



Security Council

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Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. Almost two years after Implementation Day (16 January 2016), I continue to believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to realize the aspirations of the Iranian people. The Plan constitutes a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy in addressing issues that could have an impact on regional and international peace and security, and it is my hope that it will be preserved.

2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported nine times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its most recent quarterly reports ([S/2017/777](#) and [S/2017/994](#)), the Agency again reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

3. Against this backdrop of diplomatic achievement, compliance and robust verification, the decision of 13 October by the President of the United States of America not to certify that the suspension of its national sanctions pursuant to the agreement is “appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear programme”, and the potential legislative actions that the Congress of the United States may take to reimpose those national sanctions, have regrettably created considerable uncertainty regarding the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. At present, these national executive actions do not affect the validity of the Plan or the respective commitments of the participants contained therein. I am reassured that the United States has expressed its commitment to stay in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for now.

4. I call upon all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full implementation of the agreement and to work through differences and challenges in



a spirit of cooperation and compromise, good faith and reciprocity. It is important that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering benefits to the Iranian people.

5. I encourage all Member States and regional and international organizations to act in accordance with and support the implementation of this historic agreement, which is in the interest of the international community at large. I welcome the commitment of the European Union to the continued full and effective implementation of all parts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I also welcome the affirmative statements by China, the Russian Federation and numerous other Member States in support of the Plan. I encourage the United States to maintain its commitments to the Plan and to consider the broader implications for the region and beyond before taking any further steps. Similarly, I encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider the concerns raised by other participants in the Plan.

6. The present report, the fourth on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of the third report of the Secretary-General ([S/2017/515](#)), on 20 June 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

II. Key findings and recommendations

7. Since 16 January 2016, the Secretariat has not received any reports on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In relation to alleged inconsistent Iranian procurement activities in Germany, the Government of Germany confirmed to the Secretariat in November 2017 that it had no indications of any activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B and had no evidence of any transfers or activities inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.

8. Since 20 June 2017, eight additional proposals to participate in or permit activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end uses have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the Procurement Channel.¹

9. On the basis of interactions that took place during outreach activities carried out by the Secretariat, it appears that there remains a general lack of understanding of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), especially in the private sector. This lack of understanding, coupled with a sense of political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the decisions of some Member States and private sector entities to engage in activities requiring prior approval from the Security Council. Member States should undertake greater efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the specific restrictions, in particular the Procurement Channel, the procedures for the submission of proposals and the process for review. The Secretariat stands ready to assist Member States in such efforts, in line with the arrangements and procedures outlined in the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)).

10. Regarding the emerging information on the possible transfer by the Islamic Republic of Iran of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology to the

¹ All nuclear-related proposals and other documents related to the Procurement Channel are treated as confidential.

Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017, the Secretariat has examined the debris of the missiles launched at Yanbu' and Riyadh and is carefully reviewing all the information and material available. The Security Council should consider a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the "2231 format", to be jointly briefed by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings at the appropriate time.

11. The Secretariat was provided with an opportunity to examine the arms and related materiel seized by the United States aboard a dhow in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman in March 2016 (see S/2016/589, paras. 29–31). The Secretariat is confident that close to 900 of the assault rifles seized by the United States are identical to those seized by France, also in March 2016, which the Secretariat had assessed to be of Iranian origin and to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see S/2017/515, para. 10).

12. The Defence Industries Organisation, an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015),² participated in a foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon, held in Zhukovsky, Russian Federation, in July 2017. In November, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations informed the Secretariat that an investigation into the issue had found no action inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

13. Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Qasem Soleimani has continued to travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, despite the travel ban provision of resolution 2231 (2015) and previous reporting to the Security Council on this issue. The Council should call upon the Government of the relevant Member States in the region, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to take the steps necessary to ensure proper implementation of the travel ban and other provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

14. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) has not been reviewed or updated by the Security Council since 17 January 2016. To ensure proper implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban provisions, I recommend that the Council review and update the list as appropriate and consider appropriate options for delisting processes.

15. In a letter dated 28 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/739), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, signed into law on 2 August 2017, violated the terms of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). While the allegations raised in the letter have been duly considered, it is my assessment that this information does not fall within the scope of the present report, unless guidance to the contrary is provided by the Security Council.

² Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

16. In resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a dedicated Procurement Channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through this Channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

17. Since 20 June 2017, 8 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 24 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day for approval through the Procurement Channel. At the time of reporting, 16 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had not been approved, and 5 had been withdrawn by the proposing States.

18. In addition, the Security Council received four new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities that do not require approval but require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

19. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might have attempted to procure nuclear or dual-use items, materiel, goods and technology in Germany outside the Procurement Channel. In its interactions with the Secretariat, including during meetings in Berlin in early November 2017, the Government of Germany recalled the 2016 report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution according to which, as far as the Federal Office was able to verify such evidence, it did not reveal any violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed the Secretariat that it had no indications of any activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) conducted in Germany by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was also reiterated that German authorities would continue to rigorously explore and assess any possible activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

20. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

21. On 2 August 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States on the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017. Those States underscored that the phrase “ballistic missile designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems — defined as those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km — that are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

destruction. They noted that space launch vehicles such as the Simorgh were “inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km if configured as a ballistic missile” and “inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons”. Therefore, those States considered that the launch was inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

22. Through a letter dated 16 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/720), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations transmitted a position paper in which it was underscored that there was “no legal prohibition on the development by the Islamic Republic of Iran of missile and space programmes”, as resolution 2231 (2015) contained only a call, which was “by all means not a prohibition”, to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that were designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It was also stated in the paper that there was no information that Iranian ballistic missiles were specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons and that, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, “Tehran does not possess nuclear weapons, and it does not carry out work on the development thereof”. The Russian Federation also noted that “no prohibition on cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran on missile-related items” was in existence, but that there was the requirement for Member States to seek prior approval of the Security Council for the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

23. In a letter dated 23 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/731), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that the launch of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017 was “part of a scientific and technological activity related to the use of space technology” and that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “determined to continue to exercise this right for its socioeconomic interests”. He also stated that the definition of the Missile Technology Control Regime was not an internationally agreed definition and that the “technical characteristics and operational requirements of the satellite launch vehicles clearly make them distinct from ballistic missile systems”. The Permanent Representative concluded that the test launch could not be regarded as inconsistent with the resolution.

24. The Security Council discussed the launch of the Simorgh space launch vehicle on 8 September 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on how that launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The fourth six-month report of the facilitator for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) will provide the details of Council deliberations on this issue.

25. In addition to the above, several launches of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran were brought to my attention. In identical letters dated 28 June 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/555), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations brought to my attention information that had reportedly recently come to light regarding the flight test of a Qiam ballistic missile on 15 November 2016 that used a Star of David as the intended target. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative referred to the ballistic missiles reportedly launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic on 18 and 19 June 2017. He considered that the test-firing of those ballistic missiles, all of which were Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). A joint statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued on 28 July 2017, referred to the same launches at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to an alleged flight test of a medium-range ballistic missile on 4 July 2017.

26. In identical letters dated 17 August 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/719), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic

of Iran stated that the claim made “regarding the test launch of a ballistic missile on 15 November 2016 and the use of a specific marking as target practice is a sheer falsehood”. He also underscored that “Iranian military capabilities, including ballistic missiles, have not been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and were thus “outside the purview of the Security Council resolution”. In addition, he referred to the terrorist attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) in Tehran on 7 June 2017 and to the determination of the Islamic Republic of Iran to fight terrorism and violent extremism.

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

27. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,³ the provision of various services or assistance, and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

28. In identical letters dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/937](#)), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations stated that the authorities of Saudi Arabia had confirmed, through the examination of the debris of the missiles launched from within Yemeni territory on 22 July and 4 November 2017 at Yanbu‘ and at Riyadh, respectively, “the role of the Iranian regime in manufacturing the missiles”. He also stated that this was “a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions [2216 \(2015\)](#) and [2231 \(2015\)](#)”. In a letter also dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/936](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects such baseless and unfounded accusations”.

29. In October and November 2017, the authorities of Saudi Arabia invited the Secretariat to examine the debris of the ballistic missiles launched at its territory on 22 July and 4 November 2017. During those visits, the authorities of Saudi Arabia indicated that, according to their assessment, those missiles were Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missiles (a variant of the Scud missile). The Secretariat observed that the diameter of both missiles was consistent with that of the Scud family and that the missiles had similar structural and manufacturing features, which suggested a common origin. The Secretariat noted that markings found on the missiles indicated that the oxidizer tank was situated above the fuel tank. The Secretariat also observed that, under the blue overpaint, the missile launched on 4 November had paint and markings resembling those of the one launched on 22 July. The Secretariat was informed that no tail fins had been recovered in either instance. The Secretariat observed remnants of mounting plates on the tail unit of the missile of 22 July, which suggest that the missile was finless. The Secretariat also observed three actuators that bore the castings of a logo similar to that of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and a subordinate to the Aerospace Industries Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to

³ The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list (see [S/2015/546](#), annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

Saudi authorities, the actuators belonged to the missile of 4 November. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

30. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might also have attempted to procure ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods or technology in Germany. On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed the Secretariat that it had no evidence of any transfers or activities inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran in Germany. It was also reiterated that German authorities would continue to rigorously explore and assess any possible transfers or activities inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

31. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

32. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

33. In June 2016, the United States brought to the attention of my predecessor information on the seizure, on 28 March 2016, of an arms shipment on board a dhow, the *Adris*, transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman (see [S/2016/589](#), paras. 29–31). According to the assessment of the United States, the arms shipment had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In October 2017, United States authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the arms and related materiel seized, consisting of 1,500 AKM type assault rifles, 200 rocket propelled grenade launchers, 21 heavy machine guns and miscellaneous other items. The Secretariat could independently ascertain that close to 900 of the assault rifles and the 21 machine guns were in new condition. The 900 assault rifles were identical to those seized by France in March 2016, which had characteristics of the Iranian-produced KLS 7.62 x 39 mm (furnishing made of dark brown synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight markings, slanted screw-on compensator and dot-peen marking style), which the Secretariat has assessed were of Iranian origin and shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [S/2017/515](#), paras. 10 and 31). In addition, the serial numbers of the assault rifles seized by France and the United States fall within the same production batch and include sequential numbers. More than 100 of the grenade launchers appeared to have characteristics similar to Iranian-produced launchers (for example, paint markings and heat shields). Among the miscellaneous items examined by the Secretariat, which included gun covers, tools and cleaning kits, were two foreign-made neodymium sirens that appeared to have been modified after sale by the addition

of a cable, bearing markings indicating Iranian manufacture, with a military-type electrical connector. An identical siren was also observed by the Secretariat in a separate incident (see para. 34 below), as well as a fuse plate and a detonation device booster identical to those seen in photographs taken on board the *Adris* and provided to the Secretariat by United States authorities. The Secretariat is still analysing the remaining information, and I will report back to the Council accordingly as additional information becomes available.

34. During its visits to Saudi Arabia in October and November 2017, the Secretariat received information on unmanned surface vessels laden with explosives allegedly used against the Saudi-led coalition. Saudi authorities indicated that one such vessel had been recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemeni waters. Reportedly, the vessel itself and the explosives were from Yemen, but parts of the guidance and detonation systems had been supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In November 2017, the Secretariat examined parts of the detonation and guidance systems. It observed that the computer terminal (part of the guidance system) had a dual English/Farsi keyboard and characteristics (design and construction features, graphical user interface and programme icon) similar to those of terminals produced by an Iranian company. The Secretariat also observed that some of the electrical cables bore markings indicating Iranian manufacture and that the detonation system included a neodymium siren, a fuse plate and a detonation device booster identical to those seized on board the dhow *Adris* (see para. 33 above). The Secretariat was also presented with a selection of photographs and geographical coordinates reportedly extracted from the guidance system computer. At the time of reporting, the Secretariat had not been able to independently confirm the authenticity of the photographs and geographical coordinates. The Secretariat is still analysing the available information and will provide an update to the Council in due course.

35. Also during its visits to Saudi Arabia, the Secretariat was given the opportunity to examine two unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly recovered in Yemen after Implementation Day. Saudi authorities determined that one was an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle of the Ababil-II family. The Secretariat observed that the vehicle appeared to have characteristics (for example, design and construction features, serial number prefixes and engine) identical to those of others reportedly seized or recovered in Yemen after Implementation Day that had been brought to its attention by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations in letters dated 18 May 2017 (see [S/2017/515](#), para. 34) and 8 November 2017. The Secretariat is still analysing the information provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia and looks forward to the opportunity to examine the other unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of the United Arab Emirates, in order to independently ascertain their origin.

VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions

36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to those individuals and entities.

37. It appears that the Defence Industries Organisation, an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), once again participated in a foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon held in Zhukovsky, Russian Federation, in July 2017. Its name is on the list of exhibitors released by the organizers and, according to images released by Iranian and Russian media outlets, its official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items.

38. The Secretariat raised this issue with the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation. In November, the Permanent Mission informed the Secretariat that an investigation into the issue had found no action inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Permanent Mission indicated that no financial transactions had been carried out with the Defence Industries Organisation because no fee had been charged to Iranian participants by the hosts. The Permanent Mission also indicated that all samples of Iranian-made military equipment exhibited were mock-ups that had been returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran after the exhibition.

VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision

39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.

40. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. In mid-June, pictures of the General on a pilgrimage to the holy shrine of Imam Husayn in the city of Karbala', Iraq, were published by Iraqi media outlets. In October, pictures of him visiting the tomb of the former President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, were also published by Iraqi media outlets. In addition, according to media from the Kurdish region of Iraq, the General reportedly visited Iraqi Kurdistan several times in September and October.

41. Furthermore, in mid-June, pictures showing Major General Soleimani in the Syrian Arab Republic, allegedly with members of the Afghan militia known as the Fatemiyoun Division along the border with Iraq, were published by Iranian media outlets. In early November, pictures of the General, allegedly with members of the Syrian militia known as the Baqir Brigade, in Dayr al-Zawr, Syrian Arab Republic, were reproduced by Arab media outlets. In mid-November, the Iraqi militia known as Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba published pictures of the General posing with militia members in the vicinity of Albu Kamal, Syrian Arab Republic. In late November, video footage of him in Albu Kamal after its liberation from ISIL (Da'esh) was reproduced by Arab media outlets.

42. The Secretariat raised the topic of travel by Major General Soleimani with the Permanent Missions of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. In November 2017, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Secretariat that his Government had not granted the General any visas to enter the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

VIII. List maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

43. During the reporting period, the Secretariat was provided with information on an individual who may be acting in support of a designated entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat was also provided with information indicating that another designated entity on the list had used subsidiaries to circumvent the asset freeze provision of annex B to the resolution. The Secretariat is seeking further information and will report to the Security Council in due course. An updated list would facilitate the implementation of the restrictive measures.

IX. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

44. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the Procurement Channel. In addition, the Division provided induction briefings for the incoming facilitator and members of the Security Council, to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

45. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website.⁴ Relevant documents were regularly added to the website and updated in all official languages. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote information on the resolution, in particular the Procurement Channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016. In October 2017, the Division participated in two forums organized by the World Export Controls Review, held in London and Washington, D.C. Also in October 2017, the Secretariat participated in a public awareness-raising workshop on resolution 2231 (2015) and the Procurement Channel, held in Seoul and organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The interactions of the Division with representatives of Member States and private sector entities at these events showed that there remains a general lack of understanding of resolution 2231 (2015), of the restrictive measures that came into force on 16 January 2016, in particular the Procurement Channel process, and of the respective roles of the Joint Commission, the Security Council and its facilitator and the Secretariat. This lack of understanding, as well as a sense of political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the decisions of some Member States and private entities to re-engage with the Islamic Republic of Iran in trade activities relating to items, materials, equipment, goods and technology requiring the prior approval of the Security Council.

46. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.

⁴ See www.un.org/en/sc/2231.