Special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted following my report of 5 September 2014 (S/2014/653), in which I informed the Security Council of my request that the United Nations Secretariat conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Libya, in close partnership with the Libyan authorities and in consultation with regional and international partners. The present report covers the main findings of that exercise, as well as recommendations for the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Libya to adjust to the new realities on the ground.

2. In preparing the present report, the Department of Political Affairs, in coordination with the inter-agency task force for Libya, initiated a strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya. The assessment focused on the current and anticipated challenges faced by the United Nations in the consolidation of peace. A strategic assessment mission, comprising representatives from the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (representing the agencies, funds and programmes), visited Tunisia from 7 to 13 January 2015. In developing recommendations, consideration was given to the priorities of key Libyan parties, as well as the concerns of regional and international partners.

II. Context and factors of instability

3. Since early July 2014, Libya has witnessed the most serious outbreak of armed conflict since the 2011 revolution. The fighting in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere in the country has been characterized by serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Indiscriminate firing of heavy weaponry by all sides in densely populated areas has resulted in significant civilian casualties. The internationally recognized authorities are no longer in Tripoli and parallel legislative and executive bodies have been put in place. The political division and the fighting have led to an upsurge in internal displacement and tangible worsening in the provision of and access to essential services. Imports of commodities and movements across the country have been severely curtailed. Women have been
particularly affected by the escalation of the conflict, and those visibly engaging in public affairs have been increasingly targeted. It has also gravely affected the lives of cultural groups (namely, the Tabu, Tuareg and Amazigh communities), as well as refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, which is already a vulnerable population.

4. At the heart of the current political impasse and rapidly deteriorating security situation is a stark deficiency in the area of political and human rights resulting from decades-old policies of systematic disenfranchisement of the population and the undermining of State institutions, which effectively created a culture characterized by lack of accountability, absence of transparency and denial of civil rights and liberties. Libyans have therefore experienced difficulty in forging a national consensus or a shared vision regarding how to address the Qadhafi legacy and manage the transition, which has had serious consequences for the nascent political process.

5. This is compounded by the fact that emerging political, societal and security actors in Libya remain heavily fragmented. There are divisions not only between former regime opponents, including those who participated in the revolution and those who had held positions with the regime, but also along ideological, regional, local, tribal and ethnic lines. Many of these categories overlap, and the distinctions commonly used to define the various political camps have little explanatory value as concerns political positioning and behaviour. As a result, security and political actors have become embroiled in battles aimed at safeguarding factional and other particular interests.

6. The political transition of Libya was predicated on the assumption that popularly elected institutions, namely the legislative and executive branches, would take the lead in putting in place the necessary foundations for a modern democratic State. These institutions were also intended to take forward crucial reforms to allow for effective national security decision-making, the reform of State security institutions, including those responsible for governance, building the capacity of the courts, the judiciary, the prison service and prosecution, and establishing transitional justice mechanisms. However, effective decision-making structures have not been put in place and the responsibilities of each branch of government were not properly clarified in the constitutional declaration. As a result, relations between the transitional legislature and the executive branch have been marked by strong competition and rivalry, preventing them from designing and implementing the required policies to ensure a successful transition process. In addition, the poor quality of services provided to the population, particularly in the fields of security, health and education, has undermined public trust in the State.

7. Furthermore, the successive Governments of Libya have not been able to establish control over the use of force. Libyan security forces remain weak and lack proper command and control, cohesion and morale, while armed groups have proliferated. The sanctioning of the armed brigades by the State in 2012, including by giving them law enforcement and custodial functions, and the comparatively high salaries paid to their members resulted in the establishment of security structures parallel to those of the State. Arms control, disarmament and the integration of revolutionary fighters into State structures, or their reintegration into civilian life, remain key to national efforts and international assistance to reform the security sector.
8. Many armed groups have increased their capabilities and armaments, becoming more powerful than the national army and police forces, while remaining on the payroll of the Government. The vast amounts of arms and ammunition stockpiled around the country under the Qadhafi regime remained, for the most part, intact or partially destroyed and unstable, unsecured and easily accessible to armed groups and radical elements. Large quantities of arms were also imported by legal and illegal means, providing a steady supply of heavy weaponry and ammunition. While efforts have been made to tighten the arms embargo, the flow of weapons into the country continues. The gradual erosion of the public’s trust in its elected institutions has provided space for these armed groups to broaden their scope of influence, with many operating with impunity.

9. Little progress has been achieved in confronting the legacy of crimes committed by the former regime. Thousands remain in custody without trial, missing persons issues have been addressed only partially and in a discriminatory manner, and little attention has been given to the claims of victims of the former regime. A fact-finding and reconciliation commission has been established by law but is not yet operational. While some of the officials of the Qadhafi regime are now being prosecuted, there are increasing concerns about the fairness of such proceedings and no measures have been taken against those allegedly responsible for human rights violations committed after the revolution. Political activists, human rights defenders and media professionals of both genders have increasingly been threatened and killed. Attacks on courthouses and the judiciary, as well as the recent fighting, have halted the work of the judiciary in Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Tripoli.

10. The absence of an effective justice system amid the ongoing power struggle has been accompanied by a breakdown of law and order. Both ordinary and politically motivated crimes have been on the rise since 2013. In Tripoli and Benghazi especially, the number of kidnappings, carjackings, improvised explosive device attacks and robberies has increased significantly, undermining the population’s safety and security. Benghazi has been plagued by a wave of assassinations of former regime officials and members of the judiciary, as well as armed and security forces and activists.

11. Meanwhile, the southern cities of Sabha, Kufra and Awbari have seen large-scale clashes along tribal and ethnic lines, with many killed and the State unable to contain the violence or pursue those responsible without relying on armed groups. Moreover, porous borders have enabled continued smuggling and provide easy passage for criminal elements into and out of the country. Vast unpopulated areas of the relatively less developed and poorer southern parts of the country allow these criminal and extremist groups to continue their activities outside the reach of the State.

12. The economy of Libya remains heavily dependent on oil revenues and no significant progress towards diversification has been made. Oil revenues make up 90 per cent of the annual budget, which has led control of the fields, pipelines and ports to become a goal of the fighting in itself, and their blockage a tool for political leverage. In addition, the lack of a transparent revenue collection and distribution process not only provides ample opportunities for graft and corruption but also exacerbates subregional and local conflicts.

13. There have been significant delays in the development of the new constitution, which has not only impeded the effective functioning of the nascent institutional
framework but has also prolonged and possibly exacerbated the power struggle among the political actors. While the Constitution Drafting Assembly has been careful not to be drawn into the ongoing political struggle, the situation may become untenable once the body begins its work on controversial issues, such as the role of Islam in the new State, resource distribution, federalism and rights of cultural groups.

14. While the lack of a United Nations presence inside Libya and limited access due to insecurity limit the availability of verified information, it is estimated that 360,000 people have been internally displaced as the result of recent fighting. Most of them live with relatives or host communities or in public buildings, but the lack of cash and skyrocketing prices for food and non-food items may decrease their ability to support themselves. Frequent fuel shortages and electricity cuts are impacting people’s livelihoods. Owing to ongoing fighting, the Government’s lack of access to resources and the location of warehouses in conflict zones, the supply chain for food and medical supplies has been broken. Furthermore, with the departure of foreign doctors and nurses, many hospitals have stopped functioning. There is very low capacity to deal with the increasing number of trauma-related cases inside Libya, and emergency medical services have collapsed in some areas. After humanitarian activities were largely phased out in 2012, most key donors, Libyan partners and United Nations agencies now anticipate that humanitarian needs will increase in the course of 2015, even under the most positive scenario of a successful political dialogue. Meanwhile, there is a strong feeling of neglect and abandonment in the east and south of the country, in particular in terms of assistance.

**III. Priority areas for Libya**

15. Drawing from the analysis of the conflict and possible scenarios for the next 12 to 18 months, as well as the priorities expressed by national actors, four priorities have been identified for Libya for the next two years to resume its democratic transition and set the basis for long-term stability.

1. **Ending the conflict**

16. An initial agreement on addressing the immediate crisis will be needed. This requires the main parties to reach agreements on ceasefire, security and interim political arrangements. In addition to reducing the impact of the fighting on the population, ending the conflict would pave the way for the restoration of security and the resumption of the transitional process. It would also reduce the obstacles to the delivery of essential services and to freedom of movement for the population. In that context, stopping abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law should be a priority.

2. **Completing the transitional process**

17. For the process to move forward, an agreement must be reached on a political framework that lays the foundations for a stable Libya based on legitimate and inclusive institutions and respect for the rule of law, including arrangements for the remainder of the transition. This will need to be underpinned by the adoption of a constitution and a clear road map to address issues related to the proliferation of arms and of armed groups operating outside State authority, as well as the implementation of an effective process of transitional justice.
3. **Maintaining or restoring essential services**

   18. At a time when Libya is undergoing considerable stress, it is important, including for the success of the political process, that essential services to the population be maintained or restored throughout the country.

4. **Moving towards a stable and democratic State**

   19. The longer-term stability of Libya will depend upon visible progress towards the establishment of legitimate, inclusive and effective institutions based on the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights. This includes a public financing and budget system that is transparent and accountable. Independent media and active civil society are essential to achieving these goals.

   20. The first three priorities would bring Libya back to a state of relative normalcy, in which the democratic transition continues and people are able to live their lives without fear of abduction, assassination or being caught in combat zones, and with some access to essential services. The fourth priority will require immediate, robust and sustained engagement by the international community to support the realization of the aspirations of the people of Libya to live in a functioning State with representative institutions.

   21. The success of the transition will require consultative, inclusive and transparent processes in compliance with the obligations of Libya under international law. Throughout, special attention will need to be paid to the rights and particular needs of women and vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons, cultural groups, persons with disabilities, children, refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, including through the development of legislation and mechanisms to ensure compliance by Libya with its obligations under international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

**IV. United Nations strategic priorities in Libya**

22. The establishment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in 2011 signalled the strategic investment by the United Nations in the transformation of Libya into a viable, stable and democratic State. Despite recent setbacks in attaining that goal, the Organization continues to enjoy the strong support of Libyan stakeholders and the international community to lead and coordinate international efforts in support of Libya. However, the circumstances under which UNSMIL was created have changed. The resumption of fighting and the political divisions have prevented the United Nations from implementing some critical mandated tasks aimed at building the capacity of national institutions.

23. While the above analysis shows the broad array of challenges faced by Libya, the current situation requires the United Nations to focus its efforts. Based on the priorities for Libya identified above, as well as on an analysis of the United Nations capacity and comparative advantages, the priorities set out below are recommended for United Nations engagement in Libya.

1. **Support to the political process**

   24. The immediate priority of the United Nations is to support Libyans in reaching a political agreement on the way forward for the transition, thereby bringing an end
to the semblance of parallel State institutions, and reaching an agreement on basic security arrangements in the major towns and cities, including a ceasefire.

25. Reaching these agreements, however, will not end the demand for facilitation and mediation by the United Nations. An agreement that ends the fighting, political crisis and institutional division would create the conditions for the next step, which is a broad political framework and national vision. This would take place within the context of a long-term, formal, multi-pronged dialogue process facilitated by the United Nations that engages political parties, civil society, tribal forces, municipalities and armed groups with the objective of reaching a broad consensus that bolsters support for a political agreement and provides a more conducive environment for the pursuit of national reconciliation. It is therefore expected that facilitation by the United Nations of dialogue at various levels will not decrease once the political process resumes. The United Nations will have to continue to provide good offices to ensure that the agreements are implemented and that the transition is as smooth as possible to prevent the resumption of conflict.

26. In order to provide mediation and good offices, the United Nations will need to maintain expertise on a variety of issues, including in the areas of political affairs, mediation processes, human rights, transitional justice, gender issues, arms and ammunition management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, rule of law, and support to key State institutions and governance. The United Nations will need to be in a position to provide strategic advice, including to support the negotiation, implementation and monitoring of any ceasefire and to assist with realistic and practical arrangements for interim security. It will be necessary to maintain constant engagement with Libyan security forces and armed groups to reduce the effect of fighting on the civilian population and to encourage behaviour by all armed parties that is in accordance with international norms, including the transfer of custodial and law enforcement functions to central authorities. Such engagement with formal and informal security structures will also be an important part of the broader political dialogue, as interaction with the armed groups will be key to obtaining ceasefires and negotiating interim security arrangements utilizing the trust that has been built up over a period of time.

2. Protection

27. Regardless of the evolution of the political situation, the United Nations will continue to give high priority to human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy, given the scale of ongoing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, the need for impartial and accurate reporting in a heightened context of politically motivated claims and counter-claims, and the demands for justice and accountability originating from within Libyan society.

28. Given the presence of large caches of arms and ammunition, as well as explosive remnants of war, which have a serious impact on the security of the population and its freedom of movement, the United Nations should also continue its task of securing weapons, combating improvised explosive devices attacks and clearing explosive remnants of war in close coordination with, and in support of, the Libyan Mine Action Centre and security institutions as they become established.
3. Support to key institutions

29. Competition among institutions makes the identification of Libyan interlocutors for the United Nations contentious. Divided institutions are weak and have a limited absorptive capacity; however, the few remaining functioning and neutral institutions have to be supported, as their success or failure will have a considerable impact on the future of the country. For these reasons, the United Nations should continue to provide support to the Constitution Drafting Assembly, the High National Electoral Commission and the National Council on Civil Liberties and Human Rights. The United Nations should also be ready to support a Government of national unity once it is established.

30. Given the need to protect the wealth and financial assets of Libya in order to safeguard the social, economic and political aspirations of the Libyan people, the United Nations should work with international partners to ensure support to the Central Bank. The international community has a responsibility to support Libya in using and distributing its resources through the Central Bank and public finance mechanisms during the transition phase in a transparent, effective and inclusive manner that benefits the population as a whole.

4. Support for the provision of essential services

31. The United Nations should support the restoration of such essential services as health and education on an emergency basis and help maintain the access of vulnerable groups to food, electricity, water and sanitation, as well as justice. Support to ensure the restoration of law and order will also be required. This will imply working with national institutions, but also, and perhaps primarily at the local level, with municipalities and other local groups.

32. In so doing, the United Nations will need to factor in the potential for a rapid increase in humanitarian needs and the serious deterioration in the provision of essential services across the country. These risks will be especially acute if the political crisis deepens or the country faces an extended negotiation process and the conflict causes further destruction of critical civilian infrastructure.

5. Coordination

33. Given the broad support it enjoys from Libyan interlocutors, as well as international and local partners, the United Nations remains uniquely placed to coordinate international engagement on Libya. This involves coordination at the political level, including through the various international special envoys to Libya and others involved in Libyan affairs, as well as at the strategic and operational levels. However, the effectiveness of the United Nations coordination role will depend not only on the Organization but also on the willingness of its partners to participate in coordination arrangements and to contribute resources.

34. Coordination will also be necessary for the continuation of humanitarian assistance. The provision of such assistance should remain a priority for the United Nations system in Libya. Principled, needs-based assistance must be expanded to meet the growing needs of the population. The United Nations and Libya’s partners must also stand ready to intervene rapidly after the end of hostilities to help restore some State authority, implement priority institution-building measures for key
institutions and resume essential services. This is essential to create an environment conducive to the success of longer-term institution-building and stabilization efforts.

V. Risks

35. In planning for future United Nations engagement in Libya, there are a number of risks to take into consideration that could undermine the Organization’s efforts and limit its impact. The risks include the following:

(a) The critical first step of ending the conflict does not materialize and Libya collapses further into a complete civil war;

(b) One or several of the parties refuse dialogue and call for foreign military intervention, which might be supported by some external actors;

(c) The ability of the United Nations to work is contingent on basic security conditions which the Libyan authorities prove unwilling or unable to provide;

(d) Security conditions prohibit deployments inside Libya, limiting the Organization’s ability to deal with day-to-day issues and reduce tensions in a timely manner;

(e) The United Nations is perceived as losing its impartiality, thereby becoming part of the conflict dynamic;

(f) Support from international actors that encourages and/or enables the parties to pursue military victory, thus undermining the work of the United Nations;

(g) The United Nations is not ready to scale up its engagement when needed.

VI. Recommendations on the United Nations configuration

36. To maximize the chances of success, it will be critical for the future United Nations presence to focus on a clear and limited list of tasks based on the priorities identified above. Aligning the mandate of the Mission and the relevant work of the United Nations country team with the identified priorities will ensure increased capacity to focus on a few critical tasks, while other activities are put on hold until the circumstances become more auspicious. It is also important to ensure that the presence of the United Nations is structured in the most efficient manner and is adequately resourced.

37. The change of focus would entail a considerable reduction in the size of UNSMIL. Given the new environment in which it operates and based on a realistic assessment of what it will be able to achieve in this context, the Mission should be reduced substantially, while it refocuses its capacity on the tasks described above.

38. Most Libyan interlocutors have noted the need for the United Nations to return to Libya as soon as possible. However, the logistical and security resources required for the Organization to be able to operate from secured premises and move around safely render a full return unrealistic until conditions change. In addition, the added value of a full return would be limited in the current circumstances and the United Nations presence on the ground while conditions are not conducive would devalue the currency of its presence. Therefore, the full return of the United Nations to
Libya is not recommended at this stage. The presence and mobility of United Nations staff in Libya will be reviewed regularly through the existing security coordination mechanism.

39. However, the Organization should be able to operate in Libya to complete critical tasks in support of its strategic priorities, including maintaining a link and active engagement with its local counterparts in anticipation of a full return when conditions permit. The best option would be a limited but continuous footprint in Libya, with a rotation of 15 to 20 substantive staff from across the United Nations system according to needs and strategic and operational priorities, with an appropriate logistical and security support component. Tripoli would be considered the forward base of the United Nations operations, with a temporary headquarters in Tunis until it is assessed that a larger United Nations presence can safely and productively return to Libya. Mission support services would continue to be derived from the Global Service Centre in Brindisi.

40. Such an approach would require UNSMIL to relinquish existing facilities in Tripoli since they are unsustainable from a security perspective. This, in turn, will have an impact on the ability of the Mission to rapidly establish larger permanent facilities that comply with minimum operating security standards to accommodate a full return once the decision is made.

41. In order to remain operational and efficient with a limited presence in the country, the support concept for the Mission should be designed to enable the mobility of my Special Representative and personnel of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team. The goal should be a nimble, flexible United Nations presence able to go quickly where it is needed and adapt to evolving tasks. This would entail travel in and out of Libya as needed, but also within the country to handle priorities in the east, west and south of the country. It would require dedicated aviation support for the mediation effort and a robust air bridge between Tunis and Tripoli for operational and security purposes pending the resumption of commercial alternatives or the full return of the United Nations to Libya. This would be supplemented by travel by road from Tunisia and Egypt, as well as from Tripoli.

42. Even with a limited presence in Libya, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the types of protection provided to UNSMIL and the country team so that staff can move around and engage with key partners and beneficiaries. Future United Nations operations in Libya will therefore require a considerably enhanced security presence (not in real terms but in proportion to the numbers to be deployed inside Libya at any given time), with the ability to cope with direct and determined threats, including from extremist groups. The deployment of staff to Libya and the allocation of resources to enable United Nations operations must be prioritized based on programme criticality and reflective of the urgent priorities of the United Nations system as a whole. At the same time, the United Nations will have to constantly reassess the risks related to its presence in Libya to determine whether the arrangements in place need to be revised.

43. While the current political and security situation limits the scope of United Nations engagement in Libya, it is essential that the progress made by the Organization so far is sustained and that the Organization maintains readiness to be able to re-engage at short notice. This will require continuing knowledge of the situation and contacts on the ground, as well as an understanding of the needs of the population. UNSMIL will require capacity to monitor, assess and plan for a larger
United Nations engagement in support of building national capacity once the political and security situation permits.

44. Part of maintaining readiness is the ability to scale up quickly to support Libya in implementing agreements and confidence-building measures or respond to a prioritized need. This may involve, for example, assistance in the monitoring or supervision of ceasefires, assistance to key institutions and facilities or assistance in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to places where reliable guarantees of safe access have been provided. Towards this end, it will be important to put in place mechanisms with the necessary flexibility to increase staffing and operations at short notice. An integrated planning cell should be established, tasked with maintaining awareness and preparedness for possible scale-ups, with the ability to mobilize expertise across the United Nations system and from key partners, including the management of up-to-date rosters in specialized areas.

45. However, readiness and the ability to scale up should not entail resuming previous activities and returning to business as usual. There is a need to “press the reset button” for both UNSMIL and the United Nations country team and recalibrate activities in order to increase the relevance of the United Nations and the pace with which it responds to the new realities in Libya. The transition from long-term capacity-building to providing an immediate response will be critical on all fronts. In addition, it will be essential for the United Nations system as a whole to work under a common strategy to deliver collectively on the above priorities. This will require common understanding and analysis of the situation and better information-sharing, not least to ensure the situational awareness necessary to operate in a volatile environment. For this purpose, a joint mission analysis cell should be established.

46. With revised priorities, there is a need to review the division of labour between UNSMIL and the country team based on their comparative advantages and mandates. UNSMIL should operate at the strategic level, in close consultation and coordination with the country team, with a focus on the aforementioned critical priorities. This would necessitate keeping broad expertise to support my Special Representative in his mediation efforts. It will also be important to ensure that his mediation team includes planners to advise on the technical aspects of implementing any agreements to enable step-by-step progress in the political dialogue process to be accompanied by step-by-step planning for implementation. At the same time, programmatic and operational tasks should be delivered chiefly by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (as and when conditions permit), working in partnership with the Mission, as well as by qualified international and national partners. In the area of rule of law, the global focal point arrangements would be used. Whatever specific distribution of tasks will be agreed, it will be critical to establish strong coordination mechanisms within the United Nations at all levels.

47. Continuation of the existing integration arrangements (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator)) is useful at this point because of shared security assets; shared analysis and context awareness; and mutually reinforcing support to access and engagement. However, regular review of the shifting realities on the ground and their impact on the perception of the Mission, and the United Nations as a whole, will be necessary, taking into account the need for a clear distinction between the political process and humanitarian/development responses and the resulting required support structure. In
this respect, complementary capacity may be needed to support the effective undertaking of the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator functions.

48. If the situation of competing institutions continues to exist, the United Nations should engage with its counterparts on all sides, as required, for operational purposes. This is true not only for mediation and facilitation but also for humanitarian and development work. This does not entail any formal recognition by the United Nations.

VII. Observations

49. Four years after the revolution, Libya’s transition process hangs in the balance. The aspirations of the revolution remain largely unfulfilled. The road map for a democratic transition has not been completed and a coherent vision for the future of the country, including the use of its considerable financial assets, does not exist. A dangerous power struggle within Libya has deepened the political, social, economic and geographic divisions. The control of much of the country by heavily armed militias, the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas, the curtailment of fundamental freedoms and rights, and disregard for the institutions and services built so far, have left Libyans with a deep sense of frustration, a longing for security and stability and waning confidence in the political process.

50. The situation in Libya has fundamentally changed since the establishment of UNSMIL in 2011 and it has considerably deteriorated over the past six months. On the basis of the findings of the strategic assessment, it is recommended that the United Nations adapt to this new reality by establishing a nimble, flexible presence focused on a clear and limited list of tasks. The recommendation to reduce the size of UNSMIL does not mean the United Nations is disengaging from Libya. On the contrary, I believe that by refocusing our priorities we will be able to maximize our impact on the most urgent priorities, while progress in those areas will in turn pave the way for increased engagement in the future. I therefore recommend that members of the Security Council consider giving UNSMIL a mandate focused on support to the political process, protection, support to key institutions, support for the provision of essential services and coordination. In support of these priorities, the division of labour between UNSMIL and the United Nations country team should be based on their respective comparative advantages.

51. At the same time, it will be critical for the United Nations to remain prepared to increase engagement in other areas when the circumstances permit and in response to the expressed needs of Libyans. This ability to respond quickly to developments on the ground will be challenging for the Organization, but I am committed to finding ways for the United Nations to be more flexible and responsive. In order to maintain preparedness, I recommend a capacity within UNSMIL dedicated to ensuring that we are able to respond promptly to demands from Libyan parties.

52. While I am recommending a limited footprint in Libya, it is critical to ensure that the Organization becomes more mobile and can travel in and out of the country, as well as within Libya where the needs are. This will require dedicated aviation support for the mediation effort and a robust air bridge between Tunis and Tripoli. In addition, the United Nations will only be able to have an impact on the ground if we are able to operate with adequate security. In this regard, I call on all Libyan
parties to enable the work of the United Nations by ensuring that its personnel can move around freely and securely.

53. These recommendations assume that the situation will improve or remain as it is. However, if mediation efforts fail and the situation further deteriorates, the Security Council has options at its disposal, in the framework of current resolutions, for other actions that may be considered appropriate.

54. The building of the Libyan State will only succeed if the Libyan authorities take full ownership. In this regard, I encourage them to take full advantage of the work of the United Nations and partners by identifying clear and reliable focal points and capacities for each institution, accepted across the Government, as the entry point for international assistance. United Nations and international efforts require predictable and committed Libyan interlocutors.

55. The challenges facing Libya need to be confronted with a heightened sense of urgency, first and foremost by the Libyans, but also by the United Nations and by the regional and international partners of Libya. The stability and security of Libya will not only affect Libya, but also neighbouring countries and regions, as well as international peace and security. Assisting the Libyans in getting the democratic process back on track should therefore remain a priority for the international community. The United Nations will be prepared to play its role, but Member States must also revisit their commitments to Libya. All of those who helped Libyans to overcome the Qadhafi regime now have a continued responsibility to help complete the transition and also be ready for “the day after” a political agreement is attained. In this regard, ensuring sufficient resources will be critical.

56. I wish to thank my Special Representative, Mr. Bernardino León, as well as the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their continued hard work in uncertain and sometimes dangerous circumstances, as well as for their support to the strategic assessment process. I also thank all Libyan stakeholders who shared their views with the United Nations during this review process and international partners for their continued support.