



# Security Council

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## Special report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

### I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2148 (2014), the Security Council endorsed the findings of the strategic review presented in my special report dated 25 February 2014 (S/2014/138). The review identified three strategic priorities for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID):

(a) Mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, while taking into account ongoing transformation at the national level;

(b) The protection of civilians, the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel;

(c) The provision of support, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, to the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes.

2. The review also identified the three main challenges that were impeding the effective discharge of the mission's mandate, namely:

(a) The cooperation and partnership of the Government in mandate implementation;

(b) Major shortfalls in several troop- and police-contingent capabilities;

(c) The need for improved coordination and integration structures within the mission and between the mission and the United Nations country team.

3. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2173 (2014), by which the Council requested me, in close cooperation with the African Union, to conduct an analysis of the implementation of the review of UNAMID, including specific achievements reached under the revised strategic priorities, progress in addressing the challenges facing the mission, as identified by the review, any significant developments in the situation in Darfur and their impact on the mission's mandate and tasks, and a road map to transfer to the United Nations country team those tasks where it had a comparative advantage, taking into account the contributions of donors and other relevant actors. In addition, the present report provides recommendations on the future mandate, composition,



configuration and exit strategy of UNAMID and on the mission's relationship with other United Nations actors in Darfur and the Sudan.

## **II. Main achievements in relation to the three strategic priorities**

### **A. Inclusive peace process**

4. Efforts towards an inclusive peace process included the continued high-level engagement of the African Union and the United Nations Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur with the parties towards direct negotiations and the facilitation role of UNAMID in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

#### **High-level mediation**

5. The Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator focused on bringing the Government and the non-signatory armed groups to direct negotiations, their persistent divergence of views notwithstanding. The armed groups continued to press for a comprehensive national process to address the political challenges in the Sudan and to insist on entering into direct talks as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. For its part, the Government insisted on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the exclusive framework for the talks with the Darfur armed movements and rejected negotiating with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front jointly. During the first half of 2014, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator engaged with the parties separately, urging the non-signatory movements to join the peace process on the basis of the Doha Document and without preconditions and the Government to create an environment conducive to the resolution of the conflict.

6. The discussions were held in the context of the announcement on 27 January 2014 by the President of the Sudan, Omer Hassan A. Al-Bashir, of an all-inclusive national dialogue that would focus on political and economic reform and democratization. On 8 August 2014, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the National Umma Party signed the Paris Declaration, in which the former declared its readiness to cease hostilities as a basis for a credible national dialogue.

7. Following a meeting on 18 August 2014 in Khartoum between the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy to the Sudan of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator, it was agreed that the Panel was best placed to leverage its broader mandate to urge and facilitate the Sudanese armed movements to join the national dialogue, that pre-talks and confidence-building activities were essential to bridging the gap between the parties, that the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur should continue to be the framework agreement addressing the Darfur-specific root causes of the conflict and that direct talks between the parties would begin in September 2014 to influence progress on the dialogue.

8. In that spirit, from 30 August to 3 September 2014 the High-level Implementation Panel, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator and the special envoys of the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development held a series of meetings with the leaders of the Justice and

Equality Movement-Gibril Ibrahim (JEM-Gibril), the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), the Eastern Front and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, as well as representatives of the National Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, to discuss modalities for their participation in the national dialogue. On 4 September 2014, talks facilitated by the Panel between representatives of the preparatory committee for the dialogue, composed of representatives of the National Congress Party, the political opposition and the Paris Declaration Group, resulted in an agreement on initial talks, facilitated by the Panel, on the cessation of hostilities between the Government and armed groups in Darfur and the Two Areas on separate mediation tracks (referred to as "one process, two tracks"). It was also agreed that the Panel would facilitate preparatory talks on procedural issues pertaining to the dialogue.

9. Since then, tangible progress has been slow. After some delay, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel convened direct talks between the Government and SLA/MM and JEM-Gibril in Addis Ababa on 23 November 2014. The concerted efforts to include all non-signatory rebel groups notwithstanding, SLA/AW decided not to participate in that round of negotiations. During the talks, the Government reiterated that it would not reopen the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur for negotiation, while the armed movements insisted that they were not bound by its provisions. On 26 November 2014, the Panel proposed the inclusion of security arrangements, political issues, humanitarian issues, the relationship between the talks and the dialogue and the overall method of work as agenda items. The Government rejected the inclusion of humanitarian issues as a separate agenda item, while the armed movements insisted on that point and proposed the addition of other issues such as development, land and reconciliation. In the light of the lack of agreement, the Panel adjourned the talks on 30 November 2014 for the parties to consult their constituencies on the draft framework agreement.

10. The political and armed opposition in the Sudan, including the Darfur armed movements, adopted a joint declaration known as the "Sudan Call" on 3 December 2014 in Addis Ababa. They pledged to create a comprehensive solution, beginning with a cessation of hostilities, for the resolution of the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas and to establish mechanisms with the aim of achieving a popular uprising or a comprehensive political solution that would lead to the dismantling of the one party-regime in Khartoum.

11. In January 2015, as the stalemate continued, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Acting Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator and my Special Envoy visited Khartoum to engage with the Government and opposition stakeholders on ways of reviving the negotiations. They also visited Doha, N'Djamena and Addis Ababa to brief regional leaders on the process and seek their support on the way forward.

### **Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

12. Very gradual and limited progress was made in the further implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2014. As part of the agreement on final security arrangements, the Government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) agreed in February 2014 to integrate three battalions of ex-combatants from LJM into the Sudanese military and the police. In December 2014, the Darfur

Security Arrangements Implementation Commission began the integration of 4,664 ex-combatants from LJM in South Darfur and East Darfur. The integration of LJM combatants in West Darfur began early in February 2015. Meanwhile, the Implementation Commission began the integration of 1,350 ex-combatants from the Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan (JEM-Sudan) into the armed forces in August 2014. In November 2014, in collaboration with the World Food Programme and the United Nations Development Programme, UNAMID provided technical and logistical support to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for the demobilization of 534 ex-combatants from JEM-Sudan in Turbo, North Darfur.

13. JEM-Sudan, which had acceded to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in April 2013, was absorbed into its power-sharing arrangements in 2014. Other important institutions, such as the panels of experts established under the Judicial Service Commission and the National Civil Service Commission, remained non-functional, even though their office holders had been named. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Darfur also remained non-functional owing to a lack of necessary funds. The Chair of the National Human Rights Commission, Amal Hassan El Tinay, resigned in August 2014, but the President of the Sudan did not accept her resignation. The subcommittees of the Commission to monitor, protect and promote human rights in Darfur have not been established owing to financial constraints.

14. At the end of 2014, the Darfur Regional Authority indicated that 70 per cent of the 315 projects launched in the first phase of a three-phase programme under the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, with funds from the Government of the Sudan, had been completed. The Government of Qatar provided \$88.5 million in September 2014 to support development projects, but only \$10 million has been disbursed to date.

15. The Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process was launched on 25 January 2015 following the provision of seed money by the Government of Qatar. Nevertheless, 75 per cent of the funding required for the process has yet to be provided.

## **B. Protection of civilians**

16. In 2014, UNAMID provided protection to displaced persons in camps and around team sites, to wider vulnerable communities through patrolling, including targeted patrols in relation to firewood and grass collection and farming activities, and through the strategic redeployment of peacekeepers. The most significant achievements with regard to the protection of civilians in 2014 were related to the establishment of protective areas within, or in the vicinity of, the UNAMID team sites at Saraf Omra and Korma, North Darfur, and Khor Abeche, South Darfur, and instances in which peacekeepers repelled or prevented attacks against civilians at Kalma, Labado and Kabkabiya in South Darfur, East Darfur and North Darfur, respectively.

### **Saraf Omra, North Darfur**

17. During the outbreak of violence between the Northern Rizeigat and Gimir tribes early in March 2014, an estimated 50,000 people fled to the UNAMID team

site at Saraf Omra. UNAMID responded swiftly and proactively, constructing a protective area adjacent to the site, deploying two additional companies to provide physical protection and redeploying 60 formed police officers to assist with crowd control and security. The enhanced strength of the site increased the mission's capacity to conduct confidence-building patrols. UNAMID also deployed a medical team to the site and set up an emergency clinic, delivered water and first aid to the displaced and evacuated 24 seriously injured individuals to El Fasher for medical treatment. A joint crisis management team comprising members of the UNAMID military, police and civilian components and selected members of the United Nations country team was mobilized at the sector level to respond to the crisis. UNAMID escorted 27 humanitarian vehicles with food and non-food items for those affected.

18. The mission also provided technical support to the mediation process, which resulted in the signing on 12 March 2014 of an agreement on cessation of hostilities between the two tribes. UNAMID has since been actively involved in the monitoring and implementation of the agreement. All the efforts of the mission and the United Nations country team to stabilize the situation ultimately led to the successful return of 66,473 people to their places of origin.

#### **Korma, North Darfur**

19. Also in North Darfur, following an attack by armed men on the town of Kobe on 21 March 2014, 4,000 displaced persons fled to the UNAMID team site at Korma the following day. As with the case of Saraf Omra, a formed police unit was pre-emptively redeployed from March to April 2014 for public order management operations within the camp and to bridge potential gaps in the physical protection of internally displaced persons during rotations of military battalions. Security and confidence-building patrols around the site were also enhanced, and the mission provided the security and logistical support necessary for the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons sheltering at the site.

#### **Khor Abeche, South Darfur**

20. On 22 March 2014, some 4,000 people sought refuge at the UNAMID team site at Khor Abeche, South Darfur, reportedly fleeing attacks by the Rapid Support Forces (a 5,000-6,000-strong counter-insurgency force raised by the Government) and unidentified militia. UNAMID personnel provided water and shelter and enhanced patrols around the newly constructed protective area, while working closely with the humanitarian community to facilitate the provision of emergency support. The creation of the protective area followed an earlier example of provision of protection at the site, when clashes between SLA/MM and the Abu Bashir militia group had led 100 displaced persons to flee to the site on 9 January 2014. In that instance, increased patrols conducted in and around the area assisted in easing the tensions and prevented retaliatory attacks.

#### **Kabkabiya, North Darfur**

21. An example of a robust protection response with tragic consequences for the mission was seen on 24 May 2014, when UNAMID troops intervened to protect civilians at the Birgi market in Kabkabiya from a group of 60 Arab militiamen. Following earlier altercations between the Arab militiamen and Fur tribesmen from

the village of Al Salam, UNAMID peacekeepers intervened to facilitate a mediation meeting in the hope of averting an imminent attack on civilians. During the meeting, the Arab militiamen became hostile and began shooting at the peacekeepers, who returned fire. The ensuing firefight resulted in the wounding of four Rwandan peacekeepers, one of whom later succumbed to his injuries. The mission's attempts to defuse the prevailing tensions have since been seen as key factors in ultimately controlling and preventing a further escalation of the situation.

#### **Kalma, South Darfur**

22. In August 2014, upon learning of the Government's plan to conduct cordon and search operations inside the Kalma camp, which houses some 250,000 internally displaced persons, UNAMID proactively engaged with the national and local authorities in an attempt to avert violence and urged them to uphold international human rights standards and humanitarian law while implementing any security measures. While the local authorities continued to assert their sovereign right to enter the camp, they agreed that any government operation would be coordinated with UNAMID. On 20 August, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator met the camp's leaders to reassure them of the mission's protection and to urge cooperation with the Government. UNAMID and the United Nations country team also developed response preparedness plans in the event of an escalation of tensions in the camp. To enhance its ability to provide protection, the mission established a temporary operating base near the camp, increased daily patrols and reinforced the presence of formed police units and individual officers. The police component also used existing good relations with the internally displaced community and the local police in Nyala to coordinate mitigation measures and ease the tensions. Continuous engagement by the UNAMID leadership at the national level further helped to improve the security situation. No government operation has been conducted in the camp since those preventive actions were taken by the mission.

#### **Labado, East Darfur**

23. On 8 October 2014, representatives of the estimated 13,200 internally displaced persons residing at the Labado camp approached the UNAMID team site at Labado to seek protection, fearing retaliatory attacks by the some 400 armed Arab militiamen stationed on the outskirts of the camp following clashes with the Northern Rizeigat. UNAMID proactively engaged with key community leaders, the leaders of the internally displaced persons and the Government to resolve the issue, which ultimately led to an agreement and the withdrawal of the militiamen. Simultaneously, UNAMID worked closely with humanitarian agencies to gain access to remote locations and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance by providing escorts and logistical support, undertaking integrated joint missions and contributing to the security of the area.

#### **Um Baru, North Darfur**

24. Following reports of aerial bombardment and ground fighting between the Government and SLA/MM from 7 to 13 January 2015, internally displaced persons consistently sought shelter in the protective area established by UNAMID adjacent to its team site at Um Baru, North Darfur. As at 19 February 2015, some 7,500 internally displaced persons had been registered by humanitarian agencies at the

site, while personnel at the site estimated that up to 23,000 civilians from affected and nearby villages were seeking protection within its proximity.

25. UNAMID troops in Um Baru provided protection within and in the vicinity of the team site and, to prevent further displacement, conducted confidence-building patrols in accessible nearby villages that were not directly affected by the hostilities. UNAMID supported humanitarian efforts by providing tents, water tanks and containers, as well as medical assistance to pregnant women, older persons and the unwell, complementing the work of international non-governmental organizations on the ground. UNAMID police officers assisted women and children, including by establishing facilities for the delivery of babies. A formed police platoon was deployed to assist with crowd management during the distribution of relief items. By early February 2015, humanitarian partners and UNAMID had arranged flights containing nutrition, water and sanitation supplies and basic household items, following the denial of road access from El Fasher by the Sudanese authorities. Meanwhile, food, additional nutrition and water and sanitation items were dispatched by road from El Geneina, with an escort from the mission.

### **C. Intercommunal conflict**

26. Four major tribal conflicts occurred in 2014, all of which were contained, to a certain extent, through the conclusion of peace or cessation of hostilities agreements.

#### **Ma'alia and Southern Rizeigat, East Darfur**

27. The Ma'alia and the Southern Rizeigat clashed three times in May 2014 in the localities of Adilla and Abu Jabra, East Darfur, over livestock theft, leaving six Southern Rizeigat and seven Ma'alia tribesmen dead. On 5 July 2014, renewed clashes in the village of Al Fadul near El Daein left 18 Rizeigat and an unconfirmed number of Ma'alia dead. UNAMID engaged with the leaders of both communities at the state and national levels, including their respective Shura Councils. A reconciliation conference between the two tribes began on 10 June 2014 in Al Foula, Western Kordofan, with support from UNAMID, focusing on the need for government security forces to strengthen the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities agreement and to ensure the permanent opening of the road between El Daein and Khartoum.

28. In July and August 2014, hostilities resumed following cattle theft by Southern Rizeigat at a Ma'alia village. The clashes, involving the Rapid Support Forces and the Border Guards, left 320 people dead. UNAMID actively engaged with the state authorities, tribal leaders and members of civil society, calling for immediate measures to be taken to stop the fighting. A task force consisting of eight representatives of the two tribes was formed to invigorate the reconciliation process. Four investigators and five judges were appointed to investigate and prosecute persons suspected of involvement in the clashes. Those efforts notwithstanding, tensions remained high because disagreements over ownership, control and utilization of land and resources had not been resolved sustainably.

**Ma'alia and Hammar, East Darfur**

29. Fighting between the Ma'alia and the Hammar erupted in late May and again early in July 2014 in the border area between East Darfur and Western Kordofan, reportedly owing to rustling of Hammar cattle by Ma'alia. The intervention of the state authorities, through the deployment of government forces, stabilized the situation. UNAMID engaged with youth leaders to de-escalate the situation and supported the talks between the two communities in July and August 2014. Following a reconciliation conference mediated by a committee composed of tribal leaders and witnessed by the second Vice-President, an agreement between the tribes was signed in Al Foula, Western Kordofan, on 27 September 2014. The agreement was aimed at addressing resource sharing, the amount of blood money (*diya*) to be paid and the return of Hammar living in Ma'alia territory and vice versa. By the end of October, the tribesmen had returned to their respective tribal areas.

**Beni Hussein-Northern Rizeigat, North Darfur**

30. Renewed fighting and retaliatory attacks between the Northern Rizeigat and the Beni Hussein triggered by cattle rustling occurred in El Sireif, North Darfur. From April to June 2014, the El Sireif-Kabkabiya-Saraf Omra road was blocked by the Northern Rizeigat to prevent movement by the Beni Hussein. To draw the Government's attention to the fighting and increase in killings and attacks in El Sireif, Beni Hussein community members demonstrated in front of the National Assembly in Khartoum on 29 June 2014 and submitted a memorandum stating that 1,013 people had been killed and 700 injured since the escalation in violence in 2013.

31. To contain the conflict, UNAMID engaged with tribal leaders, the local and state authorities and the Sudanese security agencies and provided technical and logistical support to a reconciliation conference held from 5 to 7 June 2014, which brokered the release of seven Beni Hussein abducted by Northern Rizeigat on 26 May 2014 and established committees to strengthen existing reconciliation mechanisms. In addition, a command order was issued on 26 July 2014 to prohibit the recruitment and use of children as fighters.

32. Fighting subsequently flared up in the localities of El Sireif and Saraf Omra, where the Beni Hussein and the Northern Rizeigat clashed five times from 25 to 28 August 2014, leaving at least 16 Northern Rizeigat and 25 Beni Hussein dead. UNAMID engaged extensively with the native administration and tribal leaders from North Darfur and West Darfur, the state authorities and the Sudanese armed forces in an effort to contain further clashes and pursue genuine reconciliation. From 18 to 21 September 2014, Northern Rizeigat and Beni Hussein leaders from Central Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur established a peace committee and conducted campaigns in the Jebel Amer gold-mining area. Those efforts resulted in the end of the conflict and the restoration of relative calm in El Sireif. UNAMID encouraged the leaders to continue consultations with the Northern Rizeigat to open the blockade of the El Sireif-Kabkabiya-Saraf Omra road, which was hindering the movement of civilians and curtailing commercial activities in the area. The road reopened on 28 September 2014. Tensions persist, however, because issues pertaining to the management of the gold mine remain unresolved.

### **Salamat-Misseriya, Central Darfur**

33. In February 2014, the Salamat and Misseriya tribes clashed in the village of Salih, near Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, after the killing of a Misseriya. The violence left 28 people, mostly Salamat, dead. The deterioration in security in Um Dukhun following the incident led to the displacement of some 5,000 civilians who fled to Chad and 10,000 who fled to camps for internally displaced persons in South Darfur. UNAMID supported mediation efforts undertaken by traditional leaders, which helped to quell tensions and prevent further escalation, and provided technical and logistical support to the Darfur Regional Authority for the establishment of a reconciliation follow-up mechanism in Central Darfur.

34. In June 2014, violence flared up again near Um Dukhun and Mukjar over competing land and resource claims, causing significant casualties on both sides. As a result of the conflict, some 3,700 civilians fled towards Chad; since then, most have returned to Um Dukhun. More than 100 people from both communities accused of fomenting the clashes were reportedly arrested. UNAMID engaged with the Government and the local authorities of both communities with regard to the root causes of the conflict to encourage the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement of July 2013.

## **III. Three challenges**

### **A. Cooperation and partnership of the Government of the Sudan in mandate implementation**

35. Over the course of 2014, the time taken to clear contingent-owned equipment and issue visas improved somewhat, and measures were taken to address denials of access. The overall situation, however, remains a cause for concern.

36. With regard to the issuance of visas, of a total of 2,699 requests, 2,616 were granted, 46 were rejected and 37 remain outstanding after the agreed processing period of two months.

37. Many long-standing issues pertaining to contingent-owned equipment were resolved during the year. After more than two years of impasse regarding the deployment of a utility helicopter unit, however, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat decided, in coordination with the troop-contributing country in question, to deploy the unit to another theatre. Another troop-contributing country has now pledged to replace the unit and the Department is working to deploy it by the middle of 2015, assuming that the Government grants all necessary clearances. Furthermore, in late 2014 and early in 2015, incoming Bangladeshi and Pakistani troops experienced delays in the issuance of visas and clearances for contingent-owned equipment, causing inadequate military coverage on the ground.

38. UNAMID developed standard operating procedures whereby patrol teams were instructed to negotiate access and not turn back until they had received orders to do so by their higher command. The military component also created an operational readiness assessment and support team, which visits team sites to ensure the proper implementation of standard operating procedures, directives and instructions. Moreover, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations launched a process of reporting regularly to the Security Council on denials of access. Such

practices have allowed the mission, with the support of the Council, to pinpoint sources of denials more accurately and to engage with the Government and armed movements thereon.

39. Nevertheless, access restrictions, especially in the early stages of conflict, continued to impede the discharge of the mission's mandate to protect civilians. With the beginning of the dry season and the outbreak of hostilities between the Government and the non-signatory armed movements in January 2015, access restrictions on routine and verification patrols and humanitarian escorts increased significantly.

40. In October 2014, following allegations of mass rape in Thabit, North Darfur, restrictions on access to the area increased considerably. In a press statement on 16 November 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan stated that UNAMID would not be allowed to visit Thabit owing to the security situation.

41. With the launch of offensive operations in December 2014, the Government prevented UNAMID from gaining access to East Jebel Marra, including the localities of Rokero and Golo in Central Darfur, Tawila and Kabkabiya in North Darfur and Deribat in South Darfur. UNAMID was on 20 occasions denied access to both the conflict-affected areas and camps for internally displaced persons between 1 December 2014 and 17 February 2015.

42. From 15 February 2014 to 15 February 2015, 502 of 564 requests from United Nations agencies for security clearance were granted (89 per cent). Similar to the situation with UNAMID, however, access was frequently denied in the immediate aftermath of the conflicts that displaced many people in 2014. Six requests for assessment missions to the areas affected by the conflicts were denied in March and April 2014, undermining initial efforts to conduct assessments. For the localities of Al Tawisha and Al Lait in North Darfur, where the armed conflict displaced more than 61,000 people in March 2014, humanitarian actors were permitted to conduct an assessment only in mid-April, causing a significant delay of more than a month in the provision of humanitarian assistance. The localities of Adila and Abu Karinka in East Darfur, hosting an estimated 123,000 people displaced in 2013 and 2014, also experienced significant delays in receiving assistance owing to the continuous denial of access by the local authorities between September 2013 and November 2014. In addition, some areas remain cut off from humanitarian assistance, including North Jebel Marra in Central Darfur and Sharq Jebel Marra in South Darfur. Although a breakthrough in access to a part of Jebel Marra came in June 2014 when an inter-agency mission to Guldo in West Jebel Marra was able to provide some assistance to people in need, no further access has since been granted. Moreover, the local authorities granted access and requested agencies to provide assistance in some areas while denying them access to others. The quality of access was also affected by government-imposed arbitrary conditions, which included the compulsory use of government escorts, restrictions on the participation of international staff and requests for the mandatory participation of Humanitarian Aid Commission staff in assessments.

## **B. Troop- and police-contingent capabilities**

### **Military**

43. Over the course of 2014, measures implemented by UNAMID and engagement by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with troop- and police-contributing countries helped to improve the effectiveness of the military and police components of UNAMID. The military component undertook structural and compositional changes, including the establishment of two additional sectors to improve command and control and the reduction of redundant staff officers, military observers, enablers and combat units. With the establishment of two additional sectors, the military sector now mirrors the civilian and police sectors. This has improved mission coordination and integration. The military component was reduced by 200 military observers, staff officers and liaison officers following a review of their deployment and tasking. A heavy transport company was also repatriated.

44. The serious shortfalls in contingent-owned equipment have largely been addressed, with a serviceability rate of close to 90 per cent having been reached. In that regard, UNAMID and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations engaged closely with troop-contributing countries during the year to ensure that worn-out armoured personnel carriers were replaced and spare parts made available to keep them serviceable. Eight contingents now have an armoured personnel carrier serviceability rate of 100 per cent, six of between 75 and 99 per cent and only three of below 75 per cent. The current average total serviceability rate is 92.62 per cent, compared with 91.98 per cent in the previous quarter.

45. The UNAMID military leadership stepped up its oversight and field-level guidance to troops on the ground through more regular operational visits to team sites and crisis locations and the issuance of updated orders, guidelines and standing operational procedures to enhance operational preparedness, including with regard to movement restrictions, joint military and police operations, the establishment and operation of temporary operating bases, the work of the Joint Operations Centre at the team site level, the handling of armed combatants seeking refuge at UNAMID camps and convoy operations. The military component also issued guidelines for the protection of civilians and is training military contingents thereon, which has resulted in enhanced standardization of procedures.

46. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stepped up consultations with troop-contributing countries on requirements to enhance operational efficiency and predeployment training regarding the protection of civilians. In addition to other measures, a small arms firing range has been constructed in Sector South, and additional sectors are using Sudanese armed forces firing ranges in order to periodically verify that weapons are functioning.

47. In the light of several incidents in which military units failed to respond effectively to armed attacks, UNAMID introduced measures that provide for the sanctioning and repatriation of relevant contingent members. The mission also placed added focus on the production of after-action reports to implement lessons learned and thereby improve military operational capability.

48. Lastly, the military component increased efforts to cooperate with the local government, carrying out engineering projects to repair and maintain roads and airfields as well as participating in the rehabilitation of a school in Nyala and a

hospital in El Geneina. It also provided medical assistance to injured civilians in government military hospitals and performed 19 medical evacuation missions, transporting 77 Sudanese citizens, including 30 soldiers, during the period under review.

### **Police**

49. By December 2014, the UNAMID police component had completed the streamlining of its strength and command and control structures. At the same time, it had increased its operational flexibility, proactively deploying formed police units and individual police officers in response to urgent security threats and providing immediate protection to internally displaced persons.

50. Moreover, the component established a selection committee and a new assessment tool to review the skill sets of individual officers. It revised induction training modules based on actual scenarios on the ground. Several police-contributing countries also reviewed their predeployment training and nomination policies to meet the mission's requirements.

51. The police component reduced its strength by 723 individual police officers, four formed police units and four Professional posts. The repatriation of the four formed police units was completed in July 2014. The remaining 13 units are based in 10 team sites, covering 49 camps for internally displaced persons. The overall serviceability rate for the contingent-owned equipment of the formed police units was 91.8 per cent as at October 2014, an increase of 9.1 per cent from the figure for December 2013 (82.7 per cent). Furthermore, the situation in relation to armoured personnel carriers improved during the same period, with an increase of 13.3 per cent in the serviceability rate from 72.4 per cent (76 serviceable armoured personnel carriers of the 105 required under the memorandum of understanding) to 85.7 per cent (72 of the 84 required under the memorandum of understanding). The improvement stemmed from the repatriation of units with long-standing compliance issues and continuous engagement with those countries contributing formed police units.

## **C. Need for improved coordination and integration structures within the mission and between the mission and the United Nations country team**

### **Internal restructuring**

52. Over the course of the year, UNAMID recalibrated its activities towards the three strategic priorities, discontinued other tasks and conducted a comprehensive assessment of and adjusted its structures, personnel and material capacity. In that context, 1,260 posts were identified for abolishment: 770 by 31 March 2015 and the remaining 490 to follow during the subsequent budget year.

53. The mission substantially revised its management structures, including by introducing two Deputy Joint Special Representative pillars to provide leadership, guidance and oversight to 10 substantive sections and the Office of Legal Affairs. The new configuration allows the Joint Special Representative to focus more comprehensively on the management of the mission, while at the same time ensuring that the substantive section chiefs receive the leadership guidance and

support of the Deputy Joint Special Representatives for the implementation of the mission's three strategic priorities. UNAMID has also put in place several new management and coordination structures that support strategic and operational decision-making for the implementation of the mandate.

54. At most team sites, military and police personnel are co-located and undertake some degree of operations jointly (e.g. monthly and long-range patrols). In addition, the military component has reconfigured its operations to include five sectors, rather than the previous three, meaning that it is now in line with the civilian substantive and support configurations. Both the Mission Support Division and substantive sections have also begun to deploy staff to sector offices and team sites in a more concerted manner, in order to further strengthen and support mandate implementation at those levels.

55. The implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review regarding integration and coordination among UNAMID components and sections included the continuous improvement of an integrated joint operations centre, including at the sector headquarters and team sites. A functional three-tiered joint operations centre is being made operational, with the appointment of its Chief and personnel at the sector headquarters under way to ensure more seamless communication between the team sites and the sector headquarters in the field, the mission headquarters and United Nations Headquarters. Regarding external communication, the Chief Public Information Officer has been recruited and a revised communications strategy is being developed. Nevertheless, the gains made to date in terms of ensuring accurate, timely and transparent reporting of incidents and issues in Darfur notwithstanding, there remains significant room for improvement by the mission in that regard.

56. The Mission Support Division has been restructured to better streamline its operational activities and align them with the global field support strategy. It has re-engineered the Property Management Section to enable increased oversight with regard to the management and safeguarding of United Nations assets. The mission has also introduced a centralized warehousing system and reorganized the Mission Support Centre to enhance the coordination and support role of the Division, especially with regard to identifying the needs of all mission components and coordinating coherent, effective and efficient support plans and strategies for implementation. The Centre is also being reorganized to better interact with the United Nations country team and strengthen relations with the host Government and other external parties.

57. With regard to cooperation between and among the mission's civilian substantive sections, the Human Rights Section and the Rule of Law, Judicial System and Prison Advisory Section have successfully strengthened their relationships with a view to conducting complementary operations. This has included the introduction of joint trial monitoring — an initiative that represents a fresh way of looking at rights within the justice sector in Darfur. The two sections are also jointly building the capacity of the prison system in Darfur to manage institutions in accordance with human rights standards. The Human Rights Section focuses on compliance with human rights and both sections are concerned with accountability for grave human rights violations. Consequently, in accordance with the revised strategic priorities of the mission, the Rule of Law, Judicial System and Prison Advisory Section has refocused its efforts towards strengthening the capacity of national actors, with the expectation that those activities will gradually be handed over to the United Nations country team.

**Collaboration between the mission and the United Nations country team**

58. Collaboration between UNAMID and the United Nations country team saw measured improvement in 2014, both strategically and operationally. At the strategic level, a joint task force comprising UNAMID and country team staff successfully revised the integrated strategic framework. A second joint task force was created to revise the mission's strategy for the protection of civilians. A coordination mechanism between UNAMID and the country team also now exists, with meetings held periodically in Khartoum and El Fasher. In addition, from 4 to 6 November 2014, the Acting Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator and the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan undertook a joint visit to Doha for consultations with Qatari officials, during which funds were approved for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process. Also during the period under review, a support plan under the joint global focal point for the police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations was finalized. It foresees a joint United Nations rule of law programme aimed at strengthening the role of the country team in taking on rule of law activities in line with the mission's revised priorities. This includes the strategic co-location of a senior corrections officer at the headquarters of the General Directorate of Prisons to facilitate the implementation of the five-year strategic development plan for the Darfur prisons, covering the period 2014-2018.

59. In the light of evolving concerns with regard to the protection of civilians and to promote a more coordinated response, together with the United Nations country team, to the challenges facing UNAMID in implementing its mandate, a joint UNAMID-country team task force was also established to revise the mission's strategy for the protection of civilians, the finalization of which is continuing. UNAMID continues to review the ways in which it engages with the country team and the humanitarian country team on matters pertaining to the protection of civilians. This includes the sharing of information and analysis, as well as the extent to which existing coordination mechanisms such as the joint protection group can provide a platform for all partners to contribute to the identification of priorities, and, ultimately, the provision of a measured protection response. The frequency of meetings of the group, which is chaired by UNAMID, increased in 2014, allowing for enhanced coordination between the humanitarian protection sector and the mission. To increase coordination at the operational level, UNAMID invited United Nations humanitarian partners to participate in daily operational meetings.

60. Further collaboration is being undertaken on the establishment and implementation of an effective Darfur-wide early warning and response system, which will include a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess the impact of the mission's activities to protect civilians. The monitoring system is a joint effort between the UNAMID military, police and civilian components and the United Nations country team and the humanitarian country team (in particular those agencies within the protection cluster). It aims to review, evaluate and report on the mission's responses to protection incidents and overall effectiveness in doing so. While the mechanism is still being refined at the mission headquarters level, it is expected to be an integral part of the early warning and response system and will also be used at the team site and sector levels. A more fully coordinated response between the mission and the country team and the humanitarian country team is still required to improve early warning capabilities. This is particularly important for durable solutions to displacement and migration issues, given that many related

activities are run by national and international non-governmental organizations. The enhancement of early warning information, in particular that of a security nature, is therefore crucial to improving the timely sharing of information with such partners.

#### **IV. Significant developments in the political and security situation**

61. Since the formation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front in 2011 as a loose alliance of armed opposition movements, the field of conflict of the armed movements in Darfur has broadened. In particular, JEM-Gibril divided its efforts between Darfur and the Two Areas, which, coupled with the absence of its leadership on the ground, has significantly weakened its presence in Darfur. In 2013, the Government launched a major military offensive in Darfur and the Two Areas using the Rapid Support Forces, causing large-scale displacement of civilians in Darfur. From February to May 2014, with aerial and ground support from the Sudanese military, the Rapid Support Forces succeeded in dislodging the armed movements from many of their traditional strongholds in the central corridor, as well as in areas south of Nyala. SLA/MM in particular sustained heavy losses.

62. Clashes decreased between June and early December 2014 owing to the rainy season and the prospect of direct negotiations with SLA/MM and JEM-Gibril. With no progress in the talks held in Addis Ababa, however, the Government resumed offensive operations early in December. Whereas the earlier phase of the operation had targeted SLA/MM, the second phase concentrated on dislodging SLA/AW from the hilly terrain of Jebel Marra.

63. The two phases of Operation Decisive Summer have given the government forces the upper hand in the conflict in Darfur. The non-signatory armed movements, especially SLA/MM and JEM-Gibril, have been considerably weakened, while SLA/AW has been confined to a very small geographical area.

64. Intercommunal fighting also led to heavy casualties and some displacements in 2014. Given that the root causes remain largely unaddressed, mediation efforts leading to peace agreements relieve the underlying problems and grievances of the communities only temporarily. Of particular concern is the management of the artisanal gold mines in the Jebel Amer region of North Darfur, which has been at the heart of repeated clashes between the Northern Rizeigat and Beni Hussein tribes, and the control over pastures and potential oil-producing areas in the localities of Adila and Abu Karinka in East Darfur, the battleground of the Southern Rezeigat and Ma'alia tribes.

65. Lastly, crime, targeting both the local population and United Nations and UNAMID personnel and assets, remained a significant source of insecurity. There were 762 crimes committed against civilians from 15 February 2014 to 15 February 2015, compared with 684 in the previous year (an increase of 12 per cent). The key factors in the situation include wide circulation of arms, weak rule of law mechanisms and impunity. Reports indicate that armed Arab tribesmen, unidentified armed groups and disgruntled and unemployed young people and gangs perpetrated most of the crimes. Armed Arab nomads often accused internally displaced persons of initiating attacks against them and, as a result, demanded exorbitant compensation. The internally displaced persons usually gave in to such demands out of fear of

retaliatory attacks. Livestock theft and looting often lead to tribal conflict if not resolved swiftly.

66. A total of 384 crimes targeting United Nations and international non-governmental organizations were recorded during the period under review, compared with 373 in the previous period. In 11 incidents of armed attacks on UNAMID personnel, 5 peacekeepers were killed and 13 injured. The seven cases of abduction recorded involved 11 United Nations or international non-governmental organization personnel.

67. The announcement by the President of the Sudan of a national dialogue on 27 January 2014 was followed by significant work towards a comprehensive and inclusive process in which national grievances could be addressed. In November 2014, with the breakdown of the talks on a cessation of hostilities on Darfur and the Two Areas, which would have allowed the armed groups to participate in the dialogue, and the implementation by the Government of measures curtailing political freedom, the likelihood of holding the dialogue before the elections in April 2015 is in doubt. The Government has suggested, however, that talks can continue before and after the elections.

68. While the Government is now focused on preparations for the elections, opposition parties, especially the major parties, have decided to boycott the elections and suspend their participation in the national dialogue, arguing that elections should be an outcome of a genuine national dialogue.

69. The humanitarian situation in many parts of Darfur deteriorated significantly in 2014. Humanitarian actors estimated that more than 450,000 people fled their homes as a result of violence — the highest volume of displacement in any single year since the peak of the crisis in 2004. Of the newly displaced, at least 300,000 are estimated to have remained displaced, for the most part in established camps. This has driven the total number of internally displaced persons in Darfur to in excess of 2.5 million, including 1.4 million children, putting further strain on an already underresourced humanitarian response operation. The suspension or forced departure of key humanitarian partners, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross (which did not resume operations until September 2014), created additional challenges. The broadly negative trajectory of key humanitarian indicators has continued in 2015, with at least 40,000 new internally displaced persons confirmed since the beginning of the year. In North Darfur, the global acute malnutrition rate is at 28.3 per cent, above the emergency threshold of 15 per cent.

70. While the operating environment for humanitarian actors was extremely challenging, significant assistance continued to be provided. Some 2.2 million people, mainly internally displaced persons, received food assistance. Another 400,000 people received vouchers allowing them to purchase food in local markets, a scheme that contributed to the local economy and ensured basic levels of food security. In rural areas, around 600,000 people received assistance under a food-for-assets programme involving the provision of food in exchange for activities benefiting local communities. Some 1 million people benefited from animal health services and agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools, while 1.1 million were provided with sustainable access to improved drinking water. An estimated 3.4 million people were reached with health services and more than 140,000 severely or moderately malnourished children received specialized treatment. There is scope to scale up that assistance across all sectors if additional resources are made

available. Nevertheless, just 54 per cent of requirements set out in the humanitarian community's strategic response plan had been covered by the end of 2014. Increased donor support in 2015 will be critical.

## **V. Recommendations**

### **A. Mandate, configuration and composition**

71. Over the past 12 months, the security and political situation continued to evolve, with no tangible progress towards a comprehensive resolution of the conflict in Darfur. In the light of that situation, the three strategic priorities of UNAMID remain a top priority.

72. The current force deployment is generally aligned with the mission's mandate and strategic priorities. The evolution of the security situation on the ground, however, suggests that it may be possible to close some team sites or move them to locations closer to civilians under threat of physical violence. Rising crime in Darfur has also had a direct impact on the military component, forcing it to assign significant resources to protecting the mission's administrative movements and facilities at the expense, at times, of its ability to take protective measures in support of the local population in line with its core mandate to protect civilians. A military capability study will be undertaken in the second quarter of 2015 to assess current capacity in relation to those challenges. It will make recommendations on possible adjustments to deployments and the rightsizing of the mission's military strength.

73. There are structural and managerial aspects that the mission still needs to refine and improve. They include its reporting and analysis, its communication (both internal and external) and the recruitment of staff to fill some key vacant posts. Over the coming months, UNAMID will focus on finalizing its restructuring process and further improving its output in accordance with its three strategic priorities.

### **B. Road map for handover to the United Nations country team**

74. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2173 (2014), UNAMID has been working to identify relevant tasks that could be transferred to the United Nations country team following the revision of the mission's strategic priorities. In December 2014 and January 2015, UNAMID and the country team held discussions on the transfer of tasks, following which a matrix of strategic and operational activities was prepared. The matrix will be further refined with the country team over the coming months and presented in my report in May.

75. It is envisaged that the transfer of tasks will be implemented strategically and pragmatically over the short term, medium term and long term, depending on the security situation, the availability of funds and capacity. Once an agreement on the matrix has been reached, an objective assessment of the capacity of the United Nations country team to take over the tasks identified within it will be carried out. This will serve as the basis of a realistic road map for the gradual transfer of tasks. Preliminary indications, however, are that, given the nationwide remit of United

Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the Sudan, fundamental issues of security, financial resources and human resources, as well as obvious capacity constraints, are likely to arise. This will require appropriate intervention by the Government, donors and other actors to enable the country team to take over tasks as UNAMID continues to focus on its revised strategic priorities.

### **C. Exit strategy**

76. Further to the request from the Security Council in resolution 2173 (2014) and requests from the Government of the Sudan, the assessment team agreed with its Sudanese interlocutors to establish a joint working group to develop plans for an exit strategy for UNAMID. During those meetings, the team and the Government discussed the possibility of implementing the strategy in a phased manner, beginning with an immediate downsizing of UNAMID military and other capabilities in relatively safe and stable parts of Darfur where crime was the main driver of insecurity. The mission's presence in other parts of Darfur would be downsized based on benchmarks relating to, among other things, the capacity of the Government to protect civilians, begin recovery for war-affected communities and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons. Any downsizing would also assume the existence of sufficient access and donor support for other United Nations actors.

77. Following further consultations in Khartoum from 15 to 18 February 2015, the Government, the African Union and the United Nations agreed on draft terms of reference for the working group. According to those terms of reference, the objective of the working group is to develop an exit strategy that would enable a gradual and phased handover of mandated tasks from the mission to the Government and the United Nations country team. This would also include an analysis of those activities that would not continue and the resulting impact on civilian protection activities. The working group would begin its work with a comprehensive review of the situation in Darfur in March 2015, followed by the development of the road map for the strategy by April 2015. Upon the completion of its work, the working group would submit a report on the strategy to the Government, the African Union Commission and the Secretariat. The report would then be submitted to the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council for consideration and endorsement.