Letter dated 6 May 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to send you the report of the tenth annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council, which was held on 15 and 16 November 2012 at the Arrowwood Conference Center in Rye Brook, New York (see annex). The final report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House rules under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

On the basis of the very positive feedback we have received from the participants each year, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland hopes that this report will contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the work of the Council.

I should be grateful, accordingly, if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jarmo Viinanen
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations
Annex to the letter dated 6 May 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

“Hitting the ground running”: tenth annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council

15 and 16 November 2012
Arrowwood Conference Center
Rye Brook, New York

The Government of Finland, in cooperation with the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies of the University of San Diego and the Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat, convened the tenth annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council on 15 and 16 November 2012.

Each November, the workshops serve to familiarize the newly elected members with the practice, procedure and working methods of the Security Council so that they are in a position to “hit the ground running” when they join the Council the following January. The series also provides current members of the Council with an opportunity to reflect on their work in an informal setting.

To mark the tenth anniversary of the launching of this initiative, the opening evening featured a gala dinner for the Permanent Representatives of countries that had participated in past workshops as well as those participating in the current one. Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen, Permanent Representative of Finland, gave a welcoming address, followed by opening remarks by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a keynote address by Henry A. Kissinger, and closing remarks by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative of India and President of the Security Council for the month of November 2012.

The full-day programme on 16 November included three round-table sessions that focused on the following themes:

II. Working methods and subsidiary bodies
III. Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2012

Gala dinner

Following welcoming remarks by the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commented on the enduring value of the workshop series and the contributions the incoming members could make both to the work of the Security Council and to the larger peace and security agenda of the United Nations. Each non-permanent member, he underlined, brought its own expertise, experience and knowledge to the Security Council table. Each contributed by chairing subsidiary bodies of the Council, planning thematic debates and bringing fresh perspectives to Council deliberations and consultations. In recent years, noted the Secretary-General, non-permanent members had helped the Council to address a wider range of critical issues, such as climate change, that affect political and economic stability and the prospects for maintaining international peace and security. He stressed the
fundamental importance of achieving unity of voice in the Council, because it conditioned not only its effectiveness but also that of the Secretary-General and others in helping to advance its agenda. There continued to be a wide variation in outcomes, he commented, depending on the degree to which the Council had been able to find a unified voice on the issue at hand.

Henry A. Kissinger responded to a series of questions posed by the Dean of the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies of the University of San Diego, Mr. Edward Luck. Given Mr. Kissinger’s unusually rich combination of scholarship and high-level diplomatic experience, Mr. Luck wondered whether he believed that the value of the Security Council derived more from its role in facilitating an enduring concert of great powers or in permitting a geographically representative group of Member States to address global peace and security issues. In light of those dual functions, what would be his preferred formula for the Council’s future composition? Mr. Kissinger noted that he had dealt with such questions much more from the perspective of a concert of great powers. Indeed, as Secretary of State, he had never participated in Security Council deliberations or debates. Then, as now, various United Nations ambassadors expressed their opinions quite openly and starkly. However, he continued, over time a growing range of issues with security implications, such as the environment, had required global consideration. The attitude that security issues always require prior agreement among the great powers had become increasingly anachronistic.

According to Mr. Kissinger, the eventual enlargement of the Security Council was inevitable. The challenge was how to expand the number of countries around the table without increasing the number with veto power. Similarly, he underlined the need to find incentives to encourage the permanent members to refrain from casting vetoes when they continued to have at least symbolic importance. He was of the view that there was no point in talking a Security Council reform package that would be vetoed by one of the permanent members.

Mr. Luck commented that the Council was likely to play a critical role in 2013 in the two matters on the global agenda with the highest stakes: the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their nuclear ambitions. What would Mr. Kissinger counsel the members of the Council regarding those situations? Mr. Kissinger agreed that they were and would remain absolutely critical. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he acknowledged, had worried him precisely because of its isolation. Something dramatic could happen in that country, the consequences of which could be serious; yet, the situation was largely beyond the influence of the great powers. He pointed out that the Secretary-General could play an essential mediating role, should that be needed. Sometimes it was easier to obtain agreement on a fact-finding mission under the authority of the United Nations. In his view, China did not want nuclear weapons in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but neither did it want to pressure the regime in Pyongyang to the point where it felt that its future was threatened and the status of the Korean Peninsula was opened up.

Turning to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Kissinger suggested that there were prospects for some form of bilateral talks with that country. The five permanent members of the Security Council had made their common view clear. Part of the issue was technical and, in that regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played an essential role by providing inspectors. The ultimate
question was whether the Islamic Republic of Iran was prepared to accept genuine restrictions on its military capacity and potential. What kind of international guarantees and assurances could one give to the Islamic Republic of Iran? The United States administration would have to overcome considerable domestic opposition to any formal bilateral talks, so their technical facilitation by the United Nations or another group could be helpful. The world body had often been useful in providing forums for discussion. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that domestic political considerations in the United States could be critical factors, but that the political debate had barely started. President Obama might want to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran very early in his second term. If so, the United Nations could play a part in the technical assessment of uranium levels.

Mr. Luck pointed out that the Security Council had been devoting more attention to human rights and humanitarian issues, including human protection and the responsibility to protect, in recent years. It had dealt with them in different ways in the cases of Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic. Did Mr. Kissinger believe, he asked, that such concerns should have a prominent place on the Council’s agenda or should they be addressed primarily in other bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, the Economic and Social Council, or the General Assembly? Mr. Kissinger reminded the audience that as a child he had lived in a dictatorship as a member of a minority that had been discriminated against. While he did not normally approach international security from that perspective, he could easily have been persuaded to undertake an international intervention to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. However, he had not supported the intervention in Libya. He had been uneasy about it but had not felt it was appropriate to comment publicly while the United States was engaged in a conflict. His concern had been that there would be the kind of negative outcomes that we have since seen.

According to Mr. Kissinger, problems tended to arise when the United Nations intervened in situations with wider geopolitical implications, as in the Syrian Arab Republic. Some countries were reluctant to see the world body set a precedent by intervening in situations that they deem to be essentially domestic. In the Syrian Arab Republic, he questioned whether one should begin the political process by demanding that President Bashar Al-Assad leave office. In such a situation, he would prefer to separate political and humanitarian issues. In his view, the brutal domination by the Alawites was unacceptable, but one needed to recognize that there was an ongoing struggle among ethnic groups for predominance in their country. Therefore, it might be better for the international community to focus not just on the Government, but instead on what outcome it was seeking: dominance by the Sunni majority or a situation that would permit the autonomy and security of groups within Syrian society? It was not helpful, he cautioned, to advocate outcomes that would represent a total victory by one side or the other, since such scenarios could lead to horrible carnage. He called instead for consideration of a range of possible outcomes. He suggested that there should be a Russian-American dialogue on the Syrian Arab Republic that did not begin with the premise that the overthrow of the Government was necessarily a good thing. The United Nations could facilitate such a dialogue. With the election campaign behind him, President Obama could now take a fresh look at the Syrian Arab Republic from a longer-term perspective. In conclusion, Mr. Kissinger stressed that he strongly favoured efforts to protect minorities.
Mr. Kissinger then responded to questions from two of the Permanent Representatives with experience serving on the Security Council. Describing the Council’s inability to do anything to stop the killing in the Syrian Arab Republic as “appalling”, one asked how a political dialogue might be established. According to Mr. Kissinger, such a dialogue could be initiated by the parties or imposed from the outside. The first option was preferable, but the fighting would not be continuing if dialogue was possible. A second option would be to raise and deploy an international force to stop the fighting and compel a political solution. He had been in Korea in 1952, however, and four times he had witnessed the United States going to war with wide political support and then eventually having to withdraw rather unconditionally. Since American involvement was usually a prerequisite for a successful military outcome, one should soberly assess at the outset how long the United States was likely to be able to sustain its military commitment to such a conflict. The struggle in the Syrian Arab Republic had deep religious and ethnic dimensions, so it was difficult to envision who would want to participate in a military intervention. Therefore, political dialogue had to be the key. It was not enough, however, to come up with a scheme and try to impose it. As Moscow had learned in Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., was learning as well, one had to structure a viable Government. The premise of the question was right in the abstract, but it was difficult to envision any collection of forces that could successfully impose peace.

The final question to Mr. Kissinger concerned what the Arab countries might do to add momentum to the stalled peace process in the Middle East. In response, he noted that one of the reasons for the complexity of the situation was that Israel was predominant militarily but threatened geopolitically. Governments led by the Muslim Brotherhood were emerging in the area and it remained to be seen whether they would accept Israel’s existence. Mr. Kissinger urged Arab States to create an atmosphere that would make a situation of coexistence plausible, just as Anwar Sadat had acted to ease the psychological atmosphere. At times, however, events of the Arab Spring had made it difficult to express such views. His preference would be for a one-shot negotiation, something that would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. It would create a Palestinian State and leave issues relating to refugees and Jerusalem to a later stage, while establishing the principle that those refugees were not Israelis. He agreed that the United States was a critical player in the Middle East, but questioned whether the key to success was for the United States to throw its full weight behind the peace process. For him, a change in Arab attitudes was essential, given that the psychological dimension was critical to forward movement. If the challenge from the Islamic Republic of Iran were to become more acute and imminent, however, difficult and courageous decisions would have to be made and, in his view, the Palestinian issue should be part of those decisions.

Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri made closing remarks in his capacity as President of the Security Council. He thanked the Government of Finland warmly for hosting the series of “Hitting the ground running” workshops, noting that they had made a greater contribution to the work of the Council over the past decade than any non-permanent member could hope to make in a single two-year term. Mr. Kissinger's reference to the need for additional permanent members was music to his ears. Although the Council produced an impressive number and range of outcomes, it needed to assess whether it was making sufficient difference on the ground. The world needed the Council to both work well and make a real difference, for it had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. The critical importance of the Council’s work should be borne in mind, when it had impassioned debates about women and peace and security or children and armed conflict, as well as when it found itself pursuing short-term matters of national interest at the expense of the longer-term purposes for which the Council had been established.

Session I

State of the Security Council in 2012: taking stock and looking ahead

Moderator:
Ambassador Masood Khan
Permanent Representative of Pakistan

Commentators:
Ambassador Martin Briens
Deputy Permanent Representative of France

Ambassador Alexander A. Pankin
First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Counsellor Tofig Musayev
Deputy Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan

Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States

Issues covered in Session I include:

• Where has the Security Council been most/least successful in the past year? Why? How does its record in 2012 compare with that of 2011? How well is it responding to the peace and security implications of the historic transformation under way in the Middle East?

• What lessons should be drawn from its experience in Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Haiti?

• How successful has the Council been at anticipating crises and taking timely preventive action? What lessons should the Council draw from the crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau?

• Have the efforts to enhance the Secretariat’s capacity for early warning and preventive diplomacy been helpful in that regard? Have the channels for alerting the Council worked well? What further steps should be considered?

• How might collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements, such as the Arab League, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) be improved?

• Which thematic debates have contributed the most to the Council’s work in the past year or two? Why and how? Could their results be applied more directly and fully to the situation-specific work of the Council?
• Looking ahead, in the next two years how are geopolitical developments, leadership transitions, resource constraints, climate change and other external factors likely to affect the framework within which the Council works?

There was broad agreement that, in 2012, as before, the degree to which the Security Council had been able to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security had depended heavily on the extent to which there was unity among Council members on how to proceed in each situation. A number of speakers commented on the fact that, despite public perceptions of a deeply divided Council, the members had found common ground on most issues, and 2012 had been a relatively successful and active year for the Council. It was natural, noted one participant, that public attention was drawn to cases of serious division within the Council, as in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, according to one speaker, in 2012, the spirit of consensus had remained in the Council on most matters, as manifested in its united approach to the situations in, inter alia, Haiti, Mali, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. One interlocutor, however, questioned whether unanimity should always be the goal, since the Council was not an omnipotent body that was expected to address all security-related issues.

Most participants drew the balance sheet of cases of Security Council successes and failures in 2012 in similar ways. Many identified the Council’s engagement in Libya, Somalia, the Sudan/South Sudan and Yemen as relatively successful, despite the continuing challenges in each of those situations. The Council’s support of elections and post-conflict transition processes in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia and Libya was praised by one interlocutor. Although the situation in Haiti was still difficult, commented another discussant, the Council had at least demonstrated a capacity to adjust its posture and operations as conditions in Haiti evolved. One delegate commended the Council for delivering a quick, clear and united message to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea following its missile test, even though it had been unable to prevent it.

Speakers agreed that the Security Council’s worst failures in 2012 had been in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to one of them, the sense of unity in the Council had hit a wall in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, while another termed its performance there a “permanent stain” on the Council’s reputation. As discussed below, there were divergent explanations for the Council’s inability to stop the violence or promote sustainable peace there. In the view of one discussant, the Council’s biggest failure had been its inability to facilitate peace agreements in Kosovo, the Middle East and the Syrian Arab Republic, which could undermine the reputation and credibility of the United Nations.

In terms of the Syrian Arab Republic, several participants pointed to the vetoing of two draft resolutions as symbolic of the Security Council’s failure to take effective action to stop the violence, while others emphasized the need to take a more strategic and balanced approach to the problems in that country. Terming the situation the most important question facing the Council, one commentator warned that the Syrian Arab Republic was going down in flames, with huge consequences for the stability of the region as well as for the Syrian people. The five permanent members of the Council should demonstrate stronger leadership on the Syrian Arab Republic, contended a second participant. More and more people were dying while the permanent five failed to agree on an effective course of action. Another delegate
countered that the casting of vetoes had hardly been the only problem with the Council’s approach. Rather than taking a longer-term and more strategic approach to the crisis, some delegations had favoured a quick-fix approach, based on the false assumption that a dictatorship could be quickly turned into a democracy regardless of whether the material conditions for a working democracy existed on the ground. While acknowledging that deep divisions had prevented the Council from adopting more results-oriented actions, one speaker pointed out that the members of the Council had searched for common ground on the issues, agreeing to a series of resolutions, presidential statements and press statements and providing political support for the mediation efforts of the Joint Special Envoys. Despite their geopolitical differences and distinct conceptions of sovereignty, noted another commentator, all members of the Council favoured a political solution over a military one.

A participant lamented that, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there had been no reduction in the violence against civilian populations, despite the presence of the Organization’s largest peacekeeping operation. That reflected, in part, the Security Council’s limited and inconsistent attention span, while the cyclical violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seemed to surge every three to four years. Another discussant asserted that there had been five peace operations over the past 55 years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that the Council needed to find a better way of dealing with the situation. Noting that regional partners had provided considerable assistance and that a transition in the country was approaching, another delegate contended that the Council had to do a better job of managing the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the future.

There were a range of assessments of the Security Council’s handling of the peace and security dimensions of the Arab Spring. While regretting that the members of the Council had been slow to grasp the full security implications of such a profound political transformation, one interlocutor commended their active engagement in the events and their willingness to move beyond an Africa-centric agenda. Another delegate cautioned against generalizations, since the situation in each country in the region was unique. The Council needed to approach each of them individually, on its own merits. For example, it had not been necessary to become engaged in the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt.

Several participants spoke of the Security Council’s inability or unwillingness to address the core peace and security issues of the Middle East, such as Gaza. “I do not know how the Council could influence the underlying situation in the Middle East,” commented one delegate, “other than through encouraging bilateral and regional efforts, by assessing the situation each month, and by calling on our peers to do their part. The Council on its own cannot resolve the long-term conflict.”

Several delegates pointed to situations in which it would be premature to assess how successful the Security Council’s approach would ultimately prove to be. Two participants stressed both that Libya had proved to be a game-changer for the Council and that the results to date had been mixed and incomplete. There had been some political progress within Libya, one noted, but the risks posed by the proliferation of arms and political instability in the region as a result of the international intervention had not been sufficiently taken into account. More follow-up was needed, declared another. According to one speaker, her/his delegation had voted for Council resolution 1973 (2011) in order to protect civilians, not to
overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Declaring that Libya had been the defining challenge for the Council in 2011, just as the Syrian Arab Republic had been in 2012, one discussant drew political linkages between them. Resolution 1973 (2011) had been a response to the plea by the League of Arab States to prevent rivers of blood from flowing in Benghazi. It had called for a ceasefire and other provisions that had not been fully implemented. In response, another commentator pointed out that the Council had received conflicting advice from the African Union and the League of Arab States on how to handle Libya. With no such divergence now, the Council should heed the advice of the Arab League on the Syrian Arab Republic. Seconding that viewpoint, another speaker saw the Syrian Arab Republic as an opportunity to improve relations between the Council and the League.

One speaker suggested that it was too early to know whether the Security Council’s engagement with Mali and Guinea-Bissau would succeed, while another commented that Guinea-Bissau had been on the Council’s agenda for a long time and the problem of periodic coups had still not been resolved. A third participant agreed that it would be premature to assess the Council’s efforts vis-à-vis Guinea-Bissau, but asserted that it was evident that the United Nations Office for West Africa had not done an adequate job of supplying the Council with timely and accurate information about the course of events, which would have allowed the Council to take early preventive action. According to one discussant, the Council’s engagement in the crisis in Mali was at a critical junction. The Council had acted in collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements and it was not too late to prevent the very worst-case scenario for that country. The regional perspective on Mali had been very helpful, concurred another delegate. A participant agreed that the Council had worked well with regional and subregional groups on the situation in Mali, but contended that it was too early to be certain whether those efforts would ultimately prove successful.

Several delegates emphasized the importance of the Security Council employing the full range of tools at its disposal under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, as needed. As in past workshops, particular attention had been given to collaboration with regional and subregional organizations and arrangements. As a participant noted, regional organizations often understood a particular situation better than the Council; however, they frequently faced resource constraints and the United Nations should provide them with greater logistical and financial support. Working with the African Union, another speaker asserted, the Council had been able to maintain constant pressure on Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities to respect the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as on all parties in Somalia. The Council’s relationship with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had proven productive, as had the useful debates in the Council on cooperation with the African Union and the League of Arab States. Another interlocutor concurred that the debate on relations with the Arab League had been timely and helpful. A speaker agreed that the Council had been reasonably effective in situations, such as Yemen and the Sudan, where there was a strong regional organization and the Council was willing to threaten consequences for spoilers and thereby to provide strong support for regional diplomatic initiatives. When neither condition had existed, as in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council had not been successful. In Yemen, commented another discussant, the Council had been slow to back the diplomatic initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but once it did, the situation had turned for the better.
According to one delegate, the level of Security Council engagement with a regional organization in a particular situation often depended on the internal dynamics in the Council and on factors relating to realpolitik. Sometimes, regional views were taken into account and other times, they were ignored. Another discussant acknowledged that considerable progress had been made, particularly concerning relations with the African Union, as illustrated by the effective collaboration on the Sudan and South Sudan. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, however, the Council tended to pay more attention to the views of ECOWAS than to those of the African Union — though the former was just a subregional body. On Libya, the Council had backed the position of the League of Arab States rather than that of the African Union, despite the fact that the votes of the three African members of the Council were critical to the adoption of resolution 1973 (2011).

Emphasizing how helpful the cooperation of the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council had been regarding the Sudan and Yemen, respectively, a speaker recalled that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was solely vested in the Security Council. It stood above regional efforts, and an overly egalitarian approach would be neither feasible nor desirable. Moreover, the Council should not get involved in questions of subsidiarity between regional and subregional organizations. Another participant agreed that working with regional organizations and arrangements could be very productive when they had the same objectives as the Council, but that was not always the case. The Council’s mandate under the Charter was unique. Concurring with that point, a discussant emphasized that the recommendations from a regional body had to be in synch with the priorities of the members of the Council if they were to have a positive impact. According to one speaker, regional organizations had a different mindset from the Council, in part because they believed they had a better understanding of developments within their respective regions and a better feel for possible solutions to regional crises. The Council had a larger vision and mandate; it was therefore important to try to maximize the positive potential and minimize the negative potential of regional-global interaction. Although much had been done to facilitate collaboration between the Council and the African Union, too often divisions within the continent spilled over into the Council’s deliberations in unhelpful ways.

Following the pattern of earlier workshops, there was also considerable discussion on how the Security Council could sharpen its tools for prevention. One speaker suggested that the Council’s inability to address the fundamental security challenges in the Middle East demonstrated, once again, that it was much better at managing conflicts than at preventing them, contributing to post-conflict peacebuilding. The speaker recalled that at the previous year’s workshop, the participants had all agreed on the importance of conflict prevention, but when they walked out of the room, they forgot about it. Others agreed on the need for a greater focus on prevention.

Several delegates commented on the use of horizon-scanning briefings by the Department of Political Affairs as a way of drawing the members’ attention to emerging threats to international peace and security. One underlined their utility in complex situations, such as Mali. While acknowledging that horizon-scanning briefings could be controversial, another asserted that they could be very useful to the Council’s prevention efforts. For instance, the briefing in February had covered Madagascar, the Maldives and Mali, warning that the situation in Mali was of particular concern.
Observers saw the briefings as a potentially useful component of a wider prevention strategy, but suggested that improvements in the way they were conducted were needed. One participant, urging the Secretariat to be more transparent about the sources of information on which the briefings are based, called for the briefings to be more relevant to the work of the Council and less procedural. Another, noting that such briefings could make a contribution to the Council’s understanding of an emerging situation, cautioned that care should be taken regarding which country situations were addressed in such briefings, given sensitivities and worry in some capitals that this could be the first step towards being added to the Council’s agenda.

In response, a discussant acknowledged that countries generally did not want to be the subject of discussion in the Security Council, but pointed out that the Council’s mandate demanded that it address sensitive questions. If anything, the Council should consider more, not fewer, situations that could pose a threat to international peace and security. Agreeing that horizon-scanning could be useful, a speaker suggested that such briefings should not be limited to relatively peripheral situations. The speaker wondered why the Council did not hold similar discussions on situations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and Gaza, which were more central to the maintenance of international peace and security?

One speaker characterized the practice of discussing items on the Security Council’s formal agenda only as absurd, since the Council could not engage in conflict prevention if it was limited to discussing situations of ongoing conflict. The failure of the Council to discuss the conflict in Sri Lanka was said to be an indictment of the body. Agreeing, a participant recalled the controversies about raising the situations in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. According to that delegate, the Council’s refusal to discuss a problem did not make it go away.

A discussant commended the Secretariat for its reports on mediation and the General Assembly for its recent resolutions on the subject. The Council had a good record of trying to utilize a range of mediation and conflict resolution measures in various situations. It had made relatively little use, however, of its authority under Article 36 (1) of the Charter to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. Another delegate pointed to the Council’s support in 2011 of the mediation led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in respect of the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand as an example of successful conflict prevention. Two interlocutors questioned the Council’s capacity to stay focused on long-term conflicts. One suggested that the Council needed to break out of the pattern of returning to situations periodically when a mandate was up for renewal, while failing to ensure the implementation of its decisions in the interim. The lack of follow-up, noted another speaker, meant that the Council tended to focus on a situation at one stage, get over that stage, and then go on to other issues. That had been a problem in the Council’s handling of the situations in Guinea-Bissau and Libya.

A number of delegates underlined the critical role played by the Secretary-General’s Special Representatives and Envoys. The process of selecting Secretary-General’s Special Representatives and Envoys could be haphazard and their quality varied, noted one interlocutor; yet, they could make all the difference on the ground. An effective envoy could make the Council’s task much easier. Concurring, a participant called their quality, capacity, knowledge and ability to interact with others critical, and stressed that their selection process should not be determined by political expediency. Another discussant agreed, commenting that the
same care should be given to the choice of non-permanent members of the Council. According to one interlocutor, too often the members had permitted the appointment of ineffective Secretary-General’s Special Representatives and Envoys, reflecting a preference for having the best people serve at Headquarters rather than in the field. The members of the Council could be their own worst enemies when they allowed a situation to deteriorate because of a lack of human or financial resources.

As in previous workshops, the Security Council’s relationship to the International Criminal Court and other international tribunals was the subject of a number of interventions. Through a referral to the International Criminal Court, remarked a participant, the Council could send a strong message of unity and of concern about serious human rights violations. The lack of consensus on how to handle violations in the Syrian Arab Republic had been a setback, but the ongoing dialogue within the Council on its relations with the International Criminal Court had been aided by an excellent thematic discussion on 17 October 2012 under Guatemala’s presidency of the Council. Several others echoed that point. A discussant commended the Council’s referrals of cases in the Sudan and Libya to the International Criminal Court. However, one delegate countered that during the transition in Libya, the referrals to the International Criminal Court and serious human rights violations had been disregarded. In the Syrian Arab Republic, addressing justice issues properly and bringing criminals to justice would require a revamping of the whole political and judicial system, which was well beyond the competence of the Council. Therefore, that could not yet be addressed. Another interlocutor cautioned against applying only victor’s justice, as had been the case in Côte d’Ivoire.

One delegate pointed out that sanctions and the way the Council employed them had become much more sophisticated. When smart sanctions were applied in the context of a broader strategy that utilized a range of tools, they could be quite effective. That had been the case, for instance, with the freeze on Muammar Gaddafi’s assets and the sanctions on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. That delegate also praised the Council’s unity and employment of carefully targeted sanctions in the cases of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but noted that the Council’s work in both situations was incomplete. In Afghanistan, there was also much unfinished work to consolidate the gains that had been made there. That would remain a central challenge for the Council in 2013. In the view of another discussant, some members seemed to be more interested in applying sanctions and enforcement measures than in making full use of the range of peaceful measures, such as mediation, under Chapter VI of the Charter. Sanctions were not always a master key; they sometimes made a difficult situation even more complicated.

A number of participants commented on the role and contributions of thematic debates to the overall work of the Security Council. One commented that they were essential expressions of the Council’s normative role and that they also served an important informational function. Although the planning of thematic debates sometimes became mired in controversy and unnecessary negotiations, such debates had made critical contributions to the members’ understanding of key issues, such as the Council’s relationship to the International Criminal Court and to regional organizations, arms trafficking, new threats, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict. Some of the permanent members, commented another speaker, were not too keen on thematic debates. Although thematic debates were not always attended by Permanent Representatives, they should not be viewed as routine, since they offered an important opportunity for non-permanent members to
add their issues to the Council’s agenda. According to a participant, thematic debates were an important dimension of the Council’s work, but they did not always have to produce agreed statements and the Council did not have a mandate to attempt to legislate each matter. Another delegate commented that thematic debates were too often viewed as one-time events that might be revisited many years later. In the case of some topics, everything had been said and there was nothing to add. It did not have to be that way, replied another participant, if members worked together on sustaining interest in a topic. For instance, three delegations had arranged complementary debates on new threats to international peace and security. In that regard, it was suggested that the incoming members consider adding issues of cybersecurity and climate security to the Council’s agenda.

Several speakers urged that more attention be given to women and peace and security and to children and armed conflict as matters that were central to the Security Council’s mission. One expressed regret that the matter of children and armed conflict had sparked disagreement. Another urged the members to recognize the relevance of those matters in their consideration of specific conflict situations. For instance, the place of women would be critical to the future of the societies in transition as a result of the Arab Spring. In the case of Libya, it was said that the members had forgotten to mention sexual and gender-based violence in the resolutions. Another participant agreed that the Council should mention women and peace and security and sexual and gender-based violence more frequently in its situation-specific resolutions and statements.

Session II

Working methods and subsidiary bodies

Moderator:
Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
Ambassador Kodjo Menan
Permanent Representative of Togo
Ambassador Gert Rosenthal
Permanent Representative of Guatemala
Mr. Tian Lin
Counsellor, China

Issues covered in Session II include:

• What are appropriate expectations for the open debate on working methods scheduled for November 2012? Can more be done to improve relations between the Security Council and other United Nations and non-United Nations organs, such as the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court, which are addressing issues of importance to the Council and to the maintenance of international peace and security?

• Assessing the implementation of the measures set out in the annex to document S/2010/507: what has been accomplished and where is more
progress needed? Which further steps to improve the Council’s working methods should receive the highest priority?

- Can more be done to make informal consultations more informal and more interactive?
- Is the system of penholders working as it should? Are there recent examples of where it has worked especially well or suboptimally?
- Are there ways to make the process of selecting the chairs of subsidiary bodies more transparent and more interactive? How might newly elected members be more fully briefed about the expectations and workload associated with heading the various subsidiary bodies?
- Has the use of video teleconferencing, briefings by a wider range of Secretariat officials, less formal settings for discussing emerging issues, the enhanced Council website and the horizon briefings improved the basis for Council decisions? Which of these steps have proved the most useful and which could be improved?
- Has the effort to adjust reporting and mandate cycles, as discussed at the previous year’s workshop, rationalized the workload and produced efficiencies? Could more be done along these lines?

At this workshop, as at some previous ones, several speakers asserted that the Security Council had proved to be the most adaptable intergovernmental organ in the United Nations in terms of adopting a series of modifications in its working methods to increase efficiency and transparency. A number of participants praised its Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions for sustaining the effort to make the Council a more efficient, effective, accountable and transparent body. Despite the substantial weight of ritual, custom and tradition, commented a participant, there had been some progress each year in improving working methods, including through steps to implement elements of the measures set out in the annex to the Note by the President of the Security Council (see S/2010/507). Many interlocutors, however, also underlined the need for further progress. One contrasted the extensive deliberations on those matters over the years with the comparatively modest progress that had been made in changing the way the Council went about its vital work. As a discussant put it, the test was less whether the Council’s procedures appeared more efficient than whether they were helping to make it more effective in maintaining international peace and security. That connection was why the effort to improve working methods had proved indispensable. Another speaker agreed that what mattered most was the effect on the Council’s work on the ground.

A number of efficiency measures were identified, including several that had been carried out since the previous workshop. Several participants commended the new practice of not scheduling Security Council meetings on Fridays, if possible, to give more time for members to do preparatory work and for the Council’s committees and working groups to meet. Implementing one of the steps discussed at the 2011 workshop, it was noted that mandate renewals were now scheduled more evenly and strategically throughout the year. The goal was to try to prevent mandate renewals and other predictable matters from falling so heavily on particular months that there would be insufficient time for responding to urgent crises or for initiatives by the President of the Council. The number of opportunities for consultation with
Special Representatives and Envoys had grown through greatly expanded use of videoconferencing technology, from once in 2009 to 31 times to date in 2012. That had substantially reduced the amount of time that key Special Representatives and Envoys had had to spend at Headquarters or in transit in order to brief the Council. Although expressing agreement with the thrust of those measures, one speaker stressed that mandate renewals should not be treated as merely routine, because they could address important questions relating to the size and scope of a mission. Another discussant commented that too much of the Council’s agenda was dictated by mandate renewals and reports of the Secretary-General, leading to ritualistic statements by the members. A participant noted that there had been some progress in clustering issues, that there had been significant cost savings through a more efficient use of meeting time, and that the Secretariat was reducing the use of faxes in favour of e-mails for communicating with the members. In response, a delegate proposed that faxes be eliminated entirely as a means of communicating within the Council and with the Secretariat.

A speaker listed the following steps that had been taken to increase the transparency of the Security Council’s work: an increase in the number of open meetings and “Arria-formula” meetings in 2012; the advent of the Council’s new and improved website, simplifying public access to detailed information about the Council and its work; more active engagement by the President with the media; and the conduct of mini-missions, such as the one to Timor-Leste in November 2012. Another participant noted, however, that one of the most significant transparency initiatives — the establishment of Security Council Report — had been undertaken privately, without the formal endorsement or encouragement of the Council. An interlocutor suggested that the Council could show respect for non-members and its commitment to transparency by listening carefully at the upcoming open debate on Council working methods to the comments of non-members and by responding to them substantively. Transparency could be enhanced, contended another discussant, by holding briefings on the programme of work; improving consultations with troop-contributing countries by each member holding regular briefings for countries in its regional and other groups; and by making the monthly assessments by the President and the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly more substantive. The new website and Security Council Report, commented one speaker, ensured that any non-member could easily find out everything that was going on within the Council, even though they were not actually sitting at the table. The new website had proved to be an extremely useful tool, agreed another discussant, in part because it included the content and scope of mandates. A delegate suggested that mini-missions could be employed with greater frequency, but cautioned that there should be a balance between permanent and non-permanent members participating, which had not been the case in the mini-mission to Timor-Leste in November 2012.

Distinct assessments were expressed regarding how much progress had been made in increasing transparency. Some speakers suggested that significant progress had been achieved, but others disagreed. One commented that, from the perspective of an incoming member, there was insufficient transparency because of the lack of formal, written guidelines for incoming members on matters such as the role of the President, the workload associated with chairing particular subsidiary bodies, and what was expected of a new member. There should be a booklet for incoming members and further training organized by the United Nations beyond the useful Finnish and United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) programmes. (It was pointed out
that the Security Council Affairs Division and Security Council Report were planning a new training initiative on the work of subsidiary bodies.) According to another delegate, it was often hard to understand why Council members wanted to let non-members know what was being discussed in some cases, but not in others. The dynamics of transparency were themselves lacking clarity.

Within the Security Council, commented one participant, the lack of transparency between the permanent and non-permanent members remained a problem. Mr. Kissinger’s description of how international diplomacy tended to work — with major powers consulting first and then turning to the wider international community with the results — was apt. In the Council, the typical pattern was for the permanent members to seek common ground and then inform the rest of the members. Generally, one had to take it or leave it: that was a fact of life in the Council. Along similar lines, a delegate commented that the question of transparency vis-à-vis the larger membership of the United Nations had largely been addressed and now non-members were generally well informed about what the Council was doing. The problem, instead, remained a lack of transparency within the Council on how decisions were made. There continued to be resistance when the core interests of the permanent members in maintaining the status quo in terms of the mechanics of intra-Council decision-making were challenged. Another participant concurred that those points remained sensitive and acknowledged having entered the Council with a conspiracy theory about the Secretariat interacting with the permanent members on a qualitatively different plane than with non-permanent members. Experience, however, had dispelled that latter myth, as the permanent members were not always united and the Secretariat sometimes had independent views or information. On “real” issues, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the members and the Secretariat were in it together.

Transparency, several delegates commented, was not an end in itself. It, too, had limits. According to one discussant, the common perception that the Security Council was an obsessively secretive society from which no information flowed to the general membership was grossly unfair. Too often, highly sensitive information leaked out, sometimes in real time. Recently a report had fallen into the hands of an interested party before all members of the Council had seen it, despite the fact that each copy was ink-marked and each member got a single copy. Stressing that confidentiality was the responsibility of each mission to the United Nations, a second speaker called for zero tolerance for leaks. National Governments had laws and penalties for leaking information from sensitive Government meetings and documents, and the Security Council Affairs Division had assured the members that it had taken the necessary measures to ensure that it was not the source of such leaks. It was therefore up to the 15 members not to leak information and to recognize that there was a thin red line between responding to national constituencies, such as the media and parliamentarians, and violating confidentiality. Another delegate called for a code of conduct for closed meetings. It was not helpful to have a news agency report remarks that one delegate had made in a closed session, just as it tended to give a distorted view of the discussions when an Ambassador or one of her or his assistants sent text messages about the ongoing deliberations. Such actions damage the institution. If delegates were that irresponsible and undisciplined, the Council could not properly fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The candid discussion confirmed that, whatever progress had been made, some of the most difficult challenges to working-methods reform in the Security Council persisted. As in other recent workshops, the most intransigent issue appeared to be how to make informal consultations both informal and interactive. Recalling the agreement at the 2011 workshop not to make prepared statements or to take to the floor just to repeat points that had already been made, a participant stated that what needed to be done was clear enough, but so far the will did not exist to implement those simple steps. Although each member’s views mattered and each had a right to take the floor, it would be better to listen more carefully to what the penholders and States with direct interests had to say first. Private meetings tended to be scripted and choreographed, commented a discussant, leaving no room for interactive or lively exchanges of view. That had even been the case with luncheons with the Secretary-General, where Council members demanded to know the agenda ahead of time so that they could consult with their experts and have prepared positions and talking points beforehand. In that regard, the hierarchical structures of missions could further discourage informality and interactivity. There had been some progress on interactivity, noted an interlocutor, but much more could be done. There was never a chance to re-enter the discussion to comment on what had been said, which was the essence of interactivity. When one had nothing to add or did not know much about the issue, then perhaps one should have the courage and discipline not to speak. Change would have to start with the Council members, with a willingness to forego the opportunity to speak just to be able to say that one had spoken.

There was a dysfunctional cycle, commented a discussant, in which consultations were held on a particular well-known situation, delegates just repeated their standard positions, and then the Permanent Representatives wrote reports back to their capitals with the same points. That practice wasted time and added to everyone’s workload. According to a delegate, the goal should be to intervene less often and to put more statements on the record instead. While acknowledging that some progress had been made, an interlocutor complained that briefings without an outcome that should take 45 minutes had sometimes taken three hours. One answer was for the President to take a more active role, asking whether delegates wanted to speak on each item on the agenda for that day and occasionally posing some questions to the speakers as well. Several participants suggested that it was not always helpful to take the floor just to agree with what others had already said. It was widely noted that few Ambassadors attended informal consultations on a regular basis and that those discussions would have to be made a good deal more interesting and interactive before they would participate. As one commentator put it, when delegates did not negotiate texts, they should use their time to discuss the real issues; yet they did precious little of that.

Others agreed on the need for greater interactivity in informal consultations, but underlined the pressures on delegations to speak and to have prepared texts. One could not improvise when one entered the Security Council, noted a speaker; even in informal settings, one’s capital might have given instructions to follow and texts to read. There was room for improvement, but it had to come from the permanent members first. One possibility was to give incoming members three months to familiarize themselves with the work of the Council and then to agree that no one could read statements in informal consultations after that point. Improvement was possible, and it was up to the members to decide how and when to achieve it. A participant pointed out that even large delegations were under pressure to speak, as
others watched to see what they had to say and some might accuse them of being disinterested in an issue if they did not comment on it. A shift in the Council’s culture could only be achieved if everyone was unusually disciplined. Another discussant said that members had been asked why they had failed to speak on a particular topic and that others became suspicious when members exercised restraint.

As in past workshops, the matter of how the Chairs of subsidiary bodies were selected and of what was expected of them when they assumed that responsibility was extensively discussed. Asserting that the selection of Chairs could be made in a more transparent manner, a participant suggested that the various subsidiary bodies be presented to the incoming members, and that they be allowed to express their views and then be given the choice of accepting or declining whichever Chair positions they were offered. An interlocutor noted that the procedure for assigning Chair positions had still not been explained to incoming members, who would need to prepare and train experts and bring them to New York in a timely manner. The burdens, they had been told, were especially heavy for the Chairs of sanctions committees. The selection process for chairing any of the subsidiary bodies therefore needed to be formalized.

It was suggested that the incoming members should receive information about the nature and scope of the workload associated with heading each of the subsidiary bodies, so that they could be certain that they had the capacities required. A mission, for instance, should have an officer assigned essentially full-time to each of the committees or working groups it chaired. Similarly, a discussant underlined the need for the Chairs to be actively engaged in the work of the subsidiary bodies, especially the demanding sanctions committees. Among other duties, the chairs of sanctions committees had to meet with groups of experts, who were often the best source of information available to the members. The method of selection of the Chairs made the assumption of those new burdens, including participation in all of the more than two dozen subsidiary bodies of the Council, that much more sudden and demanding.

The question had then arisen, continued the speaker as to why the permanent members had not taken on the burden of chairing any of those groups. A participant responded that there was a conspiracy theory to the effect that the permanent members gave the job of chairing the subsidiary bodies to the non-permanent members as a way of keeping them busy while the permanent members focused on negotiating and drafting the key resolutions. Noting that permanent members had chaired the very active Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning terrorism during its early years, a delegate proposed a new compact between permanent and non-permanent members: that the former agree to chair some of the committees in return for the latter assuming some of the penholderships. In response, a participant speculated that permanent members would be widely criticized if they sought to take over any of the key chairmanships. In principle, however, they did not object to assuming such responsibilities. The selection process was acknowledged to be imperfect and ideas for improving it were most welcome, but it had to be recognized that the process could not begin until the election of new members had been completed. Each member had preferences regarding committee assignments and there would be several Chairs of some committees if the goal was to make everyone happy. Some important assignments, on the other hand, might not have any takers.

In the view of a participant, non-permanent members should be encouraged to take a more active role as penholders. The successful experience of several
non-permanent members in that respect over the past year or two should be replicated, since they had demonstrated the utility of sharing that responsibility more widely within the Council. Some of the permanent members had been more flexible than others on that score, added another discussant, whose delegation, in fact, had had a relatively good experience within the Council in terms of being allowed to share the pen on resolutions and statements relating to developments in their region. Agreeing that greater transparency was needed in the choice of penholders, an interlocutor suggested that that could give greater credibility to the result. The Council should be careful not to accept a penholder’s draft just because time was pressing, since the country concerned should be consulted as well. In response, a delegate contended that a large and growing number of non-permanent members had been serving as penholders and that there were no barriers to others doing so in the future if they so desired. The perception that that function was restricted to a small circle of members was simply false.

As in the past, a recurring theme in this workshop was the need to reduce the workload for Security Council members and to prepare the missions of newly elected members for the increasing demands Council membership entailed. According to a participant, the Council’s programme of work needed to be rationalized to streamline the handling of routine matters and to highlight the more pressing threats to international peace and security. The tendency to refer all sorts of matters to the Council that could be more usefully addressed elsewhere should be resisted. Full use should be made of all United Nations bodies, and their mandates should be respected. There were so many meetings of the Council that Permanent Representatives and Deputy Permanent Representatives often could not attend, commented another speaker. Similarly, a discussant remarked that the workload for Permanent Representatives was so heavy in the Council that it was hard to maintain one’s presence in the General Assembly while serving on both bodies. Incoming members needed to bear in mind, however, that they would soon return to the Assembly. Those considerations, another interlocutor pointed out, put a premium on delegating responsibilities within one’s mission. Smaller missions, two participants noted, depended on the Secretariat and reports from the Secretary-General for information, since they lacked assets on the ground and embassies in many places of concern to the Council. A delegate questioned the advantage of having a large mission in New York or embassies on the ground. Large delegations might have too many officers with clashing views, producing internal debates and a lack of coherent analysis and strategy. Bigger was not necessarily better in terms of a mission’s effectiveness in the Council.

There are other sources of information open to all Security Council members. As a speaker pointed out, by participating in regional visits or missions by the Council, such as the one to West Africa, each representative, regardless of the size of her or his delegation, could get a first-hand feel of conditions and developments in areas of potential concern to the Council. Panels or groups of experts, noted a discussant, had provided valuable information or recommendations in some situations. It was critical, however, for them to follow the highest standards of professionalism in substantiating their allegations and conclusions. Another interlocutor underlined the need for experts to be independent and transparent concerning their methodology. Yet, that was not always the case, and the countries most affected were not always consulted.

A delegate expressed some concern over the lack of clear rules about when documents would be discussed at the level of experts and when they would be discussed at a political level. Sometimes Ambassadors were included and sometimes
not, without any evident pattern or guidelines. That deserved further discussion. When the President called a meeting at a ministerial level, contended a participant, members should make an effort to be present at an ambassadorial level. There had been occasions when the minister chairing the meeting was left with one or two Ambassadors and a number of experts.

Several discussants raised the issue of relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly, although the topic received less attention and generated less concern than in earlier workshops. One suggested that the tensions between the two bodies had less to do with recurrent questions about their respective mandates and more to do with a general sense of malaise about the overall system of governance in the United Nations. Another pointed out that few Ambassadors had attended the recent debate in the General Assembly on the Council’s annual report on its work. That poor turnout undermined the contention that there was widespread unhappiness about the Council’s performance. One of the reasons for the traditionally light turnout, commented an interlocutor, was that the report continued to be largely descriptive, with little new information or fresh analysis. The speaker challenged the five outgoing members to participate actively in next year’s debate, engaging with the report and drawing on their recent experience as members of the Council. According to another delegate, the comments made in the Assembly’s debate on the report were unrelated to the report itself. Indeed, as a result of the various transparency steps discussed above, the work of the Council had become so widely known among the larger membership that the report had become less important as a source of information and analysis of the Council’s activities.

Session III

Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2012

Moderator:
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Permanent Representative of India

The outgoing members of the Security Council presented a range of views on the political dynamics within the Council and on the relationship between the permanent and non-permanent members. One thanked the five permanent members for serving as guides to the incoming members, helping them by providing both facts and opinions, and showing them how to put competing claims into perspective
and how to handle major crises. Another emphasized the feeling of camaraderie and mutual respect that had grown among the delegates on the Council. Those positive sentiments tended to grow on the missions to the field undertaken by the Council, much as they did among school classmates on an excursion. There were times of deep differences and bouts of staged drama, but there were moments of fun as well. Echoing those positive notes about camaraderie, a third speaker called service on the Council a rare privilege and the most enriching experience a diplomatic career could hope to achieve. Since the effectiveness of the Council depended entirely on its unity, the role of the non-permanent members was inversely related to the degree of unity among the five permanent members. In a divided Council, the non-permanent members had more room to make a difference. Life in the Council was demanding, added a participant, but it was a fascinating experience — a dream of a diplomatic academy. There was plenty of fun, as well as more than a little sarcasm.

Two participants painted a darker picture of political life within the Security Council. The delegation of one of those participants had not benefited from the guidance of the five permanent members. The year 2011 had been historic, with all of the BRIC and IBSA countries, as well as Germany and Nigeria, serving on the Council simultaneously. The jury was still out on whether that historic configuration had made a difference. Some observers thought that they would attempt to act as a counterweight to the five permanent members, but they had chosen a different path, seeking to work with the P-2, the P-3 and the P-5, as each issue required. A second speaker cautioned against whitewashing the role of the five permanent members within the Council, because there was a problem in that they acted to limit the Council, which should be a more collaborative body. To a large extent, the permanent five set the agenda. During their first six months on the Council, the incoming members were closely watched but, after that initial period, relations between the permanent and non-permanent members became more relaxed. Therefore, an effort should be made to find a more structured way for the incoming members to be involved more deeply in the work of the Council from the beginning of their term. In any case, it should be recalled that the culture of the Council was to be united more often than not. Unanimity did not always prevail, of course, but there was always a serious effort to accommodate the views of all 15 members and to find common ground.

As in earlier workshops, a recurring theme emphasized the opportunities that non-permanent members had to make a difference. There was ample advice in that regard. Remaining on the sidelines was not an option for elected members, contended a participant, even when the situation was one in which one’s country had not been engaged in the past. One’s perspective mattered, especially if it was clearly articulated, even if it was not likely to be a determinant of the outcome of the Security Council’s deliberations. The elected members entered the Council to contribute, not to confront. A delegate added that sound arguments were generally taken into account. Non-permanent members had the capacity to make a constructive, if modest, contribution. As full members of the Council, commented another speaker, incoming members had no choice but to become fully engaged in its demanding work from the outset.

Two participants stressed the need to find political space and then use it as fully as possible. One interlocutor urged incoming members to employ that space proactively from day one, calling that the most important lesson from her/his experience in the Council. There were a number of tools for doing that, including
the convening of thematic debates. Achieving outcomes had sometimes proved challenging, so the best advice was to look for allies early, since they were essential, and to never give up. Incoming members should seek to become involved in drafting processes as fully and as early as possible. They should submit both their own texts and amendments to existing texts. A second speaker had never bought the argument that the elected members had no role to play in the work of the Council and agreed on the need to find or make space and to use it effectively. There had been a time when the non-permanent members had little space to work with, so the incoming members should appreciate how much work it had taken over the years to carve out the existing space. They should avoid appearing pompous or claiming to be guided by a higher moral compass, because both attitudes and actions mattered.

Newly elected members should be prepared for their capitals to become very attentive to their work on the Security Council. Misunderstandings between the mission in New York and policymakers in one’s capital, it was suggested, were less common if the capital had already been engaged in a wide range of global issues and situations. It was essential to keep one’s policymakers fully and currently informed of developments within the Council, because otherwise there could be complications when other capitals contacted them directly. Concurring on the importance of attaining and sustaining the full political backing of one’s capital, another participant recommended employing one’s term on the Council to build both relevant capacities in the capital and sustainable networks between New York and policymakers at home. Part of that task was to get capitals to define the national interest in broader terms.

As in past years, the current session provided an opportunity for discussion of what might be done to spur the process of Security Council reform. According to a discussant, the question of its structural reform was never assessed or debated in the Council, which left the matter to the General Assembly. There had been no progress, leaving question open as to whether some of the permanent members favoured such far-reaching reform steps. They had the key to reform, but had not yet used it. Another participant urged the incoming members to fight for deep reform of the Council. Since the effectiveness of the Council depended on its unity, a third interlocutor called for limitations on the use of the veto or, better yet, its abolition. Noting that the veto had been employed rarely over the past decade, the speaker suggested that it should not be used in cases of genocide. The permanent members should agree on the circumstances under which it could be employed.

Turning to working methods reform, a delegate characterized the work of the Security Council as overly choreographed and ritualistic. When it came to individual situations and thematic issues, a more systematic approach was needed, since the members sometimes focused heavily on a matter one month and then forgot about it the next. Consultations were insufficiently interactive, with too much reading from prepared statements and too little opportunity to react or return to what others had said. One recent improvement, noted another discussant, had been the effort to streamline and rationalize the cycle for renewal of mandates, something that had first been proposed at the previous year’s workshop. According to a third speaker, more attention should be paid to the role of the Secretariat, which had been expanding over time. The Secretariat had become a virtual sixth permanent member of the Council.
Despite strongly believing in horizon-scanning briefings as an asset in the Security Council’s efforts to become more effective in conflict prevention, a participant contended that the briefing sessions, like the informal consultations, had become too scripted and formal, with both the briefers from the Secretariat and the members reading from prepared statements. The Council needed to find ways of becoming less reactive and more adept at mediation and crisis prevention. The members should not be reluctant to mention situations that were not on the agenda, as it should not be seen as a stigma to have a situation mentioned in the Council. That point needed to be pushed by the incoming members, since there was still some resistance to moving in that direction. It had been useful, for instance, to have the mediator of the dispute regarding the Cambodian-Thai border speak to the Council about his role and seek the members’ political support for his efforts. When tensions had been rising between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the mere fact that the Council discussed the situation had led the parties to downplay the tensions.

In terms of the Security Council’s relative successes and failures, a delegate called the balance sheet very positive on the whole. There were situations in which the dynamics on the ground were simply beyond the Council’s reach. Although Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste could be characterized as relative successes, serious problems had persisted that would have to be resolved by the peoples of those countries. The same could be said of Haiti or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council had been blocked on the Syrian Arab Republic and had never been able to engage in a serious or sustained discussion on the Middle East. The United Nations was part of the Quartet, but the Council just held ritualistic and largely non-substantive monthly meetings on the Middle East (including the Palestinian question). Concurring, a speaker asked why there was a part of the world that all Council members agreed posed a threat to international peace and security, yet the Council never discussed it nor received briefings from those who dealt with it most directly. It was nevertheless a sign of progress, commented another discussant, that all members had agreed that certain situations, such as the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sudan, presented threats to international peace and security even if there was no agreement on how those threats should be addressed.

Several discussants commented on the growing importance of regional organizations to the work of the Security Council. One pointed out, for example, that the collaboration with the League of Arab States had not been anticipated. Another, on the other hand, suggested that the Council’s failure to find a way to handle the problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo underlined the need to cooperate more fully with regional groups. In that case, the Council was at risk of slowly slipping into irrelevancy. A delegate contended that resolution 1973 (2011) on enforcement action in Libya had gained African support within the Council in part because it acknowledged the African Union’s role in mediation there. In the view of another speaker, however, it was also important to realistically assess the capacities of the relevant regional organization in each situation.

Regarding other tools available to the Security Council, a delegate urged the incoming members to avoid the tendency to look at the world from just one perspective. For instance, mediation did not always provide the solution to difficult problems. Sometimes military intervention was needed as a last resort. Referral to the International Criminal Court was one of the important tools that the Council had utilized from time to time, but sometimes realism and double standards influenced how and when the Council used its relationship with the Court. The
members, for example, had not consistently demonstrated sufficient interest in whether those indicted had actually been apprehended for trial by the Court.

As in other recent workshops, the question of how the Security Council should integrate human rights and human protection issues into its work received considerable attention, including in the final lessons learned session. The increasing integration of human rights and humanitarian matters into the work of the Council, asserted a participant, represented a positive trend. The briefings by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Emergency Relief Coordinator had shaped the Council’s approach to a number of important issues. Noting that the Council had gone much further in defence of civilian protection, human rights, humanitarian issues and democratic values, another delegate contended that still more progress was possible and needed. Though the word “democracy” was not in the Charter, supporting democracy, freedom of expression and the exercise of fundamental rights had to be in the minds of all Council members. According to an interlocutor, the effort to support the protection agenda for children and armed conflict had been more difficult than expected. A discussant contended that the Council had been more responsive to human rights violations in some parts of the world than others. For instance, it had not reacted when black Libyans, suspected of being mercenaries, had been detained and tortured based on the colour of their skin. The Council needed to demonstrate that it took its decisions in that regard seriously, commented another speaker. In one situation where the Council had urged closer human rights monitoring, the country in question had responded by expelling the one human rights monitor who was there, and the Council had done nothing to follow up its decision. Moreover, the members needed to understand that asking peacekeeping missions to take on more and more cross-cutting mandates with fewer and fewer resources was not going to work. Smaller missions were especially vulnerable to such financial and resource pressures.

A range of views on thematic debates were expressed. For incoming members, they could represent an important avenue for gaining space, counselled a participant. They could be an important component of the Security Council’s work, added another, but only if they were properly prepared. Care needed to be taken, cautioned one speaker, to avoid the tendency to add issues to the Council’s agenda that should be addressed by the General Assembly instead. HIV/AIDS and the effects of climate change did not constitute threats to international peace and security. Although the speaker’s delegation favoured human rights, there were times when the High Commissioner should have briefed the Human Rights Council instead. A participant countered that the more the Security Council became a normative body, the better its work and contributions became. At times it would be tempting to wind down one body or another in the United Nations, but that was never true of the Council.