Third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. At the start of my tenure as Secretary-General, I am encouraged by the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I hope that ongoing commitments to the Plan can provide an example of the benefits of diplomacy, which leads to the reduction of tensions among States. I encourage all States to act in accordance with and support this historic agreement, and avoid provocative actions and speech.

3. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to verify and monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 15 January 2017, IAEA announced that it had verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had removed, within one year from Implementation Day, as required by the Plan, all excess centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and transferred them to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant under IAEA continuous monitoring.

4. In March and June 2017, the Agency issued quarterly reports on its verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/234 and S/2017/502). The Agency reported that it has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments since Implementation Day and that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the transparency measures contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Agency also reported that it continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing.

5. I welcome the recent recommitment by the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in Vienna on 25 April 2017, to the full and effective implementation of the Plan. I call upon them to continue to work together in good faith and reciprocity to ensure that all participants benefit from the Plan. In
resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Plan. It is in the interest of the international community, writ large, that this achievement of multilateral diplomacy endures transitions and implementation challenges, cementing our collective commitment to diplomacy and dialogue.

6. The present report, the third on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the second report of the Secretary-General, issued on 30 December 2016 (S/2016/1136). Consistent with the first and second reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

II. Key findings and recommendations

7. Since 16 January 2016, my predecessor and I have not received any report on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

8. Since 30 December 2016, 10 additional proposals to participate in or permit activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end uses were submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Five of the proposals have been approved by the Council.

9. On 29 January 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile. As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2016 (see S/2016/649, paras. 17-22), there was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches, which have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the region.

10. The Secretariat has examined the weapons and analysed the information related to the arms shipment seized by the French frigate Provence in the northern Indian Ocean in March 2016 (see S/2016/1136, para. 27). On the basis of the information analysed, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of Iranian origin and were shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

11. Iranian entities, including the Defence Industries Organisation, which is on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), once again participated in the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq. The present report also provides information on additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. I reiterate my call upon all Member States to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015), including those regarding the travel ban and asset freeze of individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

12. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-
use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through this channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

13. Since 30 December 2016, 10 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 10 proposals were approved by the Council, two were withdrawn by the proposing States and four are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

14. In addition, the Security Council received six new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities that do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Security Council and the Joint Commission.

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

15. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

16. On 1 February 2017, the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had flight-tested a ballistic missile, while stressing that the launch did not contradict the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or resolution 2231 (2015). In the same period, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ballistic missiles “have not been designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapons” and therefore were not in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

17. On 7 February 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile on 29 January 2017. Those States underscored that the phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, defined as those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, which are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Those States considered that since the Khorramshahr is designed to be capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, the launch of the missile constituted an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and “[a] launch using such ballistic missile technology”, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In the letter it was also stated that the launch was destabilizing and provocative and that it had been conducted in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015).

18. In identical letters dated 10 February 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/123), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations expressed Israel’s strong condemnation of the ballistic missile test conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January 2017. He indicated that the Khorramshahr medium-range missile had travelled a distance of 1,000 km. He also stated that the Khorramshahr is a Missile Technology Control Regime Category I missile “capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kilograms for a range of over 300 kilometres”. He concluded that the test constituted “yet another flagrant violation” of resolution 2231 (2015) and that “the development of surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warhead capability reveals the true intentions of Iran not to comply with resolution 2231 (2015)”.

19. In a letter dated 9 March 2017 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/205), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel was “replete with baseless speculations about the name, range, performance and technical characteristics of a missile”. He also stated that “Iran’s indigenous missiles are an indivisible part of its conventional deterrence and defensive capabilities” and underlined that “no universal norm, treaty or agreement bans or limits the development and testing of missiles equipped with conventional capabilities for self-defence requirements”. He further stated that “nothing in Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) prohibits Iran’s conventional missile activities” and concluded that “in this context, any demand for the cessation of Iran’s legitimate and conventional defence activities is groundless and unwarranted”.

20. The Security Council discussed the Iranian ballistic missile launch on 31 January and 2 March 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on how that particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provides the details of Council deliberations on this issue.3

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

21. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,4 the provision of various services or assistance, and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile-related activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

22. In his identical letters dated 10 February 2017, the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Khorramshahr missile originated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which had also conducted several tests of the same kind of missile in 2016. He added that “this serves as additional proof of the cooperation between Iran and DPRK on the development and transfer of surface-to-surface missile technologies”. In his letter dated 9 March 2017, the Permanent

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3 Document symbol not yet assigned.
4 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the aforementioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained “misleading information, lies and allegations”.

23. In a letter dated 7 June 2017, the United States brought to the attention of the Secretariat information on a shipment of ballistic missile-related items that, in its assessment, was undertaken contrary to resolution 2231 (2015). The letter stated that “in October 2016, an Iranian firm that supports the ballistic missile program received a consignment of controlled carbon fiber”. The letter concluded that “because this shipment did not receive advance, case-by-case approval as specified in Annex B of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), this export to Iran’s ballistic missile program was a violation of that resolution”.

24. The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate these reports. I will provide a further update on these issues should additional information become available to the Secretariat.

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran

25. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel.

26. On 20 January 2017, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced the discovery of 17 boxes containing missile system components and aircraft parts without accompanying documents in a cargo plane in Kyiv bound for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In its interactions with the Secretariat, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations confirmed that competent Ukrainian authorities had prevented an unauthorized shipment of suspected military items on 19 January 2017, including possible component parts of the “Fagot” anti-tank missile system, had initiated criminal proceedings on 30 January 2017 and were in the process of determining whether the confiscated items were covered by paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). On 13 June 2017, during consultations in Kyiv, Ukrainian authorities shared additional information on the unauthorized shipment with the Secretariat, including on the status of the judicial proceedings and classification process of the confiscated items. I intend to report to the Security Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

27. In a letter dated 1 June 2017, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat that on 27 April 2017, in the port of Zonguldak, Turkish authorities confiscated component parts of 9K111 Fagot and 9K113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles concealed in a truck that was transiting from Ukraine to the Islamic Republic of Iran on board a vessel named CENK Y. According to Turkish authorities, the Iranian truck driver stated that he had obtained the items from another Iranian citizen in Kyiv, to be transported to the Islamic
Republic of Iran. A criminal investigation has been launched by the Office of the Prosecutor of Zonguldak Province. On 9 June 2017, during consultations in Ankara, Turkish authorities confirmed to the Secretariat that judicial proceedings were ongoing. I will report to the Security Council accordingly as additional information becomes available, including on whether the confiscated items are covered by paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

28. With regard to the provision of services or assistance related to the maintenance of arms and related materiel specified in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), open-source information indicated that services had been provided to a warship5 of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the port of Durban, South Africa, in late 2016.6 In a letter dated 16 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat that “following a distress call from the Iranian vessel Bushehr, the vessel was allowed to enter Durban port on 15 November 2016” and “departed on 22 January 2017 following emergency repairs on its hull”. He also indicated that “its accompanying vessel, the Alvand, requested access to the Durban Port on 19 November 2016 to support the Bushehr and departed on 10 January 2017”. The Permanent Representative stressed that “the assistance provided to the Bushehr related to emergency repairs undertaken in accordance with South Africa’s international obligations to assist a vessel in distress and was not related to ‘the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel’ as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex B of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”.

B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran

29. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

30. In July 2016, France brought to the attention of my predecessor information on the seizure of an arms shipment on board a stateless dhow on 20 March 2016 in the northern Indian Ocean. In its assessment, the arms shipment had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen. In January 2017, France provided to the Secretariat additional information regarding the dhow, including its course prior to its interception, documents found on board and the identity of some of the crew members. The Secretariat notes that the dhow was stopped by the frigate Provence at a point on the most direct and economical route between its home port, Konarak, Islamic Republic of Iran, and its destination off the coast of Somalia, as declared by the crew master, an Iranian individual.

5 Warships are defined in the Register of Conventional Arms as “vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range”. It is the understanding of the Secretariat that the Iranian vessel involved had a displacement of more than 500 metric tons and was armed and equipped for military use.

31. In March 2017, French authorities granted full access to the Secretariat to examine the assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank missiles seized. The Secretariat was able to independently ascertain that the 2,000 assault rifles and 64 sniper rifles were in new condition. Although lacking country or factory marking, the weapons corresponded to known features of Iranian-manufactured weapons. The 2,000 assault rifles have characteristics identical to Iranian-produced KLS-7.62 mm, an assault rifle type AK-47. The 64 sniper rifles have characteristics identical to those of the Iranian-produced SVD sniper rifle. Furthermore, the Secretariat confirmed with the foreign manufacturer of the optical sights fitting the sniper rifles that they were produced as recently as 2015 and were sold to an Iranian company.

32. My predecessor and I received several letters regarding the arms shipments seized by Australia and the United States in early 2016, information that was already provided to the Security Council in the first and second reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). They include identical letters dated 15 May 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (S/2017/427), as well as a note verbale dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (A/71/581). The latter brought to the attention of my predecessor a letter dated 18 October 2016 addressed to the President of the General Assembly from the Permanent Representatives of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen (ibid., annex).

33. In a letter dated 18 February 2017 addressed to me, the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations stated that “multiple reports of similar interceptions documented the seizure of considerable quantities of weapons and ammunition” that, in the assessment of Yemen, included “Iranian-made anti-tank missiles, assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, AK-47s, spare barrels, mortar tubes, and hundreds of rocket-propelled grenades, and RBG launchers”. He also stated that three disassembled spy drones found concealed in a truck at the Yemen-Oman border on 12 December 2016 by Yemeni armed forces and a spy drone belonging to the Houthis intercepted in-flight by coalition forces in the Al-Mokha area on 28 January 2017 were a “clear manifestation of the involvement of Iranians in providing the Houthis with weapons and expertise”. The Government of Yemen was invited to provide detailed information, documents and images. I will report thereon to the Council accordingly as additional information becomes available.

34. In a letter dated 18 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations brought to the attention of the Secretariat information regarding arms and related materiel seized or recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen since 16 January 2016 that, in the assessment of the United Arab Emirates, were Iranian-made or sourced. This included detailed information and images of anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of the United Arab Emirates. The Secretariat is examining the information and will provide an update to the Council, as appropriate, in due course.

35. In the second report of the Secretary-General, information was provided that arms and related materiel are shipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hizbullah using commercial flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran, either directly to Beirut or via Damascus (see S/2016/1136, para. 32). In a statement dated 24 November 2016, the Chair of Rafic Hariri International Airport strongly refuted

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7 The KLS is the fixed stock version of the Iranian-produced KL-7.62 mm assault rifle.
those allegations. In identical letters dated 25 January 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (A/71/770-S/2017/80), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel dated 21 November 2016 (S/2016/987) contained fabrications and false claims and reiterated that his Government respects its obligations pursuant to international resolutions.

36. Information released by the organizers of the sixth International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 5 to 7 March 2017, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in the exhibition for the second year in a row. According to press coverage of the event, items displayed by those entities appear to have included small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defence systems. The Secretariat again raised the issue with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations had previously stated that it believed that no prior approval was required from the Security Council for that activity since the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions

37. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to those individuals and entities.

38. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organisation, may have participated again in the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2017 (see para. 36 above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the exhibition and, according to images released by the Iraqi and Iranian media, its official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items. All of the entity’s funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory on the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or at any time thereafter should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course.

VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision

39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231

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8 Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined in resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.

Since the issuance of the second report of the Secretary-General, additional information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. New pictures and video showing the General in the vicinity of Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic, in late December 2016 were reproduced in early January 2017. In February 2017, in an interview with an Iranian media outlet (Tasnim News Agency), the President of Iraq, in response to a question about the presence of the General in Iraq, reportedly stated that “the presence of General Qasem Soleimani is in the context of the presence of foreign military advisors in Iraq”. He stressed that Iranian military advisers, including the General, had a right to be present in Iraq, as did advisers from other countries, to provide military advice in the fight against terrorism.

Furthermore, in early April 2017, Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars News Agency, Al-Masdar News) reproduced a picture allegedly showing Major General Soleimani in the central province of Hama in the Syrian Arab Republic for a meeting with officers of the Syrian Arab Army. A few days later, media from the Kurdish region of Iraq (Rudaw Media Network) reported that Major General Soleimani had visited Sulaymaniyah, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Several Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars News Agency, Al-Masdar News) also reported that the General had been photographed with Iraqi popular mobilization forces in north-western Iraq on 29 May 2017. According to those reports, Major General Soleimani was present in the area as part of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisory mission during an operation of the popular mobilization forces along the Iraq-Syrian Arab Republic border crossing.

VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council and of its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel.

The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website. Relevant documents were regularly added in all official languages to the website. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote information on the resolution, in particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). On 18 January 2017, the Division participated in an export control seminar organized by the Awa Aussenwirtschafts-Akademie (Foreign Trade Academy) in Frankfurt, Germany. On 12 June 2017, the Division also participated in a public awareness-raising seminar related to the procurement channel organized by the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, held in Vienna.

During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.