Letter dated 23 November 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2241 (2015), the Secretariat has conducted an assessment of security planning for Juba during the transition and the appropriate role that the United Nations should play in securing key infrastructure in order to protect freedom of movement in the capital. The assessment was undertaken in consultation with the Government. United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) troop- and police-contributing countries were also consulted.

Security arrangements planned for the transition

The parties agreed to permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements during two series of negotiations in Addis Ababa in September and October. The arrangements are designed to address the security requirements of the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM in Opposition) and the former detainees when they return to Juba and minimize the risk of security incidents in the capital. The parties agreed upon the composition of the forces that would remain in Juba during the transition in a follow-up meeting on 3 November.

According to the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, the government forces (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army) would withdraw to areas 25 km outside Juba, leaving only a sufficient number of soldiers to guard key government infrastructure. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan also provided for the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Sudan, except for Western Equatoria State, within 45 days of signature, implying that the Ugandan troops deployed in Juba since early in 2014 should be withdrawn.

The parties agreed that 4,830 armed personnel (3,420 for the Government and 1,410 for the opposition) would remain in the capital. These would include 1,000 presidential guards, responsible for protecting the President, the Vice-Presidents and other key officials; an administrative and logistical battalion, numbering 750 and 840 personnel, respectively; 1,320 guards for the shared unified command to be established by the parties; 500 military police officers; and 170 armed national security officers who would be allowed to carry only small arms.

The remaining personnel, whose number is unspecified, would have to hand over their weapons to the armouries. Members of the wildlife services, firefighters
and prison officers, whose numbers are also unspecified, would be allowed to remain in Juba, but their arms would also be kept in armouries, for use only when on official duty. Pursuant to the agreement signed on 3 November, the shared unified command will decide on the status, encampment and deployment of the guards and the military police. A total of 3,000 joint integrated police officers, comprising 1,500 personnel from each side, will be responsible for the security of the public and civilian installations in Juba, working under the national police decentralized structure. A ceasefire transitional security arrangements monitoring mechanism will verify the numbers and deployment of the above forces in Juba and the state of their armaments.

At the time of writing, the shared unified command, the joint integrated police command and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism had yet to be constituted in Juba and no further operational plans with regard to the specific deployments and organization of and division of labour between those forces had been agreed upon. According to public statements by key ministers, the Government would redeploy its excess forces in the vicinity of the seven major access routes to Juba. The joint integrated police units would most likely be responsible for ensuring freedom of movement in the capital. However, the precise security arrangements for key civilian infrastructure are yet to be determined. The parties have also jointly appealed to the members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-plus group and other regional and international partners to meet urgent financial and resource needs associated with the implementation of the agreement.

**Most likely security environment during the transition**

The current security arrangements in Juba are under the control of the Government through the deployment of military and police forces. With most of those forces deployed outside Juba, however, the Government will continue to control access to the capital. No external threat to Juba is foreseen during the transition period.

The Ugandan army has now withdrawn from Juba, in accordance with the peace agreement. The support provided by the Ugandan forces to the Government during the conflict reinforced the perception of security in the capital. Their withdrawal has not had a noticeable impact to date. The security functions that they performed in Juba, including maintaining a deterrent presence at some key sites, have been assumed by the government forces. This will have to be addressed by the shared unified command and the joint integrated police. SPLM in Opposition is not believed to have retained organized military units in Juba.

However, several thousand Nuer police officers and soldiers fled the fighting and sought safety and shelter at UNMISS sites for the protection of civilians. Some remain at the sites today, albeit unarmed and in civilian clothes.

It is expected that some of the opposition security personnel present at the UNMISS site in Juba will join the opposition’s authorized contingent in the capital, but these details are yet to be worked out by the parties.

The agreement does not address the presence of other South Sudanese ex-combatants, including an unknown number of militiamen affiliated with the
Sudanese armed forces who were left behind after the civil war and after South Sudan gained independence, potentially with their weapons.

Most recently, the significant rise in crime has been the main source of insecurity in Juba. This is evident in the increased number of break-ins affecting international non-governmental organization compounds and instances of street crime. Armed robberies are perpetrated both in daylight and at night. While previous compound robberies appeared to be planned and executed by organized criminals, a pattern of more random and opportunistic incidents has emerged. There has also been an increase in the number of incidents in which force is used. Perpetrators sometimes wear the uniforms of security forces. They also present identification cards from security agencies to gain access to compounds. Street crime outside restaurants and hotels frequented by foreigners, who are often carrying foreign currency, is also on the rise. While crime targeting international compounds is well documented, that affecting South Sudanese neighbourhoods is more difficult to measure.

The rising crime is at least partially attributable to the rapid deterioration of the economy. The economic slowdown and hyperinflation have contributed to low incomes, an escalating cost of living and high rates of unemployment. The economic forecast for the transition suggests that there will be no improvement. Crime is, therefore, likely to remain a recurrent source of insecurity and will need to be addressed by the joint integrated police units.

Security incidents in Juba also stem from intercommunal tensions, notably between victims of the conflict and other internally displaced persons assembled at the UNMISS protection sites, as well as other communities perceived to be in support of, or sympathetic to, the Government. Currently, some 28,000 internally displaced persons are residing in two sites inside and adjacent to the United Nations House in Juba.

Tension in and around the sites is visible. Surrounding neighbourhoods, many of which host security personnel and their families, are feared by the internally displaced persons. At the same time, the residents of those neighbourhoods live in fear of the perceived desire for revenge on the part of the displaced. Both sides suffer from the activities of criminal gangs, many of which include former combatants in possession of crude weapons and small arms. UNMISS conducts frequent and thorough searches to uncover any weapons, but the vastness of the sites and their relatively porous perimeters make it exceedingly difficult to uncover weapons hidden inside them or in their vicinity. Several instances of violence between gangs within the sites illustrate that the sites can be extremely unruly and difficult to manage.

In addition to the joint integrated police units, three institutions in particular will play a critical role in maintaining security in Juba during the transition: the Joint Operations Centre, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. The Centre is designed to be the nerve centre for coordinating the movements of authorized security forces, including VIP escorts, providing 24-hour monitoring of developments in the capital and dispatching joint integrated police units to respond to incidents. It should benefit from the constant reporting provided by the monitors and observers from the Mechanism, who will be deployed at key locations and carry out patrols throughout the city. The monitors will be responsible for verifying
compliance by the parties with the security arrangements and reporting regularly on the state of armouries and the positions of military units and their equipment. In the event of any incidents, in addition to deploying police units, Mechanism leaders will be able to call for political support from the members of the Commission to contain violence and restore law and order.

The success of the joint integrated police units will depend largely on their initial training, command and control, level of resources and the amount of operational space given to them by the other security forces present in Juba. They will require significant international support. The parties have already requested UNMISS to assist in having the units set up and made operational, as they have done for the Joint Operations Centre, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. I have made recommendations to this effect in my special report on the review of the UNMISS mandate (S/2015/899), including the deployment of up to 100 additional trainers to enable the Mission to perform these support tasks, which would include mentoring, planning assistance and command coordination through co-location. UNMISS could also provide some operational support to the units. Other partners will need to assist with equipment, communications, logistics and administrative support.

In accordance with its mandate to protect civilians, UNMISS conducts joint military and police patrols in Juba to maintain a deterrent and confidence-building presence during the day. Plans are being formulated to also conduct night-time patrols, in an effort to mitigate the risk of incidents and deter crime. UNMISS should continue to police and protect the protection sites and United Nations personnel and assets, in line with the status-of-forces agreement and its existing mandate.

The Mission is also prepared to deal with possible crisis scenarios. It updates its contingency plans regularly and prepares for the extraction and rescue of civilians in need, within its capabilities. If the need arose, UNMISS would assist in concentrating international personnel in key locations, protecting them before a possible evacuation and securing access routes as necessary.

Consultation with the Government

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretariat sent a team to Juba from 4 to 6 November to consult the Government on the above-mentioned issues. The Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs and the Minister of the Interior expressed their full commitment to the implementation of the peace agreement.

They stressed that there was no risk or intention of political violence from their side against the leaders of SPLM in Opposition, the former detainees or internally displaced persons. They said that they would implement the peace agreement in good faith, even though they did not like it. They also stated that the opposition leaders could come with or without their bodyguards or even seek a third-party protection force if that made them feel more comfortable.

They said that the protection forces were welcome, although unnecessary. In their view, the only insecurity that would affect Juba during the transition would be crime, which was as a result of poverty, economic underdevelopment and the legacy of the civil war. They appealed to the United Nations to support the establishment of
the joint integrated police units and address the root causes of poverty through the development of infrastructure. They emphasized that UNMISS should have no role to play in securing Juba other than supporting the units and the Transitional Government of National Unity.

Conclusions

The institutions foreseen in the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements have not yet been established. It is therefore extremely difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their plans to tackle the above-mentioned security threats or determine an appropriate role for the United Nations in securing key infrastructure in order to protect freedom of movement in the capital.

There is undoubtedly a risk that there could be violence in the capital during the transition. However, the peace agreement contains a range of mechanisms designed to mitigate this risk. It is essential that they be properly supported, trained and equipped and receive the full cooperation of the parties. The security of Juba during the transition will ultimately depend on the parties’ commitment to the implementation of the agreement, their ability to resolve disputes peacefully and, most importantly, their readiness to put the conflict behind them.

In the event of a severe crisis, UNMISS will do its utmost, within its capabilities, to support efforts to respond and protect civilians, United Nations national and international staff and other international personnel under imminent threat of physical violence. It will not, however, be in a position to tackle such a crisis alone and will need the full support of partners in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-plus group.

UNMISS is already mandated to support the mitigation mechanisms proposed in the peace agreement. With the additional resources requested in my special report, it should be in a position to contribute significantly to making those mechanisms operational. The support of other partners will also be necessary to guarantee that the mechanisms perform their agreed functions efficiently and professionally. Troop- and police-contributing countries have been consulted on this assessment and concur with its conclusions.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon