



Security Council

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Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2167 (2014), the Security Council requested that I prepare, in close consultation with the African Union Commission and the European Union, and no later than 31 March 2015, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between the United Nations and relevant regional organizations in peacekeeping operations. Within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the assessment and recommendations included in the present report build on and complement my previous reports on cooperation with regional organizations, including, more recently, my reports on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security ([S/2011/805](#)) and on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations ([S/2014/560](#)) and my letter to the President of the Security Council on the transitions from the African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic ([S/2015/3](#)). They are also guided by the positions and areas of interest of the Council as outlined in resolution 2167 (2014) and in its presidential statements on cooperation with the African Union ([S/PRST/2014/27](#)) and the European Union ([S/PRST/2014/4](#)).

2. The scope of the present report covers primarily the partnership with regional organizations and arrangements in peacekeeping, rather than the whole spectrum of peace and security actions. It is focused largely on the partnerships with the African Union and the European Union, the two organizations that are explicitly mentioned in paragraph 28 of resolution 2167 (2014) and are currently the closest partners of the United Nations in respect of peacekeeping efforts. Other regional and subregional organizations and arrangements are mentioned in relevant areas, where they have engaged on peacekeeping issues and in peacekeeping operations.

II. Trends related to peacekeeping partnerships

3. The demand for peacekeeping has grown over the past decade. The bulk of the peacekeeping efforts are undertaken in Africa, with over 87 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers deployed on the continent. At the same time, peacekeeping is

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facing a shifting conflict dynamic, characterized by increasing regionalization and globalization, as well as, at times, the presence of unconventional threats, in particular from extremist groups operating side by side with criminal groups and parties to the conflict. Recently, a majority of peacekeepers have been operating in places where there is little peace to keep and where robust action is often required to implement mandates on the protection of civilians.

4. In that context, the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping alongside United Nations operations has become the norm rather than the exception. Nowhere is this fact more evident than in Africa, where the engagement of the African Union and subregional mechanisms, as well as the European Union, alongside United Nations operations, is present throughout all phases of the conflict. At the moment, there are nine United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent, six peace support operations led by the African Union and regional economic communities/ regional mechanisms, one hybrid United Nations-African Union operation, and nine European Union civilian missions and military operations. The models of such multilateral engagement are each time adapted to fit the specific circumstances of the crisis in question.

5. Over the years, those models have shaped a shared understanding of the comparative advantages of each organization and a desired division of labour among them. In the recent cases of Mali and the Central African Republic, the African Union took over the operations initiated by subregional actors, to be later rehatted as United Nations operations. In both cases, the United Nations and the European Union were engaged in supporting the deployment of the African Union-led operations. In Mali, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union has retained a political role with the establishment of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which has continued supporting the inter-Malian inclusive dialogue. In the Central African Republic, following the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the African Union, through MISAC, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have continued to play a key role in the ongoing transition and stabilization of the country. Also in both cases, the European Union has deployed its own, smaller and well-targeted common security and defence policy presences, alongside African Union or United Nations-led operations, with either a training and advisory mandate or a mandate that serves to bridge the gap between missions.

6. Those patterns, as well as other successful cases of cooperation, such as in Somalia, may provide a framework for a further rationalization of efforts in future cases. For example, the numerous cases of simultaneous United Nations, African Union and European Union engagements on the continent demonstrate that all three organizations can contribute necessary peacekeeping capacities and solutions to crises and post-conflict situations. In many cases, all three also play important roles in support of the political and mediation processes, along with other actors. Nevertheless, the potential for closer trilateral engagement and cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union has yet to be fully explored and exploited.

7. There is little question that United Nations partnerships with regional actors in peacekeeping have reached a considerable level of maturity and complexity in recent years. The proliferation of actors and models of engagement has presented both a challenge, in respect of avoiding a fragmentation of efforts, duplication or competition, and an opportunity, in respect of mobilizing as efficiently as possible the collective leverage and comparative advantages of different organizations in attaining shared peace and security objectives. The sections below provide a review of the institutional mechanisms and initiatives in place, which are aimed at maximizing that opportunity, as well as a review of the ways in which the mechanisms have worked in practice in various countries and thematic areas.

III. Coordination and consultation mechanisms

Strategic-level mechanisms

8. Effective and efficient partnerships in peacekeeping depend on the alignment of strategic and political objectives between different peacekeeping actors, from the early planning and pre-mandate stages of their operations to their transition or exit. This in turn is dependent on effective cooperation between their decision-making organs. In some challenging cases, it may be difficult to achieve a clear strategic direction within one organization, let alone among a number of organizations with different memberships and perspectives, and whose relationships are only loosely defined, in the overall context of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for peace and security.

The United Nations and the African Union

9. The entry into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in December 2003 substantially strengthened the powers of the African Union in matters of conflict prevention and resolution. Since then, the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms have been increasingly taking initiatives on peace and security, and their role in those areas has grown, both qualitatively and quantitatively. As a result, the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has evolved from a capacity-building model to a partnership based on strategic convergence.

10. Article 17 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. In practice, since 2007 the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union have established closer links, including through the holding of annual joint consultative meetings. Both organs have underlined their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, through enhanced information-sharing, synergies in planning and monitoring, joint assessments and strategies to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The practical implementation of those commitments, however, has materialized slowly.

11. The consultative meetings have yet to lead to more aligned political decisions on specific issues between the two organizations, whose processes for decision-making differ significantly. The challenge of reaching institutional synchronization and a clear understanding on the level of consultation required between the two

bodies has sometimes led to incoherent political responses. That challenge has been compounded by the lack of a clear division of labour between the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms and the African Union with regard to peace and security issues in Africa. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on the lessons learned exercise on transitions (S/2015/3), I underscored the importance of political coherence and the harmonization of policy and strategies at the highest levels.

12. In the Central African Republic, the strategic convergence among the partners involved was facilitated to a large extent by the common vision that was provided by the Security Council at an early stage and in several resolutions, in which the Secretariat was requested to undertake, in consultation with the African Union and other regional partners, contingency planning for the transformation of the African Union peace operation into a United Nations peacekeeping mission. By contrast, in Mali, divisions among Member States and the relevant organs at the international, regional and subregional levels, and within the Secretariat, on the appropriate way forward weakened the ability of the peacekeeping partners to jointly establish a clear and commonly acceptable road map for the resolution of the crisis.

13. A harmonized strategic approach, including a shared strategic vision of the objectives for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission from the outset, is also critical in the case of a hybrid mission such as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Whereas views regarding the desirability of the hybrid models may differ, it is clear that they should be anchored in close formal and informal consultations between the United Nations and the African Union at the inception and throughout the life of such missions. When the strategic objectives and visions of the two organizations on the resolution of the conflict or on the required engagement with the parties start to differ, a hybrid mission such as UNAMID loses its political leverage on the parties and its ability to implement its mandate.

14. The lessons learned exercise on the transitions in the Central African Republic and in Mali has demonstrated that the African elected members of the Security Council (the African three) can play a pivotal role in enhancing coordination and synergy between the two Councils. In February 2014, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union formally endorsed the establishment of that mechanism in New York and the Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations as the secretariat of the mechanism. The mechanism can help to ensure that the voices of the African Union and of relevant regional economic communities are heard in the debates and decisions of the Security Council and therefore support the creation of a unified vision among the Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and relevant regional economic communities.

15. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission have deepened their partnership. The United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security has proved to be an important instrument in fostering greater coherence, allowing the Secretariat and the Commission to coordinate immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest and identify areas for concerted action.

16. The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2010 has also been instrumental in advancing the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations. It has been carrying out a dual role of working with the African Union in supporting the planning and management of current operations and the development of policies, while supporting the development of institutional

capacities in the service of the partnership, with a particular focus on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

17. At the political level, close and consistent consultation mechanisms between the United Nations and regional actors are also essential in achieving greater strategic and political convergence, including in support of peacekeeping mandates. The Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, co-chaired by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, and comprising the European Union and the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, co-chaired by the African Union and the Congo, have been effective in ensuring coordination among stakeholders in support of the peace process in those countries. They have also helped to create an enabling environment for the implementation of the mandates of MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

18. Other political and mediation arrangements being carried out in conjunction with United Nations peacekeeping activities include the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, which leads the engagement and mediation efforts on the Sudan and between the Sudan and South Sudan, and is supported by the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur. The teams jointly strategize, undertake joint missions and, when necessary, jointly address the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. Similarly, in South Sudan, my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and my Special Representative for South Sudan work in close consultation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the mediation process and engage the African Union Commission senior leadership and Member States in support of the Authority on a regular basis.

The United Nations and the European Union

19. Strategic-level communication and coordination between the United Nations and the European Union on peacekeeping and crisis management is carried out in various formats. The Security Council holds biannual informal meetings with the Political and Security Committee of the European Union, at which peacekeeping and other peace and security issues are discussed. These serve as important forums for the exchange of information, but usually fall short of establishing a convergence of views on appropriate action in particular peacekeeping contexts. With regard to mandates, when the Common Security and Defence Policy operations of the European Union deploy in United Nations peacekeeping contexts, coordination usually takes place through members of the Security Council. The members help to ensure that such missions are referred to in Security Council resolutions and are complementary to the broader mandates of peacekeeping operations, whether led by the United Nations or by the African Union.

20. A number of other high-level United Nations-European Union strategic discussions are held, which involve the Secretariat and complement efforts in this regard, including the regular briefings by the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Security Council and briefings by senior United Nations officials to the Political and Security Committee in Brussels and the biannual United Nations-European Union Steering Committee on Crisis Management, co-chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping and the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service. The latter allows for

more detailed discussions on peacekeeping issues while providing opportunities for strategic alignment on such issues as the division of labour, political messaging and exit strategies. Strategic-level communication is further facilitated by the European Union delegation to the United Nations in New York and the establishment, in 2011, of the United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels.

21. Three important documents have also continued to provide a cross-cutting strategic framework for the relationship with the European Union in peacekeeping and crisis management: the 2003 Joint Declaration on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; the 2007 joint statement on United Nations-European Union Cooperation in Crisis Management; and the plan of action to enhance European Union Common Security and Defence Policy support to United Nations peacekeeping (European Union plan of action), adopted by the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in 2012. The latter identified the priorities for United Nations-European Union cooperation in peacekeeping that had been pursued jointly by the two organizations over the past two years, including seeking enhanced uniformed contributions by European Union member States; coordination during planning; cooperation in respect of policy and guidance; and lessons learned and training. Discussions are under way on the adoption of a follow-up framework on cooperation, based on the previous framework, but renewing the commitment and re-establishing related priorities, in line with more recent experiences.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

22. Besides the African Union, subregional organizations in Africa and the European Union, there have been few cases in recent years in which strategic coordination has taken place in the context of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. A notable example is the Syrian Arab Republic, where, following the escalation of the crisis, the United Nations cooperated with the League of Arab States (LAS), primarily at the political and mediation levels, leading up to the deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS). In particular, in February 2012 agreement was reached on a joint diplomatic effort between LAS and the United Nations, with the appointment of the first Joint United Nations-League of Arab States Special Envoy to Syria. The efforts of the Joint Special Envoy led to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2042 (2012), which sets out the six-point plan. The plan provided the basis for the deployment of UNSMIS, with the aim of observing and reporting on the cessation of the violence. With conflict escalating across the country, however, the UNSMIS mandate ended in July 2012, following the fate of an earlier mission comprising 67 LAS monitors.

Operational-level mechanisms

23. Beyond strategic-level discussions, operational coordination is crucial to building the common understanding that contributes to strategic-level decision-making and to ensuring the effective and coherent implementation of mandates on the ground. It involves a number of actors on all sides, including the teams producing and harmonizing analysis, and planning or backstopping the operations once deployed; and the mechanisms through which coherence is achieved not only

between the missions operating in parallel or engaged in rehatting, but also with other entities on the ground.

The United Nations and the African Union

24. To date, the United Nations and the African Union have worked together at the operational level on the ground in five peacekeeping contexts, namely, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Darfur, the Sudan. Cooperation in those countries/areas has largely shaped the peacekeeping partnership between the two organizations at the operational level. Within that partnership, the model most used has been that of sequential deployment, transitioning from an African Union-led operation to a United Nations operation. In such cases, operational cooperation takes place through the provision of support to the African Union during the planning phases of its operations, as well as during their deployment, and later on through close cooperation to ensure an efficient transition to and rehatting as a United Nations operation.

25. Somalia represents a successful example of joint planning, especially in view of the Security Council position on the potential transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time. Collaboration in the field on the 2012 strategic concept for AMISOM succeeded in revitalizing the African Union-United Nations strategic partnership and led to an increase in the AMISOM troop level endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. The 2013 joint African Union-United Nations assessment mission reinforced that collaboration through the establishment of shared strategic objectives and benchmarks. The outcome of the mission was the development of three options for the way forward, one of which was endorsed by both Councils. The broad consultations and inclusion of key partners paved the way for agreement and swift implementation of the joint recommendations. A second joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM and the Somalia National Security Forces is scheduled to take place in April 2015.

26. Two recent examples of sequential African Union-United Nations deployments are AFISMA in 2012, followed by MINUSMA in 2013; and MISCA in 2013, followed by MINUSCA in 2014. In the latter case, the United Nations worked from the outset to support the transition of authority from the ECCAS-led Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) to MISCA, and participated in the African Union-led assessment missions, as early as in April 2013. The United Nations provided technical and expert advice on the planning and deployment of MISCA, the strengthening of MISCA command and control and the building of its administrative infrastructure and training capacity. Following the adoption of resolution 2149 (2014), the United Nations and the African Union developed a transition plan, operationalized by a team in coordination with MISCA and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), thus contributing to a smoother transition. For example, the establishment of a joint MISCA-MINUSCA coordination forum on the protection of civilians in Bangui as part of transition planning efforts helped to avoid a vacuum in the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate.

27. Close operational cooperation should also be a key element in the force and police generation processes in the case of sequential deployments. In respect of both

the Central African Republic and Mali, although clarity on United Nations requirements for rehatting was established at an early stage, following the decisions for the transition, the capabilities of the AFISMA and MISCA troops inherited by the successor United Nations missions — in terms of equipment and self-sustainment, as well as in terms of training — did not match relevant United Nations standards. While lower standards are sometimes inherent in the rapid deployment of enforcement operations in Africa, rehatting can be more successful through United Nations-African Union collaboration in respect of facilitating the fulfilment of United Nations standards during the transition of uniformed personnel to African Union missions that are expected to be rehatted.

28. The United Nations also continues to coordinate with the African Union in providing support to enhance the African Union Regional Task Force, a component of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. At the request of the African Union Commission, the United Nations sent a multidisciplinary team of experts to Yaoundé in February 2015 to support the development of the strategic concept of operations towards the operationalization of the multinational joint task force initiative against Boko Haram. The Force Intervention Brigade in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) represents another creative model of operational collaboration between the two organizations, with the United Nations following up on what began as a regional initiative to resolve the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and established the Force Intervention Brigade within MONUSCO in 2013.

The United Nations and the European Union

29. Operational cooperation with the European Union in different peacekeeping settings, including, most recently, the Central African Republic, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, has usually been based on a clear division of labour, aimed at ensuring the most efficient use of the capacities and resources of each organization. In the start-up planning phases, in which coordination is crucial to ensuring complementarity and avoiding duplication, or seamless transitions logistically and operationally, recent examples have demonstrated the progress made in the United Nations partnership with the European Union over the past few years. Starting in Mali and later in the Central African Republic, operational planning for MINUSMA, the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM) and the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) took place in a consultative manner with the European Union. The United Nations-European Union guidelines for coordination during the planning for respective operations, envisaged in the European Union plan of action, were tested in Mali for EUCAP Sahel Mali as well as to facilitate a successful transfer of security tasks from the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) to MINUSCA and the deployment of the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic earlier in March in the Central African Republic. Further to those guidelines, the United Nations and the European Union plan to look jointly at the lessons learned in the transition and handover from the European Union operation to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and develop, as necessary, joint guidelines for similar transitions in the future. The experience of the handover of the European Union Ucatex camp to

MINUSCA should also be positively acknowledged, and lessons from that exercise should be drawn for potential future cases in which the sharing of resources between the two organizations are needed.

30. Cooperation and coordination on the ground between United Nations and European Union missions and operations deployed in parallel have been efficient and regular in most country scenarios. Coordination mechanisms that have worked in different country settings include the establishment of liaison officers on the ground, co-location, arrangements for the exchange of classified information, and the participation of European Union representatives in coordinating structures led by the United Nations, in particular rule of law and security sector reform-related mechanisms that involve European Union civilian missions. In order to be effective, such mechanisms should always be backed by strong political will to engage in sharing and partnerships. In Kosovo,¹ United Nations-European Union cooperation should be further strengthened to ensure a more coordinated international engagement as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) undergoes further restructuring.

31. Finally, in the light of the European Union delegation's prominent role in providing support for the justice sector and other institutions in post-crisis countries, close cooperation with the wider United Nations family in jointly setting related priorities has been crucial to the implementation of coherent institution-building strategies. For example, a close partnership has been developed between MINUSMA and the European Union delegation in Mali, which provided equipment and supported the refurbishment of a court in Timbuktu. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seven prosecution support cells have been established by MONUSCO with European Union funding to assist national authorities in the prosecution of serious crimes.

32. With regard to exit strategies, there has been less of a culture of coordination between the two organizations, although both are committed to improving their engagement during the end phases of their respective missions. Unless there is a clear understanding of a transition from one organization to the other, the two organizations have been more inclined to conduct their own strategic reviews and decide on their drawdown and follow-on arrangements on the basis of limited consultation with their partners. For example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two organizations could have consulted more closely and at earlier stages in planning their respective reviews and transitions, although the level of engagement improved at the later stages of the process.

The United Nations and other regional partners

33. Kosovo, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), represents an important example of United Nations operational coordination with other regional actors, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as its institution-building pillar, an arrangement that has allowed for close and constructive operational engagement throughout the years.

¹ References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The NATO International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR), deployed as the international security presence alongside UNMIK, maintains some 5,000 troops on the ground and performs the role of the third emergency responder, after the Kosovo Police and EULEX. UNMIK and KFOR have enjoyed close cooperation, at the military liaison and head-of-mission levels, in the implementation of their respective mandates and on all operational issues, including in ensuring a stable environment in northern Kosovo and the protection of religious heritage sites.

IV. Capabilities and capacity-building support

34. The delivery of peacekeeping in partnership with regional actors should benefit from stronger partnership with regard to capability development. While major actors in the field of peacekeeping have been working separately on the development of their own capabilities, some synergies have been established on a bilateral basis. These are focused on the sharing of expertise between organizations, and the United Nations has been both a recipient and a provider of such expertise and assistance. A common priority has been and should continue to be to ensure that the capabilities developed can be used to facilitate the rapid response of the international community to unfolding crises.

The United Nations and the African Union

35. As the African Union takes up more responsibilities in peace operations, it has been faced with the challenges of acquiring the requisite capacity to plan, deploy and sustain such operations. While the African Union has been willing to deploy rapidly and even engage in combat operations despite the risk of casualties, it has not always been able to provide troops and police with the required training and capabilities in line with United Nations standards.

36. The African Union has been working towards establishing and operationalizing the African Standby Force (ASF) and, more recently, has begun developing the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The United Nations, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, is working closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms to support those efforts, accelerate the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and improve the conceptualization, planning and management of African-led peace operations. Specifically, the Office has continued to support the African Union in the development and review of key policy and guiding documents, such as the doctrine issued by the African Union Peace Support Operations Division. The United Nations also continues to assist the African Union in the development of the police and rule of law elements of ASF as well as in the implementation of the ASF road map III, including the AMANI Africa II training cycle activities.

37. Many of the long-standing challenges related to the capacity of the African Union to deploy and manage peace support operations in extremely difficult conditions and at short notice have yet to be overcome. However, both ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises have the potential to become effective rapid-response tools for the African Union and, by extension, for the United Nations. Once fully operational, those forces could provide a critical start-up capacity for responding to African crises as bridging mechanisms, as well as for

providing enforcement action, if required. Alternatively, they could complement a United Nations peacekeeping operation when in extremis support is needed.

38. Beyond supporting the operationalization of ASF and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, the United Nations is engaged in building the capacities of the African Union and its member States in a number of key thematic areas related to peacekeeping. In particular, the United Nations Mine Action Service has supported the African Union in preparing a mine action and explosive remnants of war strategic framework for 2014-2017, aimed at enhancing the capacities of African Union member States and operations to deal with explosive threats. The United Nations and other partners, such as the World Bank, have also provided significant support to enhance the capacities of the African Union in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, human rights and child protection, including through secondment arrangements, institution-building programmes and the provision of technical assistance to civilian capacities in the African Union operations.

The United Nations and the European Union

39. Discussions with the European Union on capability development have been held in the context of United Nations efforts to expand its base of troop-contributing/police-contributing countries with additional European contributions, and in line with the relevant provisions of the European Union plan of action. States members of the European Union have indicated that contributions to United Nations peacekeeping should be discussed and determined on a bilateral basis, rather than through European Union-coordinated mechanisms. At the same time, the potential to “bundle” various European Union member State contributions into one package, potentially also combined with contributions from non-European Union members, in order to fill specific gaps in United Nations peacekeeping missions should not be underestimated. The European External Action Service has shown willingness to explore this issue further and to share capabilities with the Secretariat in respect of its expertise in specific areas, such as intelligence and rapid response.

40. With regard to rapid response, and the goal of the United Nations to deploy its operations more rapidly, the two organizations have been sharing experiences and information on their respective doctrine development. Discussions have been taking place on the possibility of deploying a European Union “battlegroup” as an autonomous rapid response force in support of or as a bridge to United Nations operations, including in specific country contexts. The battlegroup has yet to be deployed despite the potential offered by such a standing and rapidly deployable capacity. Discussions are expected to continue as European Union member States reinforce their efforts to ensure that this valuable tool is used, and I encourage this process.

41. The European Union has also been committed to building the African capacity for peacekeeping and crisis prevention. Beyond the financial support provided to African Union operations, the funds in the European Union African Peace Facility have been used for capacity-building actions focused on the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The 2014-2016 action programme of the African Peace Facility realigned the support provided by the Facility to the African Peace and Security Architecture in order to ensure more targeted support, including effective assistance to the upcoming AMANI Africa II training cycle

activities, and support for activities dealing with strategic lift, communications and logistics. In addition, the European Union is preparing to launch a new “train and equip initiative” that will complement its training activities on the continent. In the light of the commitment of both the European Union and the United Nations to support African capacity, that is an area where increased triangular cooperation could be pursued.

The United Nations and other regional organizations and arrangements

42. NATO capabilities and expertise in dealing with asymmetric threats, in particular in Afghanistan, have resulted in new fields of United Nations-NATO cooperation. The United Nations can benefit from NATO expertise in specific areas and from its large network of training centres and centres of excellence, which could be used to support the United Nations in those areas. In particular, cooperation has been ongoing in respect of counter-improvised explosive device issues, including through an awareness-raising course for United Nations staff conducted by the centre of excellence in Madrid. Cooperation in 2015 will be focused on engagement with the centres of excellence on counter-improvised explosive device issues, military engineering and explosive ordnance disposal, on participation in joint exercises and on the conduct of a seminar on strategic and operational theory and practice regarding counter-improvised explosive device efforts.

43. The United Nations is willing to contribute to the efforts of other regional organizations to build up regional peacekeeping capacities. A concrete example of such cooperation is with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has been supported by the United Nations in the development of expertise and capabilities in peacekeeping over the past two years. Following a memorandum of understanding concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the CSTO secretariat on 28 September 2012, on strengthening cooperation between the two organizations, the United Nations organized briefings and shared material on United Nations peacekeeping policies and standards with CSTO officials engaged in the development of its 4,000-strong standby force. Most recently, Malaysia’s announcement of the potential plans of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to establish a regional peacekeeping force could pave the way for increased cooperation with the Department, which is interested in supporting the endeavour.

V. Financing for peacekeeping

44. While regional organizations have the responsibility to secure their own resources, the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for operations launched by a regional organization operating under a United Nations mandate remains a critical issue, particularly in cases of transition to a United Nations operation. In particular, the continued absence of predictable and sustainable funding has led to a number of limitations for the peace operations deployed by the African Union, which in turn have an impact on the overall ability of the international community to effectively respond to crises in Africa. The Peace Fund established by the African Union to support its peace support operations is inadequate to support the current demands of African Union peacekeeping. There are efforts under way to increase the allocation of African Union-assessed funding to its peace and security efforts; the January 2015 African Union Summit decided to allocate 25 per cent of the assessed contributions of African Union member States to

peace operations. In the meantime, the African Union has been largely dependent on donor funding or, as in the case of Somalia, on United Nations-assessed contributions to launch and sustain its operations.

45. The largest source of external funding is the European Union African Peace Facility. Established in 2004, the Facility is the key instrument for facilitating the implementation of joint African Union-European Union priorities on peace and security, with a funding envelope of 750 million euros for the period 2014-2017, the vast majority of which is dedicated to supporting African-led peace operations. This financial support for African Union-led missions has been a predictable source of funding that has proved crucial to the African Union in planning and carrying out its operations. China and the United States of America are developing similar funding mechanisms to support the African Union, in addition to a range of smaller bilateral arrangements. African Union peace operations are also supported by direct bilateral support provided to their troop-contributing/police-contributing countries, which is particularly valuable in assisting the latter with improving their lethal equipment capabilities.

46. The United Nations has also developed various models to support African Union operations, including a mix of assessed funding and voluntary contributions, or voluntary contributions prior to transfer of authority to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The largest and most developed funding model today is in Somalia, where the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) manages the disbursement of funds from the United Nations-assessed budget to provide logistical support to AMISOM. That model is complemented by a United Nations-managed trust fund, in accordance with resolution 1863 (2009). That logistical support package of assessed funding has been in place since 2009, with the provision of services and equipment necessitating the utilization of voluntary contributions to meet shortfalls. Following the adoption of resolution 2036 (2012), the shortfalls were also covered by assessed funding, leading to a significant decline in trust fund activity. The Security Council adopted resolution 2124 (2013), by which it created an additional trust fund for the provision of United Nations non-lethal logistical support to AMISOM and approximately 11,000 Somali National Army troops participating in joint operations, including for medical evacuation. That support has been complemented by substantial financial assistance from the European Union in respect of paying AMISOM troop, police and civilian allowances and salaries directly through the Facility. As such, the Somalia experience represents a successful model of United Nations-African Union-European Union collaboration in this area.

47. Although the United Nations trust fund model to support African Union peace operations was also utilized in the Central African Republic and Mali, it encountered numerous challenges. Discussions to improve its use are under way, specifically in identifying ways to improve allocation and disbursement to the troop-contributing countries based on their priorities. The United Nations Trust Fund for Support to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali was established pursuant to resolution 2085 (2012). Contributions amounting to approximately \$44 million were received, of which approximately \$38 million in contributions were not earmarked, with the original intention to provide a mission support package and equipment to the various uniformed AFISMA components. Equipment worth approximately \$12 million was deployed to Mali from the United Nations strategic deployment stocks. With the transfer of authority, options for providing support became limited given the United

Nations obligation to support troop-contributing/police-contributing countries through assessed funding. On that basis, donors determined their preferences for the utilization of remaining balances, with the majority in support of counter-improvised explosive device efforts. Similarly, the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Mission in the Central African Republic was established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013). Contributions amounting to approximately \$5 million have been received, to be used to provide strategic communications to MISCA prior to the transfer of authority, and catering and kitchen equipment to the current troop-contributing countries of MINUSCA.

48. As I highlighted in my recent letter to the President of the Council ([S/2015/3](#)), the experiences in the Central African Republic and Mali have confirmed that no funding or support modality is sufficient on its own. It thus appears that there is a need to mobilize a broad range of modalities in most cases, including a combination of voluntary, assessed and bilateral modalities, as appropriate. In that regard, I have called for a lessons learned exercise, to be jointly undertaken with the African Union, which will be aimed at reviewing and providing an assessment of the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council.

VI. Cooperation in policy development and training

49. Beyond capability development and rapid deployment, the United Nations has also increased its cooperation with regional organizations in respect of policy development in a number of key thematic areas. This has yet to lead to full harmonization of predeployment training standards, which is crucial to ensuring quick and effective rehatting processes, in cases of transition from one organization to another. It should be noted that cooperation in policy development does not necessarily translate into similar results and levels of implementation, as the latter also depends on the institutional culture, mechanisms and capacities of each organization.

Protection of civilians

50. In recent years, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has worked with regional organizations on the development of guidance and conceptual frameworks for the protection of civilians. The Department was closely involved in the recent development of guidance on the issue for European Union military operations, for example. The African Union and the Department also engaged in close consultations regarding the development of guidance on the protection of civilians in the African Union context, but the guidance was never finalized. While consultations between the Department and the African Union endeavoured to ensure consistency between the concepts of the United Nations and the African Union in respect of the protection of civilians, it has become clear that one concept may not be sufficient, given that African Union and United Nations operations are often deployed in different operating environments. In Somalia, for example, AMISOM must focus on avoiding civilian casualties in the context of offensive operations, rather than proactively mitigating threats to vulnerable civilian populations. At the same time, African Union missions sometimes receive protection of civilians mandates that are similar to those of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as in the case of the Central African Republic. In

such situations, a consistent approach on the protection of civilians greatly enhances the collective efforts and makes transitioning from one organization to the other easier for troops, police and civilian personnel. Given the likelihood of the deployment of African Union and United Nations operations, often sequentially, into situations in which civilian lives are at risk, greater work on formulating and, where possible, aligning the concepts would be a step in the right direction.

Women and peace and security

51. The United Nations Office to the African Union works with the African Union Commission on issues related to gender mainstreaming and women and peace and security, including in the development of policies and guidelines and in the conceptualization and planning of African Union-led operations. Collaboration on the agenda regarding women and peace and security is also well established with NATO. The two organizations have prioritized the development of common messaging and terminology on gender and conflict-related sexual violence in order to promote a harmonized approach to operationalizing the principles regarding women and peace and security in respective operations.

Police

52. The Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, promulgated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, defines the core functions of United Nations police and the fundamental principles guiding its activities. It was developed with the assistance of key regional organizations such as the African Union, the European Union and OSCE. The overarching policy is being cascaded through a hierarchy of thematic guidelines, manuals, standard operating procedures and training materials on specific sub-areas as identified within the four core functions. The guidance materials are being developed by the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, the European Union and other key regional and professional organizations, and are intended for use by any organization or Member State deploying police to serve in complex, multidimensional international peace operations.

Security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

53. Since 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union Commission have enhanced their partnership on security sector reform, most recently in close collaboration with the European Union, the United Nations Office to the African Union, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the African Security Sector Network. The partnership has resulted in several key achievements, including the adoption of the first continental policy framework on security sector reform and the design and implementation of the \$2.4 million support programme on security sector reform, which has facilitated the development of related operational guidance. The policy framework is now actively being disseminated to African Union member States and regional economic communities, including through training sessions and the production of guidance documents on, for example, how to

incorporate the provisions of the policy into domestic legislation. With regard to doctrinal development in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the African Union, while subscribing to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, is developing complementary Africa-specific guidelines, with five already in place and an additional four planned for 2015.

Training

54. In the area of training, the United Nations continues to collaborate with the African Union in the assessment of the immediate training needs for its past and ongoing missions, especially in Mali and Somalia. The United Nations has been invited by the African Union to participate in the development and review of a peace operations training curriculum prepared by the African Union in partnership with the African Peace Support Trainers Association, as well as the planning and delivery of relevant training. Another area of significant cooperation relates to the rehatting of troops to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations. Receiving appropriate predeployment training on the protection of civilians, including women and children, is a predeployment requirement for United Nations missions. The Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support supported the training of AFISMA troops in connection with their rehatting under MINUSMA in July 2013. During July and August 2014, similar rehatting training was conducted for troops entering MINUSCA. In both cases, personnel were trained on the mission mandate and background; military and police concepts of operations; rules of engagement; the United Nations code of conduct for peacekeepers; the zero tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse; human rights; international humanitarian law; the protection of civilians; conflict-related sexual violence; child protection; and support for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations will seek to strengthen its training support capacity for the African Union.

55. Overall, the potential for training cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, NATO, the European Union and other organizations should continue to be explored in cases where organizations have training capabilities and capacity applicable to United Nations peacekeeping efforts and where the respective training architectures can be aligned. Examples of such cooperation might include the sharing of experience or expertise, the development of training methodology, standards and tools for training delivery, evaluation and certification, and the design and management of e-learning or simulations and other training exercises.

VII. Observations

56. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations showed great vision in foreseeing a global, collective security architecture with the United Nations at its centre and a clear role for regional arrangements. As shown in the present report, the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in respect of peacekeeping activity has never been stronger, particularly in Africa. It continues to deepen and evolve, with the United Nations, the African Union, the regional economic communities and the European Union working side by side, and increasingly hand in hand, in multiple countries and regions.

57. We have thus entered an era of “partnership peacekeeping”, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm — and an essential component of each organization. Rather than one organization exiting and handing off its mandates/responsibilities to another, the respective roles of the organizations continuously evolve to meet new requirements and complement the changing roles being played by the others. This is a paradigm shift that is not the result of happenstance, but reflects the invaluable contribution that each organization can make, whether in the political, security, human rights, development or humanitarian sphere, during each period of the overall response. It also reflects the clear recognition that no single organization can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its own, whether at the subregional, regional or global level. Responding to those challenges has increasingly been and must be a joint endeavour. At the same time, it is important that the endeavour truly be the full sum of all its parts, namely, that each organization play a mutually supportive role with the others to advance the common goal of peace.

58. In order to continue to make progress in that regard, there is a need to further strengthen the formal and informal mechanisms of engagement at the strategic level. It is my hope that the Security Council will consider adopting a clearer methodology for consultation with its counterparts at the regional and subregional levels, particularly with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This would allow for greater political coherence, especially in determining the role of each organization in response to crises. Although it is unrealistic to expect organizations to always agree on the best responses, strengthening the channels and practices of consultation would facilitate more rapid decision-making and an optimal use of resources, not least by reducing overlap and transaction costs. I trust that the other members of the Security Council will fully support the pivotal role that the African three can play in enhancing coherence between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, including during the drafting of relevant resolutions.

59. There is a need for the United Nations and regional actors to cooperate as closely as possible on the planning of their respective operations as their roles adapt to each new phase of the overall response to a crisis. The present report shows the significant advances that have been made in this area as well, notably in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia. Planning together and early for transitions between different missions is particularly important. Important lessons have been learned from the recent transitions of operations from the African Union to the United Nations in the Central African Republic and Mali, which should be applied to future transitions. The transition from EUFOR RCA to MINUSCA was exemplary and reflected substantial improvement compared with other transitions of operations from the European Union to the United Nations. Moving forward, it is important to continue to capture lessons together and ensure that each organization incorporates them into its guidance.

60. In my recent letter to the President of the Security Council on lessons learned on the transitions from African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and Mali ([S/2015/3](#)), I offered a number of important recommendations that are relevant in the context of the present report. I reiterate my call for their full implementation, in particular the joint lessons learned exercise on the various mechanisms for the financing of African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council. I intend to

present the recommendations of those exercises in my report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, to be issued in 2016. I strongly believe that a shared understanding of the options for, and limitations to, the provision of support to African Union peace operations will not only strengthen the operational partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, but also inform the assumptions on which relevant decisions are made and contribute to the management of expectations.

61. Recent transitions have pointed to the need for the gradual harmonization of policies and standards between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements. Efforts in the future should be geared towards closing the gap between United Nations and African Union predeployment standards and training in key areas, in order to facilitate future rehatting processes. There is also a need to strengthen the understanding between the United Nations and its partners on what certain mandates mean in practice, first and foremost those related to the protection of civilians, which are central to contemporary peacekeeping. The work of all organizations in this area would benefit from more systematic coordination on guidance, training and the sharing of lessons learned.

62. The new paradigm of “partnership peacekeeping” also highlights the need to broaden the understanding of partnerships beyond the bilateral relationships forged between the United Nations and individual regional organizations, or between regional organizations. The most obvious example is the simultaneous engagement of the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union in Africa. In many contexts, as made evident in the present report, this has become a de facto trilateral partnership. We must explore how better to exploit the great potential that that trilateral partnership can offer.

63. In a similar vein, the response mechanisms and capabilities available to each organization should not be looked at in isolation from each other. Instead, we should see how they can be combined most effectively and used more predictably, in particular in order to respond rapidly to acute crises, when thousands of lives are at risk. In that regard, I welcome the efforts of the African Union to fully operationalize ASF, a goal that will continue to be supported by the United Nations, as well as the continued discussions of the European Union on the operationalization of the European Union battlegroup. Given the magnitude of the peace and security challenges that the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union face together, it is imperative that they consider how those capacities can best complement each other to achieve the collective goal of mounting the most effective overall response to crises.

64. I also welcome the efforts and initiatives of other regional organizations and arrangements to strengthen their nascent peacekeeping capacities or develop new ones. The United Nations remains open to supporting such initiatives, in line with United Nations policies and standards, so that other regional organizations can eventually assume a greater role and further enrich today’s peacekeeping partnership.

65. Finally, I would like to thank the African Union Commission and the European Union for their collaboration in preparing the present report, and all the regional organizations and arrangements partnering with the United Nations in the quest for peace.