Letter dated 21 June 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon
I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 2093 (2013), adopted on 6 March 2013, the Security Council decided to authorize the member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 28 February 2014. In paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Council requested the African Union to keep it regularly informed on the implementation of the mandate of AMISOM through the provision of written reports to the Secretary-General every 90 days after the adoption of the resolution.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2093 (2013). It provides an update on the main developments that have taken place in Somalia since the adoption of the resolution, as well as on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and related issues. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

II. Main developments in Somalia

3. The following paragraphs cover the main political, security and humanitarian developments that occurred in Somalia during the period under review.

A. Political aspects

4. The political situation in Somalia has continued to improve. Under the leadership of the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the Federal Government of Somalia pursued its efforts to implement its six-pillar policy framework adopted in October 2012, which revolves around security and rule of law, economic recovery, dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building collaborative international relations and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia.

5. On 3 March 2013, the Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, presented a report to the Federal Parliament on the progress made during his Cabinet’s first 100 days in office. The report highlighted the improved security situation, marked by the retaking of major towns from Al-Shabaab and the reduction of piracy off the coast of Somalia. It also outlined reforms in the judiciary following the adoption by the Federal Government of a justice sector action plan for the period 2013-2015. Furthermore, the report covered steps taken to improve the provision of social services, notably a three-year plan to enrol 1 million children in school and the standardization of the education curriculum in Somalia. The Prime Minister indicated that the Federal Government had presented a number of bills to
Parliament, including draft laws on oil production, fishing, toxic waste, the protection of Somali waters the media and civil aviation.

6. Between mid-February and March 2013, the Prime Minister undertook a “national listening tour”, during which he visited major towns in Galgaduud, Puntland, Lower Juba, Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions. These visits were undertaken in pursuance of the national stabilization plan adopted in February 2013, which includes a road map for the establishment of local administrations across the country, particularly in those towns that have been recovered from Al-Shabaab by the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) with the support of AMISOM.

7. Although the Prime Minister’s listening tours have been largely successful, the process of establishing a regional administration for “Jubaland” faces serious challenges. This process began in Nairobi in June 2012 with a meeting that brought together participants from the Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions under the aegis of the Grand Stabilization Plan adopted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 27 January 2012. Following the election of President Mohamud in October 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia declared that the ongoing processes to establish local administrations should be led from Mogadishu and should be more inclusive.

8. On 28 February 2013, more than 500 delegates gathered in Kismaayo, Lower Juba region, to discuss and plan the proposed formation of the “Jubaland” state. On 26 March 2013, the Prime Minister of Somalia travelled to Kismaayo and informed the “Jubaland” political, clan and religious leaders that the Jubaland State Conference was unconstitutional and unilateral. He directed that the Conference be disbanded, the Kismaayo air and seaports be handed over to the Federal Government of Somalia, and all militias be integrated into SNSF. Further, the Government insists that all areas still under Al-Shabaab control in the region must be recovered before the state can be formed, on the understanding that it will thereafter appoint regional governors for Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo. However, the delegates gathering at the Jubaland State Conference continued with their deliberations, insisting that the process was legal under the provisional Constitution of Somalia.

9. At their twenty-first extraordinary summit meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 3 May 2013, the IGAD Heads of State and Government reiterated the need for all ongoing processes to establish regional administrations to be anchored on a set of principles, namely leadership by the Federal Government of Somalia; respect for the provisional Constitution of Somalia; inclusive consultative process; and the fight against Al-Shabaab as the primary focus of the Federal Government, AMISOM and regional and international partners. They requested that the Federal Government align its national stabilization plan with these principles.

10. On 15 May 2013, the delegates at the Kismaayo Conference formally established the “Jubaland State” and then elected the Ras Kamboni militia leader, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”, as its President. Shortly thereafter, the former Minister of Defence, Barre Aden Shire “Hirale” declared himself President of “Jubaland”. This development has raised concerns that fighting could erupt between supporters of the rival “Presidents” if an agreement is not swiftly reached to resolve this standoff.
11. In an effort to defuse tensions and following the decision by the twenty-first extraordinary summit meeting of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, a high-level fact-finding and confidence-building mission travelled to Mogadishu and Kismaayo from 16 to 19 May 2013. At their twenty-second extraordinary session, held in Addis Ababa on 24 May 2013, the IGAD Heads of State and Government, having considered the report of the fact-finding mission, noted with satisfaction the agreement of all stakeholders to respect the provisional Constitution of Somalia, to accept the Government’s leadership and to conduct the process in an all-inclusive manner and in a way that helps in the fight against Al-Shabaab. The Heads of State and Government urged the Federal Government of Somalia to convene and lead a reconciliation conference, with support from IGAD, while consulting key stakeholders in the Juba regions to chart a road map on the establishment of an interim administration and the formation of a permanent regional administration. They also called on all parties in Mogadishu and Kismaayo to uphold the tenets of the five principles enumerated in the communiqué of their twenty-first extraordinary summit and reiterated their previous call for the Federal Government to integrate the various militia forces as soon as possible into a unified national command of the Somali national army.

12. In the meantime, on 17 May 2013, a group of 100 members of Parliament tabled a motion requesting Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon to appear before Parliament for a vote of confidence. They claimed that the Council of Ministers had functioned well below expectations. On 22 May 2013, those members of Parliament abandoned the vote of confidence against the Prime Minister, but warned the Government that it would face further parliamentary interventions if it did not improve governance in the country.

13. During the period under review, the Federal Government of Somalia also continued its engagement with “Somaliland”. In the spirit of previous meetings between the Federal Government of Somalia and “Somaliland” held in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates on 20 and 21 June and on 28 June 2012, respectively, President Mohamud met with the “Somaliland” President, Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo, in Ankara on 13 April 2013. The two parties agreed to continue dialogue and to consolidate cooperation in the sharing of intelligence and the training of security sector professionals in order to become more effective in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes in Somali waters, among others.

14. The Government has taken steps to enhance financial transparency and accountability, especially through the establishment of a special finance facility with the assistance of Norway. International institutions have renewed their relations with Somalia. Notably, on 12 April 2013, the International Monetary Fund recognized the Federal Government of Somalia, paving the way for the resumption of relations after a 22-year hiatus, including the provision of technical support and policy advice to the Government. However, the Fund has indicated that it will not lend money to Somalia until the country’s US$ 352 million debt has been cleared. The Federal Government of Somalia is also engaging other partners in order to mobilize more development assistance.

15. On 7 May 2013, in London, the United Kingdom and Somalia co-hosted the second London Conference on Somalia. Fifty-four friends and partners of Somalia attended. The Conference agreed that Somalia had made significant progress,
stressed the need for sustained commitment of its international partners and urged that continued results-orientated support be given. In this regard, Somalia’s partners reiterated their determination to provide long-term support. A special conference on Somalia, co-organized by the Government of Japan and the African Union, was held on the margins of the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development on 31 May 2013 to discuss the socioeconomic aspects of Somalia’s peacebuilding efforts, particularly measures to support Somali-led efforts to achieve economic recovery and service delivery.

B. Security situation

16. The security situation, while still very fragile, continues to improve. At the end of March 2013, AMISOM forces and SNSF recovered the last stretch of the 240-km Mogadishu-Baidoa road from Al-Shabaab. Since then, efforts have focused on consolidating control over the recovered towns. Owing to both operational and resource limitations, there have been no major advances to recover more territory from Al-Shabaab. Consequently, the following key towns remain under its control: the port city of Barawe, in sector 1; Jamaame, Jilib and Buale, in sector 2; Baardheere and Dinsoor, in sector 3; and Bulo Burto, in sector 4.

17. On 17 March 2013, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), in anticipation of AMISOM deployment in sector 3 as stipulated in the Mission’s operational benchmarks, withdrew from Hudur in Bakool region. However, AMISOM, for reasons linked to a lack of enablers (helicopters), was unable to deploy its forces quickly in the positions vacated by ENDF. As SNSF was also unable to retain control of the town owing to logistical and command and control challenges, Al-Shabaab insurgents seized the opportunity and retook the town. The withdrawal of ENDF occasioned tension in the region, with a reported exodus of the civilian population fearing an upsurge of Al-Shabaab activities. The Ethiopian authorities have also informed the African Union Commission of their intention to withdraw ENDF from other towns in the Bay region, including Qansax Dheere and Bardale. As indicated below, AMISOM is closely coordinating with ENDF to put in place a successor arrangement that would ensure that no security vacuum is created by the ENDF withdrawal. However, the lack of force enablers is hampering a quick deployment of the requisite forces, as stipulated in the AMISOM operational benchmarks.

18. Overall, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab has decreased because of power struggles within the hierarchy of the group and the successive defeats it has suffered as a result of the military operations of SNSF, AMISOM and ENDF. However, the group is far from being defeated and hence the fight against Al-Shabaab cannot be declared won. Al-Shabaab has launched a number of probing and asymmetrical attacks against AMISOM, SNSF and ENDF positions. These operations have increased in tenacity, as demonstrated by the suicide attack on the Supreme Court complex in Mogadishu on 14 April 2013. The group’s fighters have melted into various communities in different regions, seeking to exploit clan rivalries and political disagreements, the absence of effective local administrations and the attendant lack of social services in certain areas. In Mogadishu, for instance, the situation has necessitated the launching, since 15 May 2013, of a joint operation involving SNSF, the National Intelligence and Security Agency of Somalia and
AMISOM and code-named “Operation Stabilize Mogadishu”, with the aim of curbing Al-Shabaab attacks in the capital. The operation is still under way.

19. Meanwhile, in those areas that have not been liberated, Al-Shabaab continues to enjoy the freedom to organize, train and access logistics, including weapons and munitions. During the reporting period, there has been an influx of military equipment, notably through Haradhere and the ports of Cadale and Barawe. In the Juba valley especially, Al-Shabaab continues to operate, using the towns of Jamaame, Jilib and Buale as launching pads. However, there has not been any major incident in the sector, except for on-and-off attacks in Dobley. Furthermore, the security situation in the port city of Kismaayo has deteriorated following the election, on 15 May 2013, of the leader of the Ras Kamboni militia as President of the “Jubaland State”. As indicated in paragraph 10 above, the former Minister of Defence, Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”, also declared himself President and two additional presumptive “Presidents” have since stepped forward. There are reports indicating that the two sides have been arming in anticipation of an eventual confrontation. Further, Al-Shabaab is reported to have recently infiltrated the city of Kismaayo and built up forces in Bulagadud, Kamusuma, Buulo Xaaji and Jana Cabdalla, with the intention of getting involved in any fighting for the city, a major source of revenue that it lost in September 2012. If clashes erupt in Kismaayo, it could draw in other regions on both sides, exacerbate divisions between the two major clans of Hawiye and Darod and create space for Al-Shabaab to exploit the situation.

C. Humanitarian situation

20. According to the data of United Nations agencies there are over 1 million Somali refugees in the region, hosted mainly in Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. There are also some 1 million persons displaced within Somalia, living in difficult conditions in camps across the country.

21. Despite the efforts of both traditional humanitarian agencies and other actors, the current humanitarian response remains inadequate, owing in part to access restrictions, as well as funding gaps. Although the security situation is improving, there are a number of security incidents which continue to inhibit access and consequently affect the delivery of assistance to the needy population. The near absence of public infrastructure, including health, education and other social services, contributes to the worsening plight of the war-weary population, particularly the vulnerable groups, including children, women and the disabled, who continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict in Somalia.

III. Deployment of AMISOM

22. During the reporting period, AMISOM attained its mandated uniformed personnel strength of 17,731. With regard to the AMISOM military deployment in sector 1, there are 85 staff officers at the Force Headquarters and 4,335 Ugandan and 4,252 Burundian troops, making a total of 8,672 troops. In sector 2, there are 4,040 Kenyan troops and 664 troops from Sierra Leone, who started their deployment in late April 2013. As this report was being finalized, relief-in-place
operations between the Kenyan and Sierra Leonean troops were in progress; Kenya will draw down its troops by a battalion. A further 186 Sierra Leonean troops will be deployed in Kismaayo. In sector 3, there are 1,180 Burundian and 1,888 Ugandan troops. Additional troops have been redeployed from sector 1 to relieve ENDF in Baidoa town and the outlying areas. In sector 4, there are 999 Djiboutian troops supported by units of ENDF and SNSF.

23. Regarding the AMISOM police component, there are currently 490 police officers serving in the Mission. This includes two formed police units of 140 personnel each from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 210 individual police officers. Plans are under way to deploy additional individual police officers in order to reach the planned strength of 560. Also, as articulated in the strategic concept, one formed police unit will shortly be relocated from sector 1 to sector 2, while individual police officers will be deployed to other sectors once the requisite infrastructure and security arrangements are in place.

24. Furthermore, Mahamat Salah Annadif, my Special Representative and the head of AMISOM, has assumed duties in Mogadishu, where he is now based, using the good offices of the African Union and closely supporting the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali political leadership. Mr. Annadif is being supported by a complement of political, civil, humanitarian and gender affairs officers in Mogadishu, who also undertake regular visits to the four sectors in support of the stabilization efforts of the Federal Government. Presently, 25 out of the 56 international civilian personnel of the Mission are deployed in Mogadishu, while the remainder, who are mostly procurement, finance and local support staff, remain in Nairobi. The Commission is considering the deployment of additional international civilian staff into the mission area as security conditions improve and the required administrative and logistical support is made available.

25. The coordination mechanisms outlined in the strategic concept, namely the Joint Coordination Mechanism and the Military Operations Coordination Committee, continue to provide the platform for guidance and coordination at the strategic level. So far, two meetings of the Mechanism and nine meetings of the Committee have been convened, the last of which took place on 14 January and 10 April 2013, respectively. The meetings of the Mechanism have finalized the recruitment guidelines and operational plans for the expansion operations. The Committee representation has been expanded to include the Inspectors-General of the police-contributing countries, namely Nigeria and Uganda. The scope of its agenda has also been expanded to include discussions on mission management issues such as handling of disengaged fighters and policies related to the AMISOM troop-contributing countries.

26. At the last meeting of the Committee, important decisions were taken, including the relief of ENDF in sector 3. Furthermore, it was agreed that AMISOM had reached its operational limit and should not undertake any further expansion operations because of the major strategic challenges facing the Mission. A number of factors are at play here. While the international community has continued to make pledges of substantial support to make SNSF an effective force, the support has yet to materialize. In the meantime, the effectiveness of AMISOM joint operations with SNSF are being seriously undermined by the lack of basic logistic supplies for SNSF, including ammunition, fuel and rations, as well as medical support. As a result, AMISOM has been compelled to use its limited resources to
hold the secured areas, instead of handing them over to the Somali authorities and undertaking further expansion operations as envisaged in the strategic concept and the concept of operations. The situation is further compounded by the lack of critical force enablers for the Mission, such as attack helicopters, utility helicopters and engineering and transport units. Additionally, the present number of serviceable armoured personnel carriers, which provide protected mobility and flexibility to the force, is insufficient. Furthermore, and despite the best efforts deployed by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), the Mission’s logistics outreach, especially in sectors 2, 3 and 4, remains inadequate.

27. As indicated earlier, a significant development has been the relocation of some ENDF troops from certain areas in sector 3 where they had been deployed at Ethiopia’s own expense in support of the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM. The Government of Ethiopia had announced, in addition to the withdrawal from Hudur in March 2013, its intention also to pull its troops out of Baidoa, Berdale, Qansax Dheere and Manaas by the end of April 2013. In an effort to avoid an Al-Shabaab occupation of the areas to be vacated, and as a follow-up to the conclusions of the last meeting of the Military Operations Coordination Committee, a relief-in-place planning session involving ENDF, SNSF and AMISOM was held in Mogadishu on 15 April 2013, during which a reconfiguration of forces for sectors 1 and 3 was agreed to in order to reinforce Baidoa and take over Manaas, while ENDF continues to secure Bardale. AMISOM is yet to deploy in Qansax Dheere, where the Ethiopian forces continue to maintain a presence. The reconfiguration of forces between sectors 1 and 3 has resulted in a further outstretching of AMISOM troops, affecting their capacity to undertake offensive actions against Al-Shabaab and adequately secure the Mission’s main supply routes.

IV. Implementation of the AMISOM mandate

28. The mandate of AMISOM is spelled out in paragraph 9 of the communiqué adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 356th meeting, held on 27 February 2013 (see S/2013/134) and in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). During the period under review, AMISOM continued to make sustained efforts towards the implementation of its mandate.

A. Support for dialogue and reconciliation

29. AMISOM has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at all levels. At local and regional levels, in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, AMISOM has mobilized clans, elders and religious and political leaders, including Members of Parliament, to resolve political and other differences, improve security and support the Federal Government of Somalia, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, Bay and Hiraan regions. In the Hiraan region, for example, in February, March and April 2013, AMISOM political and civil affairs officers worked closely with Members of Parliament in the formation of the Hiraan Council of Elders. Subsequently, AMISOM facilitated a formal engagement between federal legislators from the Hiraan region, the local administration and the population. AMISOM further engaged the youth population in the region, through the Hiraan
Centre for Youth Development, to facilitate their participation in political and development issues in the region.

30. At the national level, AMISOM has continued to support dialogue among the various political actors in the country. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the transitional era, the Political Unit of AMISOM has remained closely engaged with all political stakeholders in order to avoid repetition of the incessant problems that characterized the tenure of Transitional Federal Government. In particular, my Special Representative continues to exercise his good offices to mediate political disputes and to encourage a constructive approach in dealing with the challenges at hand, especially in Baidoa, “Jubaland” and Hiraan.

B. Support for the Somali National Security Forces

31. AMISOM has continued to provide multifaceted support to SNSF, including through training, mentoring and operational guidance. However, this support has been largely ad hoc, as the AMISOM military component is not at present appropriately resourced to undertake large-scale training activities. The Mission has only been able to play a role in this important task by drawing the requisite human and other resources from elsewhere, including by diverting critically needed resources from combat operations.

32. Since 2009, AMISOM has supported the training conducted by the European Union Training Mission of 4,500 soldiers of the Somali national army in Bihanga, Uganda. Most of the troops trained so far are from the rank and file, thus leaving gaps in junior and middle leadership positions and resulting in a critical vacuum in terms of command and control of the Somali national army. In order to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the Federal Government of Somalia and other partners to undertake the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command positions in SNSF. Accordingly, following weeks of initial training, on 15 April 2013, 96 officers completed a training course for platoon commanders and senior non-commissioned officers run by AMISOM at the newly refurbished Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu.

33. With respect to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, reorganization and professionalization of the force through various programmes and activities. During the reporting period, AMISOM police, including those in formed police units, worked closely with SPF at various police stations in Mogadishu to mentor and advise Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and the management of fraud, drug-related crimes, theft and domestic violence.

34. Recognizing the importance of mitigating security challenges and transferring skills in managing police operations to SPF, the AMISOM police component, with funding from the German Agency for International Cooperation, established and equipped a joint police operations and coordination centre which serves effectively to co-locate AMISOM police and SPF. The co-location has contributed to the transfer of policing knowledge and skills from AMISOM police to SPF. During the reporting period, the joint police operations and coordination centre facilitated joint public safety and security activities in Mogadishu, during which several suspects were apprehended and illegal weapons and ammunition recovered and handed over.
to the Federal Government of Somalia. These actions have contributed to preventing possible attacks by Al-Shabaab and other criminal activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the ability of the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM formed police units have also continued the 24-hour joint confidence-building and public assurance joint patrols with SPF in Mogadishu, thus significantly contributing to the improved security situation in the city.

35. The AMISOM police, together with SPF and in collaboration with the United Kingdom Department for International Development, have developed a strategic development plan for the period 2013-2017 that will guide SPF in its reform, restructuring and development agenda. The plan has been adopted by the Federal Government of Somalia and is currently being implemented under the guidance of a vetting unit established by the Government. At the strategic level also, AMISOM police advisers posted to the national headquarters of SPF have undertaken a pre-engagement analysis of the systems, policies, organizational structure, and support mechanisms for SPF. The result of the analysis is being compiled and the findings will constitute the foundation for the development of a reform action plan. Furthermore, the AMISOM police advisers are developing a government policing charter that will serve as a policy guideline for reforming SPF.

36. AMISOM has equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily workings of SPF. With regard to training support, AMISOM police conducted a public order management course in Djibouti for 200 SPF officers in conjunction with the Italian Carabinieri and with financial support from the Government of Italy. This course has served to enhance the performance of SPF in the conduct of day and night-time patrols, stop and search and cordon and search operations. A similar course is currently being conducted for 871 SPF officers at the General Kahiye Police Training Academy. The officers, who are being trained with support from AMISOM police, will be deployed in Mogadishu and other locations. Training has also been provided on database management and data collection for SPF officers at the Mogadishu airport police station. In February 2013, the AMISOM police arranged a field study course in Sierra Leone for the senior management of SPF. This has exposed them to police reform best practice.

37. In the coming period, the AMISOM police component will be extending its deployment to the other sectors in order to provide support to SPF in those areas. In this regard, the AMISOM police have already undertaken a technical assessment mission to sector 2 (Kismaayo) and sector 3 (Baidoa). The technical assessment to sector 4 (Belet Weyne) will be undertaken in coming weeks. The deployment will be effected once UNSOA puts the required infrastructure in place in these sectors.

C. Creation of conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance

38. During the period under review, AMISOM continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Mission continues to coordinate its activities and to cooperate with United Nations humanitarian agencies and other actors working in Somalia to ensure greater access. The Mission has secured humanitarian entry points and corridors, enabling humanitarian actors to address the needs of the Somali population in the areas under Government control. In
coordination with the United Nations humanitarian agencies, AMISOM also facilitated the voluntary return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons.

39. As has been the case since the inception of the Mission, AMISOM continues to provide lifesaving support to the needy population, especially in those areas where humanitarian actors are absent or have limited access. This support includes potable water, basic health-care services and basic social services. For instance, during the recent flooding in Jowhar, AMISOM donated medicines to the Governor of Middle Shabell for distribution to those affected by the floods. During the reporting period, AMISOM also worked closely with the Mayor of Mogadishu to rehabilitate four water wells in the Harrtar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Wadajir and Dharkenley districts of Mogadishu. These projects were realized with funding support from the Government of Sweden.

D. Engagement with the Somali diaspora

40. The African Union, through AMISOM, has begun a formal engagement with the Somali diaspora in different parts of the world. The first of these engagements took place in London on 9 and 10 May 2013. The meeting was attended by over 50 representatives of different segments of the Somali diaspora community in the United Kingdom. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations were represented. The main objectives of the meeting were to engage the Somali diaspora on the situation in Somalia; to mobilize their support for the peace process in general and AMISOM and the Federal Government in particular, including for the implementation of the Government’s six-pillar policy framework, with a view to enhancing the stabilization of Somalia; and to facilitate the return home of the Somali diaspora to provide skilled manpower for the rebuilding of the Somali State. AMISOM, working with the Federal Government of Somalia and partners, is following up the conclusions reached.

E. Support to the public and civil service of Somalia

41. During the reporting period, AMISOM facilitated basic and refresher training for 120 civil servants, including secretaries, administrative officers and protocol officers. The training, which lasted two weeks, was conducted in Bujumbura from 14 to 26 January 2013 by the University of South Africa. Furthermore, in order to improve their working conditions, and therefore facilitate increased public service delivery, in April 2003 AMISOM delivered to the Federal Government of Somalia office equipment. The Government of Italy provided funding support for both the training and equipment.

V. Other relevant aspects outlined in Security Council resolution 2093 (2013)

42. In resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council addressed a number of other issues relevant to the operations of AMISOM. These are covered in paragraphs 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the resolution.
A. Establishment of the guard force

43. As indicated above, the security situation throughout Somalia remains very tenuous and unpredictable, and personnel from the international community, particularly from the African Union and the United Nations, are targeted by the insurgents. At this critical time, however, these personnel cannot remain barricaded behind secured compounds, as highlighted by the African Union and United Nations strategic reviews and the technical assessment mission organized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in March 2013 (see S/2013/239). They must be able to actively engage local communities and stakeholders in order to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding. It is therefore imperative that appropriate security measures be taken to protect all personnel serving in Somalia.

44. The African Union remains committed to providing security for the international community, including through the establishment of an AMISOM guard force. It is within this context that the Commission and the United Nations Office to the African Union, as early as March 2012, developed options for the establishment of the guard force. Three options were proposed: a force of 312 personnel for escort and quick reaction force duties; a force of 149 personnel for escort duties only; or a force of 1,000 troops for static protection, escort and quick reaction force duties. All three options were premised on the deployment of African Union and United Nations civilian personnel in Mogadishu only. In the interim, AMISOM has put in place, in Mogadishu, an ad hoc unit of 311 soldiers to carry out escort duties.

45. Following the renewed request of the Security Council, in resolution 2093 (2013), that the guard force be established, and in view of the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) under the terms of resolution 2102 (2013), with a presence in Baidoa, Befetweyne and other locations in addition to Mogadishu, AMISOM and UNSOA constituted a working group to review the guard force concept, including the support requirements. The working group determined that the duties of the guard force should be to escort personnel to and from designated drop-off points; provide quick reaction force services; post staff at base camp sentry towers and the main entry and exit points; and provide overall security at all base camps. AMISOM military experts, under the leadership of the Force Commander, outlined a comprehensive troop-to-task analysis of the requirements for performing these duties. They concluded that the ad hoc unit of 311 troops earmarked for the guard force could not accomplish the required tasks. In reaching that conclusion, the military experts were cognizant of the fact that AMISOM is already severely overstretched given the vast geographical area it is covering and the continuing probing and asymmetrical attacks being launched by Al-Shabaab. In view of this challenge and the imperative to ensure adequate security for personnel of the international community, it is urged that the Security Council authorize an increase of 1,000 personnel in the AMISOM force strength to enable AMISOM to deploy an appropriately sized guard force in all four sectors. It is anticipated that the United Nations will support the equipping and training of these forces through UNSOA. This critically required increment in force strength is considered essential for the effective implementation of the respective mandates of AMISOM and UNSOM, as failure to put adequate security measures in place will severely limit both missions. The Commission is ready to provide the details of the troop-to-task analysis which forms the basis of the request for additional personnel.
B. Transparency and proper accountability for resources provided to AMISOM

46. Funds made available for AMISOM operations, through the Commission, have been utilized mainly to reimburse the troop- and police-contributing countries for troop allowances and death and disability compensation, as well as to cover operational costs of managing AMISOM. This has been done in line with African Union financial rules and the applicable contribution agreements with the donor partners. The expenditures are subject to periodic external audits by the concerned partner in addition to internal audits carried out by the Commission. It is gratifying to note that the recent external audits conducted by auditors contracted by the European Union had positive outcomes, acknowledging the seriousness and professionalism with which the funds have been managed.

47. Furthermore, the Commission conducts regular predeployment visits to the troop- and police-contributing countries. Recently, a troop verification exercise was conducted in conjunction with UNSOA to establish the troop levels. The procedure in place for generating the nominal roll is strict and ensures probity and accountability. In order to further improve the information received from the field, the Commission has engaged consultancy services, with the support of the European Commission, on the possibility of deploying a biometric data capture machine.

C. Protection of civilians

48. In line with the relevant requests of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the Security Council of the United Nations, in particular in resolutions 2010 (2011), 2036 (2012) and 2093 (2013), the African Union Commission and AMISOM are engaged in efforts to develop a strategy for mainstreaming considerations relating to the protection of civilians into the operations of the Mission. I am pleased to report that, following extensive consultations, a Mission-wide protection of civilians strategy for AMISOM was approved in May 2013. The strategy provides a comprehensive Mission-wide approach towards mainstreaming protection considerations into all aspects of AMISOM operations, and all necessary efforts will be made to ensure its effective implementation. I would like to acknowledge the support of all relevant partners in this process to date, and request that support for the implementation of this strategy be provided by UNSOA and the broader United Nations system.

49. I am also pleased to report that, as a part of its efforts to strengthen civilian protection in its area of operations, and as a core component of its protection strategy, AMISOM is moving towards the establishment of a civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response cell, as outlined in Security Council resolutions 2036 (2012) and 2093 (2013). Building on work undertaken by a team of experts in Mogadishu, in March 2013, a framework for the establishment of a robust mechanism in AMISOM has been developed. This document sets out the overall design, describes the processes and day-to-day operation of the cell and proposes system requirements, personnel profiles and other resources required for its inception. The framework focuses on three key functions of the cell: to assess civilian harm occurring within the AMISOM area of responsibility; to assist with operational effectiveness and prevention of civilian harm by informing force decision-making; and to respond to any harm caused. These elements have been
designed within the current operational reality. The proposed framework is undergoing the necessary African Union internal consultation and approval procedures, and with requisite funding in place, AMISOM should be able to set up a cell before the end of 2013.

D. Management of disengaged fighters

50. AMISOM continues to receive Al-Shabaab disengaged fighters, but has limited resources to manage them. The role of AMISOM is to receive and manage defectors at designated reception centres for 48 hours before handing them over to the Federal Government of Somalia for further management. AMISOM, in collaboration with other partners of the Federal Government, has developed strategies, policies and plans for the management of both captured and voluntary disengaged fighters, which were presented to the Government for adoption.

51. Standard operating procedures for the management of children associated with armed conflict have also been developed and adopted by the Government. AMISOM received 249 disengaged fighters who voluntarily surrendered in September 2012. Among them were seven children who were handed over to UNICEF. The military technical working group organized training for Government and AMISOM officers at the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya on the management of captured and voluntary disengaged fighters at the reception and transit centres. In addition, the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM and partners recently developed structures and terms of reference for the reception centres. The Government will remain the point of reference on the strategies, policies and plans needed to guide the process. In order to assist the Government, AMISOM will need support to establish the required infrastructure.

E. Strengthening protection of children and women

52. In light of previously raised concerns regarding the recruitment of child soldiers, AMISOM has assisted the Federal Government of Somalia in the screening of potential recruits into SNSF to ensure that they meet the required criteria, especially the accepted age for military and police service. AMISOM, with the support of UNICEF and in collaboration with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, is also in the process of recruiting a child protection officer. Furthermore, the Commission is working with UNICEF to assess how best child protection considerations can be strengthened at the level of the Commission as well. In addition, AMISOM has printed and circulated brochures sensitizing its uniformed personnel to the nature of Somali culture, including aspects relevant to the protection of women’s rights.

F. Gender mainstreaming

53. Over the next few months, AMISOM will prioritize the development of a strategy to mainstream gender considerations into all aspects of its operations. In the meantime, initial efforts to strengthen gender mainstreaming in the Mission’s operations are being undertaken, including the establishment of a multidimensional gender working group at the level of the Mission, the airing of radio programmes
designed to strengthen gender awareness and the establishment of an information-sharing mechanism with the Directorate of Women and Social Affairs in the Federal Government of Somalia. I welcome the support of the United Nations in the development and implementation of a comprehensive gender mainstreaming strategy for the Mission.

G. Prevention of sexual and gender-based violence

54. The African Union is fully committed to preventing sexual and gender-based violence in the mission area. Initial efforts to address these concerns are being undertaken by AMISOM, including through engagement with the Federal Government of Somalia to investigate suspected cases of abuse and provide technical advice to military courts established by the Government. Following the visit to Somalia of Zainab Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, during which Ms. Bangura held consultations with my Special Representative, AMISOM is now in the process of engaging with the Office of the Special Representative to support its training initiatives for SNSF in the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence. Furthermore, steps will be taken to ensure information-sharing between AMISOM and the Office of the Special Representative, as well as to raise awareness on sexual and gender-based violence in the newly recovered areas. The development and implementation of the AMISOM strategy on sexual and gender-based violence will be given the highest level of attention in the coming months, and the support of the United Nations system in this regard is highly appreciated.

H. Conduct and discipline

55. In 2012, the African Union Commission initiated efforts to establish a comprehensive conduct and discipline framework for its peace support operations. Initial work to establish the necessary policy frameworks and mechanisms to address prevention of abuse, staff welfare, reporting, investigation and disciplinary procedures has been undertaken. Two assessments were undertaken in the second half of 2012 to this effect. It is the intention of the Commission to establish an initial conduct and discipline mechanism before the end of 2013 and to establish a conduct and discipline office in AMISOM during the same period. I would also like to add that the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse continues to receive specific attention. Measures undertaken by AMISOM for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse have been focused on predeployment and in-theatre training for all AMISOM personnel. Renewed efforts to bring these training initiatives in line with a broader conduct and discipline policy framework will be undertaken in the coming months, and the support of the United Nations in this regard would be appreciated.

I. Support to the Federal Government of Somalia with regard to the lifting of the arms embargo

56. The Security Council, in its resolution 2093 (2013), authorized a partial lifting of the existing Somalia arms embargo for 12 months to allow the Federal
Government of Somalia to acquire specific categories of arms for the sole purpose of enhancing its capacity to provide security to its citizens through SNSF. AMISOM is working with SNSF to develop its capacity to secure acquired weapons by establishing infrastructure and procedures to ensure the safe storage, maintenance and distribution of arms and equipment. More specifically, AMISOM is planning to help SNSF build armouries, train arms storage personnel and arms mechanics; print arms registers; advise SNSF on the distribution of weapons and ensure that the weapons are issued and used only by SNSF; and ensure adherence to the terms of the lifting of the arms embargo with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. The establishment of the infrastructure to protect the weapons will require the support of donors owing to the financial constraints facing the Federal Government of Somalia.

VI. United Nations logistical support package for AMISOM

57. The United Nations logistical support package is being provided to AMISOM by UNSOA in the areas of rations, transport, accommodation, communications and information technology, medical, aviation, personnel movement, media and public information and general supplies. At the operational level, a joint task force meets on a weekly basis to provide coordination, while a strategic-level senior mission leadership meeting between AMISOM and UNSOA is held on a monthly basis. At the tactical level, a joint support and coordination mechanism, under AMISOM leadership, has been revitalized to plan, coordinate and implement the day-to-day support requirements of AMISOM. The support concept has been streamlined to provide greater support to the expanded Mission, with a special focus on the four sectors. The relocation of UNSOA operations to Mogadishu has enhanced the coordination and delivery of the support package. Joint asset management and contingent-owned equipment verification teams have been established to enhance accountability for United Nations-owned assets and timely verification and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment.

58. However, the support package, which is anchored on the United Nations procurement procedures for traditional peacekeeping operations, has been challenged by the prevailing security conditions in Somalia, resulting in slow responsiveness to AMISOM operations. It is worth mentioning here the slow roll-out of the forward logistic hubs, the relatively low budgetary allocation and the inability of the support package to match the operational tempo. Also, although the induction of two United Nations civilian contracted utility helicopters has resulted in improved intra-mission movement of personnel, medical evacuation and cargo, the full complement of 12 military utility and attack helicopters has not materialized, thus affecting the ability of AMISOM to undertake expansion operations. Additionally, the serviceability state of the partner-donated equipment, responsibility of maintenance of which lies with UNSOA, is low and varies between 50 and 60 per cent at any given time, taking into account the existence of a large number of armoured personnel carriers that need major repairs or replacement.
VII. Observations

59. Overall, the situation in Somalia continues to evolve positively. The Somali people and leaders must necessarily capitalize on the security gains made by AMISOM, the Somali security forces and their allies, to further peace and prosperity. They must seize this opportune moment to bring to an end political wranglings which can only complicate the process of stabilizing Somalia. I urge the Somali leaders to demonstrate the required maturity and goodwill as their country grapples with the challenges of this new page in their history. I welcome the initiatives of the Federal Government of Somalia to engage regional authorities through outreach and dialogue, to foster national reconciliation and unity and to rebuild the armed forces and integrate the militias.

60. As Somalia pursues its path toward lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation, the important contribution of the neighbouring countries cannot be overemphasized. For years, these countries have sheltered Somali refugees and extended utmost support in spite of the challenges they face. They have also made and continue to make an invaluable contribution to the military efforts aimed at expanding the authority of the Somali State. Their continued involvement will be of paramount importance in the period ahead. I welcome all efforts aimed at enhancing cooperation and confidence between Somalia and its neighbours. The African Union Commission will continue to support these efforts and to take any initiative that could assist in that direction.

61. While the situation in Somalia has significantly improved, the country nonetheless remains confronted with serious challenges at all levels and, therefore, needs the sustained attention of its partners. Against this background, I welcome the continued engagement of the international community as demonstrated by the second London Conference on Somalia and the special conference on Somalia, convened by the United Kingdom and Japan, respectively, in May 2013.

62. As the Security Council is aware, the current phase of AMISOM military operations has been guided by the joint strategic concept adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations in January 2012. The strategic concept had in fact considered a troop level of 35,500 for the successful implementation of the military campaign. Eventually, based on a number of strategic considerations, including the provision of force enablers, specifically helicopters and armoured personnel carriers, availability of engineering and logistics units, the continued ENDF support and provision of immediate operational logistics support to SNSF, who are involved in joint operations with AMISOM, the strategic concept recommended the middle-path option of raising the troop ceiling to 17,731.

63. However, two of the strategic considerations have not been realized: AMISOM remains without all of the required force enablers and SNSF remains without much-needed logistical support. Under the present conditions, AMISOM is geographically stretched and has reached its operational limit, making it difficult to undertake further expansion operations without risking the present gains. It was the expectation of the African Union that Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) would address this situation. While reiterating the appreciation of the African Union for the support extended by the United Nations so far, I call upon the Security Council to take the necessary steps, in line with the African Union Peace and
64. The African Union notes that, for the United Nations, the conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Yet, the situation in some parts of the country has improved to an extent that would allow the United Nations to play a more active role and establish an enhanced presence on the ground. It is worth recalling here the communiqué adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 306th meeting (see S/2012/19), in which the Council encouraged the Security Council to consider creative and action-oriented steps towards the re-hatting of the Mission. In this respect, the African Union looks forward to the benchmarking exercise to be undertaken by the Secretariat in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 2093 (2013). The Commission is ready to take part in this exercise, which could be coupled with the reconfiguration of forces referred to above.

65. The Commission further notes the call by the Security Council, as contained in paragraph 7 of resolution 2093 (2013), for the African Union to consider providing funding to AMISOM through its own assessed costs as it has recently done for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali. It is important to point out, as underlined by the Peace and Security Council, that, in undertaking the operation in Somalia, the African Union is acting on behalf of the United Nations, notably its Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The African Union has repeatedly called upon the Security Council to deploy an operation in Somalia and to give substance to the much-acclaimed principle of the responsibility to protect, for the benefit of the Somali people who have literally been abandoned by the international community for many years.

66. In the meantime, I cannot but reiterate the deep appreciation of the African Union to the AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries. Their contribution and the sacrifices they have made are unique in many aspects in the annals of the history of peacekeeping and peace support operations. They deserve the full recognition of the international community and the Security Council, in particular. The successes of the Mission will never be highlighted enough, and its shortcomings have to be understood against the backdrop of the particularly challenging environment in which it is operating and the limited means at its disposal. There is no exaggeration in saying that without AMISOM and the huge sacrifices made, Somalia would not have been where it is today and the international community would not have had cause for celebration.