Letter dated 19 November 2014 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia established pursuant to resolution 2128 (2013) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on Liberia established pursuant to resolution 2128 (2013) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of the same resolution, the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia on 29 October 2014 and considered by the Committee on 12 November 2014.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Lansana Gberie
Coordinator

(Signed) Benjamin Spatz
Expert
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Security Council resolution 2128 (2013)

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** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2128 (2013), the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia until 10 December 2014. In a letter dated 30 December 2013 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2013/777), the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Lansana Gberie (Canada, finance) and Benjamin Spatz (United States of America, arms) to the Panel, with Mr. Gberie serving as Coordinator.

2. The Panel was mandated to investigate, by conducting assessment missions to Liberia and neighbouring States, the implementation and any violations of the measures on arms, as amended by resolutions 1903 (2009) and 2128 (2013), and to compile a midterm and a final report on the basis of those missions. The Panel was also mandated to investigate the sources of financing for the illicit trade of arms and to examine progress in the security and legal sectors with regard to the ability of the Government of Liberia to effectively monitor and control the flow of arms and ensure the integrity of the country’s borders. The mandate also included the provision of an update on the Government’s progress in meeting the arms notification requirements established by the Security Council.

II. Methodology

3. The Panel worked in close cooperation with the Government of Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). It also collaborated with the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, undertaking a joint mission to Côte d’Ivoire in July 2014 and meeting again in Washington, D.C., in October 2014. The Panel regularly exchanged information with other relevant entities, in particular the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms.

4. Following the issuance of its midterm report in May 2014 (S/2014/363), the Panel travelled to Liberia, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in June and July. In Liberia, it conducted field visits to Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland counties. It also travelled to Ghana in September 2014 to investigate possible funding networks for the militias and mercenaries active along the border between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Annex I provides a list of the meetings and consultations held by the Panel during the reporting period.

5. The Ebola virus disease crisis had a significant impact on the Panel’s investigations. The Panel had planned a follow-up trip to Liberia for August and September 2014, but the outbreak rendered it unable to return to Liberia after July to gather additional physical and documentary evidence and other critical information.

6. The Panel attended the launch of a report by the West Africa Commission on Drugs, entitled “Not just in transit: drugs, the State and society in West Africa”, in Senegal in June 2014 to support its planned investigation into the dynamics of the international drug trade in the region and how the trade might relate to possible funding or funding channels for the illicit arms trade. In this regard, the Panel was particularly focused on travel to Guinea, but the Ebola crisis made it impossible to undertake that line of investigation.
7. The Panel focused its investigations on the cross-border movement of mercenaries and militias between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, including by endeavouring to understand the possible sources of funding therefor, with a view to assessing any violations of the measures relating to arms. The border region remains of concern to the Panel, in large part because the militias and mercenary groups operating there have been the main source of instability and verifiable arms embargo violations in the past, are suspected of violations in 2014 and remain a likely source of future violations and instability. As much as possible given the travel restrictions, the Panel accorded priority to analysis of the capacity of the Government of Liberia to effectively monitor and regulate its borders, its existing weapon stockpiles and the illicit trade in weapons within Liberian territory, with a particular focus on the legal framework around small arms and ammunition and on weapons marking and stockpile management of government armouries.

8. The Panel sought the active cooperation of government and United Nations officials during its investigations. It accorded priority to interviews with primary sources, including State and non-State actors. It also participated in the assessment mission fielded by the Secretary-General with regard to the sanctions measures, which was requested by the President of the Security Council in a letter dated 16 July 2014 (S/2014/504). The Panel sought incontrovertible documentary or physical evidence and corroboration from multiple sources. Its findings were, where possible, brought to the attention of those concerned to afford them an opportunity to further explain or refute evidence presented by the Panel.

III. Context of the report

9. The present report was prepared in the context of two important developments: an assessment of the sanctions measures relating to Liberia by the Secretary-General, as requested by the President of the Security Council on 16 July 2014, and the Ebola crisis, which began in Guinea in March 2014 and subsequently engulfed both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

A. Assessment mission

10. In a letter dated 8 August 2014, the Chief of the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch requested the assistance of the Panel, including recommendations, in relation to two issues critical to the measures relating to arms: providing United Nations and other technical assistance to the Government of Liberia in improving its capacity to properly manage arms and ammunition, including enacting the necessary legislative frameworks, and facilitating the Government’s effective monitoring and management of the region bordering Côte d’Ivoire. The Panel provided its written input in a letter dated 21 August 2014.

11. From 9 to 13 September 2014, the Panel participated in the assessment mission, which, as a result of the Ebola crisis in Liberia, was carried out from Headquarters in New York principally through video- and teleconferences with relevant interlocutors in Liberia. They included government officials, representatives to Liberia of the Governments of China, France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the United Nations country team in Monrovia. The assessment team also met in person the Minister of Defence of Liberia, Brownie Jeffrey Samukai, Jr., and
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia and Head of UNMIL, Karin Landgren. The team was composed of representatives of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNMIL and the Panel.

12. The report of the assessment mission was published on 29 September 2014 (S/2014/707). It stated that the Ebola epidemic had significantly weakened the capacity of the Government, in particular with regard to proper management of its security sector, and had the potential to reverse the gains achieved in the national security sector reform process since 2003 (when the civil war ended). It was noted that, should the disease spread to the security forces themselves, it might overwhelm their limited capacity and significantly threaten to erode or undo the incremental gains achieved by Liberia over the past 11 years in the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of State institutions, gains that had been accompanied throughout by the targeted sanctions measures contained in Security Council resolution 1521 (2003). It was suggested that the Council might wish to consider deferring any adjustments to the existing sanctions measures until the situation had stabilized. The team particularly recognized the importance of continued monitoring of the border regions, especially the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border, where cross-border militias and mercenaries remained active. The present report provides details that may accentuate the findings and recommendations of the assessment mission and add nuance and a different emphasis to some of the issues.

B. Ebola crisis and the security sector

13. The rapid spread of Ebola from neighbouring Guinea has overwhelmed the Liberian security sector institutions and threatens State and regional stability. Ebola began in Liberia as a health crisis, but swiftly became a crisis of State security because the country lacks mature institutions with the resilience to respond adequately to internal or external shocks. It is from that perspective that the Panel analysed the Ebola situation, the government response and the implications for near-term and future stability. The Government’s initially slow, and subsequently militarized, response to the spread of Ebola reveals the country’s fragility and persistent governance challenges, together with its citizens’ deep distrust of State authority. In particular, the Government’s deployment of the armed forces to enforce a curfew and the quarantining of neighbourhoods in Monrovia proved counterproductive. The use of violence by the armed forces against unarmed civilians on 20 August 2014 demonstrated that soldiers without specific training to deal with civilians are inappropriate tools for such situations.

14. The Panel notes that on 30 July 2014 the Government launched an operation codenamed “Rescue”, deploying more than 500 personnel nationwide to enforce the emergency measures relating to Ebola containment efforts.

15. Security issues relating to the spreading virus and the efforts to contain it were first reported in July 2014, a few months after Ebola had spread from the south-eastern forest region of Guinea into Liberia. On 23 July, a group of about 200 young people demonstrated at the hospital run by Eternal Love Winning Africa in Paynesville, Montserrado County, complaining that the erection of Ebola screening tents at the hospital would spread the virus into their community. That same day, a man claiming that an Ebola-stricken relative was not being given proper treatment
set fire to the main conference hall of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Monrovia, causing damage in the region of $200,000. The following day, an angry mob blocked the road and threw stones at Redemption Hospital in New Kru Town, demanding the body of a woman who had died of Ebola-related complications upon arrival. On 28 July, a community in Lofa County removed the bodies of Ebola victims from the local hospital to give them a traditional burial, setting ablaze a vehicle belonging to Samaritan’s Purse, a United States non-governmental organization providing care for Ebola patients.

16. Senior government officials informed the Panel that the Government had concluded that the incidents and related events threatened the authority and stability of the State, leading to the implementation of emergency measures. On 6 August, the President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, declared a state of emergency for 90 days, citing article 86 of the Constitution. She requested the Legislature to authorize $20 million in special funds, a large part to be spent on the security agencies during the state of emergency. The request was promptly approved.

17. After the launch of Operation White Shield on 8 August, the Government deployed 50 troops to Bomi County to support the national police in restricting the movement of people from Bomi, Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount and Lofa counties into Monrovia for 21 days. The deployment raised no legal or jurisdictional issues. The National Defence Strategy, completed on 11 February 2014, defines the role of the army as protecting the territorial integrity of Liberia, responding to disasters and assisting the national police in national emergencies. It drew upon the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of August 2003, which ended the prolonged civil wars. Article VII (2)(c) of the Agreement states that the mission of the armed forces shall be to defend national sovereignty and, in extremis, respond to natural disasters.

18. The Panel notes that the Ministry of Defence stated, when announcing Operation White Shield, that the armed forces were being deployed to ensure the security of health workers as they traced Ebola victims and their contacts in affected areas, to secure quarantined areas and to restrict the movement of people from Ebola-affected areas. The Government deployed five task forces, comprising members of the armed forces and other security agencies, to Montserrat, Lofa, Grand Cape Mount, Bomi and Nimba counties. On 19 August, the President announced a nationwide curfew to be enforced by the armed forces and the national police. She also announced the quarantining of the West Point neighbourhood of Monrovia, after an incident on 16 August in which community members broke into a holding centre for confirmed and suspected Ebola patients and looted or damaged equipment, in the process releasing some of the patients who were then in isolation.

19. The Panel has received credible information from several sources indicating that, since their deployment, some armed forces and national police personnel have harassed civilians and extorted money and goods at checkpoints. The most dramatic incident occurred on 20 August, when the armed forces fired live rounds at stone-throwing demonstrators in the West Point neighbourhood, leaving one young person dead and two injured. That troubling incident is likely to reinforce the perception of many Liberians that the current armed forces are little different from the predatory
armed forces of the past. This would be both unfortunate and unfair, given that the restructured armed forces, although imperfect, are fundamentally different.  

20. The Panel notes that carefully preparing military personnel in how to properly conduct operations in civilian areas is an essential part of professional military training. It has learned, however, that, in 2008, Dyncorp International, the agency contracted to recruit and train the armed forces after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, removed the three weeks of training devoted to human rights, civics and civil-military relations owing to funding constraints. The UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section informed the Panel that, in lieu of that systematic training, UNMIL conducted a number of half-day sessions on human rights and child protection for recruits during their basic training. The Panel has also received information that a group of humanitarian law instructors — trained by the International Committee of the Red Cross — conducted training sessions on humanitarian law and human rights for armed forces personnel. Some 400 personnel benefitted therefrom.

21. Systematic training in human rights and civil-military relations — a critical issue given the history of the armed forces — was apparently not accorded priority during the training of the armed forces. This significant gap in training and preparedness needs to be filled. It is especially important because the National Defence Strategy recommends that the strength of the armed forces reach 2,500 personnel by mid-2015. In April 2014, 134 new recruits completed basic training, bringing the strength to 2,040 personnel. Moreover, the code of military discipline, which was signed by the Minister of Defence in 2013, has still not been ratified by the Legislature and is one of several important bills relating to the security sector remaining in limbo (see paras. 52-56 below).

22. The security measures provoked a backlash among a population that is deeply distrustful of the Government. Internal unrest and, possibly, violence become more likely the longer such measures are enforced, especially if there is little perceived improvement in the Ebola containment efforts by the Government and its international partners. Opposition political figures have cited the Government’s alleged poor handling of the crisis to call for the resignation of the President and for the establishment of a transitional government. In one of many opposition criticisms, a senator, Prince Yormie Johnson, argued that the Government had not made a convincing case for the curfew and failed to act decisively to contain the spread of Ebola. Johnson, a former warlord who represents the heavily Ebola-affected Nimba County, called upon the heads of the national security agencies to explain to the Senate the alleged abuses by security personnel of civilians during curfew hours, the increase in incidents of armed robbery since the imposition of the state of emergency and the curfew and the circumstances leading to a teenager being shot dead in West Point.

23. The Panel reviewed crime statistics from the United Nations police component for August 2014. They show an increase in armed robbery and arrests for illegal possession of firearms, including a particularly troubling incident on 27 August in

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1 The Panel received information in October 2014 that, following the incident in West Point, the United States military advisers to the Liberian armed forces launched an administrative (not criminal) disciplinary hearing that found the officer in command of the operation guilty of conduct unbecoming of an officer and of dereliction of duty. The armed forces currently lack sufficient legal personnel to establish a legal section for prosecution.
which three unidentified persons, armed with an AK-47 rifle and a pistol, robbed a 31-year-old man in Monrovia. It was the first recorded use of a combat weapon in an armed robbery in the country in years.

24. Beyond lapses by security agencies, a more fundamental concern is the threat posed by Ebola to the personnel of those agencies and their coherence and morale. In September, there were worrisome signs that Ebola was spreading among members of the Executive Protection Service, the national police and the armed forces. On 17 September, 57 officers and agents of the Executive Protection Service were quarantined for 21 days after attending the burial of a colleague who had died of Ebola two days earlier. In the same month, the Deputy Police Director for Administration announced that two national police officers had died of Ebola. Furthermore, the police barracks in Monrovia was quarantined after an officer’s spouse died of Ebola early in September. On 25 September, a number of armed forces officers were taken to the hospital run by Eternal Love Winning Africa in Monrovia after showing signs of Ebola. The military barracks where the soldiers were living was quarantined, together with its medical clinic. On 20 October, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that seven soldiers had died of the virus.

25. The international community and the Government have spent massive sums to recruit, vet and train the current armed forces. Efforts should be made to ensure that they remain professional, coherent and functional.

IV. Current measures relating to arms pursuant to resolution 1903 (2009) and modified pursuant to resolution 2128 (2013)

A. Overview

26. By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1903 (2009), the Security Council modified the arms embargo on Liberia, which was later renewed under resolution 2128 (2013), to cover the supply, sale or transfer of arms and any related materiel and the provision of any assistance, advice or training relating to military activities, including financing and financial assistance, to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of Liberia. The measures on the notification requirements were modified pursuant to subparagraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013) such that the Government now has the primary responsibility to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia in advance of any shipment of arms and related materiel to the Government or of any provision of training. Previously, this responsibility lay with States sending arms and materiel and providing training.

27. As the Panel noted in its midterm report, many officials in the Government of Liberia remain unaware of the nature and requirements of the arms embargo, including the notification requirement that invests the Government with primary notification responsibility and the measures as they relate to non-governmental entities and individuals (S/2014/363, para. 8). Many officials with whom the Panel spoke continued to express the belief that the Government was prohibited by the sanctions regime from importing any weapons or ammunition or receiving security sector training without prior permission from the United Nations, which has not been the case since resolution 1903 (2009). As in the first half of its mandate, the
Panel explained the notification requirements to officials in the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President, the armed forces, the national police, the Executive Protection Service, the National Security Agency and the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms.

28. Many government officials to whom the Panel explained the notification requirements expressed the view that they favoured lifting the arms embargo so that the Government could more easily acquire weapons and related materiel and receive training. They claimed that the notification process was cumbersome and confusing. The Panel notes that there is no clear source in Liberia — including within UNMIL — to which the Government can turn for questions regarding the specifics of the measures relating to arms. When the Panel told the officials that the arms embargo prohibited non-governmental entities and individuals from obtaining arms, ammunition and training, they stated that they were in favour of the continuation of that aspect of the measures.

29. The arms embargo has evolved from punitive restrictions on the Government to serving as a protective mechanism in support of the Government’s peace consolidation efforts. This is in recognition of the progress that the Government has made, the support that it continues to need and the remaining threat posed by non-governmental entities and individuals that may wish to undermine the fragile peace. The views of the government officials stated above highlight three issues relating to the protective aspect of the sanctions regime. First, some key government officials perceive the current arms embargo relating to non-governmental entities and individuals to be an effective deterrent to those individuals and groups that may seek to obtain arms, ammunition and training. Second, the Government remains concerned about the possibility of such actors gaining access to arms, ammunition and training. The Panel notes in this regard that the National Defence Strategy indicates that non-State external and internal threats and natural disasters remain the key threats to the stability of Liberia. Third, the above implicitly acknowledges that the current capacity of the Government is too weak to take on the responsibility to monitor, control and regulate arms in Liberia effectively.

30. To date, no weapons in government stockpiles have been marked (see paras. 43–46 below) as required under resolution 1903 (2009), although the Government acquired two marking machines in March 2014 (S/2014/363, paras. 18–20). Owing to the travel restrictions relating to the Ebola crisis, the Panel was unable to inspect government armouries in the second half of its mandate. According to available UNMIL firearms inspections reports, and consistent with past inspections, however, the Government’s management of its weapon and ammunition stockpiles in its armouries continues to appear adequate, if imperfect (ibid., paras. 14–17 and 21).

31. No legal framework is yet in place to regulate arms. Progress towards establishing such a framework by passing the draft firearms and ammunition control act continues to be delayed for no apparent reason. The lack of national legislation governing the importation and possession of weapons, coupled with the inability of the Government to monitor large portions of its territory, impedes any effective arms monitoring by the State (ibid., para. 12). At a time of instability, as now with the Ebola crisis, establishing this framework should be a matter of national priority, especially because the legislation is ready for enactment (see paras. 52–53 below).
32. The Panel’s investigation found evidence suggesting that arms embargo violations have occurred along the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border. The suspected violations relate to the attacks of February and May 2014 on the Ivorian villages of Fete and Grabo, in addition to the cross-border attack of 13 August 2012 on the Ivorian armed forces barracks at Péhékanhouéblé (see paras. 74-78 below).

33. The Panel has continued to find evidence of broad and systemic weaknesses in the capacity of the Government of Liberia relating to security and governance. They were previously seen to be most acute with regard to border security and the continued activity among Ivorian militias operating in Liberia with support from Liberian facilitators, primarily because that was the most complicated threat that Liberia had faced and was a serious flashpoint. The Ebola crisis, however, has exposed and further exacerbated the Government’s deep institutional weaknesses that extend far beyond the security sector institutions. The Government has to date demonstrated little capacity to adequately respond to internal threats such as Ebola or external threats such as cross-border militant activity; it lacks the ability to deal with the issues simultaneously. Such systemic weaknesses require further investigation and attention as UNMIL draws down and the Government takes the final steps towards full ownership of its security sector (S/2014/363, para. 9).

34. In 2014, two attacks with links to Liberia occurred in the area of Fete and Grabo, in the Bas Sassandra district of Côte d’Ivoire. The first, discussed in the Panel’s midterm report, occurred on 23 February, while the second occurred on 15 May. There was another attack on those villages between those dates, on 26 April, most likely carried out only by Ivorians resident in Côte d’Ivoire. The Panel sought to determine the operational and strategic aspects of the attacks and the leadership and financing mechanisms that ordered and supported them. It accorded priority to on-the-ground investigations with the intent of collecting incontrovertible documentary evidence and corroborating testimony relating to the political and financial leadership of the attacks. The Panel travelled to the border region in February and March 2014 and again in June and July 2014. In July, the Panel undertook a joint investigative mission to Côte d’Ivoire with the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.

35. The Panel and the Group together uncovered evidence indicating that the attacks had been planned, financed and ordered by elements loyal to the regime of the former President of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo. The investigation revealed a much broader and more sophisticated combatant network than previously known. The attacks — and the leadership, command and finance structures that the Panel uncovered — highlight that serious cross-border security threats remain. The attacks were focused on Côte d’Ivoire and clearly linked to the post-electoral conflict in 2011, some initial analyses that emphasized land disputes as the central driver of the attacks notwithstanding (see paras. 65-69 below).

B. Notifications and compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013)

36. The measures on notification requirements were modified pursuant to subparagraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013) such that the Government has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee in advance of any shipment of arms and related materiel to the Government or of any
provision of training. During the mandate period, the Panel was unaware of any deliveries of arms or ammunition or provision of training to the Government. The Panel is aware of one notification regarding a shipment of arms, ammunition and materiel for the armed forces that was formally communicated to the Committee on 13 October 2014.

37. The Panel is concerned that, even after communicating the notification requirements to the Government on multiple occasions, the initial communication that the Government sent to the Chair of the Committee on 18 August 2014 regarding the notification still did not fully conform to the requirements set out in paragraph 2 (b) (iv) of resolution 2128 (2013) because it failed to include the date of delivery, mode of transportation and itinerary of the shipments. Annex II sets out the notification requirements in accordance with the Committee’s guidelines. In consultation with the Chair of the Committee, the Secretariat informed the Permanent Mission of Liberia to the United Nations of the need for additional details to be included in the notification. The Permanent Mission then transmitted the information to Monrovia. Subsequently, the Ministry of Defence included the missing information in the formal notification that was communicated to the Committee on 13 October 2014, rendering it compliant with resolution 2128 (2013).

38. The need for detailed information was specifically highlighted in the Panel’s midterm report (S/2014/363, para. 27). Importing weapons into Liberia without including the information required could be construed as an arms embargo violation or result in illicit movements of weapons and materiel. As the sanctions regime on Liberia winds down, it is important for the Government to take further ownership of its security arrangements by working with UNMIL and Member States to ensure that it takes appropriate and timely action to notify the Committee ahead of possible future shipments of arms and materiel and the provision of training. That the Government has trouble meeting the basic notification requirements does not send a strong message and highlights the type of assistance that the Government appears to need regarding information on the measures on arms.

39. Moreover, the Panel is concerned about the timing of the notification of the Government’s intent to purchase weapons, given that the sole notification for 2014 came amid unrest in Monrovia around the public’s perception of mishandling of the Ebola crisis by the Government (see paras. 13-25 above).

40. The Panel was previously informed of two future procurement processes relating to arms, ammunition and training, one for the national police, in particular its armed Emergency Response Unit and Police Support Unit, and one for the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (S/2014/363, paras. 25-27). The Ebola crisis has, however, slowed down those processes.

41. The Panel continues to stress that it is important for UNMIL trainers and advisers to assist the security services, in line with a request in resolution 2128 (2013), to conduct needs-based assessments that determine the appropriate type and quantity of arms, ammunition and materiel for each armed unit of the Government. The Panel also emphasizes that, if the measures relating to arms remain, future procurements of weapons, ammunition and materiel would trigger the need for a notification. Given the Government’s recent history of difficulty in complying fully with the notification requirements, the Panel stresses the need for closer collaboration on those issues, especially between UNMIL and the Government.
42. All Liberian security agencies have limited capacity and require sustained international support through funding, training and provision of equipment to improve their effectiveness. This is particularly true of the national police, whose capacity needs remain acute regarding investigations, evidentiary standards, witness and suspect handling and working with government prosecutors to build cases (ibid., paras. 41-45 and 84). The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization also requires further attention, given that its primary responsibility is to monitor and secure the country’s porous borders. Securing the borders will remain a challenge far into the future, but will prove impossible unless the capacity of the Bureau is strengthened. The Panel re-emphasizes that Bureau personnel have received less attention and support than the other Liberian security agencies in the post-war years and, as a result, many have not undergone a meaningful vetting process and have less formal training than national police officers and members of the armed forces. Further training is necessary before responsibly procuring arms and ammunition for the Bureau (ibid., para. 26).

C. Stockpile management of government armouries and weapons marking

43. In its resolution 1903 (2009), the Security Council reiterated that the Government of Liberia should mark all weapons and ammunition in its possession, maintain a registry of them and formally notify the Committee that those steps had been taken. Such a notification has not yet taken place. The Panel reaffirms that the implementation of the measures stipulated in that resolution would enhance the ability of the Government to properly manage its weapon and ammunition stockpiles and would discourage any misappropriation or theft of that materiel.

44. During the first half of its mandate, the Panel, working closely with the firearms inspection teams of the UNMIL military and police components, inspected the armouries of the armed forces, the coast guard, the Emergency Response Unit and the Police Support Unit and the Executive Protection Service. The Panel never gained access to the armoury of the National Security Agency. Travel restrictions relating to the Ebola crisis made it impossible for the Panel to travel to Liberia to inspect the armouries further. The Panel has therefore had to rely on the reports of the UNMIL teams that continued to conduct formal inspections of all government armouries in 2014. The Panel received a report from the UNMIL police component on its inspections of the armouries of the National Security Agency, the Emergency Response Unit and the Executive Protection Service of 17 September 2014. The Panel also received reports from the UNMIL military component, which inspected armed forces armouries on 18 March, 27 June and 29 and 30 September 2014.

45. The Panel continues to assess the overall standard maintained by Liberian armourers as adequate, if imperfect. Of primary and continuing concern is that the markings on weapons and ammunition are insufficient. Its analysis is consistent with UNMIL inspection reports. The Panel has consistently reported on the lack of adequate markings on government weapons. By not marking weapons sufficiently, Liberia has failed to comply with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (S/2013/316, paras. 8-11; S/2013/683, paras. 6 and 22-25; and S/2014/363, para. 17). The Panel also notes that the inspection reports indicate consistent issues with proper maintenance of the weapons in government armouries,
especially those of the Emergency Response Unit and the Executive Protection Service.

46. It is unclear why there has been no progress towards the marking of weapons. The problem appears to be partly technical. The Government obtained two marking machines in March 2014 and members of relevant government agencies received training on their use (S/2014/363, para. 18), but the Panel was informed by the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms in June that the machines lacked the engraving needles necessary to physically imprint the markings. UNMIL confirmed that information in October, stating that the manufacturer had indicated that two needles had been sent with the machines, but appeared to have been lost in transit.

47. UNMIL has submitted a quick-impact proposal to purchase 16 needles, a quantity based on the manufacturer’s estimates that eight needles per year per machine are necessary if the equipment is to be used optimally. UNMIL informed the Panel that the needles might arrive in November.

48. It is unclear whether the two-day training session in March 2014 was adequate to teach the participants how to use the machines. Even if it was adequate, the Panel suggests that further follow-up training is likely to be necessary. The Panel was informed by UNMIL that it had included follow-up training as part of its proposal mentioned above.

49. Once the needles are in Liberia and basic training on how to use the machines has been conducted, there will be no reason — logistical or financial — for the Government to further delay marking the weapons in its armouries. The Panel urges the Government, as a matter of national priority, to institute that measure, which would constitute best practice of stockpile management and reduce the threat posed by illicit trafficking in arms.

50. The machines are still being stored in the office of the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, located on the 1st floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation that the machines be housed in a secure government armoury, such as that of the armed forces (ibid., para. 81).

51. Storage of weapons in the leeward counties continues to pose a challenge for the security forces, especially the national police. The Panel has seen the storage facilities in many counties and observed the maintenance routines for the weapons, which are not always sufficient. The United Nations police component, in a report published in September 2014, noted that some weapons of the Emergency Response Unit and the Police Support Unit were stored in wooden boxes, which it had determined to be insufficient. In addition, weapons had at times remained with officers at all times, contrary to normal procedures where they would be returned to the armoury after the officers’ shifts had ended.

D. Legislative framework for small arms and capacity issues

52. In its midterm report, the Panel noted some progress with regard to establishing the legal framework to regulate arms (ibid., paras. 29-36). Nevertheless, the draft firearms and ammunition control act was still being reviewed and had not been submitted to the Legislature when the Panel submitted the present report. The Panel expressed concern that, without national legislation governing the importation and possession of weapons in a country still with limited ability to
monitor large portions of its territory, the Government would be unable to effectively monitor the movement of arms into and out of Liberia.

53. Early in June 2014, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms submitted the draft act to the Office of the President, which subsequently sent it to the Office of the Legal Adviser to the President, who was out of the country at the time. In mid-September, by a directive from the President, the draft was sent to the Chair of the Law Reform Commission. The Chair of the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms informed the Panel that the Law Reform Commission had returned the draft to the Office of the President, which, in late September, had sent it to the Inspector General of the national police. On 24 October, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms informed the Panel that the draft had been returned to the Office of the President.

54. The draft act invests the national police with significant new powers and responsibilities, although it is unclear whether the national police has the capacity to take them on. The draft states that in collaboration with and under the direction of the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms the national police is to be the sole law enforcement agency responsible for the registration, licensing and control of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials in and throughout Liberia. It requires the Inspector General of the national police to create a small arms control unit within the national police, answerable directly to him or her, to be decentralized and represented in every county for easy access for registration and tracking of small arms and ammunition. Arms brokers must also register with the Inspector General, who should maintain a register of all brokers in the country, and provide the Commission with quarterly reports of activities on the registration and licensing of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials. The draft mandates the Inspector General to make a detailed monthly report to the Minister of Justice and the Commission regarding the import, export, sale, purchase, transfer, manufacture, repair, possession and any crimes linked to the use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials to enable the Commission to initiate effective policies for small arms control.

55. The new powers and responsibilities given to the national police need to be reflected in the act on the national police, the draft of which was submitted by the Ministry of Justice to the President in May 2014 and is still awaiting submission to the Legislature. Similarly, the role and responsibilities of the national police should be reflected in the act setting up the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, possibly as an amendment, to avoid some of the consistent overlaps and confusion in coordination and jurisdiction among Liberian security agencies that have led to inertia and dysfunction. Harmonizing the Liberian security institutions to avoid overlaps is a longer-term process. While important and meriting focused international support, it should not hold up the pressing need to enact the firearms and ammunition control legislation.

56. The Panel notes that, on 18 September 2014, the House of Representatives of Liberia unanimously ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, which the Government had signed on 4 June 2013 in New York. The Treaty was established as an international standard for the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and ammunition. It requires no financial or administrative commitment on the part of the Government, which does not currently manufacture or officially export arms. The
Treaty had been submitted to the Legislature by the President in August 2014. Its ratification suggests that the Legislature can act with dispatch.

E. Cross-border security concerns and the arms embargo

57. The rapid spread of Ebola from Guinea into Liberia and then Sierra Leone exemplifies the intimate interconnectedness of the subregion. That interconnectedness and the highly porous nature of the borders continue to present serious challenges to maintaining regional security, especially regarding cross-border militant activity. The Panel has previously reported on its investigations of the Liberia-Sierra Leone border region and the Liberia-Guinea border area (S/2014/363, paras. 62-64 and 68-69). Securing both borders continues to pose a challenge to the Government.

58. The region along the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border remains of particular concern to the Panel owing to the unresolved political and social issues in Côte d’Ivoire, which have triggered deadly attacks by mercenary and militia groups in the past. This continues to be the case, as the attacks on the villages of Fete and Grabo in Côte d’Ivoire illustrate.

59. Most troubling is that the Panel’s investigation into the attacks revealed evidence that they had been, at least in part, organized, planned and financed by the political and economic elite linked to the former President of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo (see paras. 64-68 below). The Panel reiterates that, while an arms embargo might not be the most effective mechanism to prevent cross-border trafficking and militant activity, it remains one of the few tools to ensure investigations of the sources of financing, arms and ammunition supply and the combatant networks operating in the border region (S/2013/316, para. 32, and S/2014/363, para. 38).

60. Although the attacks in 2014 were small in scale and did not threaten State security in either Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire, they demonstrated that Gbagbo-linked elements continue to have the intent to organize, plan and launch deadly attacks. Furthermore, they maintain the capacity to carry out many of their tactical goals: to cause localized instability, to terrorize the rural population, primarily the Burkinabé, to launch reprisal attacks against the armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire for perceived atrocities committed during and after the electoral crisis in that country and to steal weapons belonging to the Ivorian security forces (S/2014/363, paras. 39-42, and S/2014/729, paras. 18-24). While their larger goals of retaking land that they believe to have been taken from them and ultimately returning to power the Gbagbo regime may be beyond their capacity, the groups remain committed to those goals and violent means of achieving them. The Panel continues to be concerned about further attacks as the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015 approach.\(^2\)

Attacks on Fete and Grabo

61. The villages of Fete and Grabo were attacked on 23 February and 15 May 2014. Four Ivorian soldiers were killed in February (S/2014/363, annex III) and another three in May, according to the Minister of Defence, Paul Koffi Koffi. Some 14 civilians were killed and many displaced. At least 15 weapons and various

\(^2\) The Panel notes that elections are also scheduled to be held in Guinea in 2015, which presents another concern to the border regions of Liberia.
rounds of ammunition were stolen from the Ivorian armed forces and have not been recovered. There was another attack on the villages on 26 April. Sources informed the Panel that, unlike the attacks of February and May, which had targeted Ivorian soldiers, the attack had targeted Burkinabé villagers and those collaborating with them. The attack was smaller and probably carried out only by Ivorians resident in Côte d’Ivoire, rather than Ivorians resident in Liberia or Liberian mercenaries.

62. Multiple sources, including combatants, told the Panel that additional attacks had been planned for August or September 2014. In September and October, the Panel was informed by a mercenary source that the attacks had been temporarily put on hold owing to the enhanced security measures and greater presence of security personnel in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia in response to the Ebola crisis. Arrests in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia after the attacks in February and May probably also had an impact on future attacks. The Panel remains concerned by the large number of individuals who are willing to fight, including Liberian mercenaries, Ivorians resident in Liberia and Ivorians resident in Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, sources and evidence indicate that many combatants involved in the attacks in 2012, 2013 and 2014 remain at large.

63. In July 2014, the Panel conducted multiple interviews with the commander who organized and led the first attack on Fete and Grabo, in February (hereinafter “The Commander”). He was an original member of the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix, a notorious, well-trained and well-equipped pro-Gbagbo militia formed in 2002, who maintained close links to other former combatants from that militia. He provided detailed information on the attacks, which the Panel corroborated with other sources and documentary evidence.

64. His testimony and an organization chart that he drew of the combatant structure of the attacks (see annex III) shows that there were three groups of combatants: one Liberian, one Ivorian resident in Liberia and one Ivorian resident in Côte d’Ivoire. Together, the groups comprised a unit called the “Compagnie Armageddon”. He indicated that there were 15 Liberian fighters, 24 Ivorians resident in Liberia and 14 members of the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix in the group (see annex III). The last-mentioned were Ivorians resident and recruited in Côte d’Ivoire. Sources indicate that the Liberians move freely across the border, making it impossible to determine whether they are resident in Liberia or in Côte d’Ivoire. It is possible that the three groups were not necessarily so starkly divided during the attacks and operated in combat units that merged members of the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix, Ivorians resident in Liberia and Liberians. Annexes IV, V and VII provide further details on suspected combatant and recruiter identities. The findings support the Panel’s previous findings based on testimony and documentary evidence about the structure of the attacks, the number of combatants and the various groups involved (S/2014/363, paras. 49-56 and annex III). The Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reached the same conclusion (S/2014/729, paras. 17-24).

3 The Panel notes that the name is in keeping with the religious names of the three groups of combatants comprising Ivorians resident in Liberia: the Force spécial pour la libération de la Côte d’Ivoire, the Force spécial de Dieu pour la libération de Côte d’Ivoire and the Force miraculeuse de Dieu pour la libération de la Côte d’Ivoire (S/2014/363, para. 48 and annex VIII). The three groups are the subunits of the militant group comprising Ivorians resident in Liberia, primarily in and around the Little Wlebo refugee camp.
Evidence of leadership and financial ties to the pro-Gbagbo elite

65. The Panel found sufficient evidence that makes clear that the combatants received financial assistance for their activities and command and control instructions. There is also evidence of linkages to the pro-Gbagbo Ivorian political elite. Further investigation is required to precisely identify the individuals and their locations.

66. “The Commander” informed the Panel that he had been funded and given instructions by members of the elite loyal to the former Gbagbo regime living abroad. He claimed that the attacks had been planned, organized and financed by that network. He provided the broad organizational structure of the group to the Panel (see annex VI).

67. The Panel and the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire obtained access to some of his written correspondence from 2013 to February 2014. It corroborates his testimony and suggests that the group was consistently receiving instructions, financing and support throughout 2013, culminating in the attacks in 2014 on Fete and Grabo (S/2014/729, paras. 17-24). The correspondence, corroborated by other witness testimony, indicates that the group received financing through intermediaries in Europe and West Africa. The amounts appear to be rather small, in line with that observed with regard to the attacks in 2013. Transfers discussed in witness statements ranged from 40,000 CFA francs (approximately $77) to 1 million CFA francs (approximately $2,000).

68. Testimony from “The Commander”, witness statements and both Ivorian and Liberian combatant sources to whom the Panel spoke in Liberia have consistently named high-ranking members of the former Gbagbo regime as being politically or financially involved in the militant activity. Many of the individuals named have fled Côte d’Ivoire and currently reside in Ghana or elsewhere in West Africa. The Panel sought to meet some of the individuals in Accra through the Ghana Refugee Board, but was unsuccessful (see para. 93 below).

69. The Panel recognizes that there is an incentive for detained individuals to name such high-ranking officials as a way of ingratiating themselves with the security services and perhaps gain their freedom. There is also an incentive among some in the Government of Côte d’Ivoire to promote the notion that those individuals are causing trouble in the country in order to further stigmatize them for political reasons. However, the correspondence — that details organization and financing among some members of the pro-Gbagbo elite — appears authentic and was corroborated by other sources. The Panel is of the opinion that the issue needs more systematic joint investigations by the Panel and the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.

Combatant structures that may link to past cross-border attacks in 2012 and 2013

70. The operational and leadership elements of the Compagnie Armageddon appear to be associated with the groups that undertook cross-border attacks in 2012 and 2013. In correspondence between “The Commander” and another individual, the death of Oulai Tako, or “Tarzan du Grand Ouest”, was discussed. The Panel investigated Tako in 2012 and 2013. He was closely associated with Bobby Sarpee, Nyezee Barway, Ophoree Diah and the other mercenaries responsible for the attacks on Sakré, Sao and Para in 2012, in which seven United Nations peacekeepers were killed. Tako was killed in the attack of 23 March 2013 on Petit Guiglo (S/2011/757, para. 58; S/2012/901, paras. 68, 74-75 and annex 16; and S/2013/316, paras. 16-19,
21-23 and annex III). The correspondence shows that shortly after Tako’s death there were instructions to keep the death a secret and information was conveyed that he was to be replaced soon. Even if this does not mean that the leadership was exactly the same, it suggests at the very least that there were close connections among the groups such that operational details were commonly understood and shared.

71. The Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reported that the Compagnie Armageddon had been involved in the apparent targeted attack of 11 March 2013 on the police academy in Abidjan that had claimed the life of the Training Director, General Yao Brou Alain (S/2014/729, para. 20). Correspondence and testimony obtained by the Panel further show that there was an intention to use the Compagnie Armageddon to carry out politically motivated attacks on government institutions and to assassinate political figures. “The Commander” informed the Panel that the attacks had been planned and surveillance undertaken on individuals for targeted killing, but the attacks had not been attempted because he had not been provided with sufficient funds and weapons.

**Weapons used for the attacks, suspected arms embargo violations and weapons caches**

72. In keeping with the small-scale nature of attacks seen in the region since 2012, it appears that only a small number of weapons were used in the attacks, each with only a handful of rounds. Other individuals from the groups used bladed weapons, knives and machetes (S/2014/363, annex III). “The Commander” stated to the Panel that seven AK-47 rifles had been used and provided a list of the combatants who had been armed with those rifles and those with bladed weapons (see annex VII). Other sources informed the Panel that 10 or 12 AK-47 rifles had been used.

73. According to “The Commander” and other combatant sources, the attacks were unsuccessful because insufficient arms were available to the attackers. A goal of the attacks was to obtain weapons from Ivorian soldiers. Before the attacks, the Compagnie Armageddon sought to obtain more weapons. Among the correspondence obtained by the Panel is a request from April 2013 to outfit 120 combatants with AK-47 rifles, AA-52 machine guns, PKM machine guns, 12.7 mm machine guns, grenades, mortars, pistols and associated ammunition (see annex VIII). It is unclear whether the items were procured, in part or in whole, or whether it was a purely aspirational shopping list. The only item verified to have been procured is a radio scanner used to monitor Ivorian armed forces positions before and during the attacks. The Panel further notes the persistence of networks of individuals with connections to regional arms traffickers (see annex IX).

74. The Panel received information from credible sources that, in 2014, before and after the attacks on Fete and Grabo in February and May, a small number of arms were moved across the Cavalla River between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire in violation of the arms embargo. Sources informed the Panel that AK-47 rifles used during the attacks on Fete and Grabo and those stolen from the Ivorian soldiers during those attacks had been brought to Liberia.

75. In July 2014, the Panel interviewed two villagers originally from the Fete and Grabo areas who had fled to Liberia after the attack of 15 May. They identified some of the combatants involved in that attack, including Augustin Kapeyou Gnagbe (see annexes IV and V), from a photo spread. They informed the Panel that
he had returned to the Liberian side of the border in May 2014 with weapons and ammunition wrapped in rice bags. In June and July, multiple sources in and around the Little Wlebo refugee camp informed the Panel that he had been heard bragging about killing Ivorian soldiers and stealing their weapons after returning to Liberia. The two villagers stated that the weapons were kept hidden outside the village of Jartoken, River Gee County, and provided a map to the Panel. The Panel shared the information with the Liberian authorities and UNMIL.

76. In June 2014, a national police officer informed the Panel that a Liberian named Eric Smith had been arrested in River Gee County on 16 May while fleeing from the Ivorian security forces after the attack of 15 May on Fete and Grabo. Smith admitted his involvement in the attack to the national police and was found to be in possession of a Motorola handset radio. According to the national police, he stated that, during the attack on Grabo, he had been with Gnagbe and that Gnagbe had been in possession of weapons and a Motorola handset radio. An additional militia source in Little Wlebo told the Panel that Gnagbe had control of at least some of the weapons. The Panel further notes that “The Commander” indicated that one “Augustin” — subsequently determined to be Gnagbe — had been involved in the attacks (see annexes V and VII). The Panel’s inability to return to Liberia made it unable to determine the veracity of the assertions further. The Panel assesses, however, that the credibility of the sources, taken together, is high.

77. During its mandate, the Panel endeavoured to determine the location of other weapons caches, especially those associated with past cross-border attacks. In March and June 2014, it interviewed the mercenary commander who had organized the attack on the Ivorian barracks at Péhékanhouébli on 13 August 2012 (S/2012/901, paras. 17, 40 and 59-71). He told the Panel that the weapons used in and stolen during that attack had been brought back to Liberia in 2012 and were hidden around the Tien’s Town area of Grand Gedeh County. The source has proved highly credible in the past and the Panel suspects that the weapons were indeed transported across the border and are hidden in Grand Gedeh County.

78. In 2013, a mercenary general sold a rocket-propelled grenade launcher associated with the Péhékanhouébli cache to a Liberian official (S/2013/683, para. 11). As at October 2014, the weapon had not, according to UNMIL, been turned over to it for destruction (see annexes X and XI).

79. Many weapons and stores of ammunition are scattered around Liberia, largely the result of the incomplete disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration process. During its investigation in Grand Gedeh County, the Panel observed that ammunition had been discovered on three separate occasions by the national police, all without specifically searching for arms or ammunition. On 10 February 2014, a farmer found some 600 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition in his field. On 20 March, another farmer found 37 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition and a rusted and unusable assault rifle. On 12 April, national police officers conducted a routine stop of a motorbike rider, Sekou Koshia, at the Gbabo checkpoint and found in his possession six rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. Those examples of ammunition discovered in the span of three months without much effort suggest that significant amounts of ammunition are in Liberia (see annex XII).

80. Regarding the six rounds found on the motorbike rider, the Panel notes that that small amount, which was in near-perfect condition, tallies with the information provided by sources in Côte d’Ivoire that there were only a handful of rounds for
each AK-47 rifle used during the attack. This has been a common thread in the attacks investigated by the Panel in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The Panel further notes that, even while the ammunition exhibited in annex XII appears to be rusty and unusable, upon inspection, the rounds can in fact be easily cleaned and fired, given that most of the firing pins are intact.

Possible continuing recruiting in the Prime Timber Production refugee camp and links to past attacks

81. In June 2014, a highly credible mercenary commander informed the Panel that mercenary and militia leaders had met in the Prime Timber Production refugee camp outside Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, in April 2014 to discuss recruitment. The Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reported that, Didier Goulia (alias Roger Tikouia) was recruiting combatants in the same area in July 2014 (S/2014/729, para. 25). The Panel notes that Goulia, a former commander of a pro-Gbagbo militia in Guiglo during the post-electoral crisis in 2011, served as a key intermediary between the former Gbagbo regime and Liberian mercenaries based in Moyen-Cavally, Côte d’Ivoire, before and during the Ivorian post-electoral crisis, providing both financing and weapons to the mercenaries on behalf of Abidjan (S/2012/901, paras. 52-71 and annexes 12 and 13). Goulia is also the father-in-law of Bobby Sarpee and was a leading financier who may have also provided weapons and orders for the attacks in 2012 on Sakré, Sao and Para that resulted in the deaths of seven UNOCI peacekeepers from the Niger (ibid., paras. 52, 56-57 and 70).

82. The Panel notes that, according to its sources, the recent recruiting for the attacks on Fete and Grabo was conducted largely, if not exclusively, at the Little Wlebo refugee camp in Maryland County. Previous attacks in 2012 and 2013, however, had links to the Prime Timber Production refugee camp and other refugee camps in Grand Gedeh County. Recent evidence suggests that the groups may not be as separate as previously analysed (see para. 70 above).

Militant linkages to the Little Wlebo refugee camp

83. The Panel previously reported militant linkages to the Little Wlebo refugee camp in Maryland County, Liberia (S/2014/363, paras. 43-56). It has since found further evidence that this is the case. The Panel remains concerned that refugee camps in Liberia can serve as safe havens and convenient recruiting and staging grounds for cross-border attacks, especially in instances in which militants have gained refugee status (S/2012/901, paras. 41, 46, 60-62, 64, 66-68, 70, 72-73, 76-77 and 81-83; S/2013/316, paras. 17-18; S/2013/683, paras. 30-31; and S/2014/363, para. 83).

84. According to multiple independent sources, the recruitment of Ivorians in Liberia was led by two Ivorian refugees resident in Little Wlebo, Noel Kagouho Djouka and Augustine Dabo Takouo (see annex XIII). Two militia sources in Little Wlebo informed the Panel that Djouka and Takouo had promised them money if they would fight in the attacks on Fete and Grabo. According to those sources, Djouka and Takouo never paid any of the combatants who fought in Côte d’Ivoire, their promises notwithstanding. It is unclear whether either Djouka or Takouo ever had the money to pay the combatants or whether they received the money and kept it for themselves.
85. That financing was made available to “The Commander” and his former Groupe des patriotes pour la paix leadership, but perhaps not to the combatants from Little Wlebo, suggests two points.

86. First, while the groups may have been operationally linked, they are not necessarily one group: there are clear stratifications within the group. This scenario indicates that the leadership has the ability to mobilize multiple sources of combatant labour, without needing to deploy significant resources, finances or armaments.

87. Second, it shows how the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is playing out on two levels. On the one hand, there is a political conflict among current and former politicians and the elite who have access to resources. On the other, there are small-scale, localized grievances — often over land — into which the elite can very easily tap to catalyse recruitment among low-level fighters. It is likely that the low-level combatants that attack Ivorian armed forces positions with knives and machetes are not aware of larger political motives and of the links to the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix or the former Gbagbo elite. Their primary motivation is more likely localized issues. This is probably why the Panel — before it conducted its investigation on the Ivorian side of the border — assessed that the attacks had not been funded in the same ways as previous attacks in 2012 and 2013.

Release or escape of Liberians involved

88. The Panel continues to highlight the fact that most fighters involved in the recent attacks are Ivorian and the motives for and causes of conflict are rooted in the internal political situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The Panel has, however, documented the involvement of some Liberians, relying in part on the statements and evidence gathered by the national police. That evidence notwithstanding, all three of the Liberians who, while in the custody of the national police, admitted to being involved have since been released or have escaped. They are Hansen Weah (alias “Koudou Kapet Carlos”), Augustine Tweh and Eric Smith (S/2014/363, paras. 50-56; para. 76 above and annex IV).

V. Possible sources of funding for arms

A. Need for reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire and investigation in Ghana

89. In its midterm report, the Panel expressed concern about the lack of progress in the Ivorian national reconciliation process, notwithstanding the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which ended its public testimony in September 2014. The Panel noted that militant individuals on both sides of the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border, who were often ethnically and linguistically linked, had in the past perpetrated violent attacks against government forces in Côte d’Ivoire and that such attacks were likely to increase and become more deadly

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4 The Panel has previously reported that Hansen Weah holds de facto dual nationality, his father being Liberian and his mother Ivorian, and that he is a registered refugee (S/2014/363, paras. 51-52). The Panel has subsequently been informed by the national police that he was registered to vote in Liberia by the National Election Commission.
during the period leading immediately to the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015 (S/2014/363, para. 10).

90. Since the war in 2011, the apparent pursuit of justice in Côte d’Ivoire has principally targeted the former President, Laurent Gbagbo, and key members of his former political party, the Front populaire ivoirien. That the party remains the country’s main opposition party complicates the reconciliation process, in particular in the context of the elections scheduled for 2015. The Panel understands that 341 supporters arrested during and after the post-electoral crisis remain in detention. Even more pertinent is the continuing exile of prominent members of the Gbagbo regime, many of them in neighbouring Ghana.

91. The Panel previously noted that funding from former Gbagbo regime officials residing in Ghana served as the main catalyst for cross-border attacks from Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire (S/2012/448, paras. 8 and 86-87, and S/2012/901, paras. 39, 47 and 51-58).

92. Prompted by evidence that it gathered during its investigations, especially in Côte d’Ivoire, the Panel travelled to Ghana from 13 to 19 September 2014 to further investigate possible linkages between the recent attacks in Côte d’Ivoire and the Ivorian political elite based in Accra. The Panel provided advance notification to the Government of Ghana about the trip, including details of the dates and officials whom it wished to meet. Once in Accra, the Panel made repeated attempts to meet government officials, in particular the coordinator of the National Security Council, but was unsuccessful.

93. The Panel previously discussed the issue with the Government of Ghana during a visit in July 2013 and, through it, met about a dozen exiled senior officials of the former Gbagbo regime in Accra on 11 July 2013. The Ghanaian authorities then indicated to the Panel that the former Ivorian officials were rigorously monitored to ensure that they did not engage in any acts of destabilization in Côte d’Ivoire while resident in Ghana. The Panel was also informed by the Government that the individuals had insufficient funds for such activities. The Panel was told by some of former ministers of the Gbagbo regime that their bank accounts had been frozen by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and that they were seeking to return to Côte d’Ivoire but feared being killed or detained if they did so. The Panel’s investigation in 2013 in Ghana uncovered no evidence that the individuals were funding Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia elements (see S/2013/683).

B. Drug trafficking

94. In its midterm report, the Panel noted that the apparent increase in drug trafficking into and out of Liberia presented serious concerns for State security, in part because, once trafficking networks became entrenched, opportunities for funding illicit arms would increase, as would the ease of moving firearms through clandestine smuggling routes. The Panel was particularly concerned by the possibility that illicit trafficking could become a source of funding for arms used by non-State actors. The Panel re-emphasizes the vulnerability of the Freeport of Monrovia as a trans-shipment facility for drugs (S/2014/363, paras. 70-78).

95. In October 2014, the Panel received information from the Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency that the Agency’s work had been seriously hampered by the
Ebola crisis, although there had been progress with regard to the pending drug legislation. In its midterm report, the Panel noted that Liberia was one of very few countries in the region that had not yet passed legislation on controlled drugs and substances, even though the Government had drafted an act thereon in 2013. In June 2014, the Government submitted the draft act, which imposes stiff penalties for drug trafficking and even for minor drug use, to the Legislature, which ratified it within a few weeks. The draft act was then sent to the Office of the President, but it has yet to be signed into law.

96. Moreover, the Panel was informed by the Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency in October that agents had still not been authorized by the Government to deploy at the Freeport of Monrovia because the Freeport, which maintains its own security force, continued to object to that deployment.\(^5\) The Panel remains concerned that the Freeport has an independent security force and notes that article VII (2) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement explicitly forbids the existence of paramilitary groups operating within agencies such as the National Port Authority.

97. The Panel notes that the legislation that established the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1999 mandated it to facilitate the efficient and effective enforcement of all national anti-drug legislation. It invested the Agency with all responsibilities and powers relating to narcotic issues, some of which were previously held by the national police and the National Security Agency. There are still overlapping roles and responsibilities relating to narcotics among the national police, the National Security Agency and the Drug Enforcement Agency, however. Furthermore, the powers of the Drug Enforcement Agency are not fully realized, given the continuing insistence by the National Port Authority that agents may not deploy at the Freeport.

98. In June 2014, the Panel was provided with information at the launch of a report by the West Africa Commission on Drugs, entitled “Not just in transit: drugs, the State and society in West Africa”, that neighbouring Guinea has become a major narcotic trafficking hub, taking over the role previously played by Guinea-Bissau. The Panel was told that a network of army officers and government bureaucrats involved in drug trafficking, known as “the untouchables”, was operating in the country with impunity and — with access to weapons — could potentially arrange arms trafficking across the porous borders of neighbouring States, including Liberia.

VI. **Recommendations**

99. The Panel has repeatedly highlighted the legislative gaps that relate to the control of arms and ammunition in Liberia. The Panel urges the Government to accord priority to the passage of the draft act on firearms and ammunition control. Until it is passed, the Panel urges the Government to issue an executive order to ban the importation and possession of arms and ammunition by non-governmental entities and individuals. The passage of the legislation is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for ultimately lifting the arms embargo.

100. The Panel notes that other important items of draft legislation relating to the security sector reform process await ratification and enactment by the Government. Two are critical: the draft national police act, which was submitted by the Ministry

\(^5\) The Inspector General of the national police told the Panel in June 2014 that the national police also currently did not deploy at the Freeport because the management of the Freeport objected to it.
of Justice to the President in May 2014 and is still awaiting submission to the Legislature for ratification, and the code of military discipline of the armed forces, which was signed by the Minister of Defence in 2013, but has still not been ratified by the Legislature. The Panel urges the Government to ratify and enact those important items of legislation.

101. The Panel remains concerned that weapons are not properly marked by the Government and urges it, with the assistance of UNMIL, to mark all weapons maintained in government armouries in accordance with Security Council resolution 1903 (2009) and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Similarly, the Panel urges the Government, with the assistance of UNMIL, to implement a suitable method for marking and recording ammunition stocks as a matter of priority (S/2013/316, para. 78), in line with ECOWAS standards.

102. The Panel reiterates that the two weapons marking machines should be housed in a secure government armoury, such as that of the armed forces (S/2014/363, para. 81).

103. UNMIL should develop the capacity and expertise to advise the Government on issues relating to the sanctions regime, in particular pertaining to the measures on arms. Given that the Government continues to have a poor understanding of the measures, there should be a focal point within UNMIL to which the relevant government entities can turn for information and advice. That focal point should be authorized by the Committee to receive notifications from the Government and transmit them to the Chair of the Committee.

104. The Panel reiterates the recommendation made by the assessment mission of the Secretary-General that the Government designate a focal point for issues pertaining to the sanctions regime, especially the measures relating to arms. That individual should have a close working relationship with the above-mentioned UNMIL focal point.

105. The Panel urges the Government and its international partners to make the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms fully operational by providing it with adequate financial, logistical and political support to be able to perform its mandated functions effectively (see annex XIV). This includes ensuring that it has sufficient personnel. The role of the Commission will be critical to the security of Liberia in the light of the planned transition of UNMIL. Among other things, it is mandated to oversee the inventory of State-owned armouries, manage the Government’s stockpiles, supervise the arms-marking activities of various security agencies and create and manage a central arms database and coordinate firearms registration for private ownership of firearms nationwide.

106. The Panel urges the Government and its international partners, including UNMIL, to fill the gap that the Panel has identified in the training of armed forces personnel once the emergency measures relating to the Ebola containment efforts have concluded: the training of the armed forces in human rights, civics and civil-military relations in a democracy.

107. The Government, with the assistance of UNMIL and international partners, should accord priority to building the capacity of the security services — in particular the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the national police — especially in relation to the continuing border situation with Côte d’Ivoire. This should include, as a matter of critical importance, building the investigative
capacity of the national police, both overall and among individual officers. The Panel urges the United Nations police component to increase its mentoring of the national police with regard to forensics, criminal investigations and transnational crime, including by strengthening links between law enforcement investigations and evidence collection so that such evidence can be used more effectively in a court of law. Furthermore, the Panel believes that joint training between the national police and prosecutors to strengthen relationships and enhance knowledge of how evidence can be collected and used in court is imperative. Assistance to build adequate storage facilities for weapons and ammunition in the leeward counties is also necessary.

108. The Panel recommends enhanced coordination and information-sharing relating to the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border, possibly through regular quadripartite meetings bringing together the Governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, UNMIL and UNOCI.

109. The Panel urges the Government of Liberia to provide the Drug Enforcement Agency with free and unrestricted access to the Freeport of Monrovia and to other seaports and border posts nationwide.
Annex I

List of entities with which the Panel had meetings and consultations

**Liberia**
- African Union
- Armed Forces of Liberia
- Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
- Drug Enforcement Agency
- Economic Community of West African States
- Emergency Response Unit
- Executive Protection Service
- Liberia National Commission on Small Arms
- Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
- Liberian National Police
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of State/Office of the President
- National Security Agency
- Police Support Unit
- United Nations Mission in Liberia
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
- United Nations police
- Embassy of China
- Embassy of Côte d’Ivoire
- Embassy of the Russian Federation
- Embassy of Sierra Leone
- Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Embassy of the United States of America

**Côte d’Ivoire**
- Ministry of the Interior
- United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

**Ghana**
- Ghana Refugee Board
- Embassy of Liberia
- Embassy of Sierra Leone

**United Nations**
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Office for Disarmament Affairs
Annex II

Committee guidelines on advance notification in connection with any shipment of arms and related materiel, or any provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities, for the Government of Liberia

ANNEX

Advance Notification Form for use by States in connection with any shipment of arms and related materiel to the Government of Liberia, or any provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities for the Government of Liberia

A. Shipment of arms and related materiel
   Type and quantity of weapons to be delivered:
   
   Type and quantity of ammunition to be delivered:
   
   End-user(s) of the weapons and/or ammunition to be delivered:
   
   Proposed date of delivery:
   
   Itinerary of shipments including mode of transport and entry point where the material would be imported into Liberia:

B. Provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities
   Type of assistance, advice or training to be provided:
   
   Recipient(s) of assistance, advice or training to be provided including a number where applicable:
   
   Location where assistance, advice or training will be provided:
Annex III

Organization chart of operational leadership and combatants provided to the Panel by “The Commander”
Annex IV

Suspected combatant and recruiter identities

The Panel investigated the identities of combatants involved in the attacks on Fete and Grabo to better understand the combatant networks in the region. Available information on the suspected individuals is presented below.

Suspected Liberian combatants

“Antah” (or “Antah Hawoh” or “Antage Hower”)

“The Commander” stated to the Panel that “Antah” was a Liberian “Rasta” (a man with short dreadlocks) from Harper who used one of the AK-47 rifles during the attacks on Fete and Grabo. A militia source in the Little Wlebo refugee camp confirmed to the Panel that “Antah” was a Liberian combatant resident in Harper. A United Nations police report of 14 February 2014, citing statements by individuals arrested allegedly on their way to attack Côte d’Ivoire, indicates that “Anta Hawoh” is a Liberian recruiter who lives in Harper. According to a witness statement given to the Liberian national police by an individual arrested on 14 February 2014, “Antage Hower” is a Liberian recruiter with “Rasta” in Harper.

“Mad Dog” (or “Chien Mechant” or “Jonni Mad Dog”)

“Mad Dog”, also known as “Chien Mechant” or “Jonni Mad Dog”, was listed in the recruitment notebooks (S/2014/363, annex VI). “The Commander” listed this individual as one of the Liberian combatants who attacked Fete and Grabo using one of the AK-47 rifles (annex VII).

Eric Smith

Eric Smith admitted to the Liberian national police that he had been involved with the attacks as an associate of Augustin Kapeyou Gnagbe. He was caught returning to Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire in possession of a Motorola radio handset used for communication among the groups.

Eric Smith, from identification card provided to Panel by national police
**Hansen Weah (or “Koudou Kapet Carlos”)**

Hansen Weah is a de facto dual national who was a facilitator tasked by Augustine Dabo Takouo with gathering and guiding combatants to Côte d’Ivoire ahead of the attack of February 2014. He was arrested by the Liberian national police and released in February 2014 (S/2014/363, paras. 50-56)

Another source indicated that an individual named “Othello Freeman” was a Liberian recruiter in Harper. As seen in annex V, “The Commander” wrote that Liberian combatants also included “Joseph” and “Peter”. The Panel has no further information on these individuals.

**Suspected Ivorian combatants resident in Liberia**

The Ivorians resident in Liberia include Augustin Kapeyou Gnagbe (“Augustine” or “Gnagbe”), “Couzo”, “Rocher”, “Vieux Lion”, “Ble Goude”, “Petite Princesse” and “Djegrou”.

**Augustin Kapeyou Gnagbe**

Augustin Kapeyou Gnagbe, according to militia sources in the Little Wilbo refugee camp and “The Commander”, is an Ivorian militiaman involved in the attacks on Fete and Grabo. He is a registered refugee at the Little Wilbo camp. He was arrested by the Liberian national police in Liberia on 7 February 2014 and returned to Côte d’Ivoire on 17 February 2014 (S/2014/363, annex II). He was returned to Liberia on 6 March 2014 (ibid.).
The recruiting notebooks obtained by the Panel in March 2014 contain the noms de guerre of “Rocher”, “Vieux Lion” and “Djegrou” (see below). In those same notebooks, “Couzo” (“Kouzo’o” or “Capello”) is listed as a central militia leader in the camp, the leader of the Force special de Dieu pour la liberation de Côte d’Ivoire (S/2014/363, paras. 46-49 and annexes V, VI and VIII). This individual is also named by “The Commander” as an Ivorian combatant resident in Liberia. “Petit Princesse” was named by “The Commander” and an Ivorian militia source in the Little Wlebo refugee camp (see further ibid., annexes IV-VIII).
Suspected Ivorian combatants resident in Côte d’Ivoire


The security forces of Côte d’Ivoire arrested many individuals in the aftermath of the attacks. In March, the Panel obtained a list of detainees in Abidjan (see below). That list indicates that three core fighters from the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix were detained: “Cacao” or “Kakao” (Loba David Gnápko), “Prophète Royal” (Eba Eliaou Israel) and “Kassi Kassi” (Kassi Kassi Hermane Didier). According to the Group of Experts of Côte d’Ivoire, “PKM” (Koudou Gnango Jean Didier) and “AA52” (Ouei Kouah Rodrigue) were also arrested in 2013. They are Ivorian combatants responsible for several attacks in Abidjan in 2012 and also part of the Compagnie Armageddon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>NOM ET PRENOMS</th>
<th>DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE</th>
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<th>LIEU DE REGLETEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>TAKOURA YETT ELVIS FLORENT</td>
<td>25.12.1996 à Gohôrafia</td>
<td>De : TAKOURA Robert Et de : BLEYI Yeda Martine</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>ZIE Simplice</td>
<td>01.01.1978 à Daloa</td>
<td>De : TAOFO Dié Yacouba Et de : GRAGO Bélier Virginie</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>DJEDJE NEAN HENRY</td>
<td>14.06.1983 à Oulouido</td>
<td>De : TAKOFO Djedy Patrice Et de : TAKOFO Waho Honoré</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>TAB Hid Frédéric</td>
<td>18.02.1973 à Grobo</td>
<td>De : GOLI Thi Dominique Et de : GNIPA Zito Louise</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>DRO Oulé Eric</td>
<td>23.03.1988 à Goualigolé</td>
<td>De : DRO Tieffy Et de : NON Marie</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>BLIHA Aristide</td>
<td>31.12.1989 à Doulaoud</td>
<td>De : BLIHA Stéphane Et de : SEH Thérèse</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>GRAGO Hid Massé</td>
<td>27.12.1981 à Nére</td>
<td>De : HIE GRAGO Félix</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>KOLATE Sené Diny</td>
<td>02.03.1980 à Tabou</td>
<td>De : KOLATE Enéga Valentin Et de : POLIE Lucie</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>PREGNON Arrène</td>
<td>13.01.1983 à Yopougon</td>
<td>De : PREGNON Yora Joachim Et de : NALY Rose</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>KOIFFI Talouho Mathieu</td>
<td>01.01.1986 à Tiberto</td>
<td>De : GNIPA Koffi Michel Et de : OURELE D. Honorine</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>OULAT Yopie Roger</td>
<td>01.01.1989 à Tiberto</td>
<td>De : KAPET oual Et de : DJAPE Yao Estelle</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SIMONDE Takeul Fulbert</td>
<td>08.03.1988 à Tiberto</td>
<td>De : GNIPA Simonda Joseph Et de : NDIENG Haji</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ZAOI Gnali Appolinaire</td>
<td>02.02.1988 à Saloua</td>
<td>De : ROZE Zadi Dominique Et de : BIL Dévanthi Elisabeth</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>LOBA Gnàto David</td>
<td>27.11.1988 à Golauboub</td>
<td>De : Dogbo LOBA Et de : DAKOUIRE Keping Monique</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>EBA Elieou Israël</td>
<td>28.10.1984 à Bingerville</td>
<td>De : RIE Kloue SERI Et de : FADE Dalrye Elisabeth</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>ELIE Jean Fabrice</td>
<td>En 1988 à Zoulougaub</td>
<td>De : IRECEO Jean Michel Et de : GUEHI Monique</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>KOUYA Gnipo Lucien</td>
<td>20.08.1994 à Djamokélé</td>
<td>De : KOUYA Tahanou Abraham Et de : MONE Watto Hiliine</td>
<td>Grobo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex V

List of combatants provided to the Panel by “The Commander”

Liberians Figthers
Antah, Joseph, Peter and Mad Dog

Ivorians refuged in Liberia
Augustin, Capello et Couzo, Rocher, Vieux Lion, “Ble Gonde”, Petite Princess, Djegrou ...

Ivorians recruited by GMP and Didier in Tabou
GMP, Chapo, Didier, Parfait, Pierre, Koffi, Auô, Messi, 225 Lakota, “Arafat”, DeBordo, Jean...

GPP’s Fighters coming with “Colonel H”
Colonel H, Benito, Cpt, Apôtre Pilote, Prophète Royal, Bauer Golf, Gota, Bauer Dabou, Eveque Kassi, Kassi, Procureur, Kakao O Faute
Annex VI

Organizational leadership and financing structure provided to the Panel by “The Commander”
Annex VII

List of attackers involved in the Fete and Grabo attacks and their weapons provided to the Panel by “The Commander”

SECOND ATTACK FIGHTERS

CHAPO - ANTAH - AUGUSTIN
"COUZO" KAPET - JOSEPH - PETER
MAD DOG - ROCHER

THE SEVEN (OF) PERSONS WHO HAD THE AK-47 TO ATTACK GRABO

COLONEL H - BENITO - ANTAH
JOSEPH - PETER - CAPELLO
MAD DOG

SOME WHO HAD KNIFE AND MACHETTE

CHAPO - DEBORDO "BLE GOUDE"
ROCHER
Annex VIII

Arms, ammunition and materiel list from the personal correspondence of “The Commander”

**EQUIPEMENTS POUR 120 OUVRiers**

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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Equipment Description</th>
<th>Additional Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>AK 47 MODEL SCORPION + 02 CHARGEURS GARNIS CHACUN</td>
<td>05 CAISSES DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>AA52 OU NEGUEV</td>
<td>04 BOITIERS + 02 MAILLONS 01 CAISSE DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>04 MAILLONS + 04 BOITIERS 02 CAISSES DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>12.7 BROWNING CALIBRE 50 mm</td>
<td>04 MAILLONS + 02 BOITIERS 02 CAISSES DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>LANCEURS DE GRENADES</td>
<td>01 CAISSE DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>LANCEURS DE ROQUETTES</td>
<td>02 CAISSES D’OBUS LRAC 02 CAISSES D’OBUS RPG7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>CAISSES DE GRENADES</td>
<td>01 D’OFFENSIVES 02 DE DEFENSIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>CAISSES DE GRENADES</td>
<td>01 DE FUMIGenres 01 DE LACRYMOGenES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>FUSILS DE PRECISION LONGUE PORTEE</td>
<td>MAKAROV-DRAGNOV A DEFAUT, 04 MAS 36 01 CAISSE DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>MORTIERS 82” OU BITUMES</td>
<td>02 CAISSES D’OBUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>PISTOLETS AUTOMATIQUES</td>
<td>05 PAQUETS DE MUNITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>USI SMG 9 mm</td>
<td>10 PAQUETS DE MUNITIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CASQUES LOURDS</td>
<td>20 MASQUES A GAZ</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>GILETS PARE-BALLES</td>
<td>04 PAIRES DE LONGUES VUES</td>
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<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>PAIRES DE PORTATIFS PUCES MTN GH + UNITES 50 GH C</td>
<td>OU 10 TELEPHONES AVEC PUCES MTN CI + UNITES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PS: BESOINS DANS LA MESURE DU POSSIBLE.
Annex IX

Networks of individuals with connections to regional arms traffickers

The Panel and the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire obtained documentary evidence of an attempted arms deal in 2011 in which the former aide-de-camp of Simone Gbagbo in charge of security, Commander Anselme Seka Yapo, sought to purchase lethal and non-lethal materiel and transport it to Guinea. The attempted deal was apparently linked to a Liberian individual with a business address in Monrovia. The Panel highlights this case because it illustrates recent networks of individuals in Liberia and the region with connections to international arms traffickers with a history of violating arms embargoes. The Panel has reason to believe that the networks persist in Liberia and the subregion and can be made operational in the future to finance and transport weapons in the region.

According to the document below (first and last page reproduced), the company that attempted to make the purchase was APEX Holdings SIA. In 2012, the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire determined that that company was owned by Anselme Seka Yapo under his alias Anicet Ohoueu Bessekon (S/2012/196, paras. 62-63 and annexes 4, 5 and 32-34). The Group linked APEX Holdings SIA with Robert Montoya (ibid., para. 63), a French national who was cited in a number of reports by the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (S/2006/204, S/2006/735, S/2006/964, S/2009/188, S/2009/521, S/2010/179, S/2011/272, S/2012/196 and S/2013/228). The Group further documented that Robert Montoya and Anselme Seka Yapo had separately repeatedly violated the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire relating to arms (S/2012/196, para. 30). The Panel notes the Group’s finding that networks of Robert Montoya and Anselme Seka Yapo operated for and with the support of the former Gbagbo Administration (ibid., para. 36, and S/2013/228, para. 43).

The attempted deal documented below ultimately did not transpire because Anselme Seka Yapo was arrested by the Ivorian authorities on 15 October 2011 on his way to Guinea (S/2012/196, para. 22).
The President

Bedgrad, September 6th, 2011

To

Mr James Madison TUKPAH

President & CEO ALPHA OMEGA HOLDING INC

23 Broad Street Monrovia, Liberia

Tel: 231-5901408 / 231 5901410

EQUIPMENT COTATION REF #: OZMOTEK-169-2011/APX09062011

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Désignation</th>
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<th>Montant USD</th>
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<td>Mégaphone IRL45</td>
<td>321</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Fusils à pompe calibre 12mm a 8 coups</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>130.0</td>
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<td>Balles Crouthoum 58 en Caisses (1/20)</td>
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<td>269.1</td>
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<td>Grenades assourdissantes type 46 en Caisses (1/20)</td>
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<td>209.3</td>
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<td>Pelle multiple</td>
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<td>Casques M0 avec visière et bavoile MO1/75</td>
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<td>97.5</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Imperméable Agent sapeurs pompiers</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
<td>111800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Imperméable Officier sapeurs pompiers</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
<td>44720</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Imperméable Personnel civil</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
<td>251550</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Botte</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>468000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sous Total**: 1597.180

84 283 735.00 US Dollars

Transport to CIF Conakry 15% (boat and plane) 12 642 560.25 US Dollars

**TOTAL AMOUNT**: 96 926 295.25 US Dollars

**Payment conditions**: 
1. Eighty percent (80%) of Total amount for ordering, documents of the goods, before delivery. And Twenty percent (20%) after delivery of the goods.
2. Or a Bank guarantee covering hundred and fifteen percent (115%) of the Total amount, at goods ordering

BESSEKON Othona Amici

APLEX HOLDING S.A. - Capital: 180,000.00 Vl
Registre Numéro: 400365449 - Pense Street 2 Riga, LV 1011, Latvia Lethone
Annex X

Serial number of rocket-propelled grenade launcher never turned in to the United Nations Mission in Liberia for destruction, from cache associated with Péhékanhouéblé barracks, Côte d’Ivoire.
Annex XI

Background on the rocket-propelled grenade launcher (confidential)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
Annex XII

Examples of ammunition found in Grand Gedeh County in February, March and April 2014

Found by the national police on 10 February 2014
Found by the national police on 20 March 2014
Found by the national police on 12 April 2014
Annex XIII

Further information on Noel Kagouho Djouka and Augustine Dabo Takouo

On 30 June 2014, the Panel interviewed Noel Kagouho Djouka in the Little Wlebo refugee camp and offered him an opportunity to respond to the allegations. He denied involvement in any militant activity and having gone to Ghana since arriving in Liberia. He stated that he was from Gagnoa, Côte d’Ivoire, and that in 2011 pro-Ouattara combatants had killed his wife and children because his wife was related to the former President, Laurent Gbagbo. He then informed the Panel that he had fled to Takoradi, Ghana. The Ghana Refugee Board informed the Panel in September 2014 that Djouka had never sought refugee status in Ghana. Under unclear circumstances, Djouka arrived in Liberia on 4 April 2013 where he sought and was granted refugee status, according to records of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Liberian national police arrested Djouka on 14 February 2014, along with 11 other individuals who were allegedly en route to join the attack on Fete and Grabo in February. He was subsequently turned over to the Ivorian authorities on 17 February by the national police. Djouka, along with five others, was sent back to Liberia from Abidjan on 6 March (S/2014/363, annex II). He stated that the Liberian authorities had abused him and that he had been also mistreated in Abidjan.

On 30 June, the Panel showed Djouka photographs of the individuals arrested with him on 14 February. He stated that he had never seen any of them before. Two of the individuals that Djouka said that he had never seen identified him from photographs. They further indicated to the Panel that Djouka had occasionally travelled to Ghana after becoming a refugee. One militia source identified Djouka and another individual arrested on the same day, Hie Brice Gnessoi, and described them as “best friends”. The Panel recalls its previous finding that Gnessoi was a member of a combatant group led by the notorious Mark “Doty” Wilson (also known as “Mark Miller”) that committed arms embargo violations in 2011 (ibid., para. 49).
The Panel previously reported that a man named “Augustine” was a central player in recruiting and apparently gave orders to Hansen Weah (ibid., paras. 53-54). It has subsequently identified him as Augustine Dabo Takouo. Sources informed the Panel in March that Takouo had fled the Little Wlebo refugee camp on 14 February after national police officers began arresting suspected combatants. He has subsequently returned to the camp and was there on 30 June when the Panel travelled there. When the Panel sought to speak with him, he ran away.
Annex XIV

Priority projects of the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms provided to the Panel by the Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LiNCSA’s Priority Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The following is a summary of priority projects identified by the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms (LiNCSA). The projects constitute part of a wider portfolio detailed in the Commission’s One Year Road Map and Annual Work Plan. Overall, the road map seeks to reduce armed violence and related crimes in Liberia’s rural and urban communities. Each project summary includes the project title, the objective of the project, a brief description of the project, and an indicative budget (a total of US $1,879,000 m over a period of two years). Detailed concept notes of each project shall be submitted upon request.

1. **Project Title**: Institutional Capacity Building  
   **Objective**: LiNCSA’s institutional capacity is enhanced to effectively coordinate SALW (small arms and light weapons) control efforts in the country.  
   **Project Description**: This Project entails putting in place appropriate institutional and management systems and procedures aimed at making the Commission fully operational and efficient. Key activities include an institutional assessment, restructure of technical secretariat and hiring of key professional staff, training of staff, and the provision of required logistics.  
   **Estimated Budget**: US$ 275,000.00

2. **Project Title**: Establishment of Regional Offices  
   **Objective**: Ensure that the Commission is national in character by extending its reach beyond Monrovia through the setting up of regional offices.  
   **Project Description**: This project entails the setting up of five regional offices in the five administrative regions of the country. Key activities include securing office premises in the five regions and recruiting qualified staff to man these offices, providing logistical support and operational cost.  
   **Estimated Budget**: US$ 700,000.00 (for a period of 2 years)
### 3. Project Title: Legal & Regulatory Frameworks for SALW Control

**Objective:** Existing legal and regulatory frameworks enhanced for effective SALW control in Liberia.

**Project Description:** Under this project, the Commission will endeavour to update the 1956 Firearms Traffic Act, develop administrative regulations to guide the implementation of the Act, and ensure the ratification of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Key activities will include expert inputs into the drafting of the new Firearms and Ammunition Control Act and its regulations, organizing and holding series of stakeholders’ consultations and legislative engagement meetings for both the passage of the Act and the ratification of the ATT.

**Estimated Budget:** US$ 100,000.00

### 4. Project Title: SALW Baseline Survey

**Objective:** Extent of small arms prevalence and proliferation in Liberia assessed and baseline data on private and State-held firearms established.

**Project Description:** This Project involves the collection of quantitative and qualitative data in selected regions throughout Liberia to understand current patterns and entry points for firearms proliferation, rates and types of firearms possession and perception of national security provision. Key activities will include identification of the selected area of study, design of survey instruments, conducting household surveys, focus groups discussion, key informant interviews and analysis and preparation of survey report.

**Estimated Budget:** US$ 250,000.00

### 5. Project Title: Development of a National Action Plan (NAP)

**Objective:** Delivery of LiNCSA’s core objectives are achieved through a set of coordinated activities with support from international partners, relevant governmental institutions and civil society.

**Project Description:** This project involves the mapping out of a 5-year action plan for the control of small arms proliferation in Liberia through the involvement of an array of internal and external stakeholders. Key activities will include hiring an external consultant to support the process, an institutional assessment exercise, stakeholders’ workshops, and preparation of the Plan.

**Estimated Budget:** US$ 60,000,000
### 6. Project Title:  **Arms Marking & Tracing Program**

**Objective:** All State-held small arms and light weapons are accounted-for and traceable through the placing of standard markings in line with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms.

**Project Description:** This Project involves the marking of all State-held small arms and light weapons in the various armories of the national security agencies (Police, BIN, EPS, NSA, and DEA) as well as the military using the ECOWAS standard marking procedures; and putting in place a central record keeping system for all State-held arms. Key activities will include procuring arms marking machines and associated software, training of machine operators and data management personnel, carrying out physical marking of the arms and managing the central database of State-held arms.

**Estimated Budget:** US$150,000.00

### 7. Project Title:  **Public Education and Sensitization on Illicit SALW**

**Objective:** Understanding and support of public secured in the fight against the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons.

**Project Description:** This project involves carrying out a nationwide outreach to educate and sensitize the population about the harmful effects of the trafficking, illegal possession and misuse of illicit small arms and light weapons and thereby secure the support of the Liberian public in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The awareness and sensitization campaign is being planned against the backdrop of an apparent influx of small arms and light weapons through various border crossing points and which has led to an increase in incidences of armed related violence and crimes across the country. Key activities will include holding of town hall meetings across the country, printing and distribution of public education materials, the production and airing of radio programs, and the publication of news items and features via the sue of the print media.

**Estimated Budget:** US$ 244,000.00