Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Building resilient national institutions and capacities in the aftermath of conflict is critical to the consolidation of peace. The present report, the last stand-alone report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, addresses issues raised by Member States, highlights results achieved in the past two years, underlines lessons learned, and identifies remaining challenges and a way forward.

In proposing future directions, the present report emphasizes the delivery of institution-building results in the field through a more systematic and coherent response on the part of the United Nations that is strongly connected to national priorities and to other international partners. In order to provide clear accountability, this work will be incorporated within existing structures and business processes, ending the work of the stand-alone team by June 2014, but maintaining the momentum established over the past two years. Efforts will focus on three areas where there is both a demonstrated potential to deliver results and a need to consolidate and strengthen support: (a) improvement of support to institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South and triangular cooperation.
Improvement of the impact of institution-building cannot come at the expense of the United Nations success in providing basic security and supporting political settlements through peacekeeping operations or special political missions. Those aspects are complementary: military and troop deployments and a stable political situation can provide the breathing space needed to develop national institutions, and successful institution-building consolidates gains in peace and security. We have learned the hard way that without sustainable national institutions, it will take longer for national authorities to assume their rightful role in the aftermath of conflict and crisis.

The present report comes at a time when the United Nations is supporting nationally owned institution-building in increasingly complex situations. These include supporting the recent transitions in Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; consolidating progress in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia and South Sudan, as well as other countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. The need for strengthened support to institution-building will be front and centre in the coming years in those situations and others: it is therefore timely to take stock of lessons learned and launch a concerted effort to strengthen their application.
I. Importance of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict


2. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/255, affirmed the fundamental principle of national ownership, stressed the importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and institution-building, encouraged the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding, and requested that I draw on all relevant expertise in the development of initiatives to support national capacities and provide an update to the Assembly in 2012. In response to that update (see A/67/312-S/2012/645), intergovernmental and expert bodies of the General Assembly raised a number of issues on which they sought clarification and additional information.

3. In the report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/312-S/2012/645), it was noted that there could be no sustained recovery from conflict without nationally owned transformation of institutions that provide citizens with political representation, justice, security, and economic opportunities. The report of 8 October 2012 on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/499-S/2012/746) highlighted that institutions are critical to prevent relapse into violent conflict. A considerable body of research has shown that countries with strong, accountable and inclusive institutions are 30 to 45 per cent less likely to fall into large-scale conflict.¹

4. The General Assembly, in its resolution 67/266, the Security Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013) and Presidential Statement of 21 January 2011 (S/PRST/2011/2), and the Peacebuilding Commission have all recognized the criticality of national ownership in peacebuilding, the importance of enabling global capacities to support national institutions and the need for strengthened cooperation and coordination within the United Nations activities on peacebuilding.

5. In its resolution 66/255, the General Assembly affirmed the fundamental principle of national ownership and stressed the importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and institution-building, including through peacekeeping operations in accordance with their mandates. The efforts described in the present report respond to the requests contained in the above resolution.

6. In Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, Member States have mandated the United Nations to support national institutions by, for example: building national capacity to provide security and rule of law; supporting inclusive political processes; assisting national authorities with the extension of State authority in

insecure areas; and helping to mobilize resources for national institution-building. In each of those cases, critical outcomes for peace and security are contingent on the emergence or strengthening of national institutions, and broader recovery and development will in turn be affected by successful peacebuilding and institution-building.

7. Where the United Nations presence includes a peacekeeping operation or special political mission, support to institution-building requires a partnership among Governments, missions and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations, as well as regional organizations and other international and local actors. The present report summarizes efforts undertaken and lessons learned in such settings over the past two years.

8. The first section of the present report highlights the key results achieved in the past two years. The latter sections present lessons learned and plans to: (a) improve support to institution-building, grounded on national ownership; (b) broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise available for peacebuilding; and (c) enhance regional, South-South and triangular cooperation.

II. Results

9. The programme of work outlined in previous reports on civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict (see A/66/311-S/2011/527 and A/67/312-S/2012/645) included piloting efforts aimed at: supporting national ownership at the country level; strengthening institutional arrangements and expertise as well as partnerships at Headquarters; and introducing measures to increase the nimbleness of the supporting systems to deploy civilian capacities. There has been progress on many fronts, including in the field, through better institutional arrangements for internal coherence and through policy frameworks and tools that enable the provision of more effective support to institution-building.

10. Credit for building national institutions rests with the countries and their people, who have successfully overcome the legacy of conflict. The United Nations has provided support to a number of countries over the past two years, including Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste, which have seen significant improvements in the performance of national institutions. United Nations support has played an influential role in some sectors, including in police, justice and corrections, local and central government, electoral and parliamentary institutions, and support to civil society.

11. In order to improve United Nations support, previous reports on civilian capacities laid out actions to strengthen institutional arrangements and expertise across the five core gap areas (inclusive political processes, basic safety and security, justice, core government functionality, and economic revitalization). Progress has been particularly strong in the police, justice and corrections areas (see box 1), and significant actions are under way in the areas of inclusive political processes and core government functionality. Less has been achieved in the area of economic revitalization. The latter will be taken forward through future partnership work, as described in section V of the present report.
Box 1

**Strengthened institutional arrangements in core peacebuilding areas**

The most significant area of progress has been the designation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the global focal point for police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations. The global focal point has demonstrated its ability to strengthen and combine the work of missions with the longer-term efforts of United Nations country teams in the area of rule of law. Specifically, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP, through the global focal point arrangement, have delivered:

- 12 joint field visits, which resulted in joint planning and partnerships, and the provision of advice on programme structures and funding streams in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Sudan
- Joint country support plans for Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Libya
- Joint planning processes for United Nations support in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia
- Deployments of specialized expertise to Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, with support from the UNDP Experts Roster for Rapid Response
- Co-location of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at United Nations Headquarters in New York, coupled with seconded expertise provided by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to ensure gender mainstreaming in the work of the global focal point
- Joint development of a resource note on sector planning for police, justice and corrections in post-crisis and transition situations

In addition to the global focal point, the United Nations has strengthened internal cooperation in the areas of provision of constitutional assistance and support to inclusive political processes. At the country level, United Nations presences have been active in providing technical support to governments and civil society. To support those efforts, the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP have undertaken joint assessment missions to Libya, Sierra Leone and Somalia, and have worked closely with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia and elsewhere. An internal coordination structure — bringing together the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OHCHR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNDP and UN-Women — meets regularly to coordinate efforts and is undertaking a number of joint initiatives to improve country support and share knowledge and lessons learned.

In order to improve delivery and partnerships in the area of core government functionality, I endorsed the review of lessons learned in
United Nations support to core government functions in the immediate aftermath of conflict and called on UNDP to support the implementation of its recommendations. The United Nations Working Group on Public Administration is transitioning into a robust internal coordination structure, and is led by UNDP and includes, among others, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, UNICEF and UN-Women. This structure has developed a new partnership supported by the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Trust Fund to enable joint work between the United Nations and the World Bank in a number of countries seeking assistance to rebuild the centre of government, local government, public financial management, aid management and civil service capacities in the aftermath of conflict. Work is also continuing on improving integration between missions and United Nations country teams in key areas, including the support to the extension of State authority.

12. Policy measures to improve United Nations support to institution-building include:

   (a) Strengthening support for capacity development through the United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts. The guidelines assist missions and United Nations country teams in supporting national capacity development and respecting national ownership in the aftermath of conflict. They were used as substantive input into the Somali Compact; they are also being used in Liberia to strengthen programming;

   (b) The revised Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning defined national ownership as an essential condition for the sustainability of peace and requested that integrated assessment and planning processes should specify how the United Nations will support the implementation of national priorities developed on the basis of a broad-based consensus.

13. To broaden and deepen the supply of expertise, outreach efforts through the CAPMATCH platform engaged over 50 entities from Member States, of which more than two thirds are from the global South. Lessons learned from this work are discussed in further detail in section IV below. The outreach resulted in the following deployments in critical areas of institution-building needs: (a) legislative drafting expertise from Sierra Leone to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan; (b) specialized police capacities from Rwanda to the United Nations Mission in Liberia, supporting the national police in strengthening their human resources, financial, facilities and fleet management capacities; (c) specialized training support to the Liberian revenue authority at the request of the Government of Liberia, using expertise from Sierra Leone and Sweden; (d) Liberian and Senegalese expertise to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, assisting the government in shaping its security sector reform, with support from the Peacebuilding Fund; (e) facilitation expertise from Iraq to support the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen, with the support of the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden; and (f) 19 nominations by Croatia, Egypt and Turkey of Government-provided personnel for highly specialized institution-building expertise in justice and corrections, in support of existing
outreach efforts of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

14. As outlined in prior reports on civilian capacities, the success of effective outreach is dependent on nimble processes that facilitate the deployment of expertise. To enhance access to specialized expertise from Member States, draft guidelines on the utilization of Government-provided personnel have been developed. To facilitate a more global view of personnel requirements, budget presentation has been changed to present Government-provided personnel in the civilian personnel expenditure grouping. Senior leaders and staff have been advised on how to manage resources in response to evolving national requirements.

15. To draw on the strengths of the presence of the United Nations as a whole, guidance on how to consider the issue of comparative advantage for carrying out mandated tasks was provided as part of the revision of the policy on integrated assessment and planning, and strengthened arrangements were put in place for the transition of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. Progress was also made in facilitating the flow of voluntary resources by overcoming impediments to funding from the Peacebuilding Fund through missions in support of peacebuilding and institution-building activities, in conjunction with United Nations country teams.

16. In broader partnerships to support national institution-building after conflict, three areas of work have produced good results as summarized below. Lessons learned and further work in these areas are summarized in section V below:

(a) In South-South and triangular cooperation, the civilian capacities initiative supported exchanges in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Somalia and documented the complementary strengths of Southern providers and donors from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);

(b) With the international financial institutions, the Chairs of the United Nations Development Group, the civilian capacities steering committee and two World Bank Vice-Presidents have issued a menu of options which outlines 15 different practical opportunities for collaboration between the United Nations and the World Bank in conflict-affected countries;

(c) With regard to cooperation with regional organizations, collaboration with the League of Arab States has resulted in a joint action plan which is in early implementation; and the United Nations system has engaged with the African Union to support the African Solidarity Initiative.

17. All those efforts will be judged by their application in the field. A compelling example of what can be achieved when the United Nations works to apply new approaches in a concerted manner is set out in box 2.

Box 2
A more robust approach to institution-building — Somalia

During the planning of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the technical assessment and preparation of the first budget paid close attention to national institution-building. This resulted in a mission design that is strongly based on partnership and is responsive to the situation in-country.
Drawing on experience from other countries, an options paper was discussed with the Government to identify approaches to maximize government visibility and national ownership in programming. Those options were used by the Government in the New Deal Compact for Somalia, as endorsed in Brussels in September 2013, and in the national strategy for local governance.

Through the global focal point mechanism, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP conducted joint field assessments and identified areas for joint activities between the mission and the United Nations country team. This led to the establishment of co-located teams in Somalia and holistic programmes to support the Government of Somalia across the areas of police, justice and corrections. Furthermore, joint activities and workplans between the United Nations country team and the mission are being explored for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and constitutional processes.

The provision of support on approaches to capacity-building and institution-building, including the use of the *United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts*, has led to an approach that is endorsed by all partners in the New Deal Compact. This included recognition of the need for early and dedicated support to core government functions, including the centre of government, the civil service and public sector capacities, through a two-pronged approach, that consisted of (i) capacity injection to meet immediate and emerging needs; and (ii) support to the coordinated development and roll-out of basic cross-cutting administrative systems.

Technical advice was also provided — using examples from other countries — on how to structure a financing architecture that responds to the stated requirements of the Government of Somalia.

The partnership with the African Union and the African Union Mission in Somalia has been crucial in realizing gains. The United Nations and the World Bank have also cooperated well across those activities, with joint engagement in the New Deal process and on the critical link between public financial management and security/justice reform. Joint support is also envisaged for aid coordination.

18. However, it is also clear that more has to be done. As outlined above, actions planned have been fully completed in some areas, while in others they have demonstrated good potential which needs to be consolidated. The remaining sections of the present report describe lessons learned and future direction in supporting national ownership, outreach, and expanded South-South and triangular cooperation and partnerships.
III. Lessons learned in supporting national ownership of institution-building in post-conflict settings

19. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/255, and the Security Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013), both affirmed the fundamental principles of national ownership and stressed the importance of supporting national capacity development and institution-building, including through peacekeeping operations in accordance with their mandates. Support to national institutions is crucial to build confidence in transitions by demonstrating that national institutions can provide inclusive political processes, basic security, justice, social services and jobs.

20. We continue to learn how to translate national ownership into practice in supporting complex post-crisis institution-building as set out in the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/499-S/2012/746). Lessons learned in this area have continued to draw on the relevant experience of field practitioners, as requested by the Assembly in its resolution 66/255, and highlight four key points:

(a) Enhancing national ownership means aligning with national decision-making cycles and understanding that progress is iterative. Institution-building depends on national priorities and decisions. National commitment is critical. While a common and broadly consulted national vision is necessary, those processes often take considerable national preparation and debate — as in the case of discussions in Côte d’Ivoire on security sector reform — and can go through multiple cycles. The timing of national decisions can therefore be uncertain, but the process needs to be respected and accommodated. This will inevitably require adjustments to institution-building support, for example, if national processes result in changing priorities and timings for international support. The United Nations therefore needs to pace and sequence its support to align with national decisions and processes and to ensure that national partners are fully committed to doing their part to build institutions and leverage United Nations support. Doing so may also require a careful assessment of which United Nations entity is best placed to support specific national institutions;

(b) Rapid confidence-building is key. International support in the aftermath of conflict needs to enable national institutions to show visible, early results to maintain political momentum. In Mali and Somalia, for example, national authorities have prioritized community-level infrastructure, social services and job creation for stabilization purposes, as well as early progress in reforms in the areas of governance, security and justice. United Nations presences need to move quickly to support the appropriate national institutions to deliver services that can help secure peace and build trust and promote progressive use of and alignment with country systems. This might mean bringing rapid advice, as with support to the national dialogue in Yemen or discussions on security sector reform in Côte d’Ivoire. It may also require modest but rapid financial assistance, and adapting programme delivery on the ground to give more visibility to the evolving role of national institutions during transitions;

(c) Building institutions requires sources of early and sustained financing as well as access to expertise. National authorities have primary responsibility for ensuring that there are sustainable and predictable sources of funding for institution-building through their national budgets. However, few countries after a conflict have staff in the right place with the right skills, coupled with equipment and facilities,
and the support of long-term predictable funding sources. Some countries, such as Libya and Timor-Leste, have had significant national resources to invest, but in most post-conflict countries, international financial assistance plays a key role. The international provision of short-term expertise and training, in the absence of policy, programme and financing frameworks, can lead to unsustainable substitution or the creation of individual capacity rather than organizational capability. A better approach is to embed assistance into programmes that support the national leadership vision, develop buy-in from many stakeholders and ensure sustainable funding that retains staff and supports long-term institution-building;

(d) Institution-building is a political as well as a technical process which takes time. In support of this duality, relevant Secretariat departments and agencies, funds, and programmes can bring complementary strengths. Agencies, funds, and programmes often have a depth and continuity of country knowledge, including a solid base of experience in capacity-building, and relationships that may have existed prior to mission arrival and that will undoubtedly exist after a mission departs, notwithstanding the role of the Department of Political Affairs in its continuous observation of country situations. Missions, in general, bring a powerful combination of civilian capacities, political leverage and field presence; in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the mix of police, military and civilian capacities offers a particular strength (see Security Council resolution 2086 (2013). Missions and agencies, funds and programmes both have technical expertise. Combining these related but differing strengths should improve the quality of United Nations support to institution-building in relevant contexts.

21. These lessons have a number of implications for how the United Nations provides support to institution-building. While much support to institution-building is performed by agencies, funds, and programmes, the deployment of peacekeeping and special political missions provides both opportunities and challenges for the United Nations to better integrate efforts. The section below focuses on mission settings, where the mandated role of the mission in institution-building must be situated in the context of national priorities and capacities, and framed in the light of the roles of development actors — from the United Nations and beyond.

22. The measures outlined below provide clarifications requested by the General Assembly during its sixty-seventh session on the relationship to existing structures, business processes and oversight mechanisms. They include a systematic approach to strengthen existing integrated planning approaches through the life cycle of a mission, and enhanced provision of information on institution-building outcomes, planning assumptions, inputs and risks to the General Assembly through existing mechanisms, in particular reports and proposed budgets.

A. Integrating efforts

23. To ensure that the United Nations presence delivers together and leverages differing comparative advantage across the full range of actors present in the aftermath of conflict, missions and United Nations country teams will continue to strengthen joint action and clear division of labour to support political, security, and rule of law institution-building and the extension of state authority (see General Assembly resolution 67/226). Building on many examples of joint action in Liberia,
Libya, Mali, Somalia and elsewhere, senior leadership teams, supported by the necessary resources and capacities, will:

(a) Provide close direction to integrated assessment and planning processes through which missions and United Nations country teams identify ways to complement each other, both during mission start-up and at regular intervals thereafter, especially in institution-building support;

(b) Explore the use of joint delivery mechanisms, including integrated teams where appropriate, comprising mission and United Nations country team expertise and functions, such as those that have been established for electoral, constitutional and security and justice support with UNDP and other United Nations country team partners;

(c) Carefully plan and manage mission transition and drawdown to ensure the sustainability, measurement and benchmarking of capacity development gains, as well as continuity of support by the United Nations country team and partners.

24. Full consideration of institution-building requirements and needs must take place at the early stages of mission design and take into account from the onset the complementarity between the activities and strengths of the United Nations missions and country teams. In start-up mission situations, where senior mission leadership is not yet on the ground, support to institution-building in the aftermath of conflict must therefore be an organizational focus and commitment at the very early stages of the Headquarters-level mission planning and count upon the same senior guidance and engagement required at the country level.

25. Current capacities at headquarters to undertake integrated assessments and planning for institution-building support are limited. I will consider further the options available to address these requirements.

B. Aligning with national decision-making cycles

26. Translating national ownership into practice requires that mission formulation and implementation be sensitive to national decision-making cycles. In the Libyan context, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, successive short-term mandates were intended to enable the United Nations to tailor its support to the requests, pace and absorptive capacities of national institutions. However, the lack of national capacity in many areas addressed in the mandate became apparent over a longer period of time, and despite extensive planning, the inability of national actors to absorb or utilize the technical advice the mission sought to offer in certain areas in its early stages revealed the importance of continuously assessing national capacity and national demand in real time and sequencing United Nations initiatives accordingly. The Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning highlights this need to take account of national decision-making cycles. Accordingly, I will more systematically lay out the implications of national decision-making cycles in reports on country situations.

27. To provide a more thorough basis for decision-making by the General Assembly, mission planning and the consequent budget proposals will give more specific and distinct attention to mandated institution-building tasks and will articulate desired results that each mission will pursue from the outset of its
mandate, in conjunction with the United Nations country team. This strengthening of planning and design will include:

(a) More clearly delineated institution-building outcomes and design of activities in mission planning and, consequently, in proposed budgets;

(b) Description of how national decision-making cycles may affect activities in the narrative and planning assumptions of budget proposals and on how mission activities may adapt;

(c) Descriptions of the mix of inputs required (for example, various types of personnel) and the operational costs, within approved financial levels, to support institution-building objectives (for example, funds for national counterparts to attend training, necessary small infrastructure rehabilitation or materials for national institutions). When applicable, they would also indicate implementation through the United Nations country team.

28. Supporting evolving national requirements requires the ability to adapt the mix of civilian skills to respond to needs. In response to the request of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for an explanation as to how heads of mission now exercise the ability to make such changes, the applicable conditions and procedures have been set out in the standard operating procedures on staffing tables and post management in United Nations peacekeeping missions and special political missions. For non-staff expertise, such as consultants and individual contractors, missions are able to shape the scope of work to meet the functional requirements for expertise that evolve during the course of the year. Any redeployment of financial resources to accommodate a change from the originally planned volume of resources is carried out in compliance with the established policy for the administration of allotments.

C. Supporting rapid confidence-building in national institutions

29. To support rapid confidence-building, integrated assessment and planning processes are increasingly focusing on how the United Nations can support the capabilities and visibility of national institutions in delivering a few key outcomes in the political, security, justice, economic and social areas. Agencies, funds and programmes are adapting their support to do this: an example is the rapid and innovative “go to school” programme in Somalia, where UNICEF, working with Somali governmental institutions, has delivered results which would otherwise have been obtained through parallel systems. Ongoing work on resilience is further addressing this question.

30. In the justice and security sectors, and in the case of support to political processes and extension of State authority, there may be an urgent need for rapid institutional support which is not covered by existing programmes. For those sectors — and others as needed — senior leadership teams will use assessment and planning processes to identify situations where the absence of resources to support the basic functioning of national institutions in mandated areas may threaten peace and security and draw them to the attention of Member States.

31. Support for confidence-building also entails effective and timely provision of required expertise. The United Nations deploys this expertise through a range of modalities that have been developed over time. Staff resources, the main source of
civilian capacity, are complemented by other modalities to deploy expertise in a way that reflects the variety of functions, types of expertise needed, and the possibility of drawing from a wide range of sources of that expertise. For example, support for security sector reform, police, justice and corrections institutions, border management and core government functionality might draw on expertise from civil services of Member States, where such expertise generally resides, to be deployed through Government-provided personnel. Consultancy services, while always a small part of mission personnel costs, may play a significant role in providing the ability to respond quickly to shifting national priorities. Applicable General Assembly resolutions and internal issuances must be complied with in the planning and implementation of each modality.

D. Ensuring that expert advice is linked to sustainable financing frameworks

32. Post-conflict public financial management is a promising area for cooperation between international financial institutions and the United Nations. There has been good collaboration in Afghanistan and Liberia, and there is new work under way in other countries. To acknowledge the importance of sustainable financing for institution-building, senior leadership teams will, within mandated areas:

   (a) Work with host governments and partners to ensure that robust financing frameworks are in place to support resilient political, security and rule of law and security institutions;

   (b) At the request of host governments, seek to work together with the World Bank and other international financial institutions to combine their public financial management analysis and support with United Nations professional sectoral expertise.

33. Effective institution-building support requires a system-wide approach and joint action. At the country level, responsibilities hence rest with senior leadership teams, and I will update the General Assembly globally on progress through my reports on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. Each entity of the United Nations system — including designated lead Secretariat departments and agencies, funds and programmes — is responsible for acting on those lessons in their own mandated areas and in accordance with the requirements of their governance structures.

34. While each national situation is unique and a one-size-fits-all approach must be avoided, it is clear that effective support for nationally owned institution-building requires the systematic consideration of the factors described above. I recommend that the General Assembly encourage the application of the lessons learned and the measures described in paragraphs 19 through 33 above.

---

2 Information on the differences between Government-provided personnel and type II gratis personnel was provided to the General Assembly in December 2012, following the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Information on deployments and nationality of such personnel will be reported on regularly. The forthcoming peacekeeping overview report will provide information on the guidelines, including their compliance with General Assembly resolutions 67/287 and 67/255.

3 A toolkit for this activity is being developed.
35. I call upon Member States to ensure sustained and predictable financing for the United Nations to support institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in supporting integrated efforts of the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes as outlined above.

IV. Lessons learned in broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding

36. The participation of Member States in CAPMATCH and the deployments highlighted in section II illustrate how outreach to Member States can help the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries in the global South, with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition and among neighbouring countries in a subregion.

37. They also demonstrate that the need for outreach holds true for peacekeeping operations and special political missions alike as well as across the range of regular modalities and business processes available to the United Nations and approved by the General Assembly and its organs.

38. The experience of the CAPMATCH pilot also demonstrates, however, the degree of effort and resources that are needed for the United Nations to engage in a close partnership with Member States, including those in the global South who have valuable experiences to share but who may not be able to avail themselves of the domestic systems to make those experiences easily available to others. The role of the CAPMATCH platform in supporting outreach in partnership with United Nations entities mandated for this purpose and the challenges experienced by it are highlighted in box 3.

Box 3
CAPMATCH pilot

The CAPMATCH pilot demonstrated the strength of demand from the field for increased access to specialized civilian capacities and showed the breadth of expertise available from untapped sources, including from conflict-affected countries, and across the global South. It also demonstrated, however, the need for the provision of human support to the automated tool and the need to apply established selection processes.

Demand focused on the core areas of United Nations peacebuilding that fall within mission mandates: security institutions; rule of law; political institutions; and core government functionality. Approximately 85 per cent of requests in CAPMATCH were from missions and their lead departments at Headquarters. Agencies, funds, and programmes made limited use of the system and relied on their existing networks and outreach mechanisms.

The outreach team was able to establish a strong network of contacts within Member States (50 registrants, of which 69 per cent are from the global South). Work performed by the team was conducted as
supplementary outreach in support of established procedures. Over the pilot period of the initiative, deployments were supported in six country situations and sectors (see section II above), in addition to assisting in expanding the pool for outreach to multiple duty stations.

In practice, the business process of outreach was labour intensive. The team was often required to manage differences between the way in which demand was requested and the manner in which civilian expertise was available. Supporting requests often included an element of lessons learned on the level at which personnel should be solicited in order to attract the right seniority of expertise. For example, a request for expertise in legislative drafting for South Sudan was reissued to identify someone at a more senior level in order to solicit the right experience using Government-provided personnel. Time frames were subject to change, and the team had to work closely with Member States to support the processes of identifying the right expertise to nominate and respond to questions on needs.

Member States engaging with the process also identified a set of challenges internal to their processes, in particular for those who do not have a tradition of providing civilian personnel through the United Nations. They included how to identify relevant areas of niche expertise, procedures for the release from and re-entry into the national service of personnel, and for some, the legislative basis for deployments. The work of the independent civilian capacities network, which brought together Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Norway, South Africa, Russia and Turkey for a series of meetings in Bali, Indonesia, Brasilia, Moscow and Oslo, has helped to clarify those challenges, as seen by Member States.

Efforts at outreach were welcomed to help work through those challenges. Member States wanted engagement in a manner that could promise a sustained relationship over the long term, as there were a number of issues for both parties to work out to make deployments possible. The lessons from the CAPMATCH pilot also highlighted the importance of the systems established by the Department of Field Support and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for outreach, and of the demand of both Member States and missions to intensify those efforts. There was a clear sense that Member States wanted to engage with the United Nations, both within the normal structures of the Secretariat and through established selection processes.

39. Drawing on the lessons learned from the pilot, I intend to: (a) discard the idea of automated matching; and (b) strengthen outreach efforts at Headquarters to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities available to support institution-building tasks mandated to missions.

40. Those efforts will include a particular focus on deepening the pool of civilian capacities to support the emergence of national institutions that can address the specific challenges related to gender in post-conflict situations, as outlined, inter

41. They should also draw on the findings of the review of the United Nations gender architecture in post-conflict countries, led by UN-Women in partnership with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund, which emphasized the need to increase the availability of specialized gender expertise across a range of post-conflict institutional needs and substantive areas within mission mandates, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform or the rule of law. The demand for, and value of, such support is illustrated by experiences such as the recent exchanges between Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, financed by the Peacebuilding Fund, in promoting women in security command structures and establishing gender-sensitive police services. I am committed to appoint more women protection advisers to peacekeeping missions to address gender-based violence, as well as to ensure gender expertise in integrated assessment and planning and at the highest levels of mission management, and to encourage continued collaboration between United Nations missions and country teams on these issues.

42. More broadly, my aim is to ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions are supported by a field-focused workforce planning and outreach capacity within the headquarters that is aligned with the Organization’s reform initiatives and imperatives, and that helps peacekeeping and special political missions to access the expertise necessary to successfully implement their mandates.

43. The units that currently perform outreach are overstretched. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions currently has one full-time position budgeted for thematic outreach for criminal law and judicial advisory services for over 400 advisory positions of corrections and justice experts in peacekeeping and special political missions that provide institution-building advice and expertise. The situation is even more severe in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field Support, where one full-time position is designated for monitoring and coordinating outreach activities for all position requirements in missions.

44. To effectively support peacekeeping and special political missions, future outreach activities must be linked to a strengthened workforce planning approach so as to focus on the identification of the critical gaps in capacity and determine where the optimum source of suitable candidates may be found and how to mobilize them promptly. To do so, the Department of Field Support plans to propose to strengthen within existing resources the capacity of the Field Personnel Division to perform those functions. Those functional elements, together with thematic subject matter experts in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and other functional elements within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, will then be in a better position to leverage their allotted resources to ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions will receive the civilian capacities they need to successfully deliver on their mandates.

45. I recommend that the General Assembly support the strengthening, within existing resources, of the capacity of the Department of Field Support to carry out workforce planning and outreach. In complement to those efforts, I recommend that Member States commit additional voluntary technical and
financial resources to increase outreach to the global South within the United Nations system.

V. Lessons learned in enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation and partnerships with international financial institutions

46. In its resolution 66/255, the General Assembly identified enhanced regional, South-South and triangular cooperation as a key element of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict. This approach recognizes that support delivered through the United Nations system is only a portion of the overall assistance needed to support national institutions.

47. Over the past few years, a number of South-South cooperation and triangular exchanges have delivered good results, such as from the South Sudan Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) project, which is now well evaluated, to exchanges between Somalia and Timor-Leste; Côte d’Ivoire and African countries that have gone through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform processes; and Liberia and Sierra Leone. Further examples are detailed in box 4.

Box 4
Lessons learned — promoting South-South and triangular exchanges of institution-building experiences

In Yemen, UNDP assisted the Government in developing the Youth Economic Empowerment Project, which provides youth with rapid employment in a first phase and evolves to provide matching funds for business development, complemented by technical advice. This programme builds upon the experience of youth empowerment and sustainable livelihoods programme in Burundi, linked to the reintegration of combatants, with financial support from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The ability of UNDP to draw upon expertise developed in different post-conflict country programmes was critical in developing this exchange.

The Government of Liberia requested assistance, with the support of Sweden, to draw on experiences from Sierra Leone to strengthen revenue collection. While an initial exchange was ultimately successful, the delays experienced highlighted the need for the involvement of United Nations operational entities to liaise between the host government and providers. The United Nations Mission in Liberia and UNDP played this role.

Building upon the experience of Brazil in strengthening national capacity in school feeding, nutrition and food security, the World Food Programme (WFP) partnered with the Government of Brazil to establish the Centre of Excellence against Hunger. The Centre used the lessons learned from Brazil to provide technical assistance to other countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda and Timor-Leste. The involvement of WFP in identifying opportunities to apply relevant
experiences was important in achieving results and disseminating information about the programme.

48. The lessons from those experiences are that:

(a) There is demand from post-conflict countries and a willingness to engage with Northern and Southern Member States;

(b) Realizing the benefits of such exchanges takes operational linkages in the field, and at the global level, to facilitate dialogue with host and provider countries, prepare exchanges and support them on the ground.

49. The United Nations has also documented evolving approaches from within Member States, both Northern and Southern providers. Southern countries often involve their domestic sector and provincial agencies to provide assistance to post-conflict countries and other partners (“sector solidarity”). This approach is in line with the argument made by conflict-affected countries in favour of an increase in peer-to-peer exchanges. Northern cooperation, while less closely linked to domestic experiences of institutional transformation, also brings decades of experience and the ability to connect technical cooperation to broader sources of financing, such as general or sector-specific budget support and rehabilitation projects. The approaches are complementary and can be productively drawn upon in a more coordinated manner.

50. In line with requests expressed by Member States (see General Assembly resolution 67/226), and in order to address the aforementioned challenges, the United Nations system will endeavour to offer more structured support to Member States for South-South and triangular partnerships. This may include:

(a) Provision of support at the country level, which could take five main forms:

(i) Stand-alone South-South and triangular programmes, such as the IGAD exchange;

(ii) Incorporation of South-South and triangular exchanges into broader institution-building projects and programmes financed through the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes;

(iii) Facilitation of sector planning arrangements that involve both Northern and Southern countries;

(iv) Facilitation of twinning arrangements between agencies in post-conflict countries and those with relevant post-conflict transition or capacity-building experiences;

(v) Exploration of the potential for deepening the role of diaspora, the private sector and private foundations as sources for both resources and technical expertise to support institution-building;

__________________

(b) Outreach to Member States, in particular Southern providers, on post-conflict needs and possible instruments to respond thereto. Where requested by governments, this may include exchanges on technical issues related to lessons learned on how to structure, coordinate and prepare the supply of expertise within broader programmes;

(c) Documentation of Southern experiences in institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, and exchanges among Member States on lessons learned;

(d) Development of standard operational instruments, such as model legal agreements.

51. UNDP will play a particularly important role in this area, drawing on networks of engagement with governments in post-conflict settings and provider countries in the North and the South, the tools and dialogue forums developed by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the partnerships it has established with organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, UN-Women and the World Bank. Where additional programmatic resources are required, specific proposals for voluntary contributions will be presented to interested Member States. The Peacebuilding Support Office is also well positioned to support, through the Peacebuilding Fund, priority programmes defined at the country level that include South-South and triangular cooperation for institutional strengthening in post-conflict settings.

52. A second key partnership is with international financial institutions (see General Assembly resolution 67/226). Together with the President of the World Bank, I have made efforts to deepen the partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank to benefit countries in post-conflict situations. During our joint visits to the Great Lakes Region and the Sahel, accompanied by other international leaders, we listened to the views of governments and civil society leaders, and we have worked together to mobilize much needed resources to support national and regional peacebuilding.

53. The more detailed operational work to support the partnership between the World Bank and the United Nations has demonstrated many specific areas of complementarity. For example, the resources developed to address security and justice planning and budgeting are a very positive example of using the comparative advantages of both institutions to address a need which neither would be able to address alone — for the United Nations, specialized expertise on security, police, justice and corrections; for the World Bank, detailed technical analysis of public expenditure. The “menu of options” described above highlights similar complementarities.

54. As the World Bank establishes its global practices in the coming months, we are ready to work together to deepen this work on public administration and to initiate a new partnership on the creation of employment. The United Nations also stands ready to deepen partnerships with other organizations: for example, the Peacebuilding Support Office and UNDP are in dialogue with the African Development Bank, the European Union and the World Bank on transition financing instruments, and we have consulted with the African Development Bank on the directions of its High-level Panel on Fragile States.

55. A third key partnership is with regional organizations. There is significant interest in deepening cooperation on support to national institution-building,
including in the areas of electoral and rule of law activities. The League of Arab States framed civilian capacities as the topic of its biennial sectoral meeting this year and developed an action plan for follow-up. One agreed action, a joint training on post-conflict needs assessments, is scheduled for January 2014. The African Union, through the African Solidarity Initiative, has initiated exchanges on the institution-building needs of a number of its member States, and the United Nations is committed to supporting this process.

56. There are also untapped opportunities to mobilize regional and subregional financing partnerships. My recent visits to the Great Lakes Region and the Sahel have demonstrated that some of the needs of post-conflict countries require action at the subregional level that provides assistance that builds institutional trust across borders and links assistance in one country to assistance in their neighbours. This approach to regional peacebuilding support and the exchange of civilian capacities, information and knowledge on institution-building in the aftermath of conflict needs to be strengthened in the coming years under the leadership of regional organizations and with the active involvement of intergovernmental bodies, the United Nations and bilateral donors. The Peacebuilding Commission is well positioned to support those linkages.

57. I urge Member States to support UNDP, in conjunction with other United Nations entities, in facilitating South-South and triangular partnerships for peacebuilding.

VI. Conclusions, observations and recommendations

58. The United Nations has made progress on the ground in knowledge products and through organizational arrangements to support crucial areas of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict. These include: overall guidance on capacity-building and integrated planning, and the consolidation of organizational arrangements in the areas of police, justice and corrections; inclusive political processes; and core government functionality. Those efforts are showing results in the field in terms of new approaches to national institution-building in situations such as in Somalia and the identification of experience and expertise from countries that have gone through post-conflict and democratic transition, in particular in the global South.

59. We have not completed everything we set out to do, but have learned lessons along the way. In so doing, we have had a fruitful dialogue among the Secretariat, the agencies, funds and programmes, and Member States, which has demonstrated the continued need for closer collaboration. I view the area of support to civilian capacities and national institution-building as a crucial area of partnership among the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes, and Member States and other partners.

60. Building on that dialogue, the present report focuses on a smaller number of actions to improve delivery at the country level, implemented through existing mandated structures and processes.

61. National ownership of institution-building: I recommend that the General Assembly encourage the application of the lessons learned and the measures described in paragraphs 19 through 33 above. I call upon Member States to
ensure sustained and predictable financing for the United Nations to support institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in supporting integrated efforts of the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes as outlined above.

62. Outreach: I recommend that the General Assembly support the strengthening, within existing resources, of the capacity of the Department of Field Support to carry out workforce planning and outreach. In complement to those efforts, I recommend that Member States commit additional voluntary technical and financial resources to increase outreach to the global South within the United Nations system.

63. South-South and triangular cooperation: I urge Member States to support UNDP, in conjunction with other United Nations entities, in facilitating South-South and triangular partnerships for peacebuilding.

64. The present report is the final report of the civilian capacities initiative as a stand-alone initiative and marks the beginning of a concerted effort across the United Nations system, to apply key lessons on institution-building and deepen our partnerships with Member States and other key actors.

65. The United Nations remains committed, with the support of the Member States, to doing more. The pathways to peace are complex, but we must continue to strive to be more responsive to the citizens of countries emerging from conflict so that we may help to strengthen national institutions which, in the end, are the only durable bulwark against the risks of repeated insecurity.