Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In my 2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304), I noted that the first two years after the end of a conflict offered a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts. The report identified five recurring priority areas for international assistance and laid out an accompanying agenda for action. I also emphasized the need for the full participation of women in peacebuilding processes, and in 2010 I submitted a report on that subject (A/65/354-S/2010/466) that included a seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding. In the intervening years, the United Nations has made significant progress in terms of the 2009 agenda and, more modestly, the seven-point action plan. We have also accumulated experience with regard to the long-term challenges associated with peacebuilding, which underline the need for sustained international support, beginning in the immediate aftermath of conflict but continuing well beyond it. The present report details what we have achieved since my last progress report, issued in 2010 (A/64/866-S/2010/386), and outlines additional actions to better assist conflict-affected countries in building lasting peace.

2. Progress made by the United Nations in implementing the 2009 agenda is enabling us to provide a more coherent, timely and effective response to immediate
post-conflict priorities. Our missions and country teams now work more closely together, with integrated strategic frameworks setting shared objectives and timelines in relevant mission environments. We have become more agile in deploying senior leadership, specialized experts and staff to the field, and we are holding our leaders accountable for their performance. We have strengthened and expanded our partnerships, including those with the World Bank and regional organizations, and through the civilian capacities initiative we are working to broaden and deepen the available pool of institution-building expertise. The Peacebuilding Fund has provided timely and gap-filling financial support during critical transition moments, while the Peacebuilding Commission is exploring ways in which it could play a larger role in resource mobilization. We have highlighted women’s contributions to peacebuilding, which are now more widely acknowledged. While the progress made towards the goals of the seven-point action plan has been uneven, there have been some notable achievements in women’s engagement in conflict resolution, gender-responsive planning, financing and the rule of law. Less headway has been made in the areas of governance and economic recovery.

3. Building on this progress, the United Nations and its partners must do more to ensure that countries engaged in peacebuilding are able to contain and manage conflict and transform it into sustainable peace. Post-conflict countries often continue to experience instability years after the end of the armed conflict, with high levels of relapse into violence. As noted in the World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011*, 90 per cent of conflicts between 2000 and 2009 occurred in countries that had previously experienced civil war. The causes of instability and relapse vary by context and may include external stresses such as the impact of cross-border conflict and international criminal networks as well as internal factors such as political exclusion, real or perceived discrimination against social groups, severe corruption, high levels of youth unemployment, and unequal distribution of natural resource wealth. These conditions can be profoundly destabilizing for countries that have weak institutions and are politically and socially fragmented. A key challenge in post-conflict contexts is to overcome a pervasive deficit of trust — between different political parties and social groups, between the State and society and between the State and its international partners.

4. Our experience has identified inclusivity and institution-building as critical in preventing relapse into violent conflict and producing more resilient States and societies. Exclusion is one of the most important factors that trigger a relapse into conflict. Almost all cases that have avoided such a relapse have had inclusive political settlements, achieved either through a peace agreement and subsequent processes or because of inclusive behaviour by the party that prevailed in the conflict. An early emphasis on inclusion is therefore essential. A closely related objective is to strengthen formal and informal institutions, including to restore core governance functions and equitable service delivery. Inclusivity and institution-building are also critical to domestic accountability systems, help to restore the social contract, and lay a more reliable foundation for the State’s engagement with the international community. These processes, however, require sustained political and financial support, which is often lacking. Transition compacts can help to formalize reciprocal commitments between States and their partners; they should be accompanied by a greater willingness on the part of donors and international agencies to accept and manage risk and make longer-term funding commitments.
5. I am submitting the present report to the General Assembly and the Security Council pursuant to the Council’s request for a report by October 2012 on further progress made in implementing my 2009 agenda, “giving particular emphasis on the impact this has made on the ground, including progress towards increasing the participation of women in peacebuilding” (see S/PRST/2010/20). The report also responds to the presidential statement adopted by the Security Council following its special debate held in January 2011 on institution-building in post-conflict peacebuilding (S/PRST/2011/2). In that document, the Council requested an assessment of the impact of my 2009 agenda “in contributing to building viable institutions in post-conflict countries, as well as additional recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations’ contribution to more effective, stable and sustainable institutions that can help prevent a relapse into conflict”.

II. Progress update

6. Since my previous report, there has been significant progress towards my 2009 agenda for action. Initial progress has also been made towards the implementation of the seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding, but much more is needed in order to generate institutional change and deliver impact at the country level.

More effective and better-supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground

7. We have made strides in the selection and rapid deployment of leadership and staff in the immediate aftermath of crises. We have ensured that our field missions have more effective and cohesive senior leadership teams, with complementary skill sets. We have provided Resident Coordinators with specialized expertise in such areas as peacebuilding, gender and recovery in both mission and non-mission settings. Where crises are prolonged, we have sought to ensure that Resident Coordinators have appropriate leadership profiles. I have also strengthened accountability by extending senior manager’s compacts and performance assessments to all my Special Representatives and Heads of Mission in the field.

8. Integrated Mission Task Forces have facilitated stronger communication and coordination between lead departments and agencies at Headquarters and in missions and country teams. Similar structures have been created for non-mission contexts in which political circumstances require coordination and dedicated support between Headquarters and the field.

Assessment, planning and strategy: building early agreement on priorities and the alignment of resources

9. Integrated strategic frameworks have been completed in nearly all mission environments in which the principle of integration between United Nations missions and country teams applies. The current review of the integrated mission planning process guidance will, by the end of 2012, clarify and streamline planning and define core principles and mandatory requirements of United Nations integrated planning, supported by guidelines and tools. I have asked that attention be devoted to ensuring that the mandatory elements of integration are fully embedded in other system-wide core strategic processes, particularly joint strategic assessments,
reporting on mandates, mission and agency-specific reporting and plans, and component planning and resource allocation mechanisms.

10. A new policy is being developed on United Nations transitions in the context of mission drawdown or withdrawal. Transition planning must be managed jointly by all United Nations system actors present in the country, and should begin at an early stage and retain flexibility. In addition, transition plans must be developed closely together with national counterparts. The development of relevant national peacebuilding capacities is critical to ensuring an effective and sustainable handover of mission responsibilities to host countries.

11. Joint post-conflict needs assessments conducted by the United Nations, the European Commission and the World Bank have contributed to more coherent approaches in a number of countries. To strengthen the post-conflict needs assessment tool, the United Nations, the European Commission and the World Bank agreed in April 2011 on a set of gender-equality principles to be applied to such assessments. These were subsequently employed, for example, during the Yemen Joint Social and Economic Assessment.

Predictable international support and national capacity development

12. Since 2009, the United Nations has undertaken functional reviews to enhance the predictability, accountability and effectiveness of our delivery in the areas of the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, employment generation, security sector reform, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, mine action, mediation, electoral assistance and the rule of law. In several cases, these reviews have helped to clarify peacebuilding roles and responsibilities, with corresponding focal points designated to mobilize United Nations system support for country-level activities and to tackle such challenges as funding shortfalls. I expect the focal point system and similar arrangements to facilitate joint country-level assessments, planning and programming and to lead to improved assistance. In September 2012, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations assumed responsibility as joint global focal point for the police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations. A forthcoming lessons-learned review of post-conflict public administration capacity development will make recommendations with regard to how the United Nations system can provide more effective, cohesive, integrated and strategic support in this area.

13. In an October 2011 decision, I called on Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators to lead the development of a strategy for durable solutions for internally displaced persons and returning refugees. I also entrusted the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNDP with supporting them in this endeavour through policy guidance and technical support. UNDP, UNHCR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have since identified three countries — Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Kyrgyzstan — as pilots for the implementation of this decision, in consultation with the respective Governments and United Nations country teams.

14. My recent report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/312-S/2012/645) describes progress made towards the objectives set out in my 2011 report on that subject (A/66/311-S/2011/527). One such objective is to enhance our support for national capacity development. UNDP is coordinating an inter-agency
group to develop system-wide principles and guidelines for the more effective use and development of national capacities to lead peacebuilding efforts. Rather than to provide definitive or prescriptive advice, the principles are designed to help the United Nations system provide national capacity development support in such a way that it is based on national ownership yet acknowledges United Nations mandates and norms. The guidelines, meanwhile, are intended to help practitioners identify and address the parameters to be considered in reaching decisions that fit the context, are pragmatic and manage trade-offs associated with supporting national capacity development. Together, the principles and guidance are aimed at better alignment of United Nations system support with national priorities and sustainable results.

15. As an illustration, our work in South Sudan to build the capacity of national institutions has helped enable the new State to perform the basic functions of governance. During the six-year transition leading to the referendum, South Sudan put in place 37 ministries, 19 commissions, a national Parliament and 10 state governments and state legislatures. Today, the United Nations has State-building teams across the central ministries and is present in each state, building the capacity of the judicial, police, civil service and finance ministries. Mine action teams are also in place as enablers for socioeconomic growth. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan is implementing a strategy of decentralized presence whereby the mission expects to be present in 25 of the 79 counties by the end of its third year. This is aimed at enabling the State to gain a stronger foothold to serve rural populations.

16. I noted in my 2010 progress report that land and natural resources were key drivers of conflict and, even more so, of relapse into violence (A/64/866-S/2010/386, para. 44). Important substantive progress has been made since then to address this emerging concern, reflected in a number of reports, policies, resolutions and practical guidance for mediators working on resource-related conflicts and for practitioners addressing land, renewable resource and extractive issues. In 2011, for example, the United Nations-European Union partnership on natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding produced four sectoral guidance notes, on extractive industries, renewable resources, land and capacity-building. Work is under way to integrate those various approaches into country programmes. Within the United Nations system, a major obstacle concerns the need to more consistently reflect expertise gained in the area of natural resources management between United Nations entities. I call on United Nations entities to collaboratively leverage their respective skills and knowledge to inform natural resources management assistance. I also call on the private sector and peacebuilding actors to deepen their interaction.

Working with the international community to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms

17. Cooperation with the World Bank has intensified. This includes post-crisis assessments in Haiti, Pakistan and Yemen; a project to develop the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity of the African Union; a security and justice sector public expenditure review toolkit; a new facility for joint analysis and work on job creation; and support for the Group of Seven Plus (g7+) conflict-affected countries in their efforts to implement the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. In May 2010, the World Bank-United Nations Fragility and Conflict Partnership Trust Fund was established to strengthen collaboration. The Trust Fund has allowed for the implementation of projects in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, South Sudan and
Yemen. The United Nations and the World Bank are also currently undertaking a review of our partnership with a view to enhancing collaboration.

18. In July 2012, the Peacebuilding Fund and the World Bank’s State-building and Peacebuilding Fund launched a process to strengthen the alignment and impact of multilateral peacebuilding financing instruments. The process is aimed at providing better joint analysis and advice for national actors, ensuring that programmes are based on the comparative advantages of each fund, improving risk analysis and management, and measuring results by building national monitoring and evaluation capacity.

19. The Peacebuilding Fund assists countries at critical transition moments when political sensitivity and risks are high and speed is critical. In Libya, the Fund provided rapid support for civic engagement in preparation for the July 2012 elections. In Yemen, it supported the February 2012 presidential election, a critical step in the transition agreement. In Kyrgyzstan, it enabled the interim presidency to initiate, in 2011, several human rights, justice and economic revitalization activities. After the 2010 political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the Fund provided rapid support to restore State authority and longer-term support for reconciliation. Its multi-year efforts support national ownership and leverage longer-term donor assistance, as in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Fund-financed stabilization programmes — especially critical amid the renewed armed conflict in that region — have since mobilized international support. Funding provided to Nepal by the Fund encouraged further donor support for the cantonment and demobilization of child soldiers, transitional justice and technical assistance in the area of human rights. Since 2011, 10 independent evaluations of Fund-financed programmes have found that the Fund has strengthened United Nations coherence and helped United Nations leadership to address potential obstacles to peace processes (see A/66/659).

20. In my 2009 report, I urged donors to establish more effective funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict. The International Network on Conflict and Fragility responded to this challenge by issuing guidance for donors. This is a welcome development that requires sustained attention and implementation at the country level. The United Nations is ready to support its recommendations and will continue to work with the Network to improve the flexibility, speed and risk tolerance of donor funding. I call upon Member States to ensure sustained and predictable financing for peacebuilding, including through the use of flexible and risk-tolerant pooled funding instruments.

Peacebuilding Commission

21. The 2010 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture (see A/64/868-S/2010/393) acknowledged that while the Peacebuilding Commission had yet to fulfil the original vision behind its establishment, it had made incremental contributions to peacebuilding. The Commission is addressing some of the challenges highlighted in the review. It is working to strengthen its political accompaniment to countries emerging from conflict, foster coherence among key actors and mobilize international support. The Commission has collaborated with the African Development Bank in aligning peacebuilding priorities in the countries on its agenda. It engaged in the consultative process for the development of Burundi’s second poverty reduction strategy, supported the organization of a partners’ round table by the Government of the Central African Republic and mobilized funds for
Guinea-Bissau’s elections in 2012. The Commission also continues to lobby for sustained support for Sierra Leone’s progress against its Agenda for Change. I encourage the Peacebuilding Commission to strengthen its strategy of promoting improved coherence and alignment of donors with national peacebuilding plans. I also call upon the Commission to engage with foundations and the private sector and encourage these actors to contribute to peacebuilding processes.

22. Since 2010, Guinea and Liberia have joined the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. Statements of mutual commitment have been agreed upon that set out joint strategic priorities and the respective roles of the Government and the Commission. In Liberia, the Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund have worked closely in support of the Government and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services to strengthen the security and justice sectors, critical elements in the joint transition strategy for the Mission and the Government. In Guinea, a non-mission context, the Commission and the Fund have reinforced the work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP and the Resident Coordinator in supporting a national military census and a retirement programme for 4,000 personnel — the first steps towards security sector reform in a country emerging from more than five decades of military rule. I encourage the Peacebuilding Commission to continue to explore lighter and more flexible forms of engagement. Such engagement should be aimed at strengthening the impact of the Commission by complementing and supporting national actors and United Nations leadership in the field.

23. The July 2012 Security Council debate on the report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifth session (A/66/675-S/2012/70) highlighted challenges to be addressed to maximize the Commission’s contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding. The most significant element of discussion concerned the relationship between the Security Council and the Commission. Council members stressed the need for the Commission to add value to their deliberations, while Commission Chairs emphasized the need for information, access and guidance from the Council. In September 2012, the Council requested briefings from the Commission to inform its deliberations on mandate renewals for Liberia and Sierra Leone. I encourage the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission to build on the debate and interactive dialogue. I also encourage the Council to continue to articulate the advice that it requires from the Commission, including during mandate discussions.

Women and peacebuilding

24. In my report on women’s participation in peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466), I noted that women are crucial partners in shoring up three pillars of lasting peace: economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy. The foundation for that report was laid in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which called for women’s equal participation in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and for the mainstreaming of gender perspectives into conflict prevention, peace negotiations, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction.1

1 See also S/2012/732.
25. The seven-point action plan on gender-responsive peacebuilding, outlining commitments on conflict resolution, planning, financing, civilian capacity, governance, the rule of law and economic recovery, is a strategy for achieving the commitments set out in resolution 1325 (2000) and is essential for generating United Nations coherence and accountability for that agenda. Its system-wide implementation is one of the priorities of my second term. In early 2012, 11 United Nations presences nominated themselves to spearhead the implementation of the plan.

26. Progress has been made towards the action plan’s goals regarding women’s engagement in conflict resolution, gender-responsive planning, financing and the rule of law. In these areas, procedures have been put in place to support the United Nations in meeting its commitments, which will need to be closely monitored for their impact. There has been less progress in the areas of governance and economic recovery. On the whole, the action plan has yet to galvanize institutional change, owing to thinly stretched human and financial resources and capacities, established patterns of assistance, a lack of systematic monitoring and scarce gender expertise in post-conflict contexts. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), in consultation with various other United Nations entities, has identified capacity gaps and good practices with respect to the deployment of gender expertise in conflict and post-conflict contexts, such as the inclusion of a full-time gender expert in the Mediation Support Standby Team of the Department of Political Affairs.

27. Gender-specific issues have not so far been systematically included in conflict resolution processes. Where the United Nations has had a lead mediation role, provisions concerning women and peace and security and other gender-relevant issues are more likely to have been included in peace agreements. Of the nine brokered peace agreements signed since 2011, two of the four in which the United Nations was co-lead mediator contain specific provisions focusing on women’s participation in the implementation of the agreements. There is a continuing need for the United Nations and Member States to develop and fund strategies to promote the inclusion of women and the fulfilment of their needs. Since 2011, women have been represented in 12 of the 14 United Nations mediation support teams established, but in only four negotiating party delegations. Of the 11 relevant peace negotiations, gender experts were deployed to 5, while consultations with women’s civil society organizations were conducted on a regular basis in 7. Regional training programmes conducted by the Department of Political Affairs, UN-Women and United Nations regional offices on mediation for women leaders have produced results. The Department and UN-Women will continue to analyse conditions under which women have participated in mediation processes and suggest lessons that could be applied elsewhere. To support the inclusion of gender issues in mediation processes, the Department has developed new guidance and tools on gender and mediation, such as the United Nations Guidance for Mediators on Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements. I renew my call on United Nations entities to take more systematic action to ensure women’s participation in and the availability of gender expertise to peace processes. I also encourage United Nations and Member State mediators to meet regularly with women’s groups as part of conflict resolution efforts, to ensure that gender-relevant provisions are included in ceasefire and peace agreements, and to report on the results of those efforts to the Security Council through established mechanisms.
28. Women’s civil society delegations participated in all international donor conferences held in 2011 to support conflict-affected countries, establishing good practice for inclusive national decision-making. That participation rate has fallen to only one third of the conferences held to date in 2012, however. Women civil society representatives did not participate in any of the eight meetings of groups of friends or contact groups held in 2011 and 2012. I reiterate my call on United Nations entities involved in organizing international dialogues, contact groups and donor conferences to ensure that issues relating to women and peace and security are addressed and that women’s groups are consulted from the earliest stages of planning and priority-setting.

29. The target of dedicating at least 15 per cent of United Nations-managed funds to peacebuilding projects addressing women’s specific needs and empowerment or gender equality, as set out in my 2010 report on women’s participation in peacebuilding, has yet to be achieved. Some progress has been made on mechanisms to track resources, including by the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund and the World Food Programme (WFP), and I will continue to support greater coherence, including through the establishment of common principles for gender marker systems and the full use of gender markers in post-conflict contexts. In 2011, only 7.1 per cent of the project budgets of United Nations multi-donor trust funds targeted gender-specific needs or issues. In Nepal, the country team exceeded this global average, achieving a 9 per cent allocation of its peacebuilding portfolio to meeting the specific needs of women or girls, through methods that include guidelines and checklists agreed upon by the Government, the United Nations and donors. This should be replicated elsewhere. I have asked UN-Women, with relevant United Nations partners, to address the achievement of the 15 per cent funding target for gender-specific programmes. I call on the executive boards of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to consider this issue in their forthcoming discussions. I encourage all stakeholders, including Member States, to work towards this target.

30. With regard to governance targets and the promotion of appointed and elected women in public institutions, affirmative action laws for elections in Haiti, Kosovo and Timor-Leste were adopted in 2011 with United Nations support. The United Nations also supported women’s advocacy for quota legislation in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone and Somalia. In May 2012, the focal point for electoral assistance matters directed that all United Nations electoral assistance fully mainstream a gender perspective, including the views of women’s organizations, and rigorously assess the potential benefit of temporary special measures. In the area of governance and public administration, a 2010-2012 review reveals little progress in increasing gender-responsive policy design and service delivery, especially at the subnational level. I call on Member States and relevant United Nations entities to exchange information on methods of increasing women’s participation and representation in political processes, in both elected and appointed positions. This could include, inter alia, sharing experience and advice on the use of temporary special measures with civil society and Government officials, including electoral authorities.

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2 Afghanistan, Central African Republic and South Sudan.
31. In the area of the rule of law, notable efforts have been made to strengthen the capacities of country teams and missions to document conflict-related sexual violence and support national actors in protecting and strengthening access to justice with regard to these crimes. With the support of UN-Women, the commissions of inquiry for Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria all included gender expertise, and truth commissions in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya have received support in increasing women’s access to justice. In 2011 in Mogadishu, UNDP support enabled 204 women and children to receive legal counselling on issues relating to sexual and gender-based violence. In more than 20 countries, the United Nations has supported legal aid service delivery. Justice processes should also ensure equal access to justice for all segments of the population in civil and administrative matters, in particular in gaining access to identification cards, birth and death certificates, citizenship and inheritance and land rights. Legal support services for women must be a standard component in the United Nations post-conflict rule-of-law response.

32. The United Nations is drafting minimum standards for gender-responsive transitional justice mechanisms, and I urge their use by Member States going forward. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN-Women are also drafting guidance concerning reparations for victims of conflict-related sexual violence. I urge Member States to strengthen women’s security and access to justice, including through reparations programmes and by linking them to existing development efforts to ensure sustained impacts.

33. Addressing women’s engagement in economic recovery and service delivery in post-conflict situations needs to be more systematic. There has been some progress in the application of a range-of-parity principle for United Nations-supported temporary employment, ensuring that neither sex receives more than 60 per cent of employment days. In Burundi, Haiti, Myanmar and Uganda, between 36 and 60 per cent of beneficiaries of temporary employment programmes were women. In 15 countries, UNDP has supported women ex-combatants and associated members in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, amounting to a third of the caseload in 2011. In Liberia, UN-Women has supported the training and employment of women in rural areas as financial services extension agents. These good practices must become the norm across the international community. In relation to development and infrastructure programmes, which often attract the majority of funds in the aftermath of conflict, existing reporting is insufficient to assess the impact on women, as it cannot be assumed that all members of a community benefit equally. Furthermore, the United Nations has not yet developed a systematic approach to support gender-responsive land rights and the resolution of land disputes. UNDP and UN-Women, together with other relevant partners, are addressing these gaps by collaborating on gender mainstreaming in economic recovery, with particular attention given to improving systematic reporting and supporting national capacity to recruit women as agricultural extension workers and other front-line service providers.

III. Priority directions for peacebuilding

34. As noted above, experience accumulated by the United Nations has highlighted the importance of inclusivity, institution-building and sustained international support in preventing relapse into violence and supporting countries in building a sustainable peace. There is growing international recognition of the
linkages between these areas, as also reflected in the *World Development Report 2011*. They have also been championed by countries that are themselves emerging from conflict. The g7+ has agreed on five peacebuilding and State-building goals — inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services — that will guide the identification of specific priorities for each of its member countries. These goals have been endorsed by the g7+ and a broad range of development partners, including the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, through the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Republic of Korea.

Inclusivity
35. Building peace requires the early engagement of a broad cross section of society. While inclusive political settlements may take longer to negotiate, they are more sustainable. An inclusive process builds confidence among participating parties that their core objectives can be achieved through negotiation rather than violence. It is also more likely to address the root causes of conflict and increases the legitimacy and ownership of a political settlement. “Inclusivity” in this regard refers to the extent and manner in which the views and needs of parties to conflict and other stakeholders are represented, heard and integrated into a peace process. Settlements — even those concluded initially for a limited purpose, such as achieving a ceasefire — should be progressively broadened to permit wider citizen participation. While inclusivity may not necessarily imply that all stakeholders participate directly in formal negotiation, an inclusive process goes beyond the representation of parties to conflict by facilitating their interaction with other stakeholders and creating mechanisms that allow for the inclusion of different perspectives in the process, including those of women’s groups. Political settlements should also facilitate the development of local and national capacities for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

36. Political or economic exclusion, horizontal inequalities and discrimination undermine sustainable peace. A successful peacebuilding process must be transformative and create space for a wider set of actors — including, but not limited to, representatives of women, young people, victims and marginalized communities; community and religious leaders; civil society actors; and refugees and internally displaced persons — to participate in public decision-making on all aspects of post-conflict governance and recovery. Participation and dialogue enhance social cohesion and national ownership, and they leverage resources and knowledge for peacebuilding existent within post-conflict societies.

37. Inclusive peacebuilding is an effective investment. Studies have shown that active social engagement deters corruption and makes public administration systems more transparent and service delivery more effective. Data on economic recovery highlight the positive impact of women’s engagement on national growth and household well-being. UNICEF work on equitable social services and WFP case studies on food assistance show that prioritizing the most excluded can lead to greater social cohesion and stable economic growth. For example, innovative community-based demining in Afghanistan demonstrates that an inclusive mine action sector promotes transition to national ownership and job creation.
38. Inclusivity needs to be applied throughout peacebuilding, from analysis, design and planning to implementation and monitoring. It requires affirmative efforts by the United Nations system, including through the identification of tools, methodologies and strategies tailored to engage specific population groups. Reconciliation, for example, requires that victims, perpetrators and the wider society be enabled to decide how to heal the wounds inflicted by conflict and restore relationships in society and thus reduce the risks for relapse into violence. Inclusive approaches to peacebuilding can also entail monitoring the equitable delivery of services and redressing the structural inequalities and patterns of discrimination that undermine social cohesion and diminish citizenship rights. I call on United Nations entities to ensure that factors contributing to marginalization are identified early and addressed in peacebuilding strategies and programmes, including by considering analysis and recommendations of United Nations human rights mechanisms. In addition, United Nations entities and national Governments should work to ensure the equitable and non-discriminatory delivery of services, including through the monitoring of United Nations programmes in socially diverse environments.

39. Inclusivity also requires that private sector actors be engaged in order to maximize their contribution to peacebuilding through employment and skills development, and to ensure that any adverse impacts of their activities are mitigated. Multi-stakeholder initiatives are beginning to address these needs. In Haiti, for example, the United Nations Stabilization Mission is working with the private sector to train and mentor at-risk youth through a community violence reduction programme. A key challenge is to scale up and institutionalize emerging standards to frame the activities of companies in peacebuilding contexts, including through coordination, training, funding and integration into local programmes. My report to the General Assembly on the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (A/HRC/21/21 and Corr.1) provides relevant recommendations in this regard.3

40. The United Nations and the international community need to identify entry points and opportunities for inclusion and social dialogue, including long-term investments through formal and informal education. The early signalling of a commitment to inclusion can help to build confidence in the political process among historically marginalized or alienated groups. For example, in the negotiation of the implementation mechanism for the Yemen transition agreement in 2011, my Special Adviser met with a broad range of political opposition groups, young people, women and representatives of civil society and encouraged the inclusion of their priorities. His efforts paved the way for their participation in a national dialogue conference that will lay the foundations for subsequent stages of the transition.

41. When rapid action is combined with inclusion, there exists the temptation to structure dialogue around formally constituted and well-organized civil society organizations. Patriarchal and patronage cultures, a lack of education and significant ethnic and religious divides can, however, limit the visibility of other groups as well as their awareness of and access to peacebuilding processes. This profoundly affects the participation of women — who are often affected by gender-based exclusion and sometimes a high tolerance for the infringement of their rights — and of young people. Corrective strategies may include measures to compensate for time

3 See also A/HRC/17/31.
constraints and lack of experience, knowledge and mobility, and the provision of identity documents that facilitate women’s participation in political and peacebuilding processes.

42. All stakeholders, most importantly the Governments of countries emerging from conflict, should foster inclusion by establishing mechanisms for, and signalling commitment to, representative politics and participatory dialogue at the earliest possible stages of peacebuilding. My senior representatives should advocate and facilitate inclusion, with due consideration accorded to key political actors, gender balance and social diversity. This includes calling for space for marginalized groups to participate in political dialogues and consulting with all stakeholders in a systematic and structured way, including women’s groups. I also call on my Representatives to support diversity in appointments to senior-level posts and to ensure timely communication about the peace process to different social groups.

Institution-building

43. Functioning Government, political, market and social institutions have long been recognized as prerequisites for establishing popular confidence in the State and preventing violent conflict. Institutions — defined broadly as the rules of the game and the organizations that frame and enforce them — provide the incentives and constraints that shape political, economic and social interaction. The importance of institution-building as a central pillar of sustainable peace was recently reinforced by the *World Development Report 2011* and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidance to donors on supporting State-building in situations of conflict and fragility. The United Nations civilian capacities initiative is also directed towards the strengthening of support for nationally owned institution-building in five key capacity gap areas.4

44. We must build on existing institutions to ensure that they are democratic, accountable and professional; allow those institutions to develop at their own pace and with a certain level of experimentation; and sustain institution-building efforts over decades. International assistance can facilitate the development of national institutions, but only if it is highly sensitive to evolving political and social dynamics. The international community must gain a better understanding of how decisions are made locally, where change agents are located and in what ways they can be positively supported. Institutional support and capacity development are not a quick fix. When pursued too quickly and without national ownership, or prematurely by authorities that lack legitimacy, reforms can prove detrimental. Allowing sufficient time for longer-term policy solutions to emerge should not, however, impede immediate work to restore basic functionality and deliver peace dividends. A steady stream of results is needed in order to strengthen confidence in institutions. I urge Governments and their international partners to carefully pace, sequence and adjust institutional reform programmes, balancing long-term support for institution-building with the need to achieve early and tangible outcomes through the restoration of core Government functions and service delivery.

45. Institution-building in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a difficult undertaking, and the track record of international support is mixed. In many cases, uncoordinated and short-term action has undermined success. The early departure of the initial United Nations Transitional Administration mission from Timor-Leste, and the rapid succession of two additional United Nations missions with progressively narrower mandates (the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor and the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste), led to a lack of continuity in expertise and investment to support nascent national institutions. The current planning for mission transition in Timor-Leste has seen concerted engagement between the Government of Timor-Leste, the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the United Nations country team over the past two years. A joint transition plan details how the work of UNMIT will either be completed by December 2012 or be handed over to partners thereafter.

46. Violent conflict undermines the quality, quantity and consistency of Government functions and essential services precisely when citizens are in most urgent need of them. Working with partners as early as possible to build or rebuild the functionality of country systems is critical to allowing for a successful transition from conflict and the drawdown of missions. These systems include the core administrative and financial management systems of the public administration, as well as social services, without which national Governments are unable to lead recovery efforts and respond to the needs of the population. They include policy formulation and public financial management, in particular planning, budgets and spending; leadership from the centre of Government, which is critical to driving change and ensuring coherence; civil service management, which entails ensuring that key administrative staff are in place, paid regularly and follow instructions and procedures; local governance, the level at which the State most frequently and directly interacts with its population; and the coordination of aid, which in many post-conflict contexts covers a major part of the budget. Improvement in other Government service systems, including health, education, agriculture and natural resources management, is also critical.

47. Learning from the experiences of other countries that have gone through comparable transitions from conflict or crisis can help national authorities decide which approaches to institution-building best fit their needs. The civilian capacities initiative has established an online platform, CAPMATCH, which connects those seeking expertise or experience with potential providers, fostering in particular South-South and triangular cooperation.

48. Public administration and social services delivered in an accountable and equitable manner can address grievances and offer a means for the State to rebuild its legitimacy. The United Nations supports calls made in the New Deal to identify oversight and accountability measures required to enhance confidence in country systems. However, this support should include a focus on ensuring that such systems are also responsive to the needs and rights of the populations in question, rather than serving only the constitutive functions of the State or being focused exclusively on financial accountability. I urge all international actors to make greater use of country systems that offer appropriate oversight and accountability mechanisms when providing support to post-conflict countries and to invest more in strengthening the capacity of these systems.
49. When conflict has eroded a State’s core functionality, local organizations, non-State actors and informal institutions are often essential in providing security, delivering services and building trust. Informal institutions — comprising socially shared rules that are created, communicated and enforced outside formal channels — can be remarkably resilient during or after crises and can coexist with, or even be more influential than, formal institutions. In many environments, the absence of democratic traditions, whether national or local, can result in formal institutions being controlled by one actor or group. The building of informal institutions is frequently neglected in the immediate aftermath of conflict, yet it is at this level where communities may most effectively manage disputes and prevent conflict from escalating into violence. At the same time, informal institutions may reflect and reinforce and reinforce social inequalities within communities, especially with respect to the rights of women, children and locally marginalized groups. Support for informal institutions must therefore begin with a careful analysis of their sources of legitimacy, structures and practices, and must include, where necessary, measures to promote awareness of and respect for fundamental human rights.

50. The United Nations can play a critical role in supporting informal institutions and their connections to formal ones. This means investing in informal institutions such as local peace councils, traditional dispute resolution and social protection mechanisms and non-formal education networks, alongside formal institutions such as public administrations, parliaments and schools. It also entails strengthening the interface between formal and informal institutions, particularly in rural areas or areas that have been isolated by prolonged conflict. The United Nations should focus its support for national institution-building priorities not only on strengthening formal institutions, but also on reinforcing their interface with informal institutions that respect fundamental human rights, particularly where these serve as key service providers or means of resolving disputes and defusing violent conflicts.

51. I welcome recent work to consolidate deeper understanding of the frameworks and partnerships required to improve support for institution-building processes. The establishment in Liberia of county support teams, coordinated jointly by the Resident Coordinator’s Office, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and UNDP, represents a model of good practice. However, closer interaction across the United Nations system, in particular between United Nations missions and country teams, is a precondition for effective support for post-conflict institution-building. I call on United Nations entities to take a comprehensive approach to institution-building. To this end, I urge missions and country teams to develop effective partnerships based on a clear division of labour that reflects comparative advantages.

Sustained international support and mutual accountability

52. Maintaining and expanding domestic coalitions for peace and the rebuilding of national institutions require sustained international political and financial support. Intergovernmental bodies, including the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, and my Representatives have helped to ensure that critical political attention is given to countries during and after the drawdown of peacekeeping missions. Yet commensurate financial support has often been lacking, leading to uncertainty and unpredictability in the implementation of national peacebuilding
and development strategies. A recent OECD report found that while overseas development assistance to fragile and conflict-affected States had increased in 2010, 34 per cent had been dedicated to just two countries, while others such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia faced declining or volatile aid levels.

53. The emergence of new conflict situations and a global climate of fiscal austerity inevitably have an impact on the levels of attention and assistance provided to more mature post-conflict countries. There are other significant hurdles: the continued deficit of trust between post-conflict countries and their partners, and what the World Development Report 2011 terms the “dual accountability dilemma” — the fact that multilateral and bilateral donors are accountable first to their domestic constituencies and shareholders, and only second to their counterparts or the citizens of recipient States. In practice, this has often meant that donors and international agencies are reluctant to assume what they regard as high-risk investments, including the use of national budgets and country systems to deliver assistance.

54. The concept of mutual accountability has gained currency as a means to create a more balanced partnership between donors and recipient Governments. Mutual accountability helps to ensure that the international community complements and supports national plans and priorities, and provides a robust foundation to sustain predictable international support. It also fosters greater inclusivity and ownership of peacebuilding, as it recognizes that domestic systems of accountability build the social contract and broaden national ownership.

55. This concept has the broad endorsement of United Nations intergovernmental processes. The General Assembly has recognized that the commitments made by developed and developing countries in relation to the Millennium Development Goals require mutual accountability (resolution 65/1, para. 78 (c)). The Peacebuilding Commission has, from the outset, premised its country engagements on mutual accountability, outlining the mutual commitments of the Commission and the countries concerned, as well as a process of periodic reviews, in its instruments of engagement.

56. A recurrent issue in ensuring mutual accountability is the absence of adequate aid data to allow for informed decision-making, coordination and prioritization. The lack of data, particularly projections of future aid flows, also prevents post-conflict countries from undertaking realistic medium- to long-term planning. The Peacebuilding Support Office is currently implementing a European Union-funded project that seeks to improve reporting on peacebuilding assistance in Liberia. Globally, the International Aid Transparency Initiative is the process with the most obvious potential to integrate the collection of peacebuilding-relevant data and publish it in real time for the benefit of all stakeholders.

57. In a number of post-conflict countries, mutual accountability has underpinned transition compacts, through which Governments and their partners have agreed on the most urgent post-conflict peacebuilding priorities and identified sources of and instruments for the financing of their implementation. The results to date have been mixed, but lessons learned as a result have informed recent approaches to the

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5 Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind (OECD, 2011).
6 See Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States: Lessons from the First Generation of Transition Compacts (International Peace Institute, April 2012).
development of compacts. Compared with the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, the recently concluded Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework has a more tightly focused set of goals tailored to the country context, as well as politically challenging but specific and achievable benchmarks. It is also more specific in relation to international partners, committing them to sustaining support at current levels for the next five years, aligning 80 per cent of aid with national priorities and channelling at least 50 per cent of aid through the national budget.

58. Despite the difficulties that have been associated with their implementation, transition compacts play a critical role in the operationalization of mutual accountability. Compacts provide a strong negotiating platform for countries emerging from conflict, enhancing their legitimacy domestically and internationally, and, if they are successfully implemented, can provide a basis for improved trust and a deeper partnership. I encourage Member States to support the development and use of transition compacts, with agreed strategic objectives and mutual accountability, in post-conflict environments. United Nations country presences will work with national counterparts to help ensure the development and implementation of these compacts through inclusive and participatory processes.

59. For partner organizations and countries, implementing transition compacts entails a greater willingness to assume risks. The case for doing so rests on balancing the risks of action (which include engaging with and investing in weak institutions) against the risks associated with inaction (which include an absence of long-term institution-building, failure to uphold the social contract and, potentially, relapse into violence). The need for coherent joint action, and thus the sharing of risk, has been affirmed repeatedly. More recently, the World Development Report 2011 proposed a number of strategies for managing risk in post-conflict environments, including the use of independent monitors to scrutinize procurement and expenditures, the conditioning of the release of funds on external audits, the engagement of external financial management and procurement agencies, “dual key” programmes in which both national and international actors sign off on high-risk transactions, and “in kind” support for a national budget through a donor’s own financing and procurement systems. Yet another strategy for managing risk is the use of pooled funds, such as the Peacebuilding Fund and other global funds for peacebuilding, as well as country-specific multi-donor trust funds. I encourage all stakeholders to ensure sound assessments and analysis of risk in post-conflict environments and to develop joint approaches to risk management whenever feasible. I encourage Member States, and in particular donors, to implement risk tolerant approaches, recognizing that the risks of inaction may outweigh the risks associated with action.

60. Sustaining international support for peacebuilding is an essential element of social and economic development in post-conflict countries. The gap in Millennium Development Goal performance between conflict-affected countries and other developing countries is large and increasing. These issues will be considered by the High-level Panel that I have appointed to advise on the global development agenda beyond 2015, and they also merit the early attention of Member States. The outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development noted that

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7 E.g., in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).
countries in situations of conflict need special attention in achieving sustainable development. It also acknowledged that sustainable development requires good governance and the rule of law, as well as effective, transparent, accountable and democratic institutions. This recognition by Member States strengthens the case for the inclusion of these issues in the post-2015 development agenda with a view to creating both an enabling environment and the institutional foundations required to achieve a wider set of development objectives. I call upon Member States to build on their commitments as set out in the Millennium Declaration and the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and to support the incorporation into the post-2015 development agenda of peacebuilding considerations related to inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services.

IV. Conclusion

61. The present report outlines the progress made since 2010 in enhancing efforts to build lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations and the wider international community have achieved greater coherence, efficiency and internal accountability in our peacebuilding activities.

62. Much remains to be done, however, to consolidate the implementation of my agenda for action. I am concerned at the slow pace of progress in reaching the goals of the seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding, and urge all stakeholders to systematically ensure the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peacebuilding. To further advance our collective peacebuilding efforts, I call upon United Nations entities and Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in this report. Above all, we must place greater emphasis on an inclusive approach to peacebuilding that facilitates broad national ownership of lasting peace. I also stress peacebuilding through institution-building by prioritizing the development of core Government administrative and service delivery functions. Finally, I appeal both to countries emerging from conflict and to international partners to further consolidate and enhance their partnership through mutual accountability for the delivery of results. In moving forward, I stand ready to report further on impacts and experiences in these critical areas for lasting peace and the prevention of conflict.