Letter dated 10 November 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2082 (2012).

I should be grateful if the attached report could be brought to the attention of the Council members and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gary Quinlan
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)
Third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to resolution 2082 (2012) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan

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Summary

The violence that has characterized the year to date in Afghanistan underlines the continuing challenge to peace and security posed by the Taliban and associated groups. Taliban violence has not translated into significant gains on the ground, where Afghan national security forces have shown themselves capable of containing an aggressive Taliban threat. Currently, the Taliban leadership remains committed to a military campaign, outweighing those within the movement who favour dialogue alongside fighting. The Security Council, in its resolution 1988 (2011), reiterated the need to ensure that the sanctions regime contributes effectively to ongoing efforts to combat the insurgency and support the work of the Government of Afghanistan to advance reconciliation in order to bring about peace, stability and security in Afghanistan. The sanctions regime has the greatest effect when it is properly targeted and fully implemented. The present report contains suggestions for steps that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) could explore to advance this agenda, in particular through improved listings, enhanced biometrics and specific technical steps to improve the travel ban. It also identifies specific challenges linked to the increasing use of commercial components in improvised explosive devices, the source of 80 per cent of casualties among the Afghan national forces and a significant tool used by the Taliban to kill civilians. The sanctions regime is already a feature of the post-2014 scenario.
I. Introduction

1. This independent report has been prepared by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to support the Security Council targeted sanctions regime in Afghanistan. The sanctions are designed to target the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. This reflects a continuing international interest in and commitment to the future of Afghanistan. Some of the analysis of developments in Afghanistan focuses on what will change during 2014, not least as a consequence of presidential and provincial council elections and the drawdown of international security forces. The sanctions regime represents one element of continuity, designed to contribute to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan. The sanctions regime underlines the international community’s message that actors seeking to undermine peace and security in Afghanistan lack international legitimacy, and commits States to take specific actions against those listed under the regime.

II. Political context

2. The Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan national security forces and the international community are currently facing a campaign characterized by elevated levels of violence not seen since 2010. The number of casualties among the security forces and the civilian population is significantly higher than in 2012 (see A/67/981-S/2013/535, paras. 16 and 19-22). The scale of the violence committed against the Afghan State, civilians and the international community has not, however, led to significant gains for the Taliban, who have neither managed to seize population centres nor gained popular support.

3. With regard to the overall security situation, three different areas are discernible. In the northern provinces, Afghan officials and international security forces are mostly in control and actively counter attempts by the Taliban, the Haqqani Network (TE.H.12.12), Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (QI.H.88.03) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QE.I.10.01) to establish themselves in remote and mountainous districts. The eastern and south-eastern provinces are facing an intensified onslaught by a combination of the elements mentioned above. In addition, an array of groups belonging to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QE.T.132.11), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QE.L.118.05) and Lashkar-i Janghvi (QE.L.96.03) are involved in significant insurgent and terrorist activity. Moreover, there are active splinter groups, such as the Mawlawi Nazir Group, the recently reactivated “Tora Bora Front” and the “Fidayi Mahaz”, formerly known as the “Mullah Dadullah Front”. The southern and south-western provinces are dominated by Taliban groups loyal to the senior leadership and the “Quetta Shura”

4. Efforts by the Taliban to overrun population centres during the summer of 2013 have failed. The Taliban attempted to overrun district centres, notably Sangin in Helmand, in operations starting on around 21 May (the first day of the month of Jawza in the Afghan calendar). These operations did not succeed in capturing a

1 Terms such as “Quetta Shura” refer to leadership groups rather than geographical locations.
single objective. In mid-2013, the Afghan security forces started launching decisive military operations that the forces themselves had planned and executed. As a result of these operations, the Afghan forces succeeded in taking over Waygal (Nuristan) district centre, which had been held by the Taliban since 2010, and enlarging the territory held by the Government in the districts of Sangin (Helmand), Chapa Darra (Kunar) and Azro (Logar). Despite heavy losses (more than 880 members of the Afghan national army and 1,300 of the Afghan national police), the Afghan security forces have maintained an aggressive posture. Losses on the insurgent side are difficult to estimate, but government sources and Taliban internal statistics alike estimate them at between 10,000 and 12,000. As long as government support and supply systems remain in place, any attempts by the Taliban to retake population centres remain unrealistic.

5. Largely as a result of their predictable failure to take or hold territory, the Taliban have concentrated their efforts on intimidating the population and silencing community leaders who are not supportive of their programme. Targeted assassinations, the wanton use of improvised explosive devices and threatening letters have been effective among many in rural communities. The primary target of Taliban intimidation efforts have been clerics who have spoken out against the legitimacy of the presumed “emirate” of Mullah Omar (TI.O.4.01) or against the proclaimed “jihad” in Afghanistan.

III. Reconciliation

6. The Government of Afghanistan has requested that the Security Council support national reconciliation where possible. The sanctions regime is currently well structured to advance this agenda. In its resolution 2082 (2012), the Security Council expressed its intention to give due regard to lifting sanctions on those who reconcile and provided for exemptions to the travel ban for listed individuals to enable them to participate in meetings in support of peace and reconciliation.

7. There have been tentative moves towards political negotiations with the Taliban, most notably with the opening of a Taliban office in Doha on 18 June 2013. There is no evidence yet, however, of a decisive shift in favour of dialogue from those running the Taliban movement. The opening of a Taliban office in Doha appeared to pave the way for direct talks, but a debate over the nature and status of the office quickly triggered controversy. Although the Qatar initiative appears to have stalled, the potential for dialogue persists. The challenge lies within the Taliban movement, as those interested in dialogue still appear subordinate to those committed to further fighting.

2 Taliban attacks in the context of the “Khalid Bin Walid offensive” centred on Khas Uruzgan and Charchino (Uruzgan), Ghorak and Mianashin (Kandahar), Bargi Mital and Kamdesh (Nuristan), Zana Khan (Ghazni), Bala Murghab (Badghis) and Ghormach and Qaisar (Faryab). In the August and September 2013 (Shawal 1434) issue (No. 88) of its magazine Al-Somood, the Taliban unconvincingly explained its failures by “foreign forces themselves ... carrying out the missions in most of the Afghan provinces, especially in air operations and support and night raids”.

3 The Afghan national security forces conducted 1,259 independent operations between 21 March 2013 and 21 September 2013 (Ministry of Defence data).
8. Meanwhile, questions remain about how much direct control the Taliban leadership can exercise. The Taliban combine centralized authority with significant scope for decentralized action. The movement has an elaborate command structure that is not anchored solely around the so-called “Quetta Shura”. Despite what passes for a zonal command structure across Afghanistan, the Taliban have shown themselves unwilling or unable to monopolize anti-State violence. The persistent presence and autonomy of the Haqqani Network and the manner in which other, non-Taliban, groupings like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba are operating in Afghanistan raises questions about the true extent of the influence exerted by the Taliban leadership. The attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross office in Jalalabad on 29 May 2013 could be taken as a sign that individual commanders on the ground violate declared Taliban policies without fear of adverse consequences. While a spokesman for the Taliban denied responsibility for the attack, local security officials and other Afghan interlocutors identified a Taliban “front” (the “Fidayi Mahaz”) as the perpetrator of the attack.

9. The High Peace Council, led by Salahuddin Rabbani, visited Pakistan in November 2012 and submitted a comprehensive “road map to peace”, in which a number of confidence-building measures were proposed. The measures included delisting named individuals, releasing Taliban prisoners held by Pakistan, holding a joint conference of Islamic scholars (ulema) and setting up an “address” that the Taliban could use to start engaging with the High Peace Council. While not within the original time frame proposed, these measures have been implemented. Between December 2012 and January 2013, 26 Taliban (including Nooruddin Turabi, listed as TI.T.58.01) were released; in September 2013, an additional eight Taliban were also released (including Abdul Ghani Baradar, listed as TI.B.24.01). By taking these measures, Pakistan responded to the Afghan request aimed at allowing the above-mentioned individuals to choose between peace and war.

10. The setting up of the Taliban office in Qatar on 18 June 2013 was meant to provide the Taliban with an address for engaging with the High Peace Council. Moreover, an ulema conference held in Kabul on 25 September 2013 brought together over 200 scholars from 15 countries. In the final resolution of the conference, rebellion against the Government of Afghanistan was declared un-Islamic, and speakers asked all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to talk to each other and solve their problems peacefully.

11. It is too early to fully assess the effectiveness and ultimate impact of these measures on the reconciliation process. The implementation of some steps, however, was criticized by Afghans as falling short of expectations. Freed Afghan Taliban detainees did not return to and become reintegrated in Afghanistan. Some provincial security officers reported that groups loyal to freed commanders returned to active fighting against the Government of Afghanistan. The Taliban stretched the understanding that had been reached on the role and status of the Doha office when it declared that the office was an embassy of the “Islamic emirate” rather than a political office. The Taliban also launched major military operations at the same time. After the opening of the office, a number of complex suicide attacks were mounted on targets in Afghanistan, leading to significant civilian casualties.

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4 At least six staff of the office are listed: Nik Mohammad (TI.N.19.01), Din Mohammad Hanif (TI.H.43.01), Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai (TL.S.67.01), Shahabuddin Delawar (TLD.113.01), Jan Mohammad Madani (TL.M.119.01), and Mohammad Zahid (TIZ.127.01).
IV. Sanctions List

A. Composition of the List

12. Sanctions make most sense when they target the right individuals, including the senior leadership, important decision makers and those particularly instrumental to financing or arms procurement. In its current form, the sanctions List established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011) includes a cross section of the most senior leadership of the Taliban, encompassing the founders of the movement, many individuals who were senior officials during the period of Taliban rule over parts of Afghanistan and newly emerging financiers and attack planners. Nine senior leaders of the movement, however, remain unlisted, among them individuals with significant military command authority, such as Abdul Qayum Zakir (see S/2012/683, para. 22, and S/2012/971, annex I). Furthermore, as Afghan authorities explained to the Monitoring Team, the most immediate threat to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan currently emanates from a new generation of mid-level Taliban commanders with direct responsibility for military operations in various provinces. The Committee should be aware of who these key spoilers are and work with concerned States to have them included in the List. The Team will continue to track this issue in cooperation with Afghan and international authorities.

13. The Taliban combine hierarchy and a structured leadership with considerable autonomy for individual commanders. Informal networks and personal relationships play a significant role. The senior leadership does not necessarily enjoy absolute control over all commanders in the field. It may therefore make sense to improve the impact of the sanctions regime by targeting multiple layers of the Taliban military structure.

14. The network character of the movement had already been recognized in 2012, when the Haqqani Network (TE.H.12.12) was listed as a separate entity. During its most recent visit to Afghanistan, the Monitoring Team was briefed on the emergence of other person-centric networks or “fronts” that act in a manner similar to the Haqqani Network, autonomously from the senior leadership, handling money and logistics for their respective groups. Building on the precedent established in respect of the Haqqani Network, such networks could be added to the List as entities. This would make it possible to target all relevant decision-making groups within the movement.

15. As far as the senior political leadership of the Taliban outside Afghanistan is concerned, the List continues to include the most important actors. Various regional and international media reports indicate that six members of the Taliban office in Qatar are currently targeted by the sanctions regime established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011). This demonstrates the continuing relevance of the List for the ongoing political process.

16. Key financiers have been targeted since 2010, when Saleh Mohammad Kakar (TI.K.149.10), a used-car salesman in Kandahar, was listed. Faizullah Noorzai (TI.M.153.11) and Malik Noorzai (TI.N.154.11), brothers, were designated in 2011. In 2012, the sanctions regime was further strengthened through the targeting of the financial infrastructure of the Taliban. Three traditional money service providers (hawalas), which play a central role in the transfer of funds to the Taliban in
southern Afghanistan, were listed. While the listing of these entities sends a clear signal to the Taliban, these three hawala businesses represent only a small part of the financial structure of the group.

17. Further listings in this area could disrupt the ability of the Taliban to move large amounts of money through the region. One option would be to concentrate on the business interests of the Haqqani Network. Companies connected to the Haqqani family and its wider network could be subsumed under the entity that is already listed (TE.H.12.12). High-ranking Afghan officials explained to the Monitoring Team that naming specific companies that are part of the Haqqani Network would offer wider legal authority to freeze accounts inside Afghanistan. All accounts related to a listed company can be frozen in Afghanistan. If a company is listed under the name of its owner, only accounts held under the name of the listed individual can be frozen.

B. Quality and maintenance of List entries

18. The quality and precision of the information in existing List entries have improved significantly since the split of the sanctions regime in 2011. Currently, only six entries in the List lack sufficient identifiers and those identifiers relate to the nationality of the listed individuals. Consequently, only these entries will be included in the review concerning individuals and entities on the List whose entries lack the identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them (see Security Council resolution 2082 (2013), para. 28 (b)).

19. Implementation of the three sanctions measures could be greatly enhanced if entries in the List, in addition to including identifying information, also included a confirmed picture or a detailed physical description of the individual. Although the current technical format of the website of the Committee does not allow the inclusion of photographs, it is technically possible to include pictures in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)-United Nations Security Council Special Notices.

20. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee include in the list of the criteria for reviewing List entries lacking identifiers the absence of a photograph or a detailed physical description.

C. Hekmatyar

21. On 20 February 2003, the Committee added Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to the Consolidated List, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 1390 (2002), for participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of the Taliban and Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01). In the view of the Afghan authorities and in line with the Monitoring Team’s assessment, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is presently primarily a threat to the peace and security of Afghanistan, and therefore more associated with the Taliban than with Al-Qaida.

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22. When Hekmatyar was listed, his association to Al-Qaida was evidenced by his offer of shelter to Usama bin Laden in 1996 and his pledge of support to Al-Qaida in 2006. Since 2010, his affiliation with Al-Qaida has been repeatedly brought into question and was denied by Hekmatyar himself as recently as January 2013 during an interview with Afghan national television (see S/2011/790, para. 40). His son-in-law attended a meeting in Chantilly, France, in December 2012 that was also attended by Taliban representatives and members of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan aimed at promoting a negotiated peace settlement.

23. Hekmatyar has repeatedly presented proposals that would allow him to return to the political mainstream in Afghanistan. The first was the “Afghan national rescue agreement”, in 2009, in which it was proposed that elections be held in 2011 and that foreign fighters be excluded from Afghanistan — a reference to Al-Qaida as well as to international forces. Hekmatyar’s activities are largely confined to the eastern, central and north-eastern parts of Afghanistan and the relationship of Hekmatyar with the Taliban seems to swing between confrontation and cooperation. At times, Hekmatyar has sought to impress the Taliban by organizing suicide attacks, such as the attacks in Kabul in September 2012 and May 2013 that killed dozens of civilians. Hekmatyar’s military activities are designed to gain exclusive control over territory. The Monitoring Team has previously reported on Hekmatyar’s training and military structures in Afghan refugee camps (see S/2012/729, para. 59). Hekmatyar also regularly comments on Taliban attacks and political initiatives. His message on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr in August 2013 included appeals to continue fighting the Government of Afghanistan and, in particular, to target one ethnic group, the Shia Hazaras.

24. Afghan interlocutors have repeatedly mentioned to the Monitoring Team that they would welcome the improved negotiation leverage over Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that would result from including him in the 1988 sanctions List, as the specific exemptions procedures of the 1988 sanctions regime include the option of easing sanctions for those who engage in a peace process. The Team recommends that the Committee consider a mechanism for moving Hekmatyar from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List to the List established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).

V. Implementation of the sanctions

A. Travel ban

25. The travel ban is a powerful sanctions tool. Taliban members need to travel to communicate, raise funds and take part in the planning or execution of terrorist acts. Some travel may also be for the purpose of exploring the possibility of engaging in a political process. National, regional and international media reports allege
violations of the travel ban by listed individuals. The Monitoring Team closely monitors these reports and allegations.

1. Implementation of the travel ban

26. Measuring the impact of the travel ban is difficult, as Member States are not obliged to report to the Committee when they have prevented a listed person from crossing their borders. Most Member States tell the Monitoring Team that national lists and databases are regularly updated to meet the travel ban requirements. They tell us that their immigration and border control authorities give immediate effect to the Committee’s listing decisions through regulatory or administrative actions. The Monitoring Team is not aware of the existence of cases of listed individuals having been stopped at borders since its report of December 2012 and the Committee has not received any reports in this regard.

27. The location of listed individuals is a crucial piece of information in a sound threat assessment. Furthermore, the procedures to grant travel ban exemptions outlined in Security Council resolution 2082 (2012) demand that specific information on the location or locations to or through which listed individuals are expected to travel be submitted to the Committee in order for it to reach a decision on the exemption request (see para. 9 of resolution 2082 (2012)). The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage Member States to report when they have prevented or become aware of the entry of a listed individual into their territory. In addition, receiving and adding to the List information on travel documents used by listed individuals in their attempts to enter countries would improve implementation of the travel ban.

2. Exemptions

28. No travel ban exemption request has been submitted to the Committee under Security Council resolution 2082 (2012), which was adopted in December 2012.

3. Opportunities and challenges

29. The effective implementation of the travel ban is closely connected with the capability of Member States to police their borders. National capabilities, technologies and border control systems vary widely. The sanctions regime depends on a continuing flow of specific information on listed individuals and entities that are useful to both high-tech and low-tech national control mechanisms. The relevant officials should be provided with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether the person in front of them is a listed individual.

30. Core identifying information (name, date of birth, place of birth and nationality) is already included in the majority of entries in the List. However, additional information on current and past travel documents, as well as precise information on the current country of residence, would enable more effective implementation of the travel ban and the processing of travel ban exemptions. Furthermore, a continued stream of up-to-date information on alternate identities and names is important and many Member State officials have consistently requested this. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee continue to encourage Member States to submit data on residence, travel documents and alternate identities and names as soon as the information becomes available.
31. The Monitoring Team’s cooperation with INTERPOL is a crucial ingredient in implementing the travel ban. INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices have been issued for all entities and nearly all the individuals on the List. The content of the Special Notices has been improved, making it easier for border control officials to refer to and use them.

32. The inclusion of fingerprint, DNA and biometric data in Special Notices would make it possible to verify the identity of a listed individual irrespective of the travel documents used. The effectiveness of biometric data to check the identity of a listed individual depends on the use of biometric recognition machines at border control points. Although such technology is increasingly being used, it remains unavailable in a significant number of countries. As a result, the use of false, forged or stolen documents by listed individuals seeking to conceal their identity continues to present a significant hurdle to the effective implementation of sanctions.

33. One important instrument in countering this problem is the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database. Currently, the database contains more than 35 million travel documents reported lost or stolen by 166 countries. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee draw the attention of Member States to this tool and encourages Member States to enable direct and instant access to it for first-line border security and consular officials (see S/2012/968, para. 74).

4. The International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association

34. Air travel remains the preferred mode of transport for prominent listed individuals, in particular financiers. Denying it offers a significant opportunity to influence their behaviour and disrupt support to the Taliban. The travel ban requires States to prevent the entry of listed individuals into their territories, which makes them de facto inadmissible passengers as defined in relevant international conventions. The significance of this status is that airlines are responsible for the return of inadmissible passengers. This could create complications if States where the flight originated were to deny re-entry to listed individuals on the basis of the sanctions regime. In some cases, States could deny airspace access to an aircraft in flight carrying a listed person among its passengers. In short, facilitating the unauthorized international travel of listed people presents a business liability for airlines, which is why the Committee has seen merit in inviting States to draw the attention of the airlines to the existence of the List (see S/2010/125, para. 14).

35. Some States use electronic advance passenger information (API) systems to check passenger lists against national no-fly lists. Such systems can be highly sophisticated, as with the interactive advance passenger information (iAPI) system used by a small number of States. Some 59 countries use the more basic API system, by which the airline transmits the final list of passengers, once the aircraft has taken off, to the State of destination. That country then checks the passenger list against its national lists and informs the airline of any passenger barred from entering the country. All States that use some form of advance passenger screening could include United Nations sanctions obligations as part of their screening criteria. This would not apply to all air passenger traffic, however, as advance screening methods are only used by some States.

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9 See www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases.
36. All commercial airlines, on the other hand, are required to check passengers against the International Air Transport Association (IATA) automated Travel Information Manual (TIMATIC) database. Such checks are designed to verify whether passengers meet the entry criteria of the State of destination. At present, TIMATIC does not include any information on restrictions imposed by United Nations mandates. This presents an opportunity for the Committee to cooperate with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its private sector equivalent, IATA. The Monitoring Team continues to facilitate such contacts.

37. Member States’ aviation authorities could inform IATA that one of the formal requirements for an airline passenger to enter their territory would be non-inclusion in the List. That requirement would not apply to individuals subject to a specific travel ban exemption. Member States could also include the List and the travel ban in their national guidelines for inadmissible passengers (see S/2009/502, para. 73). The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage all States to include travel restrictions on listed individuals in their entry criteria.

5. Travel documents of listed persons

38. New and existing travel documents make it possible for listed individuals to travel internationally. Member States insert a variety of notes in travel documents to clarify that a passport is not valid for travel to certain countries. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage States to include language in existing or newly issued travel documents to indicate that the document bearer is subject to the travel ban and to raise awareness of the corresponding exemption procedures (see S/2012/968, para. 74).

39. Another way to increase the chances that listed persons will be detected when they travel is to make greater use of the INTERPOL Travel Documents Associated with Notices (TDAWN) search platform. TDAWN allows border authorities to check passport data against Special Notices and can be used by airlines to carry out advance passenger information checks, avoiding the need to have listed persons rejected at their destination, which can be legally complicated and costly. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage Member States to make TDAWN widely available to relevant officials and the private sector and a part of routine checks like the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Document database.

40. TDAWN is one of the reasons why the List should contain up-to-date information about all travel documents of listed persons, as recommended by the Committee (see S/2009/427, para. 32, and S/2008/408, para. 17). It would be useful for Member States to issue passports for at least five years (ideally, for 10 years), to mitigate problems arising from delays or lapses in updating travel document information linked to the List. ICAO currently recommends that passports be issued

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10 TIMATIC is the industry standard used by airlines and travel agents to comply with border control regulations. See www.iata.org/publications/Pages/timatic.aspx. In theory, the TIMATIC system has the capacity to include information on passports that are not valid for travel to certain destinations. The known details of travel documents available to listed individuals could be included in TIMATIC so that airlines deny travel to listed individuals, though this has not yet been tested.

for a period of at least five years.\textsuperscript{12} In advance of the review in 2014 of the implementation of the measures outlined in resolution 2082 (2012), the Committee could consider reviewing this recommendation.

B. Assets freeze

41. The Monitoring Team continues to monitor the three main revenue streams through which the Taliban and its affiliates finance their operations: (a) revenues from “taxing” the local economy, including narcotics; (b) extortion from national and international enterprises and organizations; and (c) donations (see S/2012/683, para. 35).

42. Taliban revenue from the extortion of those involved in one particular business sector — fuel and food transportation — is in decline, as the drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reduces demand.\textsuperscript{13} Conflict over this decreasing revenue has become apparent for some time and led, for example, to the shooting of Said Ahmed Shahidkhel (Tls.28.01) in April 2012. It also increases the Taliban’s dependence on revenue from narcotics.

43. Afghan officials estimate that the Taliban were able to collect around $155 million from the drug trade in Afghanistan in 2012. Helmand is an important revenue-generating province for the Taliban: the Afghan authorities estimate that the Taliban collected around $8 million between January and May 2013 from the drug trade in Helmand Province. Furthermore, provincial authorities in Helmand estimate that the Taliban extracts around $400,000 per month from the local transport industry. In other provinces, however, Taliban commanders rely on funds from the central leadership to fuel their activities. Provincial authorities in Uruzgan estimate that the Taliban are able to generate around $8 million a year through the drug trade and extortions from the local economy. That said, the Taliban spend around $40 million per year to finance their activities in the province. As a result of this Taliban patronage, the central shuras enjoy a high level of direct command and control in Uruzgan. In Helmand, however, different Taliban commanders are able to maintain their activities independent of financial support from the central structure, which gives them a greater degree of autonomy.

44. In 2014, Afghanistan will experience a significant spike in international spending to finance the large-scale logistical operations necessary for the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. As the Taliban continue to exercise partial control over the eastern and southern routes leading out of Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{14} it must be expected that the Taliban will be able to extort a portion of the money resulting from the drawdown from local subcontractors. The sanctions regime established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011) is not designed to prevent this. Nonetheless, a global enforcement of the assets freeze measures would ensure that the proceeds of extortion cannot be used to finance the Taliban. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the sanctions measures, timely, accurate and detailed information is crucial. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage Member States to submit any relevant

\textsuperscript{12} ICAO, \textit{The Facilitation Manual} (2011), paras. 3.4.9 and 3.4.11.

\textsuperscript{13} According to press reports, the total value of these contracts has shrunk by two thirds since 2010.

\textsuperscript{14} Discussion of the Monitoring Team with provincial authorities during Team visits in April, May and September 2013.
information on Taliban bank accounts, hawalas and financial facilitators to the Committee for inclusion in the List.

45. Increasingly, the Monitoring Team receives media and academic reports that indicate that illicit business activities and investments play a role in the financial structure of the Taliban and its affiliates. Numerous such reports have been received in relation to the Haqqani Network. Because of the reach of the Haqqani Network into legitimate business and finance, the business activities of the Network are particularly vulnerable to the assets freeze. However, in order to target relevant companies and the business interests of listed individuals and entities, comprehensive and accurate information is necessary. The Team recommends that the Committee encourage Member States, especially the Government of Afghanistan and States participating in ISAF operations, to submit relevant information relating to the business interests and enterprises of listed individuals and entities to the Committee for inclusion in the List.

46. The Taliban gain revenue from a range of illicit activities, not only the narcotics trade. However, Security Council resolution 2082 (2012) only highlights involvement in the narcotics trade as one criterion for listing rather than a broader range of criminal behaviour. In advance of the review in 2014 of the implementation of the measures outlined in resolution 2082 (2012), the Committee could consider recommending a revision to paragraph 4 of resolution 2082 (2012), to bring it in line with the broader definition used in paragraph 5 of resolution 2083 (2012).

47. Afghanistan is rich in gemstone deposits, which are distributed throughout the country, notably in the Panjshir Valley (emeralds), Jegdalek (rubies and sapphires), Nuristan (emeralds, rubies, aquamarine, tourmaline, kunzite and spodumene), Helmand (fluorite), Herat (aquamarine and tourmaline) and Badakhshan (sphe, peridot, aquamarine, ruby, spinel, lazurite and lapis lazuli). The Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Afghanistan estimated in 2011 that the commercial potential of the gemstone industry in Afghanistan was between $100 million and $200 million. The World Bank estimates that between 90 and 99 per cent of all gemstones mined in Afghanistan are illegally smuggled out of the country, depriving the Government of Afghanistan of royalty payments. The Taliban has targeted specifically gemstone and mining operations.

48. There is the risk that any profitable illegal trade will provide additional revenue to the Taliban and its affiliates. The Government of Afghanistan is currently developing a national gemstone policy and strategy and has already implemented a central registry for all gemstones and precious stones mined in Afghanistan. In order to impede the Taliban and its affiliates from generating income from the gemstone sector, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee clarify, in the definition of the assets freeze, that this sanctions measure covers illegally exported and marketed gemstones and precious stones from Afghanistan. This extended

definition could be included in the pending “explanation of terms” paper on the assets freeze.

49. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) has continued to make progress in registering hawalas in Afghanistan and requiring regular reporting from registered financial enterprises. Significant progress has been made in this regard in the central areas and provincial capitals of the country. As at September 2013, 832 hawalas in seven provinces were registered with FinTRACA. Nevertheless, FinTRACA continues to struggle with identifying and registering hawala businesses outside the major cities. The opening of new liaison offices within the Da Afghanistan Bank branches in Gardez and Kandahar is an important first step towards remedying this situation, but closing the gap will require continuing national and international support. The Monitoring Team continues to promote the working relationship of FinTRACA with partners in other States and international organizations. The Team is in close contact with FinTRACA and receives regular updates on the implementation of the assets freeze in Afghanistan.¹⁹

50. The new counter-terrorism legislation, currently awaiting approval by the Council of Ministers, will streamline the process of freezing assets. The law will introduce a new high-level coordination committee consisting of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Economics, the National Directorate for Security, the Da Afghanistan Bank and other relevant Afghan authorities. The work of the committee will be supported by a working-level committee. The new law will eliminate the need for presidential decrees to freeze accounts after an individual or entity has been added to the List. This is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the assets freeze measures by increasing the speed with which the assets can be frozen after a designation by the United Nations.

51. The effective implementation of assets freeze measures depends on a clear understanding by government officials and other relevant stakeholders of what this measure entails and how it can be implemented effectively. Important and relevant information can be found in the interpretive note to recommendation 6 of the Financial Action Task Force on international standards in combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation and the related best practices for the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions. The Monitoring Team believes that the interpretive note to recommendation 6 and the related best practices continue to be important sources of useful information and guidance in this regard.

C. Arms embargo

52. The enforcement of the arms embargo presents a particular challenge. The wide availability of small arms and ammunition in Afghanistan, a cultural tradition

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¹⁸ Of the 832 hawalas, 34 were in Gardez, 172 in Herat, 315 in Kabul, 33 in Kandahar, 68 in Kunduz, 114 in Mazar-e-Sharif and 96 in Nangahar.

¹⁹ The latest update was received during the visit of the Monitoring Team to Afghanistan in September 2013.


of bearing arms and long and difficult-to-police borders complicate the enforcement of the arms embargo (see S/2012/683, paras. 59-66, and S/2012/971, paras. 45-50).

53. Afghan and international security officials explained to the Monitoring Team that the Taliban and its affiliates continue to obtain most of their weapons and ammunition inside Afghanistan. The majority of the small arms they use are fake Russian and Pakistani models. Most of the ammunition measures 7.62 x 54 mm (Mosin-Nagant and PK-M family) and 7.62 x 39 mm (AK-47 family). Western and other foreign models do not form a major part of Taliban military equipment. A recent development has been a sharp increase in the use of pistols with silencers (.22 or 9 mm), which have been used widely in the intimidation campaigns observed during 2013.

54. Afghan officials highlighted that the Taliban and affiliated groups are receiving most of their specialized training outside the country and that the training is frequently conducted by foreigners, some of whom are affiliated with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or Al-Qaida. The training of suicide attackers was a particularly worrying trend. Afghan officials shared details with the Monitoring Team of two cases of suicide attackers being sexually abused in order to be conditioned for their mission and of the use of children to trigger improvised explosive devices and as suicide attackers.

55. In recent years, improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan have become an important part of the arsenal of the Taliban. Currently, 80 per cent of all casualties sustained by the Afghan national security forces are caused by such devices. Improvised explosive devices also pose a major danger to civilians in Afghanistan. The devices used by the Taliban and its affiliates are increasingly sophisticated and technically advanced (see A/67/889-S/2013/350, paras. 16 and 59). This is particularly true of components such as the explosive materials, the detonating cord and the detonators. The insurgency is continuously improving the way it constructs improvised explosive devices. Explosive materials, detonating cords and detonators are being produced and sourced in an increasingly professional manner. Detonating cords are used to connect the detonator to the trigger mechanism, to set off several improvised explosive devices simultaneously or as catalysts to increase the explosive yield of the devices. Therefore, control of the supply of detonating cords and detonators in Afghanistan is central to undermining the capacity of the Afghan insurgency to use improvised explosive devices.

56. The developing Afghan mining industry presents a challenge in this context. Afghanistan requires large-scale mining operations in order to sustain the national budget and support the governmental and security structure. For example, only a well-developed Afghan mining industry has the long-term potential to cover the expenses associated with the maintenance of over 300,000 members of the security forces, which will in turn deny Al-Qaida, the Afghan insurgency and associated groups sanctuary in Afghanistan. But commercial mining operations require large

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22 Discussion of the Monitoring Team with provincial officials in Afghanistan in May 2013.
23 According to information provided by the provincial authorities in Khost in September 2013, in one province bordering Pakistan, authorities seized over 250 pistols within two months from Taliban logistics facilitators in two seizures.
24 Discussion of the Monitoring Team with ISAF officials in Kabul in April, May and September 2013.
amounts of explosives and associated equipment, which can also be used by the Taliban to kill or maim security forces and civilians.

57. The risk of such misuse of explosives could be mitigated by improving the domestic regulatory framework for mining in Afghanistan. The introduction of stringent due diligence processes and reporting requirements in the extractive industry in Afghanistan, realistically defined given the capacity of the Government and the cost burden on the private sector, could disrupt the supply of arms and related materials to the Afghan insurgency.

58. The Monitoring Team has identified a number of areas in which the Committee could encourage the Government of Afghanistan to make progress in this regard. Revisions to the Afghan minerals law and the Afghan firearms and explosives law are two specific areas of opportunity. The Government of Afghanistan could introduce the measures set out below.

1. **Stronger due diligence, administrative controls and reporting requirements**

59. An improved regulatory framework for commercial explosive materials, detonating cords and detonators could significantly enhance the arms embargo against the Taliban and associated groups and limit supply to listed individuals.

60. Making such improvements could begin with the requirement for companies to introduce improved due diligence and know-your-supplier processes. Companies could be obliged to ask their suppliers every six months for written assurances that their internal controls are sufficient to ensure that all materials are accounted for at all times. In parallel, companies in the extractive sector in Afghanistan could be required to introduce stringent administrative controls and detailed records of all explosive material, detonating cords and detonators imported and used in their operations.

61. These records, as well as the written assurances of the respective suppliers, could be submitted once every six months by all companies working in the extractive sector in Afghanistan to the regulatory authority within the Ministry of Mines. In addition, the Ministry could commission an annual independent audit of these records. Finally, companies could be required to notify immediately the regulatory authority within the Ministry if a significant amount of explosive material, detonators or detonating cords is found missing from their stockpiles. The notification should include information on the relevant technical specifications, as well as the weight of the explosive material, the number of the detonators and the length of the detonating cords.

2. **Electronic trigger mechanisms**

62. Electronic detonators initiate a small explosion, which triggers the combustion of explosive material. A significant amount of detonators seized from supplies of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan are of this variety. The advantage of an electronic trigger mechanism in an improvised explosive device is that it can be handled safely by untrained insurgents. If these detonators were outlawed in Afghanistan, and if the extractive industry were required to use only shock tubes, the risk of accidents during the construction of improvised explosive devices would
increase significantly. This increase in personal risk for the insurgents could slow down the production of advanced improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, if a national ban were enacted, any electronic detonators seized in Afghanistan could also provide additional information on the international supply chain used by the Afghan insurgency. The Monitoring Team is not proposing an immediate ban but plans to conduct further research and analysis with government and commercial actors to identify whether such action would be viable.

3. Detonating cords of specific colours

63. Industrially produced detonating cords are thin, flexible plastic tubes filled with a high explosive such as pentaerythritol tetranitrate. They are used as high-speed fuses that explode, rather than burn, and are suitable for detonating high explosives. The speed with which they explode is sufficient to enable the detonation of multiple charges almost simultaneously, even if the charges are placed at different distances from the trigger point. During production, the colour of the outer plastic layer can be changed without incurring significant additional costs. In the framework of the extractive industry in Afghanistan, different colours could be used to establish a clear and controllable chain of supply. If the extractive industry would import detonating cords of certain colours, by supply company, for a defined period of time (for example, 12 months), detonating cords seized from the Afghan insurgency could be traced back along the supply chain. While this would not hinder the illegal supply of detonating cords to the insurgency, it would make it easier to carry out forensic investigations and therefore increase the chance of discovering illicit/illegal suppliers. It is also a low-cost measure as it does not require new expensive machines or major changes in the business process. The Monitoring Team will continue to discuss this proposal with States and companies to identify potential benefits and risks before making a formal proposal, and plans to present a clear cost-benefit analysis in the coming months.

Recommendations for neighbouring and donor States

64. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage the States neighbouring Afghanistan and all Member States wishing to invest in the extractive sector to strengthen the internal controls over their national companies and their national suppliers of explosive material, detonating cords and detonators. Ideally, these controls should augment the control mechanisms in Afghanistan suggested above and allow for a recognized and tightly controlled supply chain of these materials to Afghanistan.

65. One positive example of action was taken in Pakistan, where the Government held an inter-agency meeting in February 2013 and an international conference in March 2013 to address the issue of improvised explosive devices. The inter-agency meeting brought together State authorities and representatives of the ordnance and fertilizer industry of the country, namely Pakarab Fertilizers, Biafo Industries and

25 A shock tube detonator is a non-electric explosive fuse or initiator in the form of small-diameter hollow plastic tubing used to transport an initiating signal to an explosive charge by means of a percussive wave travelling the length of the tube. This kind of trigger mechanism is not uncommon in the extractive industry. For example, the Nonel shock tube is generally used to demolish buildings and in mines and quarries.

26 Discussion of the Monitoring Team with a United Nations arms and explosives expert in August 2013.
the Wah Nobel Group. Participants discussed a regulatory mechanism for the effective control of the movement of explosive material and calcium ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, from various countries inside and outside the region.

66. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee endorse further work by the Team with Afghanistan, its neighbours and relevant Member States, as well as private sector stakeholders, on the feasibility of adopting further measures to constrain the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.

VI. Work of the Monitoring Team

A. Analysis, monitoring and implementation

67. Since it issued its previous report in December 2012, the Monitoring Team has focused on its core business: analysing the threat posed by the Taliban and its affiliates to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, providing advice on listings and focusing on strengthening the impact of the sanctions regime. Detailed, evidence-based analysis is essential to the work of the Committee. The Team does not seek to supplant the extensive work done by Member States in this regard. Its advantage lies in its ability to work collaboratively with Governments around the world, in particular the Government of Afghanistan. In addition, the Team reaches out to external specialists in order to make an integrated assessment of the threat posed by the Taliban and its associates and to advance a targeted, effective and fair sanctions regime. The Team’s own expertise on Afghanistan, along with that of specialists on finance, arms and border security measures, helps sustain these efforts.

68. First-rate analysis depends on excellent information, good judgement and the ability to provide an independent assessment. The Monitoring Team has advanced this during 2013 through the following activities:

(a) Liaising with Member States and their experts, including through country visits;

(b) Tracking the latest analysis on the Taliban and its affiliates in the media and in academic and think-tank literature, as well as reaching out directly to subject-matter experts;

(c) Holding closed seminars with leading experts on the Taliban, its affiliates and the situation in Afghanistan in order to identify the right questions to explore in greater depth;

(d) Sharing and testing the analytical findings of the Team with the Committee, Member States and other United Nations entities.

B. Cooperation with Member States

69. The Monitoring Team has continued to reach out to Member States as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2082 (2012). Between January and September 2013 the Team made two extended visits to Afghanistan, where it held discussions on the overall political and security situation, as well as on listed
individuals and entities, with national and international authorities in Kabul and with provincial and international officials in 11 provinces.\(^{27}\)

70. In addition, the Monitoring Team liaised closely with relevant Member States through their representatives in Afghanistan and in their respective capitals. These visits helped the Team understand the challenges that Member States face in implementing the sanctions regime. The valuable information gathered during these trips has allowed the Team to make recommendations to the Committee. The Team has also attached great importance, during its direct engagement with national authorities, to the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 36 of resolution 2082 (2012) that the Team should facilitate assistance on capacity-building upon request by Member States, and will continue to further develop this approach.

C. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies

71. The Monitoring Team works closely with other United Nations expert groups and special political missions, in particular the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The Team cooperates on a daily basis with UNAMA and is grateful for its logistical support in Afghanistan and for the support it extends to the Team concerning the gathering of information. During the Team’s frequent visits to Afghanistan, UNAMA has provided logistical and security support, as well as access to relevant national and provincial decision makers in Afghanistan, greatly enhancing the quality of the work of the Team. The Team also values greatly the political support provided by UNAMA under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Jan Kubiš. Moreover, meetings and telephone conversations have been held with other Security Council expert groups in order to identify areas where it might be possible to share lessons learned, in particular with regard to the arms embargo, the travel ban and the assets freeze.

72. The comprehensive and high-quality support received from the Department of Political Affairs is particularly appreciated. The Department staff members assigned to support the Monitoring Team have made much of the work possible.

D. International and regional organizations

73. The Monitoring Team cooperates closely with a range of regional and international organizations. During its visits to Afghanistan, the Monitoring Team interacted regularly with specialist forces of ISAF and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ISAF forces were also crucial in providing logistical and security assistance during the Team’s visits to Afghanistan. The Monitoring Team has initiated closer cooperation with relevant officials from the European Union. This is in addition to the valuable technical discussions with ICAO and IATA.

\(^{27}\) Kabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kunduz, Kunar, Nangahar, Khost and Paktia.
E. Cooperation between the Security Council and the International Criminal Police Organization

74. The Team has continued to strengthen its active cooperation with INTERPOL and the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Afghanistan. During its visit to Afghanistan in September 2013, the Team updated the Bureau on the existence and function of the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices and cooperated with the Bureau on improving the quality of the information presented in the Special Notices related to the sanctions regime established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011).

75. The use of Special Notices has also improved with the agreement between the Secretariat and INTERPOL signed at the end of 2012, which established direct iLink access to the content of the Notices, allowing the Secretariat to make updates and amendments in a timely manner. The use of the Special Notices system has now been extended to involve seven sanctions committees. The Team has consistently received positive feedback from Member State officials during its country visits and regional meetings about the impact of the Special Notices on the implementation of the sanctions.

76. INTERPOL also makes it possible for the Committee to disseminate Orange Notices, which serve to warn of an event, a person, an object or a process representing a serious and imminent threat to public safety. INTERPOL suggested that some of the Team’s findings — for example on issues concerning the arms embargo and, in particular, improvised explosive devices — could be disseminated through INTERPOL. The Team recommends that the Committee consider adopting Orange Notices on matters that would enhance the implementation of the sanctions regime.

F. Building links with academic and civil society experts

77. The Monitoring Team is mandated to study and report on the changing nature of the threat posed by the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities, including through dialogue with relevant scholars and academic bodies. Since December 2012, the Team has held some 30 meetings with external experts and scholars and introduced a monthly research update for internal circulation.

G. Contributing to the public debate

78. The Team would welcome feedback on the analysis and suggestions contained in the present report, which can be sent to 1988mt@un.org.