



Security Council

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Letter dated 13 December 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report on the situation in Mali of 29 November 2012 (S/2012/894) and Security Council resolution 2071 (2012), in which I was requested to provide financial costs for the possible deployment of a logistical support package for an international military force. I also have the honour to refer to the request by Council members that the Secretariat provide different options and cost estimates for logistical support that could be provided by the United Nations.

I should like to recall paragraphs 92 and 93 of my report, in which I shared some of my concerns associated with the possible provision of a United Nations logistical support package for an African-led international support mission for Mali. The United Nations has developed a comprehensive capability to deploy and support peacekeeping operations where the international military presence enjoys the strategic consent of the major actors. The United Nations does not have, nor has it sought to develop, significant expertise or capability to provide logistical support to international military forces deployed to conduct offensive combat operations against hostile armed forces. When the hostile forces to be defeated are a highly capable and violent terrorist organization or organizations, the expertise required to conduct combat and support such operations is more specialized than that for standard combat, making the lack of expertise of the United Nations in this area of particular relevance.

The United Nations has worked hard to provide logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including while it has been engaged in combat operations. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the fact that the initial deployment of AMISOM to Mogadishu was mandated through resolution 1744 (2007) of 20 February 2007 and that it was not until 16 January 2009, through resolution 1863 (2009), that the Council authorized the United Nations to deploy a logistical support package to AMISOM. Following Council authorization, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions granted an initial commitment authority for United Nations operations on 10 March 2009. The Secretariat began to provide logistical support directly to AMISOM through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in October 2009. During the period from the initial deployment in February 2007 to October 2009, AMISOM was provided with logistical support through bilateral channels. From October 2009 to June 2012, United Nations logistical support was confined to the capital city, Mogadishu, with very limited supply lines. While UNSOA gradually



built up capacity to support the two contingents of AMISOM in Mogadishu, once AMISOM began combat operations outside Mogadishu, UNSOA experienced significant challenges in providing the level of logistical support required for sustained AMISOM combat operations.

Drawing on the lessons of Somalia, and as indicated in my report, one option that the Council may wish to consider would be a phased approach, whereby combat-related military operations would receive logistical support through voluntary or bilateral sources. Once the objectives of the military operations had been achieved, the Council could authorize the United Nations to provide a support package to assist an international force during stabilization operations. Were the Council to endorse this approach, details of such a support package could be developed over time when the operational environment of the post-combat phase would be clearer.

A second option would be for the United Nations to provide logistical support to an African-led international support mission for Mali deployed in southern Mali for the purpose of helping the Malian defence and security forces to build their capacity to conduct the operations called for in the harmonized joint concept of operations endorsed by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), referred to as the “strategic operational framework” in my report. Under this option, the United Nations would provide a comprehensive logistical support package, as detailed below, to international troops in southern Mali, but would not provide such support to international troops in territory not controlled by the Government of Mali or in areas of active combat.

A third option for a support package would be to combine the first two options. Under this scenario, following authorization by the Council of an African-led international support mission for Mali, the United Nations would immediately initiate efforts to provide logistical support to the international force in areas of Mali to which it deploys that are controlled by the Government. After the Malian defence and security forces and the international force achieve their strategic military objectives in northern Mali, and combat operations have broadly ended, the United Nations could then provide logistical support to the international force wherever it is deployed in the territory of Mali, including in northern Mali, as part of a second, stabilization phase of military operations. For planning purposes, the information on the types of logistical support that the United Nations would provide under the first phase of this scenario would be the same in the initial phase as option II and can also be found below. Details of the support that would be provided under the second phase of this scenario could be developed at a later time, as in the case of option I.

As has been broadly acknowledged, the strategic operational framework makes a number of planning assumptions that would need to be fulfilled, and leaves unanswered a number of important questions that would need to be answered, for the concept to be successful. The support package options presented herein offer the possibility of the United Nations providing significant logistical capability to an international military force, but are not designed to provide the critical military enablers necessary for the success of the envisaged operation. Significant bilateral, financial and material support from Member States and other partners would be required to cover, among other things, the equipping, predeployment training and preparation of international forces, in addition to reimbursements of salary and allowances and acquisition of contingent-owned equipment.

Logistical support provided by the United Nations to an international military force in Mali under the above options would be funded primarily or exclusively from United Nations assessed contributions and comprise the equipment and mission support services normally provided for a United Nations peacekeeping operation of the same size. This would be used to meet the life-support needs of the deployed international forces, including the provision of rations, fuel, engineering works, communications and medical support. Assessed funding would also provide for the strategic deployment of new forces, the rotation of existing forces, the movement of equipment and supplies and additional staff to manage the delivery of the support package.

A limited set of the requirements of an international force that would not be covered by United Nations assessed funding could possibly be met by financial support from Member States and other partners provided through a trust fund administered by the United Nations. The trust fund could cover additional requirements such as the procurement of Organization-owned equipment to bridge gaps in contingent capability not provided for in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The use of funds administered by the United Nations would need to strictly adhere to United Nations financial and procurement rules.

In developing the concept for a support package under the above options, assumptions were made, including that it would be for an international force of up to 3,300 personnel, comprising 2,990 troops, 30 individual police officers and two formed police units of, in total, 280 personnel, as provided for in the strategic operational framework. The composition of the troops would include a force headquarters, infantry battalions and enabling companies, including aviation, logistics, transport, engineering, medical, signal and military police.

Logistical support by the United Nations to the international force could be provided in the functional areas of supply (rations, water and fuel); engineering, including construction, power generation, water supply and sanitation; medical support; strategic movement; strategic communications; and limited information technology support. The troop-contributing countries would be reimbursed for their organic contingent-owned major equipment, in accordance with United Nations rates, from assessed contributions. The United Nations could provide logistical support, under options II and III above, in the following areas, on the basis of the initial planning estimates and the strategic operational framework endorsed by ECOWAS and the African Union:

(a) **Supply.** After an initial period of self-sufficiency, the required rations, water and fuel would be provided to the international military force up to United Nations standards through commercial contract arrangements. Delivered commodities might be provided by the contractor to predefined sector locations from where the troops would be responsible for collection. Sufficient levels of reserve stocks would be established to improve the robustness and survivability of the force. Pending the completion of the requisite procurement processes, the interim logistical support capability would depend on strong bilateral assistance from Member States;

(b) **Engineering.** Engineering support for international troop deployment would be provided by the United Nations, leveraging a range of enabling capabilities (military, United Nations and Member States) in addition to construction services provided by commercial companies. The overall conditions in theatre are

harsh and significant efforts would be required to bring facilities and other positions for the force up to United Nations standards, in particular in the areas of accommodation, power supply, refrigeration, sanitation and the quality and quantity of potable water. There would be an urgent need to establish key facilities, including the force headquarters. The limited engineering concept will recognize the tactical and interim nature of the international force, with 80 per cent of the force housed in camps with soft-walled accommodation (tentage). The remaining 20 per cent could eventually be provided with modularized prefabricated facilities in semi-permanent hubs. Essential defence stores required by the force would be provided by the United Nations. The troops would be expected to deploy with self-sustainment capacity according to United Nations standards. This would include troop-contributing-country-provided tentage, limited sanitation, power and water production. Bilateral assistance would be essential to bridging any gaps in the capacity of troop-contributing countries. Particular attention would need to be paid to minimizing the negative impact of the deployment on host communities, their resources and the environment;

(c) **Medical support.** Troop-contributing countries would be expected to deploy one level II medical facility up to United Nations standards. The United Nations would support the establishment of additional medical facilities with equipment, pharmaceuticals, consumables and laboratory supplies, including ambulances. The United Nations would establish, through commercial or bilateral arrangements, medical evacuation/casualty evacuation services in Government-controlled territory and to locations outside Mali. Medical evacuation/casualty evacuation capability from locations in northern Mali would need to be provided by troop-contributing countries or partners. Pending the completion of the requisite procurement processes, interim medical evacuation/casualty evacuation capability to meet all needs would depend on the aviation resources of troop-contributing countries, with possible support from bilateral partners. Appropriately qualified medical personnel to staff the facilities must be provided by the participating contingents;

(d) **Movement support.** The United Nations would provide the international force with support in the surface and air transportation of cargo and the deployment and rotation of contingent personnel. Capability and capacity enhancements to the existing transport infrastructure might be required to enable airfield, terminal and port operations. To the extent possible, the strategic movement support will rely on existing regional United Nations capacities and supply lines;

(e) **Aviation.** It is not anticipated that, under the current strategic operational framework, there would be a requirement for United Nations-provided aviation support operating only in Government-controlled territory. Consequently, it is not anticipated that the United Nations would provide tactical aviation support within the theatre of operations. If this requirement were to change, the United Nations would re-examine this recommendation. The international force would require aviation support for combat operations in northern Mali, which would need to be provided by a troop-contributing country or partner. The nature of the tactical military aviation requirements would need to be identified by the force. The Council may wish to consider whether the costs of such aviation operations should be covered by assessed contributions. As mentioned above, the United Nations could implement some airfield upgrades for the benefit of the force, if required. The determination of equipment and infrastructure development requirements at local

airfields would require the conduct of a specialized assessment mission to examine and assess the suitability of the existing capabilities in operational safety, including night operation capability, available aviation fuel supply systems, firefighting and emergency crash and rescue services. Search and rescue operations would need to be conducted by the force;

(f) **Communications and information technology.** The United Nations would provide the required strategic communications and information technology capability and equipment for force locations in Government-controlled territory. The United Nations would rely on local contracts or bilateral arrangements for installation, training of contingents and technical support in theatre. Contingents from each troop-contributing country would be expected to deploy with the appropriate tactical communications capability. The United Nations could provide the equipment and training for the force's strategic communications and information technology requirements in areas not controlled by the Government, but the force would need to install and operate the equipment. The United Nations could maintain and repair equipment if it were transported to the designated United Nations facility.

The United Nations logistical support would be defined and provided through a range of contractual instruments. Host Government agreements would need to be established to allow the United Nations and its contractors to operate in Mali and in countries in the region. Memorandums of understanding between the United Nations, troop-contributing countries and the organization fielding the international force would be required to provide for fully accountable use of the Organization's resources in conformity with its rules and regulations and to define the roles, responsibilities and obligations of each party. As the United Nations and international partners' analysis of contingent and future United Nations support conditions develop, it is anticipated that other required services would be identified. In parallel, scopes of work for longer-term requirements to bring support services to United Nations standards would be developed and bid on commercially.

United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces would be provided in compliance with the Organization's human rights due diligence policy. Under the policy, the United Nations would be obliged to carry out a risk assessment of any forces that might receive United Nations assistance under such a support arrangement. Should it be determined that there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk that an intended recipient may commit grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the United Nations would work with the relevant authorities with a view to putting in place effective measures to eliminate or minimize that risk. Should the United Nations receive reliable information that provides substantial grounds to believe that a recipient of United Nations support is committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the United Nations would intercede with the relevant authorities with a view to bringing those violations to an end. If, despite such intercession, the situation were to persist, the United Nations would be obliged to suspend or withdraw support from the elements committing those violations.

The troop-contributing countries would be reimbursed from assessed contributions for their organic contingent-owned major equipment, in accordance with United Nations rates. However, the United Nations logistical support package would not provide reimbursement for contingent-owned major equipment that was gifted or donated to troop-contributing countries, ECOWAS, the African Union or

where the ownership remains with the donor; personnel reimbursement (troop costs); reimbursement for self-sustainment; the acquisition of contingent-owned major or minor equipment; compensation for loss and damage of contingent-owned equipment owing to hostile action and forced abandonment; and compensation for death and disability.

Costs for the logistical support package remain dependent on the further development of a concept of operations for the international force, in addition to continuing work to identify suppliers and deliver support solutions. Logistical support for the deployment and sustainment of the international force would be a substantial undertaking. A preliminary assessment of the financial implications for assessed contributions, should the Secretariat be requested by the Council to implement the logistical support package outlined in option II or phase I of option III, indicates that support for a fully deployed force, in a sustainment phase, would cost approximately \$133 million over a full year. One-off establishment costs of \$64 million could also be expected. If the Council were to authorize a multidimensional mission, including components to provide political and rule of law support as described in my report, additional costs each year of approximately \$25 million, in addition to up to \$10 million in start-up costs, could be expected.

The above costs are based on comparable elements of United Nations operations. Should the Council decide to authorize a logistical support package, the Secretariat would conduct detailed planning, in consultation with relevant partners. Such planning may result in an adjustment to the above-estimated costs. Following the planning, the Secretariat would present a financing proposal to the General Assembly for its consideration. Such a proposal would be prepared with regard to the appropriate funding period and a phased deployment timeline for personnel and equipment.

With the information currently available to the Secretariat, it is difficult to estimate the costs involved in providing logistical support to combat operations in northern Mali. Nevertheless, the recent expansion of AMISOM, and its support from UNSOA, beyond Mogadishu into south and central Somalia provide an indication of the difficulties and added costs that could be incurred in supporting combat operations by an international force in a remote environment. Such a force would need to rely extensively on its own organic logistical capabilities, as AMISOM does, including light engineering and distribution of supplies, in the absence of available vendors and given an expected inability to sufficiently secure United Nations activities. Even so, on the basis of experience in Somalia, the lengthened supply lines and more hazardous conditions associated with the provision of support to combat operations in the north of Mali would probably add significantly to support costs as compared to the costs presented above for options II and III. On the basis of the provision of supplies and services through a combination of bilateral and commercial channels, it is estimated that the costs of a basic support package to a fully deployed mission of 3,300 personnel undertaking combat operations in northern Mali would amount to \$161 million over a full year. In addition, initial start-up costs could reach \$82 million.

I further observed in my report that the effective implementation of any intervention in northern Mali would require significant and timely external support for training, equipment, logistics and funding for both the international force and the Malian defence and security forces above and beyond what the United Nations

could provide. There are various options for the provision and funding of such support. The full range of support required by the Malian defence and security forces, including training and equipping requirements, will need to be provided through direct bilateral and multilateral arrangements, in addition to support in coordination with the African Union, ECOWAS and other key stakeholders. The options presented above do not anticipate a role for the United Nations in providing support to the Malian national forces.

In addition to the logistical support package and financial contributions delivered through a trust fund administered by the United Nations, the force would also have a number of military capabilities required to achieve the objectives outlined in the strategic operational framework. ECOWAS has identified special forces, air support assets (combat and utility aircraft and logistic air transport), additional fire support capabilities, intelligence and counter-improvised explosive device equipment and training as areas that require additional support. These would also need to be addressed through bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

Subject to the adoption of a resolution by the Council and budgetary approval by the Assembly, the United Nations would be able to begin to deliver initial elements of logistical support through commercial arrangements six to nine months following such authorization and approval. It will be important to be realistic about the time that will be required to bring contingents up to United Nations standards and to deliver the full logistical support package. In the interim, capability would need to depend on strong bilateral assistance from Member States.

Furthermore, as conveyed in my report, I intend to establish a full-time United Nations political presence, including expertise in human rights, in Mali. This presence could evolve into a multidimensional United Nations mission with the mandate to provide the Malian authorities with long-term stabilization and peacebuilding assistance. It would include rule of law and security institutions, mine action, promotion of national dialogue, regional cooperation, security sector reform, human rights and the initial demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, as necessary. Should the Council decide to authorize these additional mandated responsibilities, I would initiate an integrated assessment and planning process and revert with specific proposals for further consideration. As more information becomes available, the proposals provided above would be further refined, including with regard to the structure, composition and mandate of the multidimensional United Nations presence in Mali.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon