Letter dated 19 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012), I have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In this connection, I would appreciate if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

* Reissued for technical reasons on 30 July 2013.
Letter dated 20 June 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the midterm report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012).

(Signed) Nelson Alusala
(Signed) Daniel Fahey
(Signed) Henry Fomba
(Signed) Bernard Leloup
(Signed) Marie Plamadiala
(Signed) Emilie Serralta
Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. By his letter dated 28 December 2012 (S/2012/967), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed to the Group of Experts the following individuals: Nelson Alusala of Kenya (arms); Henry Fomba of Cameroon (customs and aviation); Bernard Leloup of Belgium (regional issues); Marie Plamadiala of the Republic of Moldova (armed groups); and Emilie Serralta of France (natural resources and Coordinator).

2. By his letter dated 2 January 2013 (S/2013/1), the Secretary-General appointed the sixth member of the Group, Daniel Fahey of the United States of America (finance).

3. Following bilateral consultations with members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and concerned Member States in New York, the Group presented its investigative priorities to the Committee on 1 February 2013. The Group arrived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 9 February and met central and provincial government authorities. From February to May 2013, the Group visited the Provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.

4. During the first part of its mandate, the Group conducted two official visits to Uganda, two official visits to Rwanda and an official visit to Burundi. The Group also conducted official visits to Belgium, Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States. The Group wishes to express its gratitude to the Governments of those countries for their availability and cooperation. The Group regrets, however, that the Government of Rwanda did not authorize two members of the Group (its experts on armed groups and regional issues) to carry out official missions on its territory or to meet the Rwandan delegation in New York on 29 January 2013.

5. The Group also wishes to express its appreciation to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for its support and continued cooperation since the beginning of the current mandate.

6. The Group’s role is to gather and analyse all relevant information on flows of arms and related materiel and on networks operating in violation of the arms embargo concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

7. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012), the Group submits the present midterm report in fulfilment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Committee, by 28 June 2013. The purpose of the present report is:

   (a) To describe the Group’s mandate and methodology;

   (b) To define the framework of the Group’s current investigations;
(c) To highlight critical events relating to the Group’s mandate that have occurred since the submission of its final report on 12 October 2012 (S/2012/843), including updates on sanctioned individuals and entities.

8. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended in the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, as much as possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. The Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources. The Group notably used eyewitness testimonies from former and current combatants of armed groups and members of local communities where incidents occurred. In addition, the Group obtained telephone records, bank statements, money transfer records, photographs, videos and other material evidence to corroborate its findings.

II. Congolese armed groups

A. Mouvement du 23 mars

9. In its final report of 2012 (S/2012/843), the Group documented arms embargo violations committed by the Government of Rwanda and by senior officials of the Government of Uganda in their support of Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) rebels and their allies. As part of its commitment to upholding the right of reply, the Group has annexed to the present report a letter by the Prime Minister of Uganda regarding the Group’s findings (see annex 1). Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has to date found no indication that support is being provided to the rebels from within Uganda, but has gathered evidence that continuous — but limited — support is being provided to M23 from within Rwanda. The Group wrote to the Government of Rwanda on 14 June 2013 to seek clarification about this support and looks forward to a reply.1

10. Early in 2013, leadership struggles between the sanctioned leaders of M23, General Bosco Ntaganda and his deputy, “Brigadier General” Sultani Makenga, led to a split in M23 and, ultimately, to military confrontations between both factions. After two weeks of combat, Makenga’s troops, supported by demobilized soldiers from Rwanda, defeated troops loyal to Ntaganda on 15 March 2013. At the same time, Rwandan officials dismantled Ntaganda’s network of support and recruitment in Rwanda (see paras. 16-17).

11. After Ntaganda and 788 of his loyal troops and political cadres fled into Rwanda, Makenga struggled to rebuild a weakened M23. The movement is unable to control its entire territory and suffers from poor morale and scores of desertions (see paras. 31 and 142). During the course of the Group’s mandate, Makenga’s M23 continued to recruit in Rwanda and to enlist demobilized Rwandan soldiers. Some Rwanda Defence Force officers also held meetings with M23 commanders and impeded the voluntary repatriation of M23 combatants to Rwanda.

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1 The Group received an extensive reply from the Rwandan authorities on 1 July 2013 and intends to consult the authorities further on the contents of that reply during the second half of its mandate.
1. **Under the control of Ntaganda**

12. Fearing arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, the senior commander of M23, Ntaganda, clandestinely led the rebellion from a hideout near the Rwandan border, while his deputy, Makenga, acted as the official leader of the movement (see S/2012/843, para. 6). Ntaganda played a key role in M23 by developing a recruitment network within Rwanda and forging alliances between M23 and other armed groups. As from late 2012, Ntaganda increasingly endeavoured to control M23 and monopolized leadership positions for his loyal officers. While M23 sought to build an image of a political movement with legitimate demands, the movement, led by Ntaganda and his officers, who are notorious for their poor human rights records, was not a credible interlocutor during the negotiations led by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Kampala.

13. Strong disagreements between Ntaganda and Makenga concerning the management of M23 eventually led to a split and, subsequently, to open military confrontation. Ntaganda used his network of contacts within Rwanda to support his own M23 faction. To halt Ntaganda’s activities, the Rwandan authorities arrested some of the individuals who were part of that network. Some Rwandan officers also provided limited material support to Makenga as he sought to defeat Ntaganda.

2. **Internal divisions**

14. The two M23 commanders first clashed during their takeover of Goma in November 2012. Ntaganda moved into the city once it had fallen into the rebels’ hands, notwithstanding Makenga’s advice not to do so, according to two M23 cadres and provincial authorities. The current president of M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, reported to the Group that Makenga had ordered his soldiers to vacate Goma following international pressure, but Ntaganda’s loyalists had attempted to remain in the provincial capital. According to M23 cadres and politicians close to M23, the then president of M23 and Ntaganda’s ally, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, unilaterally promoted Col. Baudoin Ngaruye to the rank of brigadier general, elevating him to the same rank as Makenga to have more leverage with regard to decision-making.

15. Following the withdrawal of M23 from Goma on 1 December 2012, the leadership struggles continued. Ntaganda and Makenga clashed over the division of the goods looted from Goma (see box) and both endeavoured to appoint their officers and cadres to key positions within M23. According to former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda bribed M23 officers to gain their loyalty and managed to mobilize most

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2 Ntaganda’s loyal officers include Col. Baudoin Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda and Lt Col. Eric Badege, whose names were added to the list of sanctioned individuals on 30 November 2012, 1 December 2010 and 31 December 2012, respectively.

3 For more details on Ntaganda’s network, see S/2012/843, para. 30.

4 Ntaganda and Makenga had already clashed following the arrest of the former military commander of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, Gen. Laurent Nkunda, in January 2009. Nkunda was betrayed by Ntaganda, who assumed his position.

5 Ntaganda accused Makenga of receiving bribes from the Congolese delegation in Kampala to integrate into the Congolese army. Ntaganda had imposed his military aide-de-camp, Col. Alex Bizimungu Masozera, as part of the M23 political delegation to receive reports of the negotiations. Col. Masozera had been instrumental in large-scale smuggling of minerals in Goma before the 2012 mutiny (see S/2011/738, para. 613).
M23 officers around him. Former M23 political cadres and an M23 supporter stated that Ntaganda recruited in Rwanda (see S/2012/843, paras. 22-23) and maintained supporters within the Rwandan army.

16. According to M23 cadres, a former Rwandan army officer, a former M23 officer, an M23 collaborator and two Congolese politicians, Rwandan officials who had previously supported Ntaganda, and who could no longer control his network in Rwanda or his actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, decided to sideline him from M23 and to dismantle his support in Rwanda. In late December 2012, the Rwandan authorities arrested a Rwandan army officer, Col. Jomba Gakumba, owing to his close ties with Ntaganda, according to former Rwandan army officers and an M23 collaborator (see ibid., para. 83). A former Rwandan Patriotic Front member, two former Rwandan army officers and a politician loyal to Ntaganda told the Group that John Rucyahana, a bishop and ally of Ntaganda in Rwanda who recruited politicians and raised funds for M23 (see ibid., para. 30), had to stop his collaboration. The Group has sought clarification from the Government of Rwanda on the matter and is awaiting a response.

17. A Rwandan army officer, an M23 cadre and two M23 collaborators stated that, on 10 March 2013, the Rwandan authorities had arrested Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki, part of Ntaganda’s recruitment and support network in Gisenyi, while they were attempting to help Ntaganda from Rwanda by supplying him with small quantities of ammunition, food and medical supplies during the hostilities between the two factions in Kibumba.

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**Looting of Goma**

M23 engaged in extensive looting while in Goma in November 2012. M23 cadres and several politicians informed the Group that Ntaganda and the former president of M23, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, had appointed loyal M23 members to positions in the Congolese customs offices at the border between Goma and Gisenyi, Rwanda, where they embezzled cash and other goods (see annex 2). On 26 November 2012, Logo Kubu, a business associate of Ntaganda (see S/2011/738, para. 601), deposited $38,050 in an account with Equity Bank just across the border in Gisenyi (see annex 3). The Group has contacted Equity Bank for further details.

Ngaruye, a Ntaganda loyalist, organized the systematic looting of government offices and vehicles (see annex 4). Officers loyal to Makenga seized a T55 tank belonging to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 5), in addition to an extensive stock of Congolese army heavy weapons and mortars (see annex 6). In a report by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the value of goods stolen by M23 from government offices was estimated at more than $3 million (see annex 7). In April, the Group observed trucks stolen in Goma stationed in M23-controlled Bunagana, at the border with Uganda (see annex 8).
3. Separation between factions of the movement

18. M23 split into two factions on 28 February 2013. Ntaganda and his officers took up positions at Kibumba, 27 km north of Goma (see annex 9), while Makenga maintained control of Rumangabo, situated further north (see annex 10). Former Ntaganda loyalists reported that Ntaganda had grown suspicious, fearing arrest, and increased his own protection. Ntaganda had retained the loyalty of most of the movement’s troops. The M23 “Minister of Finance”, Ephrem Bwishe, told the Group that, before joining Ntaganda in Kibumba, Runiga had taken with him most of the finances of M23. Makenga had retained most of the movement’s weapons and ammunition stock.

19. The presidents of both M23 factions denied having collaborated with Ntaganda. In February 2013, the president of Makenga’s M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, told the Group that M23 leaders had discovered that Ntaganda was hiding in M23-held territory. On 27 February, Bisimwa issued a communiqué in which he accused Runiga of offering Ntaganda “political leverage to influence decisions of M23” and dismissed him as president (see annex 11). In an interview with the Group, however, Runiga denied having forged an alliance with Ntaganda and said that he had not seen him since January 2012.

20. In late February 2013, Ntaganda attempted to prepare an escape route towards Masisi. According to an Ntaganda loyalist, a former M23 officer and an M23 collaborator, Ntaganda maintained regular contacts with a former member of the Congrès national pour la défense du people, Col. François Mudahunga, the commander of the 812th regiment of the Congolese army, based in Kitchanga. In collaboration with Mudahunga, Ntaganda sent some 50 men to prepare for his eventual escape to Masisi and to collect ammunition from the weapons caches that he maintained there (see paras. 117-123).

4. Clash between factions of the movement

21. On 28 February 2013, fighting broke out between the two M23 factions. Three former Rwandan army officers, an M23 cadre, an M23 collaborator and a Congolese politician stated that, while some Rwandan officers had assured Ntaganda of their assistance, in reality they had decided to support Makenga.

22. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s advance against Ntaganda. Two active M23 members and an M23 collaborator confirmed that groups of demobilized Rwandan soldiers had infiltrated the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the two weeks of fighting to assist Makenga. Five former M23 officers separately witnessed the arrival of small groups of men from Rwanda. They were immediately assigned specific military roles and joined Makenga’s forces in combat against Ntaganda’s troops. The Group sought clarification about this matter from the Government of Rwanda and is awaiting an answer.

23. Makenga had a tactical advantage because he controlled most of the heavy weapons looted in Goma, in addition to weapons that M23 had captured during previous operations and the movement’s ammunition stock. His commanders used a tank, a multi-barrel rocket launcher and 14.5-mm heavy machine guns to push...
Ntaganda’s soldiers towards the Rwandan border. According to an M23 officer, a former M23 officer and a civilian member of M23, four demobilized Rwandan soldiers helped Makenga’s troops to operate the heavy weapons.

24. Rwandan officers also fed disinformation to Ntaganda, which precipitated his defeat. According to two former Rwandan army officers, an M23 officer, former M23 officers and a Ntaganda loyalist, some Rwandan army officers met Ntaganda early in March 2013, ahead of the final battle, and promised to support him with troops and ammunition. Former M23 soldiers who fought alongside Ntaganda reported that Rwandan special forces who had been deployed along the border had provided Ntaganda with ammunition at the outset of the fighting, which had made him believe that he enjoyed support from the Rwandan army.

25. Two former M23 officers and a former M23 soldier told the Group that they had overheard regular telephone communications between Ngaruye and Rwandan army officers during that week, following which Ngaruye had assured his troops that they would receive support from Rwanda. As the combat progressed, however, it became clear that the ammunition would not come. According to three former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda’s soldiers who attempted to flee to Rwanda during the week of 11 March 2013 were captured by Rwandan army soldiers at the border and handed over to Makenga’s forces.

5. Surrender of Ntaganda’s branch

26. As his troops ran low on ammunition, Ntaganda fled into Rwanda. According to three loyalists, former M23 officers and soldiers who fought alongside him, Ntaganda feared that the Rwandan army soldiers deployed along the border would kill him. Makenga’s deputy, Col. Innocent Kaina, a sanctioned individual, also told the Group that he had planned to kill Ntaganda. Two officers loyal to Makenga also reported that the latter had ordered his troops to kill Ntaganda.

27. On 15 March 2013, Ntaganda clandestinely crossed the border into Rwanda using a small path in the Gasizi area, with an escort. Four of Ntaganda’s troops, two politicians loyal to Ntaganda, three M23 members and an Ntaganda family member told the Group that he had reached Kigali with the help of his family and arrived at the embassy of the United States on 18 March, where he had requested to be transferred to the International Criminal Court, without the prior knowledge of the Rwandan authorities. Subsequently, the Rwandan authorities arrested an individual suspected of having aided Ntaganda’s escape and interrogated Ntaganda’s wife and brother.7

28. According to the Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 788 individuals, consisting of 7188 of Ntaganda’s troops and 70 political cadres, began crossing into Rwanda on 15 March through the Kabuhanga and Gasizi border points. Some 500 troops surrendered to Makenga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 16 March (see annex 12). Rwandan army soldiers disarmed Ntaganda’s troops who entered Rwanda. In a letter to the Group in April 2013, the Government of Rwanda confirmed that, “upon their arrival on the

7 In 2012, Ntaganda’s brother facilitated the travel of recruits through Ntaganda’s hotel — Bushokoro — in Kinigi, Rwanda. See S/2012/843, para. 22.
8 This figure has also been reported to the Group by a foreign diplomat and by the Kigali-based New Times in an article on 18 March 2013.
territory of Rwanda, all M23 combatants were disarmed”. According to Rwandan authorities, the combatants handed over a total of 409 weapons, including 333 submachine guns (see annex 13).

29. Ntaganda’s M23 faction that crossed the border into Rwanda on 15 and 16 March included five sanctioned individuals. While Ntaganda was transferred on 22 March 2013 from Kigali to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, on 1 April 2013 the Rwandan authorities relocated Runiga, Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimirinda and Col. Eric Badege to Ngoma, some 300 km from the Congolese border. The Congolese authorities have issued arrest warrants for those sanctioned individuals. On 22 March 2013, the Group visited the former M23 members in Rwanda. Rwandan officials shared with the Group a list of individuals who had crossed into their territory (see annex 14).

30. On the basis of the accounts of former M23 officers and M23 medical personnel, the Group estimates that more than 200 combatants from both factions died during the fighting. The same sources reported that more than 50 people had been injured on Makenga’s side and that some of the injured on Ntaganda’s side had been executed on Ntaganda’s orders (see para. 130). The Rwandan authorities told the Group that 159 of the Ntaganda loyalists who had crossed into Rwanda had been injured.

6. Under the control of Makenga

31. After Ntaganda’s defeat, Makenga remained with a weakened M23 of some 1,500 soldiers spread out over an area of 700 km². From 20 March to 19 June 2013, a total of 246 M23 combatants surrendered to the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section. Many others surrendered to the Congolese army or fled. Moreover, M23 has lost the support of leaders and communities that had supported Ntaganda in northern Rwanda and has stopped benefiting from the recruitment and financial networks that he established. Troop shortages forced Makenga to vacate several M23 positions, opening the way for incursions by the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyatura into M23-held areas (see annex 15).

32. Makenga has sought to increase the movement’s strength through recruitment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Thanks to assistance from some sympathetic Rwandan officials, Makenga has been able to recruit in Rwanda, but Ugandan officials have thwarted several M23 attempts to recruit on their territory. Recent recruitment notwithstanding, the failed attempt by M23 at the end of May 2013 to recover a key Congolese army position near Goma illustrates the movement’s current inability to carry out large-scale coordinated military operations.

7. Preparation of new military operations

33. After Ntaganda’s M23 faction was dismantled, negotiations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Makenga’s M23 resumed in Kampala in June 2013. Although Makenga promised his soldiers that they would be integrated into the Congolese army after defeating Ntaganda, eight former M23 soldiers interviewed by the Group indicated that Makenga was planning a new attack on Goma.
34. Subsequent to the adoption on 28 March 2013 by the Security Council of resolution 2098 (2013), in which the Council authorized the deployment of a force intervention brigade to neutralize and disarm Congolese rebels, M23 leaders addressed letters to South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania, the troop-contributing countries, to dissuade them from sending their troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 16).

35. According to former M23 soldiers, M23 held military training sessions in April and May 2013 that included training on urban warfare and guerrilla techniques to defend against the force intervention brigade. Current and former M23 members informed the Group that, on 27 May 2013, all M23 political cadres had attended a week-long training session in leadership and management, during which the rebels had apportioned key administrative functions in the event of a recapture of Goma.

8. Recruitment

36. The Group notes that M23 recruitment in Rwanda has decreased since the dismantling of Ntaganda’s recruitment network. Community leaders in northern Rwanda who supported Ntaganda have ceased collaborating with M23. An active M23 political cadre, former M23 officers and local leaders reported, however, that, since the end of March 2013, M23 had acquired some 200 new recruits, including some from refugee camps in Rwanda and others — including children — from Rutshuru and Masisi territories in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. M23 also sought to recruit in refugee camps in western Uganda (see para. 39).

37. Since mid-February 2013, the Group has interviewed 66 surrendered M23 officers and soldiers, including 23 Rwandan nationals. From 1 January to 9 June 2013, the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section demobilized and repatriated 57 former M23 soldiers who declared that they were Rwandan nationals. During its visit of May 2013 to Mutobo, the demobilization camp in Rwanda, however, a camp official told the Group that no former M23 combatants had ever arrived there.

38. Fourteen former M23 soldiers told the Group that Rwandan nationals who had deserted from M23 and sought to return directly to Rwanda had been forcibly returned to M23 by Rwandan army officers. Two of those soldiers had themselves been forced back to M23 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwandan army soldiers. One had fled to Rwanda alongside four other M23 soldiers in March. He said that his group had been immediately brought back to the Congolese border by Rwandan army soldiers and handed over to M23 commanders, who had imprisoned them at Rumangabo. The other M23 soldier told the Group that he had fled from M23 in January and had been arrested in Rwanda by Rwandan army officers and sent back to M23. In April, another former M23 soldier witnessed Rwandan army soldiers bringing a group of 10 soldiers back to Makenga after they had attempted to flee to Rwanda.

39. M23 has also been recruiting in Uganda on a limited scale. The Group interviewed three Ugandan citizens who had been recruited in Kampala in May 2013 by an M23 agent called Mufuruki and subsequently escaped. Mufuruki had promised them lucrative jobs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Upon their

9 During the same period, the Section also repatriated a Ugandan national and a Kenyan national who surrendered from M23.
arrival at the Bunagana border post, they had been handed over to another M23 agent, a Mr. Kazungu, who had ferried them across the border into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and delivered them to M23 commanders. The commanders had threatened to shoot the recruits when they protested. Ugandan officials told the Group that, on 7 May 2013, they had arrested seven individuals suspected of recruiting for M23. In June 2013, six Ugandan nationals deserted from M23 and surrendered to the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section.

9. **Infiltration of demobilized Rwandan soldiers**

40. In 2013, demobilized Rwandan soldiers have enlisted in M23. Three former Rwandan army officers, 10 former M23 soldiers and five former M23 officers reported that M23 agents had recruited demobilized soldiers in Rwanda. Since February, the Group has interviewed three demobilized Rwandan soldiers who reported that Rwandan army officers sympathetic to M23 had recruited them. According to three former Rwandan army officers, an M23 collaborator and a current M23 member, Rwandan army officers have facilitated M23 recruitment inside Rwanda by requesting senior demobilized officers at the district level to work with local chiefs to enlist demobilized Rwandan army soldiers for M23. Former Rwandan army officers, an M23 cadre and a former M23 officer told the Group that M23 had recruited both former Rwandan army and former FDLR soldiers in Musanze and Rubavu.

41. Since March 2013, former M23 officers have reported to the Group that demobilized soldiers have joined M23 in groups of 5 to 30 individuals, also seen by local leaders from the Chanzu and Kabuhanga areas. Once in M23-held territory, the recruits received military fatigues, ranks and weapons at the M23 headquarters at Chanzu and at Rumangabo. They subsequently received a briefing at Chanzu and were mixed into brigades. Former and current M23 cadres told the Group that demobilized soldiers usually performed specialized functions such as the operation of heavy weapons.

42. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers have been killed on M23 front lines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group obtained the identities and addresses of seven families residing in the northern Rwandan villages of Bigogwe and Mukamira whose sons fought in the ranks of M23 as demobilized soldiers and died during the fighting between Makenga and Ntaganda.

43. Since the beginning of its current mandate, the Group has interviewed an active Rwandan army soldier arrested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the end of 2012. Since the fall of Goma in November 2012, however, the Group has documented no instances of full support being provided by Rwandan army units to M23 (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 31).

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10 In Rwanda, most demobilized Rwandan army soldiers and demobilized FDLR soldiers become part of the Rwandan army reserve forces (see S/2012/843, para. 20).

11 The M23 administrative headquarters are at Rumangabo and the military headquarters at Chanzu.
Mutaho operation

On 20 May 2013, three days before the visit of the Secretary-General to Goma, M23 unsuccessfully attempted to seize Mutaho hill, one of the Congolese army’s positions defending Goma (see annex 17). Current and former M23 members reported that M23 had redeployed troops towards Goma, vacating other positions (see annex 18). The rebels also moved their heavy weapons southward (see annex 19).

Faced with strong resistance from the Congolese army, however, the rebels retreated to their initial positions. According to former M23 officers who participated in the combat, M23 soldiers ran out of ammunition, lacked rockets and shells, suffered 40 dead and more than 30 injured and were compelled to announce a unilateral ceasefire after failing to receive promised troop and ammunition support from within Rwanda (see annex 21).

On 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122-mm cannon rounds were fired by M23 on a densely inhabited area of Goma and the Mugunga camp for internally displaced persons (see annex 21). Two M23 members and three former M23 soldiers who participated in the fighting told the Group that the firing on a civilian objective resulted from operator error (see para. 131).

Early in June 2013, an active M23 member and two M23 collaborators told the Group that M23 was maintaining troops in advanced positions close to Goma. According to the same sources, during a meeting held on 1 June at Chanzu, Makenga told his troops that operations on Goma would resume.

10. Meetings with Rwandan army officers

44. The Group received information that M23 commanders regularly met Rwandan army officers. Three former M23 officers, a former M23 cadre and several local authorities told the Group that, from March to May 2013, they had witnessed two M23 colonels, Kaina and Yusuf Mboneza, meeting Rwandan army officers at the border at Kabuhanga. Current and former M23 members reported that some Rwandan army officers, or their representatives, had also travelled to Chanzu or Rumangabo to hold meetings with Makenga.

11. Arms and ammunition used by the movement

45. Congolese army officers and M23 members told the Group that, as it left Goma on 1 December 2012, M23 captured a large quantity of rockets, mortars and ammunition. Current and former M23 members reported, however, that, while much of the ammunition stolen by the rebels in Goma remained available in the movement’s stocks, it did not always correspond to the types of weapons that the rebels used.
12. Finance

46. According to M23 cadres, Ntaganda and Runiga financed M23 through a network of individual supporters and business dealings. They used part of their revenues to bribe M23 officers to join their side. M23 officers who had formerly supported Ntaganda told the Group that they had received salaries during his last few months with M23 because he had attempted to buy their loyalty. All the M23 officers and soldiers interviewed by the Group who had surrendered from Makenga’s M23 stated that they had not received salaries while serving under Makenga.

47. According to current and former M23 members, M23 continues to tax commercial trucks crossing its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja and the border at Bunagana. These taxes are currently the main source of revenue for M23, which taxes from $200 to $1,000 per truck, depending on the load (see annex 22). According to M23 members, the movement earns an average of $6,000 per day or $180,000 per month from this taxation. Since Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga has attempted to reorganize the movement’s finances (see annex 23).

B. Armed groups allied with the Mouvement du 23 mars

48. Since 2012, M23 has sought to create a broad coalition of armed groups in the expectation that simultaneous attacks on several fronts would overburden the Congolese army. In 2013, M23 continued to foster insecurity while its representatives were at the negotiating table in Kampala. The movement’s objective was to demonstrate the existence of a wider governance problem in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seemingly unrelated to M23. Following the brief takeover of Goma by M23, the rebels expanded their alliances in the Democratic Republic of the Congo using Rwandan territory. After Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga consolidated the collaboration of M23 with most of the armed groups that Ntaganda and Runiga had originally mobilized. Many of the M23-led alliances were short lived, however, because the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo succeeded in arresting or neutralizing several M23 allies operating in South Kivu and the Beni area.

1. Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo

49. In its final report of 2012, the Group documented M23 attempts to win allies in South Kivu (see S/2012/843, paras. 69-81). The alliances have gained little ground, however, because M23 lacks popular support in South Kivu. After M23 withdrew from Goma on 1 December, its initiatives to open a second front in South Kivu continued. A political activist and former employee of the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, attempted to organize armed groups in South Kivu on behalf of M23.

50. In August 2012, Bagayamukwe travelled to M23-held areas to meet Col. Albert Kahasha, who hails from South Kivu and had joined M23 in Rutshuru, North Kivu. M23 commanders decided that Kahasha was to become the military leader of M23 in South Kivu (see annex 24). Makenga coordinated Kahasha’s move to South Kivu with Bagayamukwe. According to Bagayamukwe, one of his collaborators and a current M23 cadre, in November 2012 Kahasha travelled through Rwanda, where he held a series of meetings, following which he crossed...
back into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After a failed attempt to integrate into the Congolese army in November 2012, Kahasha fled to Walungu territory in South Kivu and continued his collaboration with M23.

51. On 16 December 2012, Kahasha and Bagayamukwe created a political-military group, Dynamique populaire pour le changement, to bring together various armed groups for M23. The declaration signed by Bagayamukwe and Kahasha on that occasion included the phrase “sent to M23 for approval” and called for all Congolese institutions to be disbanded (see annex 25).

52. Bagayamukwe travelled again to M23-held Bunagana on 8 January 2013 to participate in a meeting led by sanctioned M23 leaders Runiga, Makenga and Ngaruye. The purpose of the meeting was to further consolidate M23 alliances and open a front in South Kivu. Bagayamukwe, a member of the Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC) and a UFRC collaborator confirmed the details of the meeting to the Group. Two participants in the meeting and two former M23 politicians told the Group that representatives of several armed groups from South Kivu had gathered at Bunagana that day. Among the attendees were Benoit Kadage, Sadock Kayira and Citoyen Ruhema, who lived in Kigali at the time and were seeking to recruit members of the Banyamulenge community throughout the Great Lakes region for M23.

53. According to three participants in the meeting, Makenga thanked the attendees for having turned against the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, promised financial support and stated that he maintained a weapons cache in South Kivu. He added that, while M23 was unable to carry out military operations because it was negotiating in Kampala, “salvation needed to come from South Kivu”. After the meeting, Bagayamukwe spent several days in M23-held areas to learn about the movement (see annex 26).

54. Three UFRC members told the Group that, through the coalition, M23 leaders intended to form alliances with several Raia Mutomboki factions operating in South Kivu and mobilize Banyamulenge young people, together with Lt Col. Bede Rusagara’s group under the command of Kahasha. According to the same sources, two Raia Mutomboki colonels, Kashi Maheshe and Mukimbula Ndushi, formed alliances with M23, in addition to Deogratias Bizibu Balola, the former president of the opposition party, Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, in Bukavu, who had resigned in September 2012 to create an armed group. The Group obtained a copy of a declaration by Bagayamukwe during the meeting with M23 at Bunagana, in which he outlined the details of the armed groups that he wished to federate (see annex 27). The Group also obtained a copy of a text message sent by Bagayamukwe on 3 February 2013 in which he claimed that he would soon liberate the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 28).

55. Bagayamukwe told the Group that he had travelled to and from Bunagana through the Cyanika border post between Rwanda and Uganda (see annex 29) and that he had subsequently gone to Gisenyi, Rwanda. Bagayamukwe also reported that he had prepared a declaration creating UFRC in Gisenyi, which he had released on 20 January 2013 (see annex 30); that was confirmed to the Group by a UFRC collaborator. In addition, M23 political cadres told the Group that they had met Bagayamukwe in Gisenyi.
56. UFRC diaspora members interviewed by the Group confirmed that Bagayamukwe had coordinated the creation of UFRC while in Rwanda. The Group obtained a rental contract in the name of Bagayamukwe for a residence in Kamembe, Rwanda, in addition to a letter dated 6 January 2013 in which Bagayamukwe requested to set up his residence in Rwanda (see annexes 31 and 32). After spending nearly three weeks in Rwanda between Kigali and Kamembe, Bagayamukwe travelled through Burundi to cross back into the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 9 February, where he was arrested the following day by the Congolese authorities.

57. Bagayamukwe told the Group that UFRC received the support of diaspora members. In this connection, the Group has been in contact with Tamusa Lumembo (residing in Belgium), Moké Silubwe (residing in France) and Gaudens Bisimwa (residing in Germany). All three confirmed that they were active UFRC members. The Group obtained a copy of a draft communiqué in which Lumembo was nominated as the coordinator of the UFRC diaspora (see annex 33). After Bagayamukwe’s arrest, Silubwe assumed the presidency of UFRC and issued a declaration in which he condemned the arrest (see annex 34).

58. UFRC diaspora members told the Group that the diaspora was specifically tasked with collecting money to finance UFRC and that its members had opened a bank account for that purpose (see annex 35). The same sources reported that diaspora members had created a budget based on the estimated cost of toppling the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 36). To date, the Group has concluded that the diaspora linked to UFRC has mainly carried out propaganda on behalf of the movement; the Group intends to investigate other forms of support further.

59. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cracked down on UFRC and arrested Bagayamukwe and Col. Mushamuka and Col. Mbangu Mukaz, two Raia Mutomboki leaders operating under Kahasha’s command. Consequently, the prospect of forming a coalition for South Kivu has lost momentum. Kahasha, however, continues to operate in Walungu alongside some Raia Mutomboki factions, maintains his alliance with M23 and enjoys the cooperation of the same diaspora members. On 24 and 25 April 2013, Kahasha attacked the positions of the 1002nd regiment of the Congolese army in Chishadu, South Kivu. Silubwe issued a communiqué in which he acknowledged UFRC responsibility for the attack (see annex 37). While in the communiqué he claimed victory for UFRC, a Congolese army officer and a United Nations source told the Group that several Raia Mutomboki soldiers had been killed in the battle.

2. Raia Mutomboki

60. Since 2011, Raia Mutomboki has rapidly developed throughout South Kivu and, subsequently, North Kivu. Most Raia Mutomboki members organized themselves as local defence groups against FDLR. In 2012, the Group reported several cases of massacres of FDLR and their dependants committed by Raia Mutomboki (see S/2012/843, paras. 148-149). In March 2013, Mutuza Kasapa, a Raia Mutomboki commander in Shabunda, South Kivu, told the Group that Raia Mutomboki would not cease hostilities as long as there were Rwandophones in the Kivus. Raia Mutomboki groups have replaced FDLR in some areas and levy taxes on trading routes and mines. Raia Mutomboki commanders Maj. Donat Omari
Kengwa, Meshe, Constant and Ngandu met in mid-February 2013 in Kigulube to settle their differences, create a common structure and discuss their financing through taxation. Additional meetings were held in Shabunda in May and June 2013.

61. In its final report of 2012, the Group documented the provision of support by M23 to several Raia Mutomboki groups in southern Masisi territory, North Kivu (S/2012/843, para. 63). The Raia Mutomboki commanders in Masisi had mostly maintained ties with Ntaganda and another sanctioned M23 leader, Lt Col. Eric Badege (see ibid., paras. 62-63). In March 2013, after Ntaganda’s loyal officers, including Badege, fled to Rwanda, a Raia Mutomboki leader visited M23 to initiate collaboration with Makenge’s branch. The Group obtained a draft document produced by a Raia Mutomboki group from Masisi, in which the group criticizes the division created within M23 and aligns itself with the M23 agenda. It also requests the departure of FDLR and threatens to kill FDLR members (see annex 38). The enmity of Raia Mutomboki towards Rwandophones notwithstanding, M23 has managed to form alliances with some Raia Mutomboki factions, although this has created tensions because of the popular resentment against M23 in South Kivu (see paras. 54 and 59).

3. Union pour la réhabilitation de la démocratie du Congo

62. Armed groups in the North Kivu territories of Lubero and Beni have proliferated in 2012 and 2013. These militias consist almost entirely of members of the Nande community. The most significant group is the Union pour la réhabilitation de la démocratie du Congo (URDC), led by “General” Hilaire Kombi, who defected from the Congolese army in June 2012. URDC has alliances with other rebel groups, including M23.

63. According to ex-combatants, local leaders and Congolese officials, URDC represents the opposition of local politicians and businesspeople to the central Government. In mid-2012, Mbusa Nyamwisi, a Congolese opposition politician currently residing in South Africa, acted on this discontent by encouraging Congolese soldiers — many of whom had served in the armed wing of Nyamwisi’s Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML) rebel group — to defect and join Hilaire’s group. Nyamwisi’s affiliate, Andy Laurent Patandjila Paluku, also recruited demobilized RCD-K/ML militants and other young people to join URDC (see S/2012/843, para. 65).

64. Hilaire’s group consists of some 300 combatants operating in three camps. Hilaire leads the main group based at Bunyatenge in Lubero territory, while a “Colonel” Werrason heads a second group based at Mumbiri in Beni territory. “Colonel” Eric Kenzo, a former member of the Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais (see S/2011/738, para. 266), leads a third group at Kyavinyonge in the Virunga National Park in Beni territory. That group consists of remnants of the group formerly headed by “Colonel” David Lusenge. Former combatants, local leaders and the Congolese authorities state that Hilaire’s groups obtain weapons and ammunition from local Congolese army soldiers (either by purchasing the arms or attacking and looting Congolese army positions), from M23 (see below) and from smugglers who bring arms from Uganda.

65. Mbusa Nyamwisi recruited Lusenge, who had deserted from the Congolese army in November 2012 to join Hilaire. According to the Congolese and Ugandan authorities, Lusenge carried out recruitment in Uganda with the support of Kakolele
Bwambale, a sanctioned individual. The Group interviewed four Ugandan nationals who had been recruited and armed by Bwambale and Lusenge and who had been arrested by the Congolese authorities at Kamango in March 2013 (see annex 39). Lusenge informed the Group that he had coordinated his operations with Hilaire and admitted to having been in regular contact with M23 commanders after his desertion in November 2012. In April 2013, the Congolese authorities requested Bwambale to come to Kinshasa, while Lusenge surrendered to the Congolese army. In May 2013, the Ugandan authorities arrested Loli Adrain, alias “Muhumuza”, who recruited on behalf of Lusenge and Bwambale in Kampala.

66. According to local authorities and escapees or former abductees interviewed by MONUSCO, Kenzo’s group is responsible for some of the 160 kidnappings of children and adults in Beni territory since the beginning of 2013 (see annexes 40 and 41). Escapees and former abductees stated that some of them had undergone military training, while others had been used for forced labour. The Group continues to investigate the identities and motives of the kidnappers and the fate of the abductees.

67. On 15 May 2013, Kenzo’s troops, including child soldiers, led members of other local militias in an attack on the Congolese army base in Beni town to liberate prisoners and loot weapons. Seven Congolese army soldiers wounded in the attack told the Group that most of the attackers had been armed with spears, machetes and some AK-47 rifles. Nine Congolese army soldiers were killed and 17 wounded, while 33 Mai Mai combatants were killed and 8 captured.

68. According to ex-combatants, local leaders and officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hilaire maintains close ties with M23 (see S/2012/843, para. 66). These same sources told the Group that, in May 2013, M23 had sent troops and arms to Hilaire in an attempt to establish an M23 presence in Lubero and Beni territories before the deployment of the force intervention brigade. Hilaire communicates with M23 through Lt Col. Tahanga Nyoro Kasereka, a Congolese army deserter who acts as a political liaison between Mbusa Nyamwisi, M23 and Hilaire. A former combatant, two local leaders and three officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the Group that Andy Patandjila had been one of several Nyamwisi associates among the pro-Ntaganda M23 political cadres who had surrendered on 16 March 2013 in Rwanda (see annex 42).

69. URDC also works closely with “Major General” Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, who leads the Union des patriotes du Congo pour la paix, operating around Bunyatenge in Lubero territory (see annex 43). After defecting from the Congolese army, Hilaire was initially subordinate to Lafontaine. Former combatants, government officials and United Nations sources have indicated to the Group that Hilaire now wields greater operational power than Lafontaine over militias in Beni and Lubero territories.

70. Hilaire also coordinates with the militia controlled by Paul “Morgan” Sadala (see para. 72). Former combatants and local leaders stated that Hilaire supplied Morgan with weapons and ammunition in exchange for gold and ivory. The same sources reported that Hilaire had occasionally dispatched some of his combatants to support operations conducted by Morgan, including the attack of 6 January 2013 on Mambasa town (see para. 73).
71. According to former combatants, local leaders and the authorities of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, URDC and other militias primarily finance themselves by exploiting natural resources, especially gold and ivory, and trading these resources with businesspeople in Beni, Butembo and Kasindi. According to these sources, in 2012 and early 2013, a Congolese businessman, Muhindo Kasebere, was the most prominent financier and supplier of arms and ammunition to Hilaire’s militias (see para. 200). In December 2012, the Congolese authorities arrested Arnold Musinganinaya, a businessman and relative of Mbusa Nyamwisi, for recruiting former RCD/K-ML soldiers for Hilaire’s group by offering them 100,000 Congolese francs (S111).

C. Other Congolese armed groups

1. Mai Mai Morgan

72. Paul Sadala (alias “Morgan”) is an armed group leader operating in the territories of Mambasa and Bafwasende in Orientale Province (see S/2012/843, paras. 128-132). Morgan commands several dozen combatants who operate in small groups out of shifting camps. He frequently swells his ranks with recruits from Kisangani or troops dispatched from allies such as Gen. Hilaire of URDC (see para. 70) and Mai Mai Simba (see S/2011/738, paras. 246-251), when he carries out major attacks.

73. On 6 January 2013, Morgan led a group of some 150 armed troops, including some of Hilaire’s soldiers, in an attack on Mambasa town, the capital of Mambasa territory in Ituri district. According to local authorities and United Nations sources, Morgan’s forces looted goods and money and raped some 50 women during the attack. Soldiers from the 905th regiment of the Congolese army, under the command of Col. John Tchinyama, pushed Morgan’s forces out of Mambasa, with support from the Ituri brigade of MONUSCO. Nine Congolese army soldiers, six civilians and some 45 Mai Mai fighters were killed during the retaking of Mambasa.

74. Two people abducted by Morgan and a former Mai Mai combatant told the Group that they had on several occasions overheard Morgan talking to Congolese army officers on a satellite phone before and during the attack on Mambasa. They also said that allies within the Congolese army had guided Morgan along routes so as to avoid encountering government forces.

75. After recapturing Mambasa, some Congolese soldiers committed human rights abuses while searching for remnants of Morgan’s forces. Local populations and civil society representatives reported that some troops had engaged in rape, harassment, extortion and arbitrary arrests. The Group obtained video footage, which it intends to archive, showing that, on 7 January 2013, Congolese soldiers engaged in cruel, degrading and inhumane treatment of Mai Mai suspects at the Hotel Pygmy in Mambasa (see annex 44).

76. According to civil society groups and MONUSCO investigators, from 1 to 5 November 2012 alone, Morgan’s group raped or sexually mutilated more than 150 women during a series of attacks on villages in a gold-mining area south of Mambasa. Former captives told the Group that, on several occasions, Morgan’s group had engaged in cannibalism and killed or injured people by setting them on fire (see annex 45). Six former captives told the Group that Morgan’s group had
captured more than 50 women and used them as sexual slaves (see para. 133). While Morgan is the overall commander, other leaders include his lieutenant, Manu, and a witch doctor named Jean Pierre (alias “JP” or “Docteur”) (see annex 46).

77. Morgan is a long-time poacher of elephants in and around the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, but in the past year has increasingly sustained his group by stealing and selling gold and by pillaging the property of local populations. In late 2012 and early in 2013, Morgan’s group attacked mines near Biakato, Elota and Pangoy, stole gold from miners and killed at least two elephants for ivory. The Group confirmed this with four people abducted by Morgan’s group and with several community leaders in Epulu and Mambasa. The Group continues to investigate Morgan’s connections to criminal networks in Orientale Province (see S/2012/843, para. 129).

78. The Congolese army attacked Morgan’s group early in 2013, causing it to fragment into small armed criminal bands. His force continues to carry out attacks. For example, on 2 June 2013, Morgan and his troops attacked two sites near the village of Adusa, west of Epulu, killing two Congolese soldiers, wounding three women and a soldier, stealing weapons and gold and abducting several people, including women and children.

2. Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri and Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri

79. There has been little progress since the Group’s final report of 2012 on integrating into the Congolese army, or defeating, the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI), led by “Brigadier General” Justin Banaloki, alias “Cobra Matata” (see ibid., paras. 83-84). FRPI controls a large part of eastern and southern Irumu territory in Ituri district, Orientale Province, centred on Walendu Bindi chefferie, where it has resisted government control since 2001.

80. Cobra Matata nominally remains the head of the Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri (COGAI), which destabilized Ituri in 2012 but was weakened by Congolese army operations (see ibid., para. 85). Five local leaders and civil society representatives in Ituri and Kampala informed the Group that Mateso Savo, who had been the main financier of COGAI, had been living in Kampala since the raid on his farm near Jiba in Ituri district by the Congolese army in September 2012 (see ibid.). Among the five groups that are officially part of COGAI, only FRPI is currently active. The remnants of the other groups have been integrated into FRPI.

81. On 22 May 2013, seven senior FRPI leaders, including “Colonel” Mbadhu and “Colonel” Hitler (see annex 47), told the Group that they wished to reach an agreement with the central Government similar to the accord of 23 March 2009 between the Government and the Congrès national pour la défense du people and other armed groups (see S/2010/596, para. 165). They told the Group that their main objectives were to be integrated into the Congolese army at their current (self-proclaimed) ranks, to remain in Ituri and to have the Government release and grant amnesty to FRPI prisoners.

12 Col. Hitler told the Group that the five members of COGAI were FRPI, commanded by General Cobra, based in Irumu territory; FRPI-Aru, commanded by Col. Eneko, based in Aru territory; the Front populaire pour la défense et le développement de l’Ituri, commanded by Col. Hitler, based in Djugu territory; the Force armée d’intégration iturienne, commanded by Col. Semire; and the Force armée de la révolution, commanded by Col. Kabu.
82. FRPI claims to represent the Ngiti (Lendu) community in Walendu Bindi, but enjoys only limited local support. Six local leaders and residents of Walendu Bindi told the Group that FRPI harassed and collected taxes from local populations. For example, each household is required to pay 500 Congolese francs ($0.55), plus a full basin of food, on a monthly or, sometimes, weekly basis. FRPI also sustains itself with funds from artisanal gold mining in Bavi (see S/2012/843, para. 84). Since the beginning of 2013, FRPI militias have looted several thousand head of cattle from ranchers within and around their area of control. Walendu Bindi leaders have publicly opposed the cattle thefts. Four local leaders and residents of Walendu Bindi and Bahema Sud chefferies told the Group that Hema and Bira leaders in areas around FRPI territory were creating self-defence groups to protect cattle herds and local communities.

3. Kata Katanga

83. Kata Katanga (a Swahili phrase meaning “cut off Katanga”) is a loosely structured armed group that brings together individuals and groups advocating the secession of Katanga Province from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The most significant armed group leader is Kyungu Mutanga, or Gédéon, who operates in the areas of Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto. He is allied with the armed wing of Coordination pour le référendum et l’autodétermination du Katanga (CORAK) (see S/2011/738, paras. 272-277), which calls itself CORAK Kata Katanga, or simply Kata Katanga.

84. Four senior Kata Katanga leaders told the Group that Kata Katanga was not a Mai Mai organization, but rather a group consisting of “Katanga Tiger” soldiers who had fought against the Mobutu regime in the 1970s and against the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire in 1998. It also includes younger followers. Eight Kata Katanga members among those arrested in March 2013 and transferred to Kinshasa (see below) told the Group that the leader of CORAK was Ferdinand Ntanda Imena, who lived in exile. In a sign that the leadership of CORAK remains disputed, however, the four Kata Katanga leaders interviewed by the Group stated that Ntanda Imena directed only certain groups within Kata Katanga, while others operated semi-autonomously.

85. The Kata Katanga movement is linked to debates over the future political status of Katanga. While Kata Katanga represents the radical wing of a long-standing movement pushing for Katanga to become an independent State, other political interests favour decentralization (dividing Katanga into four provinces) or federalism (leaving Katanga intact as a province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo but giving it greater autonomy). Politicians in southern Katanga, where most of its vast mineral wealth is concentrated, generally support decentralization, but politicians in northern Katanga, which is poor by comparison, generally oppose such a move and favour Katanga remaining intact as a province or an independent country. Although the secession sentiment is strongest among older Katangans who were part of provincial independence movements in the 1960s and 1970s, Kata Katanga has recently attracted many disaffected young people into its ranks.

86. Kata Katanga states that its principal objective is to fight for the independence of Katanga. Its leaders told the Group that they had troops in Kamina, Manono, Mitwaba, Kalemie, Pweto and Bendera, as well as in Lubumbashi. The group claims to be recruiting new members and providing them with military training. The group also claims to have links with Katangan political leaders at the national, provincial
and local levels; sympathizers within the Congolese army and the Congolese National Police; and the support of the Katangan diaspora in Europe and North America.

87. In late 2012 and early in 2013, armed activities in Katanga resulted in serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law. The perpetrators of the violations are both armed groups, some of which are aligned with Kata Katanga, and the Congolese army, which has been conducting operations against Kata Katanga (see annex 48). Violence in Katanga has been characterized by massacres, summary executions, ethnically targeted attacks and burning of people, homes and property. The violence has led to an increase in internally displaced persons, who numbered approximately 365,000 as at June 2013. Most of the displacements are in the area between Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto, with the last-mentioned recording the highest number of internally displaced persons (159,000). In total, 10 of the 22 territories of the province are affected.

88. On 23 March 2013, a group of 336 Kata Katanga members entered Lubumbashi. During their march to the MONUSCO headquarters in the town, where they planned to make a plea for independence, Congolese soldiers (Republican Guard and Congolese armed forces) and police shot at the lightly armed group, killing or injuring scores. When the group entered the MONUSCO headquarters, the Republican Guard fired dozens of shots at the MONUSCO base, damaging the premises (see para. 139 and annex 67).

89. Following the incident, the Congolese army embarked on operations against armed groups in Katanga. There were numerous clashes between the army and Kata Katanga in April and May 2013, but Kata Katanga has also battled newly formed self-defence groups in central and northern Katanga. These groups are fighting Kata Katanga in order to control mining sites, such as the gold mine at Ntoya, and to protect communities that oppose the objectives of Kata Katanga.

III. Foreign armed groups

A. Allied Democratic Forces

90. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are an Islamist rebel group led by Ugandan fighters and operating north-west of the Rwenzori mountains in North Kivu. The current strength of ADF is estimated to range between 800 and 1,200 soldiers.13 ADF is a tightly controlled organization, with close to no combatants who surrender, and there are persistent reports that it has sought to increase its numbers through recruitment and kidnappings early in 2013.

91. Since 2011, Jamil Mukulu, the sanctioned leader of ADF who previously undertook extensive travel, has been primarily based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to Ugandan intelligence sources, an ADF collaborator and a former ADF soldier. The same sources informed the Group that Mukulu’s headquarters was currently located north-east of Eringeti at a camp called Madinat Tawheed Muwaheedina. ADF maintains two other camps, Canada and Commander Ibrahim Battle Group. MONUSCO and Ugandan intelligence sources reported that ADF had recently opened new camps east of Eringeti.

13 The Group is investigating claims that ADF has greater numbers of combatants.
92. According to a former ADF soldier, an ADF collaborator and the Ugandan authorities, ADF maintains regional networks for recruitment in Uganda and Burundi. As at June 2013, the Ugandan authorities had arrested several people for recruiting adults and children for ADF on Ugandan territory. Two former ADF soldiers and United Nations sources stated that ADF was engaged in voluntary recruitment in Uganda, but had also deceived potential recruits with promises of employment or education. It primarily recruited in eastern Uganda and transported recruits into the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the border village of Bwera. The Ugandan authorities also reported that, in 2012, ADF elements in Uganda had killed five former ADF collaborators; two former ADF collaborators confirmed that to the Group. The Ugandan authorities arrested the individuals suspected of the killings.

93. According to the Congolese army and former ADF elements, ADF also recruited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013 and carried out a series of abductions of Congolese nationals in Eringeti and Oicha for recruitment purposes. The Congolese authorities estimate that ADF has abducted some 80 civilians since the beginning of 2013, including women and children (see annex 41).

94. A former ADF soldier and Ugandan intelligence sources told the Group that Mukulu required all women and children present in ADF camps, both dependants of ADF soldiers and recruits, to receive military training. The same sources stated that compulsory military training began for boys at the age of 10 years and for girls at the age of 15 years. The Group obtained video material of training sessions of children and women carried out in ADF camps in 2012.

95. A former ADF soldier and Ugandan intelligence sources estimate that the ADF arsenal consists of mortars, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Former ADF soldiers told the Group that, when foreign trainers had previously visited ADF, they would provide instruction in how to assemble improvised explosive devices.

96. Two former ADF soldiers and Ugandan intelligence sources reported that ADF received money transfers from London, Kenya and Uganda that were collected by Congolese intermediaries in Beni and Butembo. According to the same sources, ADF commander Benjamin Kisokeranyo is in charge of intelligence, finances and supplies within ADF (see annex 49). Two former ADF soldiers and the Ugandan authorities stated that ADF also derived funding from its network of car and motorcycle taxis operating in and between Butembo, Beni and Oicha. ADF also derived profits from gold and timber exports to Uganda. Ugandan and Burundian intelligence sources told the Group that ADF continued to collaborate with Al-Shabaab in 2013 (see S/2012/843, para. 105). The Group is further investigating financial support to ADF and potential links with Al-Shabaab.

B. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

97. FDLR continued to grow weaker in the first half of 2013. FDLR currently has some 1,500 soldiers, most deployed in North Kivu and the remainder in South Kivu. The decrease in the strength of FDLR is mostly due to a high surrender rate.

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14 The Group based its estimates on MONUSCO disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement figures and on interviews with current and former FDLR soldiers. In a communication to the Group, however, the Government of Rwanda estimated the current FDLR strength to be 5,000 troops.
In 2012, the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section repatriated 1,441 foreign FDLR combatants and demobilized 398 Congolese FDLR combatants. The rate of FDLR surrenders has, however, declined since the beginning of 2013. As at 14 June 2013, only 309 FDLR combatants had surrendered to the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section.

98. In 2012, Raia Mutomboki attacks against FDLR forced the latter to redeploy towards the east of North Kivu and the south of South Kivu. Consequently, there is a gap of 400 km between the northern and southern FDLR sectors and hardly any movement of troops between the two (see annex 50). As a consequence of the Raia Mutomboki threat, the FDLR military commander, Maj. Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura, shifted his headquarters northward to the Ngango area, in Walikale, North Kivu (see annex 51).

99. FDLR suffers from internal divisions and a weak hierarchy that lacks the capability to command and control the organization’s entire operations. The movement’s leadership is divided between hardliners such as Mudacumura who want to continue the armed struggle and moderates belonging to younger generations who favour demobilization and reintegration. The FDLR command has been further weakened by the arrest in the United Republic of Tanzania early in 2013 of the FDLR deputy commander and sanctioned individual, General Stanislas N'zeiymana, alias “Izabayo Bigaruka”, who had travelled on a clandestine mission in violation of the travel ban. FDLR officers and intelligence sources from the region confirmed the arrest and told the Group that Rwandan officials were currently detaining Bigaruka. In a letter to the Group, however, the Government of Rwanda denied having arrested or detained Bigaruka.

100. The Group has found no evidence that FDLR receives significant financial or other support from abroad. The Group has investigated a diaspora network led by Bernard Twagiramungu, Felicien Barabwiriza and Jean Bosco Uwihanganye, who have been residing in Germany. In December 2012, the German authorities arrested those individuals and charged them with belonging to a terrorist organization. The Group continues to investigate FDLR support networks that may be maintained in Europe.

1. Attacks in Rwanda

101. Since M23 took control of the area along the border with Rwanda in Rutshuru territory, FDLR has concentrated its troops adjacent to M23-controlled areas. It carried out three attacks on Rwandan soil in late 2012 and in mid-2013. FDLR officers told the Group that the objective of the attacks was to show that FDLR was not a dying force. The same sources stated that the incursions into Rwanda had boosted the morale of FDLR troops and encouraged their leaders to plan other attacks.

102. On 27 November 2012, taking advantage of the movement of M23 towards Goma, which left its western flank exposed, some 160 FDLR soldiers crossed into Rwandan territory through Gasizi. According to FDLR officers, a pathfinder unit operating from Nyamulagira crossed into Rwanda ahead of the attack. FDLR targeted Rwandan army positions at Kabuhanga and Muti, in Rubavu district (see

15 In 2012, the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section also repatriated 1,587 FDLR dependants.
On 2 December, some 80 FDLR soldiers infiltrated Rwanda near Mount Visoke and attacked the Rwandan army position near Kinigi, killing a park ranger (see annex 53).

103. The FDLR spokesperson, La Forge Fils Bayeze, publicly claimed FDLR responsibility for the attacks. FDLR cadres and surrendered soldiers reported that the deputy commander of the FDLR North Kivu sector, Col. Stanislas Gakwerere, alias “Stany”, had coordinated the incursions, acting under sector commander Col. Pacifique Ntavunguka, alias “Omega” and, ultimately, on the orders of Mudacumura.

104. Rwandan officials told the Group that the Rwandan army had killed 30 FDLR soldiers and captured another during the attacks of November and December. Rwandan army officers had recovered weapons used by FDLR during the incursion, in addition to telephones, SIM cards, identity cards and FDLR documents (see annex 54). They had also discovered a hand-drawn map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda border area and a list of radio signs in the belongings of the dead FDLR soldiers (see annex 55).

105. According to FDLR and M23 commanders, on 24 May 2013, when most of the M23 troops were engaged in a failed offensive near Goma, FDLR again infiltrated Rwanda through Gasizi to launch another attack.

2. Cooperation between the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda and the Congolese army

106. Faced with the rapidly evolving M23 rebellion in 2012, the Congolese army first abided by a tacit non-aggression agreement with FDLR. The deteriorating security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, culminating with the fall of Goma on 20 November 2012, however, enhanced the collaboration between some Congolese army units and FDLR in areas of close proximity to M23-controlled territory. The Group has documented local-level collaboration between the Congolese army and FDLR and continues to investigate the extent to which the Congolese army hierarchy may be involved in such collaboration. The Group wrote on 12 June 2013 to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seek clarification about this support and is awaiting a reply.

107. The Group interviewed 10 Congolese army soldiers in Tongo, North Kivu, who reported that the army and FDLR regularly met and exchanged operational information and stated that Congolese army soldiers supplied ammunition to FDLR. Col. Faida Fidel Kamulete, the commander of the second battalion of the 601st regiment of the Congolese army, based at Tongo, denied such collaboration, but declared to the Group that the Congolese army and FDLR did not fight each other. FDLR officers and an FDLR collaborator told the Group that “Colonel” Jean-Baptiste Gakwerere, alias “Esdras Kaleb”, who commanded FDLR forces deployed in Tongo, was in charge of coordination between FDLR and Congolese army officers in the area.

108. Four former FDLR soldiers from Tongo and Bambo confirmed to the Group that Congolese army soldiers had transferred ammunition to FDLR with the instruction that it had to be used against M23. In January 2013, two former FDLR soldiers separately witnessed meetings between the Congolese army and FDLR in the Tongo area, at which operational information was exchanged. One told the Group that he had seen the Congolese army transfer ammunition to FDLR during
one of the meetings, while the other saw a Congolese army officer give boxes of submachine gun ammunition to the rebels. From January to April 2013, a former FDLR soldier witnessed four distinct ammunition transfers by the Congolese army based at Bambo to FDLR, while in February, another former FDLR soldier saw the Congolese army hand over ammunition to FDLR, also at Bambo.

109. A Congolese army officer and local leaders from Muja, 10 km north-west of Goma, also reported to the Group a pattern of collaboration between the Congolese army and FDLR. The Congolese army has established positions at Muja and Rusayo to defend Goma against M23. According to FDLR commanders, the FDLR North Kivu sector pathfinder unit under “Maj.” Alexis, usually based at the Nyamulagira volcano in the Virunga National Park, carries out regular operations in that area. The Group interviewed two former FDLR soldiers who surrendered from Muja. Both were aware of ammunition transfers from Congolese army commanders and one claimed to have witnessed Congolese army soldiers supply boxes of submachine gun ammunition to FDLR.

C. Forces nationales de libération

110. The Forces nationales de libération (FNL) operate in South Kivu and consist mainly of Burundian combatants whose stated aim is to overthrow the Government of Burundi. In 2013, FNL remains divided and weakened (see S/2012/843, paras. 112-113). On 14 January 2013, FNL announced in a press release the dismissal of its president, Agathon Rwasa, and his replacement by Isidore Nibizi, with “General” Aloys Nzamapema as the military commander-in-chief. Since then, FNL has sought to build up its strength in South Kivu to carry out attacks in Burundi.

111. FNL has two main military factions. “General” Nzamapema, who split from “General” Antoine “Shuti” Baranyanka in 2012, leads the strongest faction. Former FNL combatants and Congolese army officers stated that Nzamapema’s headquarters continued to be located in Mushule, with bases in Magunda and Ruhuha, in the Uvira plateaux, Uvira territory. While in 2012 Mai Mai Mayele hosted Shuti and his troops in Lusambo, Fizi territory, they have since left the group (see ibid., para. 112).

112. FNL conducted raids in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi to forcibly recruit young people and obtain food supplies. In February 2013, FNL troops raided cattle in Buringa, Burundi. Former FNL soldiers and Burundian intelligence sources told the Group that the FNL head of operations, Innocent Ngendakuriyo, alias “Nzarabu”, had led the raid. Nzarabu was convicted of the 2011 Gatumba massacre, west of Bujumbura, but escaped from prison in late 2012. In mid-May 2013, FNL carried out another raid in Buringa.

113. The Congolese and Burundian armies continued to attack FNL on both sides of the border. According to Congolese army intelligence sources and Burundian civil society members, “Colonel” Negamiye, Nzamapema’s deputy, was killed during Congolese army operations following FNL attacks in late October 2012 in villages near Magunda, in the Uvira plateaux, in which FNL soldiers looted goods, burned hundreds of houses and killed at least six people.
114. According to an FDLR combatant and Burundian intelligence sources, FNL and FDLR troops conduct joint operations in South Kivu. At the end of January 2013, they fought together against a local armed group in Masango, burning houses and schools during the raid. FDLR also provided training in heavy weapons to FNL at the Namaramara base near Itombwe.

D. Front du peuple murundi/alliance divine pour la nation

115. In 2012, the Group reported that the Front du peuple murundi/alliance divine pour la nation (FPM/ADN), a group of 40 Burundian Tutsi soldiers, had joined with the Mouvement congolais pour le changement, an M23 ally in South Kivu led by “Colonel” Bede Rusagara (see ibid., paras. 70-76). In March 2013, the commander-in-chief of FPM/ADN, “Colonel” Jean-Claude Mutoni, alias “Kasongo”, was killed during fighting between FPM/ADN and a Congolese armed group under the orders of Col. Richard Tawimbi (see S/2011/738, paras. 285 and 656), according to the Congolese army, Burundian intelligence sources and armed group members. In June 2013, the president of FPM/ADN, Guillaume George Majambere, who currently resides in Belgium (see S/2012/843, para. 114), confirmed to the Group that he had become the leader of an alliance called Intore. This group is a coalition of several armed groups and political parties, formed with the objective of challenging the party in power in Burundi.

116. In October 2012, Rusagara told the Group that the Mouvement congolais pour le changement had been responsible for the death on 4 October of a Burundian military intelligence officer on mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The spokesperson of FPM/ADN, Major Fidèle Nzambiyakira, an ex-member of the Burundian army dismissed in October 2010, also claimed responsibility for the death in a press statement (see annex 56).

117. FPM/ADN aims at organizing sabotage actions in Burundi and is training troops accordingly. In November 2012, FPM/ADN posted pictures of combatants undertaking training in the Uvira plateaux of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on its website (see annex 57). On 22 October 2012, after between 25 and 30 FPM/ADN soldiers launched an attack in the Cibitoke area of Burundi, the Burundian army conducted operations against the group for several days. The Burundian intelligence services told the Group that several FPM/ADN soldiers had been killed or injured. The Burundian army said that it had captured two combatants and seized several weapons (see annex 58). Burundian intelligence sources later told the Group that the FPM/ADN objective had been to establish a base in the Nyungwe forest in Rwanda, on the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, given that Congolese and Burundian army operations were impeding its movements in the Ruzizi plain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its usual route into Burundi.
IV. Integration challenges facing armed groups: example of the failed integration of the Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain in Kitchanga

118. Overstretched by the rapidly expanding M23 crisis, in mid-2012 the Congolese army launched an accelerated integration programme of armed groups opposed to M23. In its final report of 2012, the Group reported on the integration of Nyatura (see S/2012/843, paras. 120-125). In 2013, integration exercises continued, with mixed results.

119. On 9 January 2013, as part of an attempt to integrate the Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), a predominantly Hunde armed group led by Gen. Janvier Buingo, the commander of the Congolese army eighth military region, Gen. Bauma, ordered 300 APCLS soldiers under “Colonel” Musa Jumapili to be integrated in situ into the Congolese army at Kitchanga, North Kivu. While the 812th regiment of the Congolese army, commanded by Col. Mudahunga, was then based at Kitchanga, Congolese army commanders had not taken steps to coordinate the integration of APCLS into that local unit.

120. The integration was hindered by Mudahunga’s collaboration with Ntaganda’s M23. An M23 collaborator, a former M23 soldier and an APCLS officer reported that Ntaganda’s allies in Kitchanga worked clandestinely with Mudahunga and his deputy, Lt. Col. Alexis Muhire, to recruit for M23 and establish a rear base for the movement at Kitchanga. M23 cadres and a Congolese army soldier told the Group that Mudahunga also protected land owned by M23 commanders in that area. Former M23 soldiers and armed groups operating in the Virunga National Park told the Group that Ntaganda had regularly sent patrols to Kitchanga.

121. According to the authorities in Kitchanga, after integrating into the Congolese army, APCLS patrolled the town and arrested individuals with suspected links to M23. According to a Congolese army officer, Mudahunga wished to prevent APCLS from controlling Kitchanga and interfering with M23 recruitment. Mudahunga told APCLS to disarm, but APCLS refused. Gradually, the tensions between the Congolese army and APCLS acquired an ethnic character, as the Congolese army accused the ethnic Hunde residents of Kitchanga of supporting APCLS.

122. A former M23 officer and two Congolese army officers operating under Mudahunga’s orders told the Group that, on 24 February 2013, both Mudahunga and Muhire had distributed arms to Rwandophone young people and cattle herders in Kitchanga and in the nearby Kahe camp for internally displaced persons and incited them to attack ethnic Hundes. One of the officers saw Muhire distribute weapons in his compound at Kitchanga, while another saw Mudahunga distribute AK-47 rifles to cattle herders. Mudahunga and Muhire told Rwandophone populations that they needed their help to combat the Hunde. According to Congolese army soldiers, those who received the weapons fought alongside the Congolese army against APCLS.

123. The local authorities stated that tensions had risen following the execution by the Congolese army of an APCLS major on 26 February 2013. Former APCLS soldiers told the Group that APCLS had subsequently killed one of Mudahunga’s soldiers, following which APCLS had advanced towards the Congolese army position in Kitchanga and the camp for internally displaced persons at Kahe. Internally displaced persons from Kahe declared that APCLS soldiers had entered
the camp, saying that they wished to rid the area of Rwandophones, and burned 20 huts (see annex 59).

124. According to two Congolese army soldiers serving under Mudahunga, he ordered his soldiers to “kill everybody without distinction in Kitchanga” because he considered all the ethnic Hunde to be APCLS supporters. The Group obtained a recorded statement in which Mudahunga ordered his officers to “kill whoever they find in Kitchanga”. Congolese army soldiers fired mortar rounds into Kitchanga to prevent APCLS from advancing, but many mortar shells landed in civilian areas (see annex 60). The Group was able to examine recovered mortar shells when it visited the area (see annex 61). The local authorities told the Group that Congolese army soldiers had actively searched for ethnic Hunde chiefs to kill them. The Group spoke to a local chief who survived, having heard soldiers looking for him saying that “they do not want to see Hundes in Kitchanga anymore”. The local authorities reported that another local chief had not managed to escape and had been killed (see para. 127).

125. After the events, the 812th regiment was redeployed from Kitchanga. On 25 March, Bauma announced that the integration of APCLS would not be completed.

V. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law

A. Killings

1. Congolese army and Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain in Kitchanga

126. Fighting in February and March 2013 in Kitchanga, North Kivu, between the 812th regiment of the Congolese army and APCLS left at least 90 people dead and more than 500 houses burned (see annex 62). According to Médecins Sans Frontières, more than 140 people were injured and hundreds of houses and pieces of key infrastructure destroyed, including part of the hospital (see para. 124 and annex 63). According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the fighting temporarily displaced some 100,000 people.

127. The Group visited Kitchanga and interviewed local authorities, survivors of the battle and APCLS and Congolese army soldiers. The Group’s investigation revealed that Col. Mudahunga of the Congolese army had issued orders to his soldiers to carry out attacks targeting civilians in Kitchanga, including shelling an area inhabited by civilians, causing considerable collateral damage (see para. 124).

128. The local authorities and the Congolese army told the Group that most of the victims had been Hundes and that most of the houses targeted had belonged to ethnic Hundes. The same sources stated that Congolese army soldiers under Mudahunga and young men armed by them had specifically targeted Hunde civilians and killed them. The same sources revealed that APCLS under Col. Musa had also committed targeted killings of Rwandophone civilians in the Kahe camp for internally displaced persons, where they had burned 20 huts (see para. 123).

16 The Group has filed the recording in the United Nations archives.
2. **Mouvement du 23 mars**

129. From 8 to 15 March 2013, during the M23 infighting between forces loyal to Ntaganda and forces loyal to Makenga, Ntaganda ordered the execution of his own combatants who had attempted to desert in Kibumba. Former M23 soldiers witnessed Ntaganda ordering the execution of at least 20 of his combatants, who were either shot or stabbed to death. Two former fighters loyal to Ntaganda saw the bodies of some 20 fellow combatants. Another former M23 soldier witnessed Ntaganda order the execution of a group of eight soldiers. Two additional former M23 soldiers witnessed the execution of six soldiers within their unit.

130. The Group also documented a pattern of execution of war wounded on the orders of Ntaganda and Ngaruye. According to current and former M23 officers who participated in combat alongside Ntaganda during the M23 scission, Ntaganda and Ngaruye ordered the execution of wounded soldiers. Former M23 soldiers witnessed Ntaganda personally shoot war wounded with his pistol.

131. On 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122-mm rounds fired from the M23 position landed on Ndosho and in the Mugunga camp for internally displaced persons (see box on the Mutaho operation). The rounds killed two civilians and injured nine. Current and former M23 officers interviewed by the Group declared that that had been the result of a calculation error by M23.

B. **Sexual violence**

1. **Congolese army**

132. From 20 to 30 November 2012, Congolese army soldiers committed mass rapes in Minova, South Kivu, and the surrounding villages of Bwisha, Buganga, Mubimbi, Kishinji, Katolo, Ruchunda and Kalungu. A joint investigation by MONUSCO and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented at least 135 cases of rape, including of minors, and other acts of sexual violence perpetrated systematically and with extreme violence by Congolese army soldiers. To date, the Government’s investigation is continuing. Twelve unit commanders have been suspended and two soldiers arrested in relation to the investigations. According to a Congolese army intelligence officer and a local non-governmental organization, the commanders of the units in the area lost control over their units as they retreated from North Kivu. Given the large number of soldiers present at the time in the area, it is a challenge to identify which soldiers, and which units, were responsible for the rapes. The Group obtained a list of the commanders who were suspended following the attack. Most of them belong to the eighth military region (North Kivu).

2. **Mai Mai Morgan**

133. Morgan’s group has been responsible for rape, sexual slavery and sexual mutilation. The Group mentioned previously that, from 1 to 5 November 2012 alone, Morgan’s group raped or sexually mutilated more than 150 women (see para. 76). During its visit of March 2013 to Ituri, the Group interviewed separately 20 former Morgan combatants and escaped or liberated abductees, including seven women who told the Group that they had been forced to become the “wives” of various militia members.
134. In late 2012, Morgan abducted other women during attacks on villages and gold mines. Former abductees told the Group that Morgan’s soldiers would beat the women whom they held captive, a statement corroborated by images obtained by the Group.

135. Former abductees and United Nations sources reported that Morgan had between 50 and 60 female abductees with him in January 2013 when he attacked Mambasa town (see para. 73). Some of those women managed to escape.


136. Since the beginning of the Group’s mandate, there have been numerous attacks on MONUSCO peacekeepers and staff, in violation of the sanctions regime, and on humanitarian workers. In one case, unknown gunmen killed a Pakistani peacekeeper on 7 May 2013 near Bukavu, South Kivu. Below are examples of other, large-scale attacks.

137. **Kisangani.** On 20 November 2012, demonstrators in Kisangani, Orientale Province, who were protesting against the capture by M23 of Goma attacked two MONUSCO facilities. The headquarters suffered only minor damage, but protesters caused more extensive damage at the logistics base, including the destruction of four vehicles and the main gate (see annex 64).

138. **Bunia.** On 20 and 21 November 2012 in Bunia (Ituri district, Orientale Province), the national police and the army organized the looting of more than three dozen facilities belonging to MONUSCO, various United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organizations, in addition to residences of United Nations and humanitarian staff (see annex 65). Eyewitnesses in Bunia and a report by the district of Ituri specifically identified the acting commander of the Congolese army forces in the Safisha operational zone (Ituri), Col. Willy Bonane Habarugira (see annex 66), as having organized and participated in the ransacking of the United Nations and humanitarian facilities. In addition, eyewitnesses told the Group that the then chief of the national police in Bunia, Colonel Juvénal Bideko (see annex 66), also organized looting of United Nations and humanitarian compounds. Following the attacks, the military authorities arrested 10 national police officers and three Congolese army personnel. The military tribunal in Bunia convicted five national police officers and a Congolese soldier of pillaging, but the Government has brought no charges against either Col. Bideko or Col. Bonane, their well-known roles in the pillaging notwithstanding.

139. **Lubumbashi.** On 23 March 2013, Republican Guard and Congolese army soldiers shot at the MONUSCO headquarters in Lubumbashi after a group of Kata Katanga members entered the compound (see para. 88 and annex 67). The attack caused minor damage to MONUSCO facilities and a national police post next to the compound’s back gate.

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17 In 2009, the Government of the United States rejected Col. Bonane for participation in a military training course run by the United States owing to his poor human rights record.
D. Child soldiers

140. The Group investigated cases of recruitment of children in Katanga, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu Provinces. The Group interviewed 23 former child soldiers between 8 and 17 years of age and 34 former combatants who witnessed the presence of children in their armed groups. The Group also received information from the MONUSCO Child Protection Section and other partners. On the basis of the data that it collected, and pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 2078 (2012), the Group notes that Col. Innocent Kaina of M23, a sanctioned individual, remains engaged in the recruitment of children.

1. Trends

141. The Group continues to collect data and analyse trends in relation to recruitment of children by armed groups. It has confirmed that, from January to May 2013, armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo recruited at least 200 children. The MONUSCO Child Protection Section documented that, during the first four months of 2013, armed groups recruited 183 children, including 36 girls. Of those children, most were recruited and served in North Kivu (82), with the rest split between the Provinces of South Kivu (28), Katanga (38) and Orientale (35). From January to April 2013, the Child Protection Section recorded 641 cases of children escaping from various armed groups, including 109 girls. Of the total, most children were originally from North Kivu (314), while others hailed from Katanga (79), Orientale (157), South Kivu (78), Rwanda (11), the Central African Republic (1) and the Sudan (1).

2. Mouvement du 23 mars

142. Desertions from M23 have been on the rise (see para. 11). While M23 denies recruiting children, the Child Protection Section identified 33 boys aged between 15 and 17 years who had deserted from M23 from January to April 2013 (see annex 68), including 11 recruited in Rwanda. In addition, the Group interviewed nine M23 deserters who confirmed that some children had escaped and returned directly to their families without surrendering to authorities, confirming that there are undocumented cases of child soldier desertions. According to these sources, this practice has been more common among deserters recruited in Rwanda, who seek to return home directly.

143. M23 continued to carry out forced recruitment within its area of operation in an effort to compensate for the desertions. Four former child soldiers told the Group how an unknown man had captured them while they were herding cows in Chanzu. The man had then handed them over to two anonymous men, who had delivered them to Col. Innocent Kaina at Rumangabo. The children had subsequently served Kaina as cooks.

144. The Group also interviewed seven adult former combatants who had been recruited in Rwanda. They stated that recruiters had promised them and some children “lucrative jobs in Congo”, but they had instead been delivered to M23. These sources also disclosed that they had been recruited in the Nkamira refugee camp in Rwanda and the villages of Mizingo, Bigogwe, Byumba and Nkuri. They added that, while training in Rumangabo, they had met other recruits from Kitotoma, Gitega, Musanze (Ruhengeri), Kichumbi, Rukomo and Gisenyi town in Rwanda. The Group also
interviewed nine M23 deserters and 24 civilians in Kiwanja, Kanyaruchinya, Rutshuru town and Bunagana, who also confirmed cases of forced recruitment of children in their communities.

3. **Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda**

145. According to 23 former FDLR combatants interviewed by the Group, FDLR has been attempting to recruit children among the Rwandan refugee population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and among Congolese Hutu populations, but with limited success. The Group interviewed 15 children who had escaped from FDLR and been forcibly recruited. A 16-year-old boy born to FDLR parents told the Group that he had automatically become a FDLR soldier at the age of 13 years.

4. **Kata Katanga**

146. MONUSCO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) separated 45 children from the group of 242 Kata Katanga members who sought refuge at the MONUSCO base following their protest march through Lubumbashi of 23 March 2013 (see para. 88 and annex 69). UNICEF separated an additional 30 children from the group upon its arrival at Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa. The Group is continuing to investigate reports that Kata Katanga and other armed groups in Katanga Province are recruiting children.

5. **Raia Mutomboki**

147. Raia Mutomboki remains the most geographically widespread armed group in the Kivus, with a high rate of recruitment and use of children (see S/2012/348, para. 181). The Group estimates that between 25 and 30 per cent of Raia Mutomboki combatants are children. In 2012, a local non-governmental organization in Walikale territory assisted 415 former Raia Mutomboki child soldiers (between 8 and 15 years of age) to reintegrate into their communities. As at May 2013, that organization was in the process of reintegrating an additional 310 children.

6. **Mai Mai Morgan**

148. During its investigation in Orientale Province, the Group interviewed five eyewitnesses who testified to the presence of at least 15 children serving with Mai Mai Morgan (see para. 78).

7. **Congolese army**

149. The Group is also investigating cases involving the illegal detention and use of children for military purposes by the Congolese army. According to Congolese army and MONUSCO sources, in addition to the local authorities in the Kisala area of Butembo territory, from February to April 2013, the 1032nd battalion of the Congolese army arrested four boys between 15 and 17 years of age on charges of belonging to the Nyatura rebel group. A major in the Congolese army subsequently enlisted three of them as cooks, while assigning the fourth to be a soldier in Mushaki with the 106th regiment, commanded by Col. Civiri.

150. In April, UNICEF separated 19 children from the 812th regiment of the Congolese army, located at Camp Bobozo in Kananga, Kasai Occidental Province.
The regiment had rotated from North Kivu to Kananga in March and forcefully recruited the children before its departure from North Kivu. Four soldiers from the regiment acknowledged to the Group that they had been aware of the presence of the minors (commonly referred to as *kadogo*) in their ranks. In April, UNICEF separated two minors (a girl and a boy) from the same regiment; both had been forcefully recruited.

**VI. Natural resources**

151. Pursuant to resolution 2078 (2012), the Group is investigating the involvement of armed groups and the Congolese army in the illegal exploitation of and illicit trade in natural resources, in addition to the impact of due diligence measures. The Group is focusing on minerals such as gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as on ivory, and is documenting, whenever possible, the commodity chains of these resources from local to international markets.

152. In its final report of 2012, the Group discussed how recorded exports of tin, tantalum and tungsten from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo had nearly ceased (see S/2012/843, paras. 159-181), apart from in north Katanga, where mineral tagging had been introduced in 2011. Partly as a consequence of the low production and prices of tin, tantalum and tungsten, most armed groups have shifted to exploiting gold, which is easier to smuggle, has a high value per volume and has almost no due diligence oversight.

153. Given that companies have proved reluctant to purchase untagged minerals from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, local traders continue buying untagged minerals at lower prices. These traders also deal in minerals coming from conflict zones and engage in smuggling across borders to neighbouring countries. One exporter explained to the Group that, “as long as nobody is buying from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there will be smuggling to neighbouring countries”. Smuggling not only undermines due diligence efforts aimed at stamping out conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but also jeopardizes traceability schemes within the country and its neighbours, given that it negatively affects the perception of exports from the entire region.

154. The Group notes, however, positive initiatives in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to monitor cases of conflict minerals and smuggling. For example, in North Kivu, a follow-up committee on mining activities monitors cases of smuggling and illegal imposition of taxes and maps out mines occupied by armed groups.

155. Some progress notwithstanding, significant obstacles remain. In particular, the Group notes the continuing tension between organizations or individuals committed to expanding due diligence, on the one hand, and individuals, notably in the armed forces, who continue to be involved in the sector through illegal taxation or smuggling, on the other. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must address the issue of Congolese army complicity, criminality and impunity if it wishes to convince the international community that it genuinely wants to legalize and formalize the minerals sector.

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A. Gold trade

156. In paragraph 15 of resolution 2078 (2012), the Security Council encouraged all States, in particular those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the Group’s due diligence guidelines, in particular in the gold sector. In 2013, artisanal gold production has remained significant in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, while due diligence efforts in the sector remain minimal.

157. In the main, gold continues to be smuggled along the routes identified in previous reports of the Group and by the same players (see S/2012/843). Traders, however, complained to the Group that the sharpest drop in gold prices in 30 years on the international market had negatively affected the trade. The presence of armed groups at some mines has also negatively affected the trade because miners and traders are facing growing insecurity at mine sites.

1. Without official trade, nearly no due diligence

158. Two gold traders, local officials and civil society representatives in Bunia stated that gold production in Ituri had not declined in recent years; in fact, it might have increased as the price of gold had increased dramatically after 2007. Nevertheless, gold traders and the authorities of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the Group that, in 2012, only 16.17 kg of gold had been legally exported from Ituri.

159. In North Kivu, the Government registered no gold comptoir (export house) during the first five months of 2013. No exports of gold were recorded during that period. AR Gold, an export house based in Goma (see S/2012/843, para. 185), exported 10.15 kg of gold from Lubero in November 2012 to its own branch in Dubai, but did not renew its export house licence in 2013 (see annex 70). Glory Minerals (see S/2008/773, para. 97, and S/2009/603, paras. 128-136, 156 and 307), the other gold export house operating in North Kivu in 2012, also failed to register in 2013.

160. In 2012, businesspeople exported only 39 kg of gold from South Kivu. According to official mining statistics, Mining Congo exported 27.7 kg of gold to Dubai from January to May 2013. The local authorities, miners and businesspeople informed the Group that production was in the order of several tons per year in South Kivu. Consequently, the Group continues to investigate the smuggling of gold from South Kivu.

2. Gold smuggling

161. The Group notes that nearly all gold smuggling continues to follow the same path from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through Kampala and Bujumbura and involves largely the same networks as those documented in previous reports of the Group (see S/2012/843, paras. 188-193).

162. According to two gold traders and the local authorities in Ituri, most gold from Ituri continues to be exported to Uganda, where it is purchased by Rajendra “Raju” Vaya of the sanctioned entity Machanga Ltd. (see ibid., para. 183), while a small amount (especially from Mambasa territory) goes to Butembo before being smuggled to Uganda. Notwithstanding numerous testimonies from gold dealers, local officials and civil society representatives in Ituri and North Kivu that virtually
all gold produced in these areas is exported to and traded in Kampala, the Government of Uganda told the Group that it had officially exported only 286 kg of gold in 2012 (see annex 71).

163. During its visit of April 2013 to Burundi, the Burundian mining authorities informed the Group that there was currently no traceability in the gold sector in Burundi. They also declared that, while trafficking of minerals across borders was occurring, they had made no seizures in 2013. They explained, however, that plans for traceability schemes, including for gold, were being considered. In March 2013, the President of Burundi imposed a two-month ban on mining activities with a view to formalizing the artisanal mining sector. The authorities confirmed to the Group that a new gold refinery in Cibitoke would refine all Burundian gold before exportation. The Group notes that 552.4 kg of gold was exported from Burundi from 1 January to 31 March 2013 (see annex 72).

3. Conflict gold

164. In its final report of 2012, the Group concluded that criminal networks within the Congolese army and armed groups profited from the production and trade of gold (see S/2012/843, paras. 185-187). The Group has documented that armed groups continued to be involved in the production and trade of gold during the first half of 2013.

165. The tenth military region of the Congolese army controls the Mukungwe gold mine in Walungu territory, South Kivu (see S/2011/738, paras. 528-532). At this site, Congolese soldiers collect illegal taxes from artisanal miners on a weekly basis. Miners who fail to pay are arrested and held in an underground prison until payment is made. The Group obtained a letter of October 2012 from the president of a local cooperative at Mukungwe, in which the local army intelligence officer was reminded that the weekly tax of 1,000 Congolese francs ($1.11) per miner needed to be split between the national intelligence agency, the police and the army (see annex 73). A former FDLR officer in charge of logistics told the Group that FDLR also collected taxes from miners working in Mukungwe and in Rukatu mine, Mwenga territory. FDLR accrues $2,000 per month from both mines.

166. According to a former FDLR officer and gold traders in Butembo, FDLR is involved in gold mining in Lubero territory, North Kivu. According to several former FDLR combatants, FDLR commanders are also drawing profits from gold mines in Walikale. In some instances, FDLR combatants search for gold themselves, while in other cases they tax gold miners, demanding their production one day per week.

167. In Walikale territory, local authorities told the Group that Raia Mutomboki elements were present at gold mines in Bakano, while Mai Mai Simba elements were at mines near the Osso River. Mai Mai Sheka is benefiting from taxes on almost 100 mining sites in Walikale, some of them previously controlled by Raia Mutomboki.

168. In Orientale Province, several miners told the Group that the modus operandi of Mai Mai Morgan was to attack gold mines, such as at Pangoy, Elota and Itembo, every three days to two weeks and rob miners of some of their gold (see paras. 77-78).
B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten trade

1. Production and trade trend

169. In 2013, the production and export of tin, tantalum and tungsten varied greatly by province. In Maniema, the mining authorities recorded a gradual increase in tin exports, but no tantalum or tungsten exports. In North Kivu, the mining authorities told the Group that, while there had been no official tin or tungsten exports, tantalum production and exports had significantly increased. In South Kivu, only exports of tin were recorded.

170. Several factors explain the differences in exports of tin, tantalum and tungsten. First, as a consequence of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010, many companies simply ceased purchasing minerals from the Great Lakes region. Second, from 1 April 2011, smelters and refineries seeking conflict-free smelter status from the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition began to process minerals tagged exclusively by the International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply Chain Initiative. That scheme has superseded other approaches to carrying out due diligence. The prospect of legal sale for untagged minerals is therefore limited. Only a handful of companies on the international market are willing to purchase untagged Congolese minerals, which explains the low level of exports from some provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Third, progress in expanding traceability schemes such as the Tin Supply Chain Initiative remains slow in the Kivus, partly owing to the volatile security situation there.

171. The Governor of Maniema Province, Tutu Salumu Pascal, has taken actions that have had a positive effect on the legal trade in tin and increased provincial revenues. On 26 February 2013, in a bid to combat trafficking, he reinforced the oral order of the Minister of Mines banning the export of minerals from Maniema to the Kivus by air by signing an official letter to that effect. That encouraged the legal export of minerals to Kindu, the capital of Maniema, from where exporters can legally ship tin ore by train to Kalemie (Katanga Province) and on to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

172. Following the ban, the provincial government recorded an increase in revenues from legally traded minerals, partly owing to this measure and to the launch of tagging of tin ore in the province. Production for the period from January to May 2013 increased to 576 tons, exported to China (including Hong Kong) and Panama. In the absence of tagging, no other mineral was exported from Maniema.

173. In North Kivu, production and exportation differed by the type of mineral. Owing to the ban on air transport of minerals from Maniema through the Kivus, and the absence of tagging and validation at the main tin mine of Bisie, no tin ore was exported from January to April 2013. In the same period in 2012, companies exported 485 tons of tin ore. Production in the province continued in 2013, however.

174. In late May 2013, the Group observed people bagging minerals when it visited the village of Njingala, near Bisie mine (see annex 74). It counted 12 bags, each weighing 50 kg (i.e. 600 kg of tin ore). While most production at Bisie is consigned and stored, some of the current production is being smuggled (see below). North Kivu exporters told the Group that they were anxious for a prompt validation of Bisie and other mines so that they could relaunch the tin trade. Regarding
production and export of tantalum, the mining authorities recorded an increase in 2013. From January to April, companies exported 47.4 tons of tantalum ore from North Kivu to the China-based companies Tolead Group and Guilin Jinli New Chemical Materials. In the same period in 2012, exports totalled 21.2 tons.

175. South Kivu is home to the only validated mine in the Kivus where tagging is occurring. For the first three months of 2013, exports from South Kivu amounted to 190 tons of tin ore; tagged minerals represent most of those exports. Other validated and non-validated mines in South Kivu do not have tagging. While production continued in Walungu, Shabunda, Mwenga and Idjwi territories, among others, the province recorded no exports of tantalum and tungsten from January to March 2013. In 2013, the local price for tungsten continued to decline, falling from $9 per kg in July 2012 to $6.5 in May 2013 (see S/2012/843, para. 228). From February to May 2013, however, miners on Idjwi island in Lake Kivu produced 491 tons of tungsten, which was later purchased and stored by local traders. During its visit to Idjwi in late May, the Group received information regarding continuing smuggling from the island to nearby ports (see ibid., para. 163).

2. **Due diligence efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

(a) Integrating the due diligence requirements of the note circulaire into companies’ policies

176. On 3 March 2013, the Ministry of Mines reinstated the rights of Congo Minerals and Metals and Huaying, which had been prohibited from exporting in 2012 (see ibid., paras. 141-142). Those companies have since opened offices in Kindu and Bukavu. While Huaying continues to export untagged minerals extracted from non-validated mines in Maniema and South Kivu, Congo Minerals and Metals has signed a protocol agreement with regard to 11 validated tin mines in Maniema. The owners of both companies have pledged in writing to implement due diligence procedures (see annex 75).

177. Following the reopening of the processing companies, the Minister of Mines unsuccessfully called for a certification and validation mission for Bisie mine in Walikale territory, North Kivu, which would allow minerals to be purchased and exported (see annex 78). In the interim, in the absence of certification, the ministerial ban on sale of minerals from Bisie remains in place. The question of the mineral stocks from Bisie also persists. After the suspension in May 2012, the provincial mining authorities set up a commission to verify the stocks. In July 2012 and February and June 2013, the commission registered the number of bags of red tin ore and black tin ore held by each négociant (trader) in Mubi, Njingala and Makana to ensure that already stored minerals were not being sold, moved or smuggled (see annex 76). During the first registration, however, the commission did not record the number of bags, only the total weight, and did not number the bags (see annex 77). The Group was informed of the practice of replacing bags of tin ore with bags full of reject materials so that the tin ore can be sold and the stocks appear unchanged to inspectors.

178. On 22 May 2013, aware of this continuing problem of movement of bags and the confusion that it creates, the local authorities decided to stop any movement of bags from Bisie mine to the village of Njingala, where minerals are stored or transported to Goma. On 27 May, in a letter to the Minister of Mines, the Governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, requested authorization to release all the minerals
stored in the village of Mubi (see annex 78). No decision on this request had been made at the time of writing. The Group continues to monitor smuggling and due diligence efforts in North Kivu.

179. In South Kivu, mining authorities also noted the challenges in expanding and strengthening due diligence, given that most of the actors in the mining sector in the province are refusing to become involved in due diligence and traceability efforts. In April 2013, the Group met miners at the tin ore mine of Zola-Zola, near Nzibira in Walungu territory. The miners told the Group that the small-scale mining technical assistance and training service (SAESCAM) had raised their awareness of issues of conflict minerals and child labour at mining sites. They complained, however, that, as long as the mine was not validated and there was no tagging, they would have difficulties selling their minerals. To address some of their demands, the trading counter project is being restarted.19

(b) Progressive development of validation, tagging and certification

180. The cautious approach to expanding validation and tagging throughout the Kivus has resulted in impatience among the artisanal mining community, which is the sole producer of tin, tantalum and tungsten. In some areas, the Government has successfully demilitarized mining zones, notably in parts of South Kivu, thus creating a situation favourable to the validation of several mines in the province. In June 2013, a new validation programme was launched in South Kivu, with plans to expand it during the final quarter of 2013 to Maniema.

181. There are 11 validated (“green”) mines in North Kivu, including 8 tantalum ore mines, but no tagging process. In April 2013, Congo Minerals and Metals resumed exports of tantalum from North Kivu and sent 39 tons to Tolead Group Limited in Hong Kong, China. In April 2013, AMR Mugote also began exporting tantalum from the validated site at Bibatama to China.

182. Following the Government’s validation in July 2012 of six mines surrounding the Kalimbi mine site in Nyabibwe, South Kivu, tagging began in Nyabibwe in October 2012. In addition to tagging at the mine, a good step in itself towards traceability, only one processing company in Bukavu, World Mining Company, purchases these minerals, further simplifying the supply chain. Pact, the non-governmental organization in charge of the tagging, tags minerals from the T20 and Koweit mines at the Kalimbi mine site. World Mining Company purchases the minerals from two local cooperatives and then sells them to Traxys in Belgium (see S/2008/773, para. 88).

183. In April 2013, the Group visited the mining sites in Nyabibwe. Prices at the mines ranged from $3 per kilo for raw minerals to $5 per kilo for washed minerals. While the prices were lower than past prices, miners told the Group that the buyers preferred to buy in Kalimbi than at other mines in the area because of the demand for tagged and “well-traced” minerals on the international market.

184. In July 2012, the joint validation team headed by MONUSCO and the Maniema Ministry of Mines qualified 20 mining sites in Kailo and Punia territories as “conflict free”. The Minister of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

19 In 2011, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO launched a parallel and complementary system of traceability of minerals through the validation of mining areas and the creation of trading counters in the Kivus.
further validated those sites on 19 October (see annex 79). On 17 December 2012, the provincial government officially authorized tagging in Kailo and Kalima, two centres of tin production. Maniema Mining Company SPRL (a consortium led by the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and a member of the International Tin Research Institute) is currently the sole processing entity buying minerals from Kailo and Kalima. As at May 2013, it had 100 tons of tin ore in stock from 11 mining sites and was planning to export by the end of the month.

185. On 12 April, because minerals from 9 of the 20 validated mines were not receiving tags, the provincial Minister of Mines banned export houses from purchasing minerals from those sites (see annex 80). On 9 June, the Minister of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo visited Kindu and reiterated the ban, promising that the validation process for the remaining non-validated mines would begin soon.

c) Certification

186. The Group is also closely following the implementation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism, 20 which is intended to address the illicit trade of minerals at the regional level by “providing sustainable conflict-free mineral supply chains”, notably with the delivery of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates for satisfactory compliance with due diligence guidelines (see annex 81). Such a scheme could partly address smuggling issues because there are safeguards built in to the system, such as the regional tracking of mineral flows via the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region database, 21 regular independent third-party audits and the creation of an independent mineral chain auditor. Minerals from various mines could also be identified through the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources system of fingerprinting. 22 The Institute has a database in which the chemical fingerprints of minerals from various mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda are stored after analysis.

3. Continued smuggling

187. The Group has confirmed that smuggling of minerals continues within and from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Miners, traders, local residents and civil society representatives have told the Group that businesspeople smuggle minerals by cooperating with corrupt mining and military authorities. The Group has documented smuggling from Maniema Province to Bukavu (South Kivu) and Goma and from Bisie to Goma and Bukavu. The Group intends to continue investigating this matter, to investigate the networks that facilitate smuggling and to follow commodity chains through neighbouring countries to international markets.

188. The measures taken by various provincial authorities notwithstanding, the Group was informed during its visits to Maniema and Walikale Provinces at the end of May 2013 that smuggling of minerals from Maniema to North and South Kivu was continuing. Traders smuggle tantalum ore from Punia and Kasese to Bukavu in South Kivu. They give $2 to the local authorities at the airports in Kindu and

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21 See https://icglr.org/spip.php?article94.
Bukavu for every kilogram of tantalum ore that they export. They also smuggle minerals from Maniema by road to Goma via Walikale, or via Walikale through Hombo-Bunyakiri to Bukavu, all with the complicity of some military officers and the local mine agents.

189. At Bisie, where minerals cannot be purchased legally, traders from Goma and Bukavu are exploiting the situation and buying tin ore at a low price ($2 per kg). Smugglers work with some local civil and military authorities to move the minerals by road to Goma or Bukavu. They transport minerals at night in military vehicles to avoid the checkpoints in Njingala. They then move the minerals to civilian vehicles. The Group documented two incidents of illegal transport of minerals from Bisie in the course of the final two weeks of May. In addition, on 7 June 2013, police in Goma seized 1.3 tons of tin from Walikale (see annex 82). Various governmental authorities complained to the Group about smuggling by the Congolese army and its detrimental impact on the possible validation of Bisie.

190. During its field mission to Idjwi in May, the Group documented cases of smuggling of tungsten to Goma and Gisenyi, indicating that smuggling continues, as documented in the Group’s final report of 2012 (see S/2012/843, para. 163). According to local mining agents, miners and national intelligence agents, the smuggling is facilitated by local military and naval forces. During the night of 13/14 April 2013, a boat smuggling 3 tons of tungsten from Idjwi (Nord) towards Goma capsized on Lake Kivu.

4. Efforts to tackle smuggling in the region

191. **Seizures in Burundi.** During its official visit to Burundi in April 2013, Burundian customs agents showed the Group bags of minerals that they had seized in 2012 (see annex 83). They informed the Group that they had seized between 10 and 20 tons of tin ore from traffickers in 2012 at the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and at the port of Bujumbura.

192. **Seizures in Rwanda.** In a letter to the Group dated 7 June 2013, the Rwandan mining authorities told the Group that they had seized 8.4 tons of minerals in 2012 and were handing the minerals over to the Congolese authorities. They stated that they would be working with the Democratic Republic of the Congo “to devise together means of curbing this smuggling”. The authorities informed the Group that they had seized no minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo from January to May 2013.

193. **Seizures in Uganda.** On 14 May 2013, the Ugandan mining authorities told the Group that, in 2013, they had seized no illegal tin, tungsten or tantalum coming from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

5. **Conflict tin, tungsten and tantalum**

194. The Group has confirmed that armed groups are continuing to control mines and to illegally tax the trade in minerals. In particular, the Group documented the activities of Raia Mutomboki in South Kivu. Local authorities and non-governmental organizations informed the Group that various factions of Raia Mutomboki controlled several tin, tungsten and tantalum mines in Kalehe and Shabunda territories. The Group continues to investigate the involvement of Raia Mutomboki and other armed groups in the production and trade of tin, tungsten and tantalum.
195. During its visit of March 2013 to Shabunda, South Kivu, the Group confirmed that Raia Mutomboki controlled tin, tungsten and tantalum mines and strategic locations in the territory. In October 2012, Raia Mutomboki troops attacked the Congolese army base in Lulingu. Although the rebels sustained heavy casualties, they took control of the airstrip, the usual exit route for minerals from Shabunda. The Governor of South Kivu responded by banning the use of the airstrip. Minerals from zones controlled by Raia Mutomboki that were formerly airlifted from Lulingu to Bukavu were thenceforth transported by porters and motorbikes to Shabunda for transportation by air to Bukavu.

196. In March 2013, the Group witnessed the loading of tin ore from Lulingu and other mines into aeroplanes at the Shabunda airstrip for transportation to Bukavu (see annex 84). Mines agents issue official documents without properly ascertaining the origin of the minerals. The Group also documented how Raia Mutomboki fought the Congolese army in November 2012 in order to stop its deployment in tantalum-rich and tin-rich mines in Kigulube. In addition, sources in the mining sector, the local administration and civil society in Kindu confirmed to the Group that Raia Mutomboki had stolen minerals during an attack in February 2013 on Kasese and had sold them to traders in Goma.

197. The Group was also informed that Raia Mutomboki was levying taxes on trading roads in Shabunda and Kalehe territories. The Group obtained notes from a Raia Mutomboki meeting in February 2013 listing four checkpoints in Shabunda where the armed group taxed all vehicles and goods, including minerals. The mining authorities separately informed the Group that Raia Mutomboki levied a tax of 0.5 kg of minerals per 50 kg bag at checkpoints on key trading roads in Shabunda. Near Hombo, Raia Mutomboki also taxes $5 per bag of tin ore carried on motorbikes from Walikale on the Walikale-Bukavu road. The Congolese army and other Congolese services are also levying illegal taxes on this road.

C. Ivory

198. The Group has confirmed that ivory poaching is occurring in many areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the Virunga, Maiko and Garamba national parks and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve. The Group observed ivory in North Kivu and Orientale Province that local craftspeople had made into scrimshaw or jewellery (see annex 85), but conservationists and Congolese authorities told the Group that most ivory was exported raw through neighbouring countries.

199. The Government of Uganda reported eight seizures of ivory from 1 January to 16 September 2012 (see annex 86), but no seizures from 17 September 2012 to 14 May 2013. The origin of the seized ivory is unclear, but former poachers, ex-combatants and local leaders in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have told the Group that Uganda is the most common transit country or destination for poached ivory from the north-east Democratic Republic of the Congo.

200. Ex-combatants and local leaders in the Grand Nord administrative region of North Kivu told the Group that ivory poached in Virunga National Park was traded in Butembo, Beni and Kasindi. A prominent purchaser of ivory is Muhindo Kasebere, a businessman from Butembo who lived in Kasindi, on the border with Uganda. The Congolese authorities arrested Kasebere in March 2013 for supporting militia groups allied to URDC (see para. 62), but, following his release two days
later, Kasebere fled to Uganda, where, according to former URDC combatants and the Congolese authorities, he is currently residing.

201. A former poacher and local authorities told the Group that, in exchange for ivory, Kasebere gave Hilaire’s militias arms, money or supplies, depending on the militia’s desires. He told the Group that Kasebere paid him $90 per kg for ivory. The same sources mentioned above stated that Kasebere obtained arms and ammunition from sources in Uganda and that he coordinated his smuggling with political and military officials in Kasese district, Uganda.

VII. Recommendations

202. The Group of Experts makes the recommendations set out below.

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

203. The Committee should renew its commitment to considering recommendations of the Group of Experts proposing the designation of specific individuals and entities for targeted sanctions.

Countries of the Great Lakes region

204. The 11 signatories to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region (see S/2013/131) should respect the obligations contained therein, in particular the commitment of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continuing and deepening security sector reform with regard to the army and the police.

205. The countries of the region should refrain from harbouring sanctioned individuals or providing protection of any kind to persons falling under the sanctions regime, in accordance with the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

206. The States members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries — Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda — should revive the extradition provisions of their tripartite convention.

207. The countries should promote regional integration through the development of mutually benefiting infrastructure and guide and monitor private initiatives in this regard in a transparent manner, with a view to safeguarding the interests of all parties.

208. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, acting with the support of international partners, should clarify the status of persons surrendering from M23 to the MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Section who declare that they are Rwandan nationals and address the problem of the repatriation of those ex-combatants to Rwanda.

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

209. The Government should expand validation missions to mining sites where such missions have not been conducted to date, including Nzibira and Bisie, as soon as the security situation allows.
210. The Military Prosecutor’s office should investigate and prosecute all military personnel involved in the trade of natural resources, in addition to individuals and entities supporting these criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces.

211. The Government should appoint a special envoy to be in charge of negotiations with specific rebel groups and to facilitate demobilization and possible integration into the Congolese army.

212. The Government should cease its in situ integration of armed groups into the Congolese army without proper vetting.

**Government of Rwanda**

213. The Government should submit to the Committee, providing a copy to the Group of Experts, a list of the remaining former M23 combatants who crossed into Rwanda in 2013.

214. The Government should investigate and prosecute individuals supporting M23 activities on its territory.

**Government of Uganda**

215. The Government should demonstrate a renewed commitment to restructuring its gold trade sector and combating gold smuggling and inform the Committee regarding progress achieved.
Annex 1

In response to the Group of Experts 2012 final report, the Ugandan Prime Minister’s office addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General regarding the Group’s findings, on 23 October 2012.

On 12 November 2012, the Government of Uganda also wrote a comprehensive response to the Group of Experts 2012 report, which will be archived at the United Nations.

23rd October, 2012

H. E. Ban Ki-Moon
United Nations Secretary General
NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GROUP OF EXPERTS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

The Government of the Republic of Uganda is totally disappointed at the manner in which the United Nations system has treated her contribution to conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace building in the region. The disappointment arises from the accusations levelled against Uganda in the latest report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC and the apparent endorsement of its findings and recommendations by the UNSC as expressed in the Presidential Statement adopted by the UNSC on 19th October 2012 on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the report, Uganda is accused of having provided support to M-23 in the form of direct troop reinforcement in DRC territory, weapon deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and facilitation of external relations. They also claim that units of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July, 2012 to take over the major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Forces armée de la RDC (FARDC) base of Rumangabo and that both Governments have also co-operated to support the creation of expansion of M23’s political branch and have consistently advocated on behalf of the rebels. That further, the sanctioned individuals continue to reside in or regularly travel to Uganda.
Prior to the Group of Experts' visit to Uganda they indicated that they would be in Uganda for one day and indicated areas where they needed relevant information and, indeed, Government officials provided them the response to the questions they raised.

The Experts arrived on 17th September 2012 and departed on 18th September 2012. They held a meeting with Government officials on 18th September 2012. At the end of the meeting they requested to meet with Chiefs of Intelligence but it was not possible to arrange a meeting at such short notice because the Chiefs were engaged with other scheduled duties. The Government of Uganda asked the team to extend their stay in order for them to hold the requested meeting but they were unable to do so.

The Government of Uganda is, therefore, surprised that issues which were neither notified to Uganda prior to the visit nor discussed in the meeting of 18th September 2012 are the subject of the report. Uganda categorically denies the allegations against her because they are totally false. For example, how could it be possible as is alleged in the report, that UPDF were inside DRC attacking the FARDC and at the same time a battalion of more than 600 FARDC soldiers ran into Uganda for safety on 7th July 2012? They were received, the wounded ones were treated and, later on all of them were transported and handed over to the DRC Government at an agreed location in the presence of UN officials. Logically, the FARDC soldiers would not have fled to Uganda if Uganda had been fighting them alongside M-23 at the border. Curiously the Group of Experts doesn’t even mention this significant event.

You recall that at the height of the conflict in Eastern DRC, you personally contacted H.E. Yoweri K. Museveni, the President of the Republic of Uganda and requested him to intervene and stop the fighting in Eastern DRC. About the same time, H.E. Joseph Kabila, President of DRC, contacted President Museveni and explicitly requested him to intervene and facilitate dialogue between M23 and DRC Government. In accordance with article 23(2) of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the
Great Lakes Region, President Museveni convened four Extra-Ordinary Summits of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the security situation in Eastern DRC, three of which were hosted in Kampala using Uganda’s own resources.

During the Summit of 8th September 2012, President Museveni was specifically mandated by the ICGLR Heads of State and Government, as the Chair, to facilitate dialogue between M23 and DRC Government and to coordinate regional efforts to find a durable solution to the security situation in Eastern DRC. This regional initiative was approved by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 19th September, 2012. At the last two of the Summits, the UN Secretary General was represented by the Special Representative Ambassador Abu Moussa as well as Special Representative for MONUSCO, Ambassador Roger Meece at which your messages of support were highly appreciated. On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 27th September 2012 in New York, you convened a High Level Mini-Summit on DRC and pledged full support to the regional efforts. The international community then also expressed strong support for ICGLR regional efforts. During the same period, Mr Herve Landsous, the Undersecretary for Peacekeeping operations visited Uganda and pledged UN total support to the regional efforts spearheaded by Uganda.

In this whole situation, two aspects are not acceptable:

1. The maligning of Uganda that it supports the M23 group and that our troops have secretly taken part in fighting the brother Congolese Army, including taking part, along with the Rwanda troops, in the capturing of the town of Rutshuru. Yet, all serious actors should know, from the past experiences, that we say what we mean and mean what we say. Which troops of Uganda took part in those operations? Where is the evidence? Is it acceptable that an organ of the UN should falsely and carelessly accuse a member of the UN in this way using either amateurs or malicious actors dressed up as “experts”? As already stated above, our recent involvement in the issues of DRC was at your express request and that of President
Kabila when you both, separately, rang President Museveni in July 2012, requesting him to intervene when the M23 rebels were threatening to attack Goma. It was after those requests, that President Museveni started looking for those rebels because we did not even know the individuals involved prior to the requests from you and President Kabila. It was not easy to convince M23 rebels to suspend operations. However, President Museveni was able to show them that political solutions are generally better than military solutions, where those political solutions are possible.

That is how the delegation of M23 was invited to come to Uganda on 29th July 2012. They were even not allowed through the official border entry points by the border officials who did not know about the peace efforts. They had to infiltrate through the bush because they know those areas and the peoples are the same. Since that time, Uganda has hosted three summits on the situation in Congo i.e. on the 7th to 8th August, 7th to 8th September and 7th to 8th October 2012, using our own money.

In the September 2012 Extra-ordinary Summit, Uganda was requested to use the mode of indirect talks between the DRC Government and the M23 rebels. This is because President Museveni threatened to expel the delegation of M23 if the DRC Government did not want to have dialogue with the group they had told Uganda to invite in the first place. Since that time, indirect dialogue has been going on between the DRC Government and the M23 rebels.

When the UN decided to send MONUC to DRC in 2000/01, Uganda offered Entebbe Airport free of charge for that operation – if only they (the UN) could restore peace to the brotherly people of DRC who share with us a common ancestry and heritage as do all the other neighbouring countries. Up to now the UN does not pay a single coin for using the facility at the Entebbe Airport. Unfortunately, the UN has not pacified Eastern DRC as we had hoped. Eastern DRC is still a permanent base for genocidal forces from Rwanda and terrorist groups from Uganda such as the so called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the so called Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF). Is falsely accusing Uganda the reward for these efforts? This we cannot accept. If these are “experts” as they are held to be, why did they not put their questions to competent people in Uganda to answer them? We demand to see that evidence of complicity in supporting the M23 which some people claim to have.

2. The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a Presidential Statement on 19th October 2012 which, among other things, stated as follows:

In paragraph 3:

"...The Security Council expresses its intention to apply targeted sanctions against the leadership of the M23 and those acting in violation of the sanctions regime and the arms embargo and calls on all Member States to submit, as a matter of urgency, listing proposals to the 1533 committee”.

In paragraph 11:

"... The Security Council expresses its full support to the United Nations Group of Experts of the 1533 committee and calls for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, and the Group of Experts, encourages further that all parties and all States ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control and reiterates its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members, and unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate..."

In view of this, what becomes of our mediation role for which we were, initially, requested by President Kabila and yourself? Why did the UNSC not seek the views of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) through its current Chairman, President Museveni? If these African Regional bodies are to be given a fait accompli by the UN, why should they exist? Where the UN works with the Region, we get good results e.g. the struggle for the independence of Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Namibia; the democratization of South Africa, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan; etc. Where the Region is ignored, failure is almost certain e.g. the American actions in Somalia; the endless Western involvement in the Congo from 1960 to date; the recent actions of the West in Libya, disregarding the proposals of the African Union (AU); etc.

The patriots of Uganda are Pan-Africans by conviction. We do not seek to curry favour with any extra-African actors. Whatever little contribution we have made – in Southern Africa, in Sudan, in Rwanda, in Burundi, in Congo, in Somalia or fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Central African Republic (CAR), etc., is out of Pan-African conviction, in the tradition of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Dr. Agostinho Neto and others.

Since, however, there are actors in the UN system who are not able to understand that there can be principled actors in Africa and who think that all actors are looking for gold and other minerals like the imperialists who invaded Africa were doing, we have now decided, after due consultations with our African brothers in the AU and ICGLR, to completely withdraw from these Regional peace efforts i.e. in DRC, Somalia, etc.

There are only two factors that can persuade us to change this regrettable but unavoidable course of action on our part, given the malevolent and myopic actors in some of the international institutions:

- The UN must sort out the malignments against Uganda by bringing out the truth about Uganda’s role in the current Regional efforts.

- Our African brothers in the ICGLR, through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), a group of real military experts as opposed to the amateurs from New York masquerading as “experts”, should quickly pronounce themselves on these malignments against Uganda.

It is worth noting, though, that our work was progressing well. At the last ICGLR Summit, it was decided not to hold more Summits and President
Museveni was only waiting for the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of Defence on the way forward and had, indeed, started the process of raising funds for the 4,000 troops of the Neutral international Force (NIF). However, given these malignations against Uganda, a country that is now in the chair of ICGLR, another Summit may have to be convened to receive the Report of the Committee of the Ministers of Defence in respect of these malignations.

If our African bothers in the ICGLR stand with us, it will put the Region in the position it was in, in respect of Burundi, where the Region had to impose its own sanctions against the Tutsi faction, which the UN completely refused to endorse because some of the international parasitic forces were in cahoots with the faction, its crimes against the Barundi people ever since 1965 notwithstanding. In the end, the Region proved right and the UN, eventually, joined us. We had to reject endless lies by some Western actors who used to claim that Tanzania was backing the Hutu rebels and that the late Mwalimu Nyerere was pro-Hutu and anti-Tutsi. In order for Uganda to continue contributing to Regional efforts, we need understanding, respect and fairness from the UN or the Region itself or both. We cannot continue otherwise. Some friends say; "Ignore that Report. Continue contributing. We know that it is not true, etc". This is not good enough. What do we tell the people of Uganda? Why should we continue involving Uganda where the only reward we get is malignment? Why should the children of the Ugandans die and we get malignment as a reward? Why should we invite retaliation by the Al-shabaab terrorists by standing with the people of Somalia, only to get malignment by the UN system? Al-shabaab killed 76 Ugandans on the 11th July 2010 on account of our spearheading the Somalia operation.

Your Excellency, we would only want to remind the UN about the rights of the people of Uganda which are the reason we have been keenly spearheading the regional efforts to find a lasting solution to the insecurity in Eastern DRC. It is not in order for DRC, in partnership with MONUSCO, to maintain terrorists against Uganda by allowing ADF to freely use DRC territory to train, to receive arms and to launch assassination attacks on Ugandans. Recently, three Moslem Sheikhs were assassinated in Uganda- our suspicion is on ADF based in Eastern DRC. What is the UN going to do about this? Our view was to use dialogue to help Congo to
resolve the issue of the M23 which is a recent complication in the endless DRC situation and, then, using the Neutral International Force and MONUSCO, get rid of terrorists from the DRC territory. Some of the actors seem to have a different opinion. How long will the Congolese territory continue to be used as a base against neighbours?

In light of the above, withdrawing from Somalia, CAR, etc., becomes inevitable so that we keep watch on the DRC territory donated to the terrorists by the DRC Government and the United Nations.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Amama Mbabazi
PRIME MINISTER

Copy to: President of the Republic of Uganda
President of the United Nations Security Council
President of the UN General Assembly
Vice-President of the Republic of Uganda
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Holding the Portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Attorney General, Republic of Uganda
Minister of Defence, Republic of Uganda
Annex 2

Extract of DRC Government report on lootings of border offices committed by M23 during their occupation of Goma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTE</th>
<th>MONTANT EN USD</th>
<th>MONTANT EN CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PETITE BARRIERE</td>
<td>18.076 $</td>
<td>902,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANDE BARRIERE</td>
<td>14.267 $</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUICHET UNIQUE</td>
<td>7.996 $</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.339 $</strong></td>
<td><strong>902,000 CDF</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retrait des fonds par le M23 en USD et en CDF.

Les recettes du 23/11 au 01/12/2012

Pour la Direction du Nord-Kivu

Le Chef de Service Tresor

Province

KAMAISE KATANGA

Fondateur de Pouvoir

Le Chef de Direction

RATAMBIYE ISSA

Directeur
Annex 3

Deposit slip of 38,050 USD signed by Logo Kubu, Ntaganda’s associate, during M23’s occupation of Goma
Annex 4

Col. Baudouin Ngaruye standing, while M23 soldiers steal an Office des Routes truck in Goma (picture taken by a local source during M23 occupation of Goma)
Annex 5

Picture of the T55 tank stolen from the FARDC in Goma, which was subsequently used by Makenga’s M23 (picture taken by an international journalist during M23 occupation of Goma)
Annex 6

Extent of the weapons and ammunition looting by M23 during their occupation of Goma (pictures taken by the Group)

(A) A view of the containers before M23 looting

Aerial view of the 17 containers at the Goma Port, before M23 looted them during their occupation of Goma in November 2012.
13 containers at the Goma Port before M23 looting (See also S/2011/738, annex 156). The containers were loaded with light and heavy ammunition including 12.7 anti-aircraft ammunition, 75 mm cannon rounds, 122 mm cannon rounds and 120 mm cartridges.

(B) A current view of the containers (after the looting by M23 rebels)

A section of the now empty containers after the looting by M23 during their occupation of Goma in November/December 2012. They also carried away two of the 17 containers.
Annex 7  

Extract of DRC Government report on looting of Government offices by M23 during their occupation of Goma

**RAPPORT DE MISSION SUR LES BIENS PUBLICS PILLÉS DURANT L’OCCUPATION DE LA VILLE DE GOMA ET SES ENVIRONS PAR LE MOUVEMENT REBELLE M23**


1. Procéder à l’inventaire des biens publics pillés durant l’occupation de la Ville de Goma et de ses localités environnées par le M23 ;
2. Valoriser les biens publics pillés ;
3. Faire rapport.

La mission était composée des personnes suivantes :

a) Monsieur Dieudonné NGWASI , Conseiller du Ministre ;
b) Monsieur Remy RUBINGE , Chargé de mission du Ministère.

Arrivés à Goma le 26/12/2012, la mission s’est immédiatement rendu au Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province pour les civilités ou elle a été reçue tour à tour par le Ministre provincial de l’Instruction assumant l’intérim du Gouverneur de Province en mission, par le Ministre du Plan et Budget et par le Directeur de Province.

Il ressort des données recueillies auprès des autorités provinciales, des responsables des services publics et des vérifications sur terrain, le constat ci-après :

I. Biens pillés appartenant au Gouvernement provincial et ses services techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Cabinets du Gouvernement Provincial</th>
<th>Nature des biens pillés</th>
<th>Valeur (SUS)</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gouverneur de Province</td>
<td>Chambre automobile :</td>
<td>200.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 jeep VIP pour le Gouverneur de Province, 1 jeep routière, 1 jeep pour Cabinet, 1 jeep pour l’Ambulance, 1 jeep pour l’écoles d’Etat, 1 jeep pour la Protection civile et 1 jeep pour la Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Réhabilitation</td>
<td>71.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Restauration et équipement du Gouverneur de Province, Equipement de la Résidence du Vice-gouverneur, établissement du Gouvernement de Province, Office de la Bonne Gouvernance et Lutte contre la Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinateurs et Internet</td>
<td>55.915</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaux du Gouverneur de Province, Bureau du Vice-Gouverneur, Poste Informatique, Société du cabinet du Gouverneur de Province, Presse, Information, SIA, TIC, TVC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilier</td>
<td>4 750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conseiller du Gouverneur de Province et Protocole d’Etat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ministre provincial de l’Administration du Territoire, Code public, Affaires culturelles et Reconstruction</td>
<td>Véhicule officiel du Ministre, Meubles de bureau (bureau, 200 l), 1 ordinateur complet, 1 imprimante photo copiante, 3 chaises bureau et 3 chaises pliantes</td>
<td>48.495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ministre provincial du Plan, Budget, Communication et Médias</td>
<td>Véhicule officiel du Ministre, 1 kit complet, cartier du plateau, 1 ordinateur, 1 scanner et des fournitures de bureau (PPP 500 000)</td>
<td>37.115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ministre provincial de l’Education, Jeunesse, Gens et Enfant</td>
<td>Véhicule officiel du Ministre, 1 kit complet, cartier du plateau, 1 ordinateur, 1 imprimate, 2 chaises bureau, 2 chaises pliantes, 3 semaines et des fournitures de bureau</td>
<td>37.268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ministre provincial de l’Agriculture, Energie, Pêche et Développement Rural</td>
<td>Véhicule officiel du Ministre, 1 chaise inutile, 2 chaises pliantes formatées, 2 Ordinateurs (500 l), 1 imprimate, 2 cartouches, 1 table, bureau 5 chaises en plastique, fournitures bureau (papiers, stylos, agrafières, cartouches...).</td>
<td>37.161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

Les éléments du M23 ont assiégé et occupé la Ville de Goma du 20/11/2012 au 1/12/2012. Durant les onze jours d'occupation, le fonctionnement de l'Administration s'est arrêté, les activités économiques ont été paralysées, des cas de viols, d'assassinats ont été déplorés ; s'emparant ainsi la désolation et la terreur au sein de la population.

Les pillages ont été perpétrés dans les bureaux de l'Assemblée provinciale, au Gouvernorat, à l'Hôtel du Gouvernement provincial ainsi que dans certaines divisions provinciales, entreprises et autres services publics de l'État. Les biens des sociétés privées, des particuliers et des organisations non gouvernementales n'ont pas été épargnés dans la quasi-totalité des quartiers de la ville.

Le présent rapport s'est limité à faire l'inventaire des biens publics pillés pour se conformer à l'Ordre de mission et n'intègre donc pas les biens des personnes ou organisations privées. Il n'intègre pas non plus les biens des FARDC.

Néanmoins, il ressort de l'état des lieux fait par le Gouvernorat de Province du Nord Kivu que l'évaluation chiffrée des pillages effectués par le M23 donne la valeur approximative de 3.739.483$us. Cette évaluation n'intègre pas les matériels pillés de l'Office des Routes, les biens pillés de l'ONC, de la DGDA, de la CENI, de l'Assemblée provinciale, de la DGI, de l'ANIR, de la Police Nationale Congolaise, de la BCC et de la DGM. Le présent rapport donne néanmoins la liste des biens pillés appartenant à ces services sans les valoriser.

L'estimation des besoins prioritaires pour le redéploiement des activités au Gouvernement provincial s'élève à 923.543$us selon l'état de besoins repris en annexe du présent rapport.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 10/01/2013

Dieudonné NGWASI, Chef de mission

Remy RUZINGE, Membre
Annex 8

Trucks looted by M23 in Goma and stationed at Bunagana in April 2013 (picture taken by the Group in April 2013)
Annex 9

House occupied by Gen. Bosco Ntaganda between January and March 2013, in Kibumba, 27 kilometers north of Goma (picture taken by the Group, on 17 March 2013)
Annex 10

M23 headquarters in Rumangabo (picture taken by the Group on 27 May 2013)
Annex 11

M23 communiqué firing M23 president Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero

Resolution No. 013/HCM/M23/2013 of 27 February 2013 concerning the impeachment of the President of the Movement of 23 March

The Military High Command

- Given the Statutes of the March 23 Movement, as amended to date,
- Given the Rules and Regulations of the March 23 Movement, and with regard to Decision No 002/HCM/M23/CNDP/2012 of 9 July 2012 establishing a body responsible for the coordination of political action of the Movement,
- Considering Decision No 003/HCM/M23/CNDP/2012 of 9 July 2012 appointing a Coordinator of the Political Wing of the Movement,
- Considering the relevant resolutions of the Extraordinary Congress held on March 23 Movement dated 17 August 2012 relating to the restructuring of the Movement,
- Considering the need to ensure the defense and protection of the noble cause that led to the creation of the Movement of March 23;
- Considering the inability of Mr. Jean-Marie RUNIGA Lugerero to drive the vision of the March 23 Movement and to implement its political program;
- Considering the inability of the concerned individual to define and provide General policy guidance to the different structures of the Movement in order to ensure the required visibility and appropriate advocacy;
- Whereas it is an established fact that Jean-Marie RUNIGA Lugerero offered to outsiders to the Movement, namely General Bosco Ntaganda, the political leverage to influence the decisions of the Movement at the highest level;
- Whereas during his tenure at the helm of our Movement, Mr. Jean-Marie RUNIGA Lugerero has diverted finances of the Movement to support obscure and prohibited activities such as the recruitment of political and military leaders on behalf of General Bosco Ntaganda to whom he answered to thus enabling the General the opportunity to attempt to sow unrest and divisions;
Given the charges brought against Mr. Runiga including financial embezzlement, divisions, ethnic hatred, deceit and political immaturity;

- Given that during the meeting of the Military High Command extended to Executive Board Members and senior officials of the Movement, Mr. RUNIGA acknowledged the charges brought against him and consequently agreed to abide by the final decision of the Military High Command;

- Whereas in its conclusions, the Military High Command has qualified the charges against Jean-Marie RÚNIGA Lugerero,

- Whereas it is fitting to ensure the proper functioning of the Movement and continue during the peace process at a time when positive signals are coming from both the national and international community to ensure a peaceful and sustainable resolution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

- Given the need and urgency, the Military High Command

HAS DECIDED as follows:

Article 1: Mr. Jean-Marie RÚNIGA Lugerero is relieved of his duties as Chairman of the Movement of March 23 with immediate effect;

Article 2: The Vice-President of the Movement assumes on an interim basis, the functions of President until the appointment by Congress of a new President of the March 23 Movement.

Article 3: All previous provisions contrary to this decision shall be repealed with effect on the date of its signature.

Done at Bunagana, February 27, 2013

For the Military High Command of the March 23 Movement

SULTANI MAKENGA
Brigadier general
Annex 12

M23 soldiers of Gen. Bosco Ntaganda faction who fled to Rwanda on 15 and 16 March 2013 (picture shared with the Group by the Rwandan Government)
Annex 13

List of arms and ammunition recovered from soldiers of the M23 Ntaganda faction who fled to Rwanda on 15 and 16 March 2013, as provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda

View of the storeroom containing M23 and FDLR arms and ammunition.

26 medium machine guns.

333 AK-47s.

1 general purpose machine gun; 2 anti-aircraft guns.
25 RPGs.

7 pistols.

7 60 mm mortars.

13 anti-tank munitions.

1 light machine gun, 4 Uzi guns, 3 rifles.

7.62 mm ammunition — loose.
7.62 mm ammunition — belted.

15 anti-tank rounds and 8 RPG grenades.
Annex 14

First page of a document provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda citing the names of M23 combatants and political cadres who crossed into Rwanda starting 15 March 2013 (original on file at the United Nations)

RESTRICTED

1. PROFILE / Date d'entrée 16/March/2013

RANK: Gen 3de
FULL NAMES: NGARUYE Baudela
F/NAMES: HIJGLIA M/NAMES: ANNONCIATA
APPOINTMENT: Dept Army Chief OF Staff/ARC
AGE: 35 Ans
ETAT CIVIL: Marié(e) à UWERA Angelique TEL
NOMBRE DES ENFANTS: 48 Enfants

2. ADRESS IN DRC

NATIONALITE : CONGOLOISE
PROVINCE D'ORIGINE: NORTH-KIVU
TERRITOIRE : MASISI
COLLECTIVITE; BASHALI GROUPEMENT; BMUKOTO. LOCALITE; NYAMITABO
ADRESSE: GOMA /TEL 0993313339

3. PAYS DE CONVENANCE / COUNTRY OF SUITABILITY

1: RWANDA
2:
3:

4. IN RWANDA

VILLAGE: KIGALI
CELL:
SECTOR:
DISTRICT:
PROVINCE:
NOM DE LA FAMILLE D'ACCUEIL: /TEL

RESTRICTED
Annex 15

Position vacated by M23 in the Rugari area, Rutshuru, North Kivu
(picture taken by the Group on 27 May 2013)
Annex 16

Extract of the public letter addressed by M23 to the parliament of South Africa to dissuade South Africa from sending troops for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)

Bunagana, April 3rd 2013

Réf : 006/Prés - M23/2013

To The attention of the Parliament of South Africa and South Africa people as whole, in South Africa.

RE: MOTION FOR CANCELLING THE SENDING OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS TO WAR IN THE DRC

Honorable Speaker,
Honorable members,
Honorable Senators,

The M23, noted the UN resolution 2098, of March 28, 2013, which transforming the UN peacekeepers in a belligerent force, entrusted with offensive mission to extend the reign of an army which the crime rate and rape is the highest of all armies of the world and come to rescue the most corrupt regime in the world. Words of the Secretary General of the United Nations stating in the same resolution that corruption are the main cause of failure of the Congolese Government.

Recalling that, the UN resolution creating the Brigade with mandate to kill and also in turn to be killed comes into existence when negotiations are taking place in Kampala/ Uganda between the Kinshasa Government and the March 23 Movement, under the mediation of his excellency President YOWERI MUSEVENI of Uganda and Chairman of the International conference of the Great Lakes Region “ICGLR” and on the recommendation of the 11 countries of the Great Lakes Region.

Meanwhile it was noticed during the interview of April 2nd 2013 by the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raymond TSHIBANDA who said that: “countries (South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique) who have militarily contributed for the UN intervention brigade are also those countries who have accepted for their soldiers to be killed on the Congolese land”.

By this fact, the same countries gave mandate to the oppressed forces to kill the soldiers of the UN Brigade as they defend themselves. What a shame.

This decision, which is an evil precedent, dedicates the victory of force without reasoning. This is why, M23 invites the Parliament and the people of the South Africa to consider and convince the Government to do not send their sons and daughters of their good nation in an absurd war against their Congolese brothers.
Extract of the public letter addressed by M23 to the parliament of South Africa to dissuade South Africa from sending troops for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)

Bunagana, April 11th 2013

Réf: 0012/Prés. - M23/2013

To the Attention of the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Tanzanian People

Honorable Speaker
Honorable Senators
Honorable Members of Parliament

RE: Request for the cancellation of the decision to deploy Tanzanian Armed Forces to wage war in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The M23 has taken note of the UN Resolution 2098, of March 28 2013 that transforms the UN Peacekeeping Mission to DRC into a belligerent force with the mandate to carry out offensive operations against Congolese citizens. In doing so, the UN will in effect come to the rescue of one of the most corrupt regimes in the world and will contribute to extending the reign of an army that is infamous for rampant rape and other atrocities that it wantonly and habitually inflicts on the Congolese population.

It is ironical that contained in the same UN Resolution 2098, are the UN Secretary General’s own words stating that corruption is the main cause of the failure of the DRC Government.

In taking a decision to engage in war in DRC, the same countries give a defacto mandate to the oppressed forces of M23 to retaliate and inflict fatalities upon the soldiers of the Intervention Brigade as the M23 defend themselves and the population under their protection.

The M23 takes this opportunity to stress to the brotherly people of Tanzania that the Movement bears no responsibility in the event of a massacre which appears to be on the horizon at the instigation of those who, sitting in their air-conditioned skyscrapers in New York and other Western cities, have nothing but contempt for the lives of African soldiers ignoring everything with regard to our values and our Pan-African beliefs.
Annex 17

FARDC position at Mutaho (picture taken by the Group on 27 May 2013)
Annex 18

M23 position at Kibati, called the “three antennas” (picture taken by the Group on 27 May 2013)
Annex 19

122 mm cannons which the M23 seized in Goma and used in Mutaho (picture taken by a foreign journalist during the M23 capture of Goma)
Annex 20

M23 communiqué announcing a ceasefire after their retreat from Mutaho

COMMUNIQUE N°006/DCM/M23/2013

La Direction Politique du Mouvement du 23 Mars informe l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'elle est prête à une cessation immédiate des hostilités pour faciliter la visite du Secrétariat Général des Nations Unies dans la ville de Goma. Cette trêve qui devra être formalisée par un accord de cessez-le-feu dûment signé par les parties permettra ainsi la reprise des négociations de Kampala pour aboutir ainsi à un accord qui donnera aux congolais une vraie paix, celui qui s'obtient par la voie politique.

Cependant, il est vrai que cette cessation des hostilités ne dépend pas que de notre Mouvement, il requiert également la volonté de la partie adverse, c'est-à-dire, le Gouvernement de la RDC car, il reste vrai que ce dernier a choisi le moment où le peuple congolais attendait la venue en RD Congo du Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies pour expédier son armée, les FARDC, conduire une guerre généralisée contre toutes nos positions dans l'unique but d'empêcher l'évaluation de l'Accord cadre d'Addis-Abeba et compromettre le soutien à apporter par les Nations-Unies au processus de paix de Kampala en cours pour lequel les États de la Région des Grands-Lacs ont consenti suffisamment d'efforts.

Le M23 dénonce donc, avec la plus grande énergie, les velléités militaristes du Gouvernement qui, après une nuit d'accalmie sur toutes les lignes du front, vient de reprendre les hostilités ce matin du 22 mai 2013, avec une intensité rare.

Rappelons que nos forces s'étaient, longtemps, absténuies de toute contre-offensive face à la provocation des FARDC, mais l'intensité des bombardements et la menace de conséquences désastreuses sur nos positions, ne pouvaient nous laisser sans riposter.

Si la trêve n'est pas respectée par la partie adverse, l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise (ARC) a été clairement instruite pour réagir vigoureusement avec fermeté contre l'initiative malheureuse des FARDC, aux conséquences humanitaires dramatiques sur nos populations civiles.

Il est aussi important de signaler que le sentiment de revanche de la coalition FARDC-FDLR/Interahamwe contre le M23 pour des nombreuses défaites lui infligées en 2012, confortant ainsi la position de notre Mouvement à la table de négociations en décembre 2012 convoquée par la CIRGL après notre retrait de la ville de Goma, a dangereusement dopé la guerre actuelle.

C'est pour inverser la donne en poussant jusqu'au bout sa logique militariste que, le 28 mars 2013, le gouvernement congolais nous a laissé sur la table de négociation à Kampala pour forcer la main du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies et arracher la Résolution 2098. Et, le déclenchement des hostilités, le 20 mai 2013, devait, à nouveau, pousser le même Conseil
de Sécurité à précipiter l'entrée en action irréversible de la Brigade d'Intervention onusienne aux côtés de la coalition FARDC/FLDPR-Interahamwe, déjà à l'œuvre; parce qu'au regard des données concrètes du terrain, au cours de ce mois de mai 2013, relatives aux causes profondes de la crise en RDC, l'opinion internationale commençait à douter de l'efficacité réelle de l'option militariste pour ramener une paix durable à l'Est de la RDC.

En conclusion, le M23 veut attirer l'attention de l'opinion sur les allures bellicistes du Gouvernement de la RDC qui ne relèvent pas de la passion pour les guerres mais de son intention réelle d'embraser la RDC et la Région des Grands Lacs.

Fait à Bunagana, le 22 Mai 2013

Le Chef de Département de la Communication et Médias

Amani KABASHA
Annex 21

Damage caused after M23 fired on Ndosho suburb of Goma during the 22 May 2013 battle against the FARDC in Mutaho

The site in on avenue Ngungu in Ndosho, showing the clothing remains of a three-year old girl killed on 22 May.

The remnants of a house hit on 22 May on Avenue Kanyamuhanga, Ndosho. A 14-year old boy was killed.
Annex 22

M23 tax slip
Extract of an internal M23 document dated 19 March 2013, which endeavours to reorganize the movement’s finances

Annex 23

1. INTRODUCTION


Réunie du 15 au 18 mars 2013, la Commission a focalisé ses efforts sur les points ci-après :

1) Mission du Département des finances (objectif global);
2) Objectif spécifique;
3) Moyens de mise en œuvre;
4) Faiblesses et Menaces;
5) Remèdes;
6) Structure organique du Département;
7) Attributions des tâches (job description);
8) Méthode de gestion financière et comptable;
9) Surtax Evaluation et Audit;
10) Budget;
11) Nomenclature des taxes.

II. MISSION DU DÉPARTEMENT

La mission assignée au département des finances est la production des moyens dont le mouvement a besoin pour sa politique.

III. OBJECTIF SPÉCIFIQUE

Développer une autonomie financière et une capacité de gestion et de prise en charge de la vie du Mouvement et de toutes ses activités.

IV. MOYENS DE MISE EN ŒUVRE

A. Les recettes internes

a) Recettes classiques

– Recettes provenant des exportations et importations;

– Recettes provenant du contrôle de qualité à la frontière;

– Pèage routier;

– Taxes marchés et étalages;

– Taxes parking;

– Impôts locaux dans les centres urbains et semi urbains;

– Recettes fiscales (IPR, IRL, IF, TVA, impôts sur les bénéfices...)

b) Recettes administratives et domaniales

– Taxes sur les concessions bâties et non bâties;

– Taxes parcellaires;

– Acts administratifs;

– Recettes provenant de la DGM;

– Amondes transactionnelles;

c) Recettes sporadiques

Ce sont les recettes tirées des exclusivités sur les événements spéciaux tel le droit de retransmission ou de diffusion.

B. Les recettes externes

Ce sont des recettes qui proviennent de l’extérieur:

– Baillers des fonds;

– Fundraising;

– Diners conférences;

– Amis du Congo;

– Donateurs Congolais.
Annex 24

Col. Albert Kahasha
Annex 25

Attempt to create a coalition of armed groups ("Dynamique populaire pour le changement", DPC), signed by Gustave Bagayamukwe and Col. Albert Kahasha

ACTE D'ENGAGEMENT No: 0001/SK/2012

Nous, regroupement populaire, représenté par les associations de développement et membres de la Société Civile, les groupes résistants, les mouvements politiques, nationalistes et combattants, tous évoluant depuis des années avec l'objectif commun de prônover le changement profond du mode de gestion de notre pays;

Sous le signe de l'unité et de la cohésion nationales, suite à la mauvaise gouvernance et au déficit caractéristique de l'autorité de l'État dans tous les domaines de gestion et sur toute l'étendue de notre pays;

Tenant compte de l'incapacité avérée des institutions actuelles à revoir notre armée nationale, à légitimer un ordre politique en RDC, à redorer l'image ternie de notre diplomatie particulièrement envers les États voisins, et à pouvoir restaurer l'unité, la paix et la concorde nationales surtout à l'Est du pays;

Considérant la conduite répréhensible du régime en place, spécialement caractérisée par des violations graves des droits de l'homme;

Décisions:

1. De la création du cadre politico-militaire, dénommé DYNAMIQUE POPULAIRE POUR LE CHANGEMENT, en sigle « DPC », dont la branche politique est chargée de canaliser nos aspirations auprès de notre population ainsi que des partenaires nationaux et internationaux intéressés au changement profond du mode de gestion de notre pays.

2. En attendant la mise en place du comité de coordination de cette branche politique, nous lui désignons, comme porte-parole, Mr Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE TADJIN.

3. Que, toutes nos forces combattantes qui en constituent la branche armée et tous les autres signataires du présent acte reconnaissent un seul et unique Haut Commandement Militaire dirigé par le Général Albert KAHASHA aliès FOCA MIKE.

4. Que, notre objectif principal étant la renfonction d'un État et d'une NATION dévouée à la République Démocratique du Congo, nous exigeons la démission pure et simple de toutes les institutions de la République, et ne répandons désormais qu'au seul pouvoir politique émanant de la DYNAMIQUE POPULAIRE POUR LE CHANGEMENT (DPC), créée par le présent acte et dont le siège est établi à Bukavu.

(Voir les signataires à la page suivante)
Les signataires :


7. Axe MWENGA: Col. Nyakair, M. Mvula,


9. Axe UYIRA:

10. Axe FiZi:

Personnalités, toute tendance confondue dont les noms figurent sur une liste à publier ultérieurement pour des raisons de leur sécurité.

Transmis pour avis motivé avant publication, au Mouvement du 23 mars (M23).

Dont prend acte,

Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE TADJI, Porte-Parole :

Le Général Albert KAHASHA alias FOCA MIKE, Chef d'Etat-major :
Annex 26

Gustave Bagayamukwe in M23-held Bunagana
Annex 27

**Gustave Bagayamukwe’s statement during a meeting in Bunagana to federate armed groups in South Kivu**

Exposé de Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE TADJI, porte-parole des Forces Populaires pour le Changement Intégral en RDC, en sigle F.P.C.I.-RDC à la rencontre organisée par les leaders du Sud-Kivu.

**BUNAGANA, le 08 janvier 2013.**

Bien Chers frères et sœurs,

Permettez-moi de commencer par remercier sincèrement le Très Haut, Dieu notre Père qui, visiblemment nous utilise depuis un certain temps et qui a sûrement inspiré la personne qui nous offre encore aujourd’hui une occasion de nous retrouver ici.

Nous saluons spécialement l’organisation de ces assises dans ce cadre très significatif pour son emplacement sur le territoire congolais mais aussi et surtout à un moment assez particulier de l’histoire de notre pays en général et singulièrement, celle de notre Kivu natal qui finalement commence à voir ses propres fils s’occuper de l’avenir même de notre pays.

L’occasion est donc toute offerte pour que les personnalités ici présentes fassent un état des lieux des initiatives disparates mais très actives au Sud-Kivu, qui visent toutes le changement profond du mode de gestion de notre pays, afin de baliser ensemble notre avenir, l’objectif commun étant celui d’œuvrer pour la refondation d’un ETAT et d’une NATION dignes en RDC.

C’est donc dans ce contexte qu’en tant que porte-parole du regroupement des Forces Populaires Nationalistes et Combattantes pour le Changement Intégral, réunies au Sud-Kivu sous le commandement du Général Albert KAHASHA, nous nous sentons interpeller pour rendre compte et partager avec vous tous la situation exacte sur terrain, les objectifs déjà atteints et à atteindre, les difficultés rencontrées, des solutions possibles envisagées et envisageables, des échéances prévisionnelles.

Vous comprendrez Chers frères, que tout au long de nos échanges ici que nous souhaitons constructives, le souci qui nous anime à ce stade de la conception, est celui de voir une participation massive de toutes les tribus et communautés présentes au Sud-Kivu dans cette œuvre salutaire pour la RDC et d’éviter au maximum les erreurs du passé.

En effet, Chers frères, — je rappeler que nous avons huit territoires au Sud-Kivu, 23 chefferies, 184 groupements et une population estimée à 3.500.000 en
2003 et que depuis 1997, sous différents régimes (AFDL, RDC, 1+4, PPRD), nous sommes la seule province qui n’a jamais dégagée une certaine majorité autour d’un leader qu’il soit politique, militaire, religieux ou même indépendant afin de nous choisir un gouverneur à nous, un chef militaire à nous et encore moins, un représentant attitré chaque fois que nécessaire.

Nous avons donc été ainsi, tous ensemble responsables de nos propres misères et de l’in-gouvernabilité de notre province pendant 16 ans. Pendant tout ce temps, il y a eu des projets repris au budget de l’Etat et qui étaient reporté chaque année sans que personne ne se pose la question du pourquoi jusqu’en 2010 quand notre association s’était penché sur cette problématique de la gouvernance au Sud-Kivu.

Nous devons donc tirer des leçons de ce comportement pour regarder désormais dans le même sens et accepter de nous accorder sur une personne qui doit parler au nom de la province, l’essentiel étant de l’encadrer comme il se doit pour éviter tout dérapage.

Nous avons donc besoin de l’accompagnement de chacun d’entre nous et de l’appui de toute notre population dans ses diversités pour porter au mieux l’action que nous envisageons au niveau national, régional et international.

Pour parler des Forces Populaires pour le Changement Intégral (FPCI), nous avons prévu les points suivants :

1. Genèse ;
   Contacts pris avec les différents groupes combattants à Shabunda
   Centre, Kingulube, Tchulwe, Mwenga, Kalehe, Bunyakiri, Lutunkulu,
   Itombwe, Minembwe, pour canaliser les revendications et aspirations.
   Contacts avec FM (mois de juin 2012)
   Chiribanya, Bosco et Makenga
   Contacts avec M23 pour solliciter la mise à disposition de FM (fin
   aout 2012)

2. Situation exacte sur terrain ;
   Nos contacts
   UPCP/FPC Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix de Gén La Fontaine
   et Col Kahasha (50 éléments)
   Col Hilaire voir MbasaNyanuisixxxx
   UCDD Union Congolaise pour la Défense de la démocratie de Xavier
   Chiribanyaxxxxxxx
Mouvement Congolais pour le Changement MCC de King et Obed voir Tommyxxxxxxx
UFAMANDU de Walikale et Kalehe : col Mbangu
RAHIYA MUTOMBOKI de Songa alias Ndushi
Col Maheshe
MAI-MAI de Col Gaston Bweyze
MAI-MAI de Gen Sisawa
Gen Eyadema
MAI-MAI de Maj Ngandu
CHEKA de Walikale
Rahiya de Col Edmond Lubanda
Rahiya de Yakutumba
NYATURA de Kalehe, Numbi et Ziralo
Mouvement pour la vérité des urnes de DéoBalole
FDDC
Mouvement Debout Congolais (MDC) Colonel Bisimwa Gaudens et Col MokeSiluwa (diaspora) et Colonel Mugula Antoine
Rahiya Bunyakiri, Ghislain Kataki

3. Les objectifs déjà atteints et à atteindre :
   Arrivée et installation dans la ville de BKV de 135 éléments dans les positions stratégiques (trahison)
   Regroupement à Kaniola avec Mushamuka
   Arrivée FM à la tête des groupes
   Signature acte d’engagement
   Règlement de discipline
   Encadrement des masses dans la ville BKV, Kamaniola, luvungi, BarundiKabare, Walungu, Kaniola, Lutunkulu, Kingulube, Tchulwe, Mwenga, Bulambika, Hombo Nord et Sud
   Allemagne, Bruxelles, France, Norvège, Italie.
   Partenariat avec M23
   Equipement radio, bottes,
   Occupation Colline Nzibira, Mulumemunene
   Objectifs : prise Kamaniola, Nyangezi, Walungu, Kabare, Kalehe et ensuite BKV

4. Les difficultés rencontrées :
   Armes et munitions insuffisants
   Equipements radio
   Paiement et prise en charge blessés et familles

5. Solutions possibles envisagées et envisageables :

   Obtenir du M23 armes, munitions et 250hommes

Annex 28

SMS sent on 3 February 2013 by Bagayamukwe during his stay in Rwanda
Annex 29

Receipt for Bagayamukwe’s visa at the border of Cyanika, between Rwanda and Uganda, on his way to attend a meeting with M23 in Bunagana on 8 January 2013
Annex 30

Statement dated 20 January 2013 declaring the creation of the UFRC coalition of armed groups
2. Proclamons la suspension de toutes les institutions de la République et ne reconnaissons qu’un seul pouvoir politique, celui émanant de l’UNION DES FORCES RÉVOLUTIONNAIRES DU CONGO (U.F.R.C), créée par le présent acte et dont le siège est établi provisoirement à Bukavu.


Soldats congolais,
L’heure du devoir national a sonné ! Où que vous vous trouviez, dans la diaspora ou au pays, quelque soit le groupe dans lequel vous lutez, rejoignez l’Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo pour défendre nos femmes contre les viols, pour stopper la violence dans notre pays.

Vaillants combattants de la diaspora,
Les multiples manifestations faites dans le monde, n’ont pas su mobiliser la Communauté internationale en faveur de la cause congolaise. Mais comme la victoire finale dépend de notre détermination à vaincre, rassemblons-nous. Car seule notre union sacrée donnera un impact victorieux à la lutte commune.

Peuple congolais, Citoyens Citoyennes, Bana Mboza, wana inchichi, bantu ya ditunga, bana bwa la na beto :
L’heure est venue d’apporter notre soutien indéfectible aux résistants armés qui luttent depuis des années, armes à la main, contre les guerres à répétition, les crimes et l’anarchie. Levons-nous tous contre l’aventurisme et l’irresponsabilité du régime actuel qui, pour maintenir Kabila au pouvoir, entretient les forces du mal responsable de l’errance de nos frères et sœurs condamnés à l’insécurité et aux souffrances atroces.

Vive la République Démocratique du Congo !
Vive l’Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo !

Fait à Bukavu, le 20 janvier 2013

Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE TADJI,
Président du Comité de Coordination et Haut Conseil provisoire

« Pour un Etat et une Nation Dignes en RDC »
Annex 31

Bagayamukwe’s rental contract for a residence at Kamembe, Rwanda

AMASEZERANO Y’UBUKODE (CONTRAT DE BAIL)

Hagati ya NSENGEUMOREMYI... (Propriétaire) na GUSTAVE BAGAYAMUKWE... (Locataire) bagiranye amasezerano y’ubukode bw’inzu yo kubamo. Inza ikodesheje w’i mu Murenge wa Kamembe, akagari ka Gihundwe mu Mudugudu wa Murambi irimo umururo w’amashanyarazi n’amazi bya EWSA iri muri Parcelé N°............................

Abagiranye amasezerano bumvikanye ibi bikurikira:

1. Ubukode bw’inzu ni amafaranga ibihumbi mirongo itanu y’Urwanda (50000frw) ku kwezi.

2. Uko desheje (locataire) yishyuriye rimwé ubukode bw’amézi atatu kandi ayatanze mbere y’ako atangira kayibamo.

3. Uko desheje (locataire) ni yemerewe gushyira undi muntu muri iyo inza akodesheje atabyumvikanye ho na nyírayo.

4. Uko desheje niwe uziyishyurira Facture y’umururo w’amashanyarazi n’amazi azaba yakoresheje, akaba agombaga gufata inzu inza akodesheje no kwisanira ibikoresho byo muntu byakwangiri ari kuyikoresha. Urugero: amatara, ibiyo, Selure, robine n’ibindi.

5. Aya masezerano azatangira gakurikizwa guhara itarikiaza hapa yinjiyiye mu nz u 4/28/11/2012

6. Aya masezerano asibora guhura igihe cyose abanyagiranye batakubahiriza ibyo basezeranye ni igihe nyir’inzu yaba akencye kuyikoreramo indi mirimo ariko agatanga integuza y’iminsi cumi n’itana mu buryo bw’inyando.

7. Ibindi bibazo asibora kuvuka bidateganyijwe muri aya masezerano abanyakiranye byubumvikana ho, byanirana aya masezerano agaseswa hifashishijwe inzego z’Ubuyobozi.

Rokoreu i gihundwe kuwa 28/11/2012

Abagiranye amasezerano:

Ukodesheje (Propriétaire)

NSENGEUMOREMYI

FAMEN

Ukodesheje (Locataire)

GUSTAVE BAGAYAMUKWE

FAMEN

28/11/2012
Annex 32

Bagayamukwe’s request to set up his residence in Rwanda dated 6 January 2013

BAGAYAMUKWE TADJI Gustave
Murenge wa Kamembe
Kagari ka Gihundwe
Mugudugu wa Murambi
Tél : 0786939367

Kamembe, le 06 janvier 2013

NOTE TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICE
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION

CONCERNE : DEMANDE DE VISA DE RESIDENCE

Je viens par la présente solliciter un visa de résidence en République Rwandaise ou j’habite depuis un mois.

En effet, je suis de nationalité congolaise et originaire de la République Démocratique du Congo et je continue à travailler comme agent de développement en qualité de Président du Conseil d’Administration de l’Association pour la Défense des Intérêts du Kivu-Bukavu dont le bureau se trouve à Bukavu sur l’avenue Lumumba N 118 dans la Commune d’Ibanda.

Pour des raisons de convenances et d’assurance sécuritaire, j’habite à l’adresse ci haut mentionnée et vous transmets en annexe tous les documents qui m’ont été demandés pour régulariser ma résidence au Rwanda.

Il s’agit de :
1. Formulaire de demande de visa dûment rempli ;
2. L’attestation d’identification tenant lieu d’extrait de casier judiciaire ;
3. Fiche d’activité du 02/01/2013 ;
4. PV de l’Association portant sur ma désignation comme Président du Conseil d’Administration
5. Contrat de bail du 28/11/2012 ;
6. Attestation de résidence à Gihundwe ;
7. Curriculum vitae ;

Je vous en souhaite bonne réception.

Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE TADJI
Annex 33

Draft statement nominating Tamusa Lumembo as the coordinator of the UFRC-diaspora dated 26 January 2013

Bukavu (RDC), le 26 janvier 2013

**Décision du Haut Conseil de l’UFRC portant nomination du Coordonnateur Fédéral de l’UFRC-DIASPORA**

- Vu le Procès-verbal du 10 janvier 2013 portant création de l’« Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo » ;
- Vu l’Acte du 31 décembre 2012 portant « Règlement de discipline de l’Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo » ;
- Vu le PV n°001 du Comité Fédéral provisoire de l’UFRC-Diaspora du 25 janvier 2013, notamment dans sa résolution n°2 ;
- Vu l’urgence ;

**Le Haut Conseil de l’UFRC décide:**

**Article 1.** Monsieur Jean LUMEMBO Tamusa est nommé Coordonnateur Fédéral du Comité Fédéral UFRC-DIASPORA, avec pour siège Bruxelles (Belgique).

**Article 2.** Toutes dispositions contraires sont abrogées.

Fait à Bukavu, le 26 janvier 2013

Le Président du Haut Conseil de l’UFRC,

Gustave BAGAYAMUKWE Tadjji
Annex 34

Declaration of Moke Silubwe announcing his nomination as president ad-interim of the UFRC

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gc8-5u5Qzrk
Annex 35

Minutes of a UFRC-diaspora meeting in Brussels, endorsing the opening of a bank account for the movement

Registre des PV et Décisions
Du Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora

Procès-verbal n° 001 du 25/01/2013
Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora

Le 25 janvier 2013 à Bruxelles (Bélgique), une Assemblée générale a réuni les personnes ci-après :

- Général B.G ;
- Colonel MKS ;
- Jean LUMEMBO ;
- Pasteur Daniel Lungy, Consultant international en gestion de conflit, Allemagne
- Diana Sulufutu, animateur radio, Allemagne
- Le Représentant des Résistants Combattants Londres (Royaume-Uni), Monsieur Marcel Ikala-Likulu
- Le Représentant des Résistants Combattants (Royaume de Belgique), Monsieur Jefferson-Mundonga (Liège) et Monsieur Joel Mabunga
- Le Représentant des Résistants Combattants Paris (France), Monsieur Ruffin Atula Fabu
- Major ON.

Ordre du jour :
1. Mise en place du Comité Fédéral Diaspora de l’Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC) ;
2. Proposition de nomination d’un Coordonnateur fédéral pour toute la diaspora ;
3. Appel à candidature pour tous les postes de Représentant Régional Diaspora ;

Les Résolutions

À l’issue des exposés riches et courtois, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

Résolution n°1 :
Il est créé un Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora dont le siège est basé à Bruxelles.
La présente Résolution est approuvée à l’unanimité.

UFRC
« Pour un Etat et une Nation Dignes en RDC »
Registre des PV et Décisions
Du Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora

Résolution n°2 :
Les participants proposent au Haut Conseil de l’UFRC de nommer Monsieur Jean LUMEMBO Tamusa Coordonnateur Fédéral du Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora.
La présente Résolution est approuvée à l’unanimité.

Résolution n°3 :
Les participants lancent un appel à candidature pour les postes de Représentant Régional pays de la Diaspora pour chaque pays respectif. Les candidats doivent transmettre leur demande par retour de la Fiche de Renseignement DINIR (Direction Nationale des Investigations et Recherches) de l’UFRC.
La présente Résolution est approuvée à l’unanimité.

Résolution n°4 :
Les participants attirent l’attention du Haut Conseil de l’UFRC sur la nécessité de parachever la structuration du mouvement dans la diaspora pour faciliter les soutiens moral, matériel, politique et financier tant de la Communauté congolaise de la diaspora ainsi que des autres personnes de bonne volonté. La délivrance de l’Acte de nomination au poste de Représentant régional pour le pays ou la Région du pays concerné, participe à la confiance des compatriotes quant à la traçabilité et à l’affectation des fonds au combat pour la libération de notre pays.
La présente Résolution est approuvée à l’unanimité.

Résolution n°5 :
Les participants encouragent l’ouverture sans délai d’un compte bancaire pour le Comité Fédéral UFRC-Diaspora, avec double signature dont celle du Coordonnateur fédéral UFRC-Diaspora, et ce, pour mobiliser la contribution financière des congolais de la diaspora.
La présente Résolution est approuvée à l’unanimité.

Fait à Bruxelles, le 25/01/2013

Pour le Comité Fédéral provisoire UFRC-Diaspora,
Jean LUMEMBO Tamusa

UFRC
« Pour un Etat et une Nation Dignes en RDC »
Annex 36

UFRC-diaspora budget assessing the estimated cost of toppling the DRC Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Operation CFK - Coût de la Force contre Kabila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission et actions requises</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coûts impliqués</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unité</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Qte</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coût unit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4. Mission exploratoire**
- 35 000

**1. mettre en place un réseau des renseignements**
- 35 000

**1.1 Collecte des renseignements politiques**
- Coûts sous-rubrique
  - 10 000
    - Cibler et filtrer les personnalités clés et les plus impliqués du régime et leurs domiciles et fréquentations
    - Matériel de télécom
    - Frais de communication
    - Indemnité de déplacement
    - Rémunération

**1.2 Collecte des renseignements militaires**
- Coûts sous-rubrique
  - 15 000
    - Cibler et filtrer les responsables des camps militaires et les personnes en charge des dépôts d'armes et munitions
      - domiciles, fréquentations, emploi du temps, téléphone
    - Cibler les officiers étrangers infiltrés et les officiers nationaux collabos les plus influents
      - domiciles, fréquentations, téléphone
    - Cibler et infiltrer les responsables et opérateurs les plus influents des services de sécurité
      - domiciles, fréquentations, emploi du temps
    - Identifier les domiciles, lieux de fréquentation
      - et les contacts principal concernés
    - Lister les prisons, identifier les prisonniers mil et civ
    - Matériel de télécom
    - Frais de communication
    - Indemnité de déplacement
    - Rémunération

**2. Investir la Sud-Este et Eshioha - neutraliser le pouvoir**
- Déploiement de l'effectif sur le terrain
- Lancement des opérations terrestres et l'approche aérienne
- Neutralisation et capture de CFK
- Neutralisation et capture des officiers et personnalités régime
- Neutralisation et mise sous contrôle des camps militaires
- Attaque et contrôle des dépôts d'armes et munitions
- Neutralisation et prise de la RTNC
- Neutralisation et contrôle de la BNC et de l'Institut de l'Emission
- Mise sous contrôle de la ville de Bukavu
- Mise sous contrôle de Kinshasa la Capitale
- Coût : 1 200 000

**3. Gestion de la prise effective du pouvoir**
- Jour 0
  - 2 h à 4 h Musique classique
  - 8 h à 10 h Communication militaire à la Nation
    - Appel au calme
    - Appel aux militaires pour dépôt des armes
    - Armée de suspension de ttes institutions
    - Armée de feu, y compris nouvel ordre
    - Transfert des compétences au CNL
    - Communication civile à la nation
    - Annexe et organisation du CNL
    - Comité de préparatifs des mesures et de grandes orientations
  - Après-midi:
    - Réunion du Conseil de la défense et de la sécurité
    - Convocation de quelques cadres de la presse de l'État pour instructions à donner
- Coût : 1 000 000
Après-midi : Audiance de la Société Civile

- Audiance des notabilités régionales
- 17h à 19h00 : Publication de l’Equipe du 6ème
  - 20 Ministères
  - 10 Secrétariats d’État
  - Liste en annexe

5. Maintenance de la Prise du Pouvoir

UFRC
Union des Forces Révolutionnaires du Congo

* Pour un État et une Nation dignes en RDC

Colonel Modé SIURIWE
Président a.i. du Haut Conseil Provincial
UFRC communiqué acknowledging responsibility for an attack carried out by Col. Albert Kahasha at Chisadu, South Kivu, on 24 April 2013
Annex 38

**Letter from Raia Mutomboki group in Masisi, March 2013, outlining the political objectives of a coalition of armed groups based in Masisi, North Kivu**
l'ordre du jour, elle ne réussira jamais car la résistance poursuivra son chemin.

Le secrétaire du gouvernement MATATA aux Nations Unies qui, dans sa résolution du conseil de sécurité a décidé de la création d'une brigade spéciale d'intervention pour traquer les groupes armés en RDC, est non seulement un avènement d'espoir mais aussi une lutte en avant du gouvernement congolais pour son défait monopolaire dans la gestion de ses problèmes internes et encore une autre stratégie de distraction en vue de se maintenir au pouvoir contre la volonté du peuple.

Si elle ne restera pas lettre morte à l'image de la force inter africaine et la force de la SADC tant solidaires par la RDC, la coalition des groupes armés du Congo demande au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies d'attirer les ténors de cette force à l'insertion des groupes armés, à la construction des casernes militaires ou même à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des FARDC au lieu d'envoyer les enfants d'autrui à se constituer des chars à caisse a cause de la turbulente des ingéniers congolais.

Par manque d'interlocuteur actif, partenaire fiable en RDC les efforts de la MONUSCO sont mal perçus alors que celle-ci a beaucoup donné en offrant le meilleur de soi-même jusqu’au sacrifice supreme dans la sécurisation des populations.

Il convient de souligner que notre coalition n'a aucune revendication en dehors de ceux déjà existants au sein de chaque groupe respectif, par exemple sur l'arme, les métiers 1 etc. de l'Accord Global et principe des Saut Cara qui stipulent que toutes les forces combattantes forment partie des FARDC dans les Accords signés par le Gouvernement en 2009.

La maladresse de diriger le M23 en deux factions est une manœuvre de déshonorer la croix, l'in sécurité à l'État du pays étant devenu un véritable point de commerce pour le pouvoir de Kinshasa, car tous les commandements du M23.

aurait dû être consulté de façon simultanée et prévenir ainsi toute érosion.

La Coalition des groupes armés du Congo propose à ces 3 articles soient pourvoir à tous le peuple par un référendum sur la révision de la constitution des articles ci-après.

- Le maintien de l'élection présidentielle à deux tours est vue d'éviter toute éventuelle contestation et/ou tentative de trahison dans l'avenir comme c'est le cas actuellement.
- L'élection des Gouverneurs des provinces au suffrage universel direct, et que l'intervi du vice gouverneur ne dure plus jamais au delà de 3 mois.
- La suppression du sénat en vue de réduire les dépenses des institutions, le sénat étant une redondance inutile de l'Assemblée nationale.

La coalition des groupes armés du Congo se réserve le droit d'avancer sur d'autres localités du pays si le Chef de l'État ne répond pas favorablement à sa demande. Il est également égale aux FARDC de quitter le territoire congolais car leurs chevaux y seront occupés et monéviée du regard des leurs multiples exactions commises envers les congolais.

Il est inique que rien ne vaut le dialogue, cependant, il est impossible d'accueillir des initiatives constructives et du reste se rencontrent pas des préoccupations des congolais à l'exemple du Dialogue National en préparation.

La Conférence Nationale Souveraine, le Dialogue Inter Congrès de Sud-Congo, élections de 2006 et de 2011, la conférence de Komé qui a lieu en 2009 n'ont pas instauré l'autorité de l'État en RDC, pure entente le Dialogue Congolais.
prévu à Kinshasa ne le sera pas non plus mais seule la bonne gouvernance restitue l’authenticité de l’État en RDC.

Pour ce faire, la coalition des groupes armés du Congo dit non à ce nouveau forum de conciliation et suggère plutôt à ce que le 297 million des dollars américains prévus aux dépenses dudit Dialogue soit affectés à l’organisation des élections présidentielles et législatives anticipées d’ici 2014, parce que les congolais ont plus besoin de la bonne gouvernance qui engendrera un souverain de paix et l’éradication de la pauvreté et non des pourparlers de distraction pendant que la misère et les massacres de la population se poursuivent.

Voici que le plus de 3 mois que le gouvernement a fait à Kampala et il ne se sentait pas seulement un gaspillage ridicule de temps et une forte dissipation de fonds mais également une grave commère car, ce qui est envisagé pour être reconnu au M23 pourrait être déjà en 2009 et éviter les préjudices causés à la République.

VIVE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ;
VIVE LA BONNE GOUVERNANCE EN RDC ;
VIVE LA COALITION DES GROUPES ARMÉS DU CONGO.
Annex 39

Passport copies of two Ugandan nationals recruited by Kakolele Bwambale and Col. David Lusenge in Beni area in March 2013
List of persons abducted on 22 May 2013 at Mbau, Beni Territory, North Kivu, compiled by a local NGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Date of Abduction</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Place of Abduction</th>
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<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Dera</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>22/05/2013</td>
<td>Enfant</td>
<td>Mbau, Beni Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Kabu</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22/05/2013</td>
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<td>05</td>
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The listing of these persons indicates that of the majority of them are children. In this particular case, a man named Kabu, aged 14, was taken by armed groups. According to the information received, he is an element of the population vulnerable to human rights abuses and the international community is taking the necessary steps to address this issue.
### Annex 41

**Abductions in Beni Territory, North Kivu, January-May 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number of hostages</th>
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<td>Men</td>
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<td>Tenambo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>Mukoko</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January</td>
<td>Tenambo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 February</td>
<td>Kasimbi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 February</td>
<td>Kanana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mukomuko</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Salimbamba</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Tedeu-Kanana</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>Kasese, Chuchubo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Irango</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 April</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>16 April</td>
<td>Kasuku-Bilimani</td>
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<td>Mamundioma</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Casualties</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>21 April</td>
<td>PK 13 on Mbau-Kamango road</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>Kokola</td>
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<td>11 May</td>
<td>Vemba</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Group compiled information obtained from Congolese government and UN sources, as well as local civil society organizations in Beni territory.
Annex 42

Former RCD-K/ML members among M23 surrenders in Rwanda, as provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda

1. PROFILE, Date d'entrée 16/March/2013

S/NO:318

RANK: Civil

FULL NAMES: PATANDJILA PALUKU ANDY LAURENT

F/NAMES: PATANDJILA                        M/NAMES: PALUKU ANDY LAURENT

APPOINTMENT: Minister of Trade and Industry

AGE: 50 Ans

S/NO:290

RANK: Civil

FULL NAMES: KASEREKA JACQUES

F/NAMES: MUNBERE MATE                        M/NAMES: KATUNGU ESTHER

APPOINTMENT: Cadre Politique

AGE: 50 Ans
1. PROFILE, Date d’entrée 16/March/2013

RANK: Civil

FULL NAMES: KASEREKA KAMABU
F/NAMES: KASESO KAMABU M/NAMES: JOSEPHINE KITSA

APPOINTMENT: Cadre Politique
AGE: 33 Ans

RANK: Civil

FULL NAMES: KATEMBO JANVIER
F/NAMES: KAMERE M/NAMES: KAHINDO

APPOINTMENT: Cadre Politique
AGE: 29 Ans
1. PROFILE, Date d’entrée 16/March/2013

RANK: Civil

FULL NAMES: KATEMBO MBUSA Olivier

F/NAMES: KATEMBO LEONARD  M/NAMES: KATINDI WAULWA MELANIE

APPOINTMENT: Cadre Politique

AGE: 30 Ans
Annex 43

Kakule Sikula Lafontaine (picture taken by the UN)

General Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, head of UCPC; 13 March 2013.
Annex 44

Attack on Mambasa — 7 January 2013 (pictures taken by local sources)

People flee Mambasa town at 0818h on 6 January 2013 as a result of an attack by the armed group led by Paul Sadala, aka Morgan

Morgan (left) and Manu (right) sitting at 1208h on 6 January 2013 in Mambasa.
A FARDC soldier stomps on a suspected Mai Mai man’s stomach at 1517h on 7 January 2013 at the Hotel Pygmy in Mambasa town.

While two FARDC soldiers hold down a suspected Mai Mai, a third soldier beats him with a strap that has a weighted end, at 1518 on 7 January 2013 at the Hotel Pygmy.

Suspected Mai Mai in FARDC custody at 1519h on 7 January 2013 at Hotel Pygmy.
A suspected Mai Mai is led out of Hotel Pygmy at 1522 on 7 January 2013.
Annex 45

Victim of Morgan Attack

Pregnant woman who was set on fire on 7 November 2012 by Morgan’s forces during an attack near Biakato, south of Mambasa town.
Annex 46

Mai Mai Morgan and some of his men, (pictures taken by local source)

Paul Sadala (aka Morgan); date unknown.
Manu (centre in sunglasses), a leader in Mai Mai Morgan, along with other members of Mai Mai Morgan; 30 June 2012.

Jean Pierre (aka JP, Docteur), the witch doctor for Mai Mai Morgan; 30 June 2012.
Annex 47

FRPI and COGAI leaders (pictures taken by local source)

General Justin Banaloki, aka Cobra Matata, Supreme Commander of FRPI, based at Gety; February 2012.

Colonel Bris Babi Kassima, aka Rolax, commander of FRPI brigade based at Aveba; February 2012.
Colonel Adirodhu Mbadhu, aka Adredu Mbadu, “chef d’Etat major general” of FRPI, based at Gety; February 2012.

Colonel Maki Singo, aka Hitler, commander of FPDDI, which is allied with FRPI and a member of COGAI; 22 May 2013.
Annex 48

Kata Katanga

This annex is based on Group interviews with 8 participants in the 23 March Lubumbashi events, while they were imprisoned in Ndolo Military Prison in Kinshasa; with 8 local leaders and community members in Kifita and Poteau 93 villages near Kinsevere; with a senior FARDC officer in Lubumbashi; with a group of 8 Katangan “notables” in Lubumbashi; with 4 leaders of CORAK Kata Katanga in Lubumbashi; with several MONUSCO and UN officials in Lubumbashi; and with 15 civil society leaders and witnesses of the 23 March events. The Group also reviewed documentary evidence, photos, and videos showing Kata Katanga’s march into Lubumbashi.

During February and early March 2013, representatives of Kata Katanga recruited people to join a protest march to Lubumbashi to demand the independence of Katanga. The recruits came from various places in central Katanga, and walked for several days to several weeks to reach Lubumbashi. Along the way, small groups gradually merged with each other and consolidated into several larger groups, which stayed away from main roads and traveled on foot through the bush. These groups stayed in villages, where they demanded or were given food and shelter by local populations.

On 17 March, one group of approximately 150 Kata Katanga elements arrived at Poteau 93 village, near the Kinsevere mining site. FARDC and PNC had been deployed to this area after February 2013 incursions; however, community members and leaders state that FARDC and PNC harassed and illegally taxed local populations after their arrival. In the evening of 17 March, FARDC warned local populations to leave, in anticipation of a battle with Kata Katanga.

On 18 March, FARDC and Kata Katanga waged a running battle in the villages of Sela, Tondolo and Mwati, near Kinsevere. During the fighting, FARDC killed six Kata Katanga, and mortally wounded a seventh. Local leaders took the Group to a cemetery in Kifita village where FARDC buried the six deceased young men in one grave (photo below).

Between 18 and 22 March, the various Kata Katanga groups converged in Ruashi, a commune several kilometers from Lubumbashi’s city center. Around 12pm on 23 March, 336 Kata Katanga set off on foot from Ruashi for Lubumbashi (photo below). Encouraged by cheering crowds numbering in the hundreds, the Kata Katanga marched in three groups. The first group consisted of the oldest members; the second group was mixed and included 5 women; the third group had younger members, including children. A small number of men had AK-47s and other weapons, but the majority were unarmed and carried sacks with their belongings.
At approximately 12.50 pm, as the group neared Camp Préfabriqué, a police post along the road to Lubumbashi, members of the PNC fired at the group. At least one Kata Katanga cadre fired a shot in return, but most fire came from the police, who fled their post as Kata Katanga continued to advance. During this exchange of fire, a stray bullet killed a 3-year-old girl.

As the group entered Lubumbashi, elements of the Republican Guard shot scores of rounds at them. Some members of Kata Katanga were killed and injured (photo below), including in the “tunnel” that runs under railroad tracks, and marks the entry into the center of the city.

The Kata Katanga group continued to hold its ranks and advance, with a member in the lead group holding the Katangan flag used during 1960-63, when Katanga was independent (photo below).

When the group approached the fountain in the center of town, one member climbed the statue of Moise Tshombe, father of Katangan independence in 1960, to affix the flag. Members of the state security forces shot and killed this man, then cut off his arm (photo below, surrounded by various items dropped by Kata Katanga members in the street).

The group continued to march through the city toward their destination of MONUSO Headquarters, at the corner of Avenue Kimbangu and Avenue Mama Yemo. Elements from the Republican Guard, FARDC, and PNC
continued to follow and shoot at the Kata Katanga marchers (photo below) The Kata Katanga group reached the MONUSCO HQ at 1345h (see photo below).

Video evidence shows that Kata Katanga also shot back to enable the marchers to cross intersections (photo below).

Republican Guard elements continued firing at the group as it entered the MONUSCO compound, causing damage to MONUSCO facilities and a PNC post outside, but no causalities (see para. 88 and Annex 66).

Inside the compound, MONUSCO staff negotiated with the group’s leader, Boya Kabila (photo below). Kabila agreed to have his elements disarm, but asked MONUSCO to pressure the DRC government to grant independence to Katanga.

The number of Kata Katanga in the MONUSCO compound was 242. The remaining elements were dead or wounded on
the streets of Lubumbashi; others fled. The group turned over weapons including AK-47s (18), RPG (1), machine gun (1), rifle (2), bows and arrows (25), and knives and machetes (66) (see photos below).

Kata Katanga members interviewed by the Group at Ndolo Prison in Kinshasa stated that some of the weapons were acquired after the FARDC-Kata Katanga battles near Kinsevere, while most of the light arms (bows and arrows, spears and machetes) were used by the marchers to hunt during their journey to Lubumbashi.

Of the 242 Kata Katanga that entered MONUSCO HQ, 52 were injured; sixteen were transported to a hospital. In the evening of 23 March, MONUSCO transferred the Kata Katanga elements to Congolese state authority, who transported 226 Kata Katanga to the Kasapa Prison in Lubumbashi.

In the late afternoon of 23 March, a truck from the nearby Gecamines facility traveled around Lubumbashi, collecting 23 bodies. Twenty were dead Kata Katanga, one was a FARDC soldier, one was the child killed near Camp Préfabriqué, and one was a woman killed by a stray bullet. The bodies were transported to the morgue at Sendwe Hospital in Lubumbashi.

As dusk fell on 26 March 2013, the Gecamines truck with a police escort took 20 coffins – containing the dead Kata Katanga – to a cemetery in Kimbembe, approximately 12km north of Lubumbashi. A backhoe had dug graves, and under the cover of darkness, the coffins were placed in the graves (photo below).

In response to the entry of Kata Katanga into Lubumbashi town, the FARDC were deployed in Manono, Pweto and Mitwaba in an effort to forestall further activities of Kata Katanga and other armed groups. For instance on 22 April, FARDC clashed with a Mai Mai of Petit-beau group on the Kilwa-Mitwaba road, in Muombe groupement, Mufunga sector, killing a Mai Mai leader and arresting several others (see photos below).
The Group has received numerous reports about FARDC abuses against local populations, such as harassment and illegal taxation, in the course of their operations against Kata Katanga. In May, the Group witnessed FARDC soldiers collecting a tax from a charcoal-trader at a checkpoint between Poteau 93 market center and Kinsevere mining factory (photo below). Locals informed the Group that FARDC levied between 1000 and 10000 Congolese francs ($1.11 to $11.11) on road users, depending on the nature of the merchandise ferried.
ADF commander Benjamin Kisokeranyo is in charge of intelligence, finances and supplies (picture shared by the Ugandan government)
Annex 50

FDLR deployments in the southern part of South Kivu (provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda)
Annex 51

FDLR deployments in North Kivu (provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda)
Annex 52

Map of the locations of the first FDLR attack in Rwanda on RDF positions at Muti and Kabuhanga on 27 November 2013 (provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda)
Annex 53

Map of the location of the second FDLR attack in Rwanda in the Virunga National Park, on 2 December 2013 (provided to the Group by the Government of Rwanda)
Annex 54

Mukamira camp, Rwanda — Items, including weapons, recovered by the RDF after the 27 November and 2 December 2012 FDLR attacks in Rwanda (pictures taken by the Group)

The RDF recovered a total of 33 weapons (guns, mortars, or grenade launchers) from FDLR combatants captured or killed during the attacks.

Three medium machine guns and 21 AK-47s  One R4 rifle
G3 rifle

7 60 mm mortars

255 60 mm shells

100 RPG grenades

7.62 mm ammunition
Identification documents recovered by RDF on FDLR combatants

FDLR identification card

FDLR training certificate, 8 December 2010
Annex 55

Hand-drawn map of the DRC-Rwanda border area and a list of radio signs recovered by RDF officers in the belongings of FDLR soldiers killed after they attacked Rwanda in November and December 2012 (shared with the Group by the Government of Rwanda)
Annex 56

Revocation of Fidèle Nzambyakira from the Burundian armed forces — October 2010
Annex 57

FPM combatants training — from FPM/ADN website (http://abatabazi.wordpress.com/au-front/) — image accessed on 21 January 2013
Annex 58

FPM weapons seized by Burundian armed forces after the October 2012 attack in Cibitoke (picture taken by the Group in April 2013)
Annex 59

Huts burned by the APCLS in the IDP camp at Kahe on 27 February 2013 (picture taken by the Group in March 2013)
Annex 60

Houses destroyed in Kitchanga following FARDC and APCLS fight on 27 February 2013 (first two photographs taken by the Group in March 2013, third photograph shared by the FARDC and taken on 27 February 2013)
Annex 61

Unexploded mortar shells fired on Kitchanga by the FARDC under Col. Mudahunga, on 27 February 2013 (picture taken by the Group in March 2013)
Annex 62

Provisional list of Kitchanga victims drafted by local authorities — March 2013

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<tr>
<th>No</th>
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Annex 63

Extract from the report of the Commission of Enquiry of the DRC government into the Kitchanga events
Annex 64

Attack on MONUSCO in Kisangani

On 20 November 2012, demonstrators in Kisangani (Orientale Province), who were upset about M23 capturing the city of Goma, attacked two MONUSCO facilities. One group attacked MONUSCO Headquarters by throwing stones at staff and facilities, rolling burning tires at a vehicle and the gate, and attempting to breach the wall; however, MONUSCO forces and PNC officers protected the facility and staff with minimal damage.

The same day, a second crowd of approximately 200 people attacked the MONUSCO Logistics Base (known as ONATRA). The crowd burned tires in front of the main gate, causing its destruction, and threw stones at MONUSCO staff and facilities. Some protestors breached the ONATRA perimeter, caused damage to several buildings and equipment, and burned and destroyed four UN vehicles. At the request of the MONUSCO Sector Commander in Kisangani, the 9th Military Region Commander of FARD, Gen. Jean Claude Kifwa, arrived with FARDC troops and helped to calm the situation at the ONATRA base.

Also on 20 November 2012, protestors attacked several other facilities in Kisangani including the office of the PPRD (President Kabila’s party), and the residence of the outgoing Governor Médard Autsai Asenga. Protesters also attacked two premises of the “Jesus le Seul Sauveur” church of Pasteur Runiga, then the political coordinator of M23.
Close-up of the forklift with the windows smashed by rocks thrown over the fence by protesters. (UN staff)

MONUSCO staff try to extinguish MONUSCO vehicles set on fire by protesters, inside the ONATRA base. Numerous rocks thrown by protesters at the vehicles and MONUSCO staff are visible on the ground. Photo taken by UN source at 1217h on 20 November 2012. (UN staff)

Four MONUSCO vehicles destroyed by fire and stones. (UN staff)

MONUSCO staff takes cover from rocks thrown by protesters while trying to extinguish MONUSCO vehicles on fire. Photo taken by UN source at 1229h on 20 November 2012. (UN staff)

Air conditioners ripped out of the walls of MONUSCO housing for security personnel by protesters who breached the west fence of the ONATRA base on 20 November. (UN staff)
Annex 65

Attacks on MONUSCO and Humanitarian Organizations in Bunia

On 20-21 November 2012, rioting in Bunia (Ituri District, Orientale Province) targeted facilities belonging to MONUSCO, various United Nations agencies, and international humanitarian organizations, as well as residences of UN and humanitarian staff. The rioting, which started when students and motorcycle taxi drivers demonstrated against the seizure of Goma by M23, was quickly manipulated by the senior PNC and FARDC officers in Bunia, and transformed into a two-day, organized looting spree.

Eyewitnesses in Bunia and a report by the District of Ituri specifically identified acting army commander Col. Willy Bonane Habarugira (see annex 66), a former RCD-Goma officer who has been deployed in Ituri since 2005, as participating in and organizing the looting of UN and humanitarian facilities and homes. Col. Bonane was the deputy commander of the Operational Zone in Ituri, but was acting commander during the looting spree due to the absence of Col. Fal Sikabwé, who was in Kinshasa. In addition, local residents and international staff identified PNC Chief Col. Juvénal Bideko (see annex 66) as participating in and directing attacks on UN and humanitarian compounds.

Crowds of people – sometimes mixed with police and soldiers – started attacking and looting facilities on the afternoon of 20 November. According to eyewitnesses – many of whom told the Group they were concerned for their safety by disclosing information about the attacks – police and soldiers guided the crowds to certain facilities and homes, and encouraged them to enter and loot. The attacks resumed on the morning of 21 November, and continued throughout the day into the evening.

The looting was systematic and almost exclusively targeted UN and humanitarian offices and homes, with more than three-dozen offices, warehouses, and homes affected. The looting came to end on 22 March, when Col. Fal returned to Bunia from Kinshasa, and imposed order in the city.

The UN facilities attacked were: MONUSCO Headquarters; MONUSCO House restaurant and guesthouse; the World Food Programme’s (WFP) warehouse and office; the office and psychosocial center of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the office and warehouse of the Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Police officers and soldiers also directed crowds to the residences of UN staff residences; many were looted, but in other cases the crowds were convinced to move on by guards or landlords who bribed or otherwise convinced the crowd to leave their house alone.

Looters, including police and soldiers, entered the compounds of numerous international humanitarian organizations including: Première Urgence-Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI), Solidarités International, Save the Children, Oxfam Québec, Welthungerhilfe (AAA) and Medair. While staff forestalled massive looting at some sites by bribing crowds, many offices, warehouses, and staff residences were pillaged and damaged. The looters stole food stocks, furniture, computers, printers, and cameras from UN offices, and similar items plus clothes and personal effects from staff homes. At some houses the looters
were so thorough and took their time to such an extent that they removed everything including the tiles from the walls of bathrooms.

During 21-22 November, UN and humanitarian staff moved to the MONUSCO military camp at Ndromo, where, on 22 November, they were subject to direct fire from FARDC elements outside the base. Most staff evacuated to Entebbe, Uganda on 23 November; however between 22-26 November, crowds regularly threw stones at Bangladeshi peacekeepers as they traveled on the road between Ndromo and MONUSCO Headquarters.

Looters also attacked four other sites in Bunia. They looted and burned the office of PPRD (President Kabila’s party), and the “Jesus le Seul Sauveur” church of Pasteur Runiga, then the political coordinator of M23. In addition, they stole money and other goods from the house of a gold dealer, and from the residence of staff from a minerals company.

Following the attacks, ten PNC and 3 FARDC were arrested and tried by the Military Tribunal in Bunia. Five PNC and 1 FARDC were convicted of pillaging; however no charges were brought against either Col. Bideko or Col. Bonane.

These attacks not only disrupted the work of MONUSCO and humanitarian agencies in Bunia, but have also strained relations between some parts of the local community and the international agencies serving them. These tensions persisted through early 2013, and manifested in several attacks on MONUSCO staff and vehicles during February and April in Bunia.
Close-up of a photo taken at 1600h on 20 November 2012, showing an armed FARDC soldier present as people attack MONUSCO personnel, vehicles and facilities.

Close-up of a photo taken at 1601h on 20 November 2012, showing two PNC policemen (lower left, lower right) and at least four FARDC soldiers, including a senior officer (with yellow epaulet on his shoulder) present at protesters attack MONUSCO personnel, vehicles, and facilities.

People throwing rocks at a MONUSCO vehicle near MONUSCO Headquarters on 20 November.

A close-up of the previous image shows a FARDC vehicle parked up the street.

Rocks impacting a MONUSCO vehicle near MONUSCO Headquarters on 20 November 2012.

Fire from a Molotov cocktail thrown over the east wall of the MONUSCO Headquarters on 20 November.
The paillote at MONUSCO House on fire as a result of a Molotov cocktail thrown over the east fence, at approximately 1630h on 20 November. FARDC soldiers, led by Colonel Bonane, subsequently looted the MONUSCO House restaurant, bar, and guesthouse.
Annex 66

FARDC and PNC organizers of 20-21 November 2012 looting of MONUSCO, UN and humanitarian offices, warehouses and homes in Bunia

Col. Willy Bonane Habarugira, FARDC.

Col. Juvénal Bideko, PNC.
Annex 67

Attack on MONUSCO in Lubumbashi

On 23 March 2013, elements of the Republican Guard shot at MONUSCO Headquarters in Lubumbashi. The Republican Guard had been pursuing a group of Kata Katanga, which had entered the MONUSCO compound (see para. 88). After the Kata Katanga entered, the Republican Guard surrounded the two sides of the compound that face the street. They shot through the front gate, breaking a window and destroying an air conditioner in the Security Office, and shot over the walls of the compound.

The Guard also shot up a PNC outpost near the back gate to MONUSCO HQ, destroying a television and causing other minor damage. There were no casualties among MONUSCO staff or the PNC guards, who had entered the MONUSCO compound when the Republican Guard arrived.

Window in MONUSCO’s Security Office smashed by a bullet fired through the main gate of the MONUSCO Headquarters in Lubumbashi on 23 March 2013.

Bullet hole in the wall of the MONUSCO Headquarters, shot by FARDC on 23 March 2013.

Bullet hole in the front gate of the MONUSCO Headquarters in Lubumbashi, shot by a FARDC soldier on 23 March 2013.
Bullet hole in the front gate of the MONUSCO Headquarters in Lubumbashi, shot by a FARDC soldier on 23 March 2013.
Annex 68

M23 communiqué denying the recruitment and use of child soldiers — 11 June 2013

COMMUNIQUE N°009/DCPM/M23/2013

La Direction du Mouvement du 23 Mars s’inquiète profondément du contenu d’un récent communiqué de la MONUSCO faisant état d’une prétendue menace de recrutement dont pourraient faire l’objet 53 ex-enfants soldats dans le territoire de Nyiragongo et dont notre Mouvement serait responsable.

En fait, ce communiqué qui se fonde sur des faits inexacts ne sert que de diversion sur la chasse à l’homme et des exactions dirigées actuellement contre des personnes appartenant à la communauté Rwandophone dans la ville de Goma que la MONUSCO cautions par son silence flagrant. Des citoyens Rwandophones de Goma, hommes d’affaires, fonctionnaires de l’État, étudiants, élèves, etc. sont enlevés à leurs domiciles la nuit comme le jour par des membres des services secrets, torturés et acheminés à une destination inconnue. Comme dans tous les autres cas, la prétendue collaboration avec le M23 sert de prétexte pour couvrir ces exactions d’État. Et les 17.000 hommes qui constituent le personnel militaire de la MONUSCO bénéficiant de la liberté de mouvement sur toute l’étendue du territoire national, y compris l’espace sécurisé par notre Mouvement sont incapables d’assumer leur mandat qui consiste à la protection des populations civiles.

S’agissant des enfants qui seraient sous menace d’enrôlement dans notre espace, notre Mouvement est disposé à offrir sa collaboration à la MONUSCO, au cas où elle en aurait besoin, pour garantir la sécurité à ces enfants dont cette organisation onusienne est la seule à connaître l’identité et la localisation.

Dans sa philosophie politique ainsi que ses pratiques, les convictions de notre Mouvement sont claires en matière de protection des enfants : ceux-ci ont leur place dans leur famille et à l’école. C’est pour cette raison que notre armée, notre police ainsi que notre administration observent scrupuleusement ces principes et ces organes ne sont exclusivement réservés qu’aux adultes volontaires. La MONUSCO se rappellera qu’en date du 15 mars 2013, notre Mouvement avait remis aux organisations humanitaires 13 enfants soldats capturés dans les rangs du trio Bosco Ntaganda, Jean-Marie Runiga et Baudouin Ngareyu à l’issue de 16 jours des combats. Nous n’avons jamais nourri une quelconque intention d’enrôler des enfants dans notre Mouvement ni de les utiliser de quelle que manière que ce soit. Dans notre espace, les écoles et les centres d’encadrement des enfants fonctionnent normalement et ces derniers, sécurisés par notre police, s’y rendent massivement et en toute liberté.
Les annonces sensationnelles de la MONUSCO sur des faits inexistantes ne devraient lui servir ni de cause d'excuse ni d'un quelconque acte prouvant qu'elle s'acquitte correctement de ses responsabilités dès lors qu'elle demeure inactive face à des exactions sélectives dirigées contre des citoyens pour leur appartenance ethnique ou pour leurs opinions. Les moyens matériels et humains ainsi que la liberté de mouvement dont elle dispose devraient servir à cette fin. La tragédie humaine causée par l'inaction de la MINUAR en 1994 au Rwanda est un cas d'école dont la MONUSCO devrait tirer leçon.

La MONUSCO ferait œuvre utile de veiller au secours des personnes qui font actuellement les frais des services secrets du Gouvernement de Kinshasa dans la ville de Goma en lieu et place des propos diffamatoires et des procès d'intention qu'elle tient à l'encontre du Mouvement du 23 mars pour des faits qui n'existent pas.

Fait à Bunagana, le 11 juin 2013

Le Chef de Département de la Communication, Presse et Médias du Mouvement du 23 Mars

Amani KABASHA
Annex 69

Children in Kata Katanga — 23 March 2013

Some of the 45 children separated from Kata Katanga on 23 March 2013 in the MONUSCO compound at Lubumbashi.

MONUSCO travel authorization for the transfer of the 30 Kata Katanga children from Kinshasa back to Lubumbashi
Annex 70

Extract from AR Gold export papers, mentioning the destination of 10.1 kg of DRC gold
Annex 71

Uganda, Gold Exports, 2006-2012 (kg)

![Graph showing gold exports from Uganda, 2006-2012](image)

Annex 72

Gold exports from Burundi, 1 January to 31 March 2013

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<tr>
<th>Comptoir name</th>
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<td>Golden Gold</td>
<td>127.454</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>552.403</strong></td>
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Source: Burundian mining authorities
Annex 73

Letter dated 6 October 2012 from Mukungwe head of cooperative to T2 Regiment
Annex 74

Bags of cassiterite in Njingala on 23 May 2013 (picture taken by the Group)
Annex 75

CMM pledge to implement due diligence procedures —
October 2012

ACTE D’ENGAGEMENT A L’EXERCICE
DU DEVOIR DE DILIGENCE

0. PREAMBULE

Nous, CONGO MINERALS & METALS « SPRL », Entité de Traite-
ment de catégorie A, reconnaisant avoir été suspendu par lettre
n°CAB.MIN/MINES/01/0332/2012 du 15 mai 2012 pour avoir violé
les dispositions de la Note circulaire n°002/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2011
du 06 septembre 2011 relative à l’application obligatoire des direc-
tives et recommandations du Guide du Devoir de Diligence de
l’OCDE et de la résolution 1882 (2010) du Conseil de Sécurité de
l’ONU dans le secteur minier congolais ;

Tenant compte du caractère continu, évolutif, positif et réactif du
devoir de diligence raisonnable ;
Sur décision de la haute direction de la société, déclarons avoir con-
pu, adopté et mis à la disposition de nos fournisseurs, nos part-
nairex extérieurs, les autorités du secteur minier ainsi que de notre
personnel les mesures suivantes :

1. La nomination d’une personne responsable de l’exercice du
devoir de diligence raisonnable au sein de l’entreprise.

2. Notre adhésion à l’ITSCi
Huaying pledge — July 2012

Huaying Trading Company SpRL
N.R.C.2666  I.D.Nationale 5-128-N4911E
Nº Import / Export PM / S / 007-08/10/000108E

ACTE D'ENGAGEMENT

Préambule.
Nous, HUAYING TRADING COMPANY SpRL, en cours de transformation du Comptoir en Entité de Traitement de catégorie A,

Souhaitant, par la présente, obtenir l’agrément de notre ex. comptoir au titre d’Entité de Traitement de catégorie A dont notre dossier administratif pour l’obtention de cet agrément est déjà constitué et disponible dans tous les différents services du Ministère des Mines avec en annexe tous les preuves de paiement des relevances et cautions payées.
Annex 76

Letter from the Minister of Mines to the Governor of North Kivu requesting a team to be sent to qualify Bisie mine
La Province du Nord-Kivu est l'une des provinces productrices des 3T. En dépit de l'agression dont la RDC est victime et de l'occupation d'une partie de votre Province par les forces négatives de M 23 et d'autres groupes armés non étatiques, il est des territoires hors des conflits pour autoriser les activités minières, et cela passe par la qualification et la validation des sites minières.

Aussi, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 4 de l'Arrêté Ministériel n°058/CAB.MIN/Minres/01/2012 du 29 février 2012 fixant les procédures de qualification et de validation des sites minières des filières aurifères et stannifères, je vous demande d'instruire le Ministre Provincial en charge des Mines, des réception de la présente, de constituer une équipe conjointe, en vue de procéder à la qualification et la validation des sites minières du Territoire de Walikale.

En effet, la constitution de l'équipe conjointe vise à garantir la transparence du processus de qualification et de validation des sites minières, ainsi que l'objectivité des analyses découlant des informations récoltées sur le site minier.

Dans ce cadre, le déploiement de l'équipe conjointe sur le terrain doit être effectif au plus tard 15 mars 2013 conformément aux dispositions de l'Arrêté susvisé.

L'équipe conjointe est supervisée par le Représentant du Ministre Provincial ayant les Mines dans ses attributions, assisté du Représentant de la MONUSCO Provincial. Les fonctions du Rapporteur sont assurées par le Représentant du BGR. J'attends le rapport de l'équipe à la fin de ce mois en cours.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Gouverneur, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Martin KABWECULU
Annex 77

Unnumbered stored cassiterite bags in Njingala on 23 May 2013
(picture taken by the Group)
Annex 78

Letter from the Governor of North Kivu requesting removal of Mubi minerals, 27 May 2013

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO.
GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL DU NORD-KIVU

CABINET DU GOUVERNEMENT DE PROVINCE

Le Gouverneur

Goma, le 27 mai 2013

N° 017 / PDM / CAB / GP - NK / 2013.

Transmis copie pour information à :
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Général aux Mines ;
- Monsieur le Coordonnateur Général du SAECCMA ;
- Monsieur le Directeur Général du CECG ;
- Monsieur le Coordonnateur du projet PROMINES ;
- Monsieur le Représentant de PACT/TRI ;
- Monsieur le Représentant de BGIR ;
- Monsieur le Représentant de l’USAID ;
- Monsieur le Représentant de MONUSCO/JMAC (Tous) à Kinshasa ;
- Monsieur le Chef de Division Provinciale des Mines et Géologie du Nord-Kivu ;
- Monsieur le Chef d’Antenne Provinciale du SAECCMA ;
- Monsieur le Chef d’Antenne du CECG / Goma (Tous) à Goma.

Objet : Demande d’évacuation de l’ats de minerais résiduels entreposés au Nord-Kivu

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Mines à KINSHASA.

Excellence,

J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer la présente

Cette démarche se justifie essentiellement par le fait que, après la levée de la mesure de suspension qui frappait les entités de traitement C.I.M.M. et HUAYING, celles-ci ont commencé à recycler les rejets de leurs opérations antérieures. En outre, le dernier cité a été incendiée ces derniers années en septembre 2010, dans les installations aujourd’hui vandales, du comptoir P.A.B.G qui n’a plus jamais ouvert ses portes. Le nouvel acquéreur voulant entrer en possession du bien acheté, le Ministère Provincial en charge des Mines à autoriser ce déplacement qui a été effectué en date du 2 mai 2013 sous la supervision des services techniques.
Par ailleurs, toutes les entités, y compris celles qui n’étaient pas frappées par la mesure de suspension disposent encore de stocks de cassitérite provenant de sites non-qualifiés. L’inventaire de ces minerais bloqués à Mubi (Territoire de Walikale) ayant donné 406 Tonnes, j’estime qu’on pourrait avoisiner les 450 Tonnes, qu’il faudrait évacuer afin de commencer, après qualification des sites, le processus de traçabilité avec un stock zéro. Il sied aussi de tenir compte de l’aspect social, étant donné que ces entités, doivent, après analyse, apurer les transactions avec leurs fournisseurs à savoir de nombreux négociants, voire des coopératives en détresse.

Dans l’attente d’une suite que j’espère positive et rapide, je vous prie d’agréer, Excellence, l’expression de mes sentiments patriotiques.

Honorable Julien PALUKU KAHONGYA : =

[Signature]
Annex 79

List of certified Maniema sites, Annex of Ministerial Arrêté — 19 October 2012

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Annex 80

Maniema Provincial Arrêté banning trade of untagged minerals from validated mines — 12 April 2013
Considérant l'importance nécessité d'assurer la traçabilité du circuit de commercialisation des produits miniers stannifères dans la Province du Maniema;

Considérant les avis du Comité Provincial de Suivi du Secteur Minier;

Sur proposition du Ministre provincial de l'Économie, Mines et Énergie ;

Le Conseil des Ministres entendu,

ARRETE

Article 1° : Il est strictement interdit dans la Province du Maniema, la circulation et la commercialisation des minerais stannifères non étiquetés dans les sites validés et qualifiés.

Article 2 : Les minerais stannifères dont question ci-dessus sont : Cassitérite, Wolframite et Coltan.

Article 3 : Tout contrevenant aux dispositions du présent Arrêté sera passible des peines prévues par la législation minérale en vigueur.

Article 4 : Le Ministre Provincial de l’Économie, Mines et Énergie est chargé de l'exécution du présent Arrêté qui son ses effets à la date de sa signature.

Fat à Kindu, le 01 AVR 2013

TUTU SALUMU Pascal,-
Annex 81

Example of ICGLR certificate

[Image of ICGLR certificate]

ICGLR REGIONAL CERTIFICATE

Product: ___________________________

This is to certify that Consignment No. ___________________________

originating from ______ in ______ Province

in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been mined, traded and handled in accordance
with the requirements of the ICGLR standards.

Name and address of the exporter: ___________________________

Name and address of the importer: ___________________________

Exporter Lot Number: ___________________________

Date of shipment: ___________________________

Date of expiry of certificate: ___________________________

Shipped by: ___________________________

Transiting through: ___________________________

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<th>Designated Mineral</th>
<th>Ore type</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Purity</th>
<th>Value</th>
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Security measure
foil, hologram or ink mark
(We have to discuss)

Name of issuing Officer: ___________________________

Signature of regulatory authority: ___________________________

Position: ___________________________ ID #: ___________________________

Date: ___________________________ Date: ___________________________

[Signature]

To be returned to:
Ministry of Mines
Centre of Evaluation, Expertise and Certification of Precious and Semi-Precious
Minerals (CEEC)
17th Floor, BCDC Tower
Boulevard de 30 Juin
Kinshasa, DRC
Annex 82

Truck loaded with cassiterite bags from Walikale and seized by DRC authorities in Masisi in June 2013 (picture taken by the Group in June 2013)
Annex 83

Bags of Congolese minerals seized in 2012 in Burundi (picture taken by the Group in April 2013)
Annex 84

Plane being loaded with minerals on Shabunda airstrip, March 2013
Annex 85

Ivory

A carved ivory tusk from a forest elephant, on sale for $100; May 2013.
Annex 86

Ugandan government seizures of Ivory, Hippo or Rhino in Uganda, from January 2012 to 14 May 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Location of Seizure</th>
<th>Item Seized</th>
<th>Nationality of Smuggler(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 February 2012</td>
<td>Entebbe International Airport (EIA)</td>
<td>17 pieces of worked ivory</td>
<td>Chinese (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 2012</td>
<td>Pakwatch (customs office)</td>
<td>99 pieces of worked ivory and 10 pieces of raw ivory; 162 kg of hippo teeth; 3 bones of elephants; 9 lizard skins.</td>
<td>Chinese (1), Congolese (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 March 2012</td>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>3 kg of worked pieces of rhino</td>
<td>Indian (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 April 2012</td>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>6 kg of raw ivory pieces</td>
<td>Chinese (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 2012</td>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>473 kg of raw ivory pieces</td>
<td>Liberian (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 2012</td>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>5 kg of worked ivory</td>
<td>Unknown (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 July 2012</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>92 kg of pieces of hippo</td>
<td>Ugandan (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 August 2012</td>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>9 pieces of raw ivory</td>
<td>Liberian (1)</td>
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<td>10 August 2012</td>
<td>Old Kampala</td>
<td>66 pieces of hippo teeth and 1 piece of raw ivory</td>
<td>Ugandan (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 September 2012</td>
<td>Rubirizi</td>
<td>6 pieces of raw ivory</td>
<td>Ugandan (3)</td>
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</table>

On 7 February 2013, the Government of Uganda announced that representatives of the Ugandan and American militaries had recovered 6 pieces of raw ivory in southeast Central African Republic, which were reportedly stashed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.