original sculptures in all materials	

3) European Union HS Codes from Council Regulation (EU) 2016/682 of 29 April 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the DPRK

Code	Description		
ex 2530 90 00	Ores of the rare earth metals		
ex 2612	Monazites and other ores used solely or principally for the extraction of uranium or thorium		
ex 2614 00 00	Titanium ore		
ex 2615 90 00	Vanadium ore		
ex 2616 90 00	Gold		
ex 2601	Iron ore		
2701	Coal, briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal		
2702	Lignite, whether or not agglomerated, excluding jet coal		
2703	Peat (including peat litter), whether or not agglomerated		
2704	Coke and semi-coke of coal, of lignite or of peat, whether or not agglomerated; retort carbon		
7201	Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs, blocks or other primary forms		
7202	Ferro-alloy		
7203	Ferrous products obtained by direct reduction of iron ore and other spongy ferrous products, in lumps, pellets or similar forms; iron having a minimum purity by weight of 99,94 %, in lumps, pellets or similar forms		
7204 10 00	Waste and scrap of cast iron		
ex 7204 30 00	Waste and scrap of tinned iron or steel		
ex 7204 41	Other waste and scrap: Turnings, shavings, chips, milling waste, sawdust, filings, trimmings and stampings, whether or not in bundles		
ex 7204 49	Other waste and scrap: Other		
ex 7204 50 00	Other waste and scrap: Remelting scrap ingot		
ex 7205 10 00	Granules		
ex 7205 29 00	Powders, other than of alloy steel		
ex 7206 10 00	Ingots		
ex 7207	Semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel		
ex 7208	Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more, hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated		
ex 7209	Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more, cold-rolled (cold-reduced), not clad, plated or coated		
ex 7210	Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more, clad, plated or coated		
ex 7211	Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of less than 600 mm, not clad, plated or coated		
ex 7212	Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of less than 600 mm, clad, plated or coated		
ex 7214	Other bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel, not further worked than forged, hot-rolled, hot- drawn or hot-extruded, but including those twisted after rolling		
ex 7215	Other bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel		
ex 7216	Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel		
ex 7217	Wire of iron or non-alloy steel		
from 2710 12 31 till 2710 12 59	Gasoline		
2710 12 70	Naptha-type jet fuel		
2710 19 21 00	Kerosene-type jet fuel		
2710 19 25 00	Kerosene-type rocket fuel		

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(Company Seal)

Year Month Day

Annex 16-3: Chinese Ministry of Commerce Templates of Corporate Commitment from Announcements No.11 and 81: Template from Announcement number 11 My company is importing product from the DPRK. I hereby solemnly commit that this transaction is: Solely for the purpose of people's livelihood and does not involve the nuclear program or ballistic missile program of the DPRK or any other profit-generating activities prohibited in Resolutions No. 1718 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or no. 2270 (2016) of the UN Security Council. Signature of the Company's Legal Representative or Responsible Person: (Official Seal of the Company) Year Month Day Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "MOFCOM Announcement No. 11 of 2016 Announcement on List of Mineral Products Embargo against the DPRK, 5 April 2016 Template from Announcement No. 81 The company importing coal produced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hereby solemnly promises that this transaction: 1) Is entirely for the purpose of ensuring the livelihood of the citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is not connected to the nuclear programme or the ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nor does it provide income for any other activity prohibited pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016). 2) Is not connected to any individual or entity, including designated individuals or entities, individuals or entities taking action on their behalf, entities either directly or indirectly owned or controlled by them, or individuals or entities assisting in the circumvention of sanctions, involved in the nuclear programme or the ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or any other activity prohibited pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016). Signature of company legal representative or person in charge

Source: MOFCOM and GACC No. 81 Announcement of 2016, 26 December 2016.

Annex 17-1: Entities and individuals recommended for designation

In accordance with paragraphs 27 of resolution 2094 (2013) and 43 of resolution 2270 (2016), the Panel recommends the Committee designate the following entities and individuals:

Entities

a) Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation for attempted sale of prohibited minerals and use of the DPRK Embassy for commercial activities. Alternatively, the Committee could update the sanctions list by adding Korea Kumsan as an alias of MAEI/GBAE.

Address: Haeun 2-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang City/Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Other Information:

• Tel: 850-2-18111-8550,

• Fax: 850-2-381-4410/4416

• Email: mhs-ip@star-co.net.kp

b) Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. (Pyongyang branch) for its involvement in the sales of arms and related materiel.

A.k.a: Wonbang Trading Co.

Address: Room 818, Pothonggang hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

Other information:

• Director: Ryang Su Nyo

• Employees: Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok, Kim Pyong Chol

• Telephone: +850-218-111 (Ext. 8636)

c) Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation for the sale of arms and related materiel.

A.k.a: Rungrado Trading Corporation

Address: Segori-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Other Information:

Director: Pak Kyu Hong (a.k.a. Pak Gyu Hong)

• Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022

• Fax: 850-2-3814507

• Email address: rrd@co.chesin.com

d) Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies for having violated the resolutions, assisting in the evasion of sanctions by providing services and assistance related to the manufacture and maintenance of arms and related materiel, working on behalf of KOMID through munition factory construction, and the transfer of bulk cash via its workers. This includes all Mansudae operations and subsidiary branches world-wide as well as the following entities:

Mansudae in Namibia

A.k.a. MOP Architectural & Technical Services (Pty.) Ltd. (Namibia)

Address: 34 Herbst street, Ludwigsdorf, Windhoek, Namibia

Other Information:

• Managing Director: Kim Tong-Chol

• Tel: 061-271932

Fax: 061-271873

• Email: nmop@iway.na

P.O.B.:81229 Olympia, Windhoek, Namibia

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Mansudae in Angola

A.k.a. Mansudae Group Construção Civil Publicas Ltd.

Address: Luanda, Angola

Other Information:

• Shareholder: Kim Kwang Hyok

• Manager: Ri Won Chol

Tel: 222-359-611,Fax: 222-359-611

• Email: mop.ang@nexus.ao

e) *Korea International Exhibition Corporation* for having assisted designated entities in the evasion of sanctions through Pyongyang International Trade Fair and providing a platform to transfer, sell or supply prohibited items to or from the country.

A.k.a. KIEC; In Korean, 조선국제전람사; In Chinese, 朝鲜国际展览社

Address: Jungsong-dong, Central District, Sungri Street, Pyongyang, DPRK

Other Information:

- Tel: +850-2-381-5926
- Fax: +850-2-381-5827; +850-2-381-4654
- Email: kiec@silibank.net.kp; kiec@silibank.com; kiec jonlam@126.com
- f) Strategic Force Command for its role in and support for the country's prohibited programme. A.k.a. Strategic Forces, Strategic Rocket Force, Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People's army, and the Strategic Rocket Force Command of KPA and Strategic Force

Individuals

- g) The following individuals for their role in and support for the country's prohibited programme:
 - i. Ri Pyong Chol, First Vice Director of MID
 - ii. Hong Sung Mu, Vice Director of MID
 - iii. Hong Yong Chil, Vice Director of MID
 - iv. Kim Jong Sik, Vice Director of MID
 - v. *Kim Rak Gyom*, Commander of SFC A.k.a. Kim Rak Kyom (in Korean 김락겸).
 - h) Mr. Kim Hyok Chan as a Green Pine representative.
 - Title: Secretary DPRK Embassy, Luanda, Angola
 - Passport number: 563410191
 - Date of birth: 9 June 1970