



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution [2126 \(2013\)](#), in which the Council requested that I continue to inform it of progress made in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and to bring to its attention any serious violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area ([S/2011/384](#), annex).

2. The present report provides an update on the situation in Abyei as well as on the deployment and operations of UNISFA since my last report, of 25 February 2014 ([S/2014/126](#)). It provides an update on progress made in the implementation of the additional tasks mandated to UNISFA under Security Council resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) related to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and presents the conclusions of the strategic review of the UNISFA mandate, conducted jointly by the United Nations Secretariat and the mission during the month of April, with the participation of the humanitarian country team and the United Nations country team present in Abyei.

II. Security situation

3. During the period under review, tensions between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities increased significantly as a series of serious security incidents occurred between units of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan National Police Service and Sudanese armed militias, which were deployed into the Abyei Area in violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and Security Council resolutions [1990 \(2011\)](#), [2032 \(2011\)](#), [2046 \(2012\)](#), [2047 \(2012\)](#), [2075 \(2012\)](#), [2104 \(2013\)](#) and [2126 \(2013\)](#). In addition, and also in violation of the Agreement and Security Council resolutions, approximately 120 to 150 Sudanese oil police personnel remained deployed inside the Diffra oil complex in the northern Abyei Area.

4. At the end of February 2014, up to 1,000 SPLA and South Sudan police personnel, who had originally arrived in the Abyei Area to participate in the Ngok Dinka unilateral community referendum of October 2013, were observed regrouped in military camps by UNISFA. They established military positions in the vicinity of



Makir Awed, Makir Abior, Tajalei, Marial Achak, Doungop, Miyankor and Rumamier villages. The mission's troops continuously monitored the activities of those forces and urged them to redeploy from the Abyei Area.

5. In view of the risk of escalation and serious deterioration of relations between the Sudan and South Sudan over the deployment of SPLA and South Sudan police units into Abyei, Lieutenant General Yohannes Tesfamariam, UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, met with President Salva Kiir on 25 February in Juba in an effort to secure the forces' redeployment from Abyei. He was accompanied by my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios. During the meeting, President Kiir stated that his Government would take measures to ensure the withdrawal of the SPLA and police forces by 10 March.

6. On the same day, 25 February, the SPLA and South Sudan police personnel and armed Misseriya militia from the Sudan engaged in heavy fire in Luki village in central Abyei. Upon receiving reports of the fighting, UNISFA patrols were immediately deployed to the area, where they found the bodies of three SPLA and police personnel close to a river.

7. On 1 March, another clash between SPLA/South Sudan police elements and Misseriya militias was reported in Makir Awed, near the Yura/Nyamura River. UNISFA patrols sent to the area found over 100 SPLA/police combatants and 10 Misseriya militias killed and were informed that 11 SPLA/police elements and 15 Misseriya militias had been injured. The clash in Makir Awed was the single most significant security incident in the Abyei Area since the assassination of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief on 4 May 2013.

8. On 11 March, with no progress in the withdrawal of the SPLA and South Sudan police forces, the UNISFA Head of Mission met again with Government of South Sudan officials in Juba and urged them to take immediate action to redeploy the forces in accordance with the instruction of their President. While maintaining that their forces were not officially deployed into the Abyei Area, they reiterated their commitment to ensure their withdrawal from the area.

9. On 14 March, between 4,000 and 5,000 armed Misseriya militia entered the Abyei Area from Western Kordofan State, Sudan, and approached Makir Awed. UNISFA troops immediately deployed to block their progression. Upon noticing their presence, the militia withdrew towards northern Abyei and then withdrew from the area.

10. On 21 March, two Ngok Dinka civilians were killed and another two injured by armed assailants at Yunchor village, in the vicinity of Abyei town. UNISFA deployed a quick reaction force to Yunchor and the neighbouring village of Agany Thok to pursue the assailants, but the perpetrators could not be traced.

11. From 18 to 20 March, Lieutenant General Pieng Deng Kuol, Inspector-General of the South Sudan police, visited the Abyei Area and informed UNISFA that a phased withdrawal of SPLA and police personnel would be implemented. From 22 to 25 March, the mission observed the organized redeployment of most of the SPLA and police forces to their stated gathering point in Mijan Kuol, Warrap State, South Sudan.

12. Nonetheless, one company-strength of SPLA and South Sudan police personnel remain deployed south of the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River, in the village of

Awang Thou. These forces have threatened UNISFA patrols and obstructed their access to the area. On 1 April, UNISFA troops observed an SPLA checkpoint at the entrance of Agok town. Later the same night, in Awang Thou village, 20 SPLA/police armed elements threatened a UNISFA patrol before retreating from the area. On 9 April, a UNISFA patrol observed an SPLA/police check-point at Awang Thou. On 13 April, a UNISFA patrol team was threatened by approximately 50 hostile SPLA soldiers in the same village. UNISFA continues to engage the Government of South Sudan regarding the seriousness of these incidents and to ensure the complete redeployment of the SPLA and South Sudan police forces from the Abyei Area.

13. Despite the strenuous efforts of UNISFA to discourage the bearing of arms within the Abyei Area, the prevalence of small and medium firearms persisted in the two communities during the reporting period. The mission continued to disarm individuals bearing weapons during its patrols, in collaboration with local communities.

14. A number of incidents were also reported during the period under review, particularly as a result of the presence of armed SPLA and South Sudan police elements in the Abyei Area. Local communities are particularly vulnerable to such incidents owing to the absence of any law and order institutions in the area. Frequent firing of small arms by intoxicated SPLA and police elements during the night, primarily in larger population areas such as Abyei town and Agok, were observed by the mission. On 14 March, two children, aged five and six, were sexually assaulted and killed in the Abyei town area, allegedly by SPLA and South Sudan police elements. The perpetrators remain at large.

15. UNISFA contractors were also victims of threats and attacks in several security incidents during the reporting period. On 7 March, while travelling from Diffra to Abyei town, a vehicle belonging to a UNISFA contractor was hijacked by three unidentified armed individuals. On 13 April, a vehicle belonging to another UNISFA contractor was hijacked by an armed individual, approximately seven km south of Abyei town.

16. In order to address the deteriorating security environment, the mission continued to implement its conflict prevention and mitigation strategy, which includes the maintenance of a disengagement area between the local communities, the deployment of troops in all potential flashpoints and throughout the Abyei Area, robust day and night patrols, aerial monitoring and the regular convening of joint security committee meetings with traditional leaders of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities.

17. Nevertheless, the inter-communal security incidents in central Abyei, near the disengagement area, and the presence of armed groups caused anxiety within the Ngok Dinka community and resulted in a substantial number of them relocating to locations in southern Abyei. In order to restore confidence within the community, the mission intensified its patrolling in sensitive areas and worked closely with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to assess and support the provision of the requisite humanitarian assistance. Since the end of March, with the overall stabilization of the security situation, UNISFA has observed the gradual return of displaced Ngok Dinka to their villages.

18. Meanwhile, the Misseriya migration progressed during the reporting period despite the inability of the Misseriya nomads to move southwards through the central migratory corridor. Approximately 70,000 Misseriya nomads are currently present inside Abyei, with approximately 1 million livestock. They are concentrated mainly in Soheib, Dahlop, Alal, Andal, Shegei, Todach, Luki, Goli, Wut Gok, Colladed, Um Khariet, Um Khaer, Dari, Diffra, El Shamam, Banjadeed, Abu Gazala, Saidana, Mekines and Dumboloya.

19. Mine action survey, clearance, and demolition operations by the United Nations Mine Action Service continued throughout the area to assess and remove potential explosive threats to United Nations personnel and the local communities. The Service conducted mine action surveys in 13 villages and Abyei town, and safely collected and destroyed six hazardous items and 2.5 kg of small arms ammunition. The comprehensive training and accreditation process for demining personnel from the Kadugli area was successfully completed, and they were deployed to Diffra.

III. Political developments

20. The Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have made no progress in the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 or the resolution of the territory's final status during the reporting period. The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee has not met since 3 May 2013. The UNISFA Head of Mission continued to press the Sudan and South Sudan to resume meetings of the Committee in the light of its crucial role in providing political and administrative oversight in Abyei. On 4 March, the African Union Facilitator of the Committee invited the Co-Chairs for a consultative meeting of the Committee. On 24 March, the Government of the Sudan responded positively to that request. The Government of South Sudan has yet to respond.

21. In the absence of progress in the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011, UNISFA continued to urge the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to support the convening of a joint peace conference of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya traditional chiefs in order to re-establish dialogue between them and thereby ease the tense security situation in Abyei. On 13 March, the UNISFA Head of Mission wrote to both Governments to propose the organization of the event in Aweil, with the support of the Governor of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State in South Sudan, following his successful facilitation of Misseriya and Dinka Malual and Reizegat and Dinka Malual traditional peace conferences during the current dry season.

22. In his response to the invitation of 18 March, the Sudan Co-Chair of the Committee, while agreeing in principle to hold a joint peace conference, requested that it be organized within the framework of the Committee. He also indicated his Government's reservations to the organization of the event in South Sudan.

IV. Status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

23. The monitoring and verification activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism remained suspended as a result of South Sudan's continued

disagreement with the location of the centreline in two areas of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and its link to the proposed border crossing corridors. South Sudan's decision of 22 November 2013 to temporarily suspend its participation in the Mechanism has not yet been revoked.

24. On 21 March, UNISFA wrote to the Defence Ministers of the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as President Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, recommending the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, under the auspices of the Panel, to address concerns regarding the link between the opening of the border crossing corridors, and the centreline and centreline coordinates of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, and thereby allow the resumption of the operations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The Panel has not yet responded to this request.

25. Meanwhile, 34 national monitors from the Sudan, 31 from South Sudan and 21 international military observers from UNISFA remain deployed at the headquarters of the Mechanism and sector headquarters in Kadugli (Southern Kordofan State, Sudan), waiting for the Mechanism to resume its operations. Two monitors from South Sudan and three UNISFA monitors are also deployed to the sector headquarters in Gok Machar (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan). In addition, one platoon from the advance party of 117 personnel of the Force Protection Unit is being deployed at the Mechanism's sector headquarters in Gok Machar, principally to ensure the security of the personnel, premises and assets of the Mechanism there. The schedule of deployment of the remaining personnel of the Force Protection Unit of UNISFA remains to be determined pending the reactivation of the operations of the Mechanism.

26. Route verification and clearance operations of the United Nations Mine Action Service continued in the Mechanism's Sector 1 area to support operations from Gok Machar to the UNISFA headquarters in Abyei. Mine action teams completed 10, 19 and 141.32 km respectively of route survey, route verification, and route clearance on the priority mission route linking the two headquarters. Training for patrol support teams for the Mechanism continued during the reporting period to ensure full operational readiness as soon as orders are received to commence ground patrols. In addition, the teams remain on standby for emergency mine action tasks in their areas of responsibility.

V. Humanitarian situation

27. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations continued to provide assistance and basic services to approximately 81,000 Ngok Dinka beneficiaries in the Abyei Area, including health, nutrition, water, education, and public infrastructure rehabilitation, filling the gap left by the administration vacuum and lack of remittances from the two Governments for public services. In addition, humanitarian assistance in the form of food and non-food items was provided to around 7,000 newly displaced persons from South Sudan, stretching available resources to the limits.

28. Humanitarian access continued to be hampered by both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya community members. United Nations contractors and staff of international non-governmental organizations were threatened by Ngok Dinka

individuals and prevented from accessing and executing their tasks in northern Abyei. On 26 March, employees of an International Organization for Migration (IOM) contractor, working in both the northern and southern parts of Abyei, were warned by two armed Ngok Dinka men not to continue work in northern Abyei and were given two days' notice to leave Abyei town. The contracted work in northern Abyei was abandoned and the South Sudanese contracted staff have since left the Abyei Area; the international staff are preparing to depart. Similarly, in March 2014, a non-governmental health organization was prevented by Ngok Dinka "authorities" from conducting a malaria prevention campaign in Misseriya-populated areas. On 24 March, IOM contracted staff were physically threatened by Misseriya community members in Soheib, leading to their immediate extraction by UNISFA forces.

29. The access of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to the north of Abyei has continued to be hampered by lack of travel permits and authorization to transfer assets from Khartoum to Abyei.

VI. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

30. On 12 May, the UNISFA military component stood at 4,098 of its authorized troop strength of 5,326 (see annex). UNISFA troops remain deployed in three sectors in accordance with the mission's conflict prevention and mitigation strategy. Platoon-size temporary operating bases are occupied by the troops for a designated period of time in specific areas, depending on the existing threats and security concerns. Areas inaccessible to ground patrols because of the lack of roads and tracks, mainly at the extremities of the eastern and western corridors, are monitored through regular aerial patrols. The inbound/outbound troop rotations of personnel from Ethiopian battalions 9 and 6 were completed from 15 February to 1 March. A total of 890 troops were repatriated to Ethiopia and 900 new troops arrived in the mission area.

31. Twenty-two of the 50 authorized members of the police component of UNISFA are deployed, headed by a Senior Police Adviser. Police personnel continued to provide advice and support to the UNISFA Head of Mission and the military component on matters of law and order and community security. During the reporting period, UNISFA police trained 34 members of the military component in public order management and cordoning of crime scenes.

VII. Mission support

32. The efforts of UNISFA to provide facilities and services to the troops before the onset of the rainy season continued during the period under review. This included upgrading the access road and the camp infrastructure of the Todach temporary operating base. In the next three months, the mission will focus on the Tajalei temporary operating base camp in order to complete the drilling of a water borehole, the construction of an access road and prefabricated structures for 150 soldiers currently being accommodated in tents. The light field engineering unit constructed a helipad adjacent to the camp and completed the construction of a bridge at Ayony Thok, which will connect the central and south sectors and serve as

an alternative to the main supply route. The site clearance and filling of the Athony airstrip area is also in progress.

33. Work is also under way to complete the logistical operationalization of the Kadugli and Gok Machar sector headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to enable the final deployment of the Force Protection Unit to those locations. Accordingly, in Gok Machar, the accommodation areas are being prepared and the supporting structures, including provision of information technology and fuel services, have been completed. In Kadugli, the construction of the camp indirect fire shelter has been completed.

34. Ngok Dinka community members continued preventing United Nations contractors from the Sudan from carrying out their operations in the Abyei Area. This included harassing contracted staff and confiscating United Nations property. In several cases, Ngok Dinka community members prevented internationally contracted drivers from using their vehicles, compelling mission military drivers to do so. Despite the best efforts of UNISFA in engaging the Government of South Sudan on this issue, the matter has yet to be resolved. This has delayed several of the mission's infrastructure projects and the delivery of essential services, which will exacerbate the logistical challenges with the onset of the rainy season.

VIII. Financial implications

35. The General Assembly, by its resolution [68/258](#) of 27 December 2013, appropriated the amount of \$38.5 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, in addition to the amount of \$307.1 million already appropriated for the same period under the terms of its resolution [67/270](#). Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNISFA beyond 31 May 2014, the cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount approved by the General Assembly for the 2013/14 financial period.

36. As at 14 April 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNISFA amounted to \$50.5 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1,722.2 million. Reimbursement to the contributing Government for troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 28 February 2014 and 31 December 2013, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Strategic review of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

37. A strategic review of the UNISFA mandate was conducted from 11 to 25 April 2014 by an integrated team of the Secretariat, UNISFA, and Abyei-based representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme. Representatives of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities, senior officials from the Governments of the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, officials of the African Union Commission and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, representatives of the humanitarian and United Nations country teams in Khartoum, Juba and Abyei respectively, and other

international partners and civil society representatives, were consulted during the review.

Abyei

38. The conflict over Abyei still has the potential to bring the Sudan and South Sudan back to war. The political processes, which were designed to resolve the dispute over its final status and restore confidence between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities, are now in total paralysis. For over a year, the parties have been unable or unwilling to make any compromise to move forward with the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and the resolution of the final status of Abyei on the basis of the proposal submitted to the parties by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in September 2012. As a result, the political and security situation on the ground has seriously deteriorated and could become untenable during the next dry season and 2014/15 migration cycle.

39. Both the Sudan and South Sudan informed the review team that they were content with UNISFA and its performance. Sudanese officials declared their support for the renewal of the mission's mandate, and requested that the military component be better supported, that the national staff and independent contractors from the Sudan be brought back to Abyei, that Sudanese contractors be allowed to operate in the area, and that more pressure be placed on South Sudan to implement the Agreement of 20 June 2011. South Sudan Government representatives reiterated their commitment to resolve the Abyei dispute amicably, consistent with the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to maintain good relations with the Government of the Sudan, despite differences over its implementation. They emphasized, however, that the Agreement of 20 June 2011 had been superseded by events.

40. South Sudan maintained that, while the advantages of having a single troop-contributing country — Ethiopia — were unquestionable and should be preserved, the mission should be strengthened, with stronger civilian components to include human rights monitoring and reporting, and support to community policing and rule of law institutions. They recommended that UNISFA be mandated to take over the security of the Diffra oil installations, allowing the withdrawal of the Sudanese oil police units, and to manage the 2 per cent of the oil revenue earmarked for Abyei institutions in the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. They also requested that resources available to the mission be increased to develop the territory's road infrastructure, thereby increasing coverage of the area and allowing the return of internally displaced persons, and that more employment opportunities and contracts be allocated to Ngok Dinka.

41. Ethiopian Government officials stated to the review team that the agreement under which they had agreed to deploy troops and participate in the stabilization of Abyei was no longer respected by the parties, resulting in an unsustainable situation. They emphasized that more efforts have to be made by the African Union and the United Nations to revive the political process related to the joint management of Abyei, and that the parties, in particular, need to resume their cooperation to establish law and order, administration and inter-communal mechanisms. Should these steps not be taken, they indicated that Ethiopia would need to reconsider its military commitment to UNISFA.

42. In view of the above, the review team assessed that four options were available in considering the renewal of the mandate of UNISFA:

Option 1

The first option would be the withdrawal of UNISFA. The mission was created to support an agreement which, over the past three years, neither party has taken the required action to fully implement. In the light of the discussion with the parties, the review team assessed that the parties are unlikely to come together in the medium term to complete its full implementation. In the absence of political will on the part of the two Governments to cooperate and assist the mission in managing the Abyei situation, UNISFA could simply be withdrawn. It is assessed that this could lead to the deployment of forces from both countries in the Abyei Area, at great cost to the civilian population of the two communities, who would most likely be displaced yet again. All the progress made to rebuild Abyei since July 2011 would be lost and the polarization between communities would reach a new peak, with the high risk of destabilizing cross-border areas between Warrap and Unity States and Southern Kordofan. Under this scenario, the likelihood of escalation to open conflict between the two countries would be high.

Option 2

The second option would be maintaining the status quo. This option would have the benefit of containing violence in the short run but, during the coming dry season and the 2014/15 migration cycle, UNISFA would have to once again establish a disengagement area between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities and de facto partition the territory. This would further frustrate both communities as the Misseriya would not be able to migrate through the usual corridors and the Ngok Dinka would not be able to resettle in their places of origin throughout the Abyei Area. Incidents and tensions would increase, as well as hostilities and attacks against the mission. As indicated, Ethiopia may reconsider its contribution to UNISFA. As a result of the increased tensions, the gains made in the past three years would progressively be lost. The strategic objective of UNISFA — consolidating a political and security environment in Abyei conducive to the resolution of the final status — would become more and more difficult to achieve, with no exit option in sight for the mission.

Option 3

The third option would involve the executive authority of the United Nations to implement the Abyei proposal of September 2012 of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. Should the Security Council decide to provide the United Nations with the executive authority to administer and implement the Panel's proposal, with the consent of the Governments of both the Sudan and South Sudan, the Organization would face high risks. It would have to take responsibility for all decisions as well as possible incidents and blockages in the process. Both communities are likely to contest the modalities of implementation of the eligibility criteria included in the Panel's proposal and use this to challenge the process and subsequently its outcome if it does not satisfy their respective aspirations. This scenario would most likely lead to an increase in tensions between communities, undermining the chances for a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Abyei.

Option 4

The fourth option would consist of supporting the resumption of community dialogue and administration by the communities under the supervision of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. While the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan may not be in a position to make the necessary compromises over the resolution of the final status of Abyei in the near future, they should, as a minimum, commit themselves to cooperating and working jointly with UNISFA to address current challenges in the Abyei Area, particularly in regard to law and order, administration and community dialogue. Pending an agreement on the resolution of the final status of Abyei and in the absence of agreement for the establishment of joint administration, both Governments may nevertheless be able to accept and implement other key provisions of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is necessary to prevent the ongoing deterioration of the situation. This would include the full withdrawal of all armed Government units from the Abyei Area; the resumption of the Joint Oversight Committee meetings; supporting the organization of a Misseriya-Ngok Dinka inter-communal peace conference without any preconditions; contributing the 2 per cent of revenue from oil resources for the Abyei Area into a trust fund dedicated to early recovery and the creation of a common economic zone.

43. Of the above options, option 4 is the one most likely to contribute to consolidating peace and security in Abyei and, at the same time, strengthen the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the final status of the territory. This would also offer an exit strategy for the mission. The implementation of this option is contingent, however, on the resumption of political dialogue and an agreement between the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan over the implementation of some aspects of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and the Abyei Protocol, facilitated by renewed engagement of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, or an agreement with the African Union and the parties that an alternative mechanism be put in place to achieve this result.

Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

44. Since March 2014 and the escalation of the South Sudan conflict, including the targeting of the oil installations by SPLM in opposition, accusations by the two countries of the other's support to their respective rebellions have resumed, with concern over military activities in the border areas. Both Governments stated to the review team their interest in establishing the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and operationalizing the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, to restore confidence through active patrolling and verification of the presence of any armed forces, including rebel groups, in the Zone. However, unless a compromise is reached to implement the most significant and urgently needed aspects of their border security agreement, that is the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, there is no justification for the United Nations to continue investing in developing the infrastructure of the Mechanism or to deploy troops for its protection. There are thus three options with respect to UNISFA support to the Mechanism:

1. Withdrawal — all international monitors would be withdrawn, the advance party of force protection already deployed would be repatriated to Ethiopia and all construction work would be stopped and the equipment removed;

2. The maintenance of a skeleton presence to secure the investments made, pending the reactivation of the Mechanism — the international monitors would be withdrawn, the construction work would be stopped and only the bare minimum of the force protection elements already deployed would be maintained to protect the sites already built with their equipment;

3. The completion of the infrastructure necessary to establish the initial operating capability and deployment of the additional elements of the Force Protection Unit.

45. Sustaining the upkeep of the monitors and pursuing infrastructure development for the establishment of the initial operating capability is a viable option if the parties resume their cooperation and the implementation of their agreements, starting with breaking the deadlock over the zero line coordinates of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. This may also require a resumption of political engagement by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, or an agreement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan and the African Union, for the establishment of an alternative mechanism to sustain the political dialogue over border security.

X. Observations and recommendations

46. The lack of cooperation between the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan in implementing the Agreement of June 2011 has created an untenable situation, which is likely to erupt into violence during the next dry season and the 2014/15 migration cycle. The presence of armed forces from South Sudan and militia from the Sudan for much of the reporting period has already posed a significant threat to security and stability in the Abyei Area and has led to a dangerous increase of criminality. While I appreciate both Governments' commitment to redeploying the forces and militia out of the Abyei Area, SPLA/South Sudan police armed personnel and Diffra oil police units remain deployed in the area today, while Misseriya militias from the Sudan have repeatedly entered the territory. I strongly urge both Governments to immediately withdraw these units and prevent the entry of militias into the Abyei Area in accordance with the terms of their agreements. There cannot be any exception to this course of action.

47. Abyei cannot remain in a total vacuum of joint administrative and law and order arrangements necessary to meet the challenges of the current situation. The recent escalation of tensions and multiplication of incidents within the Abyei Area has greatly increased the presence of weapons among the Abyei communities. This has, in turn, fuelled insecurity, criminality and the hostility between them. This insecurity has inhibited the provision of basic services to the communities and forced the mission to establish a disengagement area, which prevented the Misseriya nomads from migrating southwards and the Ngok Dinka from resettling in their villages in the northern part of Abyei. It is imperative that the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan resume meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and expeditiously agree with the communities on a small arms control mechanism to make the Abyei Area "weapons free", in accordance with the Committee's resolution of 3 May 2013.

48. Much of the tensions between communities could be addressed if the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya traditional leaders were able to meet and discuss the modalities to find closure over the assassination of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief. They should also be able to agree on a mechanism to address incidents, cattle-rustling and the criminality affecting their relations. I appeal to the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to support the efforts of UNISFA to facilitate such a meeting and ensure that it is held at the earliest possible time, without preconditions. I also call on both Governments to ensure that all United Nations staff, contractors and humanitarian organizations operating in the area are accorded unhindered freedom of movement.

49. The security situation in the Abyei Area is becoming untenable in the absence of constructive political dialogue between the parties, and cooperation between national interlocutors from the two countries, necessary to provide the minimum support for UNISFA and the humanitarian and the United Nations country teams to implement their mandates. The current trends have to be reversed. Similarly, in the absence of compromise over the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, there is no justification for continuing to invest in supporting the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.

50. In view of the above, and the options and political analysis outlined in section IX of this report, I seek the endorsement of the Security Council in pursuing option 4 related to Abyei, that is supporting the resumption of community dialogue and administration by the Abyei communities under the supervision of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. I also seek the endorsement by the Council of option 2 for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, that is the maintenance of a skeleton presence of the Force Protection Unit to secure the investments made, pending the activation of the Mechanism. In this connection, I recommend that the Security Council consider a four-month technical rollover of the mandate of UNISFA. During this period, an assessment will be conducted of the mandate and operational requirements related to the implementation of option 4 for Abyei. The Secretariat will also use this period to further consult the parties, the Government of Ethiopia and the African Union on the possibility and requirements for this option to be implemented and its sustainability. Should there be no interest from the parties in supporting option 4, the Council would have to engage them in finding a different course of action and support system.

51. I should like to stress that the United Nations alone cannot implement an agreement and preserve peace and stability in Abyei if the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan do not want to. It is imperative that the parties recommit themselves to resolving the current paralysis in earnest in the coming four months.

52. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Yohannes Tesfamariam, and his team for their sustained efforts to enhance peace and stability in the Abyei Area, despite many challenges, and to support the parties in the implementation of their border security agreements. I also wish to thank my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, for his assistance to the mission in engaging with the parties and trying to prevent any escalation of violence in the Abyei Area.

Annex

**Composition of the United Nations Interim Security Force for
Abyei military component (including the Joint Border Verification
and Monitoring Mechanism)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Total</i>
Benin	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Bolivia	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Brazil	Experts on mission	3	5
	Contingent troop	2	
Burkina Faso	Experts on mission	1	1
Burundi	Experts on mission	1	1
Cambodia	Experts on mission	3	3
Ecuador	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
El Salvador	Experts on mission	1	1
Ethiopia	Experts on mission	78	4 014
	Contingent troop	3 936	
Ghana	Experts on mission	3	5
	Contingent troop	2	
Guinea	Experts on mission	1	1
India	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Indonesia	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Kyrgyzstan	Experts on mission	1	1
Malawi	Contingent troop	1	1
Mali	Contingent troop	1	1
Malaysia	Experts on mission	1	1
Mongolia	Experts on mission	1	1
Mozambique	Experts on mission	1	1
Namibia	Experts on mission	3	3
	Contingent troop	0	
Nepal	Experts on mission	3	5
	Contingent troop	2	
Nigeria	Contingent troop	2	5
	Experts on mission	3	
Paraguay	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Peru	Experts on mission	2	4

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Total</i>
	Contingent troop	2	
Rwanda	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Sierra Leone	Experts on mission	3	3
Sri Lanka	Experts on mission	5	6
	Contingent troop	1	
United Republic of Tanzania	Contingent troop	1	1
Uruguay	Contingent troop	1	1
Yemen	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Zambia	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Zimbabwe	Contingent troop	1	3
	Experts on mission	2	
Total		4 098	4 098

