Security Council
Seventy-second year

8143rd meeting
Tuesday, 19 December 2017, 3 p.m.
New York

President: Mr. Bessho. ........................................ (Japan)

Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ........................ Mr. Inchauste Jordán
China ............................................................ Mr. Wu Haitao
Egypt ............................................................. Mr. Aboulatta
Ethiopia .......................................................... Mr. Alemu
France ........................................................... Mr. Delattre
Italy ............................................................... Mr. Cardi
Kazakhstan ....................................................... Mr. Umarov
Russian Federation ........................................ Mr. Safronkov
Senegal ........................................................... Mr. Seck
Sweden ........................................................... Mr. Skoog
Ukraine ........................................................... Mr. Yelchenko
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Mr. Rycroft
United States of America .................................... Mrs. Haley
Uruguay ........................................................... Mr. Bermúdez Álvarez

Agenda
Non-proliferation

Letter dated 1 December 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1009)

Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1030)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation

Letter dated 1 December 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1009)

Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1030)


The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Germany to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Ms. Joanne Adamson, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2017/1009, which contains a letter dated 1 December 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); S/2017/1030, which contains the fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); and S/2017/1058, which contains a letter dated 15 December 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Her Excellency Ms. Joanne Adamson, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Mr. Sebastiano Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy, in his capacity as a Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

Mr. Feltman: Almost two years after implementation day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), we are at a critical crossroads. Today’s meeting is an important opportunity to reflect carefully on what has been achieved and the challenges that lie ahead.

Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported to the Council nine times that Iran is continuing to adhere to its nuclear-related commitments. Against this positive story of JCPOA implementation, on 13 October the President of the United States decided not to certify to Congress that the suspension of its national sanctions pursuant to the agreement is, in the words of President Trump’s speech, “appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear programme”.

This decision has regrettably created considerable uncertainty about the future of the JCPOA. The Secretary-General is reassured that the United States, during the recent seventh meeting of the Joint Commission, together with other participants, expressed its continued adherence to its commitments and stressed the need to ensure the full and effective implementation of the agreement in all its parts, in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere.

The support of the Security Council for the agreement is vital in order to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as regional and international stability. The agreement is in the interest of the global non-proliferation regime and of regional and international peace and security. It is also the best way to realize the aspirations of the Iranian people through an opportunity for greater economic engagement with the world.

The international community will be following carefully what the participants to the agreement in the Council will do in the coming months and years, and will certainly calibrate its own actions accordingly. For these reasons, the Secretary-General encourages the United States to maintain its commitment to the agreement and to consider the broader implications for the region and beyond before taking any further steps.
Similarly, he encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to consider carefully the concerns raised by other JCPOA participants. The Secretary-General also encourages the international community to continue to support the full implementation of this historic agreement and welcomes the affirmative statements by numerous other Member States in support of the plan.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fourth report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The report was submitted to the Council on 8 December, pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and the note by the President of the Council issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). I now turn to the main findings of the fourth report.

First, the Secretary-General has again not received any report regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution. Meanwhile, Member States are making greater use of the procurement channel. Eight additional nuclear-related proposals have been submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing the total number of proposals submitted since implementation day to 24. These proposals have been processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality.

Secondly, regarding the implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects official information provided by Member States on the launch of the Simorgh space launch vehicle in July by the Islamic Republic of Iran and on several ballistic missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In October and November, the Secretariat was requested to travel twice to Saudi Arabia to examine the debris of the ballistic missiles launched at Yanbu’ and Riyadh on 22 July and 4 November, respectively. Saudi authorities assessed that Iran had a role in manufacturing these missiles, which were used in the July and November attacks. We take note of the information presented at the recent press conference by Ambassador Haley on 14 December and Iranian statements in response.

At this time, the Secretariat is not yet in a position to confirm whether those missiles were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles — a variant of the Scud missile — transferred contrary to resolution 2231 (2015), as assessed by Saudi authorities. However, the report contained preliminary observations indicating that first, the two missiles had similar features, which suggest a common origin; secondly, the missiles contained features that are consistent with missiles of the Scud family; thirdly, the missiles also had features known to be consistent with the Qiam-1 missile; and fourthly, one of the missiles bore casting similar to that of an Iranian entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat is still analysing the information available and will report to the Council in due course.

The Secretariat recommended a joint meeting of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the 2231 format, to be jointly briefed by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings at the appropriate time. It is important that the Security Council be able to consider this issue holistically and coherently on the basis of all the information available to it.

Thirdly, in terms of restrictions on arms related transfers, the Secretariat was requested to examine the arms and related materials seized by the United States in March 2016. The Secretariat also received information on an unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives, allegedly used against the Saudi-led coalition, and had the opportunity to examine parts of its guidance and detonation systems. The Secretariat was also requested to examine two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reportedly recovered in Yemen after implementation day.

The Secretariat is confident that close to 900 of the assault rifles seized by the United States are identical to those seized by France, also in March 2016, which the Secretariat assessed as being of Iranian origin and shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Secretariat is also confident that half of the 200 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers had characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG launchers. We are still analysing the remaining weapons found in the shipment and will report back in due course.
The Secretariat could also observe that the guidance and detonation systems of the unmanned surface vessel included a computer terminal with a dual English-Farsi keyboard and characteristics similar to those of Iranian-produced terminals. It was also observed that the detonation system included items identical to those found on board the dhow Adris by the United States in March 2016, and that the electrical cables within the detonation mechanism and in the guidance system bore markings indicating Iranian manufacture. An update will be provided in due course.

The Secretariat observed that one of the UAVs, which Saudi authorities determined as resembling the Iranian-made Ababil-II, was similar to other drones reportedly seized in Yemen, brought to our attention by the United Arab Emirates. We look forward to the opportunity to examine these other unmanned aerial vehicles in order to independently ascertain their origin.

Fourthly, the report also highlights the participation of the Defence Industries Organisation in another foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon, held in the Russian Federation in July. The issue was raised with the Russian Federation and we were informed that an investigation into the issue found no action inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

The Secretary-General’s report also provides information on additional travels by Major General Qasem Soleimani, noting that the Security Council should call upon the Governments of relevant Member States to take the steps necessary to ensure the proper implementation of the travel ban and other provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

Before concluding, I would like to underline that the Secretariat carefully considered the information that the Islamic Republic of Iran conveyed in its letter dated 28 August, which stated that the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, signed into law on 2 August, violated the terms of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). It is our assessment that that information does not fall within the scope of the report, unless guidance to the contrary is provided to us by the Security Council.

In closing, I would like to thank His Excellency Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi of Italy for his successful tenure as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during this challenging year. I would also like to take this opportunity to wish well His Excellency Ambassador Karel Jan Gustaaf van Oosterom of the Netherlands as he will assume the role of Facilitator on 1 January 2018, and to assure him of the Secretariat’s full support.

**The President:** I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Adamson.

**Ms. Adamson:** I am honoured to address the Security Council today again, on behalf of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

First, I would like to thank Secretary-General Guterres and Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi of Italy, who is serving as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in 2017, for their excellent cooperation. Let me also express my gratitude to our colleagues in the Security Council Affairs Division for their unwavering support and excellent cooperation, in particular regarding the management of the Procurement Channel. I would also like to note my appreciation for their work in preparing the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

As we approach the second anniversary of the JCPOA’s Implementation Day — 16 January 2016 — I believe it is right to say that we are at a critical juncture. On 13 October, President Trump announced his decision not to certify Iranian compliance with domestic United States legislation. We respect that as having taken place in the context of United States domestic legislation, but it has created uncertainty regarding the United States continuing commitment to the JCPOA. In response to that announcement, the European Union (EU) stressed that it expects full and effective implementation of the agreement by all sides. That view was expressed by High Representative Mogherini and all Foreign Ministers and Heads of State and Government of the 28 EU member States.

Since implementation day, seven JCPOA Joint Commission meetings have taken place, chaired by the Secretary General of the European External Action Service, on behalf of the High Representative/Vice-President, monitoring implementation and providing guidance on a number of implementation issues. The most recent meeting took place in Vienna on 13 December and I am pleased to report that all participants expressed their continued adherence to
their respective JCPOA commitments. They stressed the importance of ensuring the effective implementation of all sections of the Agreement, in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere.

The JCPOA is a key strategic priority, not only for European security but also for regional and global security. While the community of nations again faces the threat of unchecked nuclear capabilities, the JCPOA has become an example of peaceably resolving issues pertaining to the international non-proliferation agenda. An overwhelming number of partners around the world — in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific — have signalled that they share the view that the JCPOA must be preserved and fully implemented. The EU fully agrees with the Secretary-General’s assessment that it is in the interest of the international community that the JCPOA — an achievement of multilateral diplomacy — overcome its implementation challenges, cementing our collective commitment to diplomacy and dialogue.

The JCPOA functions as intended. As the only body mandated by the Security Council to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued nine reports — the latest on 13 November — confirming that Iran is abiding by its commitments under the deal. Iran’s nuclear programme is the subject of a strong monitoring, verification and transparency mechanism. In accordance with Iran’s commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the country will be required to apply the IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which will allow the Agency to continue monitoring Iranian nuclear activities and provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

But while the JCPOA is working, a number of serious issues outside of the deal cast a shadow. The situation in the region has clearly worsened over the past few months and the EU has repeatedly called upon all parties to de-escalate their current rhetoric and find common ground on which to base their neighbourly relations. The EU closely follows the developments concerning ballistic missile launchers aimed at the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and encourages the Secretariat to seek more information in that regard. I call upon all actors in the region and beyond to do their utmost to contain the current trend towards violence and conflict. What we need above all is for all actors to demonstrate their full commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the problems at hand.

The EU has a long-standing track record of expressing its concern about the regional military build-up, including Iran’s missile programme. The EU has repeatedly called upon Iran to refrain from activities that may deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), and from making statements that reference them. The situation in the region, including the issue of ballistic missiles, must be addressed as a priority outside the JCPOA. Dismantling a nuclear agreement that is working would certainly not put us in a better position to discuss all the rest. The EU stands ready to actively promote and support initiatives to ensure a more stable, peaceful and secure regional environment.

In addition to Iran’s nuclear obligations, which are laid out in annex 1 of the JCPOA, and to elements related to sanctions-lifting, contained in annex 2, allow me to touch upon issues related to annex 3 of the Agreement, which covers civil nuclear cooperation. The EU views annex 3 as key to the overall balance of the Agreement and essential to the overall objective of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

The EU engages with Iran on the basis of an EU-Iran statement on civil nuclear cooperation, adopted in April 2016, in a number of concrete projects focused on nuclear safety and research. Last month, the second EU-Iran High-Level Seminar on International Nuclear Cooperation: Progress and Prospects was held in Isfahan, building further on the concept that civil nuclear cooperation and the adherence to international norms on nuclear governance must go hand-in-hand. While implementing projects on the ground and conducting research, Iran is also taking steps towards its accession to the international nuclear regulatory framework. Such steps must be encouraged and supported further.

I will now focus on the reporting related to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the work of the Procurement Working Group, responsible for reviewing proposals by States seeking to engage in activities with Iran that offer nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end uses. Since Implementation Day, the Procurement Working Group, which is comprised of the E3+3 and Iran representatives and coordinated by a delegated coordinator of the EU High Representative, has been
in full operation. Setting up that new authorization mechanism after a long prohibition period was not an easy task. As a result of outreach efforts and as proof the mechanism works, the number of States interested in transfers to Iran has increased, as has the number of countries submitting proposals.

Transparency has been one of our guiding principles during the negotiations and a cornerstone of the JCPOA. According to paragraph 6.10. of annex 4 of the JCPOA, the Joint Commission reports to the Security Council every 6 months on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues. In that context, on 1 December the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group submitted to the Facilitator, on behalf of the Joint Commission, its fourth biannual report. That report aims to provide the Facilitator and Security Council members with an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 13 June to 30 November. The report has been circulated as document S/2017/1009.

During this period, the Procurement Working Group has continued to work intensively to further develop and update the Group’s operational modalities. It has also intensified its efforts to be as transparent as possible without compromising confidentiality by reaching out to Member States and promoting a better understanding of its aims, objectives and review process, which are embedded in the JCPOA’s multilayered system of checks and balances.

In addition, it is important to underline that the proper functioning of the Procurement Channel needs to be ensured. Proposals need to be judged based on their technical merits, as the aim of the Procurement Channel is to support the transfer of sensitive goods to Iran while ensuring that they cannot be misused. The Procurement Channel is ready to receive more proposals for transfers, and we are ready to further support countries and authorities interested in such transfers. To that end, our outreach efforts will continue, together with colleagues from the Security Council secretariat and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Allow me to conclude by calling upon all parties to remain committed to the full implementation of the JCPOA in good faith, as well as to resolution 2231 (2015) in all its dimensions. The very same values embodied by the United Nations community are the building blocks of the JCPOA, which has allowed us to tackle a nuclear proliferation issue in a peaceful way. We need to continue to build on that achievement of multilateral diplomacy, which is the best hope for security and stability in the region. As ever, the Coordinator of the Joint Commission stands ready to work with United Nations bodies and Member States to support the objectives of the JCPOA.

The President: I thank Ms. Adamson for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Cardi.

Mr. Cardi (Italy): I thank you in particular, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. My thanks also go to Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, and Ambassador Joanne Adamson for their briefings.

Today, I will touch on three aspects of my report covering the period from 16 June to 15 December 2017: first, the activities of the Council in the 2231 format; secondly, monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); and thirdly, developments in the Procurement Channel. The full version of the report has been circulated to Council members and has been issued under the symbol S/2017/1058.

On 23 June and 13 December, the Security Council met in the 2231 format to review the findings and recommendations contained in the third and fourth reports (S/2017/515 and S/2017/1030) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). On 14 July, I held an open technical briefing to inform Member States on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to enhance their understanding of the opportunities and obligations inherent to it. The Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission and the Secretariat also participated in the briefing. On 8 September, the Security Council held a meeting in the 2231 format to discuss the 27 July Simorgh space launch vehicle launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the various letters addressed to the Security Council in that regard. I will summarize our discussion in the second part of my briefing.

In line with paragraph 4 of the resolution, in August and November the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency submitted two quarterly reports on verification and monitoring activities (see S/2017/777 and S/2017/994). In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued the construction of the existing Arak
heavy water research reactor based on its original design, had no more than 130 metric tons of heavy water, had no more than 5,060 centrifuges that have remained installed in 30 cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235, had not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; and that there had been no nuclear material at the Plant.

In its November 2017 report, the Agency confirmed that it continued its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran which it needed to visit.

On 8 September, during a meeting in the 2231 format, the Security Council considered the Simorgh space launch vehicle launch by Iran of 27 July. The meeting’s discussion evinced various views. Some representatives considered the launch to be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), since the technology used was similar to that of a ballistic missile, and that the Simorgh, if configured as a missile, was “inherently capable” of delivering nuclear weapons. Other Member States noted that the Simorgh was not designed and could not be modified to deliver nuclear weapons, and that the language in resolution 2231 (2015) contained a call to refrain from but not to ban ballistic activities.

During the reporting period, three Member States sent communications to the Security Council alleging transfer and activities by Iran that fell under the restrictions provided for by resolution 2231 (2015). Those are listed in detail in my report, together with all the replies received from the Iranian Mission to the United Nations. Since implementation day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The continued submission of nuclear-related proposals to the Security Council shows the steady confidence of Member States in the Procurement Channel. I am also pleased to note that, on average, the proposals were processed through the Procurement Channel in fewer than 49 days.

On 1 August, the Security Council updated the list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology whose supply, sale or transfer to Iran requires approval in advance, on a case-by-case, basis by the Security Council, in accordance with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

As we approach the second anniversary of implementation day, transparency, practical guidance and outreach remain a priority. In that regard, the open briefing for Member States on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), held on 14 July, was one of the many efforts to raise awareness, with a focus on the Procurement Channel.

Finally, since this is my third and last report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and I am of course approaching the end of my annual mandate as Facilitator, allow me to conclude by saying that I am confident that the international community will continue to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA.

The President: I thank Ambassador Cardi for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mrs. Haley (United States of America): This discussion could not have come at a better time. There were reports this morning that the Houthi militants in Yemen had fired yet another missile into Saudi Arabia. According to the Houthis themselves, it was targeted at a meeting of Saudi leaders in Riyadh, in an area crowded with Government offices. Thankfully the missile was intercepted before it could hit its intended target, but the very fact of this attack is a flashing red siren for the Council. This is not the first time that the Houthis have fired missiles at civilians in a country belonging to the Group of 20 (G-20) and, unless we act, it will not be the last. While we do not yet have sufficient insight into this particular attack, it bears all the hallmarks of previous attacks using weapons provided by Iran. It is only a matter of time before one of these missiles hits its target. If we do not do something, we will miss the opportunity to prevent further violence from Iran.

Before us is the Secretary-General’s fourth report (S/2017/1030) on the Iranian regime’s lack of full
compliance with resolution 2231 (2015), and it is the most damning report yet. The report makes the case that many Member States put a lot of effort into the nuclear agreement with Iran, but that should not allow us to look the other way as concerns the very serious non-nuclear items, like the sales of arms, ballistic missile testing and support for terrorism. The report was compiled before the latest attacks, but it points to evidence of the Iranian origin of missiles fired from Yemen into Saudi Arabia this year. It notes that arms seized by the United States from a ship in the Gulf of Oman were identical to those previously seized by France, which the United Nations had concluded were of Iranian origin.

The report describes a dual English-Farsi keyboard that was part of the guidance system of an unmanned surface vehicle used against the Saudi coalition in Yemen. That was just one of several pieces of evidence that point to the Iranian manufacture of the detonation and guidance systems of the weapon. There is plenty more. The United States and our partners went to great lengths to support the Secretary-General’s investigation. We shared our intelligence, and we insisted on the use of the highest standards of evidence and methodology. We therefore welcome this report and the evidence it presents.

To build on its conclusions, the United States took the extraordinary step of revealing, in a public setting, military equipment recovered directly from military attacks on our partners in the region. Last week, we put this information on display in Washington, D.C. Nearly a dozen countries have sent delegations to see it. Members of Congress are now viewing it. We invite the entire Security Council to visit this massive and compelling display of information about Iran’s violations.

The material speaks for itself. The evidence is undeniable. The Secretary-General’s report refers to debris from missiles fired by Houthi militants from Yemen into Saudi Arabia in July and November. The inventory at the warehouse in Washington, D.C., removes any shred of doubt that the missiles are from Iran. The missile debris recovered in Saudi Arabia came from Iranian Qiam-I missiles. We have multiple indicators: everything from the lack of tail fins at the base of the missile — which only Iranian missiles lack — to the logo of an Iranian defence manufacturer stamped on the side. The fact that these missiles were transferred from Iran and fired by a group of militants should gravely concern us. The intended target of the 4 November missiles should concern us even more. The target was the civilian airport in Riyadh. Hundreds of innocent civilians could have been killed. Just imagine if this had been the John F. Kennedy airport in New York City, or Paris or Brussels.

The warehouse also contains material from Iranian-manufactured anti-tank guided missiles, which the Houthis have used to destroy buildings, an unmanned aerial vehicle known as a kamikaze drone, and material from a Shark-33 explosive boat. Those boats have a warhead inside them that has blown six-foot-wide holes in the sides of ships, killing and injuring numerous personnel. All of these weapons recovered from attacks and planned attacks on a G-20 country were made by Iranian weapons industries tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. We have made this information public because Iran’s destabilizing behaviour is only growing. It will continue to grow unless we raise the cost of defying the international community.

International peace and security depend on our working together to expose and hold accountable the Iranian regime’s hostile actions. The United States will continue to share what we know with the United Nations and other parties to combat this threat, but the effort of one nation is not enough. We must all act cooperatively to expose the crimes of the Tehran regime and do whatever is needed to make sure they get the message. If we do, then Iran will bring the world deeper into a broadening regional conflict.

Based on the violations mentioned in the Secretary-General’s report, there are a few options that we can use to put pressure on Iran to adjust its behaviour. The Security Council could strengthen the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). We could adopt a new resolution that makes clear that Iran is prohibited from all activities related to ballistic missiles. We could explore imposing sanctions on Iran in response to its clear violations of the Yemen arms embargo. We could hold the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps accountable for its violations of numerous Security Council resolutions. In the coming days, we will continue to explore those options and others with our colleagues. We must speak with one voice in dealing with Iranian threats to peace. While we do so, we must also make it clear — as I do now — that the Iranian people are not the problem. The Iranian people are victims of their own Government.
I want to add a final point about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Secretary-General’s report devotes considerable space to Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal. While the Plan itself was not intended to directly address Iran’s non-nuclear behaviour, we must all recognize that resolution 2231 (2015) does address such behaviour, and that is made clear in the Secretary-General’s report. While the United States continues to uphold its commitments under the Plan, the international community must also demand full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) by responding to Iran’s dangerous violations. We must not allow ourselves to be held hostage to the nuclear agreement or treat Iran any differently than we would any other country violating a resolution.

Today, based on the United Nations report, we have an opportunity to confront the Iranian regime for its actions, which are clearly in violation of Security Council resolutions. The international community must demonstrate that we are committed to ensuring accountability for the full spectrum of Iran’s malign behaviour. The Security Council must follow through on the violations listed in the Secretary-General’s report.

Mr. Aboulatta (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): Allow me at the outset to express my appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, for his valuable briefing.

The delegation of Egypt has considered with great interest the fourth report (S/2017/1030) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Egypt reiterates the need for the Security Council to continue to fulfil its responsibility to closely and comprehensively monitor the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in a manner that ensures Iran’s compliance with its commitments, whether in relation to nuclear non-proliferation or in the other areas covered in the resolution. The Council must also carefully monitor the consistency of Iran’s policies and behaviour with the various other Security Council resolutions related to the Middle East, which all constitute an indivisible whole.

Egypt stresses that following up on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is not a matter that concerns only the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. All States members of the Security Council and the United Nations, particularly the countries of the Middle East, have a stake in ensuring the proper and full implementation of the resolution, which is now an integral part of the United Nations machinery concerned with the establishment of peace and security in the region.

While Egypt takes note of the report’s content with regard to the continued ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, my delegation reiterates the need for Iran’s policies to be coherent and consistent with the letter and spirit of the aforementioned resolution and all the other areas covered therein, including in annex B. We call on Iran to work to build confidence and to immediately cease any activities that could destabilize and fuel sectarian divides in a number of Arab States.

The contents of the Secretary-General’s report concerning Iranian violations of multiple Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2140 (2014) — some of which have been confirmed while others remain under investigation — offer compelling evidence of the need for the Council to intensify its efforts to follow up on that information and fulfil its responsibilities in addressing those violations without delay in order to preserve regional and international peace and security.

Egypt expresses its particular concern over the information and evidence connected with Iran’s supply of weapons and missiles to militias, encouraging them to use those weapons target neighbouring countries, in violation of Security Council resolutions, United Nations principles and the most basic rules of good-neighbourliness. Another disconcerting element noted in the report is Iran’s defiance of other sanctions related to the travel ban and assets freeze. In that context, Egypt calls for the timely completion of the Secretariat’s investigations into whether the missiles that the Houthis have launched against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from Yemen are of Iranian origin.

Egypt also supports the implementation of the important recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s report so that they Security Council and other United Nations organs can assume their responsibilities, including by considering measures that could suplement the nuclear agreement and reduce Iran’s threat to regional and international peace and security and its interference in the affairs of neighbouring States and the Middle East.

The Middle East is already one of the regions of the world most affected by violence and instability. We must therefore do our utmost to prevent further
deterioration. In that regard, we emphasize that maintaining the nuclear agreement in no way implies turning a blind eye to any violation of Security Council resolutions or actions that threaten peace and security.

Mr. Bermúdez Álvarez (Uruguay) (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, for presenting the fourth report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I thank Ms. Joanne Adamson, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, Mr. Sebastiano Cardi, in his capacity as a Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. As on previous occasions, the information conveyed in such briefings sheds light on some positive aspects that deserve to be highlighted, a few challenges and some causes for concern.

Uruguay is a country that is strongly committed to non-proliferation and the consolidation of the disarmament regime, to which those present have borne witness over the past two years. It is well known but still worth recalling that Uruguay has never possessed nuclear weapons and does not intend to so. We are members of the world’s first nuclear-weapon-free zone under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which celebrated its fiftieth anniversary this year, and of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which brings together the 33 States of the region signatories of the Treaty. We are also party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Uruguay therefore optimistically welcomed the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 group in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme. In my country’s view, that agreement is a key achievement for non-proliferation and a significant contribution to international peace, security and stability, as well as to the elimination of one of the main points of tension in the more than tumultuous region of the Middle East. The agreement demonstrates, perhaps more than any other signed in recent years, that positive results can be achieved with political will and through the avenue of diplomacy and negotiation, even in cases when that seems like a distant reality.

Uruguay welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as the verification and monitoring processes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iran. The nine successive quarterly reports of the IAEA on that topic confirm that the Islamic Republic of Iran has to date complied with the provisions of the agreement. Similarly, it is essential that all parties to the agreement comply with its provisions, in addition to those contained in resolution 2231 (2015), including its annexes A and B.

We are concerned about the claims included in the report regarding Iran’s possible violations of some provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). Any ballistic missile activity pursued by Iran has the potential to inflame tensions in the region, and we therefore call on its authorities to exercise caution in their actions. In accordance with the fourth report of the Secretary-General, we reiterate that it is in our interest to include in future reports, in addition to the detailed analysis of Iran’s compliance with annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), information pertaining to annex A, which contains no less than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action itself and the commitments that all parties to the agreement have assumed, including the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran.

To conclude, Uruguay continues to call on all parties to the agreement to adopt all measures stipulated in resolution 2231 (2015) and to comply with its provisions in order to avoid jeopardizing the historic agreement reached in 2015, which is the fruit of more than two years of very intense negotiations. In that regard, we urge the parties to act with the highest possible degree of restraint and caution and to abstain from undertaking any action that violates that which has been agreed and was later endorsed by the Security Council. The Secretary-General’s report is very clear that no national executive and legislative actions of the parties to the agreement shall detract from the validity of the Plan or the commitments incumbent upon participants as detailed therein.

We regret that those measures are creating uncertainty about the future of the agreement, which, given its importance and success to date, must be protected and championed as an achievement of the entire international community. The Security Council, as guarantor of international peace and security, should ensure in full future compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).
Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): Let me first thank the Japanese presidency for convening this meeting. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and the observer of the European Union for their very enlightening briefings. I would also like to particularly thank the Italian Facilitator and his team, whose work I warmly commend.

The Council has worked for years with the rest of the international community to build a strong and sustainable system of collective security, at the heart of which is the current non-proliferation architecture to which each of us has contributed. Today, that architecture is based on robust international instruments, to which we are all committed and of which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone. The nuclear agreement reached with Iran on 14 July 2015 in Vienna is part of that framework and must reinforce it.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) entered into force two years ago. Its adoption, endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015), has enabled us to respond robustly to a major proliferation crisis. It ensures that the Iranian nuclear programme will not be used for military purposes for more than 10 years. It is a key step both for our international non-proliferation efforts and for international peace and security. The JCPOA is well established, and the decision by the United States not to proceed to the certification that its domestic legislation envisages does not change the situation. The JCPOA remains in place and must be fully implemented. Nevertheless, the decision has created uncertainty, as the Secretary-General’s report indicates (S/2017/1030). All the parties to the agreement must abide by it in the interests of the international community, which has other proliferation crises to deal with, and because respect for commitments voluntarily entered into is a fundamental element of international relations.

The JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) are closely linked. In that regard, France welcomes the Secretary-General’s solid, balanced report on the implementation of the resolution. Ensuring the ongoing monitoring of Iranian commitments under the resolution is essential if the international community is to follow the situation as carefully it should. France was an active participant in the negotiations for the robust agreement reached on Iran’s nuclear programme and endorsed in resolution 2231 (2015). We have frequently expressed our firm commitment to both documents and to their full and effective implementation by all parties. In October, President Macron of France, together with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chancellor of Germany, reaffirmed that commitment. Iran has not violated its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. I would like to point out that in its report of 13 November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not identify any violations by Iran of its nuclear commitments for the reporting period. France fully supports the IAEA’s excellent monitoring and verification efforts, and we also welcome the reports that the Procurement Channel is functioning well.

However, it should be clear to all that the commitments undertaken more than two years ago are not limited to the framework of the JCPOA or to the nuclear sector generally. Just as it would be a mistake to denounce the JCPOA, it would also be irresponsible to selectively implement the provisions of the resolution endorsing it. Iran must respect the totality of its commitments under resolution 2231 (2015), and which it voluntarily committed to implementing. The long list in the Secretary-General’s report of the cases of Iran’s ongoing non-compliance with several of its important provisions is very worrying.

First, there is Iran’s pursuit of its ballistic-missile programme and its transfers of ballistic-missile capabilities in the region, activities that are a growing cause for concern for my country. They contribute to the destabilization of the region and are a threat to the security interests of countries there. The recent tests and launches of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as those on 18 June and 4 July, as well as the space launch on 27 July, are in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). Make no mistake, these missiles are technically capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which Iran has agreed not to develop. Therefore, those activities must stop. The stability of the region and international security depend on it.

With regard to the allegations of transfers of ballistic technology to the Houthis in Yemen, it will be important to ensure that the relevant information is rigorously examined by the Secretariat. In that regard, France supports the holding of a joint meeting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). We are also gravely concerned about the reports, suspected or confirmed, of seizures of arms originating in or destined for Iran, and which have been reported or confirmed by the Secretariat. Such transfers are violations of resolution 2231 (2015).
and foment mistrust in a delicate regional context. Finally, we are also worried by the reports that General Soleimani has been abroad, when he is still subject to a travel ban. All States Members of the United Nations must comply with their obligations, which in this case are an assets freeze and a travel ban.

The Council deals regularly with the North Korean and Syrian dossiers and the immense and serious challenges of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The case of Iran represents confirmation that the will of the international community, expressed through pragmatic and realistic multilateralism, can lead to solutions. The sustainability of such a solution, as with the other instruments I mentioned, requires a joint and sincere commitment to rigorously implementing the agreed provisions. I would like to assure the Council of France’s commitment in that regard.

Mr. Safronkov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Secretary-General for preparing the new semi-annual report (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and we would like to thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. We note the effective work done by Ambassador Cardi, the Permanent Representative of Italy, the Council’s facilitator for the implementation of the resolution, and since he is speaking before the Council in that capacity for the last time, we would like to thank him and the Italian delegation for their effective efforts in this important area of the Council’s work. He and the Italian team have made a constructive contribution to our work.

In our view, preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for regulating the Iranian nuclear programme is one of the international community’s major tasks. The Plan of Action is a foundational achievement of the work of the past few years in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomatic efforts for regional and international peace and security. It was the outcome of a joint and collective effort. The Secretary-General’s report is a clear testament to Iran’s unconditional compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA. That has been consistently confirmed by both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Secretariat of the United Nations, which, as the report indicates, has no reason to believe that Iran has made transfers either of goods or technology, whether nuclear or dual-use, which would be in violation of paragraph 2 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). Unfortunately, despite this positive evidence for the implementation of the JCPOA, we are obliged to note that some countries are attempting to torpedo this breakthrough collective agreement. We hope that reason will nonetheless ultimately prevail, that issues of international security and stability will cease to be held hostage to domestic political processes and that JCPOA will finally be allowed to function at full force and demonstrate its unique potential. The best guarantee of that is every State party’s good-faith fulfilment of its voluntary commitments.

We support the Secretary-General’s call to the JCPOA participants to comply fully with its provisions, including the importance of ensuring that Iran’s compliance with the agreement brings it concrete dividends, as well as the appeal to all countries and organizations to act in full accord with the JCPOA and to support its implementation in every possible way.

We feel once again compelled to draw attention to the Secretariat’s continued practice of conducting investigations for which it has neither the authority nor the expertise. Such actions, undertaken without the Security Council’s prior consent, are not legitimate, and any information obtained through them cannot be considered reliable and should not be included in the report. Information based on such visits should not be considered equivalent to normal consultations conducted with Member States. Since we are worrying about budgets, I would like to point out that such trips are paid for with budget resources allocated under resolution 2231 (2015) exclusively for the implementation of its mandate. We continue to believe that the report should not include information obtained from open sources or references to information provided by individual countries that is unverified or clearly unverifiable. Such information must first be submitted to the Security Council, which has the authority to take decisions on further steps, including on conducting investigations. Independent action in that regard cannot be considered legitimate.

Similarly, without the Council’s unanimous agreement it is impermissible to hold 2231 format meetings jointly with subsidiary bodies of the Security Council and expert groups. We would also like to recall paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which states in black and white that Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
We would like to draw the attention of Council members to the fact that regional issues and the situation in the Middle and Near East do not generally have to be discussed in the context of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Discussions on those topics should be held in other formats and should be conducted on a basis of mutual respect with the aim of eliminating existing differences and suspicions exclusively through direct, political dialogue. A few years ago, the Russian Federation developed an initiative aimed at establishing a collective security system and confidence-building measures in the region that is still relevant. We should also be implementing resolution 598 (1987), which asked the Secretary-General to present to the Security Council measures to enhance the security and stability of the region. That request was not implemented and the time has come to do so, since this type of methodology would be more effective than the recent, punitive decisions.

Two years of the JCPOA in action have demonstrated its effectiveness and that it is fully capable of carrying out its tasks. We believe firmly that there can be no alternative to the Plan of Action nor any justification for revising it. The Russian Federation is committed to the unconditional and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which represents an outstanding accomplishment for global diplomacy and has enabled us to resolve a crucial regional issue. The importance of the nuclear deal is recognized by an overwhelming majority of the members of the international community. We can use it as a model for dealing with other current problems and serious regional crises. We have the power to ensure its successful implementation, but we must first refrain from the language of threats and sanctions, instead using instruments of dialogue and concentrating on broadening cooperation and mutual trust.

In that regard, we note that during the Joint Commission’s most recent meeting, on 13 December in Vienna, all the participants — I repeat, all the participants — affirmed their commitment to implementing their obligations under the JCPOA. That creates a solid foundation for the future, and we hope that our countries will continue sticking to this line in strict accord with the letter and spirit of this historic agreement.

Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Adamson and, of course, Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi for his report, as well as for his excellent work as Facilitator. We welcome the Secretary-General’s report (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is of crucial importance. The agreement has ensured the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, which contributes to stability in the region and indeed beyond. It also contributes significantly to strengthening the global non-proliferation architecture.

We welcome Iran’s continued compliance with its nuclear-related obligations, as verified by International Atomic Energy Agency reports. It is important that Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and we look forward to its early ratification of the Additional Protocol. It is promising that the Procurement Channel process is working according to plan. We also agree with the Secretary-General’s recommendation that more efforts be made to engage various actors, including the private sector, in efforts to increase the economic benefits of the agreement, especially for the Iranian people. Despite those positive trends, however, we continue to be concerned about the reports of violations by Iran of the arms embargo and the travel ban. We are also concerned about previously reported ballistic-missile launches, which we believe to be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

Regarding information on possible transfers by Iran of missiles or missile technology, we note that the Secretariat is still analysing the information and that it should verify any new information pertinent to these cases. We expect the Secretariat to report back to the Council as soon as possible and we welcome the suggested joint meeting in the 2231 format between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Security Council.

The agreement on the JCPOA represented a milestone and illustrated the potential of dialogue and diplomacy in advancing global non-proliferation efforts. We echo the Secretary-General’s call on all States to act in accordance with the agreement and to avoid provocative actions and rhetoric. We also welcome his clear call to all participants to remain committed to the JCPOA in a spirit of cooperation, compromise, good faith and reciprocity. All actors must now work to find peaceful solutions to the ongoing conflicts and crises in the region. We urge them all to act responsibly and to refrain from exacerbating the tensions in the
region. It is important to separate discussions on challenges in the broader region from those concerning the implementation of the JCPOA.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his briefing on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2017/1030). We also commend Ambassador Cardi, as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for his briefing on the Facilitator’s report (S/2017/1058), and express our appreciation for all that he has done as he comes to the end of his term. We also appreciate the statement by Ms. Adamson on behalf of the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.

As stated in the Secretary-General’s report, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

“constitutes a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy in addressing issues that could have an impact on regional and international peace and security” (S/2017/1030, para. 1).

Through the JCPOA, the participating States managed to establish a framework that so far has continued to ensure the peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme, with the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments.

We note from the reports of the Secretary-General and the Facilitator that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The continued provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement by the Islamic Republic of Iran is encouraging. It is also noteworthy that the Secretary-General and his predecessor have not received any report on the supply, transfer or export to Iran of nuclear and dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology.

However, we note the challenges in the broader implementation of the JCPOA by the participating States, as indicated in the reports of the Secretary-General and the Facilitator. In that regard, Iran’s ballistic missile tests, although not strictly an integral part of the JCPOA, do affect mutual understanding, which is so critical to ensuring the successful implementation of the JCPOA. Reports of arms seizures by the United States in the vicinity in the Gulf of Oman also affect mutual understanding, and we await the outcome of the investigation on the matter. Such activities could impact the overall implementation of the JCPOA and increase tension among countries of the region and beyond. Those are all matters that affect stability and security in a region that is already very sensitive.

That notwithstanding, the JCPOA continues to provide a very good framework for addressing some of the most pressing proliferation-related issues related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction through political and diplomatic means. We hope that all participating States will address any challenges and difficulties, particularly in relation to implementation, through cooperation in good faith within the proper format, and we echo the call made by the Secretary-General in that regard. We also believe that all participating parties need to continue to maintain an attitude conducive to confidence-building among the JCPOA participants, as indicated in the Facilitator’s report.

It is important that the Islamic Republic of Iran refrain from acts that could undermine the overall implementation of the JCPOA, such as ballistic missile tests, and continue to fully implement its commitments under resolution 2231 (2015), including the travel bans and restrictions on arms transfer. On the other hand, it is imperative that all the JCPOA participating States continue to fully implement their commitments in all their aspects. As we stated during the meeting under the format of resolution 2231 (2015), we will await the outcome of the independent investigation on reports of ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis, as well as information received by the Secretariat in relation to the use of unmanned surface vessels allegedly used against the Saudi-led coalition.

Finally, while expressing appreciation to all dedicated efforts by Facilitator Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi and his team during the past year, we hope the incoming Facilitator will further strengthen his engagement with, and outreach to, Member States in order to address issues raised in the report of the Secretary-General in relation to the general lack of understanding of resolution 2231 (2015).

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Cardi and Ms. Anderson for their briefings and to express its appreciation for their work.

Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme came into
effect, nearly two years ago, its overall implementation has been making steady progress with expanding and increasingly visible positive results. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported nine times that the Islamic Republic of Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Thanks to the efforts of all parties, the coordination between the Security Council and the Procurement Channel is working as planned. The JCPOA is a success story in addressing international and regional hotspot issues through political and diplomatic means and has played an important role in consolidating the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East.

At the tenth meeting of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, held on 13 December, all participants noted their continued adherence to the JCPOA commitments and stressed the need to ensure the effective implementation of all its aspects in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere. The JCPOA was achieved through arduous efforts and difficulties, and challenges will inevitably be encountered in its implementation. The parties should remain steadfast in their political will, enhance mutual trust and have greater confidence in the future of the implementation of the JCPOA. China commends the efforts by all the parties concerned, including Iran, in implementing the JCPOA and calls on them to continue to follow the JCPOA guidelines, fulfil their respective commitments and promote the steady and sustained implementation of the JCPOA.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030) is an important component of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. As such, it should be considered in connection with the overall implementation of the resolution and the JCPOA. In the current situation, the report of the Secretary-General should reflect the implementation efforts by all parties, including Iran, in an objective and balanced manner.

China noted that the Secretary-General’s report stressed the great importance of the JCPOA, objectively noted the relevant conclusions of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, encouraged all Member States and regional and international organizations to act in accordance with the historic JCPOA agreement and support its implementation, and signalled the need to continue to actively advance the implementation of the resolution of the JCPOA, which China welcomes.

With regard to issues related to Iran’s ballistic missile launches, the parties should accurately interpret the relevant resolution and take a prudent approach to addressing such questions in order to avoid any negative effect on the implementation of the JCPOA. China hopes that the legitimate concerns of Iran with regard to the content of the report can be addressed.

China appreciates the work done by Ambassador Cardi and his team as Facilitator for the implementation mechanism of resolution 2231 (2015). China has taken note of the report submitted by the Joint Commission on the work of the Procurement Working Group and will continue to take an active part in the work of the Joint Commission and the Procurement Working Group. China hopes that the various working mechanisms will act in accordance with their mandates and generate synergy in their joint efforts to advance the implementation of the resolution on the JCPOA.

China consistently advocates for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue via political and diplomatic means and is committed to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability. China firmly supports and defends the historic JCPOA. We will continue to actively participate in the implementation of the resolution and the JCPOA, promote the sustained release of JCPOA dividends to benefit all parties, and contribute to the comprehensive, long-term and appropriate settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, we thank Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and Ambassador Adamson for their briefings today. We would also like to thank Permanent Representative of Italy Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi and the team working with him this year for the impeccable work they have carried out as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Bolivia echoes the statement of the Secretary-General in his report (S/2017/1030) that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We are pleased to learn about the progress detailed in this fourth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been fulfilling its nuclear-related commitments.
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as confirmation that Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement.

Bolivia underscores that, since the JCPOA is recognized as a genuine success story of multilateral diplomacy and cross-cutting dialogue among the parties involved, it should be implemented in a constructive environment based on mutual respect. Likewise, the parties must refrain from unilaterally applying sanctions outside the scope of the JCPOA, since such sanctions could directly affect the implementation of the agreement.

Moreover, the delegation of Bolivia is pleased to learn that the European Union is upholding its commitment with regard to the full and effective implementation of all parts of the JCPOA, which is a positive addition to the statements by other Member States in support of the Plan.

It is encouraging that since 20 June — the date when the previous report (S/2017/515) was submitted — eight new proposals have been put forward to undertake or allow initiatives with the Islamic Republic of Iran for civilian purposes, both nuclear and non-nuclear, in compliance with the recommendations made by the Secretary-General. Therefore, we urge Member States to make greater efforts to promote appropriate information on the procedures of the Procurement Channel.

Bolivia is convinced that, in order for the JCPOA to fulfil all of its intended objectives, all parties must diligently comply with their obligations, especially to foster trust among the parties involved. Non-compliance by any of the parties to the Plan will set a negative precedent and could undermine the chances for reaching any agreement on non-proliferation in future. As on previous occasions, Bolivia expresses its desire for future reports to also make reference to annex A, since both annexes are integral and complementary in effectively implementing resolution 2231 (2015).

Finally, as a pacifist nation, the Plurinational State of Bolivia reaffirms its commitment to preventive diplomacy, multilateralism, non-interference and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, based on the understanding that those are universal principles recognized by the international community.

Mr. Seck (Senegal) (spoke in French): I would first like to thank the Japanese presidency for organizing this briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, as well as Ms. Joanne Adamson, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy and Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings.

By adopting, on 20 July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action through resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council confirmed an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, marking the culmination of 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts made collectively by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) that we are discussing today — the fourth of its kind submitted under the provisions set out in annex B of the resolution — provides a comprehensive outline of the provisions relating to the nuclear field, ballistic missiles, weapons, travel bans, the freezing of assets, and accompanying measures to promote the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

On nuclear-related provisions, it is encouraging that the report makes it clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to respect its obligations, as confirmed in the reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its verification and monitoring activities in the country, as well as the monitoring of Iran’s implementation of its commitments related to the Plan of Action. It is an equally reassuring and positive evaluation that the Procurement Channel continues to consider the various proposals under its consideration, as illustrated by the various notifications on the supply, sale and transfer activities that involve the Islamic Republic of Iran, thereby guaranteeing visibility, inclusiveness and transparency. The delegation of Senegal also welcomes the efforts of the Secretariat and the Facilitator in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), including the practical information provided on the Procurement Channel, which merits our full support and cooperation.

Despite all of those encouraging efforts, it is clear that many challenges remain to be solved, not least in ensuring that the private sector fully understands resolution 2231 (2015). We must address the relationship between the business world and the Security Council,
particularly with regard to the pre-approval procedure. We also agree with the recommendation of the Secretary-General that Member States should make greater efforts to ensure that they understand the restrictions of the Procurement Channel, including the procedures for submitting proposals and their review process.

The delegation of Senegal is very concerned about the information regarding the possible transfer of ballistic missiles, component parts and related technologies by the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the benefit of the Houthis in Yemen, who may have used them in firing on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. My delegation will therefore remain very attentive to the results of the Secretariat’s investigations into those allegations.

My delegation supports the idea of a joint meeting in due course between the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the 2231 format on their respective conclusions.

In conclusion, the delegation of Senegal is of the view that the situation is generally positive with regard to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and encourages the Facilitator, as well as all the parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and States Members of the United Nations, to persevere along that path.

Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I would first like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Chargé d’affaires Adamson and Ambassador Cardi — the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) — for their valuable briefings. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to commend the dedicated and practical work of the Facilitator. Throughout the year, much work has been done on organizational and technical assistance for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Kazakhstan welcomes the fourth report (S/2017/1030) of the Secretary-General, in which there is strong support for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We attach great importance to that historic agreement, which not only ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme but also represents a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation. Kazakhstan made a significant contribution to the negotiation process that led to the agreement. We stand for the further and full implementation of the JCPOA by all parties.

The majority of the international community demands the preservation and continuation of the hard-earned achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It is necessary to acknowledge that the agreement has put Iran on a nuclear-free path, with the International Atomic Energy Agency confirming that Islamic Republic of Iran is fulfilling all its obligations with regard to the nuclear aspects of the deal.

As for the conclusions and recommendations of the fourth report of the Secretary-General, Kazakhstan takes a constructive approach in assessing the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. With regard to the worrying violations of the provision of ballistic missiles and the alleged transfer of missile technology to Yemen, a transparent and impartial investigation of all reported cases requires greater and closer interaction and cooperation among the Secretariat, Iran and other countries concerned. We will expect more detailed information, as promised in the report of the Secretary-General.

We should be careful not to discredit the other achievements that have been made within the framework of resolution 2231 (2016) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Implementing the JCPOA has had a significant impact on normalizing the situation in the region and beyond. Its positive effects on the revitalization of economic activities in the region will definitely strengthen the atmosphere of trust and confidence, which are very crucial to ensure regional stability and peace.

In conclusion, I would like to underline that Kazakhstan will continue to fully support and strictly implement resolution 2231 (2015). We also express our readiness to cooperate with Iran and others in the framework of implementing the JCPOA. We are firmly convinced that the Security Council, as a guarantor of international peace security, should always oversee its full compliance. The Council can rest assured that Kazakhstan will play its full part in a responsible manner.

Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine): I also thank all the briefers for providing factual and substantial reports on the status of the implementation of both resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

We highly commend the professional and impartial efforts of the Secretariat, the European Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
Facilitator to ensure the full and proper implementation of those crucial instruments, which have contributed to easing tensions around the Iranian nuclear issue and to strengthening non-proliferation and export control regimes in general. We welcome the continuation of the smooth and effective functioning of the Procurement Channel mechanism, with the approval of more proposals to supply relevant goods and technologies to Iran.

Let me reiterate that the JCPOA fully respects the balance between the legitimate right of a State to develop nuclear energy and the need to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As we approach the second anniversary of implementation day, Ukraine welcomes the fact that, according to the IAEA reports, Iran’s nuclear programme remains peaceful. Moreover, Teheran’s constant compliance with the transparency measures set out in the Plan significantly fosters the sustainable implementation of this historic deal. At the same time, we also acknowledge that, after two years of the JCPOA's existence, different interpretations regarding the applicability of resolution 2231 (2015) to the Iranian ballistic missile activities remain.

With regard to the fourth report (S/2017/1030) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution, Ukraine is concerned about the incidents of non-compliance with restrictions on arms-related transfers, as well as the assets freeze and travel ban provisions, stipulated by annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Taking into account the risks posed by the current tensions, Ukraine fully supports the intention of the Secretary-General to continue examining all cases of concern and to obtain additional substantial information. Formalistic responses from Member States involved regarding the confirmed cases of non-observance lead only to a further exchange of accusations and undermine the future of the JCPOA.

As to the alleged cases of transfers of arms and missiles from Iran to conflict zones, we consider the proposal of the Secretary-General to hold a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the 2231 format as a useful and timely initiative that could shed light on this worrying but sensitive issue.

In addition, we find it essential to further raise public awareness on the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), thereby contributing to their comprehensive understanding and diligent implementation.

Having stressed the imperative of full compliance with the relevant obligations, I would like again to emphasize the importance for all the parties concerned to interact constructively in order to resolve all outstanding issues for the sake of the this overarching nuclear agreement. Preserving the JCPOA as a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy is a crucial contribution to regional and global security and stability. It is even more important at a time when the preparatory process for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has already commenced.

In conclusion, let me express my sincere gratitude to Ambassador Cardi, as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and his entire team for their concerted and devoted efforts in ensuring the proper implementation of the resolution during 2017. Their outstanding dedication and commitment earned wide respect and recognition.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): I thank our briefers: Under-Secretary-General Feltman, for his comprehensive presentation of the Secretary-General’s fourth report (S/2017/1030); Ms. Adamson, for her update on the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and Mr. Cardi, for his summary as Facilitator of the format under resolution 2231 (2016), as well as for his and his team’s excellent work.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is one of the greatest diplomatic successes in recent memory. The continued endorsement of the deal through resolution 2231 (2015) is another considerable achievement, and also a responsibility for all of us. We remain committed to its full and equitable implementation by all parties. As the Secretary-General's latest report demonstrates, the nuclear components of the deal are working. Iran is complying with its nuclear commitments. For our part, we are committed to ensuring that the Iranian people see tangible benefits, including from sanctions relief. I encourage all Member States to uphold their commitments.

We welcome the recommendation of the Secretary-General to promote further understanding of resolution 2231 (2015) and of the Procurement Channel. We are committed to supporting those efforts. However, despite that progress, four elements of the report are
of concern. They relate to provisions of annex B. They hinder the full realization of the reciprocal benefits of the deal and they undermine faith in Iran’s long-term commitment to regional stability.

First, we are deeply concerned by reported transfers of Iranian ballistic missile parts and related technology to the Houthis in Yemen. Such transfers would be a violation of resolution 2231 (2015), which prohibits the transfer to and from Iran of ballistic missile technology and related material. Such transfers would also violate resolution 2216 (2015), which prohibits the sale or transfer of arms and related materiel to the Houthis. The Houthi missile attack on Riyadh on 4 November deliberately targeted a civilian area, and earlier today we heard reports of a further missile attack on Riyadh, this time aimed at the Al-Yamama Palace. Both would have caused suffering and chaos had they landed as intended. That is clearly unacceptable, and risks escalating the situation. The transfer of weapons to the Houthis threatens regional security and stability. Their use is prolonging the conflict in Yemen and contributing to heightened regional tensions. It is essential that the United Nations conduct a thorough investigation and inform the Security Council of its conclusions as soon as possible. We strongly support the Secretary-General's call for a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council under the 2231 format. That will allow for a coherent discussion of the use of ballistic missiles against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while also considering next steps to address that threat.

Secondly, we are concerned by the continued reported violations of restrictions on arms-related provisions. Evidence of those activities is mounting. The latest report indicates that the arms seized from a dhow near the Gulf of Oman and an unmanned surface vessel recovered in Yemeni waters are both of Iranian origin. Those activities, which are contrary to the resolution, give us further cause for concern about Iran’s involvement in that conflict.

Thirdly, we are concerned by evidence relating to Iranian ballistic missile-related activities. Paragraph 3 of annex B calls on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such technology. The launch of the Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July made use of such technology and, as such, was inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

Finally, we are concerned about reports of multiple violations of the travel ban provisions, including new infringements by Major General Qasem Soleimani. That is particularly disturbing given the public nature of the violation.

Putting all those issues together, it is clear that such activities have a detrimental impact on regional security and undermine Iran’s integration with the international community. We remain committed to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in order to uphold the historic agreement and to working with all parties to make that a reality. But we cannot stand by and allow a Security Council resolution to be ignored and the situation in the region to be further destabilized. We urge Iran to respect all provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and we are prepared to work with Council members to ensure that those responsible are held accountable for any proven violations.

The JCPOA and its implementation through resolution 2231 (2015) are important elements of the international community’s non-proliferation architecture and are essential to supporting regional and global security. We are all responsible for ensuring its success. We must all honour our commitments. Iran is no exception.

Mr. Cardi (Italy): In my national capacity, I would once again like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman and Ambassador Adamson for their briefings on the activities of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I thank all members for the kind words addressed to me and my team after the European mandate and the year of chairing the facilitating mechanism.

Once again, we have before us a very comprehensive report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030). Italy believes that every effort should be made by the relevant parties, and the international community as a whole, to ensure that the JCPOA continues to represent a success story in the global effort to uphold the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. It is crucial to us that the Security Council display unity on such a significant topic, and the accurate and thorough report of the Secretary-General provides a good basis to work towards that important objective. We strongly appreciate the reference in the report to the JCPOA as “a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation
and diplomacy in addressing issues that could have an impact on regional and international peace and security” (S/2017/1030, para. 1). We are convinced that all participants, including the Iranian people, should continue to benefit from the JCPOA. Certainly, we strongly support the Secretary-General’s call on all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full implementation of the agreement.

At the same time, Italy believes in the importance of the full and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in all its aspects. In that respect, we also take good note of the preliminary findings of the Secretary-General, contained in the report, regarding ballistic missile-related issues. We look forward to the outcome of the investigation that has been announced.

The implementation of the JCPOA and of resolution 2231 (2015) has made significant progress to date. We wish to echo the appeal of the Secretary-General to work through differences and challenges in a spirit of cooperation, compromise, good faith and reciprocity. We encourage all stakeholders to promptly resolve issues of concern by exploiting all the relevant mechanisms set out in the JCPOA. The Security Council, of course, plays a key role within its competencies and responsibilities in that respect.

Italy reiterates its full trust in, and support to, the International Atomic Energy Agency in discharging its verification task in relation to the JCPOA, and commends Ms. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for her leadership in coordinating the Joint Commission established by the JCPOA.

Finally, as this is my last national intervention on this issue, let me thank all members of the Security Council for the kind words and cooperation that they and their teams, who worked very professionally within the 2231 format, for the support and the full collaboration that we experienced and that they extended to me and my colleagues during the year. That, I must underscore, allowed for a constructive atmosphere of cooperation to prevail in all our meetings. I and my team are grateful for that.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Japan.

I thank the three briefers for their reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I, too, would like to commend the work of Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi as Facilitator of the 2231 format.

Japan welcomes the fourth report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030), which provides concrete and vital information concerning the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat is responding ably to the Security Council’s request to undertake extensive data collection, analysis and reporting. Members of the Council should continue to support the work of the Secretariat so that it can continue to do its work to a high standard, while maintaining independence, impartiality and expertise.

We agree with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report of the Secretary-General, which, respectively, call on participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on all Member States to support the implementation of the resolution. In that regard, we positively note the recent statement by Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA are being implemented, and underline that Iran is subject to the world’s most robust nuclear verification regime to ensure that that continues. Japan is committed to working closely with the IAEA, the Council and the signatories to the JCPOA to enable the most effective implementation possible of resolution 2231 (2015).

Japan is concerned about some alleged violations of the arms embargo and the travel ban provisions, referred to in more depth in the report of the Secretary-General. Ballistic missile-related transfers or activities are subject to further analysis by the Secretariat, and Japan awaits those results. Nevertheless, we can say that the positive outcome of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) will be shared by the Middle East and the international community as a whole only when they are fully and robustly implemented. Japan strongly calls on all Member States, including Iran, to fully implement resolution 2231 (2015).

Japan has repeatedly underscored the importance of the close coordination between the 2231 format and other subsidiary organs of the Security Council, such as the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), concerning Yemen, and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), concerning Somalia and Eritrea. The most recent report of the Secretary-General calls for a joint meeting of 2140 Committee and the Council in the 2231 format so
that Council members can receive respective findings simultaneously. As Chair of the 2140 Committee, Japan fully supports that idea.

Japan hopes that the incoming Facilitator and the Secretariat will continue outreach activities such as those that Italy has undertaken this year. For non-members of the Council, the information and updates provided by the Facilitator and the Secretariat through outreach meetings are extremely useful. This issue goes beyond the interests of only the signatories to the JCPOA and the Council. It is an issue that all Member States should strive to see fully implemented.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Heusgen (Germany): I greatly appreciate being included in the discussion today, since Germany participated in the P5+1 talks, or, as Germany would say, the E3/EU+3 talks, which led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would also like to commend Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi for his work as Facilitator and to warmly thank Ms. Joanne Adamson for her statement. Germany fully supports the work of the European External Action Service and that of not only Ms. Federica Mogherini but also Secretary General Helga Schmidt, who was instrumental in negotiating the JCPOA and also oversees its implementation. I will be brief on substance. Along with most speakers, I think there are two points to make.

First, the JCPOA continues to hold following the ninth verification round, and, in my opinion, continues to represent a huge success in terms of international diplomacy and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. When the non-proliferation regime is under threat, I believe that strengthening and maintaining the JCPOA is very important, but that has to be done in every aspect. By that I mean that the people of Iran, who have suffered a great deal under the regime and because of sanctions, also have to benefit from the lifting of the sanctions so that they can live in better conditions.

Secondly, of course, we must look at the full picture concerning resolution 2231 (2015). To say the least, Iran’s activities are inconsistent with what that resolution called for. The list is long, and I thank Jeff Feltman very much for his presentation of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2017/1030), which lists a number of areas in which Iran is not in compliance. First and most important, there is the issue of the ballistic missile tests that are being conducted, and the transfer of arms to the Houthis. Given how many times that was mentioned around the table today, I believe that it is very urgent that the Secretary-General continue to work on that and subsequently present all the evidence before the Council so that the recommended actions may be taken.

As I said, we continue to support the JCPOA, but we are not blind. We see the role that Iran is playing. The leaders of Germany, France and Britain have underlined that the regional role of Iran and its ballistic missile programme give rise to serious concerns, as they directly affect European security interests. Any alleged activity involving uranium warrants our utmost attention. We call on Iran to cease all activities that might be inconsistent or violate the terms of resolution 2231 (2015) and to ensure its full compliance with the resolution.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.