



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
7 October 2015

Original: English

---

### **Letter dated 7 October 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council**

1. I refer to Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), by which the Council requested me, in consultation with all stakeholders, to carry out a strategic review of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), including a thorough review of support provided to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by all partners, and set out a wide range of options on how to improve overall support to AMISOM, in the context of the efficiency surge outlined in paragraph 6 of the resolution, including through making improvements to the performance, management and structures of UNSOA, bearing in mind the imperative of responsible cost control and taking into account the availability of resources.

2. In line with that request, a strategic review of UNSOA was undertaken, under the leadership of the Department of Field Support, between July and September 2015. A team comprising representatives of the United Nations Secretariat (the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Safety and Security and the United Nations Office to the African Union), the African Union and Member States travelled to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Mogadishu and Baidoa, where it held extensive consultations with several interlocutors. These included the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union, including AMISOM and its troop- and police-contributing countries, UNSOM, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the European Union, Member States and Secretariat entities, including the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the Department of Safety and Security, as well as United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and UNSOA. The review was undertaken applying the principle of comprehensive and wide-ranging consultations, underpinned by an evidence- and metrics-based approach to assessing performance.

3. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council also took note of my recommendation to establish a non-lethal support package for the Somali police force and stressed that an appropriate United Nations trust fund or voluntary funding arrangement should be used to fund such support if authorized by the Council. The Council requested me to provide further details for implementation



and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015. The Council also took note of my recommendation to extend the Somali National Army non-lethal support package authorized in paragraph 14 of resolution 2124 (2013) to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis, and requested me to explore the feasibility of implementing that recommendation and to report to the Council by no later than 30 September 2015.

4. In line with those requests, the United Nations further developed, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the concept for the start-up support to the Somali police and the non-lethal support to the Somali National Army troops in Puntland. The options and recommendations summarized in the present letter are also informed by the overall findings of the UNSOA strategic review.

#### **United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia: strategic review**

5. As mentioned in my letter of 2 July 2015, all efforts of the international community should be aligned to support the political process in Somalia, with a view to bringing peace and stability to the country in the long term. In particular, efforts on the security front should be aimed at creating and preserving an enabling environment for the political, peace and reconciliation process to unfold. This approach was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2232 (2015).

6. The strategic review assessed the performance of UNSOA in support of the above-mentioned approach and against the core objectives that I have established for the delivery of field support, namely, effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency and responsible stewardship.

#### **Operating context**

7. The Somalia context today is vastly complex, comprising a Federal Government that is simultaneously instituting a federal political system and its complementary institutions across an extensive territory while dealing with insecurity and violent extremism on a large scale. This translates into unique security, operational and programme delivery challenges for the United Nations effort to “stay and deliver” in partnership with the African Union.

8. In this environment, the role and impact of field support as a strategic enabler of peace operations has grown significantly, while the logistical enabling environment has remained weak and fragile, challenged by insecurity and a lack of access to major supply routes.

#### **Evolution of mandated tasks**

9. UNSOA was established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) with an initial mandate to provide a logistical support package aimed at providing mission support services to AMISOM with a view to raising operational standards in order for AMISOM forces to be incorporated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

10. As initially authorized, the logistical package covered accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, vehicle maintenance, communications, enhancement to key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services. It did not allow for the direct transfer of funds to the African Union or AMISOM and was

intended to be one element of a hybrid model of support through assessed and voluntary contributions. At the time, the logistical package was provided to a military-focused operation with an authorized strength of 8,000 troops and an area of operation limited to Mogadishu.

11. Since its authorization, the scale and scope of the United Nations support package has been in a constant and dramatic state of expansion. In terms of scale, the logistical package was expanded three times as the authorized strength of AMISOM grew from 8,000 to 12,000 in 2010, to 17,731 in 2012 and to 22,126 in 2013, currently constituting the largest United Nations-mandated force in peace operations.

12. In terms of scope, the initial package as authorized has been expanded on four separate occasions to include:

(a) Direct provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services provided in kind to AMISOM in line with the restriction on direct transfers that were initially in place;

(b) Provision of strategic communication and explosive hazard management capacities (including mitigating the threat of explosive devices);

(c) Reimbursement of AMISOM major contingent-owned equipment in line with United Nations practices and rates (lifting the restriction on the direct transfer of funds to the African Union and AMISOM);

(d) Provision of support to up to 70 personnel within the AMISOM civilian component.

13. In addition, by its resolution 2102 (2013), the Security Council established UNSOM and also mandated UNSOA to provide mission support services to it.

14. In resolution 2124 (2013), the Security Council further mandated UNSOA to provide a non-lethal support package, funded from voluntary sources, to 10,900 Somali National Army personnel, when operating alongside AMISOM, consisting of food, water, fuel, transport, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation.

15. Separate from those mandates, the Secretariat decided that UNSOA, through its Nairobi-based presence, would take on the provision of support to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group.

16. The delivery of support to those mandates has taken place in an extremely non-permissive environment, framed by the significantly higher operational intensity of AMISOM and the Somali National Army operations compared with standard United Nations peacekeeping operations.

17. In sum, the demands placed on UNSOA have dramatically increased since its establishment. It is now mandated to support both very high-intensity military operations and highly mobile political engagement across different areas of operation and in an operating environment that has become much more complex logistically and much more difficult in terms of security. The number of personnel supported by UNSOA has more than quadrupled to over 33,000, the number of entities supported has increased from one to five and the area of operations has increased 4,000 times over.

18. In responding to this expansion, the Secretariat has underestimated the scale and scope of demands that support to these entities would entail, with the overall support component expanding from 249 to 450 personnel and the budget from \$215 million to \$600 million, growth factors of 1.8 and 2.8 times, respectively.

19. As a result, UNSOA has become an underresourced support mission that, despite pioneering innovative approaches that have positively contributed to the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, is significantly constrained in delivering on the demands being placed on it.

#### **Assessment of support to mandate delivery**

20. The strategic review assessed support to mandate delivery as a combination of effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency. While it was found that performance was mixed across each of these individual criteria, there was, overall, a real and widening gap between mandated tasks and support capacity to deliver them. In particular, it was noted that the historical emphasis on efficiency has had a direct impact on effectiveness and responsiveness.

21. In the review, it was noted that UNSOA was effective and responsive in the delivery of certain elements of the logistical support package to AMISOM, including rations, fuel, communication and medical support. UNSOA has also been able to respond effectively in support of UNSOM during major political events and in optimizing the use of its existing assets, infrastructure and capacities in support of the wider United Nations and international effort. In that regard, approximately 20 per cent of all UNSOA passengers were a combination of United Nations country team personnel, Somali officials or members of the diplomatic community. In addition, and in response to recent attacks, members of the United Nations country team and diplomatic community have been temporarily accommodated within the UNSOA/UNSOM compound in Mogadishu.

22. In other critical areas, however, it was found that UNSOA was unable to fully meet the demands placed on it. Gaps have appeared, in particular with regard to the ability to provide water in remote locations, field defence supplies, maintenance services, tentage for tactical deployments, recruitment and administrative support, access to mobility for programmatic activities and significant delays in the completion of construction in the UNSOM regional offices and AMISOM sector hubs outside Mogadishu.

23. The review also noted concerns commonly held by the clients of UNSOA with respect to the challenges that the Office faced in providing support across competing demands, the visibility on the part of clients regarding key operational and resourcing activities being undertaken, and access to more predictable support.

24. Beyond the operational delivery priorities of UNSOA, it was noted in the review that the Office was headed by a director based in Mogadishu with a limited senior leadership team. As such, there were real gaps in the strategic engagement capacity of UNSOA to maintain liaison at senior levels with key stakeholders, including the African Union, AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries, Member States and AMISOM regional partners.

25. In terms of efficiency, it was confirmed in the review that UNSOA was very efficient, with indicative comparators across a range of peacekeeping missions showing UNSOA utilizing a lower resource base to deliver mission support services.

This was particularly stark in the case of the number of support personnel, where UNSOA had a supported-to-support personnel ratio between 3 and 10 times lower than comparable missions.

26. UNSOA has been able to deliver this by pioneering the “light footprint” concept and outsourcing model. This approach has brought real gains and flexibility in operating in high-risk environments, including by maximizing the programmatic footprint on the ground.

27. This efficiency, however, is also partially driven by the underresourcing referred to above, with a direct impact on the ability of UNSOA to be responsive and more effective in meeting the needs of all its clients. Furthermore, there is a largely unavoidable risk associated with very high reliance on one mode of delivery through outsourcing, as opposed to a more resilient service delivery model where outsourcing and organic capacity are more balanced.

28. The light footprint approach has brought a number of tangible gains. However, the staffing capacities and processes of UNSOA need to be significantly strengthened. In that regard, UNSOA is undergoing an internal restructuring to bring it in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery policies for peace operations. A civilian staffing review has also been conducted with the aim of adapting the UNSOA staffing complement and structure to its mandate and the resultant expectations.

29. In the review, a number of wider critical issues that need to be addressed were identified. First, different understandings exist among the African Union, the troop-contributing countries and the United Nations as to the extent of the logistical support package that UNSOA is mandated to deliver. In particular, there was a gap between the support package mandated by the Security Council and the memorandums of understanding currently in place between the African Union and AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries.

30. Second, mechanisms for joint planning and coordination both within and among UNSOA, AMISOM and UNSOM to enable the establishment of joint strategic resourcing priorities need to be strengthened, taking into account the operational realities on the ground and the real capacity constraints of UNSOA. That would allow for focused attention and clear delineation of responsibility and accountability.

31. Third, and as previously noted in my report on the future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations ([A/70/357-S/2015/682](#)), the current administrative framework for peace operations is often slow, cumbersome and averse to risk.

32. This is particularly important in the Somalia context, where there is a need to respond consistently and rapidly to high-intensity and fast-changing operations in both AMISOM and UNSOM. The current administrative framework, which on average takes 180 days to recruit someone from a roster, 288 days for purchases through a systems contract to be delivered, and 114 days to amend an existing contract, limits process risk but places the preponderance of risk on mandate implementation.

**Assessment of responsible stewardship**

33. In addition to delivering its mandated tasks, it is essential for UNSOA to meet the requirements of responsible stewardship that apply to all United Nations entities. Compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy is a cornerstone of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia and a precondition for the provision of support to AMISOM, the Somali National Army and eventually to the Somali police forces.

34. In the strategic review, it was noted that in the case of Somalia, a United Nations system-wide human rights due diligence policy framework was in place under the overall authority and responsibility of my Special Representative and that a review of existing structures and practices was under way. In the context of United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali National Army as provided through UNSOA, it was noted in the review that the following measures were in the process of being implemented:

(a) First, the overall monitoring framework in Somalia will be strengthened with dedicated operational support from UNSOA. This will be done through four mechanisms: (i) the strengthening of UNSOA procedures to better track support and the way it has been used; (ii) the provision of human rights due diligence policy training for all UNSOA and UNSOM personnel to facilitate monitoring; (iii) the strengthening of the existing human rights monitoring function within UNSOM in respect of all entities receiving support from the United Nations system and supplemented by the sharing of information with the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell of AMISOM; and (iv) by the sharing of information between UNSOA and UNSOM, with regular reporting by UNSOA and other United Nations entities delivering support to non-United Nations security forces;

(b) Second, through its Human Rights Section, UNSOM will support UNSOA with the necessary monitoring, risk assessment and responsibilities under the human rights due diligence policy, with UNSOA directly supplying resources to UNSOM for that purpose and playing a proactive role in human rights due diligence policy-related mechanisms;

(c) Third, given the continuing nature of the UNSOA mandate to support AMISOM and the Somali National Army, regular risk assessments will be undertaken on a quarterly basis to provide both UNSOA and my Special Representative with updated and accurate information about the overall level of risk of human rights violations by support beneficiaries. This would be in addition to specific and ad hoc requests for support, which already require risk assessments. The review noted the importance of AMISOM taking action in cases where violations are reported and implementing any mitigating measures necessary for United Nations support to be delivered in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.

35. In the review, it was also noted that United Nations entities providing support to non-United Nations security forces have the responsibility to ensure that their support is in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, while my Special Representative has overall responsibility for the implementation of the policy in Somalia. This includes my Special Representative informing AMISOM and the Somali National Army of any measures that they need to take to comply

with the policy as well as making any decisions regarding the suspension of support, which would be done in consultation with United Nations Headquarters.

36. While there is no record of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse by UNSOA or UNSOM staff members and only a handful of other allegations each year for other types of misconduct, past allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by AMISOM personnel and more recent allegations of indiscriminate use of force by AMISOM against civilians are indicative of some of the risks faced by the United Nations when providing operational support to a military force in combat operations. The human rights due diligence policy will continue to guide our activities in Somalia and the United Nations will need to ensure that human rights risks are assessed and addressed properly.

37. The impact on the environment of the United Nations-supported activities in Somalia also remains a concern. The review noted the absence of an environmental baseline study, dedicated environmental management capacities and an African Union environmental policy to guide AMISOM operations, particularly with regard to wastewater management.

#### **Logistics support package and enabling capabilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia**

38. While assessing the AMISOM support package, it was noted in the review that the initial restrictions within the logistical support package with regard to the direct transfer of funds had been lifted in 2012. However, legacy restrictions remain with regard to elements of the package related to catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services approved before 2012 and still provided in kind. These services are normally provided by the troop-contributing country and reimbursed under the self-sustainment framework in line with United Nations practices.

39. Further challenges raised during the review related to the issue of logistical mobility along the main supply routes and down to tactical locations. The challenges were twofold: ensuring clarity on roles and responsibilities between UNSOA and AMISOM; and addressing capacity gaps.

40. Recognizing the strain that would be placed on logistical supply lines when AMISOM deployed outside Mogadishu and the need to have an organic logistical capability, 1,845 uniformed personnel were authorized as part of the AMISOM strength referred to in resolution 2124 (2013) to serve as enabling units. Only a small number of these enablers have since been deployed and they have largely remained contingent rather than becoming force assets.

41. In the review, a significant gap in the overall logistical capabilities of individual contingents was also identified, with AMISOM having approximately 30 per cent of the support mobility capabilities of United Nations missions of similar size.

42. Owing to security risks along the main supply routes and the inability of civilian contractors to operate in such conditions without force protection, UNSOA is unable to use the main supply routes on a sustainable basis for the delivery of logistical support. As such, UNSOA currently flies rations to approximately half of all the troops deployed outside Mogadishu, a situation that is both operationally and financially unsustainable.

43. In this context, it was reaffirmed in the review that logistical mobility was a joint responsibility of UNSOA and AMISOM. UNSOA, with force protection, would be responsible for delivery along the main supply routes to the sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations and AMISOM would be responsible for carrying it forward from that point using its own organic capacity.

44. The United Nations remains committed to working together with partners to assist the African Union in generating the authorized capacities called for in resolution 2124 (2013) and as part of the efficiency surge supported in resolution 2232 (2015). This will allow AMISOM to significantly enhance its logistical capabilities. It is, however, likely to be a longer-term solution.

45. In the interim and in addressing the challenges of mobility and reliance on air support, UNSOA will support the establishment of mission enabling units within AMISOM comprising organic heavy transport, combat engineering, explosive hazard management capability (including mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices) and security elements.

46. The mission enabling units would build on initial arrangements in two of the six operational sectors of AMISOM, where they would be under the command and control of AMISOM, but with training and mentoring provided by the United Nations and equipment provided through a combination of donor support and the United Nations logistical package. This, of course, will incur significant additional costs and can be operationalized only in the medium-term perspective.

47. In the short term, AMISOM will have to continue to rely on air deliveries to these locations, with the associated costs that they entail. In parallel, individual contingents would need to raise their equipment levels in order to move their supplies from their battalion headquarters forward, in line with the roles and responsibilities agreed between AMISOM and UNSOA. Bilateral support, both equipment and training, to these contingents will be critical in that regard.

48. Lastly, the predictable and sustainable provision of ammunition was raised as a gap in the provision of support to AMISOM. I propose that the Security Council consider urging Member States to overcome this gap through bilateral assistance.

#### **Support to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the political process**

49. Support to UNSOM in the framework of Somalia's emerging federal map requires going beyond the area of operations of AMISOM. As outlined in my letter of 2 July 2015, the implementation of the overall political and security strategy will require progressively aligning security efforts with the federalism process, especially in terms of the development of the Somali security sector, the alignment of AMISOM sector boundaries with the newly formed interim regional administrations, and engagement with the regional authorities.

50. Pending this progressive realignment and in support of the mandate to strengthen the presence of UNSOM in all interim regional administrative capitals, focused support is required for UNSOM to facilitate this deployment. In the review, the need to be responsive to the dynamic and sometimes unplanned surge requirements of support to the political process, including access to aviation and mobility assets, was also recognized.

51. In the coming months, these needs will likely increase as engagement with the Somali people for the implementation of Vision 2016 grows. I therefore support the call, in the strategic review, for strengthened joint planning and coordination mechanisms between UNSOM and AMISOM, to allow for a dynamic management of limited resources.

### **Restructuring of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia**

52. The senior leadership structure of UNSOA comprises a Director, a Deputy Director and a Chief of Operations in Somalia. In accordance with resolution 2093 (2013), the Office reports to the Department of Field Support on the delivery of the support package to AMISOM and the Somali National Army and to my Special Representative on logistical support to UNSOM and on policy or political questions arising from the work of UNSOA that are relevant to the mandate of UNSOM. In the review, a number of deficits in the way in which the Office was structured were also identified.

53. The deficits included a senior leadership structure that did not provide sufficiently for the separate and distinct roles of strategic engagement and operational delivery. Practically, that means that UNSOA does not have the capacity to service the mutually dependent relationship among the United Nations, the African Union, AMISOM troop-contributing countries and bilateral partners at the strategic level while simultaneously undertaking a robust operational leadership role in Mogadishu.

54. In the review, it was also noted that the current mandate of UNSOA was scattered across several resolutions with differences of view on how they should be interpreted. There has also been no regular practice of reporting to the Security Council, except through my periodic reports on Somalia. Furthermore, the name of UNSOA continues to reflect only its responsibilities to AMISOM, whereas its mandate is in fact bound to the mandates of both AMISOM and UNSOM.

### **Start-up support package to the Somali police**

55. In my letter of 2 July 2015, I fully supported the recommendation of the joint mission to deliver a non-lethal support package to jump-start policing in the regions and bridge the gap between today's needs and the longer-term mechanisms under the framework of the New Deal Compact for Somalia. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council took note of the recommendation, requested further details from the Secretary-General for implementation and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015, and underlined that such support should be provided in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations forces.

56. I recommended that the package include the provision of elementary infrastructure, basic equipment, sustainment items and medical evacuation support. AMISOM, in collaboration with UNSOM and other partners, has the capacity to provide training for the Somali police forces. However, without the requisite logistical support, including water, food, interpreters, stationery and other course material, such training cannot take place. It is therefore recommended that logistical training support be included as a fifth element.

57. In my letter of 2 July 2015 to the Security Council, I proposed that UNSOA provide support for the delivery of fuel and in-theatre medical evacuation. However, given the gaps between UNSOA capacities today and the demands of its current mandate, new tasks for UNSOA will come at the opportunity cost of a continued inability to meet all existing demands. As such, I recommend that fuel support to the Somali police be provided by another United Nations entity. I also recommend that the funding mechanism for the police package be directly administered by the entity that will implement it, rather than using the Somali National Army trust fund. In the specific case of in-theatre evacuation, however, I believe that it is important that UNSOA provide this support on a basis similar to that provided to the Somali National Army. The support will be provided by leveraging its existing capacities and in areas where AMISOM is deployed.

58. The United Nations has looked at a number of options to provide the remaining four items of the package. At this stage, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) seems best positioned, given that it is experienced in working throughout Somalia supporting the national and regional authorities and AMISOM. UNOPS implements the disbursement of stipends and the biometric registration system, which could be utilized for asset accountability tracking through bar coding of equipment and linking to the payment of stipends. UNOPS is implementing projects to strengthen police capacity in Somalia, in particular with regard to providing equipment and developing explosive ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device defeat capacities.

59. Coordination of the support package with other support initiatives and prioritization as agreed by the federal and regional authorities will take place in the peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 Police Working Group within the national police development plan (Heegan Plan) currently under development. A project management structure of the implementing entity would be established within UNSOM to support effective coordination within wider security sector reform efforts and to make the required expertise available to the implementer.

60. To ensure compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, AMISOM and UNSOM would play a key role in assisting in the vetting of candidates and provide training in human rights and international humanitarian law. It is envisaged that UNSOM will begin to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in establishing vetting criteria and to provide technical support to the vetting process in line with international human rights standards. UNSOM will also provide advice and technical assistance to strengthen the legal and policy framework on oversight, investigations and accountability. It is expected that AMISOM police working alongside the Somali police forces and providing operational support will have a deterrent effect and support reporting on human rights violations.

#### **Non-lethal support to the Somali National Army forces in Puntland**

61. In my letter of 2 July 2015, I recommended that the provision of the Somali National Army non-lethal support package be expanded to 3,000 Puntland forces, on an exceptional basis until the end of 2016, upon completion of the integration process and inclusion in the Gulwaade (Victory) Plan. This is intended to facilitate the efforts of the Puntland forces against Al-Shabaab and help to prevent a negative spillover from the conflict in Yemen. In its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council took note of the recommendation and requested the Secretary-General to

explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation. It also highlighted the criteria for providing support to the Somali National Army specified in resolution 2124 (2013), specifically that such exceptional support shall be provided only for joint Somali National Army operations with AMISOM and which are part of the overall strategic concept of AMISOM.

62. Since my letter of 2 July 2015, the work of the National Integration Commission has continued. Discussions are ongoing between the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland, as well as with the international community within the framework of the New Deal Compact, with the aim of conducting the integration process in Puntland in the first half of 2016.

63. All Puntland forces integrated into the Somali National Army will need to be provided with training in full compliance with the human rights due diligence policy as a condition of eligibility for United Nations support. While potential trainers have been identified, further assistance will be needed to financially and logistically support this training. Furthermore, while non-United Nations military trainers will also likely be needed to ensure other training requirements under the integration process, no entity that is both willing to carry out such training and is acceptable to the Puntland Government has yet been identified. Moreover, lessons learned from the provision of the current non-lethal support package to the Somali National Army have shown the importance of ensuring that those who receive the support package are paid regularly to allow the provision of support to have its intended effect. This lesson should be taken into account in the roll-out of the proposed support to the Puntland forces and in the ongoing provision of support authorized under resolution 2124 (2013).

64. I would like to emphasize that non-lethal support to Puntland must be provided in line with the following principles:

(a) Supporting the political vision of building a federal state: Integration of the Puntland forces into the Somali National Army must be completed in a manner that furthers the objective of developing a federal security architecture;

(b) Coherence and oversight: Support to the 3,000 Puntland forces must be carried out in a manner that supports overall civilian oversight and the command and control of the Somali National Army, including common salary scales and training curriculum;

(c) Conflict sensitivity: The integration process and the provision of support will be informed by the context, the conflict and risk assessments;

(d) Risk mitigation: Integration and the process for providing support will be designed and implemented to reduce risks;

(e) Sustainability: The support provided should include a capacity-building element that allows a gradual transition of logistical support tasks to Somali counterparts.

65. I have examined the concept and feasibility of the options available for entities to provide the non-lethal support package to the Puntland forces that are to be integrated into the Somali National Army. While UNSOA is currently providing the non-lethal support package to the Somali National Army troops operating alongside AMISOM in south central Somalia, gaps in the provision of this support were also identified in the review. In that regard and as outlined above, the gaps between the

capacity of UNSOA today and the demands of its current mandate require a focus on strengthening support to its core clients in their areas of operation.

66. Moreover, as support to the Somali security forces is a long-term endeavour, greater efficiency may be realized by working with another United Nations provider that is better placed to perform this task. Such an entity would also likely be better positioned to work with the Somali National Army to build its capacity in the medium term.

67. Coordination of the Puntland support package with the non-lethal package already provided by UNSOA to troops operating alongside AMISOM, as well as other support initiatives as required, will take place in the peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 Defence Working Group.

### **Observations and recommendations**

68. UNSOA has contributed positively to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, often pioneering innovative approaches to the provision of field support in a unique and non-permissive environment. It has also provided tangible evidence of success in the partnership among the United Nations, the African Union and Member States in sustaining African Union peace support operations. Investment in, and support to, this partnership should continue.

69. It is clear that despite the innovation and best efforts of UNSOA, the resources provided to the Office and its resultant capabilities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of its mandated tasks. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine offensive operations in any other theatre today that would involve 32,000 uniformed personnel but with a support element of less than 500 personnel. This support element is, in parallel, also required to support a highly mobile political effort.

70. In sum, UNSOA has been operating at the very edge of its capabilities, with a progressively widening gap between mandated tasks and its capacity to deliver. Going forward, AMISOM will require surge support to address gaps. UNSOM will also require specific and focused support to respond to demands to support the political process in Mogadishu and the regions, especially the interim regional capitals. Neither will be possible without a significant strengthening of UNSOA.

71. I therefore intend to strengthen UNSOA along the lines set out below and, in this, seek the support of the Security Council.

72. First, it is critical to consolidate and prioritize the efforts of UNSOA around the strategic objectives established for Somalia by the Security Council. This would entail focusing primarily on facilitating the political process in Somalia through support to UNSOM and AMISOM. I therefore intend to transfer the responsibility for the provision of mission support services to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group to another United Nations entity more suitably placed to provide such support.

73. Second, I intend to address administrative, coordination and structural gaps.

74. Administratively, current processes struggle to respond to the operational demands in Somalia. As noted in my report on the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations ([A/70/357-S/2015/682](#)), I am putting in place, by the end of 2015, standing administrative measures for start-up and crisis

situations, to go into effect for six months on a renewable basis upon the establishment of a peace operation or my certification of a crisis or emergency. Given that UNSOA has been in an almost constant state of expansion since its establishment, I will look closely at how these measures could potentially be applied in that context.

75. There is a need to strengthen decision-making frameworks between UNSOM and AMISOM, including at the senior leadership level with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia for AMISOM, to ensure that operational efforts are aligned with a common set of strategic priorities, linked to capabilities and taking into account the threat environment. I have asked my Special Representative to establish this framework with support from UNSOA and in consultation with the Department of Field Support.

76. Structural gaps also need to be addressed. In that regard, I propose that the Security Council rename UNSOA to clearly reflect its expanded mandate and endorse a strengthening of its leadership, including by appointing a Head at the Assistant Secretary-General level. This renamed entity would have a single and clear mandate focused on the provision of support to, but operationally separate from, its core clients, namely, UNSOM, AMISOM and the Somali National Army.

77. The renamed entity would have clear accountability mechanisms, through a compact, for the provision of support to each client and a reporting relationship with the Security Council through my Special Representative. This formal reporting would be complemented by informal and technical-level briefings that would be conducted by the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, as requested by the Council.

78. I also expect that the ongoing internal restructuring of UNSOA in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery models for peace operations will contribute to improving the effectiveness of mission support services.

79. Third, the overall capacity of UNSOA is simply inadequate. I therefore intend to present proposals to the General Assembly for a significant strengthening of the staffing complement of UNSOA, based on the findings of the civilian staffing review of UNSOA that is under way. In this context, it is important to note that the light footprint approach has been broadly successful and that UNSOA has been used as the support model for the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

80. In both of these subsequent missions, lessons were learned in the application of the light footprint approach, including the overall capacity required which, compared with UNSOA, is significantly higher. These lessons have informed the civilian staffing review. Any strengthening of UNSOA should be viewed through the lens of the application of lessons learned in other missions and the gaps identified in the specific context of Somalia.

81. The partnership with the African Union will be critical to our joint success in Somalia. I intend to strengthen the partnership and our support to the African Union, especially in the context of the generation of its enabling capacity and the AMISOM efficiency surge.

82. I intend to urgently finalize discussions on a new trilateral memorandum of understanding framework among the United Nations, the African Union and AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries. This will serve as a basis for jointly improving performance, including raising the visibility of and regularizing equipment levels within the maintenance and contingent-owned equipment reimbursement frameworks.

83. I also propose that the Security Council consider lifting the legacy restrictions around the provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services. I recommend that services be provided in line with United Nations practices and that troop-contributing countries that are willing and able to provide such services themselves be reimbursed directly in line with the existing United Nations self-sustainment reimbursement framework.

84. I further propose that this framework be extended to include the reimbursement of tentage for tactical deployments, in lieu of its provision by UNSOA and in line with normal United Nations practices and self-sustainment rates.

85. Clear roles and responsibilities for the delivery of sustainable logistical support within the framework of the joint responsibilities of AMISOM and UNSOA have been a critical and positive step. However, the inability to maintain the main supply routes open as the primary basis for the delivery of logistical support remains a concern. A situation where half of the forces outside Mogadishu are supported by air is not a sustainable option.

86. In parallel with the generation of enabling units by the African Union, I will proceed urgently with supporting the establishment of mission enabling units and progressively expanding that capacity to all sectors. Equipment for existing capacities on the ground has been funded by bilateral contributions supplemented from the United Nations logistical package. Additional equipment required to support the establishment of these units could be funded either through direct bilateral sources or through an expansion of the logistical package.

87. In addition, individual contingents will need to raise their equipment levels in order to undertake their own responsibilities to take supplies forward from AMISOM sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations. I call upon Member States to urgently support AMISOM troop-contributing countries in that regard.

88. In support of these efforts, I also recommend that the Security Council consider assigning a specific mandate for UNSOA to support the efforts of AMISOM in the coordination of support among bilateral partners, AMISOM and the United Nations.

89. On support to the Somali security forces, I remain of the view that the expansion of the Somali National Army support package to Puntland forces is critical to their efforts against Al-Shabaab and to help to prevent further conflict as a result of the conflict in Yemen.

90. Sustainability of the delivery of this support in the long run and infrastructure support to facilitate handover are key factors in determining the providers. I therefore recommend that support to the Somali National Army in Puntland be provided by a United Nations entity other than UNSOA and will continue to work towards identifying the best mechanism.

91. I also strongly support the establishment of a police support package as a fundamental means to deliver basic security services in newly recovered areas and to create an enabling environment for stabilization and the political process to succeed.

92. I will use existing UNSOA modalities on a cost-recovery basis for the Somali police forces for casualties sustained in the line of duty and in areas of operation where similar support is provided to AMISOM and the Somali National Army. This includes extending the in-theatre medical evacuation to the Somali National Police Force.

93. The provision of logistical support by the United Nations to the Somali security forces should, however, not be open-ended. It should be seen as an exceptional measure. It is essential that this assistance be coupled with a concerted effort to build the capacity of the Somali security forces to assume responsibility for their own logistics.

94. I therefore intend to work with international partners to support the Somali federal and regional institutions in this regard. I look forward to the support of Member States in providing the necessary technical and material expertise to these institutions.

95. I will pay particular attention to the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in the delivery of all support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces. In that regard, the steps outlined in the review will help to strengthen United Nations mechanisms and engagement with AMISOM and the Somali National Army. These include, in particular, strengthening the monitoring systems of the United Nations, with additional capacity, which will be reflected in the civilian staffing review.

96. The impact on the environment, in particular wastewater management, remains a core concern. I will establish a robust capacity to support UNSOA and propose that the Security Council give UNSOA a mandate to assist the African Union and AMISOM in the development of their own environmental policies and standards and to ensure subsequent compliance with them.

97. While recognizing that there have been no reports of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse in UNSOA or UNSOM, I nonetheless strongly support the establishment of a dedicated capacity for conduct and discipline in UNSOA to support UNSOA and UNSOM and to advise the African Union and AMISOM on the development and implementation of its zero-tolerance policy. This is especially important as the Organization's own policy and implementation mechanisms continue to evolve with the approval by the General Assembly of special measures to strengthen the United Nations response to sexual exploitation and abuse.

98. Many of the recommendations outlined above will take time to materialize on the ground. Although implementation must start now, we must also be cognizant that, in the short term, the capacity of UNSOA will continue to be overstretched. Joint prioritization and comprehensive approaches that bring together programmatic, security and logistical imperatives and constraints will therefore be required.

99. Mission support services provided by UNSOA are strategic enablers that provide the platform for supporting political progress in the country, through

specific support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the Somali National Army. As Somalia continues to make progress towards peace and stability, it is critical that the United Nations keep reviewing and adapting its posture and resources to a fast-evolving environment.

100. Strengthening and refocusing UNSOA is essential in this context. I look forward to the support of the Security Council for my recommendations and efforts as a means of strengthening the ability of the United Nations and the international community to secure the important gains achieved and allow continued progress in the political and stabilization processes in Somalia.

*(Signed)* **BAN** Ki-moon

---