Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2113 (2013), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report provides an update and analysis of the conflict and the political and operational environment in Darfur. It also includes updates on the achievements and measures undertaken by the Mission to implement the strategic priorities outlined in my special report of 25 February 2014 (S/2014/138) and, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2148 (2014), and on progress in the strengthening and streamlining of the operations of UNAMID.

II. Overview of conflict dynamics, political context, and operating environment in Darfur

A. Analysis of the current trends and conflict dynamics in Darfur

2. An upsurge in violence is currently destabilizing Darfur at three interconnected levels. First, the deteriorating economic situation has led to increasing conflict among tribes over land and resources. Those conflicts have, in some areas, been manipulated (especially in North and South Darfur) by unresolved political rivalries among prominent political figures. Second, the deployment to the region of Government aligned militia, known as Rapid Support Forces, has seriously undermined the security of civilians, their property and livelihoods, particularly in South Darfur and increasingly in North Darfur. Third, the security situation continues to be aggravated by attacks by rebel groups against Government forces and indiscriminate bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces in areas of rebel control.

Local violence and intercommunal conflict

3. Intercommunal violence during the reporting period included clashes between Misseriya and Khozam and between Salamat and Misseriya in Central Darfur;
between Rizeigat and Ma’alia in East Darfur; and between Abbala of the Northern Rezeigat tribe and Gimir and Tama in North Darfur.

4. The most serious case of intercommunal violence occurred on 18 February when Salamat and Misseriya, two Arab tribes, clashed in Salih village, in the vicinity of Um Dukhun in Central Darfur, after the killing of a Misseriya tribesman. The violence resulted in 28 deaths, mostly of Salamat tribesmen. The deterioration in security in Um Dukhun following this incident led to displacement of approximately 5,000 civilians who fled to Chad, and 10,000 who fled to camps for internally displaced persons in South Darfur. Many civilians from other tribes, mainly Masalit, Zaghawa and Fur, were affected as the clashes spread to Rihad El Berdi in South Darfur. In South Darfur, the Ta’aisha, another Arab tribe, attacked the Salamat in support of the Misseriya. Paramilitary forces and Arab militia, recruited as Janjaweed militia in the early years of the conflict, were reported to have taken part in the fighting. Intervention by the Government of the Sudan in some flashpoints and mediation efforts undertaken by traditional leaders in January and February helped quell tensions and prevent further escalation. However, there is a high risk that continued hostility between the two tribes could, at any time, escalate into armed conflict.

5. In North Darfur, political rivalries between Musa Hilal, one of the main Arab militia leaders during the early years of the Darfur crisis, and Osman Kibir, the Governor of North Darfur, led to serious conflict during the reporting period. Tensions spread when Musa Hilal accused Kibir of using his government position to benefit non-Arab tribes, including Tama, Berti and Gimir, to consolidate his personal influence in the State.

6. Fighting broke out in February and March, pitting communities allied to Musa Hilal and Osman Kibir against each other. On 28 February supporters of Musa Hilal ambushed a military convoy deployed by the Governor in the Karama area. Fifteen soldiers were reportedly killed, and a number of vehicles of the Sudanese Armed Forces were destroyed. Prior to the attack, commissioners appointed by the Governor of North Darfur were chased out of the area of Saraf Umra, Kabkabiya and Jebel Amir at the instigation of Musa Hilal. Sporadic and intense clashes between Hilal’s supporters among the Northern Rizeigat militia and other tribes, particularly Tama and Gimir, in Saraf Umra and surrounding villages between 3 and 8 March, resulted in the displacement of an estimated 50,000 people and an unspecified number of casualties. An additional 10,000 people were reported to have fled to various locations in North, Central and West Darfur. The fighting is reported to have led to the destruction and looting of more than 2,000 houses in Saraf Umra and adjacent towns. An agreement on cessation of hostilities, facilitated by a local peace committee and the Government of the Sudan, was signed between the Northern Rizeigat and Gimir on 12 March, allowing for the safe return of displaced persons to their homes.

Deployment of the Government Rapid Support Force

7. The arrival of 5,000 to 6,000 militia, known as the Rapid Support Force, in South Darfur from North Kordofan via East Darfur on 19 February intensified the already volatile security situation. The Rapid Support Force, whose members were reportedly recruited by the Government from tribes in Darfur and trained in Khartoum, were initially deployed to South Kordofan and Blue Nile States to fight
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North). The redeployment followed alleged criminal acts against the local population in those States.

8. The deployment of the Rapid Support Force coincided with a series of large-scale attacks on armed groups and villages in South then in North Darfur. Attacks attributed to the Rapid Support Force included the targeting of civilians, the destruction and burning of villages, looting of property and theft of livestock. On 19 and 27 February, operations led by the Rapid Support Force in support of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Um Gunya village in South Darfur resulted in the displacement of approximately 30,000 people from Um Gunya and Hijaar to camps for internally displaced persons in El Salaam, Kalma and Labado. Violence continued in the area south of Nyala on 27 and 28 February, when elements of the Rapid Support Force attacked and burned the villages of Higer, Tunjo, Um Gunya, Tami Telebe and Himeida.

9. Attacks by the Rapid Support Force carried out later in North Darfur appear to follow a similar pattern. Nine attacks on villages and communities by suspected members of Rapid Support Force were reported in North Darfur. Between 21 and 27 March, 40 villages in the vicinity of Korma were attacked by a combined force of elements of the Rapid Support Force and militia groups, forcing some 25,000 people from their homes, including 4,000 who sought refuge at the UNAMID base in Korma. The attacks by the Rapid Support Force/militia in North Darfur included acts of rape, looting and burning of houses.

10. On 22 March, the camp for internally displaced persons in Khor Abeche was attacked, looted and burned by elements of the Rapid Support Force. About 4,000 persons sought refuge at the Khor Abeche UNAMID team site. In Baashim village in North Darfur (60 km north-east of Mellit), the Rapid Support Force conducted a retaliatory raid on 23 March, following the attack on 13 March by the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) on a Government base. Acts of rape, looting of property and burning of houses were reported. Local sources reported that on 28 March, elements of the Rapid Support Force attacked Amary village in North Darfur (65 km north-east of Kutum) and killed two civilians, while looting property and burning houses.

11. In addition to attacks against civilians, elements of the Rapid Support Force have clashed with Government forces. On 18 March, an exchange of fire occurred between elements of the Rapid Support Force and the Sudanese Armed Forces at a checkpoint near El Fasher. On the same day, in the Al Borsa area in the vicinity of El Fasher, armed men alleged to be members of the Rapid Support Force clashed with Government police resulting in fatalities on both sides. It is difficult to establish the motives behind these incidents which may not necessarily reflect a breakdown in the alliance between Government forces and the Rapid Support Force.

**Clashes between Government forces and armed groups**

12. Clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and rebel groups also increased during the reporting period. In Central Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) attacked a Government-escorted commercial convoy in Fogadiko on 9 January. Authorities reported that 12 attackers were killed and 9 injured. In South Darfur, combined forces of SLA-MM and the Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (SLA-Justice) attacked a Central Reserve Police base in Al Sunta village on
13 January, killing 13 personnel. Over 50,000 people from the affected areas were displaced to several camps for the internally displaced in the Sani Deleiba area. Persistent efforts to access the areas directly affected were consistently denied by the Government. On 4 March, an attack on a Sudanese Armed Forces camp in El Taweisha resulted in 30 personnel killed and 30 injured. Suspected SLA-MM elements subsequently attacked Delbah village on 22 March, where they were engaged by Sudanese Armed Forces. Eight civilians and an undetermined number of SLA-MM fighters were killed, and 18 houses were burned.

13. Clashes moved to North Darfur in early March when SLA-MM attacked the towns of El Laeit and El Taweisha. On the same day, joint Chad-Sudan Forces thwarted an attack in Olibade by an SLA-MM splinter group, arresting five attackers and seizing one vehicle. SLA-MM allegedly attacked Kalemando locality in North Darfur on 5 March, forcing an unspecified number of inhabitants to flee. On 13 March, elements of SLA-MM attacked a Sudanese Armed Forces base in Mellit, reportedly killing 50 personnel and 18 civilians. The attackers looted Mellit market and freed prisoners before withdrawing the following day. Joint Sudanese Armed Forces/Rapid Support Force subsequently regained control of Mellit. On 17 March, elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Force jointly attacked SLA-AW positions at Fanga Suk in Central Darfur (75 km northeast of Nertiti), looting and burning shops in the local market. On 20 March, SLA-MM attacked Haskanita, El Laeit, Jar Elnabi and El Taweisha (North Darfur), leading to the displacement of some 85,000 persons in El Daien.

B. Humanitarian situation

14. The escalation of the conflict caused a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur. Approximately 250,000 people are estimated to have fled violence since February, close to 200,000 of whom remained displaced at the time of the writing of the present report. This number is higher than the number of people displaced in 2011 and 2012 combined, and is about half of the number of persons displaced in 2013. In total, Darfur is now estimated to host over 2 million internally displaced persons.

15. Securing timely access to newly displaced people has been a challenge, but by late March, over 130,000 people had been reached. In some cases, specific agencies were granted expedited access, allowing for rapid delivery of food and health supplies in some areas. Humanitarian partners were also able to scale up emergency response in established camps for the internally displaced by using contingency stocks, particularly in South Darfur.

16. Access to areas of active hostilities has been extremely limited, however. This has affected both to deliver humanitarian assistance and the ability to provide services. Partners were unable to reach several areas in North Darfur which were believed to be hosting newly displaced persons or those villages worst affected by violence in South Darfur, which generated the influx of newly displaced persons into camps around Nyala. Humanitarian access to the Jebel Marra area has remained cut off, and the Adilla and Abu Karinka localities in East Darfur have not been reached since inter-tribal fighting broke out in the area in August 2013. Humanitarian actors continued to call for unhindered access to all areas at several
levels. The movement restrictions imposed on UNAMID also affected United Nations humanitarian agencies requiring armed escorts.

17. Funding and implementation capacity challenges also continued and were compounded by the suspension of the operations of key humanitarian partners and denial of travel permits for others. Humanitarian protection activities have been tightly controlled. This is of great concern in the light of reports of multiple direct attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure during the reporting period.

18. The increased volatility in the security situation has led to amplified threats to humanitarian actors. The most frequent target of robbery and attack has been the World Food Programme (WFP). In January, a WFP office in South Darfur was robbed twice, and a WFP-contracted truck, along with food items, was carjacked in North Darfur. In February and March, WFP warehouses in El Fasher, which serve as a major hub of the agency’s humanitarian operations for West, Central and North Darfur, were subjected to three robberies and two attempted robberies, and a WFP-contracted truck was looted in Central Darfur. On 16 March, UNAMID peacekeepers repulsed an attack by unidentified persons on the warehouse in El Fasher. On 18 March, a mortar shell, fired by unidentified persons, landed and exploded inside the warehouse in El Fasher, injuring one security guard. The following day, two items of unexploded ordnance were discovered inside the premises. Sudanese authorities were notified, and UNAMID deployed additional troops to guard the facility.

19. The offices of two international non-governmental organizations were also robbed in January in Nertiti, Central Darfur, the second such incident within a three-month period. Such incidents continue to create significant additional complications for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Darfur.

C. Operating environment

20. UNAMID and humanitarian actors continued to face substantial operational obstacles to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate and programme delivery, including insecurity, criminality and restricted movement by Government forces and armed groups.

21. Restrictions were most often imposed by local officials in areas of ongoing or recently concluded hostilities between Government and armed movement forces. Officials also used bureaucratic impediments, particularly in relation to the provision of permits for the United Nations country team, to restrict access to certain areas. Between 1 January and 1 April, UNAMID land movements were restricted on 72 occasions, compared with 35 restrictions in the previous reporting period. Restrictions were highest in South Darfur. The authorities also denied 72 of 4,386 planned flights compared with 501 of 4,637 in the previous period. The Mission brought these restrictions and denials of access to the attention of the Government of the Sudan.

22. In January and February, 33 requests for military escorts for humanitarian assessment and delivery missions were made to UNAMID by United Nations agencies. Of these, three requests were cancelled by the National Intelligence and Security Services and by the Humanitarian Aid Commission without explanation. Three requests were also cancelled by the Mission due to troop rotations.
23. During the reporting period, a total of eight carjacking incidents targeting vehicles of UNAMID and humanitarian personnel occurred. Forty-seven house break-ins and robberies targeting UNAMID and humanitarian personnel were recorded during the period. Of the 47 incidents, 28 occurred in North Darfur, 12 in South Darfur, five in Central Darfur and two in West Darfur.

24. A UNAMID military logistics patrol was disarmed by unidentified assailants on 8 February at Saiyain in North Darfur. Three vehicles, 37 small arms, 4 light machine guns, unspecified quantities of ammunition and assorted battle gear were taken. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations dispatched an investigation team to Darfur from 6 to 11 March to determine the circumstances of the incident and make recommendations to mitigate further hostile attacks against United Nations personnel.

25. A number of additional mitigation measures were initiated by the Security Management Team to reduce the exposure of staff to security threats. These included, among others, enhanced convoy escorts, static armed guards, review of the minimum operating security standards and minimum operational residential security standards with regard to convoy movements, improved security for office accommodations and residential houses, physical security and enhanced quick response mechanisms. Moreover, the joint security coordination mechanism with the Government security authorities has been strengthened.

III. Achievements and impact of the Mission

26. In its resolution 2148 (2014), the Security Council endorsed three main priorities for UNAMID identified by the strategic review of the Mission, namely: mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, while taking into account ongoing democratic transformation at the national level; the protection of civilians, the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; and support to the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the United Nations country team. During the reporting period, the mission’s activities have been focused on those priorities.

A. Inclusive peace process

27. Efforts towards an inclusive peace process include the continued high-level engagement of the Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, with the parties for direct negotiations as well as the facilitation role of UNAMID in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

High-level mediation

28. The Joint Chief Mediator continued efforts to bring the parties closer to agreement on direct negotiations despite the persistent divergence of views between the Government and the non-signatory armed groups on the way forward. In spite of the Government’s repeated expressions of readiness for direct negotiations, two key obstacles remained. The armed groups continued to press for a comprehensive,
national process to address Sudan’s challenges, rejecting the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as a basis for talks, and continued to insist upon entering negotiations with the Government as the Sudanese Revolutionary front, formed in September 2011 with SPLM-North.

29. Pursuant to the mediation mandate of UNAMID and the African Union-United Nations Framework for Peace in Darfur, the Joint Chief Mediator engaged the Government and the armed movements separately, urging the non-signatory movements to join the peace process on the basis of the Doha Document without pre-conditions. In those consultations, the armed movements committed themselves to a negotiated settlement of the conflict and the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of Sudan. The Government maintained its objection to any parallel peace process.

30. On 27 January, President Omer Al-Bashir, in a speech to the National Assembly, announced that his Government planned to initiate an all-inclusive national dialogue which would focus on peace and security; political reforms and democratization; economic reforms; and national identity. The announcement was welcomed by the international community and many Sudanese, including some opposition political parties that have committed to participating in the national dialogue. The positions of some members of the National Consensus Forces, a loose alliance of opposition parties that signed the New Dawn Charter with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front in January 2013, have changed, with some calling for a transitional government to precede the national dialogue and an independent body to oversee the process. The Government has announced security guarantees for the participation of the armed movements, including freedoms of association, assembly and press. However the modalities remain vague, and several political opposition parties have expressed scepticism about the Government’s commitment to a genuine process.

31. Following that announcement, on 10 and 11 February in Kampala, the Joint Chief Mediator met the leaders of the three armed movements, including Minni Minawi, Gibril Ibrahim and, for the first time, Abdul Wahid. During the meeting, the Joint Chief Mediator encouraged the three leaders to participate in the national dialogue. The movements’ leaders, who had advocated a holistic approach, welcomed the idea of a national dialogue as a positive step, but fell short of committing to participate and announced their intention to unveil their own proposals for a national dialogue.

32. Subsequently, the Joint Chief Mediator arranged a meeting on 8 March in Addis Ababa between the leaders of two of the armed movements, Minni Minawi and Gibril Ibrahim. The African Union Commission Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, also attended. They encouraged the armed movements to enter into direct negotiations with the Government of the Sudan and to fully participate in the national dialogue. On the same day, the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Thabo Mbeki, and the Joint Chief Mediator met jointly with the armed groups to explore ways to synchronize the two mediation efforts in support of the national dialogue.

33. Further to his engagement to facilitate the peace process in Darfur, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, initiated a second mediation forum in Um Jaras from 26 to 29 March. The forum was attended by, among others, Zaghawa leaders,
Sudanese Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman, the Joint Chief Mediator, and traditional and tribal leaders from the Rizeigat, Massalit, Ma’alia, Salamat and Ta’isha tribes. President Bashir joined the forum on 29 March. The forum ended with the participants’ announcement of their full support for peace and peaceful coexistence in Darfur. The participants praised the role of Chad and Qatar in achieving comprehensive peace through sponsoring and supporting the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, noting the financial contribution of Qatar to development projects and voluntary return to villages in Darfur.

**Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

34. Progress in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the Government of the Sudan, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan (JEM-Sudan) remains limited. Following the agreement on final security arrangements, signed on 20 November 2013, the Government of the Sudan and LJM agreed, at a meeting of the Joint Commission held on 25 February, to integrate three LJM battalions into the Sudan Armed Forces and Police. The remaining 12,570 of the 15,000 combatants declared by LJM are to undergo a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The other signatory, JEM-Sudan, has commenced preparations for the verification of its combatants with the support of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur Ceasefire Commission with a view to entering a similar agreement with the Government.  

35. Preparations continued for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations scheduled for the second quarter of 2014. On 18 and 19 February in El Fasher, UNAMID facilitated a planning workshop to define the modalities for the dialogue. The workshop was attended by 47 civil society leaders and representatives of peace centres from the five States of Darfur and Khartoum.  

36. In February, the Mission concluded a Darfur-wide survey aimed at gauging local awareness and perception of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the internal dialogue. Initial findings of the survey indicated considerable grass-roots awareness of the Document and strong support for the dialogue. Participants expressed concern that the process could be hindered by the prevailing level of insecurity, as well as the emergency law vis-à-vis freedom of movement, association, expression and assembly.

37. The Darfur Regional Authority has now been fully established with the completion of the construction of its offices and recruitment of its personnel. However, insecurity, lack of financial resources, and limited technical capacity continued to undermine the ability of the Darfur Regional Authority to effectively implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

38. In the light of the agreements reached in the meeting of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur Joint Commission on 25 February, UNAMID started working closely with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission to establish the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration caseload of the LJM combatants and to support the verification exercise of the combatants of JEM-Sudan.
B. Protection of civilians

Provision of physical protection

39. During the reporting period, the Mission provided immediate and effective physical protection to displaced populations in camps and around team sites, as well as to vulnerable communities through patrols and strategic redeployment of peacekeepers. UNAMID provided physical protection to almost 60,000 displaced persons who sought refuge within or in the vicinity of UNAMID team sites in Saraf Umra, Khor Abeche and Korma.

40. An estimated 50,000 people fled to the UNAMID Saraf Umra team site during the outbreak of violence between the Northern Rizeigat and Gimir tribes on 5 March. The Mission reinforced the site with 60 formed police unit officers, as well as two companies of peacekeepers and a medical team. UNAMID escorted about 27 humanitarian vehicles with food and non-food items for the affected populations. The enhanced strength of the team site increased its capacity to conduct confidence-building patrols and provide crowd control. UNAMID set up an emergency clinic, delivered water and first aid to the displaced persons and evacuated 24 seriously injured individuals to El Fasher for medical treatment.

41. In Khor Abeche, South Darfur, following clashes between SLA-MM and the Abu Bashar militia group, 100 displaced persons fled to the UNAMID team site on 9 January. Patrols in and around the area were conducted to ease tensions and prevent retaliatory attacks. On 22 March, UNAMID assisted approximately 4,000 people who had fled attacks by the Rapid Support Force and unidentified militia and sought refuge inside the UNAMID Khor Abeche team site. The Mission provided protection, shelter and water to the internally displaced and engaged with the humanitarian community on the provision of emergency support.

42. Also on 22 March, 4,000 displaced persons fled from Kobe town and neighbouring villages that had been attacked by armed men on 21 March, and sought refuge at the UNAMID team site in Korma, North Darfur. UNAMID deployed additional peacekeepers to enhance the security of the displaced and supported humanitarian partners to provide emergency assistance. UNAMID deployed a company from El Fasher on 31 March to reinforce the team site and escorted two WFP trucks from El Fasher with food aid for the displaced persons.

Protective environment

43. The protective environment remained difficult, as recorded crimes and human rights violations increased slightly from the previous reporting period and little concrete progress was made towards ensuring accountability and the rule of law.

44. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted 10,648 patrols, including 5,441 routine patrols, 2,052 night patrols, 908 administrative patrols, 967 humanitarian escorts, 950 short-range patrols and 330 long-range patrols. UNAMID police personnel conducted a total of 9,057 patrols, including 4,228 inside camps for internally displaced persons and 3,107 in villages, towns and markets, 940 medium-range patrols, 346 firewood and farm patrols and 236 long-range patrols.

45. In collaboration with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by explosive hazards throughout
Darfur. During the reporting period, 651 km of routes were assessed, 67 villages were surveyed, and 2,079 items of unexploded ordnance and 13,878 items of small arms ammunition were destroyed. Destruction of unexploded ordnance facilitated freedom of movement, including access, which enhanced livelihood activities. At the request of the Sudanese Armed Forces, UNMAS provided support for the disposal of time-expired ammunitions held in storage in El Geneina, West Darfur. Support was also provided to the Government police in El Fasher to rehabilitate its weapons storage facilities.

46. Recorded crimes increased from 298 cases in the previous reporting period to 331 cases in the current period, including armed robberies, rape, abductions and carjackings. UNAMID police increased confidence-building patrols in camps for the internally displaced, as well as joint security assessment patrols with the Mission’s military component and joint patrols with the Mission’s civilian components. Formed police units remained deployed in team sites with a high security risk. UNAMID also continue to provide capacity-building for Government police, particularly in community policing, and established an anti-car theft unit to counter the increase in carjackings.

47. The total number of documented human rights violations and victims increased from 156 incidents, involving 314 victims, in the previous reporting period to 185 incidents, involving 536 victims, in the current period. UNAMID documented 121 civilian deaths, 24 injuries, 20 abductions, and 10 victims of conflict-related sexual violence resulting from the attacks on Hajer and surrounding villages in South Darfur on 27 and 28 February by suspected elements of the Rapid Support Force.

48. Of the 185 documented cases of human rights violations, arbitrary arrests and detention accounted for seven cases involving nine victims; violations of the right to life accounted for 57 cases involving 203 victims (including seven minors); and violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 70 cases involving 245 victims, which included 18 cases of abduction involving 48 victims. The majority of perpetrators were identified as belonging to the Government security services or rebel groups. Some were described by the victims as “armed men” and militia groups.

49. Ensuring accountability for human rights violations in Darfur remained a challenge. Of the 185 cases recorded by UNAMID, 65 incidents were reported by the victims to the Government authorities. Investigations were initiated into 27 of those incidents, leading to 10 arrests, but only two cases resulted in trials, with one conviction.

50. One of the dominant characteristics of the Darfur conflict continues to be extensive gender-based violence, including the rape of women and girls. To enhance protection for women, UNAMID continued to provide security during “firewood patrols”. The patrols have contributed to a general decrease in gender-based violence in the areas where they have been conducted. Thirty-five cases of sexual and gender-based violence, involving 53 victims (19 minors), were documented by UNAMID, a decrease from the 35 cases and 63 victims recorded in the previous reporting period. This includes attacks inside camps for the internally displaced. In this regard, UNAMID intensified night patrols and trained community policing teams in the camps.
51. Twenty cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported to the Government authorities by the victims. Lack of confidence among the victims and their families in the Government’s capacity to conduct proper investigations, the absence of Government police in some areas, fear of retribution, and the social stigma attached to being subjected to sexual violence continued to cause under-reporting of cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

52. Through the efforts of UNAMID, the State Government of West Darfur approved the recruitment of 38 new female Government police officers to improve the reporting and prosecution of cases of sexual and gender-based violence. On 16 February, UNAMID and the State Government of East Darfur conducted a two-day workshop on the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence for 78 Government personnel and members of local women’s associations. On 18 February, UNAMID provided technical support in the drafting of the 2014-2015 workplan being developed by the Joint Committee on Combating Violence Against Women of the Government of South Darfur State.

53. UNAMID continued to provide support to strengthen the prison and judicial systems through various skills training programmes. The Mission also continued to conduct regular visits to the prisons to advise on the improvement of conditions and mentor State Directors of Prisons on prison management and best practices in accordance with international standards. In accordance with the outcome of the strategic review, the Mission is taking steps to examine the impact of its rule of law training programme on the increase in access to justice mechanisms.

Humanitarian access, safety and security

54. UNAMID enhanced its coordination with the United Nations country team and the Government of the Sudan to facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the safety and security of humanitarian organizations in specific areas. Following the intercommunal conflict in Saraf Umra in March, a Crisis Management Team comprising UNAMID military, police and civilian components and the United Nations country team was mobilized at UNAMID headquarters and at the sector level to respond to the crisis. UNAMID provided military escorts to WFP humanitarian aid convoys involving 30 trucks of emergency humanitarian supplies for distribution in the affected locality. Immediate humanitarian assistance with about 600 metric tons of food and non-food items was mobilized from El Geneina and El Fasher to Saraf Umra accompanied by 100 military personnel to support the protection of civilians.

55. UNAMID provided military escorts for 199 trucks that delivered a total of 5,432 metric tonnes of food distributed by WFP. This was part of the WFP-UNAMID collaboration to ensure timely delivery of adequate food assistance to beneficiaries across Darfur. Regular passage of escorted humanitarian convoys on main routes helped improve the safety of those routes for civilians. In February, UNAMID provided support to humanitarian actors in reaching the civilians around the UNAMID team site in Labado. In the same month, despite intensified coordination between UNAMID and the Government’s Humanitarian Affairs Commission and the Wali of East Darfur, the Government continued to deny access to humanitarian actors to Adilla and Abu Karinka, both of which were areas that were affected by tribal clashes between Ma’aliya and Rizeigat.
56. Successful joint advocacy by UNAMID and the United Nations country team resulted in improved access to persons affected by ongoing armed conflict in South Darfur. Responding to reports of displacements from the Kalma and Al Salam camps in Nyala and Sanie Deleiba, an inter-sector mission was quickly conducted, and timely access was granted by the Government which enabled effective protection assessments and responses to be carried out. However, access to Um Gunya and Hijaar by UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued to be restricted by the Government.

C. Prevention or mitigation of community conflict

57. During the reporting period, UNAMID engaged Government institutions, civil society groups, tribal leaders and the Native Administration to monitor transhumance movements, develop plans to prevent incidents of crop destruction and livestock theft along migratory routes and to prevent local conflicts. The Mission held five meetings in North, South and Central Darfur to share views with 19 stakeholder representatives on how to mitigate conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. Separate meetings were also held on 9 January and 19 February with the North Darfur Farmers Union and the Director General of Animal Resources on the same concern with a view to strengthening traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. On 8 March, UNAMID and officials of Tereij Administrative Unit facilitated the establishment of a peaceful co-existence committee by farmers and nomads for the prevention of conflict during cultivation and harvest.

58. Following the conflict between the Gimir and Northern Rizeigat militia in Saraf Umra, UNAMID provided technical support to the mediation process in Saraf Umra that resulted in the signing on 12 March of an agreement on cessation of hostilities between the Northern Rizeigat and Gimir. The presence of UNAMID in the mediation and at the signing ceremony engendered confidence in the reconciliation process and its outcome. The Mission has been actively involved in the monitoring and implementation of the agreement.

59. In January and February, UNAMID also provided technical and logistical support to the Darfur Regional Authority in organizing four social peace conferences in South, West, North and Central Darfur on the root causes of conflict in Darfur and possible solutions. A key outcome was the establishment of reconciliation follow-up mechanisms in Central and South Darfur for the implementation of the reconciliation agreements between the Salamat and Misseriya and between the Beni Halba and Gimir. Additional efforts by UNAMID resulted in the signing of another reconciliation agreement on 16 March between Gimir and Beni Halba in South Darfur.

60. In East Darfur, UNAMID helped de-escalate the conflict between Rizeigat and Ma’alia in Abu Jabra locality, El Daein, by engaging and advocating on 25 January with the El Daein Locality Commissioner, the Wali of East Darfur and officials within government security institutions for a quick mitigation response. As a result, additional Government troops were deployed in the buffer zone between the two tribes to deal with possible clashes. UNAMID also worked with the Locality Commissioner of Adilla in El Daein to engage the Nazir of the Ma’alia tribe to discourage his tribesmen from fighting with the Rizeigat.
61. On 10 March, the Salamat and Ta’isha tribes in Rehad El Berdi, South Darfur commenced the reconciliation process in line with the agreement on cessation of hostilities signed in April 2013. This process was the result of the joint efforts of UNAMID and local authorities. UNAMID provided logistical support for the Salamat and Ta’isha tribal representatives travelling to Nyala for the reconciliation process. Following reports of renewed clashes between Ma’alia and Rezeigat in Al Fadou and Algegamia, East Darfur, the Mission quickly engaged with local authorities on mitigation measures and mediation efforts aimed at preventing further escalation.

62. Rezeigat and Ma’alia leaders agreed to form a youth group at a meeting organized by UNAMID on 27 March in Bekhela, East Darfur, which would sensitize local communities about peace and reconciliation. Following a meeting facilitated by UNAMID in Umjaruma, South Darfur, on 28 March, the Abbala and Beni Hussein leaders agreed to establish a committee to mediate the grievances of both tribes against each other.

IV. Implementation of the strategic review

63. To ensure the effective monitoring of the strategic priorities outlined in my strategic review report of 25 February 2014 (S/2014/138), the benchmarks and indicators contained in annex I to that report have been adjusted. Furthermore, the Mission, the Secretariat and the United Nations country team have developed a workplan to address the three challenges the Mission faces in the implementation of its mandate, which is being monitored on a biweekly basis.

64. In accordance with the reprioritized strategy recommended by the review, the UNAMID police component will refocus its activities on the following areas: (a) supporting physical protection of civilians; (b) facilitating humanitarian assistance; and (c) creating a protective environment by coordinating police capacity-building and community-oriented policing initiatives. In this regard, UNAMID and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a thorough task analysis of the police component leading to the restructuring of its command and control and the reduction of 723 individual police officers, four formed police units, and four professional police posts from the current strength.

65. While the streamlining has taken place in the context of the needs on the ground, there will be no room for the deployment of personnel who do not meet the requirements. The Mission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will therefore work closely with police-contributing countries to ensure that personnel have the skills and expertise required to meet the mandated tasks. With regard to formed police units, it will be important that all such units have the appropriate self-sustainability and contingent-owned equipment to enable to be mobilized more flexibly and quickly to respond to public order challenges within the Mission area. Furthermore, the use of formed police units will be strictly limited to internal and non-armed crowd control situations. They will not be utilized for logistical convoys and deterrence patrols against armed threats.

66. The military component will create two additional sectors to align its operations with State structures. It will also reduce 200 military observers, staff officers and liaison officers following a review of their deployment and tasking. One heavy transport company will also be repatriated. Both the military and police
components are now developing a plan to make these reductions effective as soon as possible while taking into account the skills sets needed.

67. The civilian components aligned their workplans and priorities with the strategic priorities as outlined in my special report, while deprioritizing certain mandated tasks as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2148 (2014). Work will continue with the United Nations country team on how this streamlining may have an impact the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations. The first phase of streamlining focused on the HIV/AIDS; gender; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; child protection; and rule of law components. In addition to the civilian staffing review that was concluded in November 2013, which has already led to a reduction of 19 posts in those sections (out of a total of 169 posts), an additional 65 posts will be reduced, resulting in an overall reduction of 46 per cent of the posts in those areas. A second phase will include all other substantive civilian components, the results of which will be provided in my next report.

68. In accordance with the established policies and guidance from the Secretariat, the Mission has restructured its air fleet requirements and usage modalities. The Mission has reduced two fixed-wing and four rotary-wing aircraft in the past several months, with no negative impact on the operational effectiveness of the Mission. UNAMID is also reviewing the use of 4 X 4 vehicles with a view to maximizing use in priority areas in the field and reducing requirements for new purchases.

V. Observations and conclusion

69. The present report follows the submission to the Council of my special report on UNAMID of 25 February (S/2014/138), which presented a detailed review of the Mission’s progress towards achieving its mandate, challenges faced in doing so, and recommendations aimed at making the Mission more effective.

70. It is clear to all observers that UNAMID has faced difficulties in the implementation of its mandate. I nevertheless firmly believe that by working together towards the achievement of concrete strategic and operational goals, the African Union, the United Nations, troop and police contributors, the leadership and staff of UNAMID, the United Nations country team and other partners can have a greater impact in bringing peace to Darfur and protecting those at risk. The full partnership of the Government of the Sudan is fundamental to any progress in achieving those goals.

71. Regarding the revised strategic political priorities of the Mission, I welcome the proposal by the Joint Chief Mediator to develop, together with the African Union, a common framework for political negotiations within the context of the national dialogue. I firmly believe that a national dialogue is required for the economic and political development of the Sudan. At the same time, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remains necessary to address the root causes of the regional conflict that are specific to Darfur. In this regard, I commend the Joint Chief Mediator for his ongoing efforts to bring the parties to the conflict into direct negotiations, as well as his engagement with key regional actors to encourage the armed movements to join the peace process.
72. I welcome the invitation of the Government of the Sudan to political parties, civil society and armed groups to participate in a national dialogue. This presents an opportunity for the peaceful political settlement of the ongoing conflicts. All parties must embrace the initiative with sincerity. I urge the Government to ensure the inclusiveness and credibility of the dialogue and urge the armed groups to take this opportunity to put conflict behind them and embrace the political path to peace and democratic governance.

73. While the political process shows some signs of progress, the security situation and protective environment in Darfur has deteriorated. The attacks and intercommunal clashes in Darfur have displaced tens of thousands of civilians and disrupted their livelihoods. The increasing involvement of militia in these clashes is very disturbing. Even more worrying are reports of sexual and gender-based violence, the burning of villages and the destruction of water sources and other infrastructure.

74. I commend the Government for its efforts to mediate and resolve intercommunal conflicts and welcome the intervention of President Déby in support of peace initiatives in Darfur. I demand that the Government stop using militia elements in its counter-insurgency efforts and put an end to their abuses against civilians. I also demand that the non-signatory movements lay down their arms and commit fully to the peace process.

75. It is unfortunate that the years of effort that led to the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur have not resulted in the same level of engagement from the signatory movements and broader international community in its implementation. The root causes of conflict in Darfur, including issues of land reform and return, social and economic development, justice and the rule of law, can be addressed through the implementation of the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. I call upon the signatory parties and international partners to redouble their efforts to implement the Doha Document, while at the same time, to make use of every opportunity at the national level to address broader issues of political inclusion.

76. The mandate of UNAMID cannot be implemented without the full partnership of the Government of the Sudan. The Government has taken positive steps in the issuance of visas and the deployment of contingent-owned equipment. But without freedom of movement, the personnel and equipment deployed in Darfur cannot effectively be used to engage with Government and other actors in reaching those in need. I call on the Government to ensure full access to areas in conflict for UNAMID as well as for humanitarian and recovery actors in Darfur.

77. Despite the multiple challenges UNAMID has encountered, the Mission has made progress in the implementation of its mandate. It has taken steps to enhance its effectiveness, in line with the recommendations outlined in my special report on the review of UNAMID dated 25 February 2014. I am grateful to the United Nations country team and humanitarian actors for their quick action in responding to humanitarian needs in areas of Darfur that were affected by the recent violence and attacks against civilians. Close coordination between humanitarian actors and UNAMID in these challenging circumstances was necessary and helped to alleviate the suffering of the people of Darfur.
78. In the months ahead, much will be expected of UNAMID, the United Nations Secretariat, the African Union Commission and troop- and police-contributing countries, in partnership with the Government of the Sudan, to implement the strategic review and streamlining of the Mission. I am confident that I can count on all concerned to proactively engage in enhancing the ability of UNAMID to more effectively implement its mandate.

79. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the Joint Special Representative, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the uniformed personnel, the civilian staff of UNAMID and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes for their continued hard work under extremely difficult circumstances. I am deeply appreciative of the sacrifice they are making for the cause of peace in Darfur.
Annex 1

Proposed benchmarks

Benchmark 1: inclusive peace process through mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

Requirements for progress would include a commitment on the part of the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements to reach a comprehensive negotiated political settlement to the conflict and adhere to its full and timely implementation; and credible Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations that seek to reflect the views of the civilian population, including women, on Darfur in the peace process.

Indicators

High-level mediation

- The Government and the non-signatory movements enter into direct negotiations brokered by the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur over an all-inclusive comprehensive settlement to the Darfur conflict within the context of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

- The signatory parties, with the support of international partners, implement the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which remain essential in addressing the root causes of conflict in Darfur.

- The Government and the non-signatory movements conclude and observe a comprehensive and inclusive cessation of hostilities.

- The outcomes of the Darfur peace process are reflected in a national constitutional process supported by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for the Sudan, as provided for in the framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process.

Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations;

- Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations take place in an inclusive and transparent environment that ensures the proportional representation of Darfuris and respect for the human rights of participants, as monitored by African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

- The outcomes of the Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations are widely disseminated and implemented in a manner that promotes and consolidates peace and stability in Darfur.

- A functioning Darfur Regional Authority that oversees the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan.
Benchmark 2: protection of civilians and unhindered humanitarian access and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel

Requirements for progress would include the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict, including Government forces, non-signatory movements and other armed groups, to cease hostilities and respect and implement ceasefire and security arrangements; the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict to implement measures to protect civilians (or promote/respect human rights); the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict to allow unrestricted humanitarian access; the willingness of local actors to facilitate the safe, voluntary and sustainable return, reintegration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees; improvement of TCC/PCC performance and equipment; support by the international donor community for humanitarian activities and, where appropriate, early recovery and rehabilitation; the improved coordination between UNAMID and humanitarian actors with regard to the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; and the commitment of the Government of the Sudan at the national and local levels to improve the capacity of its security, judicial and penal institutions to promote and protect human rights.

Indicators

Protection of civilians from imminent threats of physical violence;

- Civilians facing imminent threats of physical violence are protected by UNAMID.
- Civilians at risk of physical attack, in particular women and children, carry out livelihood activities safely and securely under UNAMID protection.
- Civilians receive emergency medical assistance from UNAMID, including through evacuation to medical facilities, in extreme circumstances (i.e., when humanitarian actors are unable to assist).

Protective environment;

- Security and stability (as indicated by an absence of serious crime or violent conflict) for civilians within camps for internally displaced persons and temporary settlements.
- Security and stability (as indicated by an absence of serious crime or violent conflict) for civilians in areas outside of camps for internally displaced persons and temporary settlements, including in particular in areas adjacent to camps.
- Reduction in the number of violent crimes against civilians.
- Reduction in human rights violations, including incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, as recorded by UNAMID.
- Reduction in the recruitment of child soldiers by the parties to the conflict.
- Improved environment for the protection of civil and political rights, including through the development of sustainable foundations for professional, democratic policing and law enforcement.
- Trials monitored by UNAMID are fair and in accordance with international legal standards and practices.
• The prevalence of arms and armed actors is reduced through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants in accordance with the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

• Threats to civilians posed by unexploded ordnance are addressed through, inter alia, the safe disposal of such materials and through risk-awareness training.

Safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access and safety and security for humanitarian personnel;

• Humanitarian actors requesting UNAMID protection and other support are able to conduct operations (e.g., inter alia aid delivery and distribution and needs assessments) in a safe, timely and unhindered manner.

• Humanitarian actors and their property are safe and secure, in particular when UNAMID protection is provided.

• Parties to the conflict honour their commitments and international obligations to combat all acts of sexual violence against women, men and children and put an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

**Benchmark 3: prevention or mitigation of community conflict through mediation and, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, measures to address its root causes**

Requirements for progress would include willingness on the part of the authorities and traditional community leaders to play a constructive role in resolving intercommunal conflict peacefully; the provision of access to UNAMID to facilitate mediation efforts; strengthened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and greater respect thereof; the inclusion of measures in reconciliation agreements to address the root causes of intercommunal conflict; a willingness on the part of the authorities and other parties to the conflict to fulfil their responsibilities in regard to preventing or resolving intercommunal clashes; and the provision of access to the United Nations Country Team to enable measures that address root causes related to natural resources, recovery and reconstruction.

**Indicators**

• Dialogue between pastoralist and agriculturalist communities over peaceful coexistence and shared access to natural resources, in particular prior to and during the migration season.

• Interventions by the authorities and traditional community mediators, facilitated by UNAMID, that prevent or resolve violent intercommunal conflict.

• Dialogue between conflicting parties over local settlements to violent intercommunal conflict.

• Conflicting parties enter into and adhere to local agreements that settle violent intercommunal conflict.

• Reduction in the number of incidents of and new displacement resulting from intercommunal conflict.
• Transitional justice mechanisms, including the National Human Rights Commission, the Special Court for Darfur and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are established and operating in accordance with international human rights standards and best practice.

• Improved access to justice through the adoption of measures aimed at enhancing victims’ rights to truth, justice and remedy.