Letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the findings and observations of the Somalia technical assessment mission, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2093 (2013) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon
Annex

Results of the Secretary-General’s technical assessment mission to Somalia, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2093 (2013)

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 2093 (2013) of 6 March 2013, agreed that the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) should be replaced by a new special political mission as soon as possible. The Council requested me to urgently field a technical assessment mission, in full cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union, regional bodies and Member States, and on the basis of the guiding principles set out in resolution 2093 (2013), paragraphs 20 to 23, and to revert to the Council with advice by 19 April 2013.

2. In line with the request of the Council, and after consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union, a technical assessment mission was deployed to Somalia and the region from 17 to 29 March. It was led by the Department of Political Affairs, and comprised representatives of all relevant departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes. A representative of the World Bank had to withdraw owing to illness. The African Union met with the team in Addis Ababa.

3. The technical assessment mission began its visit in Mogadishu, where it held detailed and constructive meetings with the President and the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Somalia, the Speaker and many Federal Government ministers, parliamentarians, a range of civil society actors and some regional and international partners. In addition to Mogadishu, the team visited the “newly recovered” areas of Jowhar, Baidoa, and Beledweyne, and the town of Galkacyo, capital of the self-styled region of Galmadug. Part of the team also travelled to Garowe, the capital of the regional State of Puntland, and to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, which has claimed independence from Somalia since 1991. In each location, the team met with local officials, representatives of civil society and United Nations staff. The technical assessment mission also visited Nairobi to meet with the United Nations country team members and international partners and Addis Ababa for consultations with the African Union.

I. Key findings

4. Throughout its encounters, the technical assessment mission heard strong support for a United Nations mandate in all the areas identified by Security Council resolution 2093 (2013), namely, good offices and political support; strategic and policy advice on matters of peacebuilding and statebuilding, particularly regarding the security sector and rule of law, with an emphasis on capacity development; support to the promotion of human rights, including on sexual, gender-based and conflict-related violence and violations against children, the promotion and protection of women’s rights, focusing on building capacity and monitoring; and support to coordination of international assistance, noting that the Government intends to take the lead, with the United Nations providing support.

5. The political environment in Somalia is extremely complex, but there are also impressive capacities for peace and dialogue. The strong political will of the
leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia to rebuild their war-torn society bodes well for the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. The Government has considerable legitimacy, and inspires hope and optimism. However, it has a long way to go in reassuring political actors outside the Government, and beyond Mogadishu, that their interests will be met in the process of realizing the federal system. In Puntland, the technical assessment mission was advised that Puntland reaffirmed its commitment to be part of a federal Somalia and looked forward to the new mission assisting in ensuring the completion of the constitutional process in Somalia. At the same time, Puntland recommended that the current international assistance to the region continue. Interlocutors in Somaliland stressed that the territory has its own democratic history and is not part of Somalia, and insisted on the continuation of the “dual-track” policy regarding international assistance, stressing the need for the United Nations presence in Somaliland to have specifically tailored priorities “without prejudice to the political and priorities of federated regions of Somalia”.

6. Continued international commitment is critical to ensure an enabling security environment for delivery on the goals of the interim period. At present, south and central Somalia cannot be regarded as a post-conflict environment. Somalia is a country in which the international community is seeking to make and build peace in the context of ongoing war and active counter-insurgency operations. With international assistance, the struggle against Al-Shabaab has turned a corner, but it is far from over. The Somali National Security Forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue their campaign, under difficult conditions, to recover the large swaths of the country that still remain under the control of insurgents. However, their limited capacity constrains their ability to launch new offensives and protect existing gains.

7. In the recovered areas, the interlocutors of the technical assessment mission expressed hope for a stabilizing effect from a new United Nations mission, including by attracting political and donor attention. The United Nations was requested to help mediate reconciliation processes and to support the establishment of a federal Somalia; build local capacity for policing, prisons and justice; and provide urgent assistance to help tackle former Al-Shabaab fighters, with the authorities lacking a policy framework and facilities to handle defectors. Insecurity has many implications, both operational and political. Notably, for a future United Nations mission, insecurity will significantly raise the costs, the risks and the challenges of operating in south and central Somalia. United Nations staff in every location visited by the technical assessment mission highlighted extremely challenging and limiting security conditions within the recovered areas, describing “recovered” towns as islands, beyond which movement is nearly impossible. It also means that for the local population, cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia represents choosing sides in an ongoing war, a difficult and potentially dangerous decision for actors at all levels of society. This is a major challenge for a Government seeking to consolidate a federal system in the space of just three years. For the United Nations mission, it will require a robust physical presence and a nuanced political approach, with an emphasis on risk management.

8. The Federal Government of Somalia is committed to stabilization, peacebuilding and statebuilding. Yet, it requires time to build its own capacity, revenue and authority. Somalia needs a “one-door” approach from its international partners. Somalia enjoys considerable international goodwill, and the presence of its
friends is increasingly visible in the country. But across the statebuilding and peacebuilding agenda, international assistance is fragmented, duplicative and confused, rendering the net result suboptimal. While the Somali authorities have made clear their intention to lead international coordination, it will need practical support and discipline from donors to change the old dynamic, in which international assistance to Somalia has often fuelled conflict as much as it has built capacity.

9. AMISOM has achieved significant military successes in recent months recovering important strategic locations from Al-Shabaab. These gains, however, remain fragile as the vast area of responsibility and the lack of enablers and force multipliers constrain the ability of the force to project beyond current deployment locations. AMISOM also maintains a civilian presence in Mogadishu and has commenced recruitment of civilian personnel to be deployed in the newly recovered areas.

II. Proposed new United Nations mission

10. The above findings depict an environment in which a new United Nations mission can do much good. However, it will not be the only actor and will need strong support, partnerships and the commitment of Member States to succeed. With this in mind, and in respect of the deployment of a new United Nations mission under resolution 2093 (2013), the technical assessment mission developed a mission concept, which outlines an approach for providing:

(a) The good offices role of the United Nations, backed up by sound political and information analysis, capacity for mediation and a robust approach to strategic communications;

(b) Tailored strategic and policy advice for peacebuilding and statebuilding; advice should be complemented by programmatic support to capacity development by the United Nations country team and other partners, especially strengthened support in the areas of security and the rule of law;

(c) Assistance to develop Somalia’s national capacity to promote respect for human rights, child protection and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, coupled with monitoring in line with international standards;

(d) Support to coordination of the efforts of the international community, fully respecting the lead role of the Somali authorities.

11. In order to effectively carry out its work, the new mission will be guided by the following principles: (a) **Somali national ownership**: the mission will assist Somali actors to develop nationally owned and inclusive strategies and frameworks and to devise realistic plans and priority goals; (b) **flexibility**: the mission will maintain a flexible structure to ensure the ability to deliver to evolving priorities by having a limited permanent residential staff complemented by flexible funding to enable specialized experts, as needed; it will also require a highly mobile and flexible concept of mission support and will draw on the modalities identified in the report of the Secretary-General on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/66/311-S/2011/527); (c) **collaboration and partnerships**: the mission and the United Nations country team will work together as “One UN” to provide multidisciplinary responses to the priorities of the Government, while respecting the
humanitarian space; it will seek deeper partnerships with other major actors, such as the African Union/AMISOM and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and (d) risk management: the mission will actively work to reduce the risks that its actions may unintentionally provoke conflict. Existing tools and policies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, will be implemented and a programme criticality assessment will be completed as an essential element in determining acceptable risk.

A. Core substantive functions of the new mission

12. Based on the mandated areas indicated in resolution 2093 (2013), the mission will have substantive expertise in the following areas: (a) political affairs and mediation/facilitation; (b) rule of law and security institutions; and (c) human rights and protection. The experts of the mission will work together with the United Nations country team, AMISOM and other relevant partners in issue-specific task teams to address priority issues in a coherent, strategic manner.

Political affairs and mediation

13. The political affairs and mediation group of the mission will support the good offices of the Special Representative in respect of political and reconciliation processes at the federal and regional levels, with particular focus on supporting the Federal Government of Somalia to deliver core political tasks over the period 2013-2016, in support of the development of a federal system. Working with all relevant political actors at the federal and regional levels, the group will work to identify political opportunities and risks to the peace process; identify entry points for the United Nations, and respond to specific requests for advice and support to mediation or facilitation; for example, to the development of federal regional relations; and develop strategies, policy advice and recommendations to inform the work of the United Nations and international partners. The group will comprise a core of political affairs officers, including some with expertise in federalism, mediation, elections and other key subject areas, and will facilitate the deployment of additional consultants and seconded experts as may be required to support various phases of the political process during the period 2013-2016, which will include the completion of the constitutional review and preparation of a referendum, census and elections. The mission will also have a Senior Gender Adviser, who will work closely with the political affairs and mediation group, ensuring that a broad spectrum of gender-related issues, particularly the inclusion of women’s concerns and issues in Somalia’s statebuilding and peacebuilding priorities, is reflected in the political work of the mission. Additional capacity to support the preparation of a referendum and elections would be on the basis of a request from the Government and further to a dedicated needs assessment to be conducted at the appropriate time, in consultation with all relevant partners.

Rule of law and security institutions

14. The rule of law and security institutions capacity of the new mission will support the Government’s priority objectives of transforming and building Somalia’s security and justice institutions. In addition to strategic advice and support to the Government’s lead in coordination, the rule of law and security institutions group, working with the United Nations country team, will assist the Government and
donors in ensuring early, tangible results in strategic, priority areas identified by the Government with regard to police, justice and corrections, mine action and maritime security, where the United Nations has comparative advantage and there are gaps to be filled.

15. At the policy level, the mission will provide technical advice to the Government to coordinate bilateral efforts supporting security sector reform and develop a strategic vision within which such support can become better aligned with national priorities (as articulated in the Government’s National Security and Stabilization Plan). The mission, working with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and bilateral partners, will assist the Government to design and enhance the command and control structure in the Ministry of Defence, as well as provide technical expertise to support the nascent National Security Council. To support the Somali National Police Force, the mission will provide technical advice to the Government, including revising legislation governing the police and aligning bilateral financing and training efforts to the Strategic Action Plan for Policing (2013-2017). Mission police experts should be capable of deploying outside of Mogadishu in the early stages of the mission in order to support the Government to re-establish policing in recovered areas, as part of its stabilization strategy. The mission will also need maritime security and counter-piracy expertise to continue providing strategic advice to the Government on maritime security and to coordinate a United Nations system-wide approach to supporting the Government to implement its national maritime strategy through the Kampala process.

16. The mission will also provide much needed technical advice and related operational support to the justice institutions of Somalia, which have received little donor support to date. It will support Somali-led strategic planning processes and provide technical assistance to address critical gaps in the national legal framework. The mission will also work with the national authorities and partners to facilitate the extension of rule-of-law services delivery beyond Mogadishu, with a particular emphasis on the newly recovered areas where basic justice and corrections capacity will need to be established, building on existing traditional justice mechanisms and paying specific attention to the rights of women and children. A key early priority will be to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in establishing safe, predictable programmes for managing disengaged Al-Shabaab fighters. Even in advance of the deployment of the mission, finalization of an agreed policy and legal framework will be essential to enable pilot programmes and donor support in this regard. In partnership with the United Nations country team, the mission will work with the Government to identify requirements, under the arrangements for the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections, that will bring together the resources and the capacities of the mission, UNDP and other United Nations country team partners in a joint programme for police, justice and corrections that will support the priorities of the Government. As part of the mission, the ongoing activities of the United Nations Mine Action Service in Somalia will continue to promote coordinated support to mine action and explosive management and build national capacity to respond to the explosive threat in Somalia.

Human rights and protection

17. The human rights and protection group in the mission will promote awareness, understanding of and adherence to the rule of law and respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, including the rights of women, and the inclusion of
children’s issues in the political process. This group will include expertise in human rights, including on the rights of women, sexual violence in conflict and child protection. Building on its monitoring, investigative and public reporting capacity, the overall objective of the human rights and protection group will be to develop trust and confidence among national and local authorities to advance human rights and protection agendas throughout the country; create space for dialogue and discourse on human rights and protection issues within governmental and non-governmental institutions; link up with existing governmental and non-governmental structures and other relevant stakeholders working on these issues in creating and strengthening the national human rights and protection system; liaise closely with other parts of the mission and members of the United Nations country team dealing with rule of law, security, mediation and reconciliation, gender and humanitarian issues in order to have a coherent response to the current human rights and protection challenges in the country; and work closely with ongoing capacity-building programmes in the field of human rights and protection provided by the United Nations country team and partners, the donor community and other relevant stakeholders to avoid duplication and non-action.

18. Working closely with the United Nations country team, the human rights and protection group will support the Government to review, develop and implement legislation necessary to comply with international human rights and protection standards as the cornerstone of the mission’s capacity-building programme and develop curricula to train and raise awareness within national security institutions and other target groups. It will support the Government task force on sexual violence in developing a national strategy for preventing and responding to sexual violence. It will also provide assistance, as part of the country task force on monitoring and reporting on grave violations of children’s rights, to implement national action plans on the recruitment, use, killing and maiming of children in armed conflict, and support the Government to implement its two related actions plans, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2093 (2013). The human rights and protection group will work with other parts of the United Nations to establish the basis for effective engagement with non-United Nations security entities in the context of the implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

Multidisciplinary task teams

19. In addition to the above core expertise areas to be provided by the mission, the following multidisciplinary task teams are envisaged to ensure coherent approaches between the United Nations country team and the mission to other key challenges facing Somalia:

(a) Stability and recovery in the newly recovered areas;
(b) Maritime issues (accompanying the Kampala process);
(c) Economic drivers of conflict; and
(d) Capacity development.

The task teams will change to reflect the evolving situations of Somalia. From the outset of the mission, these teams will include the relevant United Nations country team colleagues.
20. As outlined in my report of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69) and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2093 (2013), the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) will be integrated within the framework of the new mission, with the head of UNSOA continuing to report to the Department of Field Support on delivery of logistical support to AMISOM, and, in parallel, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on United Nations mission support issues and policy/political questions arising from the functions of UNSOA. I believe that this approach will preserve UNSOA responsiveness in supporting AMISOM and is consistent with the intent of the Security Council and the request expressed in the African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué of 27 February 2013.

B. Coherence and effectiveness

21. The mission and the United Nations country team will engage in a strategic partnership based on the principle of integration. The mission and the country team will develop a shared vision of the strategic objectives of the United Nations and prepare an integrated strategic framework with agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace.

22. In order to maximize the impact of strategic advice in the core mandated areas, the mission will have an “enabling platform” for strategic integration, comprising integrated systems for analysis, strategic planning and effective mandate implementation. This will multiply the value-added of substantive experts based in the mission and as a platform for more effective intra-United Nations integration and United Nations-African Union collaboration.

23. Key features include an integrated information hub and integrated analysis team, combining mission staff and staff from the United Nations country team and AMISOM to promote common situational awareness and a shared understanding of strategic challenges, as well as provide capacity for integrated crisis management. A joint planning team, comprised of the mission’s strategic planning capacity and representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office of the Resident Coordinator and AMISOM will maintain an overview of all United Nations and African Union planning frameworks and facilitate United Nations and United Nations-African Union coordination. The modalities for United Nations-AMISOM coordination, including the leadership team described below, will be finalized in a joint planning meeting between the mission and AMISOM immediately after the mission is established.

24. Based on the principle of “form following function”, the mission and the United Nations country team will explore avenues for increased collaboration. Joint programmes will be developed in specific areas that require both political and development expertise, such as elections, while more flexible joint teams or strategies will be established in thematic areas that cut across organizational mandates; for example, support to the constitutional review process, as well as in the areas of policing, justice and corrections, which are covered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations-UNDP global focal point system. These coordinated efforts will require increased support for United Nations country team activities and coordination between the mission and the country team. From 1 January 2014, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/
Humanitarian Coordinator will take up post in the mission, and will be responsible for supporting the coordination of the country team and the coherence and synergy of the mission and the country team. Additional capacity will be made available to augment the capacity of the existing Office of the Resident Coordinator and enable it to provide tailored coordination support in different regions of the area of operations. This will include experts to be deployed at the regional level and in Puntland and Somaliland, taking into account the latter’s unique conditions. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will continue to support humanitarian coordination across the mission area.

25. In order to facilitate effective mandate implementation and to maximize the value-added of substantive support to be provided by the mission, the mission will have expertise in the areas of knowledge and skills transfer, as well as planning, monitoring and evaluation. These strategic management measures will enable the mission to track, monitor and evaluate United Nations performance and progress in supporting the Government priorities. All the above efforts will be further supported by a dynamic strategic communications capacity to enable the mission to provide accurate and impartial information about the peace process, promote the values of the United Nations, facilitate media development in Somalia and build and manage the relationship between the United Nations, Somalis and the international community.

C. Leadership and international coordination

26. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General will head the mission, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives with the following functions: one Deputy will deputize in the absence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and assist the Special Representative in overseeing substantive mission functions; and one Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator will assume the triple-hatted function with effect from 1 January 2014, and, in his or her capacity as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, will support the Special Representative in his or her functions and facilitate the coordinated activities of the United Nations country team in supporting peacebuilding and realizing synergies with the mission. In addition, the Special Representative will be supported by a Director of Mission Support, who will concurrently serve as head of UNSOA, with the reporting lines articulated in my report of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69).

27. From the outset, the new integrated mission will establish senior leadership structures with a view to ensuring systematic coordination and synergy with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and a strengthened strategic partnership with the African Union. To this end, a joint leadership team, comprising the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, the Director of Mission Support, the Chief of Staff, the AMISOM Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the AMISOM Force Commander, will meet regularly to define the common vision and shared objectives for the work of the integrated mission, the United Nations country team and AMISOM in Somalia, and will jointly address issues of mutual concern. This team will be supported by integrated arrangements for analysis and planning.
28. The coordination of assistance provided by the international community remains the sovereign responsibility of the Somali authorities. However, assisting the Government to discharge this function at the political level is a responsibility of the mission, as envisaged in paragraph 22 (e) of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). Proposals have been presented to the Somali authorities for a streamlined Somali partnership forum to replace existing structures for political coordination. With respect to aid coordination, it is anticipated that the Government will take the lead in a structure based on the New Deal, with the United Nations providing support under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. Relevant mission personnel and United Nations country team members will support sectoral coordination functions in the areas of their mandates that are aligned with the Government’s New Deal goals.

D. Expanded physical presence

29. The mission will be headquartered in Mogadishu, and will establish a presence across the whole area of operations, as requested by the Federal Government of Somalia, including in Somaliland, recognizing the need for further dialogue between Hargeisa and Mogadishu on their future relations.

30. In principle, the mission will establish presence in the capitals of regional States formed and recognized by the Federal Government of Somalia and the administrations themselves under the terms of the provisional Constitution (currently this applies only to Garowe, capital of Puntland). Where such States are yet to be formed, the mission will establish a presence in relevant regional capitals, based on (a) the presence of an interim administration recognized by the Federal Government of Somalia; (b) the relevance of the mandate of the Mission to needs in the region, as identified by federal and local authorities and civil society, in consultation with AMISOM and the United Nations country team; (c) the ability of the mission to add value, taking into account local capacity, security and logistic constraints; and (d) a cost benefit analysis of the advantages of a permanent presence versus mobile capacity provided on a needs basis from a nearby location.

31. The mission will establish a presence in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe, using existing facilities. A presence in Baidoa and Beledweyne will also be established during the initial phase of the mission, taking into account security conditions and the availability of appropriate accommodation. Presence in Kismaayo and other regional centres should be considered on the basis of the four criteria above and taking into account political and security developments. Initial mission presence will be in existing or planned UNSOA facilities located alongside AMISOM; within the first phase of the mission, planning should be developed for separate mission locations, close to Government counterparts, where security and logistic arrangements permit.

E. Personnel and funding arrangements

32. It is not possible to anticipate at this stage all the expertise that the mission may be asked to support. It will be important for the mission to adapt over its lifetime to new needs identified by the Somali authorities and/or to address contextual priorities. In addition to the provision of core staff, the mission will
F. Security arrangements

33. The mission concept, based on the request of the Somali President and Federal Government, requires that United Nations mission staff across the whole of Somalia meet frequently with a wide range of Somali counterparts, work closely alongside Government personnel and, in some cases as required, be co-located in Government offices. This must be done while meeting high standards for the security and safety of United Nations staff.

34. Delivering on these requirements in the volatile environment of Somalia will require a robust, flexible and differentiated menu of security options to allow security arrangements to be tailored to individual tasks and locations. Representatives of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security participated as part of the technical assessment mission to develop recommendations, considering the requirements of area and mobile security, as well as evacuation procedures, that will be necessary to enable mandate implementation.

35. The technical assessment mission noted that AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces are the primary enablers for the United Nations mission presence in Somalia. The African Union and Somali National Security Forces’ joint efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab and establish a presence in areas recovered from the insurgency create the critical “outer ring” of security presence within which the mission will operate. Within this overall umbrella, a “middle ring” of security of mission operations will be provided by AMISOM in recovered areas, including to secure airports and key hubs, as at the Mogadishu International Airport and elsewhere. These efforts by AMISOM will continue to be critical to improve the overall security environment in Somalia and enable the mission presence.

36. Additional security requirements for the new mission are as follows: (a) an “inner ring” of static security at mission locations, which should comply with minimum operational security standards; (b) arrangements for protected mobility through the provision of security escorts; and (c) arrangements for quick reaction to secure United Nations personnel in the event of serious security incidents.

37. Arrangements to meet these requirements will be built on the models already developed and tested in the context of United Nations operations in Somalia. In particular, the technical assessment mission took note of the successful and flexible model employed by the Department of Safety and Security to facilitate mobility in Mogadishu and elsewhere, using United Nations-contracted and trained local security guards, operating under a memorandum of understanding with Government authorities, pending the establishment of a regular diplomatic police, which will continue.

38. It is noted that AMISOM has confirmed its commitment to deploy the mandated “guard force” in Mogadishu in the coming months through 318 troops already identified within existing AMISOM capacity. However, African Union
forces available within the existing troop ceiling will not be sufficient to provide mobile security for all locations of the new mission. Subject to a further review of requirements beyond Mogadishu, the Council will need to authorize African Union personnel above the current ceiling for a period of 24 months, specifically to support an expanded “guard force” as part of the security package. In areas of very high risk, the “guard force”, with support from UNSOA, will provide static perimeter security and offer security escorts and quick reaction capacity.

39. In some locations, security conditions do not warrant the use of AMISOM military assets for civilian escort functions, whereas such assets will remain essential for the pursuit of AMISOM military objectives. It is therefore envisaged that where conditions permit, and in addition to security provided by AMISOM, the new mission should make use of a range of security options, including the Somali National Security Forces and the special protection units (as used in Puntland and Somaliland). Locally sourced guards, as already tested in Mogadishu, should form part of the package. Service providers would be selected in close consultation with the Government to ensure that the use and development of such teams is consistent with overall development of the Somali security sector. Depending on conditions and risks in each mission setting, Somali teams could provide security at some mission locations and provide security escorts to enable staff mobility within the overall perimeter provided by AMISOM. The Department of Safety and Security and AMISOM would immediately undertake work to develop the concept of operations for this arrangement.

40. Should the above arrangements prove inadequate to ensure staff security and mobility as the mission expands its deployment, and depending on the evolving security situation on the ground, the United Nations would revert to the Council with advice on supplementary measures that may be required, including potentially deploying United Nations guard units (as in the case of Iraq) or requesting authorization for the use of international private security companies.

41. In all cases, the mission will need to put in place arrangements to ensure compliance of all concerned security elements with the provisions of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and other relevant guidance. Arrangements should be kept under close review to enable them to be scaled up and down as required as the security environment evolves. They would be overseen through an integrated security management system under a designated official, in order to ensure full coherence and coordination of security arrangements for the United Nations family in Somalia.

III. Observations

42. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Federal Government of Somalia, local and regional authorities, including in Somaliland and Puntland, all other interlocutors of the technical assessment mission, and the members of the Security Council and other international partners for their detailed advice and guidance to the United Nations in developing plans for the mission. It is clear to me that there is a great desire for the support of the future United Nations mission in Somalia and many areas in which it can contribute at this critical time for Somalia. The United Nations will do its utmost to live up to the task. At the same time, I wish to
emphasize the very challenging environment in which the mission will operate, and the need to manage expectations.

43. In particular, it should be recognized that as envisaged in my report of 31 January 2013 (S/2013/69), the core function of the new United Nations mission will be to act as an enabler. It will assist the Federal Government of Somalia to create the political and strategic environment in which peacebuilding can proceed, and will facilitate engagement by other partners. Critically, noting the request of the Federal Government of Somalia for a single “door to knock on”, the mission will be a platform enabling coherent, integrated support to Somalia by the United Nations system, as well as a stronger strategic partnership and collaboration with AMISOM across all areas of peacebuilding.

44. The mission will not be responsible for delivering support to national security — this remains the role of AMISOM, supported logistically by UNSOA — or operational programmes, which remain the lead responsibility of the United Nations country team. As such, the mission’s own success will depend on the empowerment of these key partners.

45. The mission will deploy a core team with effect from 3 June 2013, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). It will build up its capacity gradually, noting the need for adequate logistical and security arrangements to be in place, and taking account of requests and priorities of the Somali authorities.

46. In terms of security, there is a critical need for enhanced support to both AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces in order to sustain the security gains. This is especially important following the announced withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces from Hudur and its anticipated withdrawal from Baidoa as announced. AMISOM needs additional enablers and force multipliers to make full use of its existing forces. The reconfiguration of the force, including the option of authorizing additional formed police units above the existing ceiling, at the request of the African Union, should also be considered to help secure population centres already recovered from Al-Shabaab, and to enable the AMISOM military force to undertake operations to recover the balance of territories under the control of insurgents. These and other innovative approaches to address the challenges faced by AMISOM should be considered and detailed options developed. In this regard, I reiterate my recommendation that the Council should revisit the option of United Nations or joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping as conventional combat operations against Al-Shabaab end, in consultation with the Somali authorities at that time. To prepare for such deliberation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should lead, in cooperation with the African Union, an exercise to identify benchmarks for a future United Nations peacekeeping operation, as indicated in resolution 2093 (2013). Meanwhile, the African Union has identified the need for additional resources to enable the AMISOM civilian component to contribute to stabilization activities in south and central Somalia, where Al-Shabaab has been defeated.

47. No less critical will be an enhanced and coherent international approach to supporting the Somali security sector and rapid investment to scale up Somali forces. AMISOM does not have the authority or resources to sustain Somali soldiers fighting alongside it in joint operations. Training by AMISOM and other international partners has helped improve operational capability, but it comes piecemeal and without an overall vision or doctrine for the Somali forces. This is an area in which, while the United Nations will provide policy advice and support to
the Government to coordinate international efforts, bilateral partners have a critical role to play. I urge Member States contributing in this sector to pursue an integrated approach, noting the risk that fragmented international assistance will fuel internal conflict and undermine the strategic goal of a Somalia that is self-sufficient in security. In this context, the United Nations stands ready to support coordination efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia in the security sector in line with paragraph 22 of resolution 2093 (2013).

48. Also, in respect of institution-building and wider economic recovery, Somalia needs a “one-door” approach from its international partners. I urge international partners, in addition to their support for the United Nations mission, to review and align their bilateral assistance to ensure that they contribute to a coherent overall international effort in support of nationally owned priorities. It would be unfortunate if the current surge of good will for Somalia were undermined by fragmented and duplicative efforts at international assistance, with different models and advice on the same issues driving internal tensions in Somalia and multiple funding modalities undermining the shared goal of greater financial transparency and accountability. To avoid overwhelming the nascent capacity, and leadership, the international community will need to make a clear commitment to working coherently and patiently with the Federal Government of Somalia, allowing it to develop its plans and build its capacities. While the Somali authorities have made clear their intention to lead international coordination, I urge international partners to commit themselves to support this goal by coordinating with one another and seeking unified models of funding, reporting and accountability. I am determined to reinforce coherence and close cooperation through the United Nations system to ensure focused, effective support.

49. Finally, I wish to highlight that, in order to complement the work of the new mission and meet the expectations of the Federal Government, there is a need for a significant scaling-up of United Nations agency programmes in Somalia, especially in the recovered areas and to support capacity-building of Somali institutions. This relies on a major extension of voluntary donor funding to such programmes, preferably through unified and un-earmarked channels. I urge donors to provide generous support to such efforts, which I hope in will be unified under a single funding mechanism, linked to the New Deal. Coordination across all aspects of international assistance to Somalia will be critical to deliver on our shared goals for Somalia. At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the ongoing humanitarian situation. While there have been improvements, 1 million Somalis continue to require life-saving assistance, and an additional 1.7 million who emerged from crisis in the last year could fall back without continued support to rebuild their livelihoods and enhance resilience. There are an estimated 1.1 million Somalis registered as refugees in neighbouring countries. In parallel with peacebuilding and statebuilding, the humanitarian effort must be supported as long as needs persist.

50. I have previously assured the Council and the Federal Government of Somalia of my personal commitment to seizing the opportunity currently presented to deliver a new era of peace and stability in Somalia. The people of Somalia have suffered far too long from lawlessness and man-made disaster. We are now in a moment of great risk and also great opportunity. We must seize the opportunity. It is with this conviction that I am formally presenting the above concept for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNAMSOM). The United Nations stands ready to do its utmost to support Somalis as they forge this new chapter in their history.