
The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2262 (2016) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 23 (c) of resolution 2262 (2016), the midterm report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) on 19 July 2016 and was considered by the Committee on 5 August 2016.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Summary

The improvement in the security situation in previously troubled parts of the Central African Republic following the elections held in late 2015 and early 2016 was short-lived. In June 2016, violent skirmishes between the militia of sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye and the Central African Republic internal security forces caused another lockdown of the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui. The same month, former Séléka factions clashed in several places in the north and centre of the country, coinciding with the return of Nourredine Adam from Chad in late May.

Violent events in Bangui and the provinces, although not necessarily related, represent a first test for the newly elected Government of Faustin Archange Touadéra. In April, President Touadéra initiated discussions with various armed group leaders, but the majority of former Séléka remain discontented, seeing little prospect for themselves and their combatants in the new Government and armed forces. While former Séléka continue to frustrate the extension of State authority and to expand their presence in large parts of the country, the rivalry among various factions appears, for the time being, to rule out the possibility of the former Séléka forming a unified front against the Government.

Former Séléka groups nonetheless maintain their fighting capacity through illicit arms trafficking from the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and the outright refusal of most of their leaders to disarm.

In contrast to the former Séléka, anti-balaka groups have taken a lower profile. Some leaders, notably sanctioned individual Alfred Yékatom, also known as “Rombhot”, were elected to the National Assembly. Active in areas where State authority is being restored, anti-balaka combatants who formerly served in the national security forces have, de facto, easier access to re-integration.

However, anti-balaka activity is still very prominent in other areas of the Central African Republic, such as majority Christian areas where Fulani cattle herders pass, and/or areas controlled by the former Séléka, such as Bambari town. Anti-balaka attacks against Fulani herders and former Séléka combatants in the extreme north-west claimed several lives in June. Competition over racketeering is the source of much of the violence perpetrated not only by the anti-balaka but also the former Séléka factions that paradoxically claim to protect pastoral interests.

The mineral sector, in particular in the east, continues to attract armed groups seeking to loot or establish parallel taxation systems around the mines. In the south-west, armed group activity is not affecting diamond mining, but the freedom of movement of Muslim operators is being threatened owing to frequent assaults on returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Oil exploration in the north has generated competition between former Séléka factions seeking employment as security guards, leading the private security firm, FIT Protection, to make a financial pay-off to one faction.
Renewed violence in the north and central regions has generated new flows of internally displaced persons, seemingly halting the gradual decrease in their numbers observed to date in 2016. Attacks and abuses by the Lord’s Resistance Army in the east are on the rise and now affect villages close to towns such as Rafai, where international forces are present.
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Background

1. On 27 January 2016, the Security Council adopted its resolution 2262 (2016), by which the Panel was mandated, inter alia, to provide to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic a midterm report no later than 30 July 2016.

2. On 26 February, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed five members of the Panel (see S/2016/188). Owing to lengthy internal administrative procedures, the recruitment of the armed groups expert, Romain Esmenjaud, was completed only on 27 June and he was therefore unable to join the field investigations. That placed a significant burden on the other four Panel members (recruited since 1 March) to cover part of the armed groups mandate.

3. During the reporting period (the first half of 2016), the Panel maintained an almost permanent presence in the country. With support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Panel members travelled to 10 out of the 16 prefectures (provinces). The present report is structured by non-administrative region, delineated by the Panel to reflect distinct security dynamics (see map in annex 1). At the regional level, the Panel conducted official visits to Cameroon (Yaoundé and Douala) and Chad (N’Djamena). The Republic of the Congo and the Sudan did not accommodate visits proposed by the Panel.

II. Methodology

4. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.

5. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

6. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Panel’s Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

III. Bangui region

A. Renewed violence in the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui

7. In June 2016, security incidents in the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui disrupted the relative improvement in security resulting from the successful elections. Those
incidents were the first major security challenges for the new authorities and tested their capacity to manage violence.

8. On 18 June, internal security forces at PK12\(^1\) arrested 26 Muslim traders suspected of weapons possession, who were part of a MINUSCA-escorted convoy. In retaliation, the PK5 neighbourhood militia of Haroun Gaye (listed by the Committee on 17 December 2015) and Abdoulaye Hissène kidnapped five national policemen. On 20 June, the attempt by MINUSCA to release the policemen led to an exchange of gunfire with the militia.\(^2\) On 24 June, the policemen were freed following negotiations.

9. The above incident and others reported in the 3rd district (see para. 30) (annex 2, map) followed actions by Government authorities aimed at reclaiming State authority. For example, from May onwards, the Minister of Public Security and Territorial Administration initiated the reinforcement of roadblocks around the PK5 Muslim enclave, which militia leaders considered a provocation (see para. 31).

10. In comparison to the previous cycle of violence in September 2015 (see S/2015/936, paras. 8-13), the violence in June was more localized. However, it demonstrated the fragility of current security arrangements and further illustrated that armed groups in Bangui maintain a strong, if not heightened, capacity as spoilers and pose a serious challenge to the efforts by the Government to promote security, notwithstanding the support from MINUSCA.

**B. Engagement by the new Government with armed groups**

**Consultations between the President and armed groups**

11. Between 12 April and 18 May, President Touadéra held consultations with armed group leaders. The meetings revealed wide-ranging views between the President and several groups, in particular former Séléka factions. Leaders of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) primarily argued that their political grievances would need to be taken into consideration before they could accept the President’s request for their disarmament (annexes 3, 4 and 5).\(^3\) The grievances concern the lack of basic services and infrastructure in the northern and eastern provinces and, more importantly, the low levels of political representation in national institutions of Muslim populations from those regions in general and members of their particular armed groups (see paras. 16-18).

12. The Panel notes that the FPRC delegation that met with the President included Haroun Gaye and Abdoulaye Hissène. A high-ranking Government member informed the Panel in May that Gaye and Hissène had not been officially invited.

\(^1\) A neighbourhood 12 km north of the centre of Bangui.

\(^2\) One peacekeeper was injured and at least six individuals were killed. Confidential report, 21 June 2016.

\(^3\) Meeting with General Yaya Scout (UPC), Bria, 22 April 2016; meeting with General Zacharia Damane (RPRC), Bria, 23 April 2016; Meeting with Moussa Shaib (FPRC), Birao, 27 April 2016; telephone call with Souleyman Daouda (UPC), 20 April 2016.
They reportedly “joined” the FPRC delegation without prior notice. The Panel, however, notes that both individuals were included in the draft calendar of meetings (annex 6).

13. President Touadéra also met anti-balaka leaders Maxime Mokom, Edouard Ngaissona, Sébastien Wénézouï and Alfred Yékatom. The President reiterated that disarmament should be the precondition for peace talks. Anti-balaka leaders highlighted the necessity of protecting civilians in areas controlled by former Séléka. On 24 June, the Minister of Interior nominated by decree Maxime Mokom as officer in the national police.4

14. In the absence of its leader, Martin Koumtamadji, also known as Abdoulaye Miskine, who remains in Brazzaville (see S/2015/936, annex 5.1), the meeting between President Touadéra and the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC), discussed in section V below, included Lucien Assalbaye.5 The main concern of FDPC is to bring Koumtamadji back to the Central African Republic in order to champion an alliance of so-called moderate former Séléka.6

15. On 18 May, after meeting with representatives of the armed groups, the President issued a communiqué (annex 7) expressing satisfaction with the results of the consultations. He committed to addressing the concerns raised by the groups, albeit following the completion of the disarmament process. On 2 July, national coordination for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, security sector reform and national reconciliation was established. Jean Willybiro Sacko, former presidential candidate and special adviser to the President, is the head. The body should now serve as the main forum of the Government for engagement with armed groups.

**Representation of Muslims and armed groups in the Government**

16. Recent appointments in the Government and the President’s and the Prime Minister’s cabinets (annex 8) have reinforced the perception of the non-inclusion of Muslims among former Séléka leaders.7 While members of the Government consider the inclusion of four Muslims in a 23-member Government representative of the country’s religious diversity,8 the 44-strong cabinet of the Prime Minister does not include any Muslims.

17. The installation of former presidential candidate, Karim Abdoul Meckassoua, as Speaker of Parliament placed a prominent Muslim politician in the second-highest State position. However, since he was elected by the parliament, this cannot be viewed as the Government reaching out to the Muslim community.

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4 Decree obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 14 July 2016. Archived at the United Nations.
5 In 2015, Lucien Assalbaye acted as FDPC liaison officer in Cameroon, (S/2015/936, annex 5.1, para. 8).
6 Meeting with FDPC, MPC and FPRC representatives, Bangui, 9 June 2016.
7 Meetings with political actors and members of the diplomatic community in Bangui, June 2016.
18. The President and the Prime Minister excluded armed group leaders from the executive branch of the Government. UPC and MPC former Séléka factions consider that they should have been rewarded with some positions after expressing support for Touadéra before the second round of presidential elections. In a letter dated 3 April addressed to President Touadéra, UPC alone demanded, inter alia, no less than four ministerial positions, six prefects and eight generals in the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) (annex 9).

19. Former Séléka leaders consistently called for Muslims to be integrated into and comprise at least 30 per cent of the armed forces (see footnote 3). They stated this as a precondition for the deployment of FACA to areas under their control.9

20. While recognizing the merits of not appointing armed group leaders in the Government, the minimal inclusion of Muslims in the overall State administration represents a missed opportunity to send a strong signal of inclusion and reconciliation. Instead, the administration of President Touadéra is seen as recycling political elite from the Bozizé era. Some politicians and FACA officers have, in meetings with the Panel, shown little interest in reconciliation with a so-called “foreign” Muslim minority.10

**Election of armed group individuals to the National Assembly**

21. Although not free of technical and logistical shortcomings, the presidential and legislative elections yielded results generally considered acceptable, thereby closing the transition period.

22. A significant number of armed group leaders, mainly among the anti-balaka, participated in the parliamentary polls. Two anti-balaka leaders and one independent militia leader were eventually elected: respectively, listed individual Alfred Yékatom, also known as “Rombhot”, in Mbaïki (Lobaye prefecture), Florent Kema in Nana Bakassa (Ouham prefecture) and Eric Pogola in Nola (Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture).11 Yékatom is currently a member of the Defence and Security Commission of the National Assembly.

23. Despite having evidence of Yékatom intimidating voters and harassing political competitors in his constituency, the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic were unable to reject his candidacy or invalidate his election because no tribunal had found him guilty of any crime and he was not subject to a national arrest warrant. The Panel considers that possible salary payments to Yékatom resulting from his seating in parliament are violations of the asset freeze, similar to his salary payments as an army officer. Through various channels, the Committee and the Panel have duly informed the authorities of the Central African Republic.

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9 A small number of former Séléka are among a list of verified FACA. The Panel intends to obtain more information on the overall figure and percentage (see para. 37).

10 Meetings with politicians and FACA officers, Bangui, 22 and 24 June.

11 Other anti-balaka candidates were Aimé Dobo (Boda), Thierry Lébéné, also known as “12 Puissances” (Bogangolo), Bernard Mokom (Bossangoa), Marcellin Alix Orogo (Bambari). Regarding former Séléka, with the exception of Fadoul Al-Bachar and Hamit Tidjani, their initial hostility towards elections prevented most from running.
Legal prosecution of sanctioned individuals and other spoilers

24. Legal pursuit of sanctioned individuals and other spoilers has been minimal and limited mainly to the issuance of arrest warrants. In its final report of 2015 (S/2015/936), the Panel highlighted the failed attempt by MINUSCA to arrest Haroun Gaye on 2 August 2015. On 15 March 2016, Abdoulaye Hissène was apprehended by the police at Bangui Mpoko airport and transferred to the research and investigation section of the national gendarmerie. His militia subsequently released him, using force, and stole one weapon previously handed over by MINUSCA as part of an exemption request approved by the Committee.

25. None of the three PK5 militia leaders, namely, Haroun Gaye, his deputy, Hamit Tidjani, and Abdoulaye Hissène, had arrest warrants against them when their arrests were attempted. Hissène therefore was not incarcerated and could challenge his arrest. Tidjani and Gaye were included in a court order, whereby the public prosecutor of Bangui requested national and international security forces to bring them for questioning. With similar intentions, on 2 July 2016, the prosecutor issued a summons for Tidjani and Gaye (different from arrest warrant). The same applies to sanctioned individuals Alfred Yékatom and Eugène Ngaïkosset and a number of other anti-balaka leaders in Bangui.

26. On 20 June 2016, an investigating judge in Bangui issued six new arrest warrants, including those against Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye. President Touadéra handed them over to MINUSCA. Forty-seven arrest warrants issued in 2014, including for Nourredine Adam, were not transmitted to MINUSCA.

C. National security actors

Calls for the lifting of the arms embargo

27. The Government has systematically reiterated its call to lift the arms embargo, although it has not submitted a formal request to the Security Council. Ministers and high-ranking officials of the army, police and gendarmerie have stated that the embargo perpetuates an imbalance of forces between armed groups and State security forces because armed groups continue to benefit from illicit arms flows.

28. The Panel has noted on a number of occasions that resolution 2262 (2016) and previous resolutions allow for exemptions to the arms embargo. The Minister of Defence remains committed to working more with the Committee and the Panel on that issue and the Central African Republic may consider submitting requests to

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12 Confidential report, 16 March 2016.
13 MINUSCA submitted the exemption requests on 30 July, 2 November and 17 December 2015.
14 See S/2016/305, para. 18), which misstates that there is an arrest warrant out for Abdoulaye Hissène.
15 The list issued by the public prosecutor in Bangui concerns 55 people.
17 Confidential report, 21 June 2016.
18 Meeting with MINUSCA police commissioner, Bangui, 30 May 2016. Apart from the warrant for former president and listed individual Francois Bozizé, MINUSCA was not made aware of six other international arrest warrants issued in 2014.
19 Meetings with political and security actors in Bangui between 29 March and 27 June 2016.
international forces for the return of seized weapons and ammunition\textsuperscript{20} and for neighbouring States to return military material confiscated from FACA that crossed their borders after the 2013 crisis. In March and May 2016, FACA received non-lethal military equipment from China and France following the activation of exemptions and notifications procedures.\textsuperscript{21}

29. Following the visit in August 2015 by the Chair of the Committee and the revision of the Committee’s guidelines in September 2015, the Government is also allowed to submit arms embargo exemption requests directly to the Committee.

30. Apart from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, other relevant regional and international organizations, including the Economic Community of Central African States, have expressed support for the arms embargo. The International Conference has recently reiterated its call for the lifting of the arms embargo (annex 10). Its calls reinforce those in government and the army who are unconvinced of the need to implement security sector reforms before rearming the national armed and security forces.

**Deployment of national armed and security forces in Bangui and beyond**

31. After the escalation of violence in Bangui in October 2015, former Defence Minister Joseph Bindoumi organized idle FACA elements who were keeping their weapons at home into units based in different neighbourhoods in Bangui.\textsuperscript{22} Eugène Ngaïkosset (listed by the Committee on 17 December 2015) led some of those irregular units.\textsuperscript{23} Contrary to the static posts deployed in Bangui since 2015, there was no coordination with international partners on the new FACA units, given that they fell outside the central FACA command.

32. While the irregular FACA units momentarily reduced crime and militia activity in Bangui, they also started racketeering local populations at unofficial checkpoints. In response to growing criticism, a high-ranking FACA official reported to the Panel that the new Minister of Defence, Joseph Yakété, intended to dismantle those FACA units and order them back to the military barracks in an attempt to restore a single system of command and control.\textsuperscript{24} The Panel has been informed, however, that to date, the irregular FACA units continue to operate.\textsuperscript{25}

33. According to several sources, the MINUSCA peacekeeper from Senegal whose body was left at the morgue of the general hospital in Bangui on 24 June was executed by a FACA element in front of the bar “Taratata” after a skirmish at the irregular FACA post in the Miskine neighbourhood in the 5th district.\textsuperscript{26} The FACA soldiers believed that the peacekeeper, travelling on a motorcycle in civilian clothing, was a former Séléka member. Witnesses confirmed that FACA soldiers

\textsuperscript{20} See S/2014/762, para. 80 and annexes 15 and 16; see also S/2015/936, para. 45 and annex 1.13.

\textsuperscript{21} France submitted the original exemption requests on 18 September and 6 November 2015. The request concerning the Chinese materials was submitted by the Government of the Central African Republic on 30 October 2015.

\textsuperscript{22} Meeting with a FACA General, Bangui, 3 June 2016.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with diplomatic source, Bangui, 5 April 2016. Interview with a gendarmerie official, Bangui, 4 April 2016.

\textsuperscript{24} Meeting with a FACA General, Bangui, 21 April 2016.

\textsuperscript{25} Mission in PK5 neighbourhood on 3 June 2016. Confidential communication, 7 July 2016.

\textsuperscript{26} Confidential communications of 25 June and 7 July 2016; Confidential source, 8 July 2016.
stole money from the corpse. Several witnesses, including FACA soldiers, were able to identify the perpetrator of the crime but refused to make an official statement. The General Prosecutor has been informed of the identity of the reported perpetrator.

34. On 21 June, FACA soldiers from the same irregular checkpoint killed another FACA soldier in the 5th district. Four days later, on 25 June, FACA soldiers from the 5th district kidnapped two of their colleagues. One of the bodies was found in Sambia village, while the other victim is in the hospital.

35. Beyond Bangui, the Ministry of Defence intends to strengthen the deployed FACA units and to redeploy to new areas. However, the Government’s wish to demonstrate the presence of FACA throughout the country stands in contrast with its structural lack of capacity to maintain and control FACA units in the field. FACA elements outside Bangui and those at the static posts in the capital are deployed under very difficult work conditions (see paras. 75-76).

Verification of the Central African armed forces

36. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, MINUSCA and the European Union military advisory mission are presently carrying out simplified vetting or verification processes of FACA in Bangui. The processes are aimed at verifying proper registration and excluding individuals who have committed gross human rights violations through self-declaration.

37. The cross-checking of a list of 46 MPC combatants with the database of the Ministry of Defence determined that 14 are actually registered and continue to be paid as members of FACA and that 6 have completed the verification process. On 21 January, the Panel met one such registered and verified member of FACA, Abdoul-Samat Ahamat, in Kaga-Bandoro. Ahamat currently serves as Director General of the MPC gendarmerie. Nourredine Adam’s chief of staff, Lambert Lissane Moukové, has called for former FACA fighters currently with FPRC to rejoin the armed forces. The Panel is awaiting the list of FPRC soldiers.

Abuses by the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry

38. As reported in the Panel’s progress update to the Committee in May 2016, the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry is reported to have committed serious human rights violations and its former commander and FACA lieutenant, Robert Yekoua-Kette, was aware of and directly participated in some of those violations. In particular, credible evidence obtained by the Panel also

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27 Confidential communications of 25 June and 7 July 2016.
28 Confidential source, 8 July 2016.
29 FACA are deployed in the west (see S/2015/936, para. 207), the Centre (mission to Mbaiki, 29 May 2016), as well as in Obo as part of the AU-RTF (mission to Obo, 13 May 2016) and Am Dafok as part of the Tripartite Force (paras. 74-75).
30 Confidential communication, 6 July 2016.
corroborates the direct involvement of Mr. Yekoua-Kette in the violent assault and execution of a handicapped young male.\(^{32}\)

39. Other testimonies obtained by the Panel highlight the involvement of Mr. Yekoua-Kette in intimidating criminal case witnesses, obstructing crime victims from filing complaints and torturing and otherwise ill-treating people.\(^{33}\)

40. Witnesses said that on 20 February in Bangui, a radio technician tried to collect money that a customer owed him; the customer refused to pay him and reported that she was being robbed. A nearby FACA detachment arrested the technician. Mr. Yekoua-Kette arrived at the scene, hit the technician with a gun and threatened to teach him a lesson. Then he took him to the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry. A relative of the victim went to the Office and saw Mr. Yekoua-Kette hit him several times, put the victim in his car and leave. Hours later, the victim’s body was dumped in front of the city morgue with a gunshot in the neck (annex 11).

41. On 7 June, Mr. Yekoua-Kette was removed as Head of the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry (annex 12). This represents a positive step towards ending impunity in Bangui. However, it remains imperative that the Government launch a thorough investigation into the alleged crimes committed by Mr. Yekoua-Kette and members of the Office.

### IV. Central region and border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

42. Insecurity in the central region is concentrated in the town of Bambari and its immediate surroundings. Previously reported confrontations between UPC and the anti-balaka around Kouango and Liotto, south-west of Bambari, and Lakouetene and Ndjangala north-west of Bambari (see S/2015/936, paras. 78-84 and 156-157), have significantly declined (see annex 13 for follow-up work on UPC attacks in the latter towns). UPC has extended its area of operations towards the south-east (see paras. 56-62).

43. Kemo and Ombella M’Poko prefectures have witnessed a slight decrease in incidents and killings, notwithstanding the continued presence of anti-balaka networks.\(^{34}\) Anti-balaka groups remain strong in Ouham prefecture, opposing armed Fulani.

44. The road from Nana Bakassa north to Markounda is particularly insecure. On 18 May, armed men in the area of Kouki attacked two Médecins sans frontières vehicles. One of the drivers was shot and killed, while staff and patients were forced out of the vehicles and robbed of personal belongings and medical supplies. On 17 June, on the road between Sibut and Grimari, another Médecins sans frontières driver was killed by unidentified assailants (annex 14 covers incidents against humanitarian personnel across the country).

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\(^{32}\) Confidential witness testimonies, Bangui, May 2016. Testimonies were also confirmed by other sources.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Panel of Experts database of incidents. See also S/2014/762, annex 5.
A. Bambari hotspot

45. Bambari town (Ouaka prefecture) is one of the principal hotspots in the country. Former Séléka, mainly the UPC of Ali Darrassa, and anti-balaka fighters operate in close proximity to one another, resulting in rival killings. In addition, there are animosities between Arab and Fulani factions of UPC and anti-balaka factions that are either aligned with Edouard Ngaïssona (operating under Gaétan Bouadé), Maxime Mokom (operating under Omer Beba and Thierry Madibo) or independently (operating under “Fally”).

46. A non-aggression pact signed on 27 January 2016 between UPC and Ngaïssona’s faction resulted in both groups identifying “Fally”, previously in the Mokom camp, as a common enemy. On 3 and 4 March, violence erupted between UPC and Mokom’s faction, resulting in the death of two UPC fighters; in retaliation, UPC killed four people unrelated to the events. On 18 April, gendarmerie officers on the Bambari-Liotto road killed “Fally”. After his death, his followers clashed with Gaëtan’s elements at Bambari’s main internally displaced persons camp “Sangaris”.

47. The departure of peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 16 February following serious accusations of sexual violence had made camp “Sangaris” Bambari’s epicentre of violence. Clashes between anti-balaka factions of “Fally” and Gaëtan had already been reported as early as 22 February. UPC had also made several incursions into the internally displaced persons camp, either in pursuit of anti-balaka elements or for other reasons. On 29 March, the date of the second round of legislative elections in the Central African Republic, the Panel witnessed an incursion by UPC, which claimed to have been in pursuit of a robber. Bullets flew over an electoral post, four civilians were randomly fired upon, sustaining serious injuries, while hundreds of internally displaced persons fled for safety.

48. Notwithstanding the progressive deployment of civil authorities and the presence of police, gendarmerie, and MINUSCA, UPC forces continue to move around Bambari fully equipped. MINUSCA has, however, implemented a weapons-free zone along the main road from Grimari up to the central market, extending up to 100 metres from the road on both sides. Although UPC does not move with arms on that road, the Panel witnessed armed UPC members within 100 metres of the main road, between Ouaka Bridge and the central market, a key reason why civilians do not use the market, as conveyed by local authorities during the visit to Bambari of the Chair of the Committee on 26 May.

35 “Fally” was the deputy of Mokom loyalist Giscard Raskia Ndarata, also known as “Cerveau Rouge” (see S/2015/936, paras. 74 and 75), a former FACA who escaped from Ngaragba prison in Bangui in September 2015.
36 Confidential report, 1 April 2016.
37 Named after French Sangaris forces that had their base at the internally displaced persons site until 15 August 2015 when a MINUSCA contingent from the Democratic Republic of the Congo took over.
38 Confidential report, 23 February 2016.
39 Meeting with internally displaced persons at Camp Sangaris, Bambari, 31 March 2016.
40 Confidential report, 23 April 2016.
49. UPC also continues to occupy the agricultural tax collection office in Bambari, forcing State officials to return 50 per cent of tax revenues on coffee transported to the Sudan (annex 15). UPC also monopolizes taxes on cattle trade.  

50. On 20 May, UPC detained officials of the national election agency for several hours for allegedly carrying military items. On 25 May, Ali Darrassa rejected the deployment of gendarmerie elements for an upcoming political seminar involving participants from Bangui. This was a further demonstration of Darrassa setting terms concerning the extension of State authority. 

51. The hegemony of Darrassa over Bambari, however, suffered a blow when the Arab faction of UPC, under Abdoulaye Ahamat Faya, turned against the Fulani faction, leading to confrontations on 4 July that reportedly left nine fighters dead. The split in Bambari follows confrontations in June between MPC/FPRC and UPC in Nana Gribizi and Ouham prefectures (see paras. 93-96).

B. Anti-balaka stronghold of Bossangoa

52. As previously reported (see S/2015/936, paras. 85-87 and annex 2.13), anti-balaka armed groups remain strong in Bossangoa. Charlin-Chabardo Momokama, also known as “Charly”, claims to have replaced Florent Kema, who was elected to the National Assembly, as regional zone commander. 

53. In this area, crossed by a transhumance route from Chad, regular incidents have been reported between Fulani and anti-balaka. Anti-balaka militias, seeking support from the gendarmerie in their attempt to address the security situation, including transhumance-related incidents, have reportedly tried to make use of their government connections. Those connections include Member of Parliament Florent Kema and high-ranking FACA officers.

V. Eastern region and border with the Sudan and South Sudan

54. The eastern region remains largely under the control of former Séléka armed groups. FPRC is the dominant group in most parts of the prefectures of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto. In Bria town, three former Séléka factions, namely, FPRC, RPRC and UPC, continue to share control. UPC has extended its control in the prefectures of Mboumou and Basse-Kotto and has established a presence in Bria and the mining town of Aigbando (Hautte Kotto prefecture).

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41 Meeting with an official of the central government agricultural tax collection office during the visit of the Chair of the 2127 Sanctions Committee in Bambari, 26 May 2016. Meeting with transporters, Bambari, 26 May 2016.
42 Confidential report, 26 May 2016.
43 Confidential report, 5 July 2016.
44 Confidential reports, 10 May 2016.
46 Interview with FPRC zone commander Jadis Kamara Tabash in Bria, 23 April 2016; Interview with RPRC General Zacharia Damane in Bria, 23 April 2016; interview with UPC General Yaya Scout in Bria, 22 April 2016.
55. Regular gendarmerie and police are present only in larger towns such as Bria and Bangassou. FACA is deployed in Obo (Haut-Mbomou prefecture) as part of the African Union Regional Task Force and in Am Dafok (Vakaga prefecture) as part of the tripartite force.

A. Union pour la paix en Centrafrique of Ali Darrassa extending control south-eastward

56. For strategic and economic reasons, UPC extended its control in the south-east in Mbomou and Basse-Kotto prefectures. In Mbomou, UPC controls and occupies the sub-prefectures of Gambo and Ouango. Its bases are established in the towns of Kémbé, Ouango, Béma and Pombolo. Armed elements of Joseph Zoundeko’s RPRC, commanded by Colonel David Dacko, are also present in Gambo town.

57. The UPC zone commander, with around 100 to 200 armed elements, is based in Béma, a strategic point at the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 18 February, without challenge from Ugandan forces operating under the African Union Regional Task Force, UPC installed a military unit comprising 30 to 50 armed elements in Nzako town, Bakouma sub-prefecture. UPC claims that it is protecting the civilian population from LRA attacks. In Basse-Kotto prefecture, UPC also controls the bigger towns, Alindao, Mobaye and Mingala.

58. Attempts by RPRC and UPC to install their elements at other locations in Mbomou prefecture, such as in Bangassou sub-prefecture in December 2015 and Bakouma town earlier in 2016, were refuted either by MINUSCA action or by offensive reactions of self-defence groups.

59. The extension of UPC control towards the south-east has also created new income-generating opportunities. UPC elements control several gold and diamond sites in the sub-prefectures of Gambo, Ouango and Bakouma. The Panel visited, near Béma, the newly discovered gold mine of Labakeze, where UPC erected a checkpoint and its fighters dig for gold (annex 16). From Béma market, UPC collects taxes amounting to $14,000 monthly, mainly from traders coming from Yakoma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Nzako, UPC arrested mine workers refusing to pay illicit taxes (see annex 17 for security incidents around mine sites in the east).

60. UPC has established additional checkpoints to levy taxes and pillage commercial trucks and travellers on roads between major towns of Mbomou and Basse-Kotto prefectures (annex 18).

49 Interview with the UPC zone commander, Colonel Daoud, Béma, 8 June 2016.
50 Meeting with Ali Darassa, Bambari, 29 March 2016. UPC’s move to Nzako was led by Abdoulaye Ahamat Faya.
51 On 15 December, MINUSCA successfully removed 11 RPRC elements from a road-block in Ngaba, 30 km from Bangassou town.
52 Panel of Expert’s mission, Béma, 8 June 2016.
53 Ibid.
54 On 5 June 2016, UPC elements looted two commercial trucks following their refusal to pay FCFA 5 million. Confidential report, 9 June 2016.
61. The occupation by UPC of Béma has also created opportunities for smuggling and arms trafficking via the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its port is the main entry point for military items from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which are often exchanged for cattle, diamonds and gold. According to witnesses, UPC fighters from Bambari regularly arrive in Béma without weapons but leave with weapons, ammunition and uniforms of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) (annex 19). As previously reported (S/2015/936, para. 58) UPC, as in Béma, had well-established supply routes via Mobaye and Satéma (Bass-Kotto prefecture).

62. Reinforced UPC presence in Basse-Kotto and Mbomou prefectures has severely impacted the security of local populations. UPC elements have arrested, detained and physically abused civilians, including civil servants, across these prefectures, and in areas with a MINUSCA or African Union Regional Task Force presence. UFC in Béma recruits very young soldiers (annex 20).

B. Upsurge in violence by the Lord’s Resistance Army

63. During the reporting period, LRA increased its attacks compared with 2015 (annex 21). Particularly worrying was the attack on 21 January 2016 on the Catholic mission in Bakouma. Church personnel were assaulted and goods and communication equipment looted. In January and February, there were also attacks in areas around Nzabe, Koyassi, Zemio, Bria, Sam Ouandja, Rafai and Nzako.

64. However, judging by the declining number of incidents reported in Haute-Kotto prefecture (annex 22), it seems that to date in 2016, LRA is reversing its previously reported expansion of operations to the west (see S/2015/936, para. 118). Up to April 2016, practically all reported incidents took place in the south in Mbomou (Rafai) and Haute-Mbomou (Zemio, and Obo) prefectures.

65. The Panel investigated the activities of the LRA splinter group of “Doctor Achaye”. Several sources report that the group is behind some of the most violent attacks against civilians along the border between the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To protect themselves against such groups (mostly LRA, but also UPC), local self-defence groups armed with hunting rifles have been organized in several towns in the Mbomou prefecture. Local authorities support self-defence groups in Agoumar and Rafai (annex 23).

66. On 17 April, the above-mentioned self-defence groups in Agoumar, 5 km from Rafai, repelled an attack from the group of “Doctor Achaye” and, in the process, injured an LRA fighter who had previously been kidnapped in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A MINUSCA battalion had to rescue the LRA fighter/abductee from being killed (annex 24 highlights issues regarding the treatment of

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55 Interview with confidential sources, Béma and Bangassou, 8 and 9 June 2016.
56 Confidential reports, 29 April 2016 and 22 May 2016.
57 Confidential reports, 21 January 2016.
59 The Panel met with a former member of the group of “Doctor Achaye” on 24 April and 19 May 2016.
captured or surrendered LRA). During the operation, one peacekeeper was fatally shot by the mob.

67. The injured fighter told the Panel that his group operates from Dembia, between Zemio and Rafai, where they purchase arms (AK-47s, rocket launchers and MAGs) from armed Fulani groups. His group comprises about 60 people from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The leadership, composed of nine fighters, is exclusively Ugandan.

68. Although LRA is increasingly splintered (see ibid., paras. 113-120), its various subgroups have shown great mobility and sustain trafficking routes for natural resources across international borders (see ibid., para. 117). Uganda’s decision of 11 June to withdraw from the African Union Regional Task Force could represent a major setback in the fight against LRA if the decision is not reversed or no other force steps in.

C. Vakaga prefecture and tripartite force deployment

69. The prefecture of Vakaga remains a stronghold of former Séléka networks, specifically, FPRC and the Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ). In Birao town, FPRC and MLCJ share some form of administrative and financial control with the Sultan, a traditional institution with judicial and mediation authority. Government officials in the town, who have no real power or authority, depend on good relationships with FPRC and MLCJ for their safety. A similar situation exists in Am Dafok, on the border with Sudan.

70. In Am Dafok, the Panel observed MLCJ and FPRC armed elements, some dressed in military uniforms, in the customs office and at the gendarmerie. The strong posture of the Zambian battalion of MINUSCA in charge of Vakaga limits the establishment of illegal checkpoints on the road to Birao. However, as reported by local authorities, MLCJ and FPRC continue to levy taxes and extort money at mobile checkpoints from traders and civilians.

71. Similarly, the deployment of MINUSCA in Birao in 2015 has improved security. The situation nevertheless remains unpredictable and can easily be reversed, as illustrated on 22 April by a sudden and momentary resurgence of armed men in military uniforms.

72. The availability of weapons and explosives in the area remains a key concern (annex 25). For example, on 29 May, unexploded ordnance blew up 4 km from Birao, killing three children and severely injuring another (annex 26).

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60 Meeting with LRA combatant, Bria, 24 April 2016.
62 Uganda has 2,500 troops, backed by 100 special forces from the United States of America.
63 Meeting with the Sultan in Birao, 26 April 2016.
64 Meeting with the Prefect of Vakaga prefecture, Birao, 26 April 2016.
65 Meeting with government officials in Am Dafok, 27 April 2016.
67 Ibid. Meeting with the Prefect of Vakaga prefecture, 27 April 2016.
68 Meeting with the Sultan in Birao, 26 April 2016; meeting in Birao with MINUSCA 26 April 2016.
Arms smuggling and illegal traffic

73. Notwithstanding the presence of the tripartite force in Am Dafok, smuggling activities, including of weapons and ammunition, continue across the border between the Central African Republic and the Sudan. The tripartite force and MLCJ and FPRC elements in Am Dafok informed the Panel that they regularly seize weapons and ammunition from Sudanese herders and merchants. They claim to return the seized weapons to official authorities in the Sudan. MINUSCA in Birao has also seized hand grenades from Sudanese traders and confiscated a type of 9mm ammunition that the Panel has not seen before in the country.

74. In order to avoid controls at the official entry point in Am Dafok, traffickers use a cross-border cattle road two km north of Am Dafok. During the dry season, traffickers also use a road between Tulu, a Sudanese border village 120 km south of Am Dafok, and Ouanda Djalle (Vakaga prefecture), from where they continue to Bria (Haute Kotto prefecture). The town of Tissi, 90 km north of Birao, has also become the trafficking centre for weapons and ammunition from Chad and the Sudan into the Vakaga prefecture.

Tripartite force

75. The deployment of FACA as part of the tripartite forces between Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic continues to suffer owing to widespread animosity from former Séléka factions. On 15 June 2015, the redeployment of FACA in Birao failed after strong protests from the former Séléka armed groups. A potential escalation of the tension was avoided owing to the intervention of MINUSCA. Similar protests arose on 22 April, when 32 FACA and Sudanese soldiers drove from Am Dafok to Birao to bring a FACA patient to the MINUSCA hospital. Former Séléka combatants positioned themselves at the entry to Birao, dissuading FACA from entering.

76. FACA also suffers from a weak chain of command, non-functional organization and poor logistics. In February, 76 FACA soldiers defected in protest of their work and living conditions. MINUSCA airlifted part of the group from Birao to Bangui after having hosted them for several weeks, fearing for their safety. The logistics and organization of new FACA rotations remain unclear.

VI. Northern region and border with Chad

77. During the reporting period, the northern region of the Central African Republic was riddled with security concerns caused mainly by competition among former Séléka factions of FPRC, MPC and UPC. This competition is mostly driven
by the desire of the armed groups to control taxation and racketeering opportunities related to mineral trade and cattle.

78. This struggle for influence largely results from the expansion and military reinforcement of both UPC and MPC, which is at odds with their proclaimed politicization. Seceding from FPRC in July 2015, MPC immediately portrayed itself as more prone to dialogue with national authorities, in particular on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration. To demonstrate that intention, a teacher and economist, El Bachar Idriss Ahmed, was appointed Executive President of the group in December 2015. Similarly, UPC claimed to have embraced democratic discourses and constantly justified its expansion by the need to protect populations, Muslims in particular. In reality, however, UPC and MPC maintain structured armed groups with some 900 and 600 men, respectively.

79. This competition notwithstanding, there have been efforts to resolve differences among the various factions. In that connection, the Panel notes that since his reported return from Chad to Ndélé on 25 May, Nourredine Adam has held meetings with MPC and UPC representatives and with local authorities and the Sultan of Ndélé. Around 30 May, Adam moved from Ndélé to the Sikikédé area (Vakaka province), near the Chadian border.

80. However, Adam’s drive to reunify former Séléka factions and take a leadership role runs counter to his relative power. His group, FPRC, has lost significant ground vis-à-vis other factions that aim to preserve and extend their respective areas of control. While it appears that, for the time being, MPC has decided to join forces with FPRC, UPC seems to be sticking to its independent posture.

A. Competition between the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique and the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique in Bamingui-Bangoran

81. Until February, FPRC had almost exclusive control of the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture and its capital Ndélé. Thereafter, the Front’s domination has been challenged by MPC.

82. MPC incursions target areas of economic interest relating to oil, mining and cattle trade. The issue of employment opportunities associated with the Chinese oil company PTIAL International Petroleum is developed below (see paras. 85-89). With regard to mining, competition has created tensions on extraction sites. For example, three MPC elements were killed by FPRC in Sangba site on 21 April. That tense situation was mitigated only temporarily by an agreement signed on 17 May.

75 MPC has proclaimed itself in favour of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration but in practice, its leaders have set up pre-conditions for participation in pre-DDR.
76 For more information on MPC and UPC, see S/2015/936, paras. 146-149 and Annex 2.
77 Meeting with local authorities in Ndélé, 30-31 May 2016.
78 Meeting with FPRC chief of Staff Lambert Lissane Moukové and FPRC deputy coordinator Moussa Maouloud, Ndele, 31 May 2016.
79 On 24 May, MPC initially issued a communiqué rejecting rumours of Séléka reunification (annex 27).
that provided for the payment by FPRC to MPC of FCFA 7.5 million ($15,000) (annex 28).  

83. With regard to transhumance issues, MINUSCA and staff of international organizations also observed important movements of MPC armed elements on the Ndélé-Bamingui road, reportedly to protect cattle herders in exchange for compensation.  

84. In Ndélé town and surrounding villages, FPRC and MPC have both been involved in the killing and mistreatment of civilians and each other’s soldiers. Accusations of assassinations and abuses by one group frequently result in retaliatory measures by the other group, creating a cycle of violence. In furtherance of its expansion to Ndélé, several witnesses interviewed reported having seen MPC political and military leaders, including Al Khatim, in the Arab village of Fehic. MPC leadership also justified that its presence was to protect Arabs and Fulani in the area and to negotiate with Noureddine Adam.  

B. **Oil exploration**

85. On 21 March, an MPC unit approached the oil exploration camp of the Chinese oil company PTIAL International Petroleum at Gaskai, north of Ndélé, after having looted cattle from Fulani herders in the vicinity of the camp. While shooting at the oil company’s private security firm, FIT Protection, they shot and killed one of their own. Following the confrontation, on 1 May, FIT Protection proceeded to sign an agreement with representatives of MPC and FPRC, including, inter alia, a payment of FCFA 20 million (40,000) to MPC and the observance of an 80km security perimeter by MPC and other armed groups (annex 29).

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80 This agreement was concluded following the killing of three MPC elements by FPRC elements in Sangba. Meeting with Lambert and Maouloud in Ndélé, 31 May 2016.  
81 Confidential official report, 17 June 2016.  
82 On 19 May, two men from the village Wi killed two Fulani cattle herders in Ndao. In response, the Arab community in Ndélé threatened to attack FPRC elements in Wi and burned the village. As a sign of goodwill to the Arab community, and acting on the order of the sultan of Ndélé and General Kanton, FPRC elements on 24 and 27 May 2016 arrested and mistreated several young men and one young woman in Wi who were supposedly linked to those who had killed the Fulanis. On 30 May, the corpse was recovered of the brother of the two men accused of having killed the two Fulanis. Meeting with a prominent businessman in Ndélé, 31 May 2016; Meeting with Minusca source in Ndélé, 2 June 2016.  
85 Davy Gaba who signed the agreement is FIT Protection supervisor of the camp in Gaskai. Email from Christophe Gazam Betty, Fit Protection General Manager, 22 May 2016.
86. While FPRC representatives told the Panel that the full FCFA 20 million ($40,000) was paid to MPC, according to the General Manager of FIT Protection, Christophe Gazam Betty, the company paid only FCFA 2 million ($4,000) to MPC. Gazam Betty also told the Panel that the payment had no connection with the death of the MPC fighter, but rather was compensation for an earlier refusal by the company to hire MPC combatants as security personnel and to keep MPC out of the area in the future.

87. FIT Protection formally employs 172 people. The company was registered in October 2015 and, in April 2016, it obtained authorization for its security agents to carry arms (annex 30). FIT Protection has enrolled a large number of FPRC combatants from the area (claiming this to be a form of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) as well as FPRC chief of staff “General” Kanton (see S/2015/936, para. 151). One of the signatories of the agreement with MPC, Kanton was released from his duties as at late May, following his decision to join Nourredine Adam when Adam returned to the Central African Republic.

88. The Panel has, on several occasions, raised concerns with FIT Protection regarding its relations with armed groups. In response, FIT Protection included in its terms and conditions of employment reference to Security Council resolutions and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles. The company also indicated that its agents or potential agents formerly belonging to a rebel group are to be screened to make sure that they were not involved in various types of crimes.

89. The Panel appreciates FIT Protection’s transparency and efforts to comply with international standards but maintains that, whatever the amount concerned, incidental security payments to armed groups are in violation of the United Nations sanctions regime. The Panel also signals the risk of financing armed groups when employed individuals drawn from armed groups rejoin the rebellion. In a discussion with the Panel, the Minister of Mines and Energy expressed the view that it was

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87 Meeting with FPRC Chief of Staff, Lambert Lissane Moukové, and FPRC Deputy Coordinator, Moussa Maouloud, Ndele, 31 May 2016.
88 Meeting with Christophe Gazam Betty, Bangui, 27 May 2016.
89 List of employees under individual contract shared with the Panel by FIT Protection by email on 22 May 2016. On 26 April the Panel met with security guards at PTI-IAS base working for FIT protection but not yet under individual contract. They told the Panel they were paid by FIT Protection but through their MLCJ leadership. They also told the Panel that 22 colleagues had left Birao mid-April to escort 11 trucks from Birao to Ndélé. Despite the general adherence to the weapons-free-zone and confidence-building measures in Birao, MINUSCA was not informed of the movements of these armed men.
90 Meeting with Christophe Gazam Betty, Bangui, 1 April and 27 May 2016. PTIAL Deputy Director told the Panel not to be aware of the background of FIT Protection’s security personnel, and the agreement signed on 1 May 2016. Meeting in Bangui, 26 March 2016; Telephone interview, 9 July 2016.
91 Meeting with Christophe Gazam Betty, Bangui, 10 June 2016. On 12 July Gazam Betty shared a note by email with the Panel claiming that when he re-joined Nourredine Adam, Kanton was still in his probationary period and had not yet been contracted and paid. Archived at the United Nations.
preferable for Central African Republic national security forces to provide security for PTIAL.  

C. Movement of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique along the Chadian border to the west

90. Since its creation in July 2015, MPC has gradually extended its control over the area bordering Chad, asserting itself as the strongest armed group in the region. In addition to an expansion of its presence across Bamingui-Bangoran towards the east, at the expense of FPRC (see paras. 81-84), MPC has extended its area of operations towards the west up to Paoua and Pougol (Ouham Pendé prefecture).

91. MPC has expanded west thanks to cooperation with the armed group Révolution et justice (see S/2015/936, paras. 140-142), including through common patrols and checkpoints, as observed, for example, in Pougol.  

92. MPC expansion and support to transhumance activities has created concerns among local communities and, at times, sparked incidents with self-defence groups and anti-balaka militia. In particular, in Ngaoundaye, close to the Cameroonian and Chadian borders, fighting took place on 11 June between Fulani pastoralists escorted by MPC/Révolution et justice and the anti-balaka. The fighting reportedly resulted in 15 dead among MPC/Révolution et justice elements and Fulani, who also lost about 100 heads of cattle and 14 weapons. Most of the inhabitants of Ngaoundaye were displaced and many moved across the Chadian and Cameroonian border. On 15 June, in retaliation for the attack of 11 June, MPC/Révolution et justice elements allegedly burned houses and looted property in Ngaoundaye.

D. Reconfiguration between former Séléka in Nana Grebizi and Ouham

93. UPC, as in the prefectures of Mbomou and Basse Kotto (see sect. III.A above), has expanded its operations to the prefecture of Nana-Grébizi (Mbrès, Kaga-Bandoro, Ouandago) and the north-eastern part of Ouham prefecture (Ouandago, Kabo and Sido). Its leadership again justified its presence by the need to protect Fulanis in a region deprived of national security forces.

92 Meeting with Minister of Mines and Energy during the visit of the Chair of the 2127 Sanctions Committee, Bangui, 27 May 2016.
93 Confidential report, 10 May 2016.
94 Confidential report, 15 May 2016.
95 Confidential reports, 17 June 2016.
94. The expansion of UPC created tensions with MPC and FPRC former Séléka factions. These two groups consider Nana Gribizi and the north-eastern part of Ouham prefecture as belonging to their sphere of influence (see S/2015/936, paras. 146-157). Notwithstanding past tensions between MPC and FPRC, the two groups have created a common front to contain the growing influence of UPC.

95. On 19 June, near Ouandago (46 km north-west of Kaga Bandoro), clashes between FPRC/MPC and UPC elements left between 10 and 15 dead, including one civilian. The following day, fighting between the same groups was also reported in Batangafo (Ouham prefecture). In letters addressed to MINUSCA, MPC and UPC blamed each other for the incident and accused the other group of cattle theft and various abuses against populations, especially the Fulani (annex 31).

96. Beyond tensions related to revenue control, it is likely that these clashes are connected to the attempt by Nourredine Adam to reassert his authority within former Séléka. Adam, with the FPRC/MPC coalition, is attempting to limit the geographical expansion of UPC and possibly trying to force the group to joining a reunified Séléka movement. Following incidents in Ouandago and Batangafo, tensions have spread to other areas, including Mbrès, where the FPRC/MPC coalition has reinforced its presence and further east in Sam-Ouandja and Bria, where FPRC elements were reportedly dispatched, as well as in Bambari and Kaga-Bandoro.

VII. Western region and border with Cameroon

97. Insecurity in the western region bordering Cameroon is concentrated north of Bouar, the provincial capital of Nana Mambéré. FAC deployment (see ibid., para. 201) have largely returned to Bouar, apart from a small unit in Niem. Since April 2016, renewed clashes, mainly between anti-balaka and armed Fulani, have generated more than 1,000 internally displaced persons in the areas of Koui, Bocaranga, and Bouar. While halting attacks on the main road and demonstrating readiness for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, FDPC continues to commit abuses close to the Cameroonian border.

A. Armed Fulani insurrection in the north-west

98. In December 2015, armed Fulani established a new armed group, dubbed “3R”, operating north of Bouar (Nana-Mambéré) in the sub-prefecture of Koui (Ouham-Pendé prefecture). 3R stands for “Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation” of Fulani and Muslim communities that fled the area to Cameroon. The group engages in active combat with Ndawe clan-led anti-balaka militia from Bouar (see ibid., paras. 205-206) and other local anti-balaka groups from Ouham-Pendé that do not fall under this banner.

99. The 3R leadership consists of former members of the Chadian armed group Front populaire pour le redressement (FPR) that was commanded by Mahamat.

96 Confidential reports, 21-24 June 2016.
97 Confidential reports, 24 and 30 June 2016.
98 Confidential report, 3 May 2016.
Abdoul Kadre, also known as “Baba Ladé”, who was extradited by transitional authorities to Chad on 2 January 2015. However, operational links between 3R and UPC of Ali Darrassa, who was chief of staff of FPR before joining Séléka in December 2012, are unclear.

100. Alleged anti-balaka cattle rustling and hostage-taking regularly provoke violent retaliatory attacks by 3R fighters. The Panel interviewed four anti-balaka members in Bouar who explained that on 1 June, 3R forces attacked their village, Gbalamo, presuming that they had abducted one of their wives. The Gbalamo attack resulted in nine people killed, three wounded and several houses burnt down.

101. Anti-balaka sources that fought with 3R, as well as MINUSCA sources, attest to the group’s possession of several Israeli-made Galil assault rifles (for more information on the Panel’s investigations concerning such rifles, see annex 32).

B. Resurfacing of the Front démocratique du people centrafricain of Abdoulaye Miskine in Zoukombo

102. On 20 May, approximately 35 armed FDPC fighters arrived in the village of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) on the main supply road near the Cameroonian border, occupying its primary school (annex 33). Fighters told the Panel that they were willing to participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration but had not received anything from the Government thus far, other than FCFA 150,000 from a delegation of the Ministry of Interior that came to see them on 28 May. Fighters also claimed land property as part of their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration package.

103. Fighters also told the Panel that part of the group, under Leonard Kormadjji, had moved towards Kabo (Ouham prefecture) and that another part of the group was in Abba, south of Zoukombo. From documents retrieved by MINUSCA from Zoukombo in June 2015, it appears that FDPC does not comprise more than 100 fighters (see ibid., annex 5.1).

104. Although having halted its attacks on the main supply road since the start of the electoral period at the end of October 2015, probably in anticipation of entering into negotiations with the newly elected Government, FDPC fighters from the area of Zoukombo continue to loot cattle and extort money and other valuables from villagers and travellers along smaller roads leading north from the main supply road towards Niem and Besson (Nana-Mambéré prefecture).

105. On 10 July 2016, the group released 3 of the 15 Cameroonian hostages held since March 2015 in order to go for medical care in Baboua, two of whom passed

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99 Including General Sidiki Abass, Colonel Ousman Mohamed (Chief of Staff) and Colonel Ahmad Ali. The latter is mentioned by Mahamat Abdelkadr when interviewed by transitional justice authorities in Bangui in December 2014. Procès verbal archived at the United Nations.

100 Meeting with alleged anti-balaka abductors from Gbalamo, Bouar 6 June 2016.

101 Meeting with MINUSCA staff in Bouar, 7 June 2016.

102 In June 2015 MINUSCA troops destroyed FDPC’s main camp in the vicinity of Zoukombo dispersing its fighters.

103 Meeting with Enoch Enock Djointan (Chef of Staff), Gustav Guingi (Spokesperson) and Edouard Bossian (former Chief of Staff), Zoukombo, 7 June 2016 (see annex 34).
Another hostage had died earlier in captivity and 11 hostages were transferred to Zoukombo on 9 July where, at the time of submitting the present report, they remain in the custody of FDPC while negotiations for their release are ongoing. The vice-president of FDPC, Ferdinand Mbokoto-Madji, had already travelled from Brazzaville to Yaoundé in January 2016 to engage in ransom negotiations with Cameroonian authorities, but was detained there.

C. Partial lifting of the Kimberley suspension

On 2 June, Central African mining services authorized the export of rough diamonds from Berbérati sub-prefecture. This heralded the country’s first export since its suspension from the Kimberley Process on 23 May 2013. Berbérati was declared compliant on 18 March 2016 after an international Kimberley Process monitoring team validated the assessment of a national follow-up committee along criteria set forth in the operational framework annexed to the Kimberley Process partial lifting decision of June 2015.

After Berbérati, the Kimberley Process follow-up committee proposed that the sub-prefectures of Nola, Gadzi and Carnot be considered compliant. Parallel to that process, on 10 March, the buying house SODIAM and the Ministry of Mines signed a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum, inter alia, presented a timetable adding the sub-prefectures of Bouar, Boda and Mbaiki (western Central African Republic) to be considered before 30 June. The chair of the Kimberley Process served as a witness to the signing of the memorandum.

In the Panel’s view, this parallel process risks creating false expectations in respective areas and is not in line with the Kimberley Process operational framework, which places the responsibility of proposing sub-prefectures with the Kimberley Process follow-up committee. As a reminder, according to the operational framework, the follow-up committee assesses compliance along three criteria: government control; absence of systemic armed group activity impacting production and trade; and free circulation of goods and people (see ibid., para. 218).

In that connection, the Panel had previously noted (see ibid., paras. 221-228) that there was no evidence of the systematic involvement of armed groups in the diamond trade in sub-prefectures proposed at the time, which excluded Gadzi sub-prefecture (Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture). For Gadzi, however, the Panel noted anti-balaka involvement in diamond production and trade in Sasélé (see ibid.,

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104 Confidential reports, 12-13 July 2016. Evidence of FDPC responsibility for the March 2015 hostage taking was contained in annex 5.1 of S/2015/936. A surrendering soldier, Patrick Bissi, helped two Cameroonian hostages escape, and his name was among a list of FDPC elements retrieved from Zoukombo camp by MINUSCA on 21 June 2015.

105 The group also detains the Mayor and sub-prefect of Baboua (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) and a pastor from Abba since July 2015. Meeting with local authorities in Bouar, 8 June 2016.

106 Meeting with Cameroonian intelligence services, Yaoundé, 27 April 2016.


para. 222). On 30 April, the local follow-up committee observed that there was no longer any such presence, noting a security level of 85 per cent, but without providing further information.\(^{109}\)

110. Freedom of movement, however, continues to be under pressure. MINUSCA has reported several acts of aggression targeting Muslim internally displaced persons and refugees returning to their homes (annex 35). In Carnot, only some of the internally displaced persons have returned home, in contrast to Berbérati, where all internally displaced persons have returned home.\(^{110}\) A report to justify Carnot’s readmission drafted by the local follow-up committee following a visit on 24 April affirms the exit of certain Muslims from the internally displaced persons camp.\(^{111}\)

111. None of the incidents reported by MINUSCA in 2016 mentioned casualties. None of the incidents indicate that assaults targeted diamond operators, as was the case in at least five reported incidents in 2015 (see ibid., annex 5.15).

VIII. Update on sanctioned individuals and entities

112. An update on sanctioned individuals and entities (including salary payments to Yékatom) is contained in annex 36.

IX. Recommendations

113. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Encourage the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to coordinate its political initiatives with regard to the arms embargo on the Central African Republic with those of the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States;

(b) Encourage countries in the region to cooperate with the authorities of the Central African Republic in the submission of exemption requests to the Committee allowing these countries to repatriate military equipment in their possession belonging to the Central African Republic armed forces;

(c) Encourage MINUSCA, in cooperation with the authorities of the Central African Republic, to establish a military presence and carry out inspections in Am Dafok, Bema and other strategic cross-border arms trafficking points identified by MINUSCA;

(d) Encourage national coordination of security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration; and national reconciliation, in cooperation with MINUSCA and the European Union Military Training Mission in


\(^{110}\) Telephone interview with the representative from the internally displaced persons camp in Carnot, 15 June 2016.

the Central African Republic, to ensure that FACA soldiers of all prefectures enjoy equal access to the registration and simplified verification process;

(e) Encourage the Kimberley Process follow-up committee and monitoring team to agree on indicators and benchmarks regarding the free circulation of people in sub-prefectures proposed for readmission into the Kimberley Process certification scheme;

(f) Encourage the authorities of the Central African Republic to carry out a thorough investigation into the crimes committed by the former Director of the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry, Mr. Yekoua-Kette, and other officials of the Office;

(g) Encourage the authorities of the Central African Republic to investigate, prosecute and judge all persons responsible for crimes committed against humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel;

(h) Encourage MINUSCA, in cooperation with other partners, to set up a mechanism to treat surrendered, escaped and captured members of the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Annexes to the Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016)

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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE RELATIF AUX ROUNDS DE CONCERTATIONS AVEC LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET CHEF DE L’ETAT CENTRAFRIQUE, SON EXCELLENCE M. FAUSTIN ARCHANGE TOUADERA

Après la publication du communiqué de presse relatif au Premier Round de Concertation avec le Président de la République, Chef de l’Etat, Son Excellence Faustin Archange TOUADERA1, nous nous sommes rendus enfin de compte que ce dernier est resté recréveilleur sur sa positions d’exclusion. A la fin dudit communiqué, il a précisé en guise de conclusion ce qui suit : « elle indique, enfin, la disponibilité de Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l’Etat a examiné au terme du DLRD, les autres questions objets de préoccupations de quelques groupes armés ». En effet, ce dernier demeure obsnubité par une rancoeur et une inflexibilité notoire quant à l’application de sa politique d’exclusion mise en route depuis la formation du gouvernement de Simplice Aurélien SARANTALI. Et, comme mars en carême, il a confirmé et certifié sa politique d’exclusion le 18 mai 2016 par la désignation des cadres de son Cabinet, des Ministres-Conseillers et des Conseillers près la Présidence de la République2. L’ensemble corrélé de ses décisions à tête de l’Etat demient à suffisance qu’il entend continuer à faire la cité pour nous et sans nous « les autres3 ». Pour ce faire, nous restons intimement convaincus que par son positionnement politique, tout indique qu’il est entrain de remettre en cause tout le travail que nous avons accomplis depuis un long moment avec la Minusca et la Sangaris.

1 http://takaplan.over-blog.com/2016/05/communique-de-la-presidence-relatif-a-la-concertation-de-touadera-avec-les-groupes-armes.html
2 Cf. Décret N° 16.247 portant nomination des personnalités à la Présidence de la République.
3 Ce terme se réfère à la minorité musulmane centrafricaine dans son ensemble.
Par ailleurs, nous, pour notre part, exigeons que soit « stoppée la stigmatisation et le mépris » dont nous en sommes victimes depuis des décennies car nous ne sommes pas des « sous-citoyens » ou « des problèmes sociaux » comme certains l’entendent en nous mettant en marge de la gestion de la cité. En effet, nous sommes des « sujets de droit » comme tout autre c’est à dire des citoyens à part entière. Et, nous ne demandons que le respect du « contrat social » qui passe par la pleine jouissance des attributs de la citoyenneté et par l’inclusion dans toutes les sphères politiques, économiques, sociales et culturelles.

De ce fait, on ne doit pas penser que notre mise à l’écart de la gestion publique contribuera à la mise sur scelle de la nouvelle nation centrafricaine. Nous ne saurons tolérer cette marginalisation bis repetita car nous ne sommes pas près à rester en marge et contempler les autres « faire la cité » à notre place. La paix que tout le monde appelle de tous ses vœux, doit être construite avec nous et non en nous excluant de ladite dynamique. En revanche, nous gagnerons en privilégiant une « sortie de crise négociée » qui mettra ensemble et sur le même pied d’égalité les chrétiens, musulmans et animistes.

Par conséquent, il semble logique que la communauté internationale s’implique d’avantage pour nous (les politico-militaires et le gouvernement) inciter à parvenir au préalable à un « Accord Politique Global Inclusif » pouvant répondre efficacement et durablement aux racines des maux de la société centrafricaine (le mépris de l’autre, l’oppression, la marginalisation et l’exclusion) avant d’engager la conceptualisation du DRRR. Tant que les racines de ces maux ne sont pas extirpées, toute tentative de façade tentant à embaumer « le mal- centrafricain » ne sera que vaïne entreprise. Il est donc plus que jamais nécessaire de régler le problème de fond de la crise centrafricaine avant d’engager tout processus de DRRR (aussi nécessaire soit-il).

Ainsi, nous demandons à la communauté internationale qui est au chevet de notre pays de s’impliquer d’avantage afin de réduire ce gap et d’éviter au pays d’atermoiements inutiles.

Fait à Bangui le 20 mai 2016
Le Président Exécutif du MPC

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Annex 4: MPC Communiqué of 17 April 2016 following the meeting between the group’s representatives and President Touadéra. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 23 April 2016
A la fin de son discours, nous lui avions fait remarqué qu'il nous semble très hasardeux et préjudiciable de vouloir lancer le processus DDRR par la composante « désarmement » sans avoir au préalable mis en place un « Cadre Stratégique et Républicain » permettant de définir et de conceptualiser la « Reforme du Secteur de la Sécurité » (RSS). Pour ce faire, nous lui avions proposés de commencer prioritairement le DDRR par la mise en place dudit Cadre Stratégique et Républicain qui permettra de conceptualiser et de planifier la mise sur-pied des FDS avant toute chose. Nous pensions intimentement que c'est seul cet organe qui permettra de déterminer le dosage et la configuration (composition, répartition et effet) des hommes en armes assurant l'équilibre des sensibilités régionales, ethniques et religieuses des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (la Police, la Gendarmerie, l'Armée, la Douane, les Gardes Forestiers, les Gardes Pénitentiaires, les Gardes Frontières….). Une fois que cette activité est réalisée, les autres composantes du processus DDRR s'en suivront logiquement.

Au terme de la rencontre, nous n'avions pas manqué l'occasion de lui réitérer notre volonté de voir lancer le processus DDRR par la mise en place du cadre stratégique et républicain permettant de travailler pour la définition et la conceptualisation de la RSS. Nous lui avons aussi exprimé notre entière disponibilité pour des plus amples discussions autour desdites questions (de la participation à la gestion du pays et du DDRR).

Par ailleurs, il faut se souvenir que quand nous étions obligés de prendre des armes c'est qu'il y avait un sérieux problème de fond au sein de la société centrafricaine (le problème d'oppression et marginalisation de la minorité musulmane centrafricaine depuis les premières heures des indépendances) qui n'a pas été résolu par un cheminement pacifique. Des négociations s'étaient succédé sans que les résolutions y relatives ne soient vues appliquées.

Ensuite, quand beaucoup des leaders centrafricains tergiversaient à propos de ces élections de sortie de crise censées ramener au pouvoir des Représentants légaux de l'État, nous, au niveau du MPC, avions unaniment et unilatéralement souscrit pour la tenue impérative de celles-ci. Nous y avions adhérés c'est parce que nous croyons que nos revendications légitimes pourraient avoir de répondant avec la tenue de celles-ci. Mais, nous n'avions nullement pensées qu'en adhérant au principe dicté par la communauté

2 Ce cadre stratégique et républicain est un cadre politique global qui permettra de lancer le débat autour du RSS, de faciliter la représentativité de toutes les composantes de la société Centrafricaine aux FDS (la Police, la Gendarmerie, l'Armée, la Douane, les Gardes Forestiers, les Gardes Pénitentiaires, les Gardes Frontières...), l'opérationnalisation de celles-ci et de signer le début du retour de la paix en Centrafrique.

3 Cf. Communiqué de Presse N° 19./MPC/PR/BE/SG/2015 qui se trouve en Annexe.
internationale on pourrait au finish se voir refuser le droit de participer à l'exercice du pouvoir sous-prétendu de la défense de la Constitution.

D'ailleurs, nous ne sommes pas entrain d'implorer la charité ou la clémence pour accéder à un supposé « partage de gâteaux » mais, nous exprimons là notre droit le plus absolu de participer à la mise en place du nouveau « contrat social » et d'exercer des hautes fonctions de la république. Nous avons le même droit que n'importe quel citoyen de servir notre pays et l'on ne doit pas pour de quelconques raisons nous en denier le droit. Et, ce ne sont pas les capacités, les compétences et les qualités qui nous font défaut.

Afin d'éviter au plus des incompréhensions inutiles, nous demandons à la communauté Internationale et à la Médiation Internationale de s'impliquer afin de nous aider à applanir nos divergences d'approches et d'éviter au pays d'auvernois inutiles.

Fait à Kaga-Bandoro, le 17 avril 2016
Le Président Exécutif du MPC

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AMPLIATION:
- Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unis pour la Stabilisation de la Centrafricaine (MINUSCA),
- Communauté Economique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEAC),
- Mégidio Nationale et Internationale,
- Ambassade de France à Bangui,
- Ambassade des États-Unis d’Amériques à Bangui,
- Ambassade de Chine à Bangui,
- Représentation de l’Union Européenne (UE) à Bangui,
- Représentation de l’Union Africaine (UA) à Bangui,
- Présidence de la République,
- Primature,
- Presse Nationale et Internationale,
- Archives.

Mouvement de l'Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique
Coordination militaire
Sectariat général

N° 001 / UPC / DIRMIL
Bambari le 18 04/2016

A son Excellence Monsieur le Représentant
Spcial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies

Excellence,

Dans le souci de restaurer une paix définitive en République Centrafricaine, nous, l'Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, tout en considérant les accords signés (de Brazzaville le 23 juillet 2014, en passant par l'accord du DDRR signé lors de forum National de Bangui), ayant en vue la rencontre avec le chef de l'Etat Président de la République Centrafricaine son excellencé Faustin Archange Touadéra à Bangui le 14 avril 2016,

Avions pris acte de la discussion, nous tenons à informer le monde entier et la communauté internationale en particulier de notre volonté d'accompagner le processus de paix si fragile dans notre pays à condition que nous, toutes les forces vives de la nation soient impliquées comme une représentation significative de notre communauté si minoritaire et marginalisée dans ce Gouvernement. Car ce gouvernement de Monsieur Sisplice Mathieu Sarandji, nous le considérons comme un gouvernement de renforcement à leurs amis et non un gouvernement de réconciliation ni de cohésion sociale ni de bonne gouvernance.

Nous appelons le chef de l'Etat à être plus respectueux de la constitution à laquelle nous attachons une valeur considérable car en nommant Monsieur Sarandji qui fut son directeur de campagne alors qu'il n'a pas la majorité parlementaire ceci est une violation pure et simple de la constitution et nous considérons cela comme du népotisme.

Nous rappelons à son Excellence que tout ne se trouve pas sur le marché. Ainsi un économiste contemporain disait : « Tout ce qui est rare est cher, un cheval à bon prix est rare donc un cheval à bon prix est cher ».

Alors nous prions la communauté internationale et le monde entier en témoins. Si nos revendications remise au chef de l'Etat ne sont pas respectées, ni prise en considération, alors nous ne participerons dans aucun processus et nous allons considérer des moyens qui sont nécessaires à défendre nos revendications et réclamer nos droits.

Dans ce cadre nous sollicitons votre bienveillante attention et nous apprécierons si vous acceptiez d'orienter nos revendications auprès du nouveau gouvernement.
**Annex 6:** Draft calendar of meetings between President Touadéra and armed groups. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 18 April 2016 (one week prior to FPRC’s actual meeting).

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<th>MOYEN</th>
<th>CONTACTS</th>
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<td>18/04/2016</td>
<td>Vol spécial</td>
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<td>Bangui</td>
<td>15/04/2016</td>
<td>19/04/2016</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Haroun Gouye</td>
<td>Bangui</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heribert Gobina</td>
<td>Bangui</td>
<td>18/04/2016</td>
<td>22/04/2016</td>
<td>Avion</td>
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| GPRC   | Lambert Moulouya | Bangui       | 16/04/2016     | 20/04/2016          | Vol spécial |          |             |
|        | Abdoulaye Mokana | Bangui       |                |                    |          |          |             |
|        | Haroun Gouye | Bangui       |                |                    |          |          |             |
|        | Heribert Gobina  | Bangui       | 18/04/2016     | 22/04/2016          | Avion  |          |             |

| MLCI   | Gilbert Toumboulou | Bangui       | 20/04/2016     | 24/04/2016          | Vol spécial |          |             |
|        | Larry N'Diaye       | Bangui       |                |                    |          |          |             |

| FDPC   | André Le Garant Banga | Bangui       | 20/04/2016     | 24/04/2016          | Avion  |          |             |

| Séléka Rénové | Mohamed Daffane | Bangui       | 23/04/2016     | 27/04/2016          | Avion  |          |             |

| UPRF   | Nerguedende        | Bangui       |                |                    | Avion  |          |             |

| UPR   | Philippe Wagramele | Bangui       |                |                    | Avion  |          |             |

| Groupe des Patriotes | Pour mémoire | Bangui       |                |                    |          |          |             |

| Conférence ANT-BALABA |           |             |                |                    |          |          |             |

| Groupe des Patriotes | Pour mémoire | Bangui       |                |                    |          |          |             |

|            |            |            |                |                    |          |          |             |
Annex 7: Communiqué of the Presidency issued on 18 May 2016 after consultations with armed groups. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 2 June 2016
Annex 8: Appointed personalities in government; and in the President and Prime Minister’s cabinets

Members of government:

Décret N°160.222 Portant nomination des membres du Gouvernement

Le président de la République, Chef de l’Etat;

Vu la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine…

Sur proposition du Premier ministre, Chef du Gouvernement;

Décèrte;

Article 1er: Sont nommés Membres du Gouvernement les personnalités ci-après:

Ministère de l’Economie du Plan et de la Coopération: M. Félix MOLOUA

Ministère de la Défense Nationale: M. Joseph YAKETE

Ministère des Finances et du Budget: M. Henri Marie DONDRA

Ministère de la Sécurité Publique et de l’Administration du Territoire: M. Jean-Serge BOKASSA

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de l’Intégration Africain et des Centrafricains de l’Etranger: Monsieur Charles Armel DOUBANE

Ministère de la Justice, des Droits de l’Homme, Garde des Sceaux: M. Flavien MBATA

Ministre des Mines et de l’Hydraulique:

M. Léopold MBOLI FATRAN

Ministère de l’Environnement, du Développement Durable, des Eaux et Forêts, Chasses et Pêches: Mme Arlette SOMBO DIBELE

Ministère de l’Education Nationale, de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique: MOUKADAS NOURE

Ministère de la Santé, de l’Hygiène Publique et de la Population: Mme Fernande NDJENGBOT

Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement: Honoré FEIZOURE

Ministère de l’Equipement des Transports, de l’Aviation Civile et du Développement: Théodore JOUSSO
Ministère de la Promotion de la Jeunesse, du Développement des Sports et du Service Civique: M. Silvère NGARSO

Ministère des Postes et Télécommunications chargé de la promotion des Nouvelles Technologie d’information et de Communication: M. Justin GOURNA ZACKO

Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Réconciliation Nationale: Mme Virginie MBAIKOUA

Ministère de l’Habitat, du Logement Social et de l’Urbanisme: M. Gaby Francky LEFFA

Ministère des Arts, du Tourisme de la Culture et de la Francophonie: Mme Gisèle PANA

Ministère du Commerce et de l’Industrie: M. Come HASSANE

Ministère de la Communication et de l’Information: M. Charles Paul LEMASSET MANDYA

Ministère de l’Entreprenariat National, de l’Artisanat et de la promotion des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises: M. Bertrand TOUABOY

Ministère Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement chargé des relations avec les Institutions de la République et du suivi-évaluation des politiques publiques: M. Jean-Christophe NGUINZA

Article 2: Le présent Décret qui abroge toutes dispositions contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 11 Avril 2016

Members of President’s cabinet:

SECRETARIAT GENERAL
1) Secrétaire Général : Monsieur Obed NAMBI

ETAT MAJOR PARTICULIER
2) Chef d’Etat-major Particulier : Général de Corps d’Armée Antoine GOUNON

CABINET PARTICULIER
3) Chef de Cabinet Particulier : Monsieur Donatien MALEYOMBO

CABINET CIVIL

MINISTRES CONSEILS

5) Ministre Conseiller Spécial, Coordonnateur au DDR, à la RSS et la Résolution Nationale : Monseigneur Jean WILIBIRO SAKO
6) Ministre Conseiller Spécial, chargé des Affaires avec les Organisations Nationales : Monsieur Fidel NGOUANDJIAKA
7) Ministre Conseiller en matière d’Agriculture et du Développement Rural : Madame Marie Noel KOYARA
8) Ministre Conseiller Economique : Monsieur Romaine BUREAU
9) Ministre Conseiller en charge du Naivi (es) Projet : Monsieur Georges COUGOU Y
10) Ministre Conseiller en charge des Investissements : Monseigneur Jean Baptiste KOBIA
11) Ministre Conseiller Diplomatique : Monsieur Namis KOUASSI
12) Ministre Conseiller en matière de Résolution Nationale : Madame Regina KONZI MONGO

CONSEILLERS

13) Conseiller à la RSS : Général de Division François MOREBOU
14) Conseiller au DDR : Colonel Noel Boumon SISSON
15) Conseiller en matière des Finances : Monseigneur Lazare DOKOUA
16) Conseiller Politique : Monsieur Blaise Alphonse DIBERT
17) Conseiller en matière de Ressources Naturelles : Monsieur Rufin BENIN
18) Conseiller en matière de l’Habitat, du Logement et de la Réforme Foncière : Madame Gina Roselyne NALOUTEY ROOSALEM

CHARGES DE MISSION

19) Conseiller en Communication, Porte-Paule de la Présidence : Monsieur Albert MOKUM
20) Chef de Mission à la Communication : Monsieur Maurice Wilfried SEBIRO
21) Chargé de Mission aux Nouvelles Technologies : Thierry GONFIO
22) Chargé de Mission à la Communication aux CNSG : Monsieur Alexis NIBA

Art. 1° - Le présent Décret entrera en vigueur à compter de la date de sa signature, sera restitué et publié au Jornal Officiel.

Faute à Bangui, le 18...
Members of Prime Minister’s cabinet:

Décret No N 16.274 Portant nomination ou confirmation des membres du cabinet de la primature

Le Président de la République chef de l'État

Vu la constitution de la République centrafricaine du 30 Mars 2016,
Vu le Décret N° 16.0218 du 30 Mars 2016, portant promulgation de la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine;
Vu le Décret N 6.0221 du 02 Avril 2016, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement;
Vu le Décret N 96.190 du 03 Juillet 1996, portant organisation et fonctionnement des services de la Primature et son modificatif subséquent.

Sur proposition du Premier Ministre Chef du Gouvernement

DÉCRÊTE

Art.1 : Sont nommés ou confirmés au Cabinet de la Primature, les Personnalités dont les noms suivent:

I - Direction de Cabinet
Ministre, Directeur de Cabinet : – Monsieur Ghislain MORDJIM
Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint : – Monsieur Maxime BALALOU
Chef de Cabinet Particulier : – Monsieur Rameaux GANAZOUI
Secrétaire Particulier du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement:
- Monsieur Guillaume GBAMOU

II - Conseillers
Conseiller chargé des Affaires Sociales, Promotion du Genre et Réconciliation:
- Madame Marguerite RAMADAN
Conseiller chargé du Désenclavement et des villes
- Monsieur Binga BASSOUKPALO
Conseiller chargé de la Jeunesse, des ONG et Actions Humanitaires:
- Monsieur Patrick NAMBEANRE NGAGUENE
Conseiller chargé des Finances et Budget:
- Monsieur Etienne SANZE
Conseiller chargé de la Bonne Gouvernance et des Relations avec les Partenaires financiers internationaux:
- Monsieur André SERBOUA
Conseiller chargé des Affaires Politiques et Institutionnelles :
- Monsieur José Gonzalit ZEKEMA
Conseiller chargé de l’Éducation, de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche:
- Monsieur Gélestin NAMKPEA
Conseiller Diplomatique : – Monsieur Léon DODONOU NANAGAZA
Conseiller chargé de la Gouvernance des Ressources et du Développement Durable :
- Madame DJIEBÉBE NDJIGUIM Ghantal Laure
Conseiller chargé du Monde Rural
- Monsieur Edouard YARAMANDJI
Conseiller Juridique: – Monsieur Martial SOUROUNGBA
Conseiller en Communication: – Monsieur Lord Esaie NGANAMOKOI
Conseiller chargé des Sports, Arts et Culture
- Madame Henriette YOUWANGA
Conseiller Défense et Sécurité:
- Général de Brigade WANZE LINGUSSARA Henri

III - Charge de Missions
Chargé de Mission aux Affaires Politiques chargé des Institutions Religieuses
- Monsieur Rigobert VONDO
Chargé de Mission aux Affaires Sociales chargée des Organisations Féminines et du Droit de la Femme: – Madame NGBODA née KOYT Clarisse Blanche
Chargée de Mission aux Affaires Sociales chargée de la protection de l’enfant :
Madame Virginie MOKONDJI
IV-INSTITUTIONS RATTACHÉES À LA PRIMATURE
HAUT COMMISSARIAT À LA DÉCENTRALISATION, RÉGIONALISATION ET AU
DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL

- Monsieur Georges PETROKONI ZEZE
  COORDONNATEUR NATIONAL DU COMITE NATIONAL DE LUTTE CONTRE LE SIDA (CNLS)
- Professeur Nestor MAMADOU NALI
  CONTRÔLEUR GÉNÉRAL DU SECTEUR PARA.PUBLIC
- Monsieur Arthur PIRI
  COORDONNATEUR CHEF DU CADRE PERMANENT CHARGE DE LA REFORME DE
  L'ADMINISTRATION CENTRAFRICAINE (CPRAC)
- Monsieur Eloi KOUZOUNDJI

V. DIRECTION
Attaché de Cabinet du Ministre, Directeur de Cabinet: – Monsieur Simplice NGAKOUNDOU
Directeur de Protocole : – Monsieur Felix BEANZOUI
Directeur de Presse : – Monsieur Célestín-David GAMOU
Directeur des Ressources – Monsieur Thomas ZANDANGA
Directeur des Archives et Base des Données – Monsieur Éric Vivien BAMANDA
Directeur de Sécurité :
- Lieutenant OUANGAI KPAWIRENA Valérie
VI – CHEFS DE SERVICE
Chefs de Service de protocole :
- Madame Noëlla ZOUMORO
- Monsieur Max Ghislain GBELE-KO
- Madame BEBIE née GOGO Ghylaine
Chef de Service du Personnel
- Monsieur Dieudonné Narcisse NGANAFEI
Chef de Service du Secrétariat du Ministre, Directeur de Cabinet du premier
Ministre :
- Madame YAKOUDOU Sotange Odile
Chef de Service Financier et du Matériel
- Monsieur Jean – Pierre WASSI
Chef de Service du Secrétariat Commun :
- Madame INZA Marianne
Chef de Service des Archives :
- Monsieur Aimé KONAMNA
Chef de Service des Bases des Données:
- Madame Marlène YANGOUBANDA ALLADOUM
Chef de Service de Vidéographie
- Monsieur Marius KOINGBO
Chef de Service de Photographie
- Monsieur Emmanuel PABANDJI
Chef de Service de Documentation :
- Monsieur Jean de la Groix PELI
Chef de Service d’Escorte :
- Monsieur Guy Gervil MALESSARA KAKOMALE

Art.2 : Les Responsables des Institutions Rattachées à la Primature ont rang et Préréogatives de Ministres.
Le Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint a rang et prérogatives de Ministre
Délegué.
Le Secrétaire Particulier du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, le Directeur de Protocole et L’Attaché de
Cabinet du Ministre, Directeur de cabinet ont rang et prérogatives de Directeur Général.
Art.3: Le Présent Décret qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet pour compter de
la date de sa signature sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 21 juin 2016
Annex 9: UPC’s letter to the President dated 3 April 2016 requesting positions for the group in the State apparatus. Document obtained by the Panel on 27 April 2016 from a confidential source.
Excellence,

Dans la sérénité et l'esprit de confiance et afin d'apaiser et rassurer cette communauté minoritaire de votre ferme volonté de rassembler et réconcilier le peuple centrafricain nous vous demandons deux (2) postes d'administrateurs civils à savoir :

1. Six (6) préfets ;
2. Quinze (15) sous-préfets.

Excellence,

De la même manière et dans le même ordre d'idée nous vous demandons de confirmer les grades de nos officiers cités ci-dessous :

1. Huit (8) généraux;
2. Quatre-vingt (80) colonels;
3. Cent (100) commandants;
4. Soixante (60) capitaines;
5. Soixante-dix (70) lieutenants.

Excellence,

Nous vous réitérons notre confiance et toute notre gratitude tout en souhaitant que nos propositions soient prises en considération.

Excellence, veuillez agréer les expressions de nos sentiments les plus distinguées.

**Le coordinateur politique de l'UPC** :

Hassan Bouba Ali

**Le Chef d'État major de l'UPC** :

Général de division Ali Darassa

Tél.: 523872-48-35-12/75-67-72-46

Le format de cette lettre est un document officiel et authentique de l'UPC. Tout autre modèle est un faux.
Annex 10: Excerpts of the Press release of the 6th Ordinary Summit of ICGLR Heads of States and Governments

Press Release

ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

6th Ordinary Summit of ICGLR Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Luanda, Angola 14th June, 2016

14. Directed the Chair of the Regional Inter Ministerial Committee (RIMC) to expedite the implementation of the previous ICGLR Summit decision on convening a Joint ICGLR/ECCAS Summit to provide support to the new Government;

15. Called on the United Nations to lift the arms embargo on the Central African Republic, and appealed to all ICGLR Member States to support this call, and further called on African members of the UN Security Council to help advance this important cause;

16. Appealed to the international community to assist the new CAR Government with critical humanitarian assistance as an important step to sustaining the gains achieved as a result of the successful conduct of the elections and the inauguration of the new government;

17. Urged Member States to implement the resolutions of the ICGLR Military Experts Assessment Mission to the CAR;

18. Called for concerted efforts to neutralize the LRA and the threat posed by this negative force in CAR and the Region.
Annex 11: Pictures of birth and death certificates of a victim abused and killed by the OCRB. Obtained by the Panel from a witness on 29 May 2016.
Victim’s birth certificate
Victim’s death certificate

RECPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRIQUE

UNITÉ - Droit - Travail

N DE DECES

NOM : YAKORO
PRENOMS : ROMARIEK
NECLE : 16/07/1997 à Bangui
FILS DE : YAKORO Thierry
ET DE : NOBALI BERTHULTE
NATIONALITÉ : Centrafricaine
DATE DE DECES : 20/02/2016
PARRSUITE DE : Blessure par arme a feu
OBSERVATIONS : Déplacee depuis sa maison à Bangui

Fait à Bangui, le 20/02/2016

Le Médecin

[Signature]
REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICANE

LA VILLE DE BANGUI

ACTE DE DECES 443

Centre d'Etat - Civil

Le Vingt-fevrier deux mil seize

est decelee a BANGUI, YAKORO Lomarie

Profession: Vendeur

Nationalite: CENTRAFRICAINE

Fils de FEU YAKORO Thierry

Et de MOBAHI Berthelette

Epoux (e) Veuve (ve) Divorcee (e) de

Demenec declarle le quatre marts deux mil seize

A 14 heures 29 minutes

Par MOBAHI Berthelette

Profession: Managere

Domicilie a BANGUI

Qui aprs lecture faite du prsent acte, a sign avec nous.

TONGBA, Officier d'Etat-Civil

Deleque

(1) Prisse la mention induite
(2) Dans le cas d'erreur.

TONGBA MAI 1016
Annex 12: Decree of the nomination of the new Head of OCRB. Obtained by the Panel on 9 June 2016

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DECRET N° 16-270
PORTANT PROMOTION À TITRE EXCEPTIONNEL D’UN OFFICIER DE POLICE, AU GRADÉ SUPERIEUR

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RéPUBLIQUE,
CHÉF DE L’ÉTAT

VU la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 Mars 2016 ;
VU l’art. 1er du N° 08.16 du 10 mai 2008, portant statut spécial de la Police centrafricaine ;
VU le Décret N° 16.0034 du 11 janvier 2016, fixant les règles d’application de la Loi N° 08.16 du 20 avril 2008 portant statut spécial de la Police centrafricaine ;
VU le Décret N° 16.0011 du 10 Mars 2016, portant ratification de la Constitution ;
VU le Décret N° 16.0231 du 03 Avril 2016, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;

SUR PROPOSITION DU MINISTRE DE L’INTERIEUR, DE LA SÉCURITÉ PUBLIQUE ET DE L’ADMINISTRATION DU TERRITOIRE.

LE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES EXTENDU

DECRETE

Article 1er. : Est promu à titre exceptionnel l’Officier de Police dans le nom suivant :

Jérôme de Commissaire de Police :
Le Capitaine de Police ZIQUÈKI Bienvenu.

Art. 2. : Le présent décret prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 7 juin 2016.

Le Ministre de l’Intérieur, de la SÉcurité Publique et de l’Administration du Territoire

Jean-Baptiste ROKASSA

Le Premier Ministre,
Chef du Gouvernement !

Signatures : Ministre SARANDIPI

Le Président de la République,
Chef de l’Etat !

Étienne Padja YOAUDPÉA

L’AGORA N°2921 du Jeudi 09 Juin 2016

52/87
Annex 13: Ali Darassa’s command responsibility over 2015 attacks between Bambari and Mbrès

In its 2015 final report, the Panel documented an attack of ordered by Ousman Abakae, alias “Chauffeur”, during which 150 houses were burned in the villages of Lakouetene and Ndjangala, on the road between Bambari and Mbrès (S/2015/936, paragraph 154-157). This attack and the repeated firing of civilians when passing through villages were ordered by the “Chauffeur”, the then FPRC zone commander in Mres, who declared his loyalty to Ali Darrassa. On 29 March 2016, Ali Darassa himself and his political adviser, Souleyman Daouda, declared that “Chauffeur” operates under Darassa’s instructions.1

Photograph of Ousman Abakae, alias “Chauffeur” (dressed in yellow in the centre) taken by the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015.

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1 Meeting with Ali Darassa and Souleymane Daouda, Bambari, 29 March 2016.
Photograph of houses burned in Lakouetene on 20 August, taken by the Panel on 22 August 2015

The grave of a man killed by UPC elements late July 2015, when passing through the village of Boussa. Photograph taken by the Panel on 22 August 2015.
Annex 14: Reported incidents against humanitarian personnel²

Annex 15: Ali Darassa’s order to the State tax collection office for agricultural products (ORCCPA) to deposit 50% of tax revenues on coffee to his ‘security forces’. Obtained by the Panel from confidential source in Douala on 29 April 2016.
Annex 16: The newly discovered goldmine under control of UPC armed elements in Labekeze

Photograph taken by the Panel in Labekeze on 15 December 2015
Annex 17: Security incidents at mining sites in the east of the CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/01/2016</td>
<td>Konon/ Nzako</td>
<td>On 9 January 2016, a group of seven unidentified armed elements in military attire (most probably the same) attacked two mining sites around Konon village (15km from Nzako) where they abducted 21 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/2016</td>
<td>Limpoutou/ Bria</td>
<td>On 13 January 2016, Human Right’s Division (HRD) was informed by a local official in Bria, Haute Kotto Prefecture that six minors including three girls in the mining site of Limpoutou were abducted on 11 January by the LRA. These elements also looted large quantities of rice, manioc, sugar and goats from the mining site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/02/2016</td>
<td>Nzako</td>
<td>From 20 to 26 February 2016, in Nzako, the UPC presence (to allegedly protect its community) is fuelling tensions with the local populace while FPRC/RPRC elements would be planning to oust it from this lucrative mining area. MINUSCA will deploy elements in town until UPC withdraw.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/03/2016</td>
<td>Nzako</td>
<td>On 5 March 2016 in Nzako (185km north of Bangassou), Mbomou prefecture, MINUSCA police were informed that three men working in the diamond mines were kidnapped and held captive by UPC elements. The victims were accused of mobilizing local youth against the UPC and of providing information to MINUSCA. The abductees were released after paying CFA 150,000 (approx. USD 250) and agreeing to pay another CFA 150,000 the next day. The original price demanded by the UPC was reported to be CFA 3 million (approx. USD 1,650).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/03/2016</td>
<td>Nzako</td>
<td>As reported between 12 and 18 March 2016, UPC elements still refuse to leave the mining town of Nzako, despite MINUSCA pressure, and children in the town still do not attend school as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/03/2016</td>
<td>Gale/ Rafai</td>
<td>On 27 June 2016, HRD was informed by local sources and its civil society partners that 19 civilians - men, women and children - were abducted by LRA elements on 23 June around 12.00 p.m. at a gold mining site in Gale (Located approximately 45 kilometres north of Dembia in Karmadar village on the Dembia-Derbissaka axis in Rafai sub prefecture which is located 150 kilometres east of Bangassou), Karmadar village. The LRA members reportedly pillaged food, some gold, manufactured goods and personal property. The civilians were forced to serve as porters in order to transport the looted goods to a forest area north of Dembia-Berbisaka axis. In the later hours of the day, two men managed to escape while 15 others were released on 24 June. The LRA members were reportedly around 40 and some were dressed in military fatigue. They were equally armed with Kalashnikov rifles. The sources reported that civilians in this village live in constant fear of further attacks from the LRA as these elements have been observed in a forest area close to Derbissaka, in Rafai sub prefecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2016</td>
<td>Kono/ Nzako</td>
<td>On 1 April 2016, in Kono village (15km south of Nzako), Mbomou prefecture, MINUSCA was informed that a Fulani encampment near a mining site was allegedly attacked on 31 March by seven former Séléka elements based in Nzako. Two cattle were reportedly stolen. No casualty reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/04/2016</td>
<td>Trombeki/ Nzako</td>
<td>On 13 April 2016, in Haute-Kotto prefecture, two armed men with AK-47 rifles arrived at a gold and diamond mining site near Trombeki village (80km north east of Nzako), asking for medicine and food. When asked to pay, the intruders reportedly refused and started shooting, killing one and injuring two other people. They fled after taking two radios and some gold.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17/04/2016</td>
<td>Karmador/ Rafai</td>
<td>On 19 April 2016, MINUSCA was informed about another LRA attack on 17 April, against Kaoufoura gold mine in the vicinity of Karmador (about 85km north east of Rafai), Mbomou prefecture. Reportedly, three persons were injured by bullet and three others momentarily abducted to transport looted goods but released thereafter. Reportedly houses were burnt in the vicinity of the mining site and Karmador. MINUSCA is ascertaining more information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/04/2016</td>
<td>Nzako</td>
<td>The activities of former Séléka elements continue to create concern throughout SE from 22 to 28 April 2016. Acting as de facto authorities, UPC elements reportedly arrested and tortured a man accused of stealing diamonds in Nzako.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/04/2016</td>
<td>Kpangou/ Nzako</td>
<td>The body of a young resident of central Bakouma was found by the roadside by merchants who were returning from Nzako on 27 April. According to the available information, the boy had left on Monday, April 25 2016, to work in a diamond site at Kpangou. Afraid, the merchants did not have time to check the body for more details as to the causes of death, and they fled to alert the authorities and his family in Bakouma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/04/2016</td>
<td>Bria</td>
<td>On 26 May 2016, HRD was informed by a local partner about the death threat reportedly made against a 40-year old man by former Seleka/UPC in Bria, Haute Kotto Prefecture. According to the source, the former Seleka threatened the victim with death and also accused him of buying a diamond stolen from the mine in Aigbando. The perpetrators threatened to kill him if he did not return the diamond which had been already sold. They confiscated his motorbike and requested him to pay one million CFA. Fearing for his life, the man agreed to pay this amount. He subsequently informed the Comité de sensibilisation in Bria which organized a meeting between him, the President of the Committee and the former Séléka/UPC to find an agreement on 24 May. However, the parties did not reach any agreement. The victim has already paid 300 000 CFA, and his motorbike remains confiscated. He has not filed any complaint with local authorities as yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/04/2016</td>
<td>Mbagou mining site/ Bakouma</td>
<td>The discovery of a corpse near Mbagou mining site (50km north east of Bakouma) on 27 April 2016, may renew fear of LRA or other armed groups’ attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/05/2016</td>
<td>Karmadar/ Rafai</td>
<td>On May 18 2016, five people, including a woman, were leaving Dembia by bicycle for the Gali mining site. Upon arriving at Karmadar, one of the bicycles broke down. While it was being fixed, a member of the convoy went looking for mangoes and surprised a band of suspected LRA, and he returned alert others. As they were fleeing, the woman was captured. The exact number of her abductors is unknown, as are the language they spoke, the clothing they wore, and the types of weapons used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/06/2016</td>
<td>Labageze/ Bangassou</td>
<td>On 7 June 2016, MINUSCA (HoO Bangassou) received unconfirmed reports that former Séléka (UPC) are controlling a diamond mining site in Labageze, 7 km from Bema town. The allegation will be verified by field missions to the areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/06/2016</td>
<td>Kombala/ Bria</td>
<td>On 8 June 2016, MILOB reported that during their patrol to KOMBALA village (14 km north east of Bria), the villagers confirmed the presence of former Séléka (RPRC) base in KALAGA Village (40 km ahead of Kombala village) on same axis. There is a presence of former Séléka check point 10 km short of Kalaga, which villagers are forced to pay money, diamonds, or even animals if they don’t have anything to make payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06/2016</td>
<td>Karmadar/ Rafai</td>
<td>On 23 June 2016, in the mining site of Galé near Karmadar village (45km north of Dembia) Mbomou prefecture, presumed elements of the LRA kidnapped 19 persons but released them the following day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 18: UPC establishing checkpoints, levying taxes and occupying government buildings in Mbomou prefecture

The UPC established checkpoints to levy taxes and loot commercial trucks and other travellers on roads between major towns of the Mbomou and Basse-Kotto prefectures two prefectures. On the road from Bangassou to Béma the Panel observed four checkpoints manned by between two and ten heavily armed fighters. On the road between Bangassou and Bambari, UPC has established up to thirty checkpoints, each responsible for levying taxes between 5,000 and 30,000 CFA, depending on the vehicle size.⁴

Photographs of UPC occupation of government buildings taken by the Panel in Ouango on 8 June 2016

⁴ Interview with Panel confidential source, Bangassou, 7 June 2016.
Photographs of UPC set up of checkpoints taken by the Panel in Ouango, 8 June 2016.

Photographs of UPC combatants controlling the market in Béma, taken by the Panel in Béma on 8 June 2016.
Annex 19: UPC combatants wearing FARDC uniforms in Bema and Ndassima

Photographs taken by the Panel in Bema on 9 June 2016
Photograph taken by the Panel in Ndassima on 28 March 2016
Annex 20: Young UPC armed fighters in Ouango. Photograph taken by MINUSCA in Ouango on 15 December 2015
Annex 21: LRA incidents in CAR from January 2015 to June 2016\(^5\)

\(^5\) Based on Panel of Experts database, as of June 2016. The incidents include: attacks, abductions, killings, and looting.
Annex 22: LRA area of operations by alleged incidents in Eastern CAR from January-May 2016. Map obtained by the Panel from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on 5 July 2016
Annex 23: Local self-defence group in Agoumar with the Mayor of Rafai, Mr. André Selim (with blue shirt in the center)

Photograph taken by MINUSCA during its 21 to 25 April mission to Agoumar and Rafai.
Annex 24: Treatment of surrendered and captured LRA

1. In order to understand LRA’s current *modus operandi* and the challenges victims face in returning to their communities, the Panel met with several former LRA abductees, and other relevant partners. In its interviews the Panel observed that civil society networks dealing with this issue have clearly defined procedures concerning helping victims reintegrate their families. In comparison, MINUSCA needs to work on establishing clear rules of operation on this matter.

2. During a visit to the Camp des Roux prison on 3 June, the Panel met with an LRA combatant who had defected in Central African Republic and was trying to return home, in Uganda. Following his defection, he was arrested by local authorities and transferred to Bangui, contrary to the national policy to encourage defections.

3. The previously mentioned LRA fighter/abductee (para. 66 of the report) who was shot in Rafai was left paralytic. He received adequate medical attention by MINUSCA for several weeks. However, the non-availability of a proper mechanism to deal with the accountability, reintegration and/or repatriation of LRA fighters put MINUSCA in a delicate situation, not knowing where to transfer the person to.

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6 Panel interviewed several victims in Obo, Bria and Bangui during May 2016.
7 Interview with LRA fighter in Bangui, June 2016
8 At the moment of writing this report the person was still in prison.
Annex 25: Weapons handed over in Vakaga

The availability and circulation of weapons and ammunition remains an important issue in, amongst others, the Vakaga prefecture, as disclosed by the list of items voluntarily handed over by former Séléka MLCJ group in Birao. The list was received by the Panel from MINUSCA on 6 July 2016.

List of weapons and munitions handed over by former Séléka MLCJ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SERIAL Nos.</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>KP-25-15</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>UBGL 49IK 0456</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Light Machine Gun</td>
<td>514858</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>SKS Rifle</td>
<td>80575</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>8mm PISTOL</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Not Certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Home Made Pistol</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Not Certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Muzzle Loaders (Home Made)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>Not Certain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AMMUNITION HANDED OVER BY FORMER SÉLEKA MLCJ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Grenade (Type 82 Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Medium Machine Gun Rounds</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>M54 Rounds</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Smoke Grenade</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>RPG Rocket</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Drill Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Grenades (36 Hand Grenade)</td>
<td>TRV-23/72 &amp; T/252</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>SKS Rounds</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Muzele Rounds (58 M)</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>14.5mm Gun Rounds</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>12.7mm Round</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Serviceable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade
- SKS: Soviet Kinden Schuetzische Sturmgewehr
Annex 26: On 29 May 2016, an unexploded ordnance blew-up killing three children, severely injuring another and also killing four donkeys.

*Photographs of the exploded device and victims in Birao taken by MINUSCA in Birao on 29 May 2016, obtained by the Panel on 6 July 2016.*

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

Nous, Mouvement Patriotique pour le Centrafrique (MPC), notons avec regret que des personnes malintentionnées et qui cherchent à saper les efforts que nous avons fournis pour la pacification du pays et pour une sortie définitive de la crise, ont publié le 21 mai 2016 sur les murs du quotidien en ligne http://www.takaparlic.overblog.com que nous nous sommes adjoint à eux pour remettre en scelle « l’ex-coalition Séléka ».

Ce communiqué ne relève que du fantasme de ses auteurs car nous ne sommes ni de loin, ni de près associés à une telle « entreprise desperado ». Nous ne saurions nous assimiler avec des « Partisans de la démocratie des cimetières » qui persistent dans leur « stratégie du chaos » pour sacrifier inutilement des vies humaines sur l’autel du retour sur la scène politique nationale.

Il est donc grand temps que ceux-ci comprennent que « l’heure n’est ni pour une logique guerrièrre, ni pour des discours balistiques » qui occasionneront fortement des pertes en vies humaines. Le peuple centrafricain a trop souffert et continue de payer le lourd tribut de cette crise. Par conséquent, ces déclarations sont nulles et non-aventures. Elles n’engagent que la responsabilité de ses auteurs. Et, le moment venu, nous instruirons notre Avocat pour les poursuites en justice.

Fait à Bangui, le 24 mai 2016

Le Président Secrétaire du MPC

M. Elhadj Idriss Ahmed
Economiste, Concepteur
Tel: (+236) 75559292 / 77668471
Email: aalwadabi@gmail.com / idrissahmed@hotmail.com
Annex 28: Compensation agreement following the killing of three MPC elements by FPRC elements in Sangba, obtained by the Panel from FPRC sources on 29 May 2016

Proos verbal de conciliation

Une telle reponse a ete obtenue au domicile du seigneur le maire du Dan et inclut une recompense de conciliation
pour couper une delegation venue du
Dago-Banondo et une equipe composee
et indite.

Au cours de cette acceps Un seul point
a retenu les ecrits elle ayant-dit au
a la mort de elements du MPC seus
en milage Sangba.

Pour la delegation di Dago-Banondo
la mort de les elements sus sequier
au cours d'une operation non reccomandee
par le MPC.

Pour l equipe di indite elle prend part a
la declaration de la delegation de
Dago-Banondo mais constate que
la mise a sac non seulement
a ete realisee mais que davent angager
Apres debat un accord a l'issue d'
conduisant a la restitution du
enorme

Un accord compte de : Un million
quarante et un millions
(1.040.000) CFA

16-12368
le reste en acqompte de deux (2) banques

de dix (10) jours.

- Trois millions deux cent trente mille (3 230 000) Francs CFA le 15 juin 2016 et
- Trois millions deux cent trente mille (3 230 000) Francs CFA le 24 juillet 2016

Pour la délégation de la Caraïbe
- Colonel MOUSSAB OUMAN

Pour l'équipe de Mabili
- Colonel ADAM KANDO YACOUB
- ELHABY ABDANAH KOGO
- IMAN ABDELHAFIS ISMAIL

Pour le Maire de Saint Louis

Jean 'Abdoullahou Moustapha Sonko

Jean Boubacar Bâ
Note expiée

Le FPIC ayant pris part à la discussion sur les morts des éléments du MPC de ne pas en domiciles, le Sultam Adlane n’a pas envoyé les éléments à détailler le 9 Juin à Bangui-Caïfar. La mort des éléments du MPC est survenue au cours d’une malentendu entre le groupe d’auto défense de Bangui-Caïfar et eux. En conséquence le FPIC ne se reconnaît pas dans le versement des jumelles échappé au MPC.

Face à cette situation, le FPIC, le Commandeur du Banouy Bangaran.

[Signature]
Annex 29: Agreement between FIT Protection (Davy Gaba), FPRC (General Kanton), and the MPC (General Moussa). Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 20 May 2016

**ACCORD DE PARTENARIAT**

A l’issue des négociations qui ont eu lieu entre la Société FIT SECURITY et les Responsables des Mouvements (MPC) et FPRC, il est convenu ce qui suit :

1. FIT SECURITY accepte de verser la somme de vingt millions (20.000.000) de francs CFA en guise d’indemnités compensatrice au Représentants du Mouvement MPC ;

2. Il est instauré un périmètre de sécurité de 80 kilomètres de rayons autour du camp de base. La circulation à l’intérieur dudit périmètre n’est autorisée que sur présentation d’un Ordre de Mission ;

3. Les éléments du FPRC, du MPC, de l’UPC, du RPRC, et des Anti-Balaka sont strictement interdits d’entrer et de circuler avec les armes et autres effets militaires dans ce périmètre de sécurité ;

4. Aucun incident du genre braquage, cambriolage ou kidnapping ne doit être constaté sur les véhicules de la société sur le trajet Camp de base – Ndélé et vice-versa. Au cas où il en arriverait un, la responsabilité incombe aux éléments des mouvements ci-dessus mentionnés.

Fait à GASKAY, le 1er Mai 2016

Ont signé :

**LE RESPONSABLE DE SECURITE DU CAMP**

Davy GABA

**LE RESPONSABLE DU FPRC**

General Adam CANTON

**LE CHEF DU VILLAGE GASKAY**

NGARA Georges

**LE CHEF DE MISSION DU MPC**

Général ANNOUR MOUSSA

**POUR LE COMITE DE MEDIATION**

Abdraman DOGO
Annex 30: FIT Protection authorization issued by the Minister of Defence to carry weapons, obtained by the Panel from Christophe Gazam Betty (FIT Protection’s General Manager)
Annex 31: MPC and UPC letters

UPC information letter of 22 June 2016 to MINUSCA on the events in Ouandago and Batangafo. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 24 June 2016

Bambari, 22/06/2016

A L’ATTENTION DU COMMANDANT DE FORCE DE LA MISSION MULTIDIMENSIONNELLE DE L’ONU POUR LA STABILISATION EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE (MINUSCA)
LE GENERAL KEITA
A BANGUI

Objet : lettre d’information sur l’évolution de la situation de Ouandago et Batangafo.

En date du 05 juin, le Chef d’Etat-major général du mouvement de l’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique, Général de Division ALI DARRASSA MAHAMAT a nommé une Brigade patrouillant dans le Secteur de l’Ouan, Bamingui Bangoran et autres afin d’appuyer à la sécurisation des mouvements de transhumance, avec à la tête le Colonel ABAKAR SAIDOU.

Quelques jours après, la Brigade a été saisi de cas de rackets massifs de boeufs au niveau de NDJELÉ par les éléments du MPC et du FPRC sur les éleveurs Pauths. Suite à ces informations, le Colonel ABAKAR et ses éléments ont reçu l’ordre de l’Etat-major de descendre sur le terrain pour vérifier.

Au cours de cette mission, la brigade est tombée sur des racketteurs au niveau de OUANDAGO, accompagnés de plus de deux cent (200) têtes de boeufs et (93) quatre-vingt-treize autres têtes détenues vers KADO afin de les vendre.

C’est ainsi que le Colonel ABAKAR et ses éléments se sont interposés contre cette manière de faire en leur intimant l’ordre de remettre ces boeufs à leurs propriétaires qui ne cessent de se plaindre et de les réclamer.

Suite de quoi, les racketteurs se sont organisés pour s’en prendre à cette Brigade en date du 19/06/2016.

Le lendemain 20/06/2016 à 9h du matin, une autre mission des deux groupes armés ci-dessus cités a attaqué notre position qui se trouve sous les ordres du Général de Brigade Hassan GUNBEROU à BATANGAFO.

Toute porte à croire que ces deux mouvements se sont organisés pour déloger nos positions dans ce secteur afin de mieux racketter les pauvres éleveurs Pauths.

Je demande à la MINUSCA de bien vouloir prendre ses responsabilités sur ces faits qui surviennent car la paix et la tranquillité du paisible citoyen centrafricain sont primordiales.

Veuillez recevoir les expressions de ma très haute considération.

Le Chef d’Etat-major de l’UPC
Général de Division ALI DARRASSA

Tél : 75 57 70 46 - 72 48 25 12

Le format de cette lettre est un document officiel et authentique de l’UPC. Tout autre modèle est un faux.
Au Chef de Bureau

de la Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la Centrafrique (minusca),

OBJET : Lettre a titre d'information sur la situation qui prévaut dans les zones (Wandago, Gondawa, Kabo, et Batangafo).

Nous Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique, venons par la présente lettre informer la MINUSCA sur les contextes sécuritaires actuels.

En effet, dans la journée du 19 /06/2016 une équipe composée d'éléments du MPC et FPRC ont été dépêchée dans les zones précitées afin de mettre la main sur des bandits opérant depuis un certain temps dans ladite zone. Ces bandits agissant sous l'autorité d'un certain M.HASSAN GUINDEPOU sont la terreur et la désolation au sein de la population en commettant des actes de (braquages, vols et confiscations des biens et vols de bétails) ils ne se reconnaissent nullement en l'autorité de guerre des deux chefs d'État major des mouvements MPC et FPRC, et se réclamant appartenir à l'UPC qu'aux yeux n'est pas en zone de commandement respectif.

Cependant nous avons dans un premier temps envoyé une note a ces derniers leurs demander des explications sur tout ce qui se passe dans ces zones dite prétendument sous leur contrôle.

Force est de constater que la lettre a été déchirée tout en précisant que tous les peuls ne se reconnaissent que dans la structure de l'UPC, et qu'ils n'ont pas de compte à rendre a qui que ce soit.
Les éléments envoyés pour la mission ont été surpris par des attaques coordonnées menées par le colonel ABAKAR, qui s’est soldé par des pertes en vies humaines. Le bilan des combats de Wando, Gondar et Gonder s’élève à 13 morts côté adversaire et 02 deux morts dans les rangs des alliés. Nos éléments ont été vigoureusement affrontés et la y’a aucun incident majeur à signaler, l’adversaire a été délogé et ses armes. À leur actuel le combat est engagé et les éléments d’UPC ont abandonné leur base, une partie des civils a trouvé refuge dans la base de MINUSCA et d’autres sont évaporés dans les milieux naturels dont leur chef M. HASSAN GUNDEROU. Les opérations continues dans la sécurité, aucune victime à déplorer côté civil ni dommages collatéraux sur les infrastructures de la ville.

Fait à Kaga Bandoro le 20/06/2016

Le Porte-parole du MPC

[Stamp: Saad Ahamat Ali, Tel: 75876667/77389194]
Annex 32: Galil rifles seized in the CAR

1. Galil assault rifles are not known to be part of the national arsenal. In 2014 the Panel traced two Galil rifles (serial number 2066204 and 2063423) to a batch sold in 2008 and 2009 to the Ministry of Defence of Chad with an end-user certificate certifying that the weapons would not be transferred to another country (S/2014/762, paragraph 159). In 2015, following new requests for information, Israel informed the Panel that three additional Galil assault rifles (serial number 2019313, 2065145, 2070357) seized in the CAR were sold to the government of the Republic of Chad in 2008 and 2009. The Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations informed the Panel that these assault rifles were previously affected to the Chadian embassy’s security service in the CAR, the Chadian security service to Bozize and the Chadian MISCA troops.

2. In 2015, the Panel also traced back to DRC eight Galil assault-rifles (serial number 2093715, 2093804, G2087182, G2087859, G2087867, G2088061, G2088680, G2088766) that were seized from armed groups, including former Séléka and the LRA. Seven of these Galil assault rifles were sold to the government of the Republic of Zaire, by Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), prior to 1995 (S/2015/936, para. 65 and Annex 9.33).

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9 Reply from Israel Weapon Industries, 25 May 2014.
10 Reply from Israel Weapon Industries, 4 August 2015.
11 Meeting with the Permanent Representative of Chad in New York, 18 November 2015.
12 Reply from Israel Weapon Industries, 4 August 2015.
Annex 33: FDPC combatants occupying Zoukombo primary school. Photograph taken by the Panel on 7 June 2016.
Annex 34: Meeting with FDPC leadership in Zoukombo. Photograph taken by the Panel on 7 June 2016

Annex 35: Incidents during the first half of 2016 targeting Muslims, including returning IDPs and refugees in the western diamond production zone CAR\textsuperscript{13}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>A Muslim returnee at Berberati was attacked by an unknown assailant who was occupying his house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April</td>
<td>Two Muslims returnees were about to be lynched by suspected Christian population in Poto Poto, Berberati. MINUSCA intervened and rescued them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>An increase in Muslims returning to check on their properties has led to some incidents in Nassole where a Muslim trader was robbed by an anti-balaka element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>A Muslim was stabbed in the back by an unidentified man in Berberati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>A Muslim was attacked as he was asked for some money at Berberati. The victim was taken to the local hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>Several Muslims returnees were harassed at Poto Poto, Berberati by a group of 7 former anti-balaka led by someone called Mr. Eto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>The Muezzin from the Central Mosque in Berberati, was attacked by a group of presumed anti-balaka elements inside the Mosque while he was getting ready to call Muslims to prayer. The attackers fled. He was later transported to the hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June</td>
<td>MINUSCA was informed of threats against the Imam of Poto Poto, Berberati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>Three armed men assaulted a Muslim merchant at Poto Poto, Berberati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June</td>
<td>The local population demonstrated at Gamboula, Berberati against Muslim IDP returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>Village youngsters armed with artisanal weapons threatened to attack Muslim traders returning from Cameroon if the traders attempted to claim their former positions at the local market, at Sasso-Nakombo (about 50km south west of Berberati).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 21 June</td>
<td>Five houses belonging to members of the Muslim community were looted by alleged anti-balaka members in Carnot, Mambere-Kadéi prefecture. During the attack, a Muslim was reportedly hacked with a machete. An unconfirmed number of houses were torched and at least 20 persons were injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>Nine men armed with knives and AK-47 rifles went to the market and attacked two Muslims at Poto Poto, Berberati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>MINUSCA reported that while patrolling the area of the market at Poto Poto, Berberati a group of persons, presumably anti-balaka members, looted two houses belonging to Muslims. MINUSCA intervened to rescue the victims. The aggressors fired at MINUSCA peacekeepers and the patrol returned fire. Three suspects were arrested and kept at the gendarmerie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>Two Muslims were attacked in Berberati by a group of six armed men. One of the victims sustained serious injuries and was transferred to the hospital for surgery. Three of the six aggressors have been identified by the local police. The situation was reported very tense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Ten Muslims were threatened by former anti Balaka elements in Sosso Nakombo. The Muslims were placed under the protection of the local gendarmerie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>Following up on the intercommunal tensions in Berberatiand Sosso Nakombo during the night of 22 to 23 June, an undetermined number of Muslims sought refuge at the local gendarmerie due to alleged threats by former anti-balaka members who subsequently surrounded the area. MINUSCA Force was deployed on site to ensure the safety of those threatened.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{13} Panel of Experts database, Jan-June 2016.
Annex 36: Update on sanctioned individuals and entities

A. Asset freeze violations, Alfred Yékatom

1. The Panel has been informed that, in spite of his resignation from the FACA and subsequent requests for payment termination from the Human Resources unit of the Defence Ministry, Alfred Yékatom still received his salary as a FACA chief-corporal in June 2016. Yékatom had resigned from the army, which was necessary, in order for him to participate in the legislative elections.

B. Travel ban violations, Nourredine Adam

2. The Panel had previously reported on Nourredine Adam’s travel ban violations (S/2015/936) during the Nairobi talks in the first half of 2015, and his movement from Chad into Central African Republic in October 2015. Continuing its investigations on these travels, the Panel obtained Adam’s flight records from Ethiopian Airlines affirming Adam’s travel from Ndjamena to Nairobi on 14 July 2015, and back to Ndjamena on 2 September 2015, on both occasions via Addis Ababa.

3. The tickets for the flights were booked through a travel agent in Dubai. On 26 April the Panel requested payment details from the company in question, copying the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On 4 May the company in question responded saying it had to clear information with UAE authorities. To date no information has been transmitted to the Panel.

4. Adam’s travel, based on the flight records from Ethiopian Airlines, was booked under his alias Mahamat Nouradine Adam, and using his Central African diplomatic passport with the number D00001184 and an expiry date of 9 April 2018. Although these details are contained in his United Nations Security Council/INTERPOL special notice, his entry and exit did not generate an alert in the INTERPOL system. Chadian officials from the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration have expressed surprise at this. An alternative explanation, provided by Chad, for Adam’s passing border control at Ndjamena airport is that he may have used another passport (apart from his Central African passport) to enter Chad. The same officials mentioned the possibility of Nourredine Adam having Chadian citizenship – and therefore a passport – and family connections in Ndjamena, which he could have used to enter the country without their notice.

5. After FPRC’s march on Sibut in October 2015, Nourredine Adam travelled back Chad where he met the Special Envoy of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio in Ndjamena on 21 December 2015. The Chadian intelligence service was aware of Adam’s arrival to Chad in December, and the Chadian Presidency had facilitated

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14 Email correspondence with confidential source, 5 July 2016.
15 Meeting with officials from the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration, Ndjamena, 4 May 2016.
the meetings.\textsuperscript{16} Chadian authorities said they did not seek an exemption to the travel ban from the Committee for Adam’s travel, due to time constraints.\textsuperscript{17} The Chadian intelligence service was also aware of Adam’s entry on 2 September 2015.

C. Exemptions and notifications to the asset freeze: BADICA

6. On 20 June 2016 the CAR Ministry of Budget and Finance transferred a notification to the Committee, guaranteeing BADICA accounts remained frozen; and notifying of the government’s approval for the addition of rental payments to one of its accounts at a commercial bank in Bangui; and BADICA’s reimbursement of loans engaged with the same bank. The concerned rental contracts and loans predate BADICA’s listing on 20 August 2015. Admission of funds and debt repayments are therefore in line with paragraphs 10 and 11 of Resolution 2262 (2016) respectively.

D. Modification to the sanctions list: Death of Oumar Younous

7. Information provided by various media sources suggest that FPRC “General” Oumar Younous, listed by the Committee on 20 August 2015, is dead. He reportedly met his death during confrontations between international forces and the FPRC at Sibut on 10 and 11 October 2015. On 9 June 2016 the Panel obtained photographic evidence of his death. The Panel notes that based on Section 7 (f) of the Committee’s Guidelines, a de-listing request, with an official document confirming the demise of the individual would have to be submitted before the individual can be removed from the Committee’s sanctions list.

\begin{center}
\textit{Oumar Younous’ corpse}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{16} Meeting with an official from the National Security Agency, Ndjamena, 4 May 2016.  
\textsuperscript{17} Meeting with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ndjamena, 4 May 2016.
Oumar Younous (middle) next to Nourredine Adam (left) and Fadoul Albachar (right)\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image1.png}
\caption{Oumar Younous (left) next to Fadoul Albachar\textsuperscript{19}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{18} Photograph posted on 12 June 2014 on Fadoul Albachar’s facebook profile accessed on 17 October 2014 at https://www.facebook.com/fadoul.albachar/posts/1433981236872040

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.