Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution 2141 (2014), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).

* Second reissue for technical reasons (20 March 2015).
Annex

Letter dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2141 (2014), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 19 January 2015 and was considered by the Committee on 11 February 2015.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Benoît Camguihem
Expert

(Signed) Katsuhisa Furukawa
Expert

(Signed) Chang Guo
Expert

(Signed) Dmitry Kiku
Expert

(Signed) Youngwan Kim
Expert

(Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert

(Signed) Neil Watts
Expert
Enclosure

Letter dated 19 January 2015 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2141 (2014), the final report on its work.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Benoît Camguilhem
Expert

(Signed) Katsuhisa Furukawa
Expert

(Signed) Chang Guo
Expert

(Signed) Dmitry Kiku
Expert

(Signed) Youngwan Kim
Expert

(Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert

(Signed) Neil Watts
Expert
Summary

During the period under review, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to defy Security Council resolutions by persisting with its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, as demonstrated by the launch of an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles and continued activity at the facilities associated with its nuclear weapons programme. While no reports of new interdictions were submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), the Panel sees no evidence that the country intends to cease prohibited activities and found widespread evidence of resilience and adaptation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s efforts to circumvent the measures imposed by the relevant resolutions.

The Panel has gained insight into techniques of sanctions evasion through its investigation of the network of Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM), designated by the Committee on 28 July 2014. The Company’s network has operated in Asia, Europe, South America and the Middle East. It uses a broad range of techniques, including shell companies, foreign intermediaries and indirect payment methods, to obscure the nature of its business and dissociate financial transactions from logistics. Since its designation, OMM has renamed and reregistered most of its vessels, which continue operations in the region and abroad despite the fact that its economic resources are subject to the assets freeze.

Entities and individuals involved in non-compliance have demonstrated capability to evade sanctions and to conduct prohibited activities through legitimate commercial networks using aliases, agents, offices and complicit companies based in multiple jurisdictions in ways that follow global trading patterns. Items are sourced from Western Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region, while concealing the true nature and identity of suppliers or end users of products or payments. A limited number of trusted individuals appear to serve as the networks’ key nodes.

Diplomats, officials and trade representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to play key roles in facilitating the trade of prohibited items, including arms and related materiel and ballistic missile-related items. In addition to brokering activities, they often serve as shipping companies’ agents or cash carriers.

Given the advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, the Panel is concerned about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ability to procure and transfer items related to these programmes. Cases investigated by the Panel show how foreign-made commercial items have been procured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for use in developing its military systems.
The Panel continues to observe Member States’ lack of implementation of the Security Council resolutions, noting that inaction and low reporting levels may be due to lack of will, technical capacity and/or issues within their domestic legal systems. The resolutions provide Member States with tools to curb the prohibited programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but are effective only when implemented. To take on the challenge of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued violation of the resolutions, it is incumbent on Member States to implement the measures in the resolutions more robustly.

Pursuant to the resolutions, the Panel recommends that the Committee designate additional individuals and entities involved in prohibited activities or the evasion of sanctions. The Panel has also made recommendations to improve the enforcement of the sanctions regime and has proposed updates to the sanctions list under resolution 1718 (2006).
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and are being issued without formal editing.

** A part of the annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

*** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Abbreviations and glossary

FATF  Financial Action Task Force
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IAN  Implementation Assistance Notice (issued by the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) to Member States)
IMO  International Maritime Organization
KCNA  Korea Central News Agency
KOMID  Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation
OMM  Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited

The following words and phrases are used in this report with the following specific meanings:

“The Committee”  The Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006)
“The sanctions”  The measures set out in the resolutions
“The 1718 Sanctions List”  The list established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) with respect to individuals, entities, groups or undertakings
“Interdiction”  The inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo as defined by paragraphs 11 to 14 of resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013) and paragraph 16 of resolution 2094 (2013)
“Designate/Designation”  Action taken by the Security Council or the Committee under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) (as amended by subsequent resolutions, including paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013)) against individuals or entities (assets freeze and/or travel ban)
I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2141 (2014), the Security Council extended the Panel’s mandate to 5 April 2015. This sixth report of the Panel covers the period from 8 February 2014 to 5 February 2015.

2. The report reviews evidence regarding the continued efforts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to develop nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The report further examines the implementation of the resolutions by Member States and the violation of sanctions relating to arms and related materiel and luxury goods. The report draws upon information provided by Member States and the private sector, as well as publicly available material, satellite imagery and vessel tracking systems.

3. The report also tracks the implementation by Member States of the Committee’s decisions, including the designation of certain individuals and entities for assets freeze and travel bans. Within this context, the report devotes considerable attention to the vessels, companies and individuals associated with OMM, which was designated by the Committee on 28 July 2014.

4. Lastly, the Panel submits recommendations to improve implementation of the resolutions. The annexes to the present report provide appropriate supporting evidence and further background to the main report.

II. Background and political context

5. Three years into his rule, Kim Jong-Un continues to consolidate power in Pyongyang. In defiance of Security Council resolutions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to strengthen its nuclear capability alongside a stated intention to grow the economy. This “Byungjin” policy was reaffirmed several times in 2014 and early 2015, including on this policy’s first anniversary, when the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that it was the only way to the final victory “to realize the people’s dream and ideal on the basis of the powerful nuclear deterrent”.1

6. Throughout 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made efforts to escape diplomatic isolation and improve its economic plight by reaching out to new partners in the region and around the world. However, it did not stop its provocations, and the security situation on the Peninsula remains volatile.

7. Indeed, there are no signs that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea intends to abide by the resolutions and stop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. On the contrary, between February and August, it undertook at least 90 test firings of missiles, artillery and rockets.2 At least a dozen of these were ballistic missiles, in defiance of the resolutions. Such activities, together with the renovation of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, demonstrate the high priority that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea places on the continued development of ballistic missile programmes.

---

1 “WPK’s new strategic line is ever-victorious banner”, Rodong Sinmun, 31 March 2014; and Kim Jong Un, “New Year’s address”, 1 January 2015.

2 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claimed that some of them were ultra-precision tactical-guided missiles.
8. Ongoing activities spotted at nuclear facilities suggest that nuclear programmes and activities have not stopped. The Six-Party Talks remain stalled despite some members’ efforts to restart them. Near the end of 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea threatened a fourth nuclear test in the wake of the adoption of a human rights resolution by the Third Committee of the General Assembly, with statements both at the United Nations in New York and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang that the country would “not exercise restraint any longer in conducting a new nuclear test”.

9. The international community remains highly concerned about failed implementation of the resolutions and instability on the Peninsula. The need for determined enforcement of the sanctions remains as clear and important as ever, as are the international community’s efforts to achieve the country’s denuclearization through dialogue, including the Six-Party Talks.

III. The Panel of Experts and its methodology

10. The Panel adheres to its mandate to gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in the resolutions, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and to make recommendations on actions that the Security Council, the Committee or Member States may consider to improve the implementation of the measures imposed by the resolutions.

11. The Panel conducts its work in line with the methodological standards of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). It always strives to maintain high evidentiary standards despite not having the subpoena, forensic capabilities and investigative powers of a judicial body. It relies on three types of information: (a) experts’ first-hand and on-site observations; (b) information supplied by Member States, international organizations, officials, accredited media sources/journalists and private individuals; and (c) information found in the public domain. The Panel keeps in mind the identity and role of sources, consistently seeks corroboration and ensures that information provided on a confidential or restricted basis is handled consistently with the responsibilities of the Panel. Wherever possible, the Panel offers individuals and entities the opportunity to reply during the course of investigations.

12. During the reporting period, from 8 February 2014 to 5 February 2015, the Panel submitted eight incident reports to the Committee. It took account of these cases in the present report, as well as providing information on ongoing investigations. The Panel held consultations with 38 Member States, 15 United Nations bodies and other interested parties. It has also continued to cooperate with other United Nations Sanctions Panels of Experts and Groups.

13. The Panel sent a total of 262 requests for information relating to its investigations to Member States, international organizations, private entities and

---

3 Letter dated 24 November 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (see A/69/616-S/2014/849); and “DPRK delegate categorically rejects ‘draft resolution’ against DPRK”, KCNA, 19 November 2014; and “FM spokesman rejects UN ‘human rights resolution’ against DPRK”, KCNA, 20 November 2014.
individuals (see annex 1). It received a total of 116 responses. The Panel sent 95 reminder letters to Member States relating to their obligations under the resolutions to submit national implementation reports. It has received one response to date.

14. In accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 2087 (2013), several international organizations sought the advice of the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel assisted the Committee in ensuring that these activities would not contribute to prohibited programmes or activities.

IV. Reports by Member States

A. National implementation reports

15. During the reporting period, five Member States submitted national implementation reports in accordance with the resolutions, increasing the total number of Member States reporting under resolution 2094 (2013) to 36. The total number of Member States that have never reported under any resolutions decreased slightly to 94 (see figure I and annex 2). The Panel sent 95 reminder letters to these Member States, emphasizing the importance of submitting national implementation reports and that the Panel stands ready to provide assistance.

Figure I
Overview of reporting by region

16. Eight years following the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006), the Panel continues to observe a consistently high proportion of non-reporting or late-reporting by Member States in some regions. In many cases, the lack of detailed information in the reports impedes the ability of the Panel to examine and analyse information about national implementation and its challenges. The reasons for underreporting vary, but further increase opportunity for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to continue its prohibited activities.
B. Reports of non-compliance and other matters

17. One Member State reported to the Committee that it had stopped an attempted violation. Multiple Member States reported ballistic missile launches between February and August 2014. An international organization engaged with the Committee regarding a project proposal in the DPRK and asked for its views and advice on sanctions-related matters.

18. In addition to reporting on national implementation and incidents of violation, the Security Council has imposed other reporting obligations on Member States under the resolutions, such as reporting on inspections without or prior to an incident of violation. From the Panel’s perspective, such reporting would be very valuable in improving scrutiny of the regime and assisting the Panel’s efforts in examining non-compliance. However, to date, very few reports along these lines have been submitted to either the Committee or the Panel. The Panel welcomed reporting by Mongolia, in its national implementation report, on its prevention of an arms transfer. The Panel recommends that Member States report to the Committee information at their disposal on all measures taken in implementation of the resolutions, including the assets freeze.

V. Continuing violations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its obligation to abandon nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes

19. Despite its obligations under the resolutions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains actively engaged in prohibited programmes, repeatedly declaring its intention to strengthen its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, threatening another nuclear test and undertaking multiple ballistic missile launches.\(^4\)

On 27 March and 17 July 2014, the Security Council condemned these ballistic missile launches as violations of the resolutions and reaffirmed its decision that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.\(^5\)

A. Recent nuclear-related activities

20. The Panel continues to monitor activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. This activity appears to be consistent with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s declarations, including its announcement on 2 April 2013 that it would restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) “DPRK to adjust uses of existing nuclear facilities”, \textit{KCNA}, 2 April 2013.
Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Punggye-ri nuclear test site

21. Commercial satellite imagery shows that the 5 megawatt electric reactor facility was active from September 2013 to mid-2014. The IAEA report of 3 September 2014 also confirmed steam discharge and outflow of cooling water during that time.\(^7\)

22. Further activity was observed at the Yongbyon fuel fabrication plant following the construction of an extension to the building containing the reported centrifuge enrichment facility, including further renovations, construction of a support building and movements of some objects (see annex 3.3), all of which were confirmed by the IAEA report. Despite the activity, it is impossible to determine the operational status of the fuel fabrication plant.

23. Activity was also observed at the reprocessing plant, including steam from a possible cooling tower and the presence of vehicles.\(^8\) Although some analysts have noted possible reprocessing activities at the plant, the purpose of the activity could not be determined by satellite imagery alone.

24. Since the completion of external work on the light water reactor building in 2013, there is nothing to indicate that the reactor is in operation. Only low-level activities, such as movement of material, have been observed near the building (see annex 3.2). The IAEA report also noted the absence of any indications of delivery or installation of major components. Commercial satellite images since October 2010 indicate persistent challenges for the reactor’s water supply system, which was likely repeatedly affected by flooding or other natural causes. More recently, the reactor’s water supply system was likely constructed between December 2013 and April 2014 and damaged by floods in September 2014.

25. At the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, various activities were reported between February and May 2014, including a significant increase in excavation activity at the West portal and increased movements of vehicles and materials in the South portal.\(^9\) Commercial satellite imagery of 16 September 2014 shows a new building structure, spoil pile growth and landscape work near the West portal (see annex 4). Some analysts suggested that these activities could be due to the installation of equipment in the South portal or excavation of a new tunnel in the West portal.

Nuclear programme-related entities and individuals

General Bureau of Atomic Energy

26. The Committee adopted the Panel’s recommendation to update the information of a designated individual, Mr. Ri Je-son, a former Director of the General Bureau

\(^7\) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), document GOV/2014/42-GC(58)/21.


of Atomic Energy (also known as the General Department of Atomic Energy or GDAE). Mr. Ri Je-son was appointed Minister of Atomic Energy Industry by the Supreme People’s Assembly on 9 April 2014. Both Mr. Ri and the General Bureau of Atomic Energy were designated by the Committee in July 2009 for their engagement in or support for nuclear-related programmes.

27. The Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry uses letterhead that is identical to that of the General Department of Atomic Energy, with the same address, phone and fax numbers (see figure II). As noted previously, the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry has undoubtedly taken over the responsibilities of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (see S/2013/337, para. 21). In addition, Mr. Ri is the most senior representative for both entities.

Figure II
Comparison of the letterheads of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry and the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (also known as the General Department of Atomic Energy or GDAE)

Source: The Panel.

28. In the light of this additional information, the Panel no longer sees any reason to distinguish the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy. The Panel therefore updates its previous recommendation to the Committee to designate the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (see S/2013/337, paras. 21-22) by adding the following information about the General Bureau of Atomic Energy to the 1718 sanctions list:

Additional alias (also known as): Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry
Address: Haeun 2-Dong, Phyongchon District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Joint Institute for Nuclear Research

29. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has participated in the activities of an international intergovernmental research organization for nuclear sciences called the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, headquartered in the Russian Federation. The Chief Science Secretary of the Joint Institute informed the Panel that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was one of the countries that founded the Institute in 1956, that it may send specialists to work at the Institute’s laboratories and that its representatives may (and have to) participate in sessions of the Scientific Council. It was also stated that the government representatives should participate in activities of the supreme governing body, the Committee of Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the 18 Member States of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. Accordingly, the Institute’s website lists Mr. Li Je Sen (or Ri Je-Son) as a member of this Committee since 1998; Mr. Kim Son Hyok as a member of the Institute’s Scientific Council and Director of the Department of Science of “the General Administration for Atomic Energy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”; and Mr. Hwan[g] Sok Hwa and Mr. Pak Ben Seb as former Scientific Council members (see annex 5). Mr. Ri Je-sen, the Minister of Atomic Energy Industry, and Mr. Hwang Sok Hwa were designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009.

30. The Chief Science Secretary of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research confirmed that as at 2 January 2015, four nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were affiliated with the Institute, with their terms ending on 30 March 2015. Their information is provided in table 1 below.

Table 1
Participation of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Member of</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>DPRK status/rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Je Sen (Ri Je Son)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Committee of Plenipotentiaries of the Governments</td>
<td>Since 1998</td>
<td>Minister of Atomic Energy Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Son Hyok</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Scientific Council</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Director, Department of Science, the General Administration for Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwan[g] Sok Hwa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Former, Scientific Council</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Director, General Bureau of Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Ben Seb</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Former, Scientific Council</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>–</td>
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10 This fax number is also commonly used by other entities.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Member of</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>DPRK status/rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ryu Pong Sik (Pyong-sik)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Research Scientist, Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions' Scientific and Experimental Physical Department</td>
<td>From April 2012 to 30 March 2015</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rim Yong Chol</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Researcher, Laboratory of Information Technologies</td>
<td>From April 2012 to 30 March 2015</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ri Yong Suk</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Laboratory of Nuclear Problems</td>
<td>Until 30 March 2015</td>
<td>Spouse of Mr. Ryu Pong Sik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Mi Dok</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Laboratory technician, Laboratory of Nuclear Problems</td>
<td>Until 30 March 2015</td>
<td>Spouse of Mr. Rim Yong Chol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Hye-rim</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Senior Laboratory Assistant, Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions' Scientific and Experimental Physical Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Kum Chol</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Research Scientist, Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions' Scientific and Experimental Physical Department</td>
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<td></td>
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*Source: The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research and the Panel.*

31. The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research informed the Panel that representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s embassy in Moscow had participated in the activities of the Scientific Council or the Committee of Plenipotentiaries as observers in recent years, but that there was no participation by designated entities or individuals. The Secretary further stated that “the problem of the growing debt of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the budget of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research became the ground for the recent decision by the Committee of Plenipotentiaries to interrupt the reception of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea specialists at the Institute.”

32. The Russian Federation informed the Panel that no designated entities or individuals were invited to the Russian Federation, that specialized training within the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research was conducted under its “international organizational” status, and that the Institute’s peaceful activities do not fall within the provisions under the resolutions, and therefore no violation of sanctions occurred. The Russian Federation also noted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should not be excluded from fundamental science activities.

33. The Panel recalls that under the resolutions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is obliged to abandon all nuclear programmes ... and immediately cease all related activities. The Panel will continue its investigation.
B. Recent activities related to the ballistic missile programme

Ballistic missile launches

34. In clear violation of the resolutions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched numerous ballistic missiles in 2014. It described them as “rocket-launching drills of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army … according to the regular training plans of fire power units” and reasserted its right to launch rockets. The launches were undertaken without prior notification, constituting a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the region.

35. Given the lack of information on flight trajectories, the Panel had to rely on information provided by Member States to the Committee and open sources. At least 13 ballistic missiles were launched from various locations (see table 2): the Kittaeryong missile test site on the eastern coast was used, but launches were also reported in the north and south Hwanghae provinces, Kaesong and Sukchon areas (see figure III). This military activity peaked on 26 March with the launch of two projectiles identified by several Member States as Nodong (also known as Rodong) medium-range ballistic missiles, for the first time since 2009.

36. The Panel submitted an incident report to the Committee, and the Security Council condemned the 26 March launch. An update of the incident report was submitted to the Committee after the June and July launches, and the Security Council condemned the launches on 17 July 2014.

Figure III
Reported launch locations

Source: The Panel, based on information from Member States and open sources.

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12 Pre-launch notifications should be issued to international organizations responsible for airspace and maritime safety. The Unha-3 launches in April and December 2012 were notified to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

13 The United States of America, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Japan and France provided relevant information to the Committee.
Table 2
Chronology of ballistic missile launches in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estimated launch time (local time) and number of missiles launched</th>
<th>Reported range (km)</th>
<th>Suspected missile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 February</td>
<td>5.42 p.m.-2 to 4</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Scud-B or -C(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Hwasong-5 or-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>6.20 a.m.-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.30 p.m.-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>2.35 a.m.-1</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Nodong (Rodong-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.42 a.m.-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>4.50 a.m.-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.58 a.m.-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July</td>
<td>4.00 a.m.-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.20 a.m.-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>1.20 a.m.-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.30 a.m.-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>9.40 p.m.-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. While the Panel lacks the technical means to verify the information, the photos released through KCNA are consistent with several events described above. The photos of the 29 June launch show a vertically launched missile immediately followed by the pitch motion typical of a ballistic missile launch (see figure IV). Similarly, the photos of the 9 July launch show a ballistic missile transporter erector launcher. An analysis of the length of the erecting arm corroborates the Scud missile launch hypothesis (see figure V).

Figure IV
Launches of 29 June 2014

Source: KCNA.

\(^{14}\) Scud-B and Scud-C are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designations.
Figure V
Launches and transporter erector launcher of 9 July 2014

Note: 1 TEL spotted at 14 August launch; 2 Nodong; 3 Scud A Horizontal centre of cabin front, B Tip of erecting arm.
Source: The Panel.

38. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also claims to have test-fired “newly developed ultra-precision tactical guided missiles”\(^\text{15}\) on at least 26 June and 14 August 2014. The photos released by KCNA for the 14 August launches resemble a KN-02 (see figure VI). However, the reported 220 km range significantly exceeds the known capabilities of this missile.\(^\text{16}\) The Panel will therefore investigate the possibility of it being an enhanced version of the KN-02 or artillery rockets with extended range capability.

Figure VI
Launch of 14 August 2014

Source: KCNA.

\(^{15}\) “Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of newly developed ultra-precision tactical guided missiles”, KCNA, 27 June 2014; and “Kim Jong Un guides tactical rocket test-fire, KCNA, 15 August 2014.

\(^{16}\) The maximum range of the KN-02 is believed to be 120 km or 160 km with reduced payload.
39. The number of ballistic missiles launched in 2014 was unprecedented. The motivation could have included leadership affirmation, test of combat readiness, flight tests, missiles reaching the end of their lifespan or the upgrading of strategic assets. If confirmed, the tests of new, more precise missiles could indicate that the country has reached a new threshold in ballistic missile programme development. These types of launches should be carefully monitored in the future, in particular if they occur at the same pace.

Launched facility activity

40. Although the Democratic People Republic of Korea did not conduct any rocket launches in 2014 from Sohae (Tongchang-ri), it undertook significant enhancement of the main complex dedicated to space launch vehicles, in order to be able to launch larger rockets (see annex 6.1). No particular activity could be detected at the Tonghae (Musudan-ri) launch site. However, after more than a year of intense work, the Sohae launch site appears to be operational again and ready for new rocket launches.

41. Activity observed at the Sohae complex includes the rapid construction of two new domed buildings (see annex 6.2), the larger of which could possibly serve as a control centre or auditorium. Close to these new buildings is a new concrete base structure that is likely a helicopter landing pad.

42. Several tests of the KN-08 engine first stage were also reported. While the Panel could not verify this information, it was able to corroborate that both the assembly building and the engine test pad were active in 2014 (see annex 6.1-6.2). Moreover, the colour changes observed inside the flame trench indicate that engine tests were most probably conducted.

43. The main improvements observed at the Sohae complex are related to the launch pad itself and the gantry tower. The launch area is now accessible by a railroad and a new road bridge providing an additional route (see annex 6.3). The modifications at the gantry tower started at the end of 2013 and continued through mid-2014. The Panel was able to assess that new platforms were added and that the height of the tower was raised to 55 metres (compared with a prior 47 metres). The modified tower will enable the launching of rockets larger than the Unha-3, which is consistent with the reported project of the country to build such a space launch vehicle.

Ballistic missile programmes-related entities and individuals

National Aerospace Development Administration

44. In January 2013, the Security Council designated the Korean Committee for Space Technology for having orchestrated the Unha-3 launches in April and December 2012 through the satellite control centre and the Sohae launch centre. Three months later, the National Aerospace Development Administration was

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18 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exhibited the model of an Unha-9 rocket on 21 December 2012, which was revealed in a party for its scientists and engineers (see “Banquet given for scientists, technicians, workers and officials who succeeded in satellite lift-off”, KCNA, 21 December 2012).
established as the “country’s central guidance institution organizing all the space development projects”, based on the decision of the Seventh Meeting of the Twelfth Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the April 2013 Law on Space Development (see annex 7.1). Several of the country’s official 2014 publications demonstrate that the National Aerospace Development Administration has taken over the functions and responsibility of the Korean Committee for Space Technology as well as a key national command centre previously controlled by it.

45. The country’s Law on Space Development specifies that the National Aerospace Development Administration “organizes a unified guidance on space development, represents the State in the field of space development, draws up the country’s general space development and activity programme, and supervises and controls the implementation while cooperating and exchanging with international organizations of other countries”. The National Aerospace Development Administration is also tasked to “notify the launch of objects into space” and is responsible for safety, which was the former responsibility of the Korean Committee for Space Technology.

46. The National Aerospace Development Administration has taken over the control of a key facility from the Korean Committee for Space Technology: the General Satellite Control and Command Centre (see annex 7.2). Mr. Yun Changhyok, who is listed as the Command Centre’s Vice-Director, stated that it will “launch more and more communication and application satellites” in order to make the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea into a space power that the world looks up to.”

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21 On 10 April 2012, the space control Center’s Vice-Director stated, “We chose safe trajectory so that the carrier rocket debris to be caused after its launch do not affect neighbouring countries and regions. We also informed international organizations and surrounding regions of falling points in line with international regulations and practices.” See “Round-table talks between KCST [Korean Committee for Space Technology] officials and foreign space experts and reports”, KCNA, 10 April 2012.

22 In Korean: 위성관제종합지휘소.

23 “The interview that could never be finished (interview with Yun Changhyok, Vice-Chief of the General Satellite Control and Command Center of the NADA)”, Ku’msu Kangsan, 3 September 2014.

24 “Powerful guarantee of space technology development for the wealth and prosperity of the nation”, Korean Central Television, 5 April 2014.
47. The central role of the National Aerospace Development Administration was also highlighted in a seminar held on 10 December 2014 at Kim Il Sung University, which was aimed at accelerating progress on space science and technology. Mr. Jong Tong Gil, Deputy Department Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration, stated that the objective of the seminar was the development of space science and technology, including “the technology of manufacturing and launching satellites and carrier rockets”. The institution also commemorated the 12 December 2012 launch of the Unha-3 rocket, which the Security Council determined as having used ballistic missile technology and violated the resolutions.

48. The Security Council demanded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology and comply with resolutions ... by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme. The National Aerospace Development Administration has taken over the function and responsibilities of the Korean Committee for Space Technology, which defies the resolutions. It has also taken over the country’s General Satellite Control and Command Centre. Lastly, the institution has publicly announced its intention to conduct future rocket launches. In the light of this information, the Panel recommends that the Committee update the 1718 (2006) Sanctions List by adding the following information for the Korean Committee for Space Technology:

Alias (also known as): National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA)

Other information: Mr. Hyon Kwangil, Meritorious Scientist, Department Director, National Aerospace Development Administration; Mr. Jong Tong Gil, Deputy Department Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration; Mr. Kim In Cheol, Deputy Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration; and Mr. Yun Changhyok, Vice-Director, General

25 “DPRK strives to develop space science and technology”, KCNA, 11 December 2014.
Satellite Control and Command Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration (see annex 7.3-4).

Second Academy of Natural Sciences

49. On 7 April 2014, a spokesperson for the Academy of the National Defence Science of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it would contribute to the further development of ballistic and nuclear programmes.26 The name of this Academy in the Korean language is identical to the identified alias of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (국방과학원), leading the Panel to conclude that this name is another alias of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences. This is an indication that the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, a designated entity, is likely to continue to play a key role in prohibited programmes.

50. Mr. Choe Chun-Sik, the Director of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, played a prominent role in the launch of the Unha-3 rocket in December 2012, after which he received the title of “Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”. Information obtained by the Panel suggests that Mr. Choe continues to play a key role in ballistic missiles and related programmes. He was seen briefing Kim Jong-Un during the inauguration of a new housing complex, the “Unha Scientists’ Street” on 9 September 2013.27

Strategic Rocket Forces of the Korean’s People’s Army

51. The ballistic missile launches of 2014 were conducted by “units of the Strategic Forces of the Korean’s People’s Army”,28 which was reaffirmed by Ambassador Ri Tong Il in his press conferences at United Nations Headquarters on 24 March and 4 April 2014.29 The “Strategic Forces” have been frequently referred to in official statements of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since the unveiling of the Strategic Rocket Force Command in March 2012.30 This new entity appears to be in charge of all short-, medium- and intermediate-range missile units and hence is a key component of the country’s ballistic missile capabilities.

52. In early 2012, Mr. Kim Rak Gyom was appointed as head of the Strategic Rocket Force. He was the only Lieutenant General to be elected to the party’s Central Military Commission.31 On 29 March 2013, he was one of only four senior officers to participate in the operational meeting during which Kim Jong-Un was briefed “on the technical conditions of the strategic means of the [Korean People’s Army] KPA” and personally ratified the plan of the “Strategic Rocket Force firepower strike”.32 His ascent within the ranks and the importance of the Strategic

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27 “Kim Jong Un goes around newly built Unha Scientists Street”, Rodong Sinmun, 9 September 2013.
28 “Purpose of S. Korea’s delayed opening to public of missile test-fire laid bare”, KCNA, 5 April 2014.
31 “Members of WPK central guidance body elected to fill vacancies, elected and appointed”, KCNA, 11 April 2012.
Rocket Force within the Korean People’s Army were highlighted when he was promoted to the rank of Colonel General on 16 February 2014.33 His importance can be seen from the fact that he greeted Kim Jong-Un on the site of the 29 June 2014 ballistic missile launch.34

Table 3

Entities and individuals identified as playing a key role in the ballistic programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Entity or individual</th>
<th>Korean name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>National Aerospace Development Administration</td>
<td>국가우주개발국</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Academy of the National Defence Science</td>
<td>국방과학원</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Strategic Rocket Force Command</td>
<td>조선인민군전략로케트사령부</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Kim Rak Gyom</td>
<td>김락겸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Choe Chun-Sik</td>
<td>최춘식</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. Export- and import-related measures

A. Implementation of the embargo on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related items

53. While no new instances of seizure or inspection of prohibited items relating to nuclear or missile programmes were reported by Member States, the Panel’s investigations show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to attempt to procure or transfer items relating to its nuclear and missile programmes. In addition to continuing work on the Unha-3 debris case, the Panel opened an investigation into the unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage found in the Republic of Korea in 2014. These cases demonstrate how foreign-made commercial items have been procured for use in developing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military systems.

Nuclear-related items seized by Japan

54. The Panel continued its investigation of an incident reported by Japan regarding the seizure of five aluminium alloy rods on board a container vessel in August 2012.35 The Panel found that a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity using the label “KUMSOK” likely manufactured the seized items. The Panel has identified that “KUMSOK” has been used by the following entities:

33 “Kim Jong Un confers military ranks on KPA commanding officers”, KCNA, 16 February 2014.
35 See S/2013/337, para. 66; and S/2014/147, paras. 48-50.
• Korea Ferrous Metals Export and Import Corporation engages in trading of various types of steels and plates and has used a cable address of “KUMSOK”.  

• Korea Kumsok Trading Corporation was previously listed in an official publication as trading ferromanganese, silicon plate, gold concentrate and other commodities (see figure VIII).

Figure VIII
Korea Kumsok Trading


55. The two second-hand shipping containers used in the shipment were acquired on 25 February 2012 by the Korean Arirang Trading Corporation of the General Bureau of Horticulture for a greenhouse construction project with a foreign company.

56. The shipment’s consignee was a Myanmar-based entity, Soe Min Htike Company, Ltd (see annex 8), designated by the United States Department of the Treasury on 17 December 2013 as one of the three Myanmar-based entities involved in arms trade with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see S/2014/147, para. 91). According to the United States of America, this entity is a procurement agent for Myanmar’s Directorate of Defence Industries and has specialized in importing foreign supplies and equipment for the Directorate of Defence Industries for over three decades. The Panel sent a letter to Myanmar requesting information but has not received a reply.

57. The Panel notes technical complexities encountered by Member States relating to the inspection of nuclear-related items. The lists of nuclear-related items prohibited by the resolutions (see IAEA information circulars INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part2) provide prohibited parameters of certain items but no information on methodology or best practice in the inspection or analysis of these items. It appears that such information is not widely understood by or shared.

36 Address: Pothonggang-dong No. 2, Pothong-gang, District, Pyongyang; Tel: +850-2-18111, ext. 381-8078; and Fax: +850-2-381-4569, 4633.

between Member States. Without the requisite capabilities, Member States will continue to have difficulties in identifying items prohibited by the resolutions. The Panel recommends that Member States consult with technical experts prior to formal incident or inspection reports when suspect items are discovered.

**Unha-3 foreign-sourced components**

58. The Panel continued its investigation into the procurement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the foreign-sourced components found among the debris of the Unha-3 rocket. The United States explained to the Panel the licencing process of its Export Administration Regulations with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, stating that no additional information was available on the cases under investigation. Switzerland could not trace the supply chain given that the items (DC/DC converters) were produced in mass quantities and easily available online.

59. Information was received from an intermediary company regarding the pressure transmitters (see figure IX), Royal Team Corporation (RTC), registered in Taiwan Province of China. It acquired the pressure transmitters and sold them in 2006 and 2010 to a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company, Korea Chonbok Trading Corporation. The second sale was purportedly for its oil industry and took place when the Royal Team Corporation attended a trade show in Pyongyang. While there are several platforms used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, this supply chain illustrates again how entities based in Taiwan Province of China can be used by the country to acquire goods for its prohibited programmes that it cannot produce domestically. It also demonstrates how trade shows are used to this end.

60. **In accordance with Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN) No. 4, Member States should exercise enhanced diligence with regard to export to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the following commercial items given their use in the ballistic missile programme: pressure switches, pressure transmitters, temperature transmitters and radial ball bearings.**

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38 See S/2013/337, para. 33; and S/2014/147, paras. 55-59.
39 This company was already known to the Panel (see S/2013/337, para. 60).
Unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage

61. The wreckage of three unmanned aerial vehicles was found on the territory of the Republic of Korea in October 2013 and March 2014. The Ministry of National Defence concluded that the drones were from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and engaged in reconnaissance activities over military facilities on Republic of Korea territory. The Republic of Korea notified the Panel that the supply, sale or transfer of these unmanned aerial vehicles and of their components could constitute a violation of paragraph 10 of resolution 1874 (2009) prohibiting the supply, sale, or transfer of all arms related materiel.

62. The unmanned aerial vehicles are of two types: a straight wing with V-tail and a delta wing. The former was found in Baengnyeongdo Island in the Yellow Sea (see figure X) and the latter in the cities of Samcheok and Paju south of the demilitarized zone (see figure XI). The remains of a fourth unmanned aerial vehicle were retrieved in September 2014 from a fishing net 6 kilometres west of Baengnyeongdo Island. This unmanned aerial vehicle appears to be similar to those found in Samcheok and Paju. The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea assessed that all three unmanned aerial vehicles were manufactured and operated over the same period.

63. This is the Panel’s first investigation into a case involving unmanned aerial vehicles, illustrating their potential new role in possible sanctions violations and the corresponding necessity for export control to take them into account along with their associated technologies.
Figure X
Unmanned aerial vehicle found at Baengnyeongdo Island

Source: South Korea Defence Ministry via Getty Images.

Figure XI
Unmanned aerial vehicle found at Paju

Source: AFP photo/South Korean Defence Ministry.
64. The drones exhibited foreign markings and contained components sourced from at least six foreign countries. Following engagement with a Member State to identify the components and their origin, the Panel was provided with a list of the items and their respective countries of manufacture (see tables 4 and 5).

65. The Panel has contacted manufacturers to determine how the components were procured. This case is similar to the Unha-3 debris case, and provides useful information on networks of acquisition of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel has yet to determine whether the unmanned aerial vehicles themselves were acquired abroad or custom-made in the country. The latter case would show that the country continues to seek off-the-shelf foreign-sourced components to integrate them into their systems or subsystems for military use.

66. Canadian export control authorities informed the Panel that the autopilot recovered inside the unmanned aerial vehicle near Baengnyeongdo Island (see figure XII) was subject to their controls. The manufacturer of the autopilot provided the Panel with an end-use statement pointing to a Chinese company, or a copy. The manufacturer also informed the Panel that the autopilot has a range of less than 300 km, which would not meet the criteria for prohibited ballistic missile-related items.

Figure XII
Autopilot from the unmanned aerial vehicle found at Baengnyeongdo Island

Source: The Panel.

67. The Panel will seek to acquire the characteristics of the gyro to determine if it was on the list of ballistic missile-related items. All of the other items appear to be of commercial origin.

68. Investigation into the capabilities and origin of the unmanned aerial vehicles continues. The resolutions prohibit the supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic

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40 See S/2013/337, para. 33; and S/2014/147, paras. 55-63; and paras. 58-60 of the present report.
41 The list of prohibited ballistic missile-related items (S/2014/253) includes autopilots designed or modified for use in unmanned aerial vehicles (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones), capable of delivering at least 500 kg of payload to a range of at least 300 km, and capable of achieving a system accuracy of 3.33 per cent or less of the range.
People’s Republic of Korea of complete unmanned aerial vehicles, including reconnaissance drones, capable of a range equal to or greater than 300 km. While the range of the Baengnyeongdo Island unmanned aerial vehicle is less than 300 km owing to the autopilot limitation, the range of the Paju/Samcheok unmanned aerial vehicle has not yet been determined.

Table 4

Foreign-sourced items found inside the unmanned aerial vehicle at Baengnyeongdo Island

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of item</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Country of manufacture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Engine</td>
<td>Flight Power</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Flight Control Computer</td>
<td>Automatic Control Board</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Input/Output Board</td>
<td>Global Positioning System receiver</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Radio Control receiver</td>
<td>Radio Control receiver</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Servo Motor and Actuator</td>
<td>Aircraft wing frame control</td>
<td>Republic of Korea or China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Global Positioning System antennas</td>
<td>Global Positioning System signal antenna</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Mission Computer</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit Board</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Input/Output Board</td>
<td>Global Positioning System receiver</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>Takes pictures</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Power supply</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

Foreign-sourced items found inside the unmanned aerial vehicle at Paju/Samcheok

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of item</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Country of manufacture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Engine and Muffler</td>
<td>Flight Power</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fuel Pump</td>
<td>Fuel supply to the engine</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Flight Control Computer Central Processing Unit Board</td>
<td>Automatic Flight Control Command</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name of item</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Country of manufacture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Gyro Board</td>
<td>Monitoring the change of flight angle</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Global Positioning System Receiver</td>
<td>Geographic location</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Servo Motor</td>
<td>Aircraft wing frame control</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Transceiver</td>
<td>Flight command and telemetry sender/receiver</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>Still photography</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Power supply</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acquisition of computer numerically controlled machine tools and technology

69. Hsien Tai Tsai (also known as Alex Tsai) and his son, Yueh-Hsun Tsai (also known as Gary Tsai), were indicted on 6 June 2013 by the United States for allegedly conspiring to violate United States laws against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Alex Tsai had been designated in 2009 by the United States Department of the Treasury for providing support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s primary arms dealer, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), designated by the Security Council in April 2009. The investigation revealed that Alex and Gary Tsai were associated with at least three companies based in Taiwan Province of China that purchased and exported from the United States machinery to process metals and other materials with a high degree of precision.

70. On 10 October 2014, Alex Tsai pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States in its enforcement of regulations targeting proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. He admitted that he engaged in illegal business transactions involving the export of United States goods and machinery. Under the terms of his plea agreement, the sentence could be reduced to approximately 30 months in prison, provided he continues to fully cooperate.

B. Implementation of the arms embargo

71. Lack of awareness and understanding of the resolutions by Member States has allowed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to exploit long-standing past relationships with African countries for arms-related services and training. The Panel also investigated two cases involving non-State actors’ ammunition and possibly a manufacturer in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

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42 See S/2014/147, paras. 60-63.
44 The three companies are: Global Interface Co. Inc., Trans Merits Co. Ltd. and Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd.
45 United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “Taiwanese businessman pleads guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. laws preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, 10 October 2014.
72. The resolutions do not prohibit military-to-military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However, such cooperation should be carefully scrutinized to avoid any possible violation of the resolutions, in particular the prohibitions on the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, as well as technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such items.

**Arms and related materiel and technical assistance provided to the Republic of the Congo**

73. In investigating the *Westerhever* incident, the Panel travelled to South Africa in 2014 to inspect seized military equipment and submitted a final incident report. 46

74. This case illustrates how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enjoys a favourable market position in the refurbishment of obsolete Soviet equipment owing to competitive prices, the absence of service competitors and lack of understanding and/or implementation of the relevant resolutions by Member States.

75. The shipment seized by South African authorities in the port of Durban was the fourth and final shipment to be delivered. The Panel found some evidence of a fifth consignment, but was not able to confirm this with Congolese authorities or through other means (table 6 contains a list of shipments).

Figure XIII

*Westerhever* in the port of Durban and the two containers seized by South African authorities

![Image](image_url)

*Source:* South African authorities.

**Table 6**

**Entities involved in the four shipments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leg</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Air shipment (mid-2008)</th>
<th>1st maritime shipment (mid-2008)</th>
<th>2nd maritime shipment (mid-2008)</th>
<th>3rd maritime shipment (late 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Consignor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shipper</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Machinery Export &amp; Import Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(declared)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Korea Solsong Shipping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 See [S/2013/337](#), paras. 96-100 and annex XVII, sects. A-F; and [S/2012/422](#), para. 71.
Leg | Actor | Air shipment (mid-2008) | 1st maritime shipment (mid-2008) | 2nd maritime shipment (mid-2008) | 3rd maritime shipment (late 2009)
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
½ | Freight forwarder | Most likely Seajet Company | N/A | Most likely OTIM and COMPLANT | OTIM and COMPLANT (Dalian)
2 | Shipper (declared) | Seajet Company | Guangzhou Surnine Shipping | COMPLANT (Dalian) | Machinery Export & Import Corporation
2 | Carrier | Ethiopian Airlines | CMA-CGM | CMA-CGM | CMA-CGM
2 | Consignee (declared) | Direction générale de l’équipement (DGE) | }

76. During the Panel’s inspection of the seized shipment in South Africa, labelled as “spare parts of bulldozer”, it found that the bulk of the delivery destined for the Republic of the Congo consisted of arms and related materiel. The majority of items were refurbished or second-hand, including cannibalized spare parts.

Figure XIV

Example of the items inspected, including second-hand spares (lower left) and poor-quality Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-manufactured tracks (lower right)

Source: The Panel.

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47 According to Congolese authorities, the Direction générale de l’équipement (DGE) was listed as the consignee of all shipments in order to simplify customs procedures in Pointe-Noire harbour and Brazzaville airport and to alleviate fees.

48 The shipment included military-specific items or items with possible military end use such as tank tracks, periscopes, Geiger counters, tank crew helmets, bulk quantities of camouflage painted plates, external oil and fuel tanks, etc. Most of the items were made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

49 Some of the odometers showed that trucks had been driven for 10,000 km.
77. In its analysis, the Panel identified several correlations with previously interdicted shipment of items that constituted violations of the resolutions, in particular relating to military-to-military cooperation, the involvement of embassies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the provision of arms-related services and technical assistance, and techniques to ensure the secrecy of foreign operations.

78. This investigation also presents similarities with the Chong Chon Gang case.\(^{50}\) The agreements that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had with both Cuba and the Republic of the Congo were military-to-military in nature, involved technical assistance and benefited from support from the respective in-country embassies and diplomats. The agreement with the Republic of the Congo was signed by a representative of the Military Cooperation Department, Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Activities such as receiving payments and customs clearance were taken care of by diplomats based both in the country and in Asia, where the consignment was trans-shipped.

79. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea requested that the Republic of the Congo provide lodging for all personnel inside military facilities or compounds to “ensure secrecy and appropriate working conditions” (see annex 9). The two refurbishment teams seldom left the barracks and never went further than a nearby market. They were also self-sufficient in terms of food and medical care with embedded cooks, doctors and interpreters and virtually all food and supplies coming from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.\(^{51}\) From June 2008 to April 2010, the death of one member resulted in the only change in team composition. Preventing personnel rotations over such a long period reduced expenses and enhanced secrecy.

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\(^{50}\) See S/2014/147, paras. 69-89 and 124.

\(^{51}\) Under the terms of the agreement, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was to provide all necessary food and other daily supplies. Congolese authorities confirmed that all appliances and supplies found inside the team’s living quarters had been foreign-sourced. In addition, the number of rice bags inside the containers on-board the Westerhever and cardboard boxes observed in Brazzaville suggest that most of the team’s food was shipped from abroad. This further contributed to limiting external contact of personnel in order to ensure secrecy.
80. Commercial equipment for the refurbishment delivered to Brazzaville included machine tools and other heavy equipment, hand tools, spares and other miscellaneous items. The Panel confirmed that the machine tools and the heavy equipment examined in Brazzaville were manufactured outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is therefore likely that they were shipped directly from Huangpu, China to the Republic of the Congo.

Submarine parts seized early in 2011

81. The Panel continued to investigate the February 2011 inspection of an air shipment of submarine parts brokered by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity, Green Pine Associated Corporation.52 A European Member State confirmed the delivery of spare parts for Yugo class submarines that were procured in the United States market, for a military-related company based in South-East Asia. The shipment also involved an individual and a company in Europe that were formerly involved in violations of European luxury goods bans. The consignment consisted of outstanding items from the South-East Asian company’s contract with Green Pine, which was liquidated in December 2010 in compliance with resolution 1874 (2009).

82. The European Member State also informed the Panel of a May 2011 delivery of ship parts to a military-related company in Africa involving Green Pine and the

52 See S/2013/337, para. 82; and S/2014/147, para. 114.
same European individual and entity. The Panel requested information from an African Member State about this reported shipment.

83. These incidents took place before Green Pine’s May 2012 designation by the Committee. The Panel nevertheless notes that brokering by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of arms transactions is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), as noted by paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 (2013). **Member States should be aware of these provisions and review any transactions of arms and related materiel brokered by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.**

**Attempted sales of MiG-21 fighter jets and components terminated by Mongolia**

84. In May 2014, Mongolia stated in its national implementation report that it had terminated an attempted sale to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of MiG-21 fighter jets, their engines and other parts in 2009. The Panel visited Mongolia for consultations and to inspect the items.

85. In early 2009, a Mongolia-based company signed a contract with a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity to sell 32 decommissioned MiG-21 PFM fighter jets as spare parts. Given that the sale would violate the 1979 Agreement between Mongolia and the former Soviet Union and resolution 1718 (2006), the Mongolian Ministry of Defence decided against transferring the jets to the Mongolia-based company for onward sale. Consequently, the jets were disassembled. Despite the decision by the Ministry of Defence, the individuals involved forged documents and declared a Russian company as the recipient. The Mongolian authorities detected and stopped these attempts. In 2012, the Independent Agency against Corruption of Mongolia investigated the case. Three individuals were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 3.5 to 7.1 years. According to Mongolia, these individuals acted in their personal capacities. During its on-site inspection, the Panel confirmed that the following items were kept in the storage facility: complete MiG-21 PFM fighter jet and 31 engines, as well as a large amount of other parts (see figure XVI).

**Figure XVI**

*Dismantled jet engines, other parts and one complete MiG-21 fighter jet observed by the Panel*

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54 The 1979 agreement is still in effect between Mongolia and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, Mongolia is prohibited from transferring military equipment or hardware to any third country without obtaining approval from the Russian Federation.

55 One complete MiG-21 PFM fighter jet was on display in front of the storage facility.
86. Had the Government of Mongolia not intercepted the attempted sale of MiG-21 fighter jets and their components to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it would have violated the arms embargo. It also acted in accordance with the resolutions to prevent the return of the funds to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see para. 204 below).

87. Since there are items that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unable to produce domestically, necessitating procurement from abroad, Member States should exercise vigilance in their export control of obsolete or decommissioned weapons and their parts.

**Possible supply of arms-related materiel to Ethiopia**

88. The Panel continued to investigate a possible connection between an Ethiopian entity (Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry) and a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity (Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation) that may have been in violation of the arms embargo. Ethiopian authorities informed the Panel that a “Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation” has been removed from the list of suppliers on the Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry website. The Panel awaits further information from Ethiopia.

**Possible arms-related cooperation with Eritrea**

89. The Panel reopened its investigation of alleged arms-related cooperation between Green Pine Associated Corporation and the Eritrean Department of Governmental Garages in the light of information published by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2013. The Eritrean authorities informed the Panel that they had not engaged directly or indirectly, with any country, entity or individual in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1907 (2009).

**Police cooperation with Uganda**

90. The Panel investigated police cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Uganda. On 19 December 2014, Uganda replied to the Panel’s follow-up inquiry with details of the cooperation, stating that the “Field Force Unit Training” carried out by Democratic People’s Republic of Korean instructors at the police training schools at Kabalye, Masindi and Butiaba, Wantembo (both former military bases) included training on the use of AK-47s and pistols. The training for the Marine Police Unit included sharp shooting (see annex 10).

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57 Ibid., paras. 94-97.
58 Ibid., paras. 102-103.
91. The Panel is of the view that this type of training is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009) prohibiting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from exporting technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of all arms or materiel. As the training at Butiaba, Wantembo is still ongoing, the Panel shared its view with Uganda and is awaiting a response.

Ammunition abandoned by Mouvement du 23 mars

92. At the invitation of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) conducted a technical assessment of the arms and ammunition abandoned by Mouvement du 23 mars after it retreated from positions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in October and November 2013. The assessment concluded that some of the ammunition originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea might have been part of the shipment from that country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in early 2009. The Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided photographs to the Panel.

93. The Panel identified 107-mm and 122-mm rockets and fuses that were most probably manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. All the ammunition shares similar features with the country’s manufactured equivalents known to the Panel, including the paint coating, markings, lot numbers, model names, quality control stamps and asterisk stamps on the fuses. The lot numbers “XX-08-XX” were assigned to the 107-mm rockets and fuses, suggesting a 2008 production year, which is also consistent with the date on the tags of the rocket crates. The lot numbers “1-97” assigned to the 122-mm rockets indicate that they were manufactured either in 1997 or 2008.\(^{59}\)

\(^{59}\) According to the Juche calendar, the year would be 2008.
Arms and related materiel intercepted onboard the *Jeehan 1*

94. Yemeni authorities intercepted a shipment of arms and related materiel that originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran onboard the vessel *Jeehan 1*. Information obtained by the Panel indicates that some of the ammunition in the shipment has markings similar to those manufactured by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel has sent a letter to the Government of Yemen to corroborate the information.

International arms fair attendance

95. The Panel investigated a media report concerning participation by a delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in an August 2014 arms fair in the Russian Federation. According to common practice, Russian authorities issued entry passes for the event for nine members of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Embassy in Moscow, but they did not participate in the exhibition, demonstration and business parts of the event. According to the Russian Federation, no information suggests that the diplomats concluded any deal. The Panel has found no evidence of violation of the resolutions.

C. Implementation of the luxury goods ban

96. The luxury goods cases that the Panel examined demonstrate that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea managed to procure luxury items from multiple countries, including by making use of its diplomatic missions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea also exploited the different definitions ascribed to the term “luxury goods” by various Member States (see annex 11). The cases also showed that luxury goods acquired by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea generally travelled through multiple countries first with the manufacturers/companies having no idea about their final destination.

**Limousines observed during the military parades held in Pyongyang in 2012 and 2013-2014**

97. On 15 April 2012, two Mercedes-Benz limousine conversions were displayed during a military parade in Pyongyang, which could constitute a violation of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006). Information available indicates that these two vehicles are modified versions of the S-Class and were previously registered and armoured by a North American company before a series of international transfers that ultimately led to their end use in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

98. With regard to the other two Mercedes-Benz limousine conversions that were displayed in Pyongyang parades in 2013 and 2014, body characteristics suggest that these vehicles are not Pullman versions of the S-class vehicles but were modified by a third party.

Figure XIX
Panel’s analysis of the body features of the limousine conversions observed in 2012 and 2013-2014 and Pullman version of the Mercedes-Benz S-Class

Source: http://www.wallpaperup.com and the Panel.
Masikryong ski resort

99. With regard to the transfer of ski equipment used in the Masikryong ski resort, China informed the Panel that a Chinese company provided ski lift equipment and relevant design services. China stated that it “is of the view that skiing is a popular sport for people, and ski equipment or relevant services are not included in the list of prohibited luxury goods specified in Security Council resolution 2094 (2013)”. Canada stated that the export of the snowmobiles to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a violation of its export regulations. Two European Union member States informed the Panel that they considered the Pisten Bully 100 and Prinoth snow groomers with a cabin as “luxury goods” under European Union Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007.

100. The Panel was informed that some producers of the special automotive equipment (namely, snowmobiles and snow groomers) had contact with multiple individuals at the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Geneva, including the Permanent Representative. The company assumed that the transactions were legitimate because Switzerland had accredited these diplomats.

101. Some Member States have included ski equipment and special automotive equipment under their definition of “luxury goods” while others have not incorporated them. This creates a situation of uneven practice by Member States.

Figure XX
Brochure from the Masikryong ski resort displaying foreign-manufactured snow equipment


Luxury yachts

102. The yacht seen alongside the country’s leader and officers in 2013 was confirmed to be a Princess 95MY manufactured by Princess Yachts International Plc, in Plymouth, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in service as early as 2011. This particular model was in production between 2007 and 2011. Out of a total of 21 sold worldwide, the Panel traced 19. The estimated value

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60 See S/2014/147, paras. 118-119.
61 “Exclusive: fit for a princess — Kim Jong Un’s $7m yacht”, NK News, 18 June 2013 (see S/2014/147, para. 120).
is between $4 to 6 million. In the absence of requested information from Princess Yachts, the Panel could not advance its investigation.\textsuperscript{62}

Figure XXI
\textbf{Luxury yacht in background identified as a Princess Yacht 95MY}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Luxury yacht in background identified as a Princess Yacht 95MY}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: NK News.}

\textbf{Gifts given by Dennis Rodman and Paddy Power\textsuperscript{63}}

103. Despite the lack of information from Dennis Rodman, the Panel was able to confirm some of the gifts he presented.\textsuperscript{64} The Irish company, Paddy Power, which accompanied Mr. Rodman on the December 2013 trip, valued the gifts at around $3,000.\textsuperscript{65} The United States informed the Panel that appropriate measures were taken in response. In addition, it said that it lacked sufficient information at that time to determine whether there was a violation of the luxury goods embargo but that some of the items were “likely to be considered luxury goods per the list of ‘Examples of Luxury Goods’ set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations of the United States Department of Commerce (15 CFR part 746, Supplement No. 1 (2013)).” Ireland informed the Panel that the total value of the goods was low and that it constituted a “once-off” arrangement and could not be considered commercial trade. Paddy Power explained that it was unaware that its activities could violate sanctions. Ireland decided not to pursue the case.

104. The Security Council’s luxury goods ban does not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial transfers. None of the parties involved intended to evade or violate the luxury goods ban. This case illustrates the potential risk of travellers inadvertently violating the luxury goods embargo should they take gifts or other items into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

\textsuperscript{62} As these yachts are not required to be registered with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or be fitted with an Automatic Identification System, the cooperation of the manufacturer is essential.

\textsuperscript{63} See S/2014/147, para. 121.

\textsuperscript{64} The Panel observed that bottles of wine, basketballs and jerseys were presented by Dennis Rodman.

\textsuperscript{65} Paddy Power’s gifts include a bottle of Jameson whiskey, a decanter and glass set, baby clothing and a Mulberry handbag.
VII. Interdiction

105. The Panel continued to monitor the air and maritime fleets of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Despite the ongoing acquisitions of vessels and aircraft, there has been an overall decline in both maritime and air fleets since 2008.

106. The Panel also examined patterns in renaming, reregistering, reflagging and provision of insurance to vessels owned by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In relation to paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013), the Panel notes a significant increase in the number of vessels renamed and reregistered in 2014, including all but one of the vessels operated by the designated entity OMM. In addition, the Panel also continues to monitor ownership and/or control of foreign flagged vessels.

A. Maritime fleet

Fleet renewal

107. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged fleet currently consists of 118 general cargo vessels (23 with container capacity), three fully cellular container vessels, one reefer and three bulk carriers. While the fleet continues to age and reduce in overall numbers, it has consistently been supplemented by second-hand vessels since 2008 (see figure XXII), the majority of which are relatively small general cargo vessels (1,500 to 3,000 gross tonnage versus vessels of 5,400 to 17,000 gross tonnage scrapped).

Figure XXII
Trends for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged fleet: vessels acquired, lost and scrapped since 2008

108. The trend towards acquisition of smaller vessels is consistent with increased regional activity. Between 2009 and 2014, voyages in the region alone increased by 79 per cent. At the same time, there has been a marked decrease in port calls outside the region, falling to just 6 per cent of 2008 figures. Given the regional economic
growth over the period\textsuperscript{66} and recent investments in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ports and related rail infrastructure, there may have been a strategic shift to the use of its own flag for regional trade\textsuperscript{67} while increasingly relying on foreign-flagged vessels for international trade (see table 7 for examples of vessels that may be using foreign flags).

109. In addition to a significant increase in vessel renaming activity in 2014, since the designation of OMM, the Panel also notes that the number of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessels registered under foreign flags is increasing.\textsuperscript{68} Flagging out to foreign ship registries provides Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operators with several advantages. Foreign-flagged vessels are able to access ports and routes that are problematic for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged ships.\textsuperscript{69} The practice can also mitigate the risk of inspection under the resolutions and risk-based scrutiny (and associated high-risk tagging)\textsuperscript{70} and frustrate due diligence by delinking association to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The move to “single shipowner” companies and renaming serves to obfuscate actual beneficial ownership as well as financial transactions that are restricted under the sanctions regime. None of the name changes or reflagging of vessels have been communicated to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013). Also, none of the vessels have been reported as being involved in prohibited activities. The Panel continues to look into the reflagging to determine if former control is retained and/or whether changes were undertaken to evade sanctions.

Table 7
Use of flags of convenience in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Vessel name</th>
<th>IMO No.</th>
<th>Vessel type</th>
<th>Date since</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Grand Union</td>
<td>8651221</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Grand Faith</td>
<td>8749262</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Dong Kun 6</td>
<td>8649993</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Chun Yang 7</td>
<td>8652756</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Grand Lady</td>
<td>8654479</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 January 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{67} Offloading a container in a regional hub with large-scale trans-shipment volumes makes determining the origin of a container more difficult.

\textsuperscript{68} See S/2014/147, paras. 128-138.

\textsuperscript{69} Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, White Paper on Korean Unification 2010, pp. 100-101. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels have been denied access to Republic of Korea waters in response to the sinking of the naval vessel Cheonan on 26 March 2010. Between April 2006 and June 2010, their vessels sailed through Republic of Korea waters 2,165 times; 1,477 were voyages between the two Koreas and 688 to other countries.

\textsuperscript{70} Under the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region, OMM is flagged as high risk/low performance based on port State control inspections over the past three years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Vessel name</th>
<th>IMO No.</th>
<th>Vessel type</th>
<th>Date since</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Dong Fang Qi Yun</td>
<td>9095412</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Fu Hong</td>
<td>8657536</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>8 November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Petrel 1 71</td>
<td>9009085</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>17 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Chon Won 65</td>
<td>8410603</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>9 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Victory 2</td>
<td>8312227</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>24 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Kunjari</td>
<td>9045182</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>9 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Woory Star 2 72</td>
<td>8717910</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>13 May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Karo Bright</td>
<td>8651219</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1 September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Global Nampo</td>
<td>9000766</td>
<td>Containership</td>
<td>1 November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>New Hunchun</td>
<td>9536272</td>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>3 June 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Equasis and IMO.

Sanctions evasion patterns: Renaming and reflagging

110. Following the designation of OMM on 28 July 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acted in order to evade sanctions by changing the registration and ownership of vessels controlled by the Company. Thus far, 13 of the 14 vessels controlled by OMM have been renamed, their ownership transferred to other single shipowner companies (with names derived from the ship’s new names) and vessel management transferred to two main companies. 73 Without exception, the companies established for reregistration purposes were registered in the IMO database in 2014. These changes are likely a strategy to evade assets freezes by Member States under resolution 2094 (2013). The registration changes were submitted to IMO by officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Embassy in London.

111. No reports on these transfers were received despite resolution 2094 (2013), in which the Security Council called upon all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers (including renaming and reflagging) of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessels to other companies, possibly to evade sanctions or in violation of the provisions of the resolutions (see annex 12.1).

71 Petrel Shipping is listed on the IMO database as a British Virgin Island-based entity which uses a “care of” address provided by a Hong Kong-based company named Petrel Shipping Co. Ltd. It is the registered owner of two Kiribati-flagged vessels, the Petrel 1 and the Blue Nouvelle. Mr. Ri Phyong Gu, a known OMM representative based in Bangkok (see paras. 135-142; and annexes 20-21), has listed his title and affiliation as “the Chartering Manager” of Petrel Shipping Co. Ltd., registered in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in his visa application. However, no such company is listed for this country on the IMO database. The Petrel 1 has called into Nampo at least four times since June 2014 and the Blue Nouvelle at least twice since July 2014.

72 There is also a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessel named Woory Star (IMO number 8408595) owned by Korea 56 Trading Co, Pyongyang.

73 Twelve of these vessels were registered as “in service”. 
Table 8  
Renaming and reregistering of vessels controlled by OMM following its designation on 28 July 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original name</th>
<th>IMO</th>
<th>New name</th>
<th>Registered owner</th>
<th>Registered manager/operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Am Nok Gang</em></td>
<td>8132835</td>
<td><em>Tae Ryong Gang</em></td>
<td>Taeryonggang Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Yongjin Ship Management Co. Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>1/10/14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Care of Yongjin Ship Management Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Tonghung-dong, Central District, Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMO: 5814906</td>
<td>IMO: 5814883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/07/2014</td>
<td>30/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chong Chon Gang</em></td>
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<td>238, Ryugyong 2-dong, Potonggang-guyok, Pyongyang</td>
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<td>Huichon Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
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<td>18/06/2014</td>
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<td>30/04/2014</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
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<td>Registered owner</td>
<td>Registered manager/operator</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<td><em>Ryong Rim</em></td>
<td>Ryongrim Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Haejin Ship Management Co. Ltd</td>
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<td>TaedonggangSonbak Co. Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Pho Thae</em></td>
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<td><em>Myong San 1</em></td>
<td>Myongsan Marine Co. Ltd</td>
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<td>(Registered inactive on 22 August 2014.)</td>
<td>30/06/2014</td>
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<td><em>BiRyu Gang</em></td>
<td>8829593</td>
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<td>Registered manager/operator</td>
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<td>Orang Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
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<td>30/06/2014</td>
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<td>Ryong Gang 2</td>
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<td>Tan Chon</td>
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<td>Tonghung-dong, Central District, 5yongyang</td>
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</tr>
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<td>container capacity</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>IMO: 5814883</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11/08/2014</td>
<td>30/06/2014</td>
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<td>Ryong Gun Bong</td>
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<td>CholRyong</td>
<td>Cholryong Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Haejin Ship Management Co. Ltd</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18/06/2014</td>
<td>30/04/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Company dates refer to incorporation.*

*Source: Equasis, IMO and Lloyd’s List Intelligence.*

**Study on vessel Automatic Identification System anomaly patterns**

112. The Panel commissioned a study of the movements of 100 vessels from 2008 to 2014 to identify non-detection by Automatic Identification System networks.\(^{74}\) Intentional non-transmission contravenes IMO regulations mandating continuous Automatic Identification System transmission. While technical issues often prevent this, the study concluded that multiple discontinuities and non-transmission over very long distances (2,500 nautical miles) raise significant concerns that intentional

\(^{74}\) Lawrence Dermody, “Maritime traffic to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2006-2014”, December 2014.
non-transmission may be linked to activities prohibited by resolutions, as illustrated in the Chong Chon Gang incident. In another case, a foreign-flagged vessel, which called in Nampo in August 2014, sailed for seven voyages over 1,000 nautical miles in 2014 (in areas of good reception), also suggesting intentional non-Automatic Identification System transmission. In the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the limited range of ground receivers and port transmission restrictions means that such port calls often do not appear in the record. The Panel will continue to monitor Automatic Identification System anomalies to identify the potential for sanctions evasion.

113. The Panel investigated the interception near Cyprus, on 11 March 2014, of an illicit oil shipment from Libya by a tanker, Morning Glory, using the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a temporary flag of convenience. Pyongyang, whose Maritime Administration had contracted with Egypt-based Golden East Logistics for the six-month use of its flag, denied any responsibility for the tanker (see annex 12.2). This is the Panel’s first case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea revoking its flag and the first known case of the issuance by its Maritime Administration of an interim certificate of registry. Golden East Logistics failed to respond to the Panel’s inquiries regarding official complicity and possible flag-brokering to support illicit activity by the Maritime Administration.

Maritime insurance

114. The Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association serves as the insurance provider for a number of vessels controlled by OMM and possibly all of the vessels under the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.75 The Association insured the following vessels controlled by OMM: the Ryong Gang 2 in 2008, the ApRok Gang in 2011, the Jang Ja Sang Chong Nyon Ho in 2011-2012, the Chong Chon Gang in 2013-2015, and the Mu Du Bong in 2014-2015 (see annex 13.1-8). The Panel also obtained documentation indicating that the Association acted as the insurer for Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd, which was the previous registered owner of 13 vessels associated with OMM.76 Representatives of the Company have declared the entity as responsible for the insurance of at least 17 vessels operated by OMM since 2004 (see annex 16.2).77

115. The Panel has obtained information indicating that the Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association provided insurance for the OMM-controlled vessel Mu Du Bong both prior to and following the Committee’s designation of the entity on 28 July 2014. A representative of the Company based in Thailand, Mr. Ri Phyong Gu (also known as Steven Lee), obtained the Association’s insurance documents with false issuing dates that extended coverage to include “grounding liability” after the Mu Du Bong was grounded on a reef off the coast of Mexico on 14 July 2014 (see annex 13.7-8). Another insurance certificate issued on 19 August 2014 shows that the Association continued to provide insurance coverage for the Mu Du Bong after 28 July.

75 There is reluctance on the part of reputable companies to insure vessels flagged by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for reasons of risk aversion.
76 IMO database.
77 Certificate of authorized activity to a shipping agent noted that OMM representatives were responsible for “the solution of any accident or disputes in connection with the vessels managed by our company [OMM]”.

116. In addition to providing insurance for the assets of a designated entity, the Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association was the insurance provider for the *Chong Chon Gang* when it was involved in a sanctions violation in 2013.\(^\text{78}\) The vessel failed to declare illicit cargo, part of which constituted dangerous goods under the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code. The Association continued to insure the *Chong Chon Gang* despite these breaches of the Code. The Panel has requested information from the Association on rules governing its insurance policies and whether the concerted breaches of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code by the *Chong Chon Gang* triggered a review of its insurance provision for that vessel before issuing a new insurance certificate in 2014. The Panel has also requested clarification of Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association-related documents in respect of vessels associated with OMM that contain irregularities, calling into question the nature of the insurance provision.

\section*{B. Air fleet}

117. All civilian aircraft registered in the country continue to be owned and operated by the State-controlled airline, Air Koryo. The overall number in Air Koryo’s operational fleet has decreased since 2012. While there has been acquisition of some modern aircraft,\(^\text{79}\) the number of new acquisitions has been less significant than originally expected. Air Koryo has also acquired old aircraft, such as an Ilyushin IL-62 from Cuba in 2012, that have subsequently been cannibalized for spare parts.\(^\text{80}\)

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Air Koryo fleet}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
Aircraft model & Number & Range (km) & Maximum payload (tons) & Maximum number of passengers \\
\hline
Passenger aircraft & & & & \\
AN-24 & 3 & 750-2 400 & 5.5 & 44-50 \\
IL-18 & 1 & 4 300-6 400 & 13.5 & 100 \\
IL-62 & 4 & 7 550-10 000 & 23 & 168-186 \\
TU-134 & 2 & 1 900-3 300 & 8.6 & 84 \\
AN-148 & 1 & 3 500-6 000 & 9 & 80 \\
TU-154 & 2 & 2 800-3 900 & 18 & 180 \\
TU-204 & 2 & 4 400-9 250 & 21 & 214 \\
Cargo aircraft & & & & \\
IL-76 TD & 3 & 3 700-9 400 & 50 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

118. In its 2014 final report, the Panel highlighted the military role of Air Koryo aircraft painted in military camouflage that undertook a fly-over in the “Victory

\(^{78}\) See S/2014/147, paras. 69-80 and 124-125.

\(^{79}\) Antonov An-148 from Ukraine and Tupolev Tu-204 from the Russian Federation.

\(^{80}\) For visual confirmation of this aircraft’s tenure at Pyongyang airport, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SjLx1RPbNo.
Day” military parade on 27 July 2013. The absence of boundaries between Air Koryo and the Korean People’s Army air force was further highlighted in 2014 when an Ilyushin 76TD aircraft was filmed dropping Korean People’s Army paratroopers as part of a military exercise (see figure XXIII).

Figure XXIII
Air Koryo Ilyushin 76 used for military purpose

Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9L9EeCb8is&feature=youtu.be&t=27m22s.

119. Analysis of the fleet shows that the Ilyushin featured in the video is not a new addition to the air force, but rather an existing asset of the State-controlled fleet bearing the livery of an Air Koryo-registered Ilyushin 76TD aircraft. The Panel considers the military use of this aircraft through participation in the military exercise further evidence that Air Koryo shares part of its assets with the Korean People’s Army.

120. Given the evidence of military use, the Panel considers that providing financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance relating to the provision, maintenance or use of Air Koryo’s cargo aircraft could constitute a violation of the embargo on all arms and related materiel as defined by paragraph 10 of resolution 1874 (2009).

VIII. Travel ban and assets freeze

121. The Panel investigated the activities of several key designated entities and associated individuals. Despite the strengthening of sanctions through progressive resolutions, the Panel could not confirm that assets freeze and travel ban measures had been effectively implemented by Member States. On the contrary, widespread evidence emerged demonstrating the resilience and adaptability of designated entities and individuals in defiance of sanctions.

122. In its 2014 final report, the Panel noted the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s “relatively mature, complex and international corporate ecosystem”. It appears that legitimate business structures have been used for illegitimate activities. While these networks appear complex, their key nodes consist of a limited number of individuals and intermediaries. They work through trusted foreign partners, embassies and trade offices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and shell companies. Although shell companies can be swiftly changed, the individuals responsible for establishing and managing them have remained, often for years.

81 See S/2014/147, para. 168.
123. Designated entities exploit the time lags between the adoption of sanctions measures and implementation by Member States. They pre-emptively adopt new aliases to evade assets freezes. The Panel considers it essential that all Member States implement the full scope of sanctions measures in a timely manner and strengthen international cooperation to that end. The Panel recommends that Member States review their national legal frameworks to ensure compliance with the resolutions.

124. Summaries of the Panel’s findings and recommendations are provided below. The Panel has also made suggestions to assist the Committee’s efforts in improving the quality of the 1718 Sanctions List.

A. Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited

125. On 28 July 2014, the Committee designated OMM for targeted sanctions based on the recommendations by the Panel and several Member States. The Company played a key role in arranging the shipment of concealed arms and related materiel on board the vessel Chong Chon Gang from Cuba to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in July 2013.

126. Prior to designation, OMM was the largest shipping enterprise of the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport (see annex 14 to the present report and annex XXXV to S/2014/147). The Company has undertaken the chartering, brokering, management, technical control and repair of the vessels, as well as the arrangement of crews and insurance for vessels, in partnership with Ryongnam Dockyard and Korean International Crew Training Centre. These two entities along with OMM constituted the Ocean Maritime Group.

127. As at 28 July 2014, the Panel identified 14 active vessels controlled by OMM. Thirteen of these officially changed their owners and managers between 28 July and 10 December 2014, effectively erasing OMM from the IMO database (see table 8 above). With the company dissolved in name only, the Panel therefore continues to monitor the new entities owning and managing the vessels.

128. OMM has operated a global network covering Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America. It has used a wide range of individuals and entities based in at least 10 Member States, including Brazil (São Paulo, Brasilia), China (Dalian, Hong Kong, Shenzhen), Egypt (Port Said), Greece (Athens), Japan, Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Peru (Lima), the Russian Federation (Vladivostok), Singapore and Thailand (Bangkok). In most countries, the Company has not been registered as a legal entity.

129. In OMM’s network, a limited number of individuals have played key roles. Some have shifted their bases of operation between countries. Several overseas representatives of the Company have embedded themselves in local companies to mask their relationship. Some held diplomatic status and operated from official positions inside the Embassy or Trade Representative Office.

130. With regard to evasion techniques in shipping, OMM has generally compartmentalized tasks by delegating them to different agents or representatives in various countries. Financial transactions have been deliberately dissociated from its logistics and operations (see paras. 188-194). These transnational activities have made it more difficult for a single Member State to monitor the Company’s
operations. One key Company official made regular use of a false identity, while others avoided using their full names to conceal their identities.

**Evolution and adaptation of OMM**

131. Over the past decade, OMM has owned and/or operated at least 35 vessels, most of which were originally owned and/or controlled by Korea Tonghae Shipping Company and are already registered as inactive (see annex 15). At various times since 1999, after two incidents of illegal cargo were reported, OMM, Sohae Sonbak Co Ltd, Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd and Tonghae Sonbak Co Ltd have gradually taken over and switched roles as ship manager, operator and/or owner for Korea Tonghae-controlled vessels (see annex 16). Since 2008, the various roles of manager, operator and owner were incrementally transferred from all these companies to OMM. In the process, the Company controlled these vessels through other entities, each of which serve as registered owner and/or operator of a single vessel for a period of time. The Company’s evasion techniques therefore predated the imposition of sanctions. In October 2006, the registrations of multiple vessels were simultaneously changed, coinciding with provocations, including the first nuclear test. These reregistrations may have been made in anticipation of, or in response to, strengthened sanctions or monitoring by the relevant Member States.

132. The Panel considers that the renaming and reregistration of vessels controlled by OMM after 28 July 2014 are also an attempt to evade sanctions. Despite the Security Council’s request to Member States as per paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013), no Member State has reported to the Committee on vessel transfers (see figure XXIV). The Panel considers that these companies have worked on the Company’s behalf or at its direction and assisted the evasion of sanctions (see annex 17).

133. Member States are obliged by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 2094 (2013) to immediately freeze assets and economic resources owned or controlled by OMM or any individual or entity working for the Company or assisting in the evasion of sanctions. The Panel considers that “assets” and “resources” are understood to include assets of every kind, including vessels, and therefore that vessels owned and/or controlled by them should be frozen by relevant Member States.\(^\text{82}\)

134. From 28 July 2014 to the time of writing, 12 of the 14 vessels associated with OMM, including the *Chong Chon Gang*, reportedly stayed, visited or were sighted near ports in foreign countries (see annex 19). Of the other two, one, the *Ji Hye San* (formerly known as *Hyok Sin 2*), is still registered as active and the other, the *Mu Du Bong*, was detained against payment in Mexico for environmental damage. Six vessels were inspected by foreign authorities under port State control inspections after 28 July 2014. The Panel considers that these vessels should be immediately frozen by the relevant Member States pursuant to the resolutions. The Panel is not aware of any Member States freezing vessels controlled by OMM. Regarding the

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Mu Du Bong, as at the submission of the present report, the vessel was still detained by Mexican authorities. A media report of 19 December 2014 indicated that the vessel might be released shortly. The Panel shared its view with the Mexican authorities that the Mu Du Bong was an asset of OMM. The authorities indicated to the Panel that they intended to wait until the release of the report to make a decision.

Figure XXIV
Vessels and shipping companies controlled by OMM

Abbreviations: ISM — International Safety Management Manager.
Thailand

135. OMM has used individuals and entities based in Thailand to provide operating and shipping agent services for vessels controlled by the Company and to carry out related financial transactions (see annex 20). A Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. Ri Phyong Gu (date of birth: 23 September 1961; passport no. 563420640), has served as the Company’s representative based in Bangkok using the titles of “Director of Bangkok” or “Ocean BKK” since at least 2005 (annex 21.1-2). Operating under the alias of “Steven Lee”, Mr. Ri has been involved in the operation and control of a vessel controlled by the Company, the Mu Du Bong, and has acted on behalf of the Mu Du Bong’s registered owner, Mudubong Shipping Co Ltd both prior to and following the 28 July 2014 designation.

136. Mr. Ri is employed by Mariner’s Shipping and Trading Company, Ltd based in Bangkok (see annex 21.3-5). At least four other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals have been embedded with Mariner’s, including three OMM Bangkok representatives, Mr. Choi Ho-young, Mr. Ho Yong Jun and Mr. Won Song Guk (see annexes 21.6 and 47.7).

137. Substantial evidence shows OMM’s control of the Mu Du Bong and Mudubong Shipping (see annex 22). From 2010 to August 2014, when the vessel was inspected by foreign port State control authorities, they reported OMM as the vessel’s owner

84 The periods when these individuals and entities were, or are, active in the relevant countries are provided in the main text. A Greek shipping agent worked for OMM until November 2012. The Panel has no reason to believe that this company continued its relationship with OMM.

85 Mariner’s Shipping contacts: 662/33-34 Rama 3 Road, Bangpompang Yannawa, Bangkok, Thailand 10120; tel: +662-2930290; fax: 662-2943847; e-mails: haen@ksc.th.com, mst001@ksc.th.com.
and/or operator (or International Safety Management Manager) even though Mudubong Shipping was listed for the vessel in the IMO database. A document obtained by the Panel notes the Mu Du Bong’s owner as OMM. The Company’s name is also consistently provided in the Mu Du Bong’s official documents issued by the country’s Maritime Administration. A contract dated 21 May 2014 between OMM and Mudubong Shipping Company, Ltd lists OMM as the vessel’s “Managers/Operators”. The vessel listed OMM’s account in transactions with a foreign shipping agent. Mudubong Shipping has also shared the same contact information as OMM. The vessel’s directory obtained by the Panel lists multiple OMM-associated entities known to the Panel (see annex 23).

138. Mr. Ri (also known as Steven Lee) has represented Mudubong Shipping and has acted on behalf of and controlled the Mu Du Bong both prior to and following 28 July 2014 (see annex 21.7-10). Using several e-mail accounts, including “OCEAN BKK” and “Earn Shipping”, he acted as the Mu Du Bong’s broker and agent in July 2014. On 5 August 2014, Mr. Ri signed a salvage agreement with a Mexican salvage company, in his capacity “as the Mu Du Bong Shipping Company Legal Representative”. The Mu Du Bong’s captain received instructions for the vessel’s operation from “Earn Shipping” with the same e-mail address used by “Steven Lee” both prior to and following 28 July 2014. In the light of the foregoing, the Panel considers that Mr. Ri has controlled the Mu Du Bong on behalf of OMM.

139. Further information obtained by the Panel demonstrates Mariner’s Shipping’s extensive relationship with OMM and Mr. Ri (see annex 21.2-5). Mariner’s Shipping has used the alias of “Ocean Bangkok” and has undertaken operational and financial transactions for vessels associated with OMM (see paras. 191-194 and annexes 21.11, 47.1-5 and 47.7). The company has also provided a base of operation for at least four other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals, including Mr. Ri’s spouse and the three aforementioned former representatives of OMM Bangkok, Mr. Choi, Mr. Ho and Mr. Won (Mr. Ho and Mr. Won held diplomatic passports). Mr. Ri has been also listed in an international ship association database as Mariner’s Shipping’s contact person and has used the company’s bank account and contact information when acting for the Mu Du Bong during its detention in Mexico for environmental damage. The company’s e-mail accounts, haeu@ksc.th.com and mst001@ksc.th.com, have been used by at least eight OMM employees (see annex 21.2). As at 5 January 2015, Mr. Ri was still employed by Mariner’s Shipping and was using the company’s e-mail account, mst001@ksc.th.com (annex 21.3 and 21.12). In the light of this, the Panel considers that Mariner’s Shipping has worked on behalf of OMM and Mr. Ri, at least prior to 28 July 2014, and also assisted in the evasion of sanctions by Mr. Ri after 28 July 2014.

140. In response to the Panel’s inquiries, Mr. Ri acknowledged, on 5 January 2015, his involvement in the operation of the Mu Du Bong, using the name Steven Lee, which he said was at the request of the vessel’s owner through Mariner’s Shipping for the vessel’s 2014 transit through the Panama Canal, using the name Steven Lee (see annex 21.12). However, he denied being the overseas representative of OMM. Instead, he claimed having “assist[ed]” the DPR Korea commercial vessels and vessels of other flags calling at Thai ports”, stating that he had “not any knowledge

86 IMO and Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region databases.
of sanctions on Ocean Maritime Management Co Ltd”. Mariner’s Shipping also replied to the Panel’s inquiries on the same day.

141. The Panel had sent four letters to Mariner’s Shipping since August 2014, requesting information on its relationships with OMM and Mr. Ri. The company’s only reply, of 5 January 2015, stated that it was wholly owned by Thai nationals, who owned 100 per cent of the company’s stock, and therefore, all decision-making power belonged to those Thai shareholders (see annex 21.13). Mariner’s Shipping stated that OMM does not have any authority or control over its operations and that Mr. Choi, Mr. Ho and Mr. Won were former employees whose employment contracts had already ended. It further stated, “Mariner’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd and all our employees were never informed that Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd was designated by the Security Council on 28 July 2014 until we received your e-mail in August 2014. In addition, we were asked for help by Mudubong Shipping Co., Ltd and not by Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd.”. Despite the Panel’s specific and repeated requests, the letter did not provide any information about Mariner’s relationship with Mr. Ri. The Panel considers that Mariner’s Shipping is complicit in an attempt to conceal its relationship with Mr. Ri.

142. In the light of the above, the Panel considers Mr. Ri to have worked on behalf of OMM both prior to and following 28 July 2014 and that Mariner’s Shipping has assisted in the evasion of sanctions by Mr. Ri after 28 July 2014.

Figure XXVI
The Mu Du Bong

Source: The Panel.

China, Japan and Malaysia

143. Over at least the past seven years, two China-based entities with connections in Malaysia and Japan, the Shenzhen Representative Office of Korea Mirae Shipping Co. Ltd and Mirae Shipping (HK) Company, Ltd, have worked for OMM and, in particular, for OMM-associated vessels in coordination with the Company’s overseas representatives, including its office in Dalian87 (see annex 24). Mirae

87 The Panel could not locate OMM Dalian’s official registration.
Shipping Shenzhen is registered in China as a subsidiary of a Pyongyang-based entity, Korea Mirae Shipping Co Ltd. Mirae Shipping Hong Kong and Shenzhen had a Malaysia-based agent, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national named Mr. Pak In Su, who was employed by a Malaysia-based company, Malaysian Coal and Minerals Corporation Sdn Bhd (see annex 25.78) until 2 January 2015 when he was dismissed by the company.

144. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that Mirae Shipping Pyongyang, Hong Kong and Shenzhen and OMM Dalian have all worked for OMM (see annexes 25 and 26). Mirae Shipping Pyongyang has been involved in the operation of vessels owned or controlled by OMM, including the Mi Rae and the Ryong Nam 2. Mirae Shipping Pyongyang and Shenzhen have shared contact information with OMM.

145. In response to the Panel’s inquiry, Mirae Shipping Hong Kong stated that it had hired OMM-supplied crew members for its vessel, the Great Hope, but had no knowledge of OMM overseas representatives (see annex 25.9 and 25.10). It also denied having shared any administrative or operational functions with Mirae Shipping Shenzhen. However, information available to the Panel demonstrates that Mirae Shipping Hong Kong and Shenzhen have both worked with overseas representatives of OMM while sharing administrative and/or operational functions (see annex 25.5-7).

146. Mirae Shipping Hong Kong also informed the Panel of its intention to terminate its relationship with OMM in 2014, but refused to provide supporting documentation for reasons of confidentiality. The Panel could not corroborate the statement by Mirae Shipping Hong Kong.

147. Mirae Shipping Hong Kong stated that it had no connection or relation with owners of the vessels managed by OMM aside from employing the latter’s crew for these vessels. However, the director of Mirae Shipping Hong Kong, a Japanese national, Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsugu, has had a long-standing relationship with OMM-associated vessels, before and after the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) (see annexes 24, 27 and 28).

148. The Panel considers that Mirae Shipping Pyongyang, Hong Kong and Shenzhen have acted and could still act on behalf of or at the direction of OMM. The Panel continues to investigate their relationships with OMM after 28 July 2014.

Singapore

149. A Singapore-registered entity, Chinpo Shipping Company Pte Ltd, was involved in financial transactions for OMM in the Chong Chon Gang incident. Acting on the information provided by the Panel, the Singaporean authorities filed criminal charges against this entity.88 As the Singaporean legal proceedings continue, Chinpo Shipping and OMM’s representatives are currently inactive. OMM’s last representative, Mr. Kim Yu Il (date of birth: 15 December 1967: passport 381220516) left Singapore in February 2014.

150. However, three other Singapore-registered companies sharing the same office, Senat Shipping & Trading Private Limited, Senat Shipping Limited, and Senat Shipping Agency Pte. Ltd., have also undertaken extensive activities on behalf of OMM (see annex 29). From 2003 to July 2013, these companies were extensively involved in the operation of vessels associated with OMM, in particular, in financial transactions for the Company (see paras. 191-193 and annex 47.8-13 and 47.16). The Panel has requested information from Senat Shipping about its relationship with OMM, but has not received a reply.  

Brazil and Peru  

151. OMM’s overseas representatives in Brazil were frequently used for arrangements for the transit of OMM-controlled vessels through the Panama Canal or visits to ports in the region (see annex 30). The Panel identified two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals who were officially registered as diplomats but worked as OMM representatives until 2012. The Panel continues to investigate whether OMM continued its activities following their departures from Brazil.  

152. A Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. Ju Yong Gun (date of birth: 24 July 1956; passport 563220083) served as OMM’s representative in Lima, at least between 1999 and 2007, presenting his affiliation as a Peru-based company, Ocean Group S.A., and then as OMM’s representative in Brazil after 2010 (see annex 30.1-2). Mr. Ju Yong Gun was a registered diplomat officially serving as First Secretary at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Embassy in Brasilia from 2010 to 2012. During that period, he was extensively involved in the operation of vessels controlled by OMM. While serving as the Company’s representative in Brazil, Mr. Ju used the phone number +55 11-2729-9571 belonging to a local shipping company. According to Peru, OMM was not registered in the country. Available information shows that until 2007, OMM used the title “Ocean Lima” and cooperated with the Democratic People’s Republic Korea Embassy in Lima (see annex 30.3).  

153. In October 2013, Mr. Ju appeared in Panama as Manager of the Sales and Purchase Department of OMM, acting for the Chongchongang Shipping Co Ltd in connection with the release of the Chong Chon Gang from its detention (see annex 30.4-5). The Panel sent three letters to Mr. Ju requesting information about his relationship with OMM after 28 July 2014 but has not received a reply. His e-mail accounts have become inactive.  

154. Another diplomat working for OMM Brazil, Mr. Jong Sang Gyo (date of birth: 18 February 1966), was stationed at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Embassy in Brazil until May 2012 (see annex 30.6-7). A third Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. Thae Yong Rok, worked for OMM Brazil from São Paulo. There is no indication of their return to Brazil after their official departures by the middle of 2012 or any indication of the subsequent presence of OMM’s representatives in Brazil. However, documents obtained by the Panel list “Ocean Maritime Management Brazil” as the Chong Chon Gang’s owner as at June-July 2013 (see annex 30.8). The Panel was unable to confirm whether this information was falsified.

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89 Senat’s Director travelled to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2011 to attend a trade fair.
Egypt

155. Information available to the Panel reveals that OMM representatives were embedded in Sunlight Agency (Port Said) until around 2011, using the titles “Ocean Egypt” or “Ocean Maritime Management Egypt” in their communications although OMM had no official registered branch or office in Egypt. These individuals were extensively involved in the operation and logistics of OMM-controlled vessels, including facilitating their passage through the Suez Canal (see annex 31). Sunlight Agency also served as a c/o address for “Tonghiae P(ort) Said”, which appears to be a branch office of OMM-related entities, Korea Tonghiae or Tonghiae Sonbak. Korea Tonghiae also had an office in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Embassy in Cairo (see annex 32).

156. OMM Egypt’s former representatives include Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals Mr. Jong Jae Son, Mr. Kim Sun Gu, Mr. O Hwan Ryong, Mr. Choe Jin Ha and Mr. Jun Ri Ki. The Panel has found no information suggesting that OMM Egypt has maintained its activities since around 2012.

157. In response to the Panel’s inquiries, Sunlight Agency acknowledged that the company had “provided maritime services solely on commercial bases, to two vessels operated by “OMM” … at a date prior to OMM being listed” by the Security Council. The company also stated that “the relationship/communication between our company and that client [OMM] had finished in about July 2011.” Additional information obtained by the Panel indicates that Sunlight terminated its transactions with OMM in July 2011. Sunlight’s licence was revoked on 10 June 2014 due to default on its debts.

Russian Federation

158. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates the key role played by individual(s) acting on behalf of OMM in Vladivostok in the 2013 Chong Chon Gang incident. They operated with the name “Ocean Russia” and provided instructions to vessels controlled by OMM, including the Chong Chon Gang, using at least two e-mail addresses: oceanvld@gmail.com and oceanrep@fastmail.vladivostok.ru. The captain of the Chong Chon Gang informed the Panamanian authorities on 5 August 2013 that the vessel’s operating company was based in Vladivostok, with its telephone numbers listed as 007-4232-748-369 and 007-4232-703-208 (see S/2014/147, annex XXVI). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals who previously presented their affiliations as “OMM Vladivostok” include “Han Yong Kyu (or Gyu)”.

159. According to Russian authorities, OMM was officially registered until 2010 at the address 43 Lugovaya Street, Apartment 39, Vladivostok, but has not operated in the Russian Federation after 2010 (see S/2014/147, annex XXXV). The Panel suspects that OMM may have operated under an alias or through third parties. The Panel has requested relevant information from the Russian Federation.

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90 The company’s president is Ragab el-Shennawy.
Other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals who have worked for OMM

160. As at 8 January 2014, Mr. Choe Chol Ho has been listed as Vice-President of OMM on the website of an international maritime law association. The Panel considers that Mr. Choe has worked on behalf of OMM both prior to and after 28 July 2014. 

161. The Panel also has information on the President and three Directors of Chongchongang Shipping Co, Ltd (see annexes 30.5 and 33.1). In October 2013, they represented the company in negotiations to release the vessel in Panama. In its 2014 final report, the Panel noted that the company had engaged in activities prohibited by the resolutions in connection to this incident (see S/2014/147, annex VI). Therefore, the Panel considers that the company’s President and Directors have also acted on behalf of OMM and violated the resolutions. Their information is contained in table 10 below:

Table 10
President and Directors of Chongchongang Shipping Company, Ltd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Passport No.</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Contact details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Ryong Chol</td>
<td>President Chongchongang</td>
<td>381420806</td>
<td>4/6/1963</td>
<td>Tel: +850-2-18333 ext. 98818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Co., Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cell: +850-191-2796331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fax: +850-2-3812100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Yong Hak</td>
<td>Director Chongchongang</td>
<td>563420271</td>
<td>23/01/1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Co., Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yun Chol</td>
<td>Director Chongchongang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Co., Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ri Yong Min</td>
<td>Director Chongchongang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Co., Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162. The Panel also continues to investigate the identities of other individuals who have worked for OMM (see annex 33).

Ocean Maritime Management Company

163. In the IMO database, OMM is no longer listed as the principal Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shipping company. Two other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-registered entities, Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd and Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, have taken over the role of registered owner, ship manager and/or operator for vessels associated with OMM. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea no longer appears to assign a large fleet to a single

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entity officially and there are indications that it is increasingly using foreign-flagged and foreign-controlled vessels.

164. The Panel continues to investigate the relationships between OMM and the entities and individuals listed in this section, as well as vessels owned and/or controlled by them.

**Recommendations**

165. Based on information obtained, the Panel recommends that the Committee update the information on OMM provided on the 1718 Sanctions List by adding the information about OMM and OMM-controlled vessels (see the summary of the additional information in Section XIA, Recommendations of the Panel to the Committee, Recommendation 2.1-3).

166. In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 2087 (2013) and paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013), the Panel recommends that the Committee designate the entities and individuals that have worked on behalf of or at the direction of OMM and/or assisted the evasion of sanctions or violated the relevant resolutions (see annex 34).

167. Given the Committee’s designation of OMM, the Panel recommends that the Committee make the following information widely available (possibly in an addendum to IAN No. 5, entitled “The M/V Chong Chon Gang Incident”):

   (a) The Committee should clarify that vessels are included in the “assets” or “resources” referred to in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013);

   (b) All 14 vessels listed in table 8 (or figure XXIV) that are owned and/or controlled by OMM or by entities acting on its behalf or at its direction in assisting the evasion of sanctions should be subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013);

   (c) The Committee should provide Member States with the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) explanation of the term “freeze” in its glossary (available from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/glossary/d-i/) for reference purposes; this term is used in FATF’s Recommendation No. 7, which is referred to in resolution 2094 (2013);

   (d) To ensure compliance by Member States with paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013), the Committee should notify Member States, through all regional port State control administrations, IMO and other interested parties, that they should communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken to evade sanctions or in violation of the provisions of resolutions, in connection with the Committee’s designation of OMM;

   (e) The Committee should remind all Member States to implement their obligations immediately, as obliged under the resolutions.
B. Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation

168. The Panel continues to investigate the activities of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (“Ryonha”) (also known as Ryonha Machinery Corporation, Millim Technology Company [Millim]92), a military-related entity designated by the Security Council in January 2013. Ryonha is also the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s principal manufacturer of computer numerically controlled machine tools.93 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has emphasized the importance of computer numerically controlled machine tools for its nuclear programmes and launches using ballistic missile technology.94

169. Ryonha has remained resilient in the face of United Nations sanctions. Multiple online Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publications continue to openly advertise Ryonha’s products. Ryonha has also used the alias of Huichon Ryonha General Machine Factory (also known as Huichon Ryonha General Machinery Plant) and new contact information (see annex 36).

170. Ryonha has maintained its ability to operate abroad while concealing its involvement in transactions by using shell companies and intermediaries. Ryonha has relied on individuals with long-standing business relationships with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The entity’s agents have skilfully manipulated several aliases, in different languages, that are not included on the 1718 Sanctions List. The Panel is also concerned about Ryonha’s ability to obtain high-end computer numerically controlled machine tools, and related technologies and items from foreign companies through sanctions evasion.

KORTEC and Koryo Technological Corporation

171. Previously, Ryonha operated under the alias of “Koryo Technological Corporation” when supplying Ryonha-produced metal-working equipment to a company based in the Russian Federation, KORTEC (see annex 37). Before the issuance in December 2013 of a Russian presidential decree incorporating paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), KORTEC’s website advertised, on 19 July 2013, at least three Ryonha-identical machine tools (see annex 37.2). Similar machine tools were also listed on several commercial websites as at October 2014, with descriptions referring to KORTEC and Koryo Technological Corporation.

172. In response to the Panel’s inquiries, the Russian Federation stated that the aforementioned online sources could not be relied upon and that KORTEC’s relationship with Ryonha was stopped after the Security Council’s designation of the entity. The Panel identified, and the Russian Federation confirmed, that KORTEC’s phone number listed on the website was used by a door sales company in December 2014 (see annex 37.2).95 Thus far, the Panel has not been able to obtain information about the individuals or entities that worked for Ryonha or KORTEC.

92 A Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. So Min Chol, served as Millim’s top manager as of 2012 (annex 35).
93 See S/2013/337, paras. 60-64 and 136-137; and S/2014/147, paras. 147-151.
173. On its website, KORTEC also advertised business relationships with at least six computer numerically controlled machine tool manufacturers, four based in Taiwan Province of China, one in Spain and one in the Russian Federation (see annex 37.3-5). Some of the products of these foreign companies use computer numerically controlled computer controllers manufactured by companies based in Germany and Japan. KORTEC also advertised a computer numerically controlled machine tool type MH-500, which was supplied by a Taiwan Province of China-based company, YIDA Precision Machinery Company, Ltd (see annex 37.6). In 2006, Ryonha acquired an MH-500 computer numerically controlled machine tool from Taiwan Province of China in violation of local export control regulations (see S/2013/337, para. 60 and annex 37.7 to the present report). The Panel is investigating whether Ryonha has obtained or is still able to obtain similar machine tools by evading sanctions.

174. The Panel has requested information from these companies regarding their relationships with Ryonha (also known as KORTEC). However, only one Taiwan Province of China-based company has responded. In its reply, the company states that it was previously approached by a KORTEC employee at a machine tool exhibition in Taiwan Province of China in March 2012 or 2013 but developed no business relationship with KORTEC (see annex 37.8). The Panel requested further information but has not received it.

Millim’s agents and related companies

175. Ryonha used a Chinese name “朝鮮密林技术会社” (chaoxian mi linjishu hui she), which is phonetically compatible with Millim Technology Company. It has used at least two local agents and three offices based in China, including two registered under this alias. Its representative office in Beijing, “朝鮮密林技术会社北京代表处” was registered in September 2010, and another office in Dandong, “朝鮮密林技术会社丹东代表处”, in May 2012 (see annex 38). The legal representative for Millim Beijing Office is listed as Mr. Yun Il (or Yoon Il) (Chinese: 尹日) and the Millim Dandong Office’s representative is listed as a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. Sung PyongJin (Chinese: 升平进). Both offices appear to be shell companies registered at addresses used by other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related entities. Mr. Sung served as Ryonha’s representative in China and participated in the 2013 trade fair in Dandong under a new alias, in an evasion of sanctions (see figure XXIX and paras. 148-151 of S/2014/147 and annex 39 to the present document). He also used the address of Ryonha’s alternate office in Dandong, which was reportedly rarely staffed.

176. In addition, Ryonha and Mr. Sung used a local agent, Dandong Yisheng Trade Co, Ltd (Chinese: 丹东易胜商贸有限公司), which is located in the same quarter as Ryonha’s Dandong office (see annex 40). Dandong Yisheng and this company’s employee, Mr. Li Yi (李毅), have acted as Ryonha’s sales agents.

177. After Ryonha’s participation in the October 2013 trade fair in Dandong was widely reported, Mr. Li adopted the aliases of “Korea Machinery Trade Co, Ltd” and “KORTEC” in order to promote the sale of KORTEC’s machine tools, which are identical to Ryonha’s products (see annex 40.2-3). The KORTEC brand appears to have been transferred from the Russian Federation to China.

178. Ryonha also used another local agent, Suzhou Hanwei Shendiao CNC Technology Co. Ltd (Chinese: 苏州威汉数控科技有 限公司) based in Suzhou,
Jiangsu Province. On its website, this company described itself as “the main agent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s largest military enterprise, Korea Millim Technology Corporation” and advertised Ryonha’s machine tools (see annex 41). The company’s M12-300 and M13-300 milling machines appear to be very similar to Ryonha’s RV-30 and RF-30 machines. Suzhou Hanwei posted Ryonha’s advertisement on its website as early as October 2012. The company explained that their cooperation did not involve the transaction of items. The Panel is gathering further information regarding their relationship.

Figure XXVII
Timeline of formation of Ryonha-related entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Registered in Nov. 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Became Millim’s sales agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Established in May 2012.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendations

179. In order to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions, the Panel recommends that the Committee update Ryonha’s information provided on the 1718 Sanctions List by adding the following:

Aliases (also known as):
Huichon Ryonha General Machine Factory
KORTEC
Koryo Technological Corporation
Korea Machinery Trade Co., Ltd.
朝鮮密林技術会社

Tel: 850-2-18111-381-2100
E-mail: ryonha@silibank.net.kp

96 See annex 41.4 for further details of these entities.
180. The Panel’s recommendation to the Committee regarding designation is contained in annex 34 to the present report.

181. Ryonha’s known machine tools are listed in annex 42 to the present report. The Panel recommends that all Member States be vigilant in any transactions involving these items.

C. Green Pine Associated Corporation

182. On 2 May 2012, the Committee designated Green Pine Associated Corporation (Chinese: 朝鲜青松联合会社) for targeted sanctions (see S/2012/287, para. 4 (2)). The 1718 Sanctions List noted that the entity had taken over many of the activities of the KOMID, which was designated by the Committee in April 2009.

183. The Panel has noted that the Chinese official business registry listed a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity, “Beijing Representative Office of Korea Green Pine Associated Corporation (朝鲜青松联合会社北京代表处)” (registration number 0012069), established in China in February 2003 (see annex 43). This company’s business licence was revoked on 11 December 2012, following the Committee’s designation of Green Pine. The entity’s former legal representatives included an individual named Mr. Pak (or Park) Won Il (or Won Ill) (Chinese: 朴元日) and Mr. Choe Kwang Hyok (Chinese: 崔光赫).

184. An individual with the same name, “Choe Kwang Hyok”, has also been listed on several online commercial sources as a legal representative of at least two other Beijing-based companies (see annex 43.2-3). The Panel continues to investigate Green Pine’s possible links to these entities.

D. Leader (Hong Kong) International

185. An entity based in Hong Kong, China, Leader (Hong Kong) International, was designated by the Security Council in January 2013 for its role in facilitating shipments on behalf of KOMID. The Panel has found no evidence of Leader’s activities after January 2013, although this entity’s status is listed as active in the Hong Kong Companies Registry database (see annex 44). The Panel continues to gather information about Leader and its director, Mr. Cai Guang (Chinese: 蔡光) (Chinese identification number 220104197201271530) (see S/2014/147, para. 159).

186. Further, the Panel notes that one of the corporate secretary companies for Leader includes a company registered in Hong Kong, China, Winning International Consulting Group Co, Limited (see annex 45). It also served as a corporate secretary for other companies, including those investigated by the Panel in relation to luxury goods violations and the Light incident (see S/2012/422, paras. 51 and 76-80; S/2013/337, paras. 101-104 and 110-112; S/2014/147, paras. 134-136). Its director is listed as a United States national who has listed a false address in the Hong Kong, China business registry. The Panel has requested from this company information on its relationship with Leader (Hong Kong) International.
E. Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation and Korea Tangun Trading Corporation

187. On 2 January 2015, the United States Department of the Treasury designated 10 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals, 7 of whom were listed as affiliated with Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and 1 with Korea Ryungseng Trading Corporation (reportedly an alias of another designated entity, Korea Tangun Trading Corporation) (see annex 46). Reportedly, most of them have been based abroad, in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. One of the individuals, Mr. Kim Kwang Chun, was implicated in an incident of non-compliance involving ballistic missile-related items. The Panel is investigating their activities.

IX. Financial measures

188. Financial information obtained by the Panel during the period under review provided insights into the commercial operations and banking practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While no reports on attempts to circumvent restrictions on financial transactions were received from Member States, the Panel undertook investigations demonstrating that the country continues to use multiple circumvention techniques to mask its involvement in both legitimate and illicit business transactions. Its entities have frequently used established international financial channels and foreign intermediaries and, where possible, still move money through bulk cash.

189. Information obtained by the Panel reveals that officers of the Reconnaissance General Bureau play important roles in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s financial system, including by arranging clandestine financial activities abroad and transporting bulk cash.

190. In most cases investigated by the Panel, transactions were made in United States dollars from foreign-based banks and transferred through corresponding bank accounts in the United States. In some instances, transactions were made in euros or in local currency. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been able to bypass banking organizations’ due diligence processes by initiating transactions through other entities acting on their behalf. The Panel continues to have concerns about the ability of banks in countries with less effective banking regulations or compliance institutions to detect and prevent illicit transfers involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

A. The Panel’s investigative activities

191. The Panel has obtained evidence of the use of foreign financial intermediaries by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in various countries, including China, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Through its investigation of OMM (see paras. 125 to 164), the Panel discovered that at least three intermediaries (Mirae Shipping Hong Kong, Mariner’s Shipping in Thailand and Senat Shipping in Singapore) have had long-term relationships involving the conduct of financial transactions on behalf of OMM’s headquarters or its representatives or associated individuals in Brazil, China, the Russian Federation, Singapore and Thailand (see
annex XLVII). Information on Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation’s financial transactions predating sanctions shows that the entity had already used the alias of Millim Technology Company and employed a foreign intermediary that had a long-standing relationship with multiple Democratic People’s Republic of Korean companies, which concealed this entity’s link to these financial transactions (see annex XLVIII).

192. The Panel has also obtained evidence of intermediaries issuing instructions for vessel names to be omitted from OMM-related financial transactions, including dollar transactions through United States correspondent banks. Such instructions were issued by Mariner’s Shipping for financial transactions made on behalf of vessels associated with OMM, the *Am Nok Gang* and the *Mu Du Bong*, and by Senat Shipping when issuing an invoice to the charterer of the *Ryong Gang 2* (then owned by an OMM-associated entity, Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd) in January 2009 (see annex XLVII.1-14). Such efforts to obscure the true nature of financial transactions were confirmed by financial institutions contacted by the Panel.

193. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has disassociated logistics from the financial aspects of managing its vessels. This frustrates due diligence and allows the country to keep its foreign currency in circulation rather than repatriating it. In the case of the *Chong Chon Gang*, OMM Dalian arranged for spare parts from a European company to be delivered to Panama, with payments effected through Chinpo Shipping in Singapore (see annex XLVII.15). Mirae Shipping Hong Kong also paid Panama Canal passage costs. Senat Shipping in Singapore has also been heavily used for these types of dissociated transactions (see annex XLVII.1-14).

194. The Panel has received information from creditors trying to recover funds owed that have pursued OMM. However, the steady transition from entire fleet ownership to single company ownership of vessels has allowed for the compartmentalization of liability and financial recourse. Such compartmentalization precludes liens against ships that might not be directly responsible for monies owed. Some creditors have focused on Panama, given that it is a choke point for vessels.

195. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has also used indirect payment methods when acquiring foreign commercial items for use in prohibited activities. One example concerns the procurement in 2006 and 2010 of two pressure transmitters discovered among the debris of the Unha-3 rocket. The transmitters were purchased by Korea Chonbok Trading Corporation, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company, from Royal Team Corporation, which had procured the items from a European country. In the December 2006 transaction, the name of the buyer appears on the invoice but not the payment document, which instead lists a Mr. Ryom Jong Chol, based in Malaysia. In the 2010 payment, two companies other than the buyer and seller became involved — one based in Taipei and one in Pyongyang — and carried out transactions during a trade fair in Pyongyang. Royal Team Corporation stated that it was informed by Korea Chonbok Trading Corporation that the items were purchased for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s oil industry. Royal Team Corporation indicated in a letter to the Panel of 18 December 2014 that it had “no idea that our buyer would use the transmitters in the way” they did.97

97 Royal Team Corporation (RTC) was previously indicted in 2008 by a court in Taiwan Province of China for exporting strategic high-technology articles to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see S/2013/337, para. 60).
196. The Panel recommends that Member States encourage greater attention to due diligence in the face of the widespread use of front companies, intermediaries and indirect payments as methods for moving funds.

B. Role of intelligence agency in financial flows associated with prohibited activities

197. The Panel investigated the role of officers of the Reconnaissance General Bureau in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s financial system. According to information from Member States, the Reconnaissance General Bureau is the country’s primary intelligence agency and has connections to arms trading and the designated entity, Green Pine.98

198. In February 2014, three Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals were arrested at a South-East Asia airport for failing to declare possession of $450,000 in cash, suspected to be proceeds from an arms transaction. The Panel confirmed both the detention of the individuals and their later release because they could not be charged under any domestic laws of the Member State A.99

199. The individuals were travelling with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea service passports, which are issued to officials (other than diplomats) working at embassies or trade representative offices. The Panel was informed that the individuals were representatives of a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company (Company X) based in a Member State neighbouring Member State A and that they claimed that they were carrying the cash per instructions for delivery to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang.

200. The Panel’s information shows that Company X is a Reconnaissance General Bureau front company with a Pyongyang branch engaged in arms trading. At the same time, Company X engages in diverse business fields, with branches and partners in multiple countries, and its links with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are not clear from open-source information.

201. A separate branch of Company X (Company Y) in Member State A engages in the export of military communications equipment to the Middle East, South-East Asia and South Asia. Further, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national employed by Company Y may be linked to the export of military communications equipment. The Panel has requested information from the relevant Member State about this entity.

98 According to the 1718 Sanctions List, Green Pine Associated Corporation’s “care of” address is: “Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang”. RGB has been designated by the United States and the European Union for unilateral sanctions and listed on Japan’s Foreign End User List as an entity related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See also United States, Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 2 January 2015; United States, Department of the Treasury, Press Release, 30 August 2010; European Union, European Commission implementing regulation No. 1355/2011 of 20 December 2011 amending Council regulation No. 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Foreign End User List. The Panel has been investigating RGB’s possible activities in connection with the relevant resolutions, in particular, its connection with Green Pine and transfers of arms and related materiel.

99 Information provided in confidence.
C. **Use of international organizations**

202. On 30 January 2014, the French Ministry of Economy and Finance ordered the freezing of assets held by two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals affiliated with the Reconnaissance General Bureau, Mr. Kim Yong Nam and Mr. Kim Su Gwang, and one affiliated with the Korean United Development Bank, Ms. Kim Su Gyong, on the grounds that they were likely to engage in activities prohibited by the resolutions (Table 11). 100

203. At the time of the freeze order, Mr. Kim Yong Nam was a Reconnaissance General Bureau officer operating under the cover of a contract as an employee at the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris and Mr. Kim Su Gwang was a Reconnaissance General Bureau officer operating under the cover of a position as an international civil servant at the World Food Programme (WFP) in Rome. Ms. Kim Su Gyong works at the Korean United Development Bank in Pyongyang and was engaged in financial activities under false pretences in order to conceal the involvement of her country. The three are related and have all provided support to Reconnaissance General Bureau officers abroad. Additional information obtained by the Panel regarding these individuals is summarized in annex 49.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11</th>
<th>Individuals involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Yong Nam</td>
<td>Reconnaissance General Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Su Gwang (also known as Kim Sou-gwang, Kim Su-kwang, Kim Son-kwang)</td>
<td>Reconnaissance General Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Kim Su Gyong</td>
<td>Director of the International Relations Department of the Korean United Development Bank (Daughter of Mr. Kim Yong Nam)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. **Panel’s assistance to Member States**

204. In the case involving the attempted sale of MiG-21s and their parts, the Independent Agency against Corruption of Mongolia found that there remained $679,000 owed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by individuals facing charges. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea requested the return of this sum. When the Panel visited Mongolia from 3 to 5 March 2014, it noted Member States’ obligations to implement financial measures pursuant to resolution 2094

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(2013). Mongolia decided to prevent the transfer of the funds to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

E. Financial Action Task Force

205. FATF remained highly concerned about the failure of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to address significant deficiencies in the area of anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism and the serious threat that this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. On 14 February, 27 June and 24 October 2014, FATF renewed the placement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on its “public list” and called upon its members to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money-laundering and financing of terrorism risks emanating from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

206. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea became an observer to the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) on 22 July 2014. The country has engaged directly with FATF since January 2013 to discuss its strategic deficiencies in the areas of anti-money-laundering and combating financing of terrorism. Engagement was strengthened in 2014 through exchange of information and meetings aimed at developing an action plan to address these deficiencies. On 24 October 2014, FATF urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to provide high-level political commitment to the action plan. On 16 January the country’s National Coordinating Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism announced a 15 January letter from the Central Bank to FATF “in which the DPRK committed itself to implementing the action plan of 'international standard' for anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism”.

207. The Panel will continue to work closely with FATF and to engage in outreach with FATF-style regional bodies to promote and support the implementation of targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

X. Unintended impact of the sanctions

208. Given the difficulties of investigating this aspect of the sanctions regime, the Panel monitors the situation through the reporting of humanitarian organizations that are active in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Estimates suggest that 17 million people in the country suffer from chronic food insecurity and lack nutritional diversity. An estimated 7 million persons need access to clean water and proper sanitation and 6 million need access to essential health-care services.

209. While the Panel has been made aware of allegations that sanctions are contributing to food shortages, its assessment has found no incidents where bans imposed by the resolutions directly resulted in shortages of foodstuffs or other humanitarian aid. National legislative or procedural steps taken by Member States

101 “DPRK Will Honor Its Commitments to Anti-Money Laundering”, KCNA, 16 January 2014. High-level political commitment is insufficient to remove FATF’s counter-measures against DPRK.
or private sector industry have been reported as prohibiting or delaying the passage of certain goods to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish these measures from United Nations sanctions. The Panel will continue to seek information on the issue.

210. Although the resolutions underline that the sanctions measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the country’s civilian population, there is no exemption mechanism in the resolutions under embargoes to that end. **The Panel therefore recommends that the Committee propose to the Security Council exemptions under embargoes, provided that such items are confirmed to be solely for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes.**

211. In previous years, a number of Member States reported to the Committee that their diplomatic missions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea faced operational difficulties owing to the resolutions. In response, the Panel was requested by the Committee to review the information provided by Member States and their diplomatic missions. Based on the Panel’s assessment paper to the Committee of May 2013, IAN No. 6 entitled “Diplomatic missions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” was issued on 26 June 2014. **It includes an overview of the various types and severity of such operational difficulties and recommendations encouraging Member States to report as necessary.**

**XI. Recommendations**

**A. Recommendations of the Panel to the Committee**

**Recommendation 1**

212. In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 2087 (2013) and paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013), the Panel recommends that the Committee designate individuals and an entity that have worked for OMM or Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, or on their behalf or at their direction, and/or have assisted the evasion of sanctions or violated the relevant resolutions (see annex 34).

**Recommendation 2**

The Panel recommends that the Committee update the 1718 Sanctions List by adding the information below relating to each entity and individual.

**1. Information on OMM**

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<tr>
<th>Alias (also known as)</th>
<th>East Sea Shipping Company</th>
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<tr>
<td>Address</td>
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2. **OMM entities**

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<td>Huchang Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
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<td>Huichon Shipping Co. Ltd</td>
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3. **OMM individuals (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Choe Chol Ho</td>
<td>Vice-President, OMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Ryong Chol</td>
<td>President, Chongchongang Shipping Co Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kim Yong Hak</td>
<td>Director, Chongchongang Shipping Co Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ri Yong Min</td>
<td>Director, Chongchongang Shipping Co Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yun Chol</td>
<td>Director, Chongchongang Shipping Co Ltd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **General Bureau of Atomic Energy**

Alias (also known as) Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry
Address Haeun 2-Dong, Phyongchon District, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Telephone +850-2-181111
Fax +850-2-3814416
E-mail mhs-ip@star-co.net.kp

5. **Korean Committee for Space Technology**

Alias (also known as) National Aerospace Development Administration
Other information Mr. Hyo’n Kwangil
Meritorious Scientist, Department Director, National Aerospace Development Administration
Mr. Jong Tong Gil  
Deputy Department Director, National Aerospace Development Administration  

Mr. Kim In Cheol  
Deputy Director, National Aerospace Development Administration  

Mr. Yun Changhyok  
Vice-Director, General Satellite Control and Command Centre, National Aerospace Development Administration  

6. Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation  
   Alias (also known as)  Huichon Ryonha General Machine Factory  
   KORTEC  
   Koryo Technological Corporation  
   Korea Machinery Trade Co. Ltd  
   朝鲜密林技术会社  

Telephone  +850-2-18111-381-2100  
E-mail  ryonha@silibank.net.kp  

7. Second Academy of Natural Sciences  
   Alias (also known as)  Academy of National Defence Science  

Recommendation 3  

Given the Committee’s designation of OMM, the Panel recommends that the Committee make the following information widely available (possibly in an addendum to IAN No. 5, entitled “The M/V Chong Chon Gang Incident”):  

(a) The Committee should clarify that vessels are included in the “assets” or “resources” referred to in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013);  

(b) All 14 vessels listed in table 8 (or figure XXIV) that are owned and/or controlled by OMM or by entities acting on its behalf or at its direction in assisting the evasion of sanctions should be subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013);  

(c) The Committee should provide Member States with the FATF explanation of the term “freeze” in its glossary (available from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/glossary/d-i/) for reference purposes; this term is used in the FATF’s Recommendation No. 7, which is referred to in resolution 2094 (2013);  

(d) To ensure compliance by Member States with paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013), the Committee should notify Member States, through all regional port State control administrations, IMO and other interested parties, that they should communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken to evade sanctions or in violation of the provisions of relevant resolutions, in connection with the Committee’s designation of OMM;
(e) The Committee should remind all Member States to implement their obligations immediately, pursuant to the resolutions.

**Recommendation 4**

The Panel recommends that the Committee propose to the Security Council exemptions under embargoes, provided such items are confirmed to be solely for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes.

**B. Recommendations of the Panel to Member States**

**Recommendation 1**

The Panel recommends that Member States report to the Committee information at their disposal on all measures taken in implementation of the resolutions, including the assets freeze.

**Recommendation 2**

The Panel recommends that Member States, in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 2094 (2013), exercise due diligence, as per IAN No. 4, on export to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of pressure switches, pressure transmitters, temperature transmitters and radial ball bearings.

**Recommendation 3**

Ryonha’s known machine tools are listed in annex 42. The Panel recommends that all Member States be vigilant in any transactions involving these items.

**Recommendation 4**

The Panel recommends that Member States review their national legal frameworks to ensure compliance with the full scope of measures included in the resolutions, in particular the assets freeze.

**Recommendation 5**

The Panel recommends that Member States exercise enhanced vigilance with regard to the business activities of diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in connection with possible sanctions violations.

**Recommendation 6**

The Panel renews its call upon Member States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures in the resolutions and any additional information on designated entities and individuals, identifying in all languages all aliases working on their behalf.

**Recommendation 7**

The Panel recommends that Member States communicate information to their respective financial institutions about the individuals and entities identified by the Panel for their complicity in prohibited activities and encourage greater attention to due diligence in the face of the widespread use of front companies, intermediaries and indirect payments as methods for moving funds.
## Annex 1 Correspondence with Member States

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<th>Country</th>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Panel*
Annex 2 – Member States to submit national implementation report

**Africa**
1. Angola
2. Benin
3. Botswana
4. Burundi
5. Cameroon
6. Cape Verde
7. Central African Republic
8. Chad
9. Comoros
10. Congo
11. Côte D’Ivoire
12. Democratic Republic of the Congo
13. Djibouti
14. Equatorial Guinea
15. Eritrea
16. Ethiopia
17. Gabon
18. Gambia
19. Ghana
20. Guinea
21. Guinea Bissau
22. Kenya
23. Lesotho
24. Liberia
25. Libya
26. Madagascar
27. Malawi
28. Mali
29. Mauritania
30. Mauritius
31. Mozambique
32. Namibia
33. Niger
34. Rwanda
35. São Tomé and Príncipe
36. Senegal
37. Seychelles
38. Sierra Leone
39. Somalia
40. South Sudan
41. Sudan
42. Swaziland
43. Togo
44. Tunisia
45. Tanzania
46. Zambia
47. Zimbabwe
48. Antigua and Barbuda
49. Bahamas
50. Barbados
51. Belize
52. Bolivia
53. Costa Rica
54. Dominica
55. El Salvador
56. Grenada
57. Haiti
58. Honduras
59. Jamaica
60. Nicaragua
61. Paraguay
62. Saint Kitts and Nevis
63. Saint Lucia
64. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
65. Suriname
66. Trinidad and Tobago
67. Uruguay
68. Venezuela

**Asia**
69. Afghanistan
70. Bangladesh
71. Bhutan
72. Cambodia
73. Iran
74. Iraq
75. Malaysia
76. Myanmar
77. Nepal
78. Oman
79. Syria
80. Tajikistan
81. Timor-Leste
82. Yemen

**Europe**
83. Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Oceania**
84. Fiji
85. Kiribati
86. Micronesia
87. Nauru
88. Palau
89. Papua New Guinea
90. Samoa
91. Solomon Islands
92. Tonga
93. Tuvalu
94. Vanuatu
Annex 3 – Yongbyon Nuclear Complex

3.1 Overview
3.2 The light water reactor and the 5 MWe reactor

Map No. 4538.2
December 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Imagery: Pléiades (captured 18 September 2014) and Quickbird (captured 07 April 2014)
Data Source: UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)
Map Production Date: December 2014
3.3. Fuel fabrication plant (uranium enrichment workshop)

Imagery: Pleiades (imagery captured 18 September 2014)
Insets: Quickbird (imagery captured 07 April 2014)
Data Source: UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)
Map production date: November 2014
Annex 4– Punggye-ri nuclear test site

The map shows various features at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, including suspected tunnel entrances, new structures, operations compound, south portal, and spoiling piles growing. The imagery used is GeoEye-1 (captured on 16 September 2014) and Quickbird. The data source is the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009). The map was produced in November 2014.
Annex 5 – Joint Institute for Nuclear Research

5.1. Extracts from JINR’s website

The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research is an international intergovernmental scientific research organisation established through the Convention signed on 26 March 1956 by eleven founding States and registered with the United Nations on 1 February 1957. It is situated in Dubna not far from Moscow in the Russian Federation.

The Institute was established with the aim of uniting the efforts, scientific and material potentials of its Member States for investigations of the fundamental properties of matter. At present the Institute has 18 Member States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Agreements are signed on the governmental level with Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Serbia and the Republic of South Africa.

5.2. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea key participants

**GOVERNING AND ADVISORY BODIES OF THE JOINT INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Armenia</td>
<td>S. Harutyunyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Azerbaijan</td>
<td>N. Mamedov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Belarus</td>
<td>L. Vaytov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Bulgaria</td>
<td>L. Kosov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Cuba</td>
<td>F. C. Diaz-Balart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>R. Maci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>A. Kvedelidze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Kazakhstan</td>
<td>K. Kafyrganov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. P. Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Li Je Sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>I. Tighineanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>S. Davar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Poland</td>
<td>M. Wajgorski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>N.-Y. Zamfir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>D. Livon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>S. Dubnitska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>B. Grynyov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Not appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Republic</td>
<td>Le Hong Khiam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL**

Chairman: V. Matveev
Co-Chairman: M. Waligórski (Republic of Poland)
Scientific Secretary: N. Russakovitch

| O. Abdinov                      | – Armenia            |
| T. Baatar                       | – Mongolia            |
| C. Boreea                       | – Romania             |
| M. Budzynski                    | – Poland              |
| L. Cifarelli                    | – Italy               |
| A. Dubničková                   | – Slovakia            |
| M. Ellashvili                   | – Georgia             |
| P. Fré                          | – Italy               |
| S. Gailes                       | – France              |
| N. Giorakis                     | – Greece              |
| B. Grinyov                      | – Ukraine             |
| A. Harrison                     | – UK                  |
| M. Hnatíč                      | – Slovakia            |
| P. Jenni                        | – Switzerland         |
| M. Ježábek                      | – Poland              |
| V. Kadyshevsky                  | – Russia              |
| E. Kenzhín                      | – Russia              |
| G. Khuukhenkhuu                 | – Mongolia            |
| S. Kūn                          | – Belarus             |
| Kim Son Hyok                    | – Democratic People’s |
|                                 | Republic of Korea     |
| M. Kovalchuk                    | – Russia              |
| G. Kulpanov                     | – Russia              |
| V. Matveev                      | – Russia              |
| J. Mnich                        | – Germany             |
| D. Nagy                         | – Hungary             |
| Nguyen Manh Shat                | – Vietnam             |
| I. Padron Diaz                  | – Cuba                |
| G. Piragine                     | – Italy               |
| G. Poghosyan                    | – Armenia             |
| S. Pospíšil                     | – Czech Republic      |
| I. Povar                        | – Moldova             |
| E. Rabhovic                     | – Israel              |
| V. Rubakov                      | – Russia              |
| K. Rusek                        | – Poland              |
| B. Sharkov                      | – Russia              |
| N. Shumeiko                     | – Belarus             |
| A. Skrinesky                    | – Russia              |
| P. Spillanti                    | – Italy               |
| M. Spiro                        | – France              |
| H. Stöcker                      | – Germany             |
| Ch. Stoyanov                    | – Bulgaria            |
| Gh. Stratian                    | – Romania             |
| V. Strazhev                     | – Bulgaria            |
| N. Tomčič                       | – Belgium             |
| Tran Duc Thiep                  | – Vietnam             |
| M. Waligórski                   | – Poland              |
| I. Wilhelm                      | – Czech Republic      |
| A. Zagorodny                    | – Ukraine             |
| G. Zinovjev                     | – Ukraine             |

Mr. Li Je Sen’s name in Russian is listed on the Institute’s website as “Ли Чэ Сон”.


According to the Institute’s Annual Reports, Mr. Li Je Sen has been listed in this position since 1998 ([http://www1.jinr.ru/Reports/Reports_eng_archive.html](http://www1.jinr.ru/Reports/Reports_eng_archive.html)).

The Institute’s 2009 Annual Report provided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea representative’s English name as “Ri Je Son”.


Mr. Ri Je-sen, the DPRK’s Minister of Atomic Energy Industry, was designated by the 1718 Committee on 16 July 2009. According to the List established and maintained by the 1718 Committee (Russian language version), his name is spelled in Russian as “Ли Чэ Сон”. This name is identical to Mr. Li Je Sen’s name in Russian.
5.3. Other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea participants

The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research’s Chief Science Secretary confirmed that as of 2 January 2015 the following four Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals’ affiliation with this Institute by 30 March 2015:

- Mr. Ryu Pong Sik: a senior researcher of the Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions since April 2012 in the fields of experimental chemistry and radiochemistry;

- Mr. Rim Yong Chol: a researcher of the Laboratory of Information Technologies since April 2012 in the fields of data processing in Kwinta Experiment of the High Energy Physics Laboratory;

- Ms. Ri Yong Suk: Mr. Ryu Pong Sik’s spouse who has worked at the Laboratory of Nuclear Problems to perform labour works, such as the preparation of double-distilled water and cleaning of surfaces of samples, without any engagement in scientific activity; and

- Ms. Hong Mi Dok: Rim Yong Chol’s spouse; and a technician of the Laboratory of Nuclear Problems.

The Institute’s website listed at least three Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals (Song Hye-rim, O Kum Chol and Ryu Pyong-sik) as having been affiliated with the Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions’s Scientific and Experimental Physical Department

- Song Hye-rim is listed as one of the staff members affiliated with the Chemistry of Transactinides sector of Flerov Laboratory’s Scientific and Experimental Physical Department. This individual’s nationality is listed as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

- O Kum Chol is listed as one of the staff members affiliated with the ion-implementation nanotechnology and radiation materials science sector of Flerov Laboratory’s Scientific and Experimental Physical Department. This individual’s nationality is listed as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

- Ryu Pyong-sik is listed as one of the staff members affiliated with the Chemistry of Transactinides sector of Flerov Laboratory’s Scientific and Experimental Physical Department. This individual’s nationality is listed as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.


Annex 6 – Sohae launch center

6.1. Sohae launch site
6.2. Sohae new domed and assembly buildings
6.3. Sohae gantry tower
Annex 7 – National Aerospace Development Administration

7.1. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publications on National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA)

Mark of the DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration

The DPRK, a manufacturer and launcher of artificial earth satellites, is fully exercising its legitimate and peaceful rights to explore space and making headway towards achieving the cutting-edge technology in this field. It succeeded in launching its first earth satellite Kwangmyongsong 1 on August 11, 1998. and Kwangmyongsong 2 on April 15, 2009. After successful launches of the two trial satellites, the sciences and techniques of the DPRK were put into focus with the development of application satellites. The project was not all plain sailing, as the field of space exploration was a synonym of advance in science and technology and, moreover, the imperialists and reactionaries of the world reserved no restriction measures against the DPRK.

However, the saturation and techniques of the DPRK were fully demonstrated to the world. The launch of Kwangmyongsong 3 was a significant leap forward. The satellite was launched on March 6, 2012, with the Kwangmyongsong 1 and 2 satellites. The satellite was launched on March 6, 2012, with the Kwangmyongsong 1 and 2 satellites. The launch of the satellite was a major milestone in the DPRK’s space program.

When they were suffering the agony of the failure in launching an earth satellite, supreme leader Kim Jong Un encouraged them, saying they must not lose courage, and as more grew up having faced, science develops further after failures. So they finished their efforts for another try, finally resolved to carry out the leader’s plan without fail.

On December 12, 2012, the launch vehicle Unha-3 loaded with the artificial earth satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2, a solar synchronous, polar-orbiting satellite, blasted off at the Sohae Launch Site in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province. Though it was a cold and rainy winter day unfavorable for satellite launch, the launch vehicle carried the satellite on a deliberately curved trajectory in regard to the sovereignty of neighboring countries and the international laws and regulations. The satellite got into its planned orbit at 9 minutes and 27 seconds after take-off. The artificial earth satellites of the DPRK are the product of our country’s capability in the field of science and technology. The launch of the satellite was a significant leap forward. The satellite was launched on March 6, 2012, with the Kwangmyongsong 1 and 2 satellites.

Artificial earth satellites of the DPRK are the product of our country’s capability in the field of science and technology. The launch of the satellite was a significant leap forward. The satellite was launched on March 6, 2012, with the Kwangmyongsong 1 and 2 satellites. The leader’s efforts for another try, finally resolved to carry out the leader’s plan without fail.

Launch vehicle Unha-3 loaded with Kwangmyongsong 3-2, a solar synchronous, polar-orbiting satellite, blasted off on December 12, 2012.

Kwangmyongsong 1, first artificial satellite of the DPRK, was launched on August 11, 1998.

Space Development for Peaceful Purposes

The history of space development is not so long in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. After the successful launching of Kwangmyongsong 1, the first artificial earth satellite of the country, in August 1998, Kwangmyongsong 8-2 went into orbit 9 minutes 27 seconds after the blastoff, in December 2012. The satellite project is based on the DPRK’s human resources, ranging from their design to manufacture, assembly, launch and post-launch observation. Now the Korean people are the master of an independent country working for space development.

In April last year the Seventh Session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK passed the DPRK Law on Space Development and adopted a resolution on organizing the National Aerospace Development Administration of the DPRK. The law stipulates the aim and principle of space development, and the position and duty of the NADA. The DPRK’s aim of space development is to protect the interest of the state and solve necessary social problems arising in the economic construction and the life of the people by using space science and technology. The principle is to develop space for out-and-out peaceful purposes while thoroughly maintaining the Juche-oriented and independent stand. The law specifies that the NADA organizes a unified guidance on space development, represents the state in the field of space development, draws up the country’s general space development and activity programme, supervises and controls the implementation while cooperating and exchanging with international organizations and space institutions of other countries. It also clarifies that the success gained from space development technology and space activity should be used for no other purposes than the country’s interest and economic development and the improvement of the people’s living standards, and legally guarantees all the principled matters in space activity ranging from notification of objects to be launched into space and responsibility for its safety to the investigation of accident and rescue and compensation for damages. Along with this, it legally affirms the DPRK’s external standpoint that it cooperates with international organizations and other countries in the field of space development on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and mutual security, respects relevant international laws and regulations on development and use of space and opposes the selection and application of double standards in space activity and military activity in space. With the proclamation of the legal measures on organizing the NADA and adopting space development as a state programme, the DPRK can exercise the legitimate right of space power.

On the initiative of and detailed instructions of the supreme leader Kim Jong Un the emblem of the DPRK NADA was instituted. It reflects the character, mission, position and the prospect of the organization. The “DPRK” and “NADA” in the center of the emblem symbolize the position of the NADA which administers the country’s space development in a unified way. The dark blue background mirrors the DPRK’s peaceful character of space development. The light blue belts of satellite trajectories representing polar and equatorial orbits show the country’s ambition to put satellites into all orbits. As a whole, the emblem reflects the Korean people’s aspiration and the DPRK’s standpoint to vigorously push ahead with the building of an economic power and the improvement of the people’s living standards by rapidly developing the country’s space science and technology as required by the time when space development is one of the global trends with its competitive power growing ever higher.

An Namin Hui

Source: KOREA TODAY, No. 8, 2014.
7.2. General Satellite Command and Control Centre

April 2012

Source: Krimsu Kangsan, 3 September 2014
7.3. National Aerospace Development Administration’s key individuals (STRICLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential
7.4. Report mentioning National Aerospace Development Administration’s Deputy Director

“National Aerospace Development Administration, Deputy Director, Kim In Cheol”

Source: Rodong Sinmun, 1 April 2014.
Annex 8 – Wan Hai 313
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential
Annex 9—Westerhever

Initial contract proposal of 2007 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Source: Republic of Congo authorities

5. Regarding the dispatch of Korean experts to Congo:
   - the Korean side sends Korean experts to Congo (Annex 4) at its own expense and to arrive at the same time as the machinery.
   - the Congolese side will be solely responsible for the buildings housing the Korean experts inside the garrison to ensure secrecy and appropriate work conditions
   - the Korean side will be responsible for internal furnishings and articles of daily life

General Department of Military Cooperation, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMISSION, D.P.R. KOREA

Project offer for refurbishment of armaments
Annex 10 – Uganda

Letter from Uganda of 19 December 2014 to the Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE
336 EAST 45th STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017-3489
Tel: (212) 949-0110
Fax: (212) 687-4515
E-mail: uganda@un.org

OUR REFERENCE \textbf{UN/SC/1}

19 December 2014

The Coordinator Panel of Experts
On the DPRK established pursuant to
\textbf{New York}

Dear Sir

In your communication dated 29th January, referenced S/AC.49/2014/PE/OC 24, the Panel of Experts specifically inquired about \textit{“...the frequency of training; locations and participants, equipment or materials utilized; and any follow up measures from these trainings...”}. This in relation to the Agreement of Mutual Cooperation signed between the Republic of Uganda and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Below is our response to this question. Detailing out training that has been offered by the DPRK to members of the Uganda Police Force in three key areas:

\begin{itemize}
\item a. The Field Force Unit
\item b. Marine Policing and
\item c. Martial Arts
\end{itemize}

And the details are:

1. \textbf{FIED FORCE UNIT (FFU)}

North Korean instructors have conducted two courses with officers from FFU

a) First Training

- Training Centre - Police Training School, Kabalye (Masindi District).
- Number of Participants - 724 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - 07/12/2013 to 16/04/2014

b) Second Training

- Training Centre - Butiaba Wamembo Training School (Bulisa District)
- Number of Participants - 1029 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - The course is still ongoing
Training Materials used both courses - AK 47, Pistols, Daggers, Fighting Knives, shields, baloons, target boards and paper

2. POLICE MARINE

Two trainings have been conducted by North Korean instructors under Police Marine Unit.

a) First Training

- Training Centre - Kigo Marine Base Wakiso District on shores of Lake Victoria.
- Number of Participants - 41 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - conducted in 2010 for 6 months

Training content
- Diving
- Navigation

b) Second Training

- Training Centre - Kigo Marine Base Wakiso District on shores of Lake Victoria.
- Number of Participants - 88 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - Conducted in 2013 for 6 months

Training content
- Diving
- Navigation
- Shape shooting

Training Materials used in both courses - Boats and Diving Gear

3. POLICE TRAINING SCHOOL KABALYE MASINDI

Notwithstanding the above, courses conducted at PTS Masindi are as follows

a) Martial Arts course

- Number of Participants - 32 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - Jan 2009 to Nov 2009
- Participants were trainers from PTS Kabalye, Masindi

b) Martial Arts course

- Number of Participants - 65 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - 12 months (2011/2012)
- Participants were trainers from PTS Kabalye, Masindi

c) Crime Analysis Course

- Number of Participants - 81 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - 4 months (conducted in 2014)
- Participants were detectives from different parts of Uganda
- Materials used for training - crime scene management kit, chemicals for analysis, finger print kit and animal specimen

d) CID Course

- Number of Participants - 127 Trainees
- Duration/Frequency - 3 months (course started in October 2014 and still ongoing)
- Trainees are detectives from different parts of Uganda
- Materials used for training - crime scene management kit, chemicals for analysis, finger print kit and animal specimen

Our Mission is available to provide further clarification, in case of need.

Most Sincerely,

Amb. Kibuwayo
Charge d' Affaires a.i

Source: Uganda authorities
## Annex 11– Luxury goods


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>European Union*</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>United States</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Live animals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food items</td>
<td>Caviar, Crustaceans (all), and ingredients, e.g. rock lobsters, lobster abdomens, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, e.g. oyster in any form</td>
<td>Gourmet foods Caviar and caviar substitutes; truffles and preparations thereof</td>
<td>Beef, fillets of tuna, caviar and caviar substitutes</td>
<td>Caviar and its substitutes, chocolate, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates and goods containing these species, honey and its derivatives, tuna, toothfish, salmon and goods containing these species</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alcoholic beverages</strong></td>
<td>Wine, spirits (all kinds)</td>
<td>Alcoholic beverages</td>
<td>High-quality wines (including sparkling wines), spirits and alcoholic beverages</td>
<td>Alcoholic beverages</td>
<td>Alcoholic beverages (wines, ethyl alcohol, spirits, liqueurs and other alcoholic beverages)</td>
<td>Cognac, wines and other liquors for more than 5,000 rubles</td>
<td>Wines and spirits</td>
<td>Wines and other alcoholic beverages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco and tobacco products</td>
<td>Tobacco products</td>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>High-quality cigars and cigarellos</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Cigars</td>
<td>Cigars</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco and tobacco products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics, fashion accessories</td>
<td>Cosmetics (all), perfumes and toilet waters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Luxeury perfumes, toilet waters and cosmetics, including beauty and make-up</td>
<td>Make-up, perfumes</td>
<td>Cosmetics, perfumes</td>
<td>Perfumes for more than 5,000 rubles</td>
<td>Perfumes and cosmetics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apparel, leather and fur items</td>
<td>Apparel and clothing accessories, furs, fur travel goods</td>
<td>Designer clothing and accessories, furs, fur travel goods</td>
<td>High-quality garments, clothing accessories and shoes (regardless of their material); High-quality leather, saddlery and travel goods, handbags and similar articles</td>
<td>Designer clothing, clothes and others, fur skins and artificial fur manufactures</td>
<td>Leather bags, clothes and others, fur skins and artificial fur manufactures</td>
<td>Designer clothing, door coverings, fur products and artificial fur products, leather bags and clothes</td>
<td>Leather goods (trunks, suitcases, cosmetic cases, executive cases, briefcases, satchels, and other similar bags, handbags, pockets or other products that may be carried in handbags, clothing and accessories), fur items (fur clothing, accessories, and other fur products)</td>
<td>Fur products; leather bags and clothes</td>
<td>High-quality apparel and clothing accessories, high-quality shoes, high-quality leather</td>
<td>Apparel and fashion items (leather articles, silk articles, fur skins and artificial furs, fashion accessories: leather travel goods, vanity cases, binoculars and camera cases, handbags, wallets, silk scarves, designer clothing: leather apparel and clothing accessories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramic and glass/ tableware</td>
<td>Drinking glasses (lead crystal)</td>
<td>Cutlery or precisions metal or plated or chisell with precious metal; high-quality tableware of porcelain, china, stone or earthenware or fine pottery; high-quality lead crystal glassware</td>
<td>Drinking glasses of lead crystal</td>
<td>Bone china, crystal glassware</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cutlery, gold, silver or platinum plated</td>
<td>Tableware of porcelain or bone china, items of lead crystal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewellery:</td>
<td>Silver, gold, Jewellery, gems, Pearls, precious</td>
<td>Jewellery,</td>
<td>Jewellery,</td>
<td>Pearls and Jewellery with Precious</td>
<td>Pearls, precious</td>
<td>Jewellery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1 See Annex IV of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013).
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Australia</th>
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<th>European Union</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Jewellery with pearls;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Gems;</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Precious and semi-precious stones (i.a., diamonds, sapphires, rubies, and emeralds);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Jewellery of precious metal or of clad with precious metal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>European Union¹</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>United States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic items</strong></td>
<td>Consumer electronics (televisions, videos, DVD players, PDAs, laptops, MP3 players — and any other relevant exports), electronic entertainment/software</td>
<td>Computers, televisions and other electronic devices</td>
<td>High-end electronic items for domestic use; high-end electronic or optical apparatus for recording and reproducing sound and images</td>
<td>Portable information devices, audio-visual equipment and software</td>
<td>Computers, audio-visual equipment (for example CD players and DVD players), data or software (for examples film, music, or both, recorded or stored on CDs or DVDs), and things on which data or software is or may be recorded or stored, mobile telephones, portable information and media devices (for example, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and MP3 players or other digital audio players)</td>
<td>Electronic goods (transmitter products for radio or telecommunications, television, cameras, digital cameras, and videocassette recorders, monitors, projectors, and related products excluding television transmitter products)</td>
<td>Plasma televisions; personal digital musical players</td>
<td>High-quality consumer electronic devices</td>
<td>Electronic items (flat-screen, plasma or LCD panel televisions or other video monitors or receivers (including high-definition televisions), and any television larger than 29 inches, DVD players, PDAs, personal digital musical players, <em>computer laptops)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Photographic/cinematic items</strong></td>
<td>Photographic equipment</td>
<td>See electronic items</td>
<td>Cameras and cinematical equipment</td>
<td>Optical instruments (cameras, movie cameras and projectors for movies)</td>
<td>High-quality electronic and optical image recording and reproducing equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>European Union¹</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>United States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clocks and watches</td>
<td>Watches</td>
<td>Watches</td>
<td>Luxury clocks</td>
<td>Wristwatches</td>
<td>Wristwatches</td>
<td>Wristwatch for more than 50,000 rubles</td>
<td>Watches of metal cladding with a precious metal</td>
<td>High-quality watches and clocks</td>
<td>Luxury watches (wrist, pocket, and other with a case of precious metal or of metal cladding with precious metal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>High-quality musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
<td>Musical instruments</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation items, as follows¹:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Yachts;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>automobiles and other vehicles to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>transport people (other than yachts)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>public transport, including station wagons; (c) Racing cars</td>
<td>Article and equipment for skiing, golf, diving and water sports</td>
<td>Sporting goods and equipment</td>
<td>High-quality sporting goods and equipment (i.e., for skiing, golf, water and equestrian sports); Goods and equipment for billiards, bowling (bowling lanes), gambling and any game played with coins or banknotes; Infrastructure installations and equipment for sports facilities with a luxury character (i.e., ski resorts and swimming pools);</td>
<td>Coin (other than Works of art)</td>
<td>Works of art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sports and recreational items equipment</th>
<th>Sports equipment</th>
<th>Sporting goods</th>
<th>Articles and equipment for skiing, golf, diving and water sports</th>
<th>Sporting goods and equipment</th>
<th>Recreational sports equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collector pieces and antiques</td>
<td>(all)</td>
<td>banknotes, not being legal tender; works of art; collectors' pieces and antiques</td>
<td></td>
<td>collectors' pieces and antiques</td>
<td>curios (collections and specimens, curios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Fountain pens, carpets</td>
<td>Hand-knotted carpets, hand-woven rugs and tapestries; articles and equipment for billiard, automatic bowling, casino games and games operated by coins or banknotes</td>
<td>Carpets, fountain pens</td>
<td>Carpets and tapestries, designer furniture, fountain pens</td>
<td>Carpeing goods (carpeting products and other textile carpets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 12– Maritime fleet

12.1. Vessels renaming or flag changes

Below is a list of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels that have changed their names and/or flags in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>IMO No.</th>
<th>Previous name</th>
<th>Previous flag</th>
<th>New flag</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mi Rim 2</td>
<td>9361407</td>
<td>Aoyang 18</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/01/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Lady</td>
<td>8654479</td>
<td>Un Pha San 1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1/02/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryu Gyong</td>
<td>9036533</td>
<td>Cheng Hai</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4/03/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Kun 6</td>
<td>8649993</td>
<td>Paek Song 5</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1/04/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka Rim Chon</td>
<td>8314811</td>
<td>Victory Hope</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1/05/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chun Yang 7</td>
<td>8652756</td>
<td>Chun Yang 9</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1/05/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Chon Gang</td>
<td>8415287</td>
<td>Golden Ocean</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/05/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son Am Chon</td>
<td>8403258</td>
<td>Guang Hai</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/05/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un Sung</td>
<td>8696591</td>
<td>Myong Jin</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/05/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Faith</td>
<td>8749262</td>
<td>Sai Nal</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hae Bang San</td>
<td>8518662</td>
<td>Kum Song</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Hung</td>
<td>9089372</td>
<td>Peng He</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/06/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Lady</td>
<td>8652823</td>
<td>Xin Zhou 2</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>25/6/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il Myong</td>
<td>8832136</td>
<td>Ming Chuan 2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu Hung 1</td>
<td>8703933</td>
<td>Bo Da</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shikil No. 2</td>
<td>8844464</td>
<td>Kosei</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chol Ryong*</td>
<td>8606173</td>
<td>Ryong Gun Bong</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/08/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myong San 1*</td>
<td>7632955</td>
<td>Pho Thae</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/08/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Chang *</td>
<td>8300815</td>
<td>O Un Chong Nyong Ho</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang Gye*</td>
<td>8829593</td>
<td>Bi Ryu Gang</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Hae</td>
<td>8672897</td>
<td>Lao Yuan 3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryong Rim*</td>
<td>8018912</td>
<td>Jou Jin 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin Pho 2</td>
<td>8672691</td>
<td>Peng Xiang 13</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui Chon*</td>
<td>8405270</td>
<td>Hwang Gun San 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ji Hye Can*</td>
<td>8018900</td>
<td>Hyok Sin 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Se Pho*</td>
<td>8819017</td>
<td>Rak Wou 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Jin*</td>
<td>8133520</td>
<td>Gang Ja San Chong</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Chon*</td>
<td>7937317</td>
<td>Chong Chon Gang</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong Hung San*</td>
<td>7640378</td>
<td>Ryong Gang 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tae Ryong Gang*</td>
<td>8132835</td>
<td>Ap Rok Gang</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang Saeng</td>
<td>8630382</td>
<td>Tenyu</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>31/10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jae San 2</td>
<td>9041552</td>
<td>Hoe Ryong</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1/11/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Rang*</td>
<td>8829555</td>
<td>Po Thong Gang</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9/12/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong San</td>
<td>8882052</td>
<td>Ka Chi Bong</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Vessels associated with OMM

Source: Equasis, IMO, and Lloyd’s List Intelligence
12.2. The *Morning Glory*

Interim Certificate issued by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the *Morning Glory* for the period 17 February to 16 August 2014

*Source:* UN Panel of Experts on Libya pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)
Annex 13: Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association


The following document shows a registered owner of the OMM-controlled vessel, Taedonggang Sonbak Company Ltd., has used Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for the Ryong Gang 2 as early as 2008.

[Image of a shipping document]

Source: The Panel
13.2. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for Zang Za San Chong Nyon Ho

Document from the Zang Za San Chong Nyon Ho (also known as (aka) Jang Ja Chong Nyon Ho) refers to Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for the vessel’s registered owner, Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd.

Source: South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA)
13.3. Insurance certificate for the *Chong Chon Gang*

Insurance certificate of 2014 below shows inconsistencies between date of issue, duration of security and validity period.

[Image of the insurance certificate]

*Source: The Panel*
13.4. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for the Chong Chon Gang

Certificate of Entry issued by Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association for the Chong Chon Gang on March 2014

Source: The Panel
13.5. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for the *Mu Du Bong*

Insurance certificate for the *Mu Du Bong* issued in March 2014

*Source: Mexican authorities*
13.6. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association’s letter of undertaking following grounding of the *Mu Du Bong* on 21 July 2014

Source: Mexican authorities
13.7. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association Certificate of Entry with false date of issue

This document was not carried aboard the vessel and was produced following the grounding of the “Mudu Bong” in July 2014 as part of efforts to persuade the Mexican authorities to release the “Mudu Bong.” Identical Certificate Number 022-43A-2014 (annex 13.8) now provides cover for “Wreck Removal and Restoration Costs” instead of “oil pollution only.”

Source: Mexican authorities
13.8. Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association as insurance provider for the *Mu Du Bong*

Certificate of Entry for *Mu Du Bong* issued by Korea Shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association in March 2014. Certificate Number 022-43A-20T/2014 provides coverage limited to “oil pollution only”.

*Source: The Panel*
Annex 14 – Ocean Maritime Group

Extract from a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publication relating to Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM)

Source: Foreign Trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2006 No. 3 and 2007, No.
Annex 15 – Ocean Maritime Management Company-associated vessels

a. Registered as active (as of 28 July 2014):

1. Chol Ryong (formerly known as [aka] Ryong Gun Bong) (IMO 8606173)
2. Hu Chang (aka O Un Chong Nyon Ho) (IMO 8330815)
3. Hua Chon (aka Hwang Gum San 2) (IMO 8405270)
4. Ji Hye Can (aka Hyok Sin 2) (IMO 8018900)
5. Kang Gye (aka Pi Ryu Gang) (IMO 8829593)
6. Mu Du Bong (IMO 8328197)
7. Myong San 1 (aka Po Thae) (IMO 7632955)
   • registered as broken up on 22 August 2014
8. O Rang (aka Po Thong Gang, Bo Thong Gang) (IMO 8829555)
9. Ryong Rim (aka Jon Jin 2) (IMO 8018912)
10. Se Phe (aka Rak Won 2) (IMO 8819017)
11. Song Jin (aka dang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho) (IMO 8133530)
12. Tae Ryong Gang (aka Ap Rak Gang) (IMO 8132835)
13. Tan Chon (aka Ryong Gang 2) (IMO 7640378)
14. Tong Hung San (aka Chong Chon Gang) (IMO 7937317)

b. Registered as inactive (as of 28 July 2014):

15. Chong Jin 2 (IMO 7623241)
   • registered as broken up on 24 April 2013
16. Dai Hong Dan (IMO 7944695)
   • registered as broken up on 25 July 2013
17. Dok Chon (IMO 7411260)
   • registered as broken up on 12 October 2010
18. Ja Gang (IMO 7405998)
   • registered as broken up on 3 March 2006
19. Jang San (also known as [aka] Zang San) (IMO 8358599)
   • registered as broken up on 29 April 2013
20. Jip San (IMO 8330827)
   • registered as broken up on 17 April 2014
21. Jon Jin (aka Grand Jade) (IMO 7385734)
   • registered as broken up on 12 October 2010
22. Kwan Mo Bong (IMO 8126862)
   • registered as broken up on 13 March 2012
23. Mi Rae (IMO 7700663)
   • registered as broken up on 14 December 2011
24. Mu San (IMO 7920596)
   • registered as broken up on 24 November 2012
25. Paek Ma Gang (aka Baek Ma Gang) (IMO 7944683)
   • registered as broken up on 16 April 2013
26. Pe Gae Bong (IMO 8328616)
   • registered as broken up on 8 March 2014
27. Sun Il Po (IMO 8829567)
   • registered as broken up on 25 April 2013
28. Sin Chon (IMO 7720881)
   • registered as broken up on 17 November 2012
29. Tae Dong Gang (IMO 7738656)
   • registered as broken up on 16 May 2014
30. Tae Gak Bong (aka Dae Gak Bong) (IMO 8729884)
   • registered as total loss on 9 December 2012
31. Ta Mak Gol (IMO 8829581)
   • registered as total loss on 5 April 2005
32. Tu Man Gang (aka Du Man Gang) (IMO 7937305)
   • registered as broken up on 3 May 2013
33. Wang Joe San (IMO 7738670)
   • registered as broken up on 8 November 2011
34. Yon Phung Ha (IMO 8101032)
   • registered as broken up on 14 June 2012

c. Ocean Maritime Management Company formerly registered

35. Ryong Nam 2 (aka South Hill 2) (IMO 8412467)
   • OMM was registered as the ship’s manager and operator from 1 August 2006 to July 2012,
     and beneficial owner from 16 November 2006 to July 2012. This vessel is still registered
     active.

Source: IMO and Tokyo MOU databases, and information obtained by the Panel
Annex 16 – Ocean Maritime Management Company and Korea Tonghae-associated entities

16.1 Summary information

The Panel has identified that Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM) has owned and/or operated at least 35 vessels over the past decade, most of which were originally owned and/or controlled by Korea Tonghae Shipping Co. By 28 July 2014, 21 out of 35 vessels were already registered inactive.

Korea Tonghae was involved in the 1996 illicit exports of two chemical precursors listed as agents for military use under the Japanese Export Trade Control Order. The Pong Su (IMO 8005836) was also intercepted by the Australian navy in April 2003 when the vessel was used in an attempt to smuggle heroin into Australia.

Sohae Sonbok Co Ltd, Taedonggang Sonbok Co Ltd, Tonghae Sonbok Co Ltd, and Korea Tonghae have been registered in the IMO database with the same address (CPO Box 120, Changgwang-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) which appears similar to OMM’s address (CPO Box 120, Tonghun-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). Further, OMM, Sohae Sonbok, Taedonggang Sonbok, and Tonghae Sonbok have shared the same fax number (+850-2-381-4567) and phone number (+850-2-18111 ext. 381-8818).

OMM developed business relationships with these four entities as early as June 2004 (annex 16.2). As of 28 July 2014, Taedonggang Sonbok still served as a registered ship manager and/or operator for two OMM-controlled vessels, according to the IMO and Tokyo MOU databases.

OMM adopted evasion techniques to evade the monitoring or regulations of certain countries, partnering with these entities, which predates the imposition of United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006. At various times over the past decade, multiple vessels’ registrations were changed simultaneously, which coincided with missile/rocket launches, nuclear tests or military actions on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These re-registrations may have been made in anticipation of, or in response to, strengthened sanctions or monitoring by the relevant Member States.

Since 2008, the various roles of manager, operator, and owner were incrementally transferred from all these companies to OMM. In the process, OMM controlled these vessels through other entities, each of which served as registered owner and/or operator of a single vessel for some period of time. Therefore, OMM evasion techniques predated the imposition of sanctions.

In particular, registrations for multiple OMM-controlled vessels were changed almost simultaneously in 1999, July-September 2006, June-September 2010, May-June 2011, and April-June 2012. While the motives behind these simultaneous registration changes have yet to be confirmed, most timings appear to coincide with missile launches, nuclear tests or military action undertaken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These include the first failed attempt to launch the Taepodong missile in 1998; the naval war with the Republic of Korea in 1999; the Taepodong rocket launch in July 2006; a nuclear test in October 2006; the sinking of the Republic of Korea’s Cheonan warship in March 2010; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea artillery attacks on the Republic of Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010; and a failed launch of the Taepodong 2 rocket in April 2012.
16.2 Ocean Maritime Management Company’s 2004 letter showing its relationships with Sohae Sonbak, Taedonggang Sonbak, and Tonghwa Sonbak

Source: The Panel
Annex 17 – Entities assisting Ocean Maritime Management Company in the evasion of sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ocean Maritime Management Company entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company Name</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See annex 18 for company details.
Annex 18 – Entities that have worked for Ocean Maritime Management Company

Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM)
- New alias: East Sea Shipping Company
- IMO registration date: 25 December 2007
- Address: Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Address 2: Donghung Dong, Central District, PO Box 120, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-17; +850-2-18111 Ext 8818
- Fax: 850-2-381-4567; +850-2-3814567
- Email: oceanmm@silbank.com, oceanmm@silbank.net.kp, wonyang@silbank.com, eastseashipping@silbank.net.kp

Ammokgang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5459864)
- A registered owner and operator of the Ap Rok Gang (IMO 6132835) from 25 December 2007 to 26 September 2014. The ship manager was registered in the IMO database as OMM for the same period.
- The Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-15; Fax: 850-2-381-4567; abokgang@silbank.com

Biryuang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5434513)
- A registered owner of the Pt Ryu Gang (IMO 8829593) whose ship manager and operator was registered in the IMO database as OMM from 2011 to 10 September 2014. This company is registered in the IMO database with a c/o address provided by OMM.

Cholyang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5814870)
- A registered owner of the Chol Ryang (IMO 5606173) since August 2014, which was renamed from Ryong Gun Bong on 1 August 2014. The Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Date of incorporation: 18 June 2014
- Address: 607, Haem, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8814-5; Email: Haejinm@silbank.net.kp

Chongchongang Shipping Company Limited (IMO 5814870)
- Registered owner, ship manager and operator of the Chong Chon Gang (IMO 7937317) from April 2009 to 30 September 2014. The Panel has identified it as an OMM-controlled vessel.
- Address: 817, Haem, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-18; Fax: 850-2-381-4567; Email: chongchongang@silbank.com

Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd (IMO 5814866)
- A newly registered ship manager and operator of the Chol Ryang (IMO 5606173) which was renamed from Ryong Gun Bong on 1 August 2014. The Ryong Gun Bong’s ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM until August 2014.
- A newly registered ship manager and ISM manager of the following OMM-controlled vessels:
  - the Song Jin (IMO 8135350) which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Hoe.
  - the Ryong Rim (IMO 8015912) which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from Jon Jin 2.
  - the So Pho (IMO 8819017) which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Rak Won 2.
- Date of incorporation: 30 April 2014
- Address: Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8814-5; Email: Haejinm@silbank.net.kp
Huchang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5820255)
- A newly registered owner of the *Hui Chang* (IMO 8330815) which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from *O Un Chong Nyon Ho* operated by OMM.
- Address: c/o Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Huchon Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817812)
- A newly registered owner of the *Hui Chun* (IMO 8405270) which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from *Pi Ryu Gang* operated by OMM.
- Date of incorporation: 5 August 2014
- Address: c/o Pyongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, Ryulkyo 1-dong, Pyongchon-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; and 35, Paksong 2 Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8071; Email: pyongjinsm@silbank.net.kp

Hwanggumson Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5701481)
- A registered owner of the *Hwang Gun San 2* (aka *Hui Chun*) (IMO 8405270) which was renamed to the *Hui Chun* on 1 October 2014. The ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from 4 October 2012 to September 2014. It is registered in the IMO database with a c/o address provided by OMM.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Hyoksin Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5459966)
- A registered owner of the *Hyok Sin 2* (IMO 8018900) which was renamed to the *Ji Hye Can* on 1 October 2014. The ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from September 2010 to September 2014.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; and 615, Haemun, Tonghung-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-23; Fax: 850-2-381-4567; hyoksin@silbank.com

Jangjasan Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5465593)
- A registered owner, ship manager and operator of the *Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho* (IMO 8133530) from 14 April 2009 to 10 October 2014 which was renamed to the *Song Jin* on 1 October 2014. However, the Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM manager.
- Address: 602, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-25; Fax: 850-2-381-4567; jangjasan@silbank.com

Jangsan Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5614045)
- A former registered owner of the *Jang San* (IMO 8328599) whose ship manager and operator was registered in the IMO database as OMM until this vessel was registered as "Broken up" on 29 April 2013. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that OMM expressed its intent to pay outstanding bunker cost on behalf of this company on 11 January 2013.
- Address: 703, Haemun, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK

Jihyasan Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5821426)
- A newly registered owner of the *Ji Hye Can* (IMO 8018900) which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from *Hyok Sin 2* controlled by OMM.
- Date of incorporation: 31 August 2014
- Address: c/o Haemin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Address 2: 563, Pongji-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8145; Email: haeminms@silbank.net.kp
Jonjin Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5571089)
- A registered owner of the *Jin Jin 2* (IMO 9018912) which was renamed to the *Ryong Rim* on 1 September 2014. The ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from September 2010 to 4 September 2014.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghuang-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Kanggye Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5822864)
- A newly registered owner of the *Kang Gyu* (IMO 8829593) which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from *Pi Ryu Gang* operated by OMM.
- Date of incorporation: 6 September 2014
- Address: Pyongyang, DPRK
- Address 2: Haeun 2 Dong, Phyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8025; Email: yongjinm@silibank.net.kp

Mirae Shipping Co Ltd (aka Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd.) (IMO 5268829)
- According to Mirae Shipping HK, this company has worked as broker for hiring OMM crews. It was associated with ownership and operation of OMM-associated vessels.
- Date of IMO registration: 24 February 2003
- Address: 105 Haewun Building, Tonghuang-dong, Chung-guyok, PO Box 2034, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Address: Tonghuang-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-09; Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: mirae@silibank.com

Mudubong Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5435991)
- A registered owner of the *Mu Du Bong* (IMO 8328197) since 6 January 2009 whose operator has been identified by the Panel as OMM.
- Address: CPO Box 120, Changkwang-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK, and 611, Haeun Tonghuang-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Myongsan Marine Co Ltd (IMO 5814897)
- A registered owner of the *Myong San 1* (IMO 8330815) which was renamed from the *Pho Thao* on 1 August 2014. OMM was the registered ship manager and operator for the vessel from June 2011 to July 2014.
- Date of incorporation: 30 July 2014
- Address: Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8025; Email: Yongjinm@silibank.net.kp

Orang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5821443)
- A registered owner of the *O Rang* (IMO 8829555) since 10 September 2014 which was renamed from *Po Thong Gang* on 1 September 2014. The vessel’s ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from 24 October 2008 to 31 July 2014.
- Address: 802, Ponghak Dong, Phyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK, and c/o Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghuang-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Oum Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5459949)
- A registered owner of the *O Un Chong Nyon Ho* (IMO 8330815) which was renamed to the *Hu Chong* on 1 September 2014. The ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from 2 July 2008 to 10 September 2014.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghuang-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK, and 713, Tonghuang Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-16; Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: oum@silibank.com
Phothae Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5614076)

- A former registered owner of the Pho Thae (IMO 8330815) whose ship manager and operator was registered in the IMO database as OMM from June 2011 to 31 July 2014. The Pho Thae was renamed to Myong San 1 on 1 August 2014.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Pothonggang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5459952)

- A registered owner of the Pho Thong Gang (IMO 8829555) from 24 October 2008 to 1 September 2014. The vessel was renamed to the O Rang on 1 September 2014. The Tokyo MOU database lists OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Address: 709, Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-10; Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: pothonggang@silbank.com

Pyongjin Ship Management Co Ltd (IMO 5817790)

- A newly registered ship manager and ISM Manager of the Hai Chon (IMO 9405270) since October 2014 which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Hwang Gun San 2.
- Date of incorporation: 18 June 2014
- Address: 102, Ryuggyo 1 Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8071; Email: Pyongjinsm@silbank.net.kp

Rakwon Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5459918)

- A registered owner of the Rak Won 2 (IMO 8819017) whose ship manager and operator is registered in the IMO database as OMM from August 2011 to September 2014. The Tokyo MOU database also listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM manager.
- Address: 712, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-07; Fax: 850-2-381-456; rakwon@silbank.com

Ryonggang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5522315)

- A registered owner of the Ryong Gang 2 (IMO 7640378) which was renamed to the Tan Chon on 1 October 2014. The ship manager and operator were registered in the IMO database as OMM from September 2010 to September 2014.
- Address: c/o OMM, CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Ryonggunbong Shipping Co Ltd

- A former registered owner of the Ryong Gun Bong (IMO 8606173) from 15 October 2006 to August 2014. The vessel was renamed to Chul Ryong on 1 August 2014. The Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Address: CPO Box 120, Changkwang-dong, Chungu-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Ryongnam Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817772)

- A former registered owner of the Tu Man Gang (IMO 7937305) whose ship manager and operator was registered in the Equasis database as OMM until this vessel was listed “Broken up” on 3 May 2013. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that OMM expressed its intent to pay outstanding bunker cost on behalf of this company on 11 January 2013.
- Date of incorporation: 13 August 2014
- Address: 404, Ryugyong 2 Dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8145
- Email: Haepmsm@silbank.net.kp
Ryongrim Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817772)
- A newly registered owner of the Ryong Rim (IMO 8018912) since 5 September 2014 which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from Jon Jin 2.
- Address: c/o Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Seapho Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5821412)
- A newly registered owner of the Se Pho (IMO 8819017) since September or October 2014 which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Rak Won 2.
- Date of incorporation: 27 August 2014
- Address: c/o Haen Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK, and 905, Poushak Dong, P'yongyangchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- TEL: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8145
- Email: haegwon@silbank.net.kp

Sohae Sonbok Co Ltd (IMO 1697711)
- Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that OMM managed vessels owned by this company no later than since 2004.
- Address: CPO Box 125, Changgwang Street, Donghieung-dong, Chung-ku, Pyongyang, DPRK; and Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-13 Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: sohauseonbok@silbank.com

Songjin Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5821430)
- A newly registered owner of the Song Jin (IMO 8133330) since 10 October 2014 which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho.
- Date of incorporation: 1 September 2014
- Address: c/o Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; and 915, Ryugyong 2 Dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8145
- Email: haejmum@silbank.net.kp

Taedonggang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5435974)
- A registered owner of the Taedong Gang (IMO 7738656) which was registered “Broken up” in the IMO database on 16 May 2014. The Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Address: Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK, and Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-04 Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: taedonggang@silbank.com

Taedonggang Sonbok Co Ltd (IMO 1845139)
- A registered ship manager and operator of the Taedong Gang (IMO 7738656). The Tokyo MOU database listed OMM as the vessel’s ISM Manager.
- Address: CPO Box 120, Changgwang-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; and Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-03 Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: taedonggangsonbok@silbank.com

Taeryongsang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5814906)
- Registered ship manager and operator of the Taeryong Gang (IMO 8132835) since 26 September 2014, which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Am Nok Gang.
- Address: c/o Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.
- Date of incorporation: 2 July 2014
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8025
• Email: Yongjinsm@silbank.net.kp

Tanchon Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817809)
• A newly registered owner of the Tan Chon (IMO 7640378) since October 2014, which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Ryong Gang 2.
• Address: c/o Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.
• Date of incorporation: 11 August 2014
• Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8025; Email: Yongjinsm@silbank.net.kp

Tonghae Sonbak Co Ltd (IMO 1845023)
• Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that OMM managed vessels owned by this company no later than since 2004.
• Address: P O Box 120 Changkwang-dong, Chang-su, Pyongyang, DPRK; and Tonghung Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
• Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-06; Fax: 850-2-381-4567
• Email: tonghaesonbak@silbank.com

Tonghungsan Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5826665)
• Newly registered owner and ship and ISM manager for the Tong Hung San (IMO 7937317) since October 2014, which was renamed from Chong Chong Gang in October 2014.
• Address: 283, Pyongyong 2-dong, Potonggang-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK.

Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd (IMO 5814883)
• A newly registered ship manager and operator of the Myong San 1 (IMO 8330815) since August 2014, which was renamed on 1 August 2014 from Pho Thao.
• A newly registered ship manager of the following vessels:
  o The Kang Gye (IMO 8829939) since 11 September 2014, which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from Pi Ryu Gang; and
  o The Hu Chang (IMO 8330815) since 10 September 2014, which was renamed on 1 September 2014 from O Un Chong Nyon Ho.
• A newly registered ship manager and ISM manager of the following vessels:
  o The Taes Ryong Gang (IMO 8132835) since 26 September 2014, which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Am Nok Gang; and
  o The Tan Chon (IMO 7640378) since October 2014, which was renamed on 1 October 2014 from Ryong Gang 2.
• Address: Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK (source: IMO database).
• Date of incorporation: 30 June 2014
• Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8025; Email: Yongjinsm@silbank.net.kp

Yonphungho Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5522350)
• A former registered owner of the Ton Phuong Ho (IMO 8101032) whose ship manager and operator was registered as OMM until this vessel was registered as “Broken up” on 14 June 2012. Information obtained by the Panel demonstrates that OMM expressed its intent to pay outstanding bunker cost on behalf of this company on 11 January 2013.

Source: Equasis, IMO and Tokyo MOU databases and information obtained by the Panel

The following OMM-associated vessels’ movements are reported in Lloyds’ Intelligence Database and other AIS tracking databases.

Chol Ryong (Ika Ryong Gun Bong) (IMO 8606173)
The Ryong Gun Bong was renamed to Chol Ryong in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Maritime Administration’s database in August 2014. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Haegij Ship Management Co., Ltd. and Cholryong Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-28 November 2014</td>
<td>Nakhodka, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October 2014</td>
<td>Dalian, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August-2 September 2013</td>
<td>Caoheidian, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-31 August 2013</td>
<td>Caoheidian, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 August 2014</td>
<td>Jingjiang, China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hu Chang (Ika O Un Chong Nyon Ho) (IMO 8330815)
The O Un Chong Nyon Ho was renamed to Hu Chang. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Yongjin Ship Management Co., Ltd. and Huchang Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-14 October 2014</td>
<td>Jingjiang, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8 August 2014</td>
<td>Qinhuangdao, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 August 2014</td>
<td>Qinhuangdao, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hui Chon (Ika Hwang Gun San 2) (IMO 8405270)
The Hwang Gun San 2 was renamed to Hui Chon in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Maritime Administration’s database sometime by 9 September 2014. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Pyongjin Ship Management Co. and Huchon Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29-30 October 2014</td>
<td>Lanshan, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 October 2014</td>
<td>Lanshan, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 October 2014</td>
<td>Juzhou, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September-2 October 2014</td>
<td>Lanshan, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kang Gye (Ika Pi Ryu Gang) (IMO 8829593)
The Pi Ryu Gang was renamed to Kang Gye. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Yongjin Ship Management Co., Ltd. and Kanggye Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 November 2014</td>
<td>Jingjiang, China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Myong San 1 (Ika Pho Thae) (IMO 7632955)
The Pho Thae was renamed to Myong San 1 in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Maritime Administration’s database in August 2014. The newly registered companies for this
vessel are Yongjin Ship Management Co., Ltd. and Myongsan Marine Co., Ltd. Shortly after this registration change, however, this vessel was recorded to have become inactive. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

**Date** | **Location**
--- | ---
22 August 2014 | Jiangyin, China (inactive)
20 August 2014 | Qingdao, China
18-20 August 2014 | Huangdao, China

**O Rang (Ika Po Thong Gang) (IMO 9829555)**
In specialized maritime databases, the *Po Thong Gang* was renamed to *O Rang* by 6 January 2015 and recorded with the following movements:

**Date** | **Location**
--- | ---
8 December 2014 | Nakhodka, Russia
24 September-13 October 2014 | Nakhodka, Russia
7-9 September 2014 | Jinggang, China

**Ryong Rim (Ika Jon Jin) (IMO 8018912)**
The *Jon Jin* 2 was renamed to *Ryong Rim* database as of 1 September 2014. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Haejin Ship Management and Ryongrim Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

**Date** | **Location**
--- | ---
4 January 2015 | Zhuhai, China
10-12 October 2014 | Laishan, China
9-10 October 2014 | Laishan, China (anchored)
23-24 September 2014 | Laishan, China
21 August- sometime before 23 September 2014 | Lianyungang, China (anchored)
19-21 August 2014 | Laishan, China
5-7 August 2014 | Tianjin, China

**Se Pho (Ika, Rak Won 2) (IMO 8819017)**
The *Rak Won 2* was renamed to *Se Pho*. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Haejin Ship Management and Sepho Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

**Date** | **Location**
--- | ---
29 November - 1 December 2014 | Zhangjiagang, China

**Song Jin (Ika Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho) (IMO 8133530)**
The *Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho* was renamed to *Song Jin*. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Haejin Ship Management and Songjin Shipping. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

**Date** | **Location**
--- | ---
6 November 2014 | Laishan, China (anchored)
2-5 November 2014 | Laishan, China
23 October 2014 | Dalian, China
14-22 October 2014 | Tangshan, China
10-14 October 2014 | Tangshan, China (anchored)
10-11 September 2014 | Jingjiang, China
Tae Ryong Gang (fka Am Nok Gang) (IMO 8132835)
The Ap Rok Gang (fka Am Nok Gang) was renamed to Tae Ryong Gang in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Maritime Administration’s database in August 2014. Yongjin Ship Management was newly registered for this ship manager, replacing OMM. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 December 2014</td>
<td>Humen, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 November 2014</td>
<td>Huangpu, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 November 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 October 2014</td>
<td>Bayuquan, China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tan Chon (fka Ryong Gang 2) (IMO 7640378)
The Ryong Gang 2 was renamed to Tan Chon. The newly registered companies for this vessel are Yongjin Ship Management and Tan Chon Shipping Co., Ltd. In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-5 October 2014</td>
<td>Huangpu, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 October 2013</td>
<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21 August 2014</td>
<td>Dalian, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19 August 2014</td>
<td>Tangshan, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 August 2014</td>
<td>Tangshan, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tong Hung San (fka Chong Chon Gang) (IMO 7937317)
The Chong Chon Gang was renamed to Tong Hung San. The newly registered company for this vessel is Tonghungsan Shipping Co., Ltd. (IMO 5826665). In specialized maritime databases, this vessel was recorded with the following movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 August 2014</td>
<td>Tangshan, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 August 2014</td>
<td>Tangshan, China (anchored)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of PSC inspection records of OMM associated vessels after 28 July 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>IMO Number</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reported Manager</th>
<th>ISM Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ho Chong (fka O Un Chong Nyou Ho)</td>
<td>8330815</td>
<td>Qinhuangdao, China</td>
<td>5 August 2014</td>
<td>OMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu Du Bong</td>
<td>8328197</td>
<td>Tuxpan, Mexico</td>
<td>6 August 2014</td>
<td>OMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Rang (fka Po Thong Gang)</td>
<td>8829555</td>
<td>Nakhodka, Russia</td>
<td>13 October 2014</td>
<td>OMM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryong Rim (fka Jon Jin Ju)</td>
<td>8018912</td>
<td>Rizhao, China</td>
<td>12 October 2014</td>
<td>Haejin Ship Management Co., Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Jin (fka Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho)</td>
<td>8133530</td>
<td>Rizhao, China</td>
<td>4-5 November 2014</td>
<td>Haejin Ship Management Co., Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tae Ryong Gang (fka Am Nok Gang)</td>
<td>8132835</td>
<td>Yingkou, China</td>
<td>12 October 2014</td>
<td>Yongjin Ship Management Co., Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tokyo MOU database and information obtained by the Panel
Annex 20 – Summary of Ocean Maritime Management Company’s activities in Thailand

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Chamber of Commerce’s 2007 publication, Foreign Trade of DPRK, includes an entry on OMM, specifically referring to the entity’s “overseas representative offices” in several cities, including Bangkok, Thailand (annex 14). According to an international maritime industry association’s records, a DPRK national, Mr. Ri P’hyong Gu, was listed as Director of OMM Bangkok as early as 2005 (annex 21). Mr. Ri was also registered as an OMM employee and a contact person for Mariner’s Shipping and Trading Co., Ltd. (annex 21.2-5). Mr. Ri was listed as a member of the Board of Directors of Marine’s Shipping until 15 July 2014. The Panel has obtained information that demonstrates the involvement of Mariner’s Shipping in the operation of OMM-associated vessels including the Am Nok Gang and the Mu Du Bong (annexes 21.7-11, 47.1-5).

An individual operating under the name of “Mr. Steven Lee” represented the Mu Du Bong as broker and agent when the vessel passed through the Panama Canal in June 2014 (annex 21.7-8). He also presented himself in Mexico as legal representative of the vessel’s owner company (annex 21.9). Based on additional information obtained, the Panel identifies Mr. Steven Lee as an alias used by Mr. Ri P’hyong Gu. The identification information of Mr. Ri matches that provided by the international shipping industry association on Mr. Ri P’hyong Gu who was registered as OMM’s employee and a contact person for Mariner’s Shipping.

Through its investigation, the Panel has obtained multiple documents demonstrating OMM’s control of the Mu Du Bong (annexes 21.10-22). The vessel’s captain received email instructions on a daily basis from “Earn Shipping <haeun@ksc-th.com>”, the same email address used by Mr. Ri (aka Steven Lee).

A document obtained by the Panel from the Chong Chong Gang, lists two individuals as “Thailand representatives” (see annex 21.6). The telephone numbers are listed as 0066 892026221 for a “Representative” named “Won, Sun-kuk” and 0066 898944733 for a “Deputy Representative” named “Choi Ho-young”. Below is the summary of the information about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals who have worked for Mariner’s Shipping:

Mr. Ho Yong Jun
- Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- DOB: 23 September 1967
- Passport number: 199120109 (diplomatic) and 563220337

Mr. Choi Ho-young
- Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- This name was listed as “Deputy representative” on a document obtained by the Panel from the Chong Chong Gang

Mr. Won Song Guk (aka Won Sung-kuk)
- Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- DOB: 7 December 1966
- Passport number: 563120138 and 918220452 (diplomat)
- Known titles: OMM’s former representative in Thailand (a document obtained by the Panel from the Chong Chong Gang); contact person for OMM.

Ms. Ri Sun Yong
- Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- DOB: 19 May 1961
- Passport number: 563420641
- Ms. Ri is Mr. Ri P’hyong Gu’s spouse and has worked as a translator for Mr. Ri both prior to and after 28 July 2014.
Annex 21 – Mr. Ri, Mariner’s Shipping, Mudunbong Shipping and Ocean Maritime Management Company

21.1 Mr. Ri, Director of OMM Bangkok

It gives us great pleasure to invite Mr. Ri Phyong Gu, from Ocean Maritime Management Co. Ltd., Pyongyang, D.P.R. of Korea and accompanying person, Mr. Choe Ho Yong to attend our upcoming General Meeting to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark from Monday, 23 May 2005 to Wednesday, 25 May 2005.

This invitation applies to both:

Name: Ri Phyong Gu
Date of birth: 23 September 1961
Place of birth: D.P.R. of Korea
Passport number: 645520639
Date of issue: 29 January 2005
Expiry date: 29 January 2010

and

Name: Choe Ho Yong
Date of birth: 22 April 1963
Place of birth: D.P.R. of Korea
Passport number: 56421310
Date of issue: 02 November 2004
Expiry date: 02 November 2009

If you require further information, please do not hesitate to contact us. We look forward to seeing Mr. Gu and Mr. Yong in Copenhagen.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Source: The Panel

[Image of delegates]

Source: The Panel
21.2 International shipping association registration of Ocean Maritime Management Company and its contact persons, including Mr. Ri Phyong Gu

Source: The Panel

Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd.

haeun@ksc.th.com

Source: The Panel

haeun@ksc.th.com
daem@ksc.th.com

Thai mobile phone number
+6622929440
21.3 International shipping association registration of Mariner's Shipping

Mariner's Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd.
14/63 Sathorn Rd.
Bang Pong Pong Yarmawa
10120 Bangkok, Thailand
(mst001)@ksc.th.com
+66-2-299-6070
+66-2-299-5847

Ri Phyong Gu
mst001@ksc.th.com

Close-up

Source: The Panel
21.4 Mariner’s Shipping request for Thailand to issue visa for Mr. Ri Phyong Gu

Ref: MST008/2312
24 December 2013

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
The Royal Thai Embassy,
Beijing, China

Dear Excellency,

We would like to request your Excellency to kindly issue visa to the Kingdom of Thailand to the following persons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Passport No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. RI PHYONG GU</td>
<td>23 SEPT 1961</td>
<td>563420640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. RI SUN YONG (Spouse)</td>
<td>19 MAY 1961</td>
<td>563420641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. RI PHYONG GU, the Chartering Manager of the PETREL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Poomyang, D.P.R. of Korea and his spouse will visit our office for the purpose of practising in the field of Shipping and Chartering Operations of Thai’s system for duration of about 90 days.

We, as their exclusive representative in Thailand will be fully responsible for the said persons during their stay in the Kingdom of Thailand.

Your kind attention would be greatly appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

Managing Director

Source: The Panel
21.5 Mariner’s Shipping’s permanent employment contract with Mr. Ri Phyong Gu of 1 August 2014

Source: The Panel
**In English**

**PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT**

This employment contract is made at Mariner's Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd., No. 603/33-34, Rama 3 Road, Bangrak Sub-District, Yanawa District, Bangkok Metropolitan, on 1st August 2014.

Between Mariner’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd., hereafter referred to as the “Company” as one party and Mr. RJ Phyoong Ge, aged 33 years, residing at House No. 1817/136, Parliament Alley, Samran Rat Road, Bangrak Sub-District, Yanawa District, Bangkok Metropolitan, hereafter referred to as the “employee” as the other party. Both parties agree to enter into the contract in writing as follows:

Clause 1. The Company agrees to employ and the employee agrees to be employed as the permanent employee in the position of Manager, Division/Section: International Coordination, such as being required by the company since 1st August 2014.

Clause 2. The Company agrees to pay the wage to the employee in the monthly rate of 45,000 Baht (Forty-five thousand Baht only). The Company shall pay wage every 30th day of each month at the company office.

Clause 3. The normal working date and time, break and weekly holidays of the Company are as follows:

3.1 Normal working days: Monday to Saturday
3.2 Weekly holiday: Sunday
3.3 Break: The Company shall provide all employees the break, 1 hour/day each.

Clause 4. The employee must be obedient and comply with the notices and instructions of the Company or the superior and observe the available or prospective work rules or regulations strictly. In case of violation or insubordination by the employee, the Company shall consider the disciplinary penalty for the employee according to the rules immediately.

Clause 5. The employee promises that if the employee does or omits any act or allows other person to do any act intentionally or negligently, and it causes damage against the Company either directly or indirectly, the employee agrees to compensate for the damage to the Company completely.

Clause 6. The employee shall not be hired to work for other person or operate the business by himself or representative or be involved with any business as the competition or damage against the company’s business.

Clause 8. If the employee wishes to resign from being the company’s staff, he should give prior notice to the Company at least 30 days.

Both parties have read and understood this contract thoroughly. They consider correct based on the intentions. Therefore, they sign names in presence of the witnesses.

Signed: ____________________________

(Mr. RJ Phyoong Ge)

Employee

Source: The Panel
21.6 Document from Chong Chong Gang captain’s cabin on referring to “Thailand Representatives”

Source: The Panel

Informal English translation

Thai Representative (handphone)

Representative: Won. Sung-Ink (0066-892026221)

Deputy Representative: Choi, Ho-young (0066-898944753)
21.7 Communication between “Steven Lee” and foreign agent where he represents himself as broker/agent for Mu Du Bong as well as employee of Mariner’s Shipping

Dear [Redacted]

This is in response to your email of [Redacted].

We are the brokers/agent of this vessel. Our contact details are: Mr. Steven Lee, Tel: 66 983696419, Mariner’s Shipping and Trading Co Ltd., Rama 3 road, Bangkok, 10120 Thailand.

Please confirm that we have your acceptance of Owners’ agency appointment by return.

Kind regards,
Steven Lee

Source: The pane

“Company details: we are the brokers/agent of this vessel. Our contact details are: Mr. Steven Lee, Tel: 66 983696419, Mariner’s Shipping and Trading Co Ltd., Rama 3 road, Bangkok, 10120 Thailand.”

“Steven Lee”
21.8 Email accounts used by “Steven Lee”

“OCEAN BKK haeum@ksec.th.com”

[Image of email]

“Eun Shipping haeum@ksec.th.com”

[Image of email]

“Li Ping jocesan@hotmail.com”

[Image of email]

Source: The Panel
21.9 Mr. Steven Lee identified as an alias used by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national named Mr. Ri Phyong Gu

Mr. “Steven Lee” has been identified by the Panel as an alias used by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national, Mr. Ri Phyong Gu, who had obtained a visa and travelled to Mexico in August 2014. Using his real name, Mr. Ri signed a salvage agreement with a Mexican salvage company, in his capacity “as the Mv Du Bong Shipping Company Legal Representative”, on 5 August 2014.
21.10 (STRICLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Source: The Panel
21.12 Mr. Ri Phyong Gu’s correspondence to the Panel of 5 January 2015

From: "Mariner's Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. (C)" <mst001@kse.th.com>
Date: January 5, 2015 at 4:31:52 AM EST

Subject: UNSC S/AC.49/2014/PE/OC.449 Mr Ri
Reply-To: "Mariner's Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. (C)" <mst001@kse.th.com>

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,
A Happy New Year!
I am writing this letter in response to your letter dated December 19, 2014 that I received by fax on December 30, 2014.
My answers to your queries are as below:
1. I am not the Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd's overseas representative but usually assist the DPR Korea commercial vessels and vessels of other flags calling at Thai ports at their request.
2. Yes, I was involved, as requested by the owners through Mariner's Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd, in the operation of M/V Mu Duong in the arranging of her transit through Panama Canal using the name of Steven Lee, which is my nick name.
3. I had not any knowledge of the sanction on Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd until I received your email in early August when I was in Mexico, looking after, at the Owners' request, M/V Mu Duong which went aground off Tuxpan port, Mexico in early July 2014.
I hope the above answers suffice your questions.

Thanks and kind regards/Ri Phyong Gu

Source: The Panel
21.13 Mariner’s Shipping’s correspondence to the Panel of 5 January 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From:</th>
<th>Mariner’s Shipping &amp; Trading Co., Ltd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To:</td>
<td>Mariner’s Shipping &amp; Trading Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co:</td>
<td>Mariner’s Shipping &amp; Trading Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>05/01/2015 05:31 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject:</td>
<td>UNSC-S/AC.4/2014/P/OC.448: Mariner’s Shipping &amp; Trading Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To: Mr. Hugh Griffiths  
cc: Whom it may concern  
Date: 5 Jan 2015

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

This letter is in regard to your message dated 19 December 2014. Please find here below our answers:

1) Mariner’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd is wholly owned by Thai nationals who hold 100% of the company common stock. Therefore, all decision-making power belongs to these Thai shareholders. Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd does not have any authority or control over its operations.

2) Mr. Choi Ho-young, Mr. Ho Yang Jun and Mr. Won Song Guk were just our former employees whose employment contracts have already ended.

3) Mariner’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd and all our employees were never informed that Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd was designated by the Security Council on 28 July 2014 until we received your email in August 2014 In addition, we were asked for help by Marubong Shipping Co., Ltd and not by Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd.

Please kindly note that we have been operating our business with honesty and integrity. We work extremely hard and abide by Thai laws and regulations. We believe that everything that we do is legal and rightful and contributes to international peace and harmony. Therefore, once and for all, we have provided the information which you requested. The information provided is the truth and it is all we have.

Best regards.

Mariner’s Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd.

Source: The Panel
Annex 22 – Ocean Maritime Management Company’s control of Mu Da Bong

22.1 Mexico Port State Control inspection of 6 August 2014 listing “Ocean Maritime Management Co Ltd”

Source: Mexican authorities
22.2 Document from the *Mu Du Bong* noting ship owner as “Ocean Maritime Management”
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) *

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential
22.3 *Mu Du Bong* official documents referring to Ocean Maritime Management Company

*Mu Du Bong* Safety Management Certificate
issued by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Maritime Administration lists Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of ship</td>
<td><em>MU DU BONG</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctive number or letters</td>
<td>UMA O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of registry</td>
<td>CHONJIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of ship</td>
<td>GENERAL CARGO SHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross tonnage</td>
<td>6683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO number</td>
<td>932897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Company</td>
<td><strong>OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT CO., LTD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address of Company</td>
<td>TONGHUN DONG, CENTRAL DISTRICT, PYONGYANG, DPR KOREA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO Company ID Number</td>
<td>1790183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Panel*
Mu Du Bong Document of Compliance, issued by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Maritime Administration, lists “Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd”
Mu Du Bong’s Continuous Synopsis Record, issued by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Maritime Administration, lists “Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd.”

Source: The Panel
22.4 Contract of 21 May 2014 lists "Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd." as "Managers/Operators" of the *Mu Du Bong*
14.3.5. The Owners/Managers/Operators of the said ship shall advise International Marine Experts, at least 88 hours prior to the arrival of the ship in Panamanian Waters about such arrival.

14.2.6. This agreement shall be valid from the date of signature. Either party may terminate this agreement by simply giving a three (3) months notice in writing. All accounts must be settled within a thirty (30) day period after the notice is given.

14.2.7. If neither party presents a written notice to terminate this agreement, the agreement will be renewed automatically.

This agreement is valid from:   
(MMDDYYYY)   
Until:   
(MMDDYYYY)

Subject to compliance with the requirements of this agreement, and the Panama Canal Oil pollution Emergency Plan (PCOPEP) requirements.

Signature and stamp of the Owner.  
(As per C of this agreement)

Signature and stamp of the Manager/Operator.  
(As per C of this agreement)
22.5 Invoice of *Mu Du Bong*’s transactions with a foreign company referring to “Ocean Maritime Management Ltd. DPR. Korea”

![Invoice Image]

*Source: The Panel*
22.6 Documents listing Mudubong Shipping Co., Ltd.'s contact information as the same used by Ocean Maritime Management Company

Mudubong Shipping Co., Ltd. letterhead lists email address and a telephone number that have also been used by Ocean Maritime Management Company.

Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited (Headquarters)  
Donghun Dong, Central District, PO Box 120, Pyongyang, DPRK  
Tel: 850-2-13111 Ext. 8813  
Fax: 850-2-3814567  
Email: oceanmm@stibank.net.kp  

Source: The Panel
Annex 23 – Directory of OMM-associated entities
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)†

† The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential
Annex 24 – Entities and individuals based in China, Japan and Malaysia

Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd. (Mirae Shipping Pyongyang) operated a China-based branch office named Shenzhen Representative Office of Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd. (hereafter “Mirae Shipping Shenzhen”) which has shared administrative and/or operational functions with Mirae Shipping (H.K.) Co., Ltd. (hereafter “Mirae Shipping Hong Kong”). Mirae Shipping Pyongyang and these two entities have been involved in arranging shipping services for OMM-associated vessels, in coordination with OMM’s overseas representatives, including OMM’s office in Dalian (see annexes 25-26).

Key facts relating to these entities:

- **Individuals named Mr. Yang Bong Rim and Mr. Lee** have worked for Mirae Shipping Shenzhen, and an individual named Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsugu has been listed as director of Mirae Shipping HK. All three have been extensively involved in arranging shipping services for OMM-associated vessels, acting on behalf of or at the direction of OMM’s headquarters and overseas representatives based in Brazil, China, Singapore, and Thailand.

- The legal representative of OMM Dalian is “Chungu Jin”. However the Panel could not find OMM Dalian’s official registration.

- Mirae Shipping Shenzhen and/or Mirae Shipping Hong Kong have used as contact person a Malaysia-based individual and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national named Mr. Pak In Su who was affiliated with a Malaysia-based entity named Malaysian Coal and Minerals Corporation Sdn Bhd until 2 January 2015 (annex 25.7-8)

- Mirae Shipping Pyongyang and OMM have shared the same fax number (+850-2-381-4567) and phone number (+850-2-18111 ext. 381-8818) (annex 25.2). Mirae Shipping Shenzhen has also used OMM’s email address (oceanum@slibank.net.kp) (annex 47.15)

- Mirae Shipping Pyongyang was a registered owner, ship manager and operator of the vessel Mi Rae (IMO 7700063) whose beneficial owner was registered in the IMO database as OMM until the ship was registered as “inactive” on 14 December 2011. A Japan-based company, OMM Incorporated, was also involved in this vessel’s operation (annex 28.3).

- Mirae Shipping Pyongyang also owned and/or controlled the Ryong Nam 2 (IMO 8412467) at least in June 2007 and from 21 September 2009 to 27 July 2011. The vessel’s owner, operator and manager were officially registered as OMM during this period.

- According to Mirae Shipping Hong Kong, Mirae Shipping Pyongyang has reportedly worked as broker for hiring crews for OMM, and Mirae Shipping Hong Kong employed crew members assigned by OMM.

- Mirae Shipping Hong Kong is the registered owner, operator and manager of the Great Hope (IMO 8307492). The vessels crew was assigned by OMM, according to Mirae Shipping Hong Kong.
Mr. Kasatsugu, Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s director, is also chief executive officer (CEO) of a Japan-based company, Kinyo Shipping Co., Ltd., which has been officially listed by Chongryon (aka General Association of Korean Residents) as one of its associated entities. For years, this company was reportedly in charge of “general agency functions” for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s vessels and involved in shipping agent services for OMM-controlled vessels before the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) (annex 28). Information obtained by the Panel indicates Kinyo Shipping’s business relationship with Mirae Shipping Hong Kong in recent years.

Kinyo Shipping has also shared administrative and/or operational functions with another Japan-based company, OMM Incorporated (hereafter “OMM Inc.”). The two companies are registered with almost identical lines of business. Mr. Kasatsugu was formerly listed as OMM Inc.’s director until March 2003. According to information obtained by the Panel, OMM Inc. was involved in the Mt. Rae’s operation.

Mirae Shipping Hong Kong and Mirae Shipping Shenzhen were established in May 2007 and December 2007 respectively. Kinyo Shipping’s functions may have been transferred to these entities after Japan strengthened sanction against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006.

The Panel investigates OMM’s relationships with the aforementioned companies based in Japan and Malaysia.

Summary of information regarding Mirae Shipping Pyongyang, Mirae Shipping Shenzhen, Mirae Shipping Hong Kong, OMM Dalian and Mr. Pak In Su

Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd.
- Aka: Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd.
- Address: 105 Haevun Building, Tonghun-dong, Chung-guyok, PO Box 2034, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Address: Tonghun Dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
- Tel: 850-2-18111 ext 381-8818-09
- Fax: 850-2-381-4567
- Email: mirae@silibank.com
- Date of IMO registration: 24 February 2003

Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd.’s Shenzhen Representative Office
- Aka: Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Office
- Chief Representative: Mr. Yang Bong Rim
- Mr. Yang has presented himself as Ocean Maritime Management Company using the email address of oceanmmm@silibank.net.kp.
- Deputy Representative: Mr. Lee (phone +86 15813730174)
- Address: 16G, New times Plaza, Taizhi road, Shekou, Shenzhen, China 518067
- Tel: +86-755-26859661
- Fax: +86-755-26859665

1 In Japanese: 株式会社近洋海運.
2 See www.chongryon.com/kr/link1.html
3 In Japanese: 株式会社オー・氷・氷・氷. The Panel has not confirmed whether OMM Inc. is a subsidiary of the designated entity, OMM.
• Email: miraeshpgsz@mrshipping.com.cn; miraeshpg@cagency.com.cn
• Mobil: 0086-18665335190; 0086 15817469031

Mirae Shipping (H.K.) Co., Ltd.
• Address: 18th Floor, Thungsun Commercial Centre, 194-200, Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China.
• Director: Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsugu (nationality: Japan; passport number: TK0666126)

OMM Dalian
• No. 10, 10th Floor Unit 1, No. 32-1 Wuwu Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China
• Tel: +86 411-82778898
• Representative: Chungu Jin

Mr. Pak In Su
• Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
• Passport number: 290221242
• Date of birth: 23 May 1957
• Employed by Malaysian Coal and Minerals Corporation Sdn Bhd (business registration number 521100-K) until 2 January 2015
• Office address: No. 26, Jalan Wangsa Delima 2A, Kuala Lumpur Suburban Centre III, Seksyen 5, Wangsa Maju 53300, Kuala Lumpur
Annex 25 – Mirae Shipping, OMM Dalian, and Malaysian agent

25.1 Mirae Shipping Shenzhen registration record

25.2 Mirae Shipping Pyongyang and Ocean Maritime Management Company’s IMO registration records

Company Name: Mirae Shipping Co Ltd
IMO Company Number: 5268829
Company Address: 105 Haewun Building, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, PO Box 2034, Pyongyang, North Korea.
Country of Registration: Korea, North

Company Name: Ocean Maritime Management Co Ltd
IMO Company Number: 1790183
Company Address: CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea.
Country of Registration: Korea, North

Source: IMO

Mirae Shipping Pyongyang
Address: 105 Haewun Building, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, PO Box 2034, Pyongyang, North Korea

OMM
Address: CPO Box 120, Tonghung-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea
25.3 Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s business registration record, dated 29 May 2014

**Annual Return**

**Company Name**

MIRAE SHIPPING (H.K.) CO. LIMITED

**Type of Company**

Private company

**Date to which this Return is Made Up**

29 05 2014

**Address of Registered Office**

18/F., Tung Sun Commercial Centre, 194-200 Lockhart Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong

Presenters Reference

Name: P & T Corporate Consultants Limited
Address: 18/F., Tung Sun Commercial Centre, 194-200 Lockhart Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong
Tel: 2598 8283
Reference: CK, 13637350014, 10/07/2014

25.4 Evidence showing the involvement of Mirae Shipping Hong Kong and/or Mirae Shipping Shenzhen in arranging shipping services for OMM-associated vessels

Communication records obtained by the Panel from the Chong Chon Gang referring to "Mirae"

Figure 1.

To: eck@eck.com
CC: Mirae

CC: Chong Chon Gang
- DISCHARGE COMPLETED 2200 18/11/11
- TTL CGA QTY DISCH 11362 MT ONLY
- DREDGING DRAFT F/A 1.77/5.24
- RMB 150 105-119.26
- NEXT PORT ARRIVAL DRAFT F/A 1.77/5.30
- 783 NM TO JINGTANG
- ETA JINGTANG 22/11/11 1400 NT

RODS.

Figure 2.

To: 163.com 01/11/11
CC: eck@eck.com

CC: Mirae

To: Chong Chon Gang

DISCHARGE COMPLETED 2200 18/11/11
TTL CGA QTY DISCH 11362 MT ONLY
DREDGING DRAFT F/A 1.77/5.24
RMB 150 105-119.26
NEXT PORT ARRIVAL DRAFT F/A 1.77/5.30
783 NM TO JINGTANG
ETA JINGTANG 22/11/11 1400 NT

RODS.

Source: The Panel
Figure 3.

Informal English translation
"I contacted MIRAE REP (representative) and was told that it did not arrange (yet) (certain of) the part and material."

Figure 4.

Source: The Panel
25.5 Communication records between Mirae Shipping Shenzhen and Panama Canal authorities regarding the O Un Chong Nyon Ho’s passage through the Canal in 2012

--- Message from miraeshipgsz@mirushipping.com.cn on 2012-03-21 10:00:00 ---

To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

Subject: MV O UN CHONG NYON HO / SIN NO.6002784 / IMO NO.8 3 3 0 8 1 5

TO PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY

FR MIRAE SHIPPING

RE: MV/OUNCHONGNYONHO / IMO NO.8 3 3 0 8 1 5 / SIN NO.6002784

Good day,

We send PCSOPEP of mv ounchongnyonho as attached. The vsl will arrive at Cristobal on/around 09th.May.

Rgds

Mirae Shipping Co Shenzhen office
16G,Times Plaza,Taiz road,Shenou,Shenzhen,PR.China
PC 518067
Tel - 0086-755-26859661
Fax - 0086-755-26859661
Mobil - 16655335190

Source: The Pasel
25.6 Communication records between Mirae Shipping Shenzhen, Ocean Maritime Management Company Brazil, and a Panamanian shipping agent regarding the Po Thong Gang’s passage through the Panama Canal in 2011

Figure 1

From: miraeshpqs
Sent: 2011-12-30 10:30
To: Yonggun Ju
Cc: OceanBrazil; BRAZIL OCEANREP
Subject: Re: PO THONG GANG

TO OCEAN BRAZIL
FM MIRAE SHPG

RE OUTSTANDING OF MV PO TRONG GANG

==

ATTACHED BANK SLIP USD2,393.51 FOR YOUR REF.
THANKS & BEST REGARDS

MIRAE SHIPPING(HK) CO LTD, SHENZHEN OFFICE
ROOM G, 16/F, TIMES PLAZA, NO.1, TAIZI ROAD,
SHENZHEN, P.R.CHINA(518057)
TEL +86 755 2685 9661 / 9662  FAX +86 755 2685 9665
CHIEF REP(MR.YANG) +86 158 17469031, DEPUTY REP(MR.LEE) +86 15813730174

Source: The Faleza
From: Yonggun Ju [mailto:oceanrep-brazil@iol.com.br]
Sent: 2011 10:44 a.m.
CC: mirae@mrshipping.com.co; 'BRAZIL OCEANREP'; 'OceanBrazil'
Subject: RE: PO THONG GANG

TO:
FM OCEAN BRAZIL

NV PO THONG GANG FINAL D/A

THANK YOU FOR THIS.

PLEASE DESPATCH FINAL D/A TO
Mirae Shipping Co Ltd, Shenzhen Office
Room G,16/F,Times Plaza,No.1,Teizi Road,
Shekou,Shenzhen,P.R.China (518067)
Tel + 86 755 2685 9661 / 9662

THEY REMITTED PRO FORMA D/A TO YOU AND WILL SETTLE ANY BALANCE
PLEASE ADVISE COURIER AIRWAY BILL NUMBER WITH COPY TO US

BEST REGARDS

Yonggun Ju
Overseas Representative in Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
IMO no. 1790183 Billing Ref no 100242
Tel 55 11 2729 9571
Cel 55 11 8739 0162

Source: The Panel
25.7 Email of March 2011 from Mirae Shipping (Shenzhen) to a Malaysian shipping agent notifying Mr. Pak in Su as a contact person

Figure 1

sosship

From: m[redacted]
Sent: 28, 2011 2:08 PM
To: [redacted]
CC: [redacted]
Subject: Re: Fw: MV JIS
Attachments: MANIFEST.pdf, SP.pdf

DEAR SIR,

WE APPOINT YOU AS A AGENT OF THE VSL. PLEASE SEND US EST PDA ASAP AND WE WILL ARRANGE REMITTANCE ASAP.

ATTACHED SP & MF FOR YOUR REF, MR. PAK WILL BE SENT YOU B/L SOON.

THANKS & BEST REGARDS

MIRAE SHIPPING(HK) CO LTD, SHENZHEN OFFICE ROOM 6,16/F,TIMES PLAZA,NO.1,TAIZI ROAD, SHEKOU,SHENZHEN,P.R.CHINA(518067)
TEL + 86 755 2685 9661 / 9662 FAX + 86 755 2685 9665
CHIEF REP(MR.YANG) + 86 1581/4600311, DEPUTY REP(MR.LEE) + 86 1581730174

----- Original Message -----  
From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]<m[redacted]>
CC: [redacted]
Sent: 2011 1:46 PM
Subject: Re: Fw: MV JIS

Dear Pak,

Good day,

We are still waiting for the charterer or owner to appoint us as their agent, also please advise which party is responsible for the port charges.

M'time, please send us below document soonest possible.
1. copy b/l
2. cargo manifest
3. stowage plan.

rgds

Source: The Panel
Figure 2

---Original message-----

From: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Fw: MV JJS

Dear [Redacted],

Pls chk mail from 50 and there is any problem, let me know.

Tkrs & B Regards,

Pak

----- Original message ------

Subject: Fw: MV JJS

From: miraeshpgsz <arshppgsz@msrshipping.com.cn>
To: Malaysia Pakinsu <ksitcd@ymail.com>

CC:

입수동부

경사장장

==

상기내 일정수락, 하선보장을 위한 다음의 자료들 보낼为您.

- SSO name KIM U YONG, IMO NBR 8133530, MMSI NBR nil - Issuance authority of
- ISSC: Maritime administration, DPR KOREA
- Date of Issue: 12TH MAY 2009
- Expiry: 11TH MAY 2014
- Port of issue of ship’s sanitation cert: FANGCHENG, CHINA
- Date of issue of ship’s sanitation cert: 12TH JUNE 2010 - Ship’s particulars: attached - Checklist: attached - Last 10 ports of call:
  1. 3rd MAR 2011 22ND MAR 2011 SONGTH, D.P.R.KOREA
  2. 23RD FEB 2011 26TH FEB 2011 ZANGDIAGANG, CHINA
  3. 14TH FEB 2011 16TH FEB 2011 POSYET, RUSSIA
  4. 1ST JAN 2011 13TH FEB 2011 CHONGJIN, D.P.R.KOREA
  5. 13TH DEC 2010 31ST DEC 2010 WONSAN, D.P.R.KOREA
  6. 29TH NOV 2010 4TH DEC 2010 HAEJU, D.P.R.KOREA
  7. 8TH NOV 2010 13TH NOV 2010 JIANJIN, CHINA
  8. 1ST OCT 2010 3RD OCT 2010 CHONGJIN, D.P.R.KOREA
  9. 15TH SEP 2010 38TH SEP 2010 KIMCHAEK, D.P.R.KOREA
  10. 3RD SEP 2010 8TH SEP 2010 NAMPHO, D.P.R.KOREA
- Ship security level: 1

Source: The Panel
25.8 Email exchanges between “Mr. Yang” of Mirae Shipping (Shenzhen) and Mr. Pak In Su (Malaysia)

From: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted] <miraeshogsz@mrshipping.com.cn>; [Redacted]
Sent: 2011 3:37 PM
Subject: RE: Fw: MV JJS

Dear Mr. Yang,

Pls send documents asked by Mr SH Ng, agent of MV JJS by fax.
And also send proper doc asked by him asap.

Tks n B Regards,

Pak

Source: The Panel
25.9 Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s correspondence to the Panel of 29 September 2014, (First round)

From: <mirae.import@mirashipping.com.cn>
To: [redacted]
Date: 29/09/2014 11:06 AM
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 188 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Dear Sirs:

Reference is made to your letter dated 12th September 2014 with reference no.: S/AC.49/PE/DC.188

We wish to clarify our relationship with as follows:

- OMM:
  We have hired the crew provided by OMM to operate and maintain the vessel of our ownership. But being aware of the present sanction against OMM, we plan to close the crew service contract with OMM within this year and work with new crewing source.

- Mirae Shipping (Shenzhen):
  It is the branch office of Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd (DPRK) being in charge of ship operation and ship technical maintenance of our vessels under the management contract between us. To our knowledge, they were the cargo brokers time to time for some of the vessels under OMM management but always before the sanction. M/V “Chong Chon Gang” was one of them and it was normal for Master to report to the broker under “CC” of his vessel’s movement under the voyage.

- Mirae Shipping (DPRK):
  They work as our brokers in hiring the OMM crew. They strictly examine, check and select the crew provided by OMM on the spot to support our ship crewing. To our knowledge, they are also broking the cargo and vessels between ship owners and charterers for the commission.
Reference is made to your letter dated 18th July 2014 with reference no.: 5/AC.49/2014/PE/OC.122

1) Mirae Shipping (HK)'s relationship with O Un Chong Nyon Ho and Bo Tong Gang;
- Mirae Shipping (HK) has no relation with both owners of mv. O Un Chon Nyon Ho and mv. Bo Tong Gang

2) Mirae Shipping (HK)'s relationship with OMM;
- We have hired the crew provided by OMM to operate and maintain the vessel of our ownership
- We have paid the accrued crew salary by way of remittance to the bank account nominated by OMM.
As long as there is no rejection from our HSBC bank, international banking system and beneficiary bank, we executed the remittance orders as per their request.

3) Identification and contact details of the individuals and/or the entities that requested Mirae Shipping make the payments to the Panama agent
To our knowledge, Mr. Choe Nam Chol was the accounting manager in charge of crew salary in OMM when he requested us the remittance to the Panama agent for canal transit of mv. Bo Tong Gang. (Tel: 00850-2-18222/ext. 8818)
To our knowledge, Ms. Sonu Ok Hi was also the accounting manager in charge of crew salary in OMM when she requested us the remittance to the Panama agent for canal transit of mv. O Un Chon Nyon Ho. (Tel: 00850-2-18222/ext. 8818)

4) Copies of documents relating to the aforementioned passages by O Un Chong Nyon Ho and Bo Tong Gang for the passages through the Panama Canal in 2011 and 2012, showing the names and contact details of the individuals or entities that worked for OMM.

Please see attached for the corresponding mails

Rgds

Source: The Panel's correspondence record of 29 September 2014
Attachment to Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s email to the Panel

From: "oceanmm" <oceanmm@slbank.net.jp>
To: "mirasehpgz2" <mirasehpgz2@mirshtipping.com.cn>
Sent: Thursday, Feb 10, 2011 5:56 PM
Subject: PO TONG GANG REMITTANCE

To Mirae Shipping
Fm Ocean MM
Re remittance

Pls remit USD 115,220.5 to below bank acct for canal passing for sub val’s smooth transition of panama canal.

Pls note Bank detail as below

Beneficiary name: [redacted]
Beneficiary bank: [redacted]

Beneficiary acc No: [redacted]

Pls inform sale receipt of this msg

B rgds/

From: "oceanmm" <oceanmm@slbank.net.jp>
To: "mirasehpgz2" <mirasehpgz2@mirshtipping.com.cn>
Sent: Monday, May 7, 2012 8:10 AM
Subject: O UJ CHONG NYON HO at Panama Canal

To Mirae Shipping
Fm Ocean MM
Re minc

Pls urgently remit USD 31,400 to below bank acct for Panama of the vsl and inform us the result:

Pls find Beneficiary Bank detail as below

Beneficiary name: [redacted]
Beneficiary bank: [redacted]

Beneficiary acc: [redacted]

B rgds

Source: Correspondence records provided by Mirae Shpping HK
25.10 Second round of correspondance between Mirae Shipping Hong Kong and the Panel. 1 December 2014

| From: <mirasehpogz@mrsshipping.com.cn> |
| To: |
| Date: 01/12/2014 09:36 AM |

Dear sir,

Please find here below our reply in red on your enquiry

Enquiry

- Information related to the relationships between your company, OMM, Mirae Shipping Shenzhen, Hua Heng Shipping Limited, and Liaoning Foreign Trade Foodstuffs Shipping Co Ltd. in connection to the Great Hope (including a summary of the specific roles and responsibilities of each company).

  Hua Heng Shipping Limited is contractual counterpart for ISM and PSC, while Mirae Shenzhen is for crew management and technical maintenance.

- Copies of documents regarding your business dealings with Hua Heng Shipping Limited, Liaoning Foreign Trade Foodstuffs Shipping Co. Ltd., and Mirae Shipping Shenzhen in connection to the Great Hope, including copies of contracts, business documents and relevant correspondence records; and

  We would appreciate your understanding that we are contractually bound not to disclose the relevant documents as per the clause of confidentiality and privacy

- Identities and contact details of the individuals and entities who have worked for Hua Heng Shipping Limited, Liaoning Foreign Trade Foodstuffs Shipping Co. Ltd., and Mirae Shipping Shenzhen with respect to their dealings with OMM in connection to the Great Hope.

  We are not allowed to disclose their personal data

Documents showing your company’s plan to cancel its contract with OMM

Your correspondence of 29 September 2014 noted plans to discontinue your contract with OMM by the end of 2014. The Panel understands that the contract requires a written notice of cancellation to be provided by your company. In this regard, the Panel would be grateful for the following information:
☐ Copies of your company’s cancellation notice and any other legally binding documents related to the contract termination;

    We contacted them by phone and explained to them of the sanction circumstances and noticed them of our intention to terminate our mutual contract asking their understanding.

☐ Copies of correspondence with OMM related to the contract termination, and

    And we sent them a letter in this connection.
    You can ask them a copy

☐ Information related to your company’s most recent business dealings with OMM (up to the point of contract termination) and copies of supporting documents.

    No any business dealing with OMM nowadays

In addition, the Panel understands that in the event of early cancellation, OMM is contractually obliged to return a share of your company’s advanced payment. In relation to this, the Panel requests:

☐ Copies of financial transaction records showing OMM’s remittance; and

    There is no balance to collect from OMM

☐ Confirmation of the OMM bank account information used for this transaction.

    Not available as no such balance transaction

Your previous business dealings with OMM

In your correspondence of 20 October 2014, you provided a copy of payment advice related to your business dealings with OMM, which included a remittance dated 9 June 2012 to Chinpo Shipping Co. Pte. Ltd. (hereafter “Chinpo Shipping”), for US$ 100,014.21. However, this document does not list any transactions with OMM (see annex 2) but the Panel understands that under your contract for the Great Hope, your company makes $350,000 (USD) payments to OMM annually for crew wages.

In this regard, the Panel would like to request the following information:

☐ Copies of correspondence with OMM and Chinpo Shipping to confirm that the remittance dated 9 June 2012 was for payment to OMM;

    We are unable to find them after long time. You can ask on same to Chinpo Shipping or OMM
Identities of all individuals at Chinpo Shipping known to have worked for OMM.

We are not allowed to disclose their personal data

Copies of documents showing financial transactions between your company and OMM related to the annual lump-sum payments of $350,000 (USD); and

Please refer to the payment instructions regarding Panama canal transit of Pho Thong Gang, O Un Chon Nyon Ho and remittance details for US$ 100k to Chinpo which we sent you last

Information related to all bank accounts known to be used by OMM.

In addition, your correspondence of 20 October 2014 states that your company acted as cargo brokers for OMM-associated vessels. In this regard, the Panel requests:

Copies of documents related to your business dealings with OMM for all vessels since 12 June 2009; and

As per the clause of confidentiality and privacy with OMM, afraid we are unable to provide with the documents. Please obtain permission from OMM.

Copies of relevant contracts, business documents, correspondence records and shipping documents.

As per the clause of confidentiality and privacy with OMM, afraid we are unable to provide with the documents. Please obtain permission from OMM.

Further, your correspondence of 29 September 2014 provided copies of OMM requests for three remittances to be paid to a Panamanian shipping agent for passage through the Panama Canal for the O Un Chong Nyon Ho and the Bo Tong Gang in 2011 and 2012 (see annex 3 for ease of reference).

In this regard, the Panel would like to request the following information:

Copies of documents that show corresponding remittances from OMM to your company to cover the remittances paid to the Panamanian shipping agent, and

We remitted from the accrued crew salary as per their request, thus no need to collect from OMM

A list of the specific services your company has provided for these vessels (as requested in our letter of 2 October 2014).
There was no specific service after normal service including the resistance for the Panama Canal transit.

Information about individuals who have worked for OMM.

The Panel would be grateful for the information relating to the identities of:

☐ All crew members who were provided by OMM to your company; and

Impossible to release any personal data without their permission.

☐ All individuals known to have who have worked as OMM’s overseas representatives.

Not available and no relationship.

Your company’s relationships with Korea Mirae Shipping Co., Ltd. (hereafter “Mirae Shipping DPRK”) and Mirae Shipping Shenzhen.

Your correspondence of 20 October 2014 states that your company is not Mirae Shipping DPRK’s branch office and that Mirae Shipping DPRK is “a counterpart of management contract and ship owner”. In this regard, however, your correspondence of 29 September 2014 noted Mirae Shipping DPRK as being “our brokers in hiring the OMM crew”. As such, the relationship between these two statements is not clear.

In order to clarify this point, the Panel requests the following:

☐ Copies of documents related to your business dealings with Mirae Shipping DPRK, including contracts (as requested in our letter of 2 October 2014);

Please understand we need permission from Korea Mirae Shipping.

☐ Identifications and contact details of the individuals who have worked for Mirae Shipping DPRK in connection to its dealings with OMM for your company (as requested in our letter of 2 October 2014); and,

Please understand we need permission from Korea Mirae Shipping.

☐ Information related to the unnamed vessel owned by Mirae Shipping DPRK referred to in your correspondence of 20 October 2014 and your company’s relationship with this vessel.

There was no “MIRAE” under ownership of Korea Mirae Shipping Co and was sold in December 2013 according to our understanding.

Your correspondence of 20 October 2014 also stated that your company has not shared any management personnel and/or employees with Mirae Shipping Shenzhen. In this regard, the Panel would be grateful for:

☐ Clarification as to whether your company has shared administrative or operational functions with Mirae Shipping Shenzhen (for example, office space or contact information).

No sharing. Mirae HK is based in HK and Shenzhen office is based in Shenzhen, China.

#gets
Annex 26 – Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s contract with OMM

CONTRACT OF SEAMEN’S SERVICE
BETWEEN MIRAE SHIPPING (HK) CO., LTD
AND
OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT CO., LTD

Date: 28th November 2008

This contract is made this day of 28th November 2008 and mutually agreed between MIRAE SHIPPING (HK) CO., LTD (hereinafter called the Party A) and OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT CO., LTD (hereinafter called the Party B) through friendly consultation with regard to the seamen’s recruit from the Party B to work on the cargo vessels of the Party A on the following terms and conditions:

1. “Party A” to employ about 30 crew from Party B for their manning of m/v Great Hope (hereinafter called “the Vessel”). The particulars of the Vessel are given to Party B who hereby confirms its receipt in order.

The ranks and/or ratings of the crew of each ship are specified hereunder:

1) Master
2) Chief Officer
3) 2nd Officer
4) 3rd Officer
5) Ch Engineer
6) 2nd Engineer
7) 3rd Engineer
8) 4th (Assist) Engineer
9) Electrical Officer
10) Bosun
11) AB * 3
12) Motorman * 3
13) Cook
14) Doctor

The Party A has the right to board and remain on board the Vessel at any time at their option to supervise the performance of the crew and the voyages.

2. Certificate and qualification
The Party B confirms that it is a duly licensed manning or crewing agency under the laws, and is competent to lawfully supply the Seamen required by the Party A.

The Party B to provide competent seamen who must possess the following documents in original and which are valid for a further period of at least 12 months from the date of embarking:

- All kinds of valid STCW qualification certificates, including seaman’s book, competence certificate, record book, professional training certificate (such as Fire Fighting; Medical First Aid; Survival at Sea: Proficiency In Survival Craft; ARPA etc.) and vaccination health certificate in accordance with the World Health Organization: Flag-State’s requirements.
- The master and other deck-officers must also hold the certificates of GMDSS.
- The Master and/or the Chief Officer should be duly certified as SSO.

Party B shall provide Party A with the records of the seamen filled in the forms presented by Party A. The qualifications and records of the seamen supplied by the Party B should be true and valid. Otherwise, the Party A has the right to cancel the employment contract and the Party B will bear all losses and consequences arising there from.

Party B is obliged to arrange all Seamen visas, passports and other travel permits and documents as required by the Party A to enable the hired Seamen to be properly employed upon the Vessel and their issuing cost to be borne by Party B. The minimum validity of all documents, so far as practical, to be at least 125% of the contract duration of the seafarer from his expected date of embarking the vessel.

Party A has obligation to provide all crew with COEs of the flag country.

Party B has obligation to provide Party A with related documents required by Flag-State for application.

3. Period of service: The seamen employed by the Party A shall serve on board the Vessel of the Party A in a period of twelve months with one month more or less in requirement of the Party A. In principle, the seamen will go on board the Vessel from a port of China and/or to go on board at a port outside China where the crew of the Party B can be on board with no problems as regards to entry to the concerned country and boarding on the ships under special circumstances.

The period of service will commence upon the seamen embarking the vessel at the port as stated above.
4. Party B is responsible and liable for ensuring that officers and ratings can prove a satisfactory command of the English language, both in oral and written communication for employment.

5. Party B shall arrange for pre-employment physical and medical examinations of the seamen in accordance with the World Health Organization/Flag-State’s requirements. All seamen to possess the international certificate of health examination and international certificate for vaccination or prophylaxis including Yellow Fever and Cholera immunizations valid for the term of their contract.

6. Party B shall arrange necessary joining documents (Seaman’s book, I.D., Certificates of Training etc.), immigration documents(obtained Visa), domestic transportation etc. and make any other necessary arrangements for the Seamen to be ready for joining the designated Vessel, and shall inform the Party A of their readiness. The seamen must possess the following certificates and documents in original, which are valid for a further period of at least 12 months:

   - Passport, Seaman’s Identity Certificate
   - STCW Certificate
   - Pre-joining Medical Examination Report
   - Vaccination Health certificates

7. Party B warrants that it has checked with due diligence and is satisfied with the authenticity of the Seaman’s training and documentation under STCW 78/95 and STCW 2010.

8. Party A shall inform the Party B of the joining schedule of the Seamen, such as date of departure, name of port, name of agent with full address, at least 30 days prior to the joining date. In the case of urgent situations, the Party B shall endeavor to dispatch the seamen in less than 15 days.

9. Wages, meals expenses and others

   1) Party A shall pay to “Party B” USD 350,000.00 (say, three hundred and fifty thousand U.S. Dollars only) per year as crew wages in lump-sum excluding crew provisions to the Party B’s nominated bank account provided that same payment is accepted by the international banks.

   2) In case of earlier cancellation of the Contract by mutual agreement, the money advance to Party B should be returned to Party A’s nominated bank account based on the calculation of actually incurred costs.
3) Opening/closing hatch covers, securing and lashing deck cargo job are as crew's routine work and crew are not be entitled to request any additional allowances.

4) Party A shall provide the crew on board with seasonal working suits, helmets, gloves and shoes on their account.

5) The crews on board have the right to use free of charge the general labor protective articles provided by the “Party A”.

6) Party A to monthly advance to Master USD 500.00 (say, five hundred US Dollars) in cash to spend as a normal entertainment for port in/out clearance.

7) Party A shall arrange timely supply of stores and parts requested by the master for technical maintenance or provisional repair of the Vessel.

8) Party B has right to request Party A. Cash-to-Master in advance against the deduction from the crew wage.

9) In case of late payment of crew wages more than one month from the due date, the interest of 1 (one) percent per month shall be charged to Party A for the delayed period from the due date.

10. The Trading Area of Ship: worldwide trading excluding USA, South Korea, Japan and Australia.

11. Party A confirms that the Vessel where the seamen will work has been properly surveyed and proved to be suitable for ocean-going by an internationally recognized or the Vessel flag administration’s recognized organization that have issued the Ships’ certificates.

12. The seamen provided by the Party B and their duties:

1) To obey the order and arrangement of the Party A and strictly comply with their discipline, rules and regulations and ship operation procedures.

2) To comply strictly with the disciplines, rules and regulations concerning the customs for foreigners and to protect the interest and reputation of the Party A.

3) To perform their duties and try their utmost to fulfill their work every day, maintaining the deck-equipment and engine in a good condition.

4) To cooperate between departments and to help one another on board.

5) To secure safety of ship and cargo on board, to provide an excellent service for the “Party A”.
6) To accept self-consciously the training under the ISM /ISPS rules and to execute the procedures and regulations of SMS/SSP/SEEMP.

7) When encountering PSC inspection, if no deficiencies are found, Party A shall pay USD 500 to the crew. On the contrary, crew will be penalized up to maximum USD 300 if all deficiencies are more than 5 items and USD 500 if vessel is detained in PSC inspection but as far as such deficiencies are proved caused due to negligence in their normal maintenance works. The same can be deducted by Party A from the crew wages.

13. The expenses for dispatch and repatriation.

1) Party A to bear all the traveling expenses for dispatch and repatriation of seamen based on the actual bills incurred out of the DPR Korea.

2) Party B to bear all the traveling expenses incurred in the DPR Korea.

3) However, if the Party B recalls a seaman or he signs off due to personal reasons during the period of a contract and which is approved by Party A, or the seaman’s incompetence of his job or his own disease, such expenses and all the related consequential charges incurred to be on the account of Party B or the seaman himself.


Party A shall provide crew with following working and living conditions

1) Maximum working hours and minimum hours of rest;
   "Working Hours" means the time during which crew are required to do work on account of the Vessel.
   Maximum working hours: 14 hours per 24 hours but 48 hours for 7 days period except emergency situation.
   Minimum rest hours: 10 hours per 24 hours but 77 hours for 7 days period standard normal working hours shall be based on one eight-hour working day including the day of rest per week and rest on public holidays.

2) Conditions of accommodation.
   Party A shall provide for accommodations which meet the minimum requirements of rules of the ILO. Otherwise, Party B may refuse to place the crew aboard the Vessel and all losses and expenses incurred there from shall be borne by the Party A.
15. Termination of contract for individual crew:

When the Party A approves a seaman to sign off, the seaman must make clear exchange of his job with the one who will take over his position by signing on a leaving bill. All the articles which he has taken care of should be handed over to the new on-signer according to the regulations of the Party A. The seaman to settle his wages against the bill of hand-over and take-over, failing to do this and leaving without approval, the Party A shall lodge a claim of economic compensation against the Party B and the seaman concerned.

16. Insurance and medical service:

1) Upon being on board the Ships till signing off the ship, the Party A shall carry personal accident insurance for the seamen and bear the insurance premium for any injury, disablement or death by accident.

Party A to compensate the seaman (seamen) according to the following criteria (all in US Dollars):

i. Loss of life: 50,000.00
ii. Disabled seaman’s loss of working ability (degree of disability);
   - 28,500 - 49,500 50-99%
   - 28,000 Upto 49%
   - 20,000 Upto 40%
   - 15,000 Upto 30%
   - 10,000 Upto 20%
   - 6,200 Upto 10%
   - 3,100 Upto 5%

* Party A shall appoint a doctor to determine degree of disability.

2) Party B, at the request of the Party A, submits the necessary documents.

3) In case of being ill or injured by an accident while working on board, the Party A shall provide medical treatment and medicine. If the crew can not work and hospitalization is required due to being heavily ill and/or injured, such situation should be certified by a
doctor and the Party A to follow the doctor's final recommendation on whether to return to work or home after recovery.

Party A shall provide the Vessel with necessary medicine and medical kits as listed in International Medical Guide for Ships and permit a ship's doctor to purchase the medicine which is unavailable on board but needed in treatment of crew who falls ill during his stay on board. Such permission shall be given upon request from the master, otherwise the master can purchase the medicine as prescribed by the ship's doctor and regulation of relate laws for the accounts of Party A. In any case, the master must present supporting documents for any expenditure he makes without formal permission from the Owners.

4) Above item 1) and item 3) are not applicable in case of intentional doing by the seaman or being ill or injured by his own misconduct.

5) The crew on board must not keep the history of illness in their medical examination record. Otherwise, any expenses and consequences arising of their historical chronic illness are to be for the Party B or the crew's account and responsibilities.

7. Termination of contract.
   In case when the Party B or the crew require signing off before the expiration of his term of service, they must notify the Party A in writing 30 days in advance and Party B shall dispatch a substitute crew at their own expense and free of any risk, responsibility and loss to Party A. Notwithstanding the above, the crew could only leave the ship upon the consent of the Party A. On the contrary, if the crew offend against the law or statute of local government or the rules and regulations of the Party A or disobey the reasonable order of the Party A, endangering the safety of the ship or refuse to serve on the vessel for whatsoever reason or not competent in Party A’s discretion, the Party A has the right to dismiss the person concerned at once and make a punishment. In such case, the “Party B” or relatives of the seaman could not appeal to the Party A for anything and the Party A has the right to make a punishment on the seaman by deducting all wages, welfare and the administration fee of the Party B to cover the losses caused by the Party A. Meanwhile, Party B shall dispatch a substitute crew at their own expense and free of any risk, responsibility and loss to Party A.

18. All the others that are not mentioned herewith will be negotiated by both parties.
19. Any dispute arising out of this contract shall be settled amicably through negotiation, and if failed, to be referred to arbitration in Hong Kong and English law to apply.

20. The contract shall be effective upon being signed by both parties and valid for one year, which shall be extended annually unless any of the contracting parties shall present a notice of cancellation in writing 2 (two) months in advance or 1 (one) month in case that Party A sell the Ship. The contract is made in duplicate in English and each side holds one.

For and On behalf of Party A

For and On behalf of Party B

Source: Mirae Shipping HK

“Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd”

According to Mirae Shipping HK, Mr. Hiroshi Kasatugu signed this contract.
Annex 27 – Mirae Shipping Hong Kong

27.1 Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s business registration record showing the company incorporation date of 29 May 2007
27.2 Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s business registration record showing Mr. Hiroshi Kasatsu as company’s Director (29 May 2014)

![Annual Return]

**Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)**

**Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up**

**Class of Shares**
- Ordinary

**Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class**
- 100,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Current Holding</th>
<th>Transferred *</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasatsu</td>
<td>Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 28 – Kinyo Shipping

28.1 Kinyo Shipping company registration records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Kinyo Shipping Co., Ltd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company registration number</td>
<td>0104-01-007854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Moved to another address on 30 April 2009, registered on 14 May 2009**

This address is registered in Mirae Shipping Hong Kong’s business registry in Hong Kong.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>株式会社名称</td>
<td>例: 株式会社ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>本店所在地</td>
<td>例: 東京都中央区</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>資本金</td>
<td>例: 1,000万円</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>設立年月日</td>
<td>例: 平成15年4月1日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>設立認可</td>
<td>例: 平成15年4月1日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>株式の割当分配</td>
<td>例: 平成15年4月1日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>株式の割当分配</td>
<td>例: 平成15年4月1日</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Japanese registration information provision services available at [http://www1.touke.or.jp/gateway.html](http://www1.touke.or.jp/gateway.html)*

CEO and Director, Hirosi Kasatogu (笠勝博)
Appointed on 1 April 2005, registered on 20 April 2005
28.2 5 December 2004 screen shot of Chongryon’s website with reference to Kinyo Shipping

![Screen shot of Chongryon's website](image)

*Source: Chongryon’s website of 5 December 2004 retrieved through waybackmachine.com*

**Japanese description**
株式会社近洋海運
1982年9月1日設立。共和国船舶の総代理業務を担当する。

**Informal English translation**
Kinyo Shipping Co., Ltd.
Established on 1 September 1982. This company is in charge of general agency function for the vessels of the Republic [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].
28.3 OMM Incorporated’s business registration record

OMM Incorporated (株式会社オーエムエム)
Company registration number 0104-01-048906

Moved to another office on 30 April 2009, which is also registered by Kinyo Shipping (registered on 14 May 2009).

Moved on 10 January 2008 to the address also listed as Kinyo Shipping’s address (registered on 11 January 2008).

Descriptions of the company’s business purposes are almost identical to those provided by the Japanese business registry of Kinyo Shipping.

Source: Japanese registration information provision services available at http://www1.tsuki.or.jp/gateway.html
28.4 Photograph of Tokyo building where Kinyo Shipping and OMM Incorporated shared office space

Source: Photos of 28 February 2014 obtained by the Panel.
Annex 29 – Senat Shipping Singapore

29.1 Summary information

Singapore-based companies named Senat Shipping & Trading Private Limited, Senat Shipping Limited, and Senat Shipping Agency Pte. Ltd. have undertaken extensive activities on behalf of OMM. The Panel’s findings about their activities are summarized below (see annexes 29.2-3; 47.8-13; 47.16).

- At least between 2003 and July 2013, these companies have acted on behalf of or at the direction of OMM’s headquarters in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and OMM’s overseas representatives, including those based in Brazil, China, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand.

- These companies have been extensively involved in the operation of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels controlled by OMM and the arrangements for related financial transactions on behalf of OMM.

- The companies have been operating from the same office address (No. 9, Temasek Boulevard, #36-02A Suntec Tower Two, Singapore 038989).

  - Those OMM-controlled vessels include the Jang San (aka Zang San) (IMO 8358599), the Kwan Mo Bong (IMO 8126862), the Ryong Gang 2 (aka the Tan Chon) (IMO 7640378), the Sam Il Po (IMO 8829567), the Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho (aka the Song Jin) (IMO 8133530), and the Chong Chon Gang (aka the Tong Hung San) (IMO 7937317).

- Between 2008 and 2009, these companies used the Dawnlight (IMO 9110236) (owned by Senat Shipping Limited and operated by Senat Shipping & Trading Pte. Ltd.) to arrange for a joint chartering with the Ryong Gang 2 (owned by OMM-associated entity, Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd at that time). When issuing an invoice to the Ryong Gang 2’s charterer in January 2009, Senat Shipping Agency Pte. Ltd. requested the charterer to avoid mentioning the vessel’s name in financial transactions, indicating the company’s intent to conceal the company’s link with the vessel in documents related to the financial transaction. The Dawnlight appears to have been carrying cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea before and after the Security Council’s designation of OMM on 28 July 2014.

These companies’ extensive links to OMM-associated vessels suggest that these entities have acted, and still could act, on OMM’s behalf or at its direction.
29.2 Documents found on board the *Chong Chon Gang* which refer to an entity named “Singapore Senat”

**LETTER OF PROTEST**

Dear Sirs,

According to joint tally one by one sling and each other signed on tally sheets of crew and stevedore’s tally, quantity of bagged rice on board are 11553.05 mt/229061 bags only.

But stevedore’s final loaded report’s quantity is 11550.00 NMT/115520.00 GM/229000 bags and also some QTTS M/R.

So 46.05 MT/899 bags difference than actual loaded quantity and AGT/SHPPR/STBVRDOR require signing on that paper.

So we are refusing to sign on stevedore’s final load report and resulting M/R and SOF can not be issued and vessel’s sailing will be delayed.

Owner/Master is not responsible if may arise delay or lossess for this dispute.

Source: The Panel
29.3 Invoice showing Senat Shipping business relationship with Ocean Maritime Management Company as early as 22 May 2003

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rate/Unit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EXP-100 CRT</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,257.50</td>
<td>125,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HSO</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>294.00</td>
<td>29,400.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total**: 155,150.00

*(TOTAL IN DOLLARS OR EQUIVALENT TO INDIAN Rupees SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN CRORES FIFTY ONE CENTS)*

Source: The Panel
Annex 30 – Ocean Maritime Management Company Brazil, Peru, Mr. Ju Yong Gun, and Mr. Jong Sang Gyo

30.1 Email communications – Mr. Ju Yong Gun

Below are email communications between a foreign shipping agent and Mr. Ju Yong Gun to arrange passage through the Panama Canal in 2010 and 2011 for the Po Thong Gang and Kwan Mo Bong (partially edited by the Panel in order to protect the confidentiality of the source). In these communications, Mr. Ju provided the following contact details:

Mr. Ju Yong Gun
Overseas Representative in Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
IMO no. 1790183 Bimco Ref no 100242
Tel: 55 11 2729 9571
Cell: 55 11 8739 0163
Email: E-mail: <jung-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br>, BRAZIL OCEANREP <jygomm@gmail.com>, Yonggun Ju <oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br>

----- Message from Yonggun Ju <oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br> on [Redacted] 2011 05:36:38 +0000 -----  
To: — Operations Department —  
cc: — <jung-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br>, BRAZIL OCEANREP <jygomm@gmail.com>  
Subject: mv po thong gang  

To
Fm Ocean Brazil

A HAPPY NEW YEAR!

Mv po thong gang

ETA Balboa 20th Feb 2011
Last port of call Qingdao (bunkering)
Next port of call Havana
Cargo on board steels, talc powder, etc reverting with cargo docs

It is a maiden transit for her and vsl has no SIN number – pls advise how to prepare EDCS
She must be issued PC tonnage cert

Vsl’s particulars

MV Po Thong Gang
Flag DPR Korea Reg no 3702421 IMO: No 8829555
9,430 dwt on 7.85m SSW/ TPC 1\mts

199/313
Flush tween, bit 87, DPR Korea flag
LOA/Beam/moulded draft 130.95/18.4/10.8m
4 ho/ha MacGregor covers weather deck/pontoons tween

[......] abbreviated by the Panel

please give us pro forma d/a for transit toll etc, charges on CTM and f.water cost
attached PCSOPEP
reverting with other e.doks for transit

Best regards

Yonggun Ju
Overseas Representative in Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
IMO no. 1790183 Bimco Ref no 100242
Tel 55 11 2729 9571
Cel 55 11 8739 0163

----- Message from Yonggun Ju <oceanrep-brazil@uo1.com.br> on 2010-06-23 09:0000 -----
To: <secretariat@uo1.com.br>
cc: <jong-oceanbrazil@uo1.com.br>, <jong-oceanbrazil@uo1.com.br>
Subject: MV Kwan Mo Bong

To: [Secretariat]
From: Oceqan Brazil

MV Kwan Mo Bong - Enquiry

The above vessel ETA Balboa 26th July for eastbound transit in laden condition, and
We invite you for quotation for pro forma d/a incld toll

Last port of call Lienyungang, China. Next port call Havana, Cuba
Last Transit of Panama Canal 30th July 2007 under agency of Barwil
Vessel’s Panama ID No. SIN 3007071

Particulars
- Name of vessel         Kwan Mo Bong        previous name   Nil
- Type of vessel         General cargo ship
- Official number       300692
- IMO number             8126862
- Flag                   DPR of KOfea
- Callsign               HMBN Satcom/selex/fax no. Inmarsat-C 4445111110
- Year/month of build/yard Jan, 1980, Korea Chugjin Shipyard
- GT/nt/dwt              6448 / 3905/10046MT
S/S 2015/131

Please also quote for fresh water supply and any surcharge on cash to master.

Regards

Yong Gun Ju
Overseas Representative, Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
Tel 005511 2729 9571
Cel 005511 8739 0163

-----Message from Yonggun Ju <oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br> on 2010 21:23:09 +0000-----
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: MV Kwan Mo Bong

To: [Redacted]
From: Ocean Brazil

MV Kwan Mo Bong-Enquiry

The above vessel ETA Balboa 26th July for eastbound transit in laden condition, and
We invite you for quotation for pro forma d/a incld toll

Last port of call Lianyungang, China. Next port call Havana, Cuba
Last Transit of Panama Canal 30th July 2007 under agency of Barwil
Vessel's Panama ID No. SIN 3007071

Particulars
- Name of vessel: Kwan Mo Bong
- Previous name: Nil
- Type of vessel: General cargo ship
- Official number: 300692
- IMO number: 8126862
- Flag: DPR of Korea
- Callsign: HMBN

Satcom/telex/fax no. Inmarsat-C 444511110
- Year/month of build/yard  Jan, 1980, Korea Chungin Shipyards
- GT/NT/dwt  6448 / 3903/10046MT
- Suez canal tonnage GT 5700.9 NT 5084.7
- Panama canal tonnage GT 6448 NT 5473 ID No. SIN 3007071
- Loa/beam/moulded depth 130.95/18.40/10.4 m
- Ho/ha  4/4
- Gram/bale  13810CUM/48830CFT, BALE-12989CUM/438974CFT
- Type of gear and SWL crane 3t x 4
- Ssw draft  7.87 m
- Class  Korea Classification Society
- Name of owners  Kwannobong Shipping Company Ltd
- Name of managers  Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd

Please also quote for fresh water supply and any surcharge on cash to master.

Regards,

YongGun Ju
Overseas Representative, Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
Tel 0055 11 2729 9571
cel 0055 11 8739 0163

----- Message from Yonggun Ju <oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br> on 2011 05:36:38 +0000 ------
To: [redacted] - Operations Department <[redacted]>
    "[redacted]" <jung-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br>; 'BRAZIL OCEANREP'
cc: [redacted]
Subject: mv po thong gang

To: [redacted]
Fm Ocean Brazil

A HAPPY NEW YEAR!

[.....] abbreviated by the Panel

please give us pro forma d/a for transit toll etc, charges on CTM and f. water cost

attached PCSOPEP
reverting with other e/docs for transit

Best regards

Yonggun Ju
Overseas Representative in Brazil
Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd
IMO no. 1790183 Bimco Ref no 100242
Tel 55 11 2729 9571
Cel 55 11 8739 0163
30.2 Email correspondence from Mr. Ju Yong Gun to shipping agent to arrange shipping services for Ocean Maritime Management Company-associated vessels in cooperation with Mirae Shipping Shenzhen

From: Yonggun Ju [mailto:oceanreq-brazil@uol.com.br]
Cc: miraespg@mrshipping.com.cn; 'BRAZIL OCEANREP'; 'OceanBrazil'
Subject: RE: PO THONG GANG

PM OCEAN BRAZIL

MV PO THONG GANG FINAL D/A
===

THANK YOU FOR THIS.

PLEASE DESPATCH FINAL D/A TO

Mirae Shipping Co Ltd, Shenzhen Office
Room G,16/F,Times Plaza,No.1,Talzi Road,
Shekou,Shenzhen,P.R.China (518067)
Tel + 86 755 2685 9661 / 9662

THEY REMITTED PRO FORMA D/A TO YOU AND WILL SETTLE ANY BALANCE

PLEASE ADVISE COURIER AIRWAY BILL NUMBER WITH COPY TO US

BEST REGARDS

Yonggun Ju

Overseas Representative in Brazil

Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd

IMO no. 1790183 Bimco Ref no 100242

Tel 55 11 2729 9571

Cel 55 11 8739 0163

Source: The Panel
30.3 Record of email communication between a Panamanian shipping agent and Mr. Ri Tong Uk, Ocean Lima, of 20 June 2007

Source: The Panel
30.4 Mr. Ju Yong Gun’s passport

Name: “JU YONG GUN”
Date of birth: “24 July 1956”

Source: The Panel

Mr. Ju Yong Gun’s business card (as at October 2013)
30.5 Power of Attorney showing names of individuals who represented Ocean Maritime Management Company and Chongchongang Shipping in Panama negotiations

Source: The Panel
CONFIRMATION LETTER

The Ministry of Land and Marine Transportation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has its honor to confirm that Mr. Kim Ryong Chol (Passport No. 381420806) represents the ownership of M.V. Chong Chon Gang as the President of Chongchongang Shipping Company Limited, having its principal office in Tonghung-Dong, Central-District, Pyongyang, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The Ministry of Land & Marine Transportation
The D P R of Korea
October 28, Juche 102(2013)

The Notary’s Office of Pyongyang City, the DPR of Korea

Source: The Panel
30.6 Communication record between Mr. Yong Gun Ju and a foreign shipping agent referring to Mr. Jong Sang Gyo

From: jong-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br
To: [Redacted]
Subject: mv Ryong Gun Bong - [Redacted]
Date: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted]
Fm Ocean Brazil
Re: mv Ryong Gun Bong - [Redacted]

Top urgent

Pls dispatch us original invoice and bunker delivery note.

Ocean Brazil / JONG SANG GYO
A STAFF OF THE EMBASSY OF D.P.R of KOREA IN BRAZIL.

EDIFICIO RIO NEGRO E NAFRA
RUA JOAO CACHOEIRA,
250-230, ANDAR-CONJUNTO 154
CEP: 04535-000-ITAIB
SAO PAULO SP, BRAZIL

Tel: 55 11 2309 2284 / 2729 9571
Mobile: 55 11 8765 2477 / 8739 0163
e-mail: jong-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br
oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br

after dispatching, pls advise AWB number for our tracing

Rgds
Ocean Brazil / Jong

Source: The Panel
30.7 Communication record between Mr. Yong Gun Ju and a Panamanian shipping agent referring to Mr. Jong Sang Gyo

As for final d/a, pls despatch them to

Mr. Jong Sang Gyo,
Staff of the DPR of Korea Embassy in Brazil

EDIFICIO RIO NEGRO E MAFRA
RUA JOAO CACHOEIRA,
250-230. ANDAR-CONJUNTO 154
CEP : 04535-000-ITAIP
SÃO PAULO SP, BRASIL
Tel no. 0055 11 2309 2284

Let's keep in touch
regards

YongGun Ju
Overseas Representative, Brazil

Mr. Jong Sang Gyo’s contact information

Nos dijimos que envíaríamos las cuentas de la siguiente manera:
Ocean Brazil / Jong Sang Gyo
A Staff of the Embassy of D.P.R. of Korea in Brazil
Edificio Rio Negro e Mafra
Rua Joao Cachoeira,
250 -230 Andar -Conjunto 154
CEP: 04535-000-ITAIP
São Paulo SP, Brazil
Tel 55 11 2309 2284 / 2729 9571
Mobile 55 11 8765 2477 / 8739 0163
Email: Jong-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br
Oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br

Source: The Panel
30.8 Receipt issued by the Cuban authorities showing Ocean Maritime Management Brazil as the owner of the Chong Chon Gang, dated 24 June 2013

Source: The Panel
Annex 31 – Ocean Maritime Management’s activities in Egypt

31.1 Summary information

Sunlight Agency

- Address: Sunlight Marine Services Co, 38 Mahmoud Sidky Street, Port Said, Egypt
- Email: mahmoudsedky@bec.com.eg

Tonghae Psaid

- This company was identified by a shipping agent as having been involved in shipping services arrangement for OMM-associated vessel(s) in 2001.
- Address: c/o Sunlight Agency, 38 Mahmoud Sedky Street, Port said, P.O.Box 267
- Email: ocean-ltd@bec.com.eg
- Contact person: “Choe”

Information provided by a foreign shipping agent

This is the address we have on file for OMM’s office in Port Said, Egypt

Ocean Maritime Management Co. Ltd.
38, Mahmoud Sidky Street,
Port Said,
Egypt.

Tel: 0020 66 3229438
Fax: 0020 66 3237752
Tlx:0391 63027 (Z0BY UN)
email:mahmoudsedky@bec.com.eg
31.2 Document showing Sunlight Agency’s business relationships with Ocean Maritime Management Company-associated vessels

Document obtained from the Chong Chen Gang

Sunlight Agency envelope addressed to the captain of the Ms Du Bong

Source: The Panel
31.3 Record of transit through the Suez Canal of the *Kwan Mo Bong* dated 6 June 2011

*Source: The Panel*
31.4 OMM Egypt’s correspondence records related to OMM-controlled vessel’s port call in September 2010

From: mahmoudsedky@bec.com.eg
To: [Redacted]
Subject: mv Sam II Po
Date: [Redacted]

Jong

mv Sam II Po

**Pis be informed that the vsl is scheduled to call CTG to disch 0.500mt bgd rice. The vsl might require the fng items there which pls quote best by rnm.

From: mahmoudsedky@bec.com.eg
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Fw. mv Sam II Po
Date: [Redacted]

Jong

mv Sam II Po

**Pis quote best the fng spares at CTG.

- M/E SULZER 5RD68
  1. nozzle E27240 *5pcs
  2. stack of spring washers, complete for fixing bolt E27126, E27171 *10pcs
  3. rubber expansion joint ISSA 735104 *4pcs

- T/C NAPIER R510A
  4. bearing 55260/55262 *2sets

- A/E YANMAR 6MAL-HTS
  5. adjust screw for valve lever 137600-11860 *24pcs
  6. fuel injection pump assy 739626-51101 *2sets

Source: The Panel
31.5 The Mu Du Bong’s Letter of Protest referring to Ocean Egypt as “OWNER”

Source: The Panel
31.6 An European shipping agent’s correspondence of 2010 referring to “Ocean P. Said” and the *Mu Du Bong*

Further to our last, we can now confirm that the 2 crewmembers are being repatriated with the following flight schedule:

*Source: The Panel*
Annex 32 – Korea Tonghae in Egypt

32.1 Envelopes showing Tonghae Psaid’s address

The above balance will be reflected in our following Statement of Account.

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

Mail to: TONGHAE PSAID
C/O Sunlight Agency
38 Mahmoud Sedky Street
Port Said
P. O. Box 267
Egypt

Source: The Panel
32.2 Korea Tonghae Shipping Co. envelope addressed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ Embassy in Cairo, Egypt

Source: The Panel
Annex 33 – Ocean Maritime Management Company’s employees

33.1 The Chong Chon Gang’s insurance certificate, referring to Mr. Kim Ryong Chol as OMM’s contact person

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT CO., LTD</td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of register</td>
<td>TONGCHUNGDO, CENTRAL DISTRICT, PYONGYANG, D.P.R.KOREA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO number</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING CO., LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call Sign</td>
<td>TONGCHUNGDO, CENTRAL DISTRICT, PYONGYANG, D.P.R.KOREA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contact Person (OPA)</td>
<td>CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPPING CO., LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YUN CHOL</td>
<td>817, HAEUM, TONGCHUNGDO, CENTRAL DISTRICT, PYONGYANG, D.P.R.KOREA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the information required below, a colored statement or certification is required to be submitted to each insurer or organization providing financial security. The statement or certificate should specify the status of the insurance or security by reference to policy numbers, or other identifying particulars. We personnel may request further information in order to establish the accuracy of the insurance cover, verification of the existence and the capability of the insurer or organization to provide adequate cover.

Part D. PARTICULARS OF INSURANCE

1. Name of insurer or organization providing financial security (1)
2. Address of insurer or organization providing financial security (1)
3. Contact person
4. Phone
5. Email
6. Type and amount of security (2) (3)
7. Oil pollution only USD 6,760,000.00
8. Duration of the security (4)

From (MM/DD/YYYY) 01/01/2014
To (MM/DD/YYYY) 01/01/2015

Signature of the Insurer/Organizer (As part of the agreement)
Source: The Panel
PANAMA CANAL
SHIPBOARD OIL POLLUTION EMERGENCY PLAN

APPENDIX A
VESSEL-SPECIFIC INFORMATION
«CHONG CHON GANG»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLAG</th>
<th>KOREA</th>
<th>IMO NUMBER</th>
<th>7937317</th>
<th>CALL SIGN</th>
<th>HMZF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VESSEL TYPE</td>
<td>GENERAL CARGO</td>
<td>GROSS TONNAGE</td>
<td>9147</td>
<td>NET TONNAGE</td>
<td>5657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LENGTH</td>
<td>«155.00»</td>
<td>CARGO OIL</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>DIESEL OIL</td>
<td>208.5m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUEL OIL</td>
<td>836.7m³</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>LUBE OIL</td>
<td>51m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OIL CAPACITY</td>
<td>1096.20 m³</td>
<td>TIER CLASSIFICATION</td>
<td>TIER 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion: 1096.20 x .9442 = 1035.03 Metric Tons Total Oil Carrying Capacity.
Tier 1 for vessels with an oil carrying capacity of more than 1,000 MT up to 7,000 MT.

Owner CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING CO., LTD
«Owner»
Operator CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING CO., LTD
«Operator»
817, Haem, Tonghun-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, North Korea.
Facsimile: «850-2-3812106»
Telephone: «850-2-18333»

Primary Contact: «Kim Ryong Chol (DPA)»
Telephone: «850 191 2796331»

Source: The Panel
33.2 Other individuals who have worked for Ocean Maritime Management Company identified by the Panel

Mr. An Chun Sok
Description: OMM’s Managing Director
Email: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Mr. Cha Sou Mo
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Choe Jin Ha
Description: OMM’s overseas representative (location unconfirmed)

Ms. Choe Myong Suk
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Choe Tong Hak
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Chun Gil Kim
Description: OMM’s contact person
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Han Jae Sik
Description: OMM’s Deputy Managing Director
Email: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Mr. Han Ki Ung
Description: OMM’s former overseas representative in Vladivostok

Mr. Han Su Choi
Description: OMM’s former overseas representative in Singapore

Mr. Ho Yong Bom
Description: OMM’s contact person
Cell: +6622929440
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Ho Yong Choe
Description: OMM’s contact person
Cell: +6622929440
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Jang Hwa Ryong
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Jong Kyong Chol
Description: OMM’s contact person
Cell: +6622929440
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Jong Jae Son  
Description: OMM’s former representative in Egypt  
Egypt Mobile: +20 – 182587517

Mr. Kim Gwang Ho  
Description: OMM’s employee affiliated with its finance department  
Email: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Mr. Kim Hak Chol  
Description: OMM’s contact person  
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Kim Jong Ryol  
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Kim Jong Su  
Description: OMM’s employee affiliated with its finance department  
Email: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Mr. Kim Kwang Jin  
Description: OMM’s person in charge for crewing  
Email: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Mr. Kim Sun Gu  
Description: OMM’s former representative in Egypt

Mr. O Hwan Ryong  
Description: OMM’s overseas representative (location unconfirmed)

Mr. Ri Kwang Myong  
Description: OMM’s contact person

Mr. Ri Sung Il  
Description: OMM’s contact person  
Email: haeun@ksc.th.com

Mr. Thae Yong Rok  
Description: OMM’s former overseas representative in Brazil

Mr. Yun Sok Bom  
Description: OMM’s contact person

Source: The Panel
Annex 34 - The Panel’s recommendations to the Committee on designations
(STRICLTY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential
Annex 35 – Millim Technology Company

A Millim document lists Mr. So Min Chol as top manager.

MILLIM TECHNOLOGY COMPANY.
Central district, Pyongyang, D.P.R of Korea
Tel: 850-2-18111, Fax: 850-2-3814110
E-mail: millim@millim.com

Attn: [Name]

2012

Letter of confirmation

Dear Sir,

Millim Technology Company confirms that the name of top management is So Min Chol.

Thanks.
Best regards,

[Name]

Source: The Panel
Annex 36 – Ryonha Machinery Corporation

36.1. Examples of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publications showing Huichon Ryonha’s premises and machine tools ¹

Figure 1. Ryonha’s premises

[Image of Ryonha’s premises]

Source: Rodong Sinmun, 8 May 2012

Figure 2. Huichon Ryonha General Machine Plant’s premises

Workers of Huichon Ryonha General Machine Plant Striving to Push Back Frontiers of Science and Technology

[Image of workers and machinery]

Source: Rodong Sinmun, 21 February 2012

Figure 3. Huichon Ryonha’s premises and machine tools

[Image of machinery and plant]

Source: Foreign Trade of DPRK, 2011, Vol. 3

¹ Multiple Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publications show that Huichon Ryonha’s premises are identical to Ryonha’s premises, and that Huichon Ryonha’s machine tools are identical to Ryonha’s products.
Figure 4. Huichon Ryonha’s machine tools identical with Ryonha’s products

Figure 5. Huichon Ryonha machine tool labelled with Ryonha’s name in Korean script “련하기계”

Figure 6. Huichon Ryonha using Ryonha’s name as participant in international exhibition
36.2. Ryonha’s contact information from the Naenara website, as of 4 April 2014

Vertical Machining Centre “RV-25”

Specifications
- Traverse: X axis: 529(20.8) mm(inc)
- Y axis: 380(15) mm(inc)
- Z axis: 400(15.8) mm(inc)
- Working surface (LxW): 600(23.6)x1200(47.3) mm(inc)
- Max. weight of toolspare: 500 kg
- Spindle speed: 8000 rpm
- Feeds: rapid feed (XY/Z): 20-20/15 m/min
- Cutting feed (X/Y/Z): 0.5 m/min
- Motor output: spindle motor: 5.5 kW
- Feed motor (X/Y/Z): 1/1/1.5 kW
- Flow rate: 2.5/1.5/1.5 m³/min
- Height: 2.477(97.5) mm(inc)
- Weight: 4100 kg

Ryonha Machinery Corporation
Add: Central District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Tel: 850-3-801-381-1300
Fax: 850-3-380-4410
E-mail: ryonha@abbank.net.kp

Source: Naenara
Annex 37 – KORTEC and Koryo Technological Corporation

37.1. 2010 online publication regarding Koryo Technological Corporation and KORTEC

== METALLOSBOROGRAFIA - 2013 ==

Открытие Северной Кореи
эффективная уникальность
Koryo Technological Corporation

После долгого Советского Союза в начале 30-х годов в предметах науки и науки в Китайской Народной Республике установлены 10% промышленных предприятий. На основании технологических процессов, Северная Корея восстанавливает свои собственные ресурсы и строительство, обновление предприятий, используя методы и результаты инновационной деятельности, включая ее собственную продукцию.

За последние десятилетия корпоративный мир, среди большого числа технологий различных предприятий, включая и собственные разработки, благодаря технологическим инновациям, они существуют, используя восточную технологию, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки.

В составе основных направлений Конференции на своем маркетинге за круглый стол участников в течение трех дней, включая восточную технологию, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки.

После архитектурного проекта М. Ф. А. Марины, генерал-лейтенант БВД и сотрудников ВБД на Китайской Народной Республике в рамках мероприятий по внедрению новых технологий на предприятиях, социальных и научных инноваций, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки.

== METALLOSBOROGRAFIA - 2013 ==

Корпорация Koryo Technological Corporation, на основании технологии архитектурного проекта М. Ф. А. Марины, генерал-лейтенант БВД и сотрудников ВБД на Китайской Народной Республике в рамках мероприятий по внедрению новых технологий на предприятиях, социальных и научных инноваций, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки, включая использование драгоценных металлов, включая собственные разработки.
United Nations translation

The opening-up of North Korea: effective uniqueness
The Koryo Technological Corporation

After the fall of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, and the change to settlement payments in freely convertible currencies, 80% of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s industries came to a halt. North Korea emerged from a period of great hardship, using its own means to return to operation many industries halted by the loss of raw materials and parts from the Soviet Union, and to find markets for its goods.

In recent decades, Koreans have made a substantial leap forward in science and technology; industries have adopted up-to-date manufacturing methods involving wide use of industrial robotics; nuclear power generation has been introduced; and independent exploitation of outer space has begun with the launch of satellites using locally-made launch vehicles.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, despite being visibly closed-off, is a peaceful, technologically developed nation following a clear political path directed towards integration with the world economy. The North Korean export goods so far offered on the Russian market are precious metals, steel alloys, bearings and related items, batteries, electronic components and textiles.

As a result of a meeting in August 2011 between Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Kim Jong-il, leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in the context of the intergovernmental commission for the development of economic links between our countries, the decision was taken to supply to Russia goods for industrial use, and specifically, advanced robotic metalworking equipment and cutting instruments of R18, R6M5K5 and hardened steel. With that aim in mind, the limited liability company Kortec was established under the patronage of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Russian Federation.

Kortec represents in Russia the interests of the DPRK’s largest State company, the Koryo Technological Corporation, which includes a number of lathe and instrument manufacturers. It remains the only source of supply for State orders, fulfilling all the needs for modern lathes and instruments emanating from the aerospace industry, defence, vehicle and ship manufacturers and other national industries.

The technical standards achieved by the Koryo Technological Corporation are evident from: its high degree of industrial professionalism; its own high-speed numeric controllers for polishing, milling and turning centres; in-house development and production of five-axis polishing centres with robot-automated loading and unloading and verification of pieces; in-house development and production of twelve-axis heavy-duty portal milling centres, with robot-automated pallet loading; up-to-date casting techniques allowing the production of superior iron and steel castings with stable structures and uniform metal hardness, and carrying a guaranteed one-year natural relaxation cycle for frames; and other components of castings; high product quality has enabled the company to provide a two-year guarantee on all of its equipment.

Kortec is not simply a representative of the Koryo Technological Corporation; it is a specialist technical centre performing technical design, industrial consulting, installation and commissioning work and studies, maintenance and guarantee servicing, and providing a full range of customer support, from the design stage to the final-product stage.

Kortec is staffed by professional Korean and Russian engineers. Among its employees are technicians, mechanics, programmers, electronics engineers, designers, fitters, translators, sales consultants and marketing staff. The Kortec warehouse exhibits a wide range of lathes.
37.2. The Panel’s correspondence with Russia

Information provided by Russia to the Panel on 24 July 2014

Unofficial translation

According to information received from the Russian Unified State Register of Legal Entities there are 20 companies which are named “KORTEC” (either operating or currently dissolved). None of them were registered in the Podolsk district of the Moscow region. It is very likely that this refers to the private joint-stock company (but not a limited liability company) “KORTEC” which has registered office address in Moscow (Bolshaya Semenovskaya Str., 55/5). This company deals with wholesale distribution of machinery and equipment (the address indicated in a booklet provided by the Panel belongs to the “KORTEC”’s parent company - private joint-stock company “Instrumentimpex”). “KORTEC” was founded in 2012 to supply metal-working equipment produced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company “Korea Ryohwa Machinery Joint Venture Corporation” on the Russian market.

As a result of imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions on the “Korea Ryohwa Machinery Joint Venture Corporation” the relationship with this company was terminated in 2013.

Taking into consideration the above the Russian authorities consider the matter closed and do not intend to return to the subject in the future. The “KORTEC” case confirms the commitment of the Russian Federation to compliance with the United Nations Security Council sanctions regimes.

The Russian side brings to the attention of the Panel of Experts the need for meticulous gathering of information which is used in Panel’s work.
The Panel’s letter of 25 November 2014 to Russia

Excellency,

I am writing to you with regard to efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013).

The Panel is grateful for the information provided by Russian authorities on 23 July 2014 related to a DPRK entity named Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (hereinafter “Ryonha”). Ryonha had previously had a business relationship with a Russia-based company named Kortec (registered office address: Bolshaya Semenovskaya Str. 55/5, Moscow, Russia). The Panel understands that Russian authorities regard the matter as closed.

However, pursuant to its mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions and its Programme of Work, the Panel continues to investigate Ryonha’s relevant assets and the entities and individuals that may have acted on its behalf or at its direction. In this regard, we have obtained the information outlined below and request further assistance from the competent authorities of the Government of the Russian Federation.

His Excellency
Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations
New York
The information provided by Russian authorities noted that Kortec was founded in 2012 to supply Ryonha-produced metal-working equipment in Russia, but that this relationship was terminated in 2013 as a result of the Security Council’s designation of Ryonha on 22 January 2013. The Panel understands that during this period of cooperation, Ryonha used the alias of “Koryo Technological Corporation” (hereafter “Koryo”).

However, Kortec appears to have posted advertisements dated 19 July 2013 on their website (http://kortec.s6-studio.ru/) for machine tools, at least three of which are very similar to Ryonha’s products (see annex 1). The Panel also learned that similar machine tools are still listed on several online commercial websites, with descriptions that refer to Kortec and Koryo (see annex 2).

As such, the Panel is investigating Kortec’s continued business dealings with Ryonha in the period after 23 January 2013 until the time the relationship was terminated later in 2013. In this regard, the Panel would be grateful for information relating to:

- The date Kortec terminated its relationship with Ryonha and its affiliates in 2013;
- Any business dealings Kortec had with Ryonha and/or its affiliates after 23 January 2013; and
- Any individuals who worked for Kortec in connection with the company's business dealings with Ryonha and/or its affiliates after 23 January 2013.

Ryonha

Further, the Panel would be grateful for information related to:

- The DPRK national(s) and/or entities that have worked for Ryonha related to the entity’s dealings with KORTEC; and
- Contact details of and bank accounts used by Ryonha related to the entity’s dealings with KORTEC.

The Panel would welcome any other information that your authorities might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. The Panel would also like to assure you that any information considered to be confidential would be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.
Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2141 (2014) urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.

As the Panel intends to provide its findings related to OMM in its next final report to the United Nations Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information supplied by 29 December 2014 in order to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration.

Any questions regarding this enquiry should be addressed to Mr. Katsuhisa Furukawa (email: [redacted] telephone [redacted]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours faithfully,

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes:
1. Comparison of Kortec's machine tools with Ryenha's products
2. Examples of online advertisements of machine tools referring to Kortec and Koryo
Annex 1 of the letter

Annex 1. Comparison of Kortec’s machine tools with Ryunke’s products

1. Information on Kortec’s machine tool labelled RU-59

2. Information on Kortec’s machine tools labelled RP-50H and RP-50V.
Annex 2 of the letter

Annex 2: Examples of online advertisements of machine tools referring to Koriec and Korys.

Example 1:

[Koriec 50000]


Example 2:

[Koriec 50000]

Source: Online commercial website available at [http://www.machinery.co.uk/koriec-50000], accessed on 20 October 2014.

Source: The Panel
Russia’s correspondence of 29 December 2014 to the Panel

New York, 29 December 2014

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

With reference to your letter S/AC.49/2014/PE.OC.379 dated 25 November 2014 I have the honour to inform you of the following.

All necessary information related to interaction between the Russian company “Korte” and a DPRK entity named “Ryonha” has already been submitted to the Panel. All relevant cooperation was stopped after the inclusion of the above-mentioned North Korean legal person to the UNSC sanctions list. For the Russian side this issue is closed.

One cannot consider as reliable the information found on a certain Internet site. Contact details provided by this web page belong to a company named “The ABC of doors” which is a contact and information center specializing in door sales. We proceed from the understanding that the Panel of experts was in a position to check this data by its own means.

In this regard we emphasize the need for a more accurate and adjusted approach to the preparation of requests to the Member States.

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York
Moreover, we recall that in the first request of the Panel concerning “Kortec” the authors of the letter weren’t able to determine what entity to refer to, among a lot of those with the same name. Besides, it is absolutely unclear why the Panel considers the issue of “Kortec” in the context of the North Korean company “OMM” (second para on the third page of the letter) which has been recently added to the UNSC sanctions list.

Let us remind in this regard that the Russian Federation has given its consent to create a position of the Panel’s Coordinator bearing in mind that this person is responsible for guiding the Panel’s work, including exclusion of unnecessary, unripe and excess requests to Member States.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Petr Iliichev
Deputy Permanent Representative

Source: The Panel
37.3. Information regarding KORTEC’s business relationships with CNC machine tool manufacturers based in Russia, Spain, and Taiwan Province of China

United Nations official translation

About the company
KORTEC supplies own-brand lathes and turning centres from major Taiwanese precision manufacturers YIDA Precision Machinery, Lilian and Gentiger, as well as Spanish-made Pimacho lathes. It also provides equipment upgrades (installing additional Exact rotary tables (spindles) for turning centres) and costs, selects and supplies machining instruments and equipment in accordance with customers’ specifications.

We have exclusive rights for Taiwanese Exact Machinery products in Russia. Installation and commissioning, servicing and equipment advice for operators are in the hands of our authorized supplier KS Service Centre (www.znaemstanky.ru). The Service Centre has extensive experience of Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese lathes.

Lathes are dispatched from our Zelenograd, Moscow, warehouse. At the same location is a showroom where our specialists can provide demonstrations of the lathes in operation. We hope to establish a long and mutually beneficial relationship with you.
37.4. Information related to the CNC machine tool manufacturers referred to on KORTEC’s website

- **YIDA Precision Machinery Co., Ltd.**
  Chinese name: 奕达精机股份有限公司
  Address: No. 41, Alley 68, Lane 357, Sec. 1, Sinan Rd., Wuri Dist., Taichung City, 41465, Taiwan Province of China
  Phone number: 886-4-23358368
  Fax number: 886-4-23356681
  Email address: yida.cnc@msa.hinet.net
  Website UHL: http://www.yidacnc.com

- **LILIAN Machine Industrial Co., Ltd.**
  Chinese name: 利联机械工业股份有限公司
  Address: 8 Ta-Tung St., Tu-Cheng Industrial District, Taipei Hsien, Taiwan Province of China
  Phone number: 886-2-22680303
  Fax number: 886-2-22681247
  Email address: sales@lilian.com.tw
  Website UHL: http://www.lilian.com.tw

- **Gentiger Machinery Industrial Co., Ltd.**
  Chinese name: 新虎将机械工业股份有限公司
  Address: 22-2, Shoalu St., Taichung City
  Phone number: 886-4-2683-6919
  Fax number: 886-4-26839900
  Email address: gentiger@ms38.hinet.net
  Website UHL: http://www.gentiger.com.tw/

- **Exact Machinery Co., Ltd.**
  Chinese name: 世圣精机股份有限公司
  Address: No. 418, Shueiyuan Road, Fengyuan District, Taichung City
  420, Taiwan Province of China
  (420 台中市丰原区水源路 418 号)
  Phone number: 886-4-25158290
  Fax number: 886-4-25158291
  Email address: info@exactmachinery.com
  Website UHL: http://www.exactmachinery.com/

- **Pinacho**
  Address: Metahirgica Torrent, S.A. Partida la Sierra s/n, 22310
  Castejón Del Puerto, Spain
  Phone number: +34 974 401 650 / +34 974 416 930
  Fax number: +34 974 401 654 / +34 974 417 733
  Email address: info@metosa-pinacho.com
  Website UHL: www.metosa-pinacho.com
37.5. Examples from the KORTEC website of CNC machine tools manufactured by companies based in Taiwan Province of China and Spain

YIDA Precision Machinery Co., Ltd.


ILIAN Machine Industrial Co., Ltd.

Gentlyt Machinery Industrial Co., Ltd.


Pinacho

37.6. YIDA Precision Machinery Co., Ltd.'s MH-500 CNC machine tool featured on the KORTEC website

Screen shot from the KORTEC website


Screen shot from the YIDA Precision Machinery Co., Ltd. website

Source: [www.yodacnc.com/english/achievements.htm](http://www.yodacnc.com/english/achievements.htm)

YIDA Precision Machinery Co., Ltd. began the production of a MH-500 horizontal machining center in 2006, according to its website.
37.7. Excerpts from a Taiwan Province of China court verdict, dated 15 August 2007

United Nations official translation

Judgement No.: 96 (Commercial) 3655 Date of judgement: 15 August 2007
Substance of judgement: breach of trade law

Proceedings were instituted against the above defendants by the public prosecutor on the grounds of their alleged breach of trade law (96 (Investigation)12681) and an application was filed for plea bargain. Following a plea bargaining procedure conducted by the judge assigned by the court, judgement was handed down by Criminal Chamber No. 15 of the court at 5 p.m. on 15 August 2007, in the presence of officials, as set out below. The judge rose to read the disposition, the facts of the offence, the legal provisions establishing the penalty and the record of the proceedings: he announced the limitations and the time for appeal and the court competent to hear appeals and directed the following matters to be set down in the record.

I. Disposition
B and A had jointly committed the offence of exporting strategic high-technology items, without authorization, to a controlled area, and were both sentenced to a penalty of six months' fixed term imprisonment, with the option of commutation to a fine equivalent to 100 silver dollars, (or, by conversion into New Taiwanese dollars. NT5900) per day. Thus, both their sentences were reduced by three months, suspended for two years.

II. Facts of the offence
B, resident is effectively in charge of the firm Ching Hwee International Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Ching Hwee”) located at Building No. 11, 697 ... Rd., Fongyuan City, Taichung County, although the company is registered under the management of his wife, Li Luohong. A is a former employee of Ching Hwee Co., and on 8 November 2004, together with B, he founded the joint venture Sinatek Equipment Corporation, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Sinatek”), with its premises at No. 75, ... St., ... District, Taichung City, with A registered as person-in-charge, but with B and A in fact jointly responsible for the operation of the company. For the purposes of import and export operations, B was engaged in business cooperation with the Chinese mainland enterprise Shenyang Machinery Import & Export Corp. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Shenyang Machinery”) and the North Korean joint venture Ryouna Machinery Corporation and, in December 2005, he and A travelled together to Shenyang city, in Liaoning Province, in mainland China, to discuss the subject of transactions in machinery with Mr. Wang Quan, general manager of Shenyang Machinery. The two parties agreed on the sale to Ching Hwee by Shenyang Machinery of one horizontal machining centre with standard and optional accessories, model No.MH-500.

Following the return of A and B to Taiwan, B, acting in the name of Ching Hwee, contacted a company operating in Taiwan, Leadwell CNC Machining Centre Manufacturers (hereinafter referred to as “Leadwell”), placing an order for one open horizontal machining centre, and after that, in March and April 2006, A was directly contacted by Wang Quan by phone, who informed him that the horizontal machining centre was in fact being purchased by the North Korean joint venture Ryouna Machinery Corporation, and that the equipment should be transported directly to the port of Nampo in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which B agreed to do. Upon the delivery of the ordered item by Leadwell, at the end of May 2006, A and B, taking into account Sinatek's track record as an exporter, first had the machining centre resold by Ching Hwee to Sinatek, with the intention of then exporting it under the name of Sinatek. At the same time, B and A were both fully aware that the aforementioned horizontal machining centre fell in the category of equipment whose export was not permitted, pursuant to official trade notice No. 09504602910 of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, of 22 May 2006, barring the export to controlled areas such as North Korea and Iran of controlled strategic high-technology articles. That law came into effect on 1 June 2006. In spite of that, the two persons in question decided to
take their chance, and jointly conspired with the criminal intent of exporting strategic high-technology articles without authorization to a controlled area, and, to ensure the smooth processing of the export operation, on 14 June 2006 B engaged employee(s) of JSC CUSTOMS BROKER CO., LTD, which was unaware of the true nature of the transaction, to prepare the customs clearance documents stating that Sinatek was exporting the aforementioned horizontal machining centre to Dalian port in mainland China, with Shenyang Machinery as the buyer, which was not true. The documents were submitted to the Taichung customs clearance authorities, who granted export approval, and B then engaged Ever Strong Shipping Limited, (hereinafter referred to as “Ever Strong Shipping”), which was unaware of the nature of the case either, to transport the horizontal machining centre to the port of Nampo in North Korea. On 15 June 2006, the horizontal machining centre was loaded for delivery by the shippers, Ever Strong Shipping, on the North Korean flagged vessel Pong Yue, for which Ever Strong Shipping is the agent, and it was carried on board the Pong Yue from Taichung port directly to the port of Nampo in North Korea and then offloaded. The consignee Ryonha Machinery Corporation was notified to take delivery of the machinery. Subsequently, information picked up by the Taichung office, the Seafarers Investigation Office at the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice was examined, leading to the uncovering of the offence and the tracking down and apprehension of the perpetrators.

III. Legal provisions establishing the penalty
Article 1, first paragraph, subparagraph 1, of the Foreign Trade Act.

IV. Record of the proceedings
Defendant B is required, prior to 10 August 2007, to contribute NTS 150,000 to United Way of Taiwan. Defendant A is required, 96 days prior to 10 August 2007, to contribute NTS 150,000 to the Boyo Social Welfare Foundation of Nantou County (both obligations have been fulfilled, as evidenced, respectively, by the remittance receipt issued by the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank and the receipt of a wire transfer by the E. Sun Commercial Bank, duly verified at the bottom of the attached copy).

V. In accordance with the judgement reached following plea bargain, the judgement shall be without appeal except as allowed by the provisions of subparagraph 1 of the first paragraph of article 455-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which establish that, prior to the conclusion of questioning, the defendant may withdraw or the prosecution revoke a plea bargain agreement; or, pursuant to the second paragraph of that article, when the plea bargain has not been made out of the defendant’s free will; or pursuant to the fourth paragraph, when the defendant’s offence may not be subject to a plea bargain judgement pursuant to the first paragraph of article 455-2; or pursuant to subparagraph 6 of that paragraph, when the defendant faces other counts incurring more severe penalties in consequence of the same offence; or pursuant to subparagraph 7, where the court deems it appropriate to grant exemption from punishment or immunity from prosecution; under any of those circumstances the application will not be accepted and be deemed in breach of the provisions of the second paragraph of article 455-4: “The court shall adjudicate the case within the scope of the plea bargain agreement … ; the sentence handed down by the court under a plea bargain agreement shall be limited to probation or fixed term imprisonment of up to two years, detention or a fine”.

VI. In the event that the present judgment is not accepted, and an appeal has been lodged as set out above, a transcript must be provided of the decision within 10 days of the date of service, and a record of the appeal submitted to this court, and the appeal lodged with the court of second instance.

Criminal Chamber No. 15, Taichung Court
37.8. Reply from Lilian Machinery Industrial Co., Ltd.

Re: Inquiry from the United Nations
sales to: furukawa

14/11/2014 05:03

Thank you for your information.

In beginning, last year in TIMTOS 2012.03.05 in Taiwan machine tool exhibition, the man works in KORTEC visited our booth and express that they would like to import our machine for their Russian market. It is no suspected that they sell machine to the company which do business with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea! We do not know why they publish our machines and link our website to their official website. Fanuc Taiwan found and advised us this fact. And so we stop to contact with KORTEC immediately from the time we got the news. And as we know well, the company is bankruptcy now.

By the way, we would like to suggest that you can contact us thru government for example) or association (TAMI for example) and which will helpful and assist us in processing.

BEST REGARDS,
SALES DEPT. OF LILIAN

LILIAN MACHINERY IND. CO., LTD.

Source: The Panel
Annex 38 – Millim’s activities

38.1. Information related to Millim’s Dandong Office (朝鮮密林技術會社丹東代表处)

Business registration records

Source: Liaoning Administration of Industry and Commerce’s website, http://lnsc.gov.cn

Chinese script
外资企业设立登记公告（2012-5-28至2012-6-1）
文章发表于: 2012-06-03
注册号: 210000500009675
企业名称: 朝鮮密林技術會社丹東代表處
法定代表人: 升平進
地址: 丹東市振興区沿江开发区H区53#
成立日期: 2012-5-29

Informal English translation
Announcement of establishment of foreign enterprises (from 28 May 2012 through 1 June 2012)
Article publication date: 3 June 2012
Registration number: 210000500009675
Company’s name: Dandong Representative Office of Korea Millim Technology Corporation
Legal representative: Sung Pyong Jin
Address: No. 53, Zone H, Yanjiang Development Zone, Dandong City
Date of establishment: 29 May 2012

Source: The Panel
38.2. Information related to Millim’s Beijing Office (朝鲜密林技术会社北京代表处)

Business registration records

Company name: Beijing Representative Office of Korea Millim Technology Corporation
Registration number: 110000450151180

Source: ftp://210.51.177.159/2013/11%B1%B1%BE%A9%CA%D0%B9%A4%C9

Informal English translation

Company name: Beijing Representative Office of Korea Millim Technology Corporation
Registration number: 110000450151180

Source: http://www.qiye265.com/company-detail.php?cid=ADV52FY1Flz1K the Panel
Annex 39 – Mr. Sung Pyong Jin

Mr. Sung Pyong Jin distributed his business card (below left) at the 2013 Expo.

Source: The Panel

Informal English translation

Korea Ryonha Machinery Corporation
Representative: Sung Pyong Jin
Address: Room 2301, Unit 1, Building B, Binjiang Middle Road, Yanjiang Development Zone, Dandong City
Cell phone: 13394259622 / 13358785891
Email: POMA250@HOTMAIL.COM

Mr. Sung Pyong Jin’s business card distributed at the 2012 Expo.

Source: The Panel

English script

Korea Ryonha Machinery Corp
Name: Sung Pyong Jin
Title: Ryonha Machinery Corporation [DPR of] Korea Sales Representative
Address: Room 301, Unit 1, Bldg A, Binjiang Middle Road, Yanjiang Development Zone, Dandong City
Tel: 0415-3141038 / Mobile: 159-415-50345
Email: sjc-1117@hotmail.com
Annex 40 – Dandong Yisheng

40.1. Information related to Dandong Yisheng and Mr. Li Yi acting as Ryonha sales agents

_ENGLISH TRANSLATION_
Dandong Yisheng Trade Co., Ltd.
Ryonha Machinery China Sales Agent
Name: Li Yi
Address: Room 301, Unit 1, Bldg A, Binjiang
        Middle Road, Yanjiang
        Development Zone, Dandong City
Tel: 0413- 3141298/ 3142058
Mobile: 13304157209

_Source: The Panel_
40.2. A record of Mr. Li Yi emailing information related to CNC machine tools featuring the KORTEC logo

I am very glad to know you.
I send you the price and technical data of the machines.
Best regards.

The above product appears to be very similar to Ryonha’s RV-25.

Source: The Panel
40.3. A sales document provided to a third party by Mr. Li in December 2013 referring to Korea Machinery Trade Co., Ltd. and KORTEC

![Offer Document]

**Offer**

Messrs:

Dear Sirs,

We thank you for your cooperation and would like to confirm here with the offer in the terms and conditions set as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.T.E M</th>
<th>Product Name</th>
<th>Q'TY</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>UNIVERSAL LATHE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Model No.: HUCHON-5A/1000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EUR 5,400</td>
<td>EUR 5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>swing Over bed</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>swing Over gapped bed</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>swing Over carriage</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distance between center</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.T.E M</th>
<th>PRODUCT NAME</th>
<th>Q'ty</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>CNC Ram Type 5 Axes Machining Center</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EUR 95,000</td>
<td>EUR 95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model No.: RM-50E with KORTEC 500M CNC control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Specifications:**

- X travel: 600 mm
- Y travel: 400 mm
- Z travel: 400 mm
- B travel: -100 ~ +100°
- C travel: 360°
- Distance from table top to spindle end: 150 ~ 550mm
- Distance from column front to spindle center: 250 ~ 650mm

*Source: The Panel*
Annex 41 – Suzhou Hanwei

41.1. Screen shot from the Suzhou Hanwei Shendiao CNC Technology Co., Ltd. website


These milling machines are identical to Ryonha’s products.

Source: [www.whsk-sz.com/](http://www.whsk-sz.com/) and Ryonha’s pamphlet
41.2. A photograph of milling machines (M12-300 and M13-300) in the Suzhou Hanwei factory that are identical to Ryonha’s products (RF-30).

These are very similar to Ryonha’s products.


Suzhou Hanwei’s website in alibaba.com:
http://szweihan.1688.com/page/albumdetail_31551952_817344398.htm?imageNum=106;
http://szweihan.1688.com/page/albumdetail_31551952_817344418.htm?imageNum=104
41.3. Additional online information about Suzhou Hanwei

Description
穿孔机-苏州威汉数控是国内较早研发生产：中走丝，穿孔机，线切割机床，火花机，公司位于电加工基地-苏州,苏州威汉携手朝鲜第一大军工企业朝鲜密林技术会社合作主要代理经销；大力铣床，车床，加工中心

Translation
Small Hole Electrical Discharge Machining (EDM)
Suzhou Hanwei Shendiao CNC Technology Co., Ltd. was one of the first enterprises in the country to develop and produce medium-speed wire-cut EDM, small hole EDM, wire-cut EDM and EDM. The company is located in the electrical discharge machining district of Suzhou. In collaboration with Milim Technology Company, the largest military enterprise in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Suzhou Hanwei Shendiao CNC Technology Co., Ltd. is mainly engaged in the distribution of powerful milling machines, lathes and machining centres.
41.4. Ryongha and Millim related entities

- Korea Ryongha Machinery Corporation (represented by Sung Pyong Jin)
  Address: Room 2301, Unit 1, Building B, Binjiang Middle Road, Yanjiang Development Zone, Dandong City
  地址：辽宁省丹东市沿江开发区绿江华府 B 座 1 单元 2301 室
- 朝鮮密林技術會社 (English: Korea Millim Technology Corporation)²
  Company’s name: 朝鮮密林技術會社丹東代表处 (the Dandong Office of Korea Millim Technology Corporation)
  Registration number: 210000500009675
  Legal representative: Sung Pyong Jin
  Address: No. 53, Zone H, Yanjiang Development Zone, Dandong City
  Date of establishment: 29 May 2012
- Company’s name: 朝鮮密林技術會社北京代表处 (Beijing Representative Office of Korea Millim Technology Corporation)
  Registration number: 11000450151180
  Legal representative: 尹日 (Yun Il)
  Registered address: Dishang 3-4, No. 27, Chaolai Green Garden, Chaoyang District, Beijing (北京市朝阳区朝来绿色家园春园27号3-4号)
  Date of establishment: 20 September 2010

- Korea Machinery Trade Co., Ltd
  Information obtained by the Panel indicates that this company’s name was used by Li Yi in a document to promote the sale of Ryongha’s CNC machine tools, in late 2013.
  Address: Inhun-dong, Moranbong district, Pyongyang, DPRK
  Tel: 850-2-18666-EX: 8399
  Fax: 850-2-3814411
  E-mail: lkk150@hotmail.com

- Dandong Yisheng Trade Co., Ltd. (丹东易胜商贸有限公司)
  Dandong Yisheng Trade Co., Ltd. was listed as a Ryongha’s sales agent in China the China-DPRK Trade Expos which were held in Dandong in 2012 and 2013.
  Address: Room 301, Unit 1, Bldg A, Binjiang Middle Road, Yanjiang

² This company’s official English name is not known as yet. “Korea Millim Technology Corporation” is the supposed English translation of “朝鮮密林技術會社”.

15-00593
Development Zone, Dandong City (辽宁省丹东市振兴区沿江开发区绿江华府 A 座 1 单元 301 室)
Tel: 0415-3141298 / 3142038  Mobile: 13304157209
Name: Li Yi (李毅)

- Suzhou Hanwei Shendiao CNC Technology Co., Ltd. (苏州威汉数控科技有限公司)
  Company registration number: 320512000108973
  Date of establishment: 16 November 2009
  Legal representative: Mr. Yu Kai [TBC] (销售经理: 禹凯 先生)
  Address: No. 158, XX Street [TBC], Gaoxin District, Suzhour City, China (中国苏州市高新区中峰街 158 号)
  Mobile: 13338653863 / 18012702222
  Tel: 0512-66623990
  Fax: 0512-69209585
  E-mail: szwhsk@126.com
Annex 42 – Known Ryonha products advertised since 2013

Universal lathe labelled RU-50

Source: The Panel
The same product is also labelled as Huichon-5A.
Milling machines labelled RF-30V and RF-30H

Source: The Panel
The same product is also labelled as M12-300 and M13-300.
High precision CNC lathes labelled TC-170, 210 and 350

Source: The Panel
Product Introduction

TC series CNC lathe is designed to meet requirements for turning shafts and cylindrical workpieces. The machine controlled by advanced CNC system has the function of turning, straight line, curve line, arc, straight and taper metric/ Inch screws.

Adjustment, fixed bed, makes easy operation and adjusting and it is easy to convey chips.

Servo motor and spindle motor ensure wide range of power regulation.

Automatic lubrication system and chip conveyor are equipped with the machine. In addition, manual tool setter, bar feeder, workpiece catcher and other equipment being available as you like.

CNC System

- Digital AC servo system
- Linear interpolation 3 axes
- Anti-interpolator
- MTH/TH scale zoom and rotate function
- Auto-accelerations/ decelerations function
- Main program call from sub-program
- Single block running
- Motor/realtime switcher
- Auto/telematic or manual programming
- User macro program and variable programming

- Tool length/tap/depth compensation
- Workpiece coordinates
- Polar coordinates
- Programming
- Graphic display function
- Relatives alarm and operation display
- Taper tapping function
- JogAuto return reference point
- USB interface
- RS-232 communication
- Ethernet interface
CNC lathes labelled TC-560 series

Source: The Panel
Vertical machining centers labelled RV-25, 30, and 40

Source: The Panel
HIGH RIGIDITY, HIGH EFFICIENCY, 
HIGH ACCURACY, AND GOOD STABILITY

Products Introduction
RV series vertical machining center is integral of mechanism, electronics and hydraulic and pneumatic. Compact machine layout can get smaller floor space and convenient installation and maintenance. The worktable is cross movement. The single column construction is equipped with high speed spindle and chip cleaning functions. Totally enclosure protections increase working safety and decrease environment pollution. The main imported outsourcing parts make the machine high reliability and high endurance. RV series vertical machining center is mainly used in automobile, mould and instrument fields. The machines are widely used for high precision, multiprocess parts.

Source: The Panel
The same vertical machining centers are also labelled VMC-25, 30, and 40.

Source: The Panel
Product Introduction

The WXYZ series vertical machining center is equipped with a mechanism, electronic, hydraulic, and pneumatic, and is easy to use. The machine is designed for high efficiency, high accuracy, and good stability. The main application is in automobile manufacturing, mold manufacturing, high-speed 5-axis processing, and aerospace fabrication. The machine features high rigidity, high efficiency, and high accuracy.
Annex 43 – Green Pine Associated Corporation’s Beijing Office

43.1. Official registration and online information

An example of online commercial registry records for Green Pine’s Beijing Representative Office

The representatives of “Beijing Representative Office of Korea Green Pine Associated Corporation” (北京代表处) (registration number 0012069) included an individual named Mr. Park (or Pak) Won Il (or Won Il) (in Chinese: 朴元日) and Mr. Choe Kwang Hyok (in Chinese: 崔光赫).

Informal English translation

(北京代表处)

联系人 (Representative): 崔光赫 经理 *
手机 (Telephone): 85612229
地址 (Address): 北京市朝阳区工体西路甲7号天和大厦701室 *

This entity’s representative and address are different from those provided in the Chinese official registration record. This address and telephone number are no longer used by Green Pine’s Beijing Office.
43.2. Online commercial listing for the Beijing Representative Offices of Korea Unha Water Trading Co., Ltd. and H.K. King Helong Int'l Trading Limited

Beijing Representative Office of Korea Unha Water Trading Co., Ltd. (in Chinese: 朝鲜银河水贸易会社北京代表处)


Source: Online commercial website [www.gs80.com/show2/2/1218635.shtml](http://www.gs80.com/show2/2/1218635.shtml) accessed on 20 February 2014
43.3. H.K. King Helong Int'l Trading Limited company registry extracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Alternate Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name in Chinese</th>
<th>(N/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name in English</th>
<th>Kung Hyok</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Name</th>
<th>(N/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence Address</th>
<th>Room 2168, No. 4 East District, Inh Mansion, Jia 19, Chayung, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email Address</th>
<th>(N/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hong Kong Identity Card Number</th>
<th>(N/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Passport</th>
<th>Korea 543-182473</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

H.K. King Helong Intl Trading Limited registered inactive in Hong Kong on 30 December 2011

Annex 44 – Leader (Hong Kong) International

44.1. A screen shot of the ICRIS website showing the active status of Leader (Hong Kong) International, as at 25 December 2014

![ICRIS Screen Shot](image)

44.2. Extracts from Leader (Hong Kong) International’s annual return dated 18 October 2012, which lists Mr. Cai Guang as this company’s director and share capital member.

### Class of Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cai Guang</td>
<td>LM873, Room B, 14/F., Wah Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 10,000

*If there have been any transfers of the company's shares since the date of the last annual return (or since incorporation if this is the first annual return), please also provide details of the transfers; the name of the transferee should be stated in the 'Remarks' column.*

**AR1**

**12. Directors**

**A. Individual Director**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>身份</th>
<th>董事</th>
<th>替任董事</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Alternate Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 中文姓名 | 蔡光 |
| Name in Chinese | |

| 英文姓名 | Cai Guang |
| Name in English | |

| 前用姓名 | NIL |
| Previous Names | |

| 別名 | NIL |
| Alias | |

| 地址 | LM 873, Room B, 14/F., Wah Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong |
| Residential Address | Hong Kong |

| 電郵地址 | NIL |
| E-mail Address | |

| 身份證明 | China ID no.: 220104197201271530 |
| Identification | |

| 香港身分證明號 | NIL |
| Hong Kong Identity Card Number | |

| 照片 | NIL |
| Passport | NIL |
Annex 45 – Winning International Consulting Group Co., Limited

45.1. Extracts from Leader (Hong Kong) International’s company registration documents notifying of Winning International Consulting Group Co., Limited’s resignation as Corporate Secretary/Director, dated 14 January 2013

Winning International’s director is listed as a United States national, Mr. Moses Wang (passport number 1303515), with a residential address of 4322 E Valley Blvd D, Los Angeles, CA 90032, USA (annex 35). However, the Los Angeles County Office of the Assessor reports that no such address exists.

### Company Registration Document

**Company Name:** LEADER (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITED  
**Company Number:** 1177053

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Name</td>
<td>LEADER (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Number</td>
<td>1177053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Resignation</td>
<td>14-01-2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resignation Declaration:**

The resignation of the above-named secretary/director is effective as of the date mentioned. It is hereby declared that the above-named secretary/director is not continuing to hold the office of alternate director/director in the company after the date of resignation.

45.2. Extracts from Winning International Consulting Group Co., Limited’s annual return dated 13 August 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CR</th>
<th>Annual Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>表格</td>
<td>AR1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Important Notes**
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form. Please print in block ink.

1. **Company Name**
   - Winning International Consulting Group Co., Limited

2. **Business Name**
   - N/A

3. **Company Type**
   - Private company having a share capital

4. **Date of Return**
   - 13 August 2012

5. **Address of Registered Office**
   - Room 1701(071), 17/F., Henan Building, No. 90, Jaffe Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong

Form AR1

Company Number
139310

Details of Members of a Company Having a Share Capital

Class of Shares: Ordinary

Name/Nickname
MOSES WANG

Address
4322 E VALLEY BLVD D, LOS ANGELES CA 90032, USA

Shares
10,000

Capacity: Director

Alternate Director: N/A

Name in Chinese: N/A

Name in English: WANG MOSES

Previous Names: N/A

Also: N/A

Residential Address
4322 E VALLEY BLVD D, LOS ANGELES CA 90032, USA

Email Address: N/A

Identification
H.K. Identity Card Number: N/A

Passport: USA 710401805

Annex 46 – Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation

United States Department of the Treasury press release, dated 2 January 2015

Annex 47 Ocean Maritime Management Company-related financial transactions

47.1. Mariner's Shipping correspondence of 13 July 2014 referring to banking details for remittance from shipping agent for reimbursement for costs of the *Mu Du Bong*.

"Details: just mention "expenses balance", not mention vessel's name."

Source: The Panel
47.2. Shipping company’s 15 July 2014 transaction of $1951.93 to Mariner’s Shipping requesting reimbursement for costs of the *Mu Du Bong* (mentioned in 13 July correspondence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Ordenante</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuenta Ordenante:</td>
<td>2100844572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular:</td>
<td>MV <em>MU DU BONG</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fecha Aplicación:</td>
<td>15/07/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importe de la Cuenta Ordenante:</td>
<td>151951.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moneda de la Cuenta Ordenante:</td>
<td>USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estado:</td>
<td>Pagado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Datos Beneficiario</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuenta Beneficiario:</td>
<td>161-3-23266-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular:</td>
<td>MARRIERS SHIPPING AND TRADING CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicilio1:</td>
<td>66233-34 RAMA 3 ROAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicilio2:</td>
<td>YANNARIA BANGKOK 10129 THAILAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tipo de Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Código Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre del Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicilio Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importe del Beneficiario:</td>
<td>1951.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moneda del Beneficiario:</td>
<td>USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comisión:</td>
<td>$45.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banco Intermediario</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tipo de Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Código Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre del Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicilio Banco:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The Panel
47.3. Mariner’s Shipping’s correspondence of July 2014 regarding remittance from a shipping agent for the *Mu Du Bong* costs

![Email correspondence]

Source: The Panel
47.4. Correspondence from shipping agent to Mariner’s Shipping regarding remittance for Panama Canal transit by the *Am Nok Gang* on 23-25 March 2010

Mariner Shipping & Trading Co Ltd
14/53 801 Pratunam
Sathupradit 67 Road
Yannawa
Bangkok
10120
THAILAND

12/04/2010

Dear Sirs,

Subject: *Am Nok Gang* 192/Panama Canal Transit - Disbursement Account

Vessel: *Am Nok Gang*
Port: Panama Canal Transit
Arrived: 23/03/2010
Sailed: 25/03/2010
Purpose: Transit Loaded
Details: Grain

We herewith enclose our Disbursement Account with Supporting Vouchers for the aforementioned vessel’s call at Panama Canal Transit.

We are glad to have been of assistance and hope the service met your requirements.

Trusting you will find all in order, we would appreciate your remitting the balance in our favor and look forward to working with you again.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Source: The Panel
47.5. Mariner’s Shipping’s remittance to shipping agent for payment of Suez Canal passage by the *Am Nok Gang* dated 24 March 2010 for US$ 47,659.00

*Source: The Panel*
47.6. Remittance by Mirae Shipping Hong Kong

Mirae Shipping Hong Kong made five payments to a Panama-based shipping agent for passages through the Panama Canal in 2011 and 2012 by two OMM-controlled vessels, the O Un Chong Nyon Ho and the Bo Tong Gang. Specialized maritime databases list Ocean Maritime Management Company as the manager of these vessels.

Source: The Panel
47.7. Exchanges between OMM Dalian and European supplier regarding spare parts for *Chong Chon Gang* in May 2013

### Ocean Maritime Management Co. Ltd.
**Dalian Office**
**Mr. Yang**
**Room 1010, Anda Business Building, 32-2 Wuwu Road**
**116001 Zhongshan Dist - Dalian**
**China**

**Phone:** +86 411 82549110

**Fax:**

**Ship's Name:** CHONG CHONG GANG
**Your Ref.** : Pielstick Spares

**Contact Person** :  
**Price Validity** : 30 days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos Code / Description</th>
<th>Qty Unit</th>
<th>Price/Unit:</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M/E 14PC 2-6V 400</td>
<td>10,000 pce</td>
<td>300,00</td>
<td>3,000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaneleitlitz Exhaust valve seat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Net Amount** : 3,000,00
**% VAT** : 3,000,00

**Payment Terms** : To be agreed upon
**Despatch Terms** :  

*Source: The Panel*
Communication between Mr. Yang Bong Rim of Mirae Shipping Shenzhen and foreign shipping agent for the *Chong Chon Gang* referring to Mariner’s Shipping as “Ocean Bangkok”

---

**eMail**

**To:** [Receipient Name]

**From:** [Your Name] oceammr@mirae.com

**Date:** 2013-09-34

---

Dear [Receipient Name],

How are you?

Nice to contact you again and hope everything is going well on your end. I am now working in Ocean Maritime Management Co.

I would be very pleased to have your quotation on below parts:

1. M/E 14PC 2-5V 400
2. 1 set of injection pump complete (02.430.9013.01)

Awaiting yours,

Yang Bong Rim

---

**From:** haeun@ksc.th.com

**To:** [Receipient Name]

**CC:**

**Subject:** Re: MV. PHO THAE

**Date:** 2010-02-23

Dear [Receipient Name],

Our full style as follows:

Mariner's Shipping and Trading Co Ltd (Ocean Bangkok)
662/33-34 Rama 3 Road
Bangpompang Yannawa
Bangkok 10120 Thailand
Tel: 662-2930290
Fax: 662-2943847
E-mail: haeun@ksc.th.com, mst001@ksc.th.com
Mr. Won Song Guik (Ocean Rep Mobile 66 892026221)
Mr. Ho Yong Jun (Ocean Deputy Rep 66 818992823)
Mr. Chanvit (66 818272053)

Please contact [Email] for m/v Pho Thae

B. regards

Source: The Panel
47.8. Remittances from Ocean Russia to shipping agent through Senat Shipping Limited’s bank account dated 8 August and 6 June 2011

Correspondence from Ocean Russia of 9 August 2011

From: oceanvid@gmail.com
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: REMITTANCE OF USD 30,000.00
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2011 16:03:51 +1100

Mr. [Redacted] Han

Pls find attached bank slip of USD 20k which had been effected yday by Senat.

Appreciate yr kind confirmation of safe receipt of this fund.

Brgds

Source: The Panel
Remittance from Ocean Russia to shipping agent through Senat Shipping Limited’s bank account dated 8 August 2011.
Remittance from Ocean Russia to shipping agent through Senat Shipping Limited’s bank account dated 10 June 2011.

Source: The Panel
47.9. Remittance from Ocean Singapore to shipping agent through Senat Shipping Limited's bank account dated 20 December 2011

Correspondence from Ocean Singapore of 20 December 2011

From: ommsingapore@starhub.net.sg
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: remittance
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 22:26:46 +0800

Mr Choe

Remittance
--
Attached pls find tt slip of usd 16,037.5 as balance for jang ja san supply.
Pls confirm safe receipt by return.

Rgds

Source: The Panel
Remittance for transfer from Ocean Singapore to shipping agent through Senat Shipping’s bank account dated 20 December 2011

Source: The Panel
47.10. Remittance from Ocean Brazil to shipping agent through Senat Shipping’s bank account dated 13 June 2011

Email correspondence from Ocean Brazil of 13 June 2011

From: jonh-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br
To: [redacted]
CC: oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br
Subject: ny JANG SAN - remittance
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2011 12:01:50 -0300

Dear Mr [redacted],

Attached bank slip. Pls check with your bank tomorrow and confirm your receipt.

Rgds

Ocean Brazil / Mr Jong

Source: The Panel
Remittance from Ocean Brazil to shipping agent through Senat Shipping’s bank account dated 13 June 2011

Source: The Panel
47.11. Remittance for payment of bunker costs from Ocean Brazil to shipping agent through Senat Shipping’s bank account dated 27 July 2011

**Email correspondence of 27 July 2011**

From: jong-oceanbrazil@uol.com.br
To: oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br, jygoam@gmail.com
CC: oceanrep-brazil@uol.com.br, jygoam@gmail.com
Subject: my JANG SAN - remittance of 2nd bunker costs
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 16:16:50 -0300

To: CTG
From: Ocean Brazil

Re: my JANG SAN – remittance of 2nd bunker costs
Usd 100K was remitted yesterday.
Pls check with your bank and confirm your receipt.
Rgds
Ocean Brazil / Mr Jong

*Source: The Panel*
Remittance for payment of bunker costs from Ocean Brazil to shipping agent through Senat Shipping Limited’s bank account dated 27 July 2011

Source: The Panel
47.12. Payment of 14 December 2010 by Senat Shipping & Trading Pte. Ltd. on behalf of OMM Egypt for costs associated with OMM-associated vessel *Sam II Po*

Email correspondence from OMM Egypt of 14 December 2010

```
From: mahmoudsedky@bec.com.eg
To: [Redacted]
Subject: mv Sam II Pho - PAYMENT USD100,000/-
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 10:12:09 +0200

Mr: [Redacted]

mv Sam II Pho / Sply at Mongla
==
Plzd to cnfm having effected payment in the NET amount of US$ 100,000.00 in your favour as the attached evidence. Pls check with your bank and cnfm safe rcpt of the funds.

Rgds

Source: The Panel
```
Payment of 14 December 2010 by Senat Shipping & Trading Pte. Ltd. on behalf of OMM Egypt for costs associated with OMM-associated vessel *Sam Il Pho*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 14 Dec. 2010</th>
<th>TELEGRAPHIC TRANSFER APPLICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name:</strong> SENAT SHIPPING &amp; TRADING PTE LTD</td>
<td><strong>Account No.</strong> 6010-000191-31-4-021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address:</strong> 9 TEMASEK BOULEVARD, SUNTEC TOWER 2, #36-02A SINGAPORE 038989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Currency &amp; Amount:</strong> USD100,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MT 103 IS URGENTLY REQUIRED.</strong></td>
<td><strong>FAX TO:</strong> 62292392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Panel
47.13. Invoice by Senat Shipping dated 23 January 2009 on behalf of owner of the OMM-associated vessel Ryong Gang 2 for payment from vessel’s charterer (instructions given not to mention vessel name)

Source: The Panel

“Kindly ensure that charter do not mention vessel name in the remittance slip, payment details [delete] to show as RG2 CPD 10.12.08…”
47.14. Remittance from Ocean Singapore (Chinpo Shipping Co. Pte. Ltd.) to shipping agent dated 8 July 2013
47.15. Correspondence from Chinpo Shipping to arrange transmission by air of spare parts from European supplier to the *Chong Chon Gang* in Panama dated 28 May 2013 (OMM Dalian copied)

---Message original---

De: [Redacted]

Mensaje enviado:

[Redacted]

To: [Redacted]

CC: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp

Asunto: m/v "CHONG CHON GANG" - PO for Pielstick Spares - shipping advice

Dear Sirs,

Good day.

Please be advised that we have sent to you on behalf of Ocean Maritime Management, Dalian 1 parcel of ship spares by airfreight. Corresponding documents please find attached.

Subject all going well the consignment will arrive at Panama on May 30th, 2013 at 16:30 hrs.

Trust you will find all in good order and condition.

Source: The Panel
Remittance from Chinpo Shipping to European supplier of spare parts dated 23 May 2013 (transaction arranged by OMM Dalian but paid for by Chinpo Shipping)

Source: The Panel
Invoice from European supplier to OMM Dalian for spare parts dated June 2013

Ocean Maritime Management Co.
Mr. Yang
Dalian
China

06.2013

As per order we charge you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invoice No.:</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Code / Description</th>
<th>Qty Unit</th>
<th>Price/Unit</th>
<th>Amount/EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>M/E 14Pc 2-5V 400 Manufacturer: Pielstick</td>
<td>1,000 pce</td>
<td>3.730,00</td>
<td>3.730,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set of injection pump complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P/N: 02.430.0013.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| HS-Code: | 84133020 |
| County of Origin: | Germany |

| 002  | 02.015.0105.03 Ventilsitz Exhaust valve seat |
|      | 5,000 pce | 300,00 | 1.500,00 |

| HS-Code: | 84819000 |
| County of Origin: | USA |

| 003  | Additional charges Precarriage, packing, handling & documents From Suppliers to our Warehouse |
|      | 1,000 pce | 100,00 | 100,00 |

| 004  | Additional charges Air Freight to Panama We deliver to you: 1 case, 81x44x56 cm, 104 kg |
|      | 1,000 pce | 625,00 | 625,00 |

Source: The Panel
Email correspondence between OMM and European supplier for delivery of spare parts in 2013

--- Original Message ---

From: oceanmm
To: [redacted] 2013 12:27 PM
Subject: MV CHONG CHON GANG / PARTS

To: [redacted]
From: Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd

Re: mv Chong Chon Gang / parts

---

Good day,

Pls urgently quote the best price for following parts:
- M/E 14pc 2-5V 400 Pidstick Valve Seat (02, 015, 0165, 03) - 10pcs

Brgds

---

Source: The Panel
47.16. Database entry for Senat Shipping Limited held by a chartering organization

Lists Senat’s bank account details and refers to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity Taedonggang Sonbak Company Ltd (registered commercial operator for OMM-associated vessels including the *Mu Du Bong*):

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE \ TIME</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>VESSEL</th>
<th>NHC</th>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.10.2008</td>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>SENAT SHIPPMG LTD</td>
<td>15-00593</td>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>SENAT SHIPPMG LTD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

**Source:** The Panel
Annex 48 Ryonha-related financial transactions

Hong Kong-based company, Hong Kong Real Friend Co., Limited, served as financial intermediary for Millim as of 2012. It was managed by an individual with long-standing relationships with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea companies. He is also a legal representative of Dahan Liaosin Group which was linked to a shipment of ballistic missile-related items that were seized by the Republic of Korea in May 2012 (S/2014/147, para. 51).

48.1. Sales contract showing Hong Kong Real Friend Co., Limited as financial intermediary for Millim as of 2012

Source: The Panel
48.2. Hong Kong business registry for Hong Kong Real Friend Co., Limited as of 17 March 2012

48.3. Liaosin Group

According to web archive records, Liaosin Group’s home page (http://www.liaosin.com) included references to Dalian Science and Trade Co., Ltd. (大连斯贝尔贸易有限公司), Shenyang Regal Trading Co., Ltd. (沈阳富豪商贸有限公司) and Shenyang Plastic Product Co., Ltd. (沈阳富豪塑料制品有限公司). Liaosin Group had long-standing business relationships with various Democratic People’s Republic of Korea companies. Dalian Super S&T principally advertised the manufacturing and sales of various valve products, remains active and advertises its business relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Archive record of the Liaosin Group website of 6 February 2011

Annex 49 – Reconnaissance General Bureau
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential