Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2109 (2013), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 July 2014 and requested updates every three months on the implementation of the UNMISS mandate. The present report covers major developments from the issuance of my report of 8 November 2013 (S/2013/651) to 6 March 2014. It also provides an update on the implementation of resolution 2132 (2013), by which the Council temporarily increased the overall force levels of UNMISS through inter-mission cooperation to support the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian assistance during the crisis that started on 15 December.

II. Political developments

2. In my previous report on South Sudan, I highlighted the divisions within the ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). I indicated that the divisions were potentially destabilizing and urged the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, to continue reconciliation efforts ahead of the meeting of the party’s National Liberation Council scheduled to be held before the end of 2013.

3. Regrettably, collective efforts to reconcile the differences between SPLM leaders that were supported by the countries of the region, international partners and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel did not succeed. By the end of November 2013, tensions between the President, the former Vice-President, Riek Machar, and other senior SPLM leaders increased. In a press conference on 6 December, Mr. Machar publicly accused the President of dictatorial tendencies and unilateral decision-making, among other things. The Vice-Chairman of SPLM and current Vice-President of South Sudan, James Wani Igga, responded on 8 December, describing the allegations as baseless and cautioning all against inciting a rebellion.

4. When the meeting of the SPLM National Liberation Council was finally held, after many postponements, on 14 December, the differences among the leaders of the party came to a head. The meeting was scheduled to take place over three days, to allow participants to discuss and endorse the party’s basic documents, including

* Reissued for technical reasons on 12 March 2014.
its manifesto and constitution. After a day of heated debate, Mr. Machar and a few other Council members did not turn up for the session on 15 December, at which the party adopted the documents.

5. On the evening of 15 December, events took a violent turn. Various elements of the Presidential Guard started fighting in their barracks in Juba, near the venue of the National Liberation Council meeting. UNMISS was unable to ascertain what exactly had triggered the fighting. However, on the morning of 16 December, the President held a press conference during which he described the fighting that had taken place overnight as an attempted coup d'état perpetrated by forces allied with Mr. Machar. Mr. Machar, who had fled Juba when the fighting erupted, rejected the accusations of an attempted coup, stating that the fighting had resulted from a brawl among Presidential Guard troops in the barracks and that the accusations of a coup were a pretext for the Government to apprehend its political opponents.

6. The fighting quickly spread to the general headquarters of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other military installations. By 16 December, it had spilled out of the barracks into the residential areas of the capital, pitting supporters of each side against one another and resulting in large-scale killings and human rights abuses. While thousands of fleeing civilians and deserting members of the national security forces sought refuge in UNMISS bases, on 17 December the Government announced that it had arrested 11 individuals whom it had accused of plotting the attempted coup with Mr. Machar. Most of the individuals had participated with him in the press conference of 6 December.

7. The fighting continued during the subsequent days and spread to Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States. SPLA, into which various militias had been loosely integrated, broke up: commanders defected and members of the rank and file took up positions against those loyal to the President and their SPLA comrades. Large numbers of civilians were killed by forces from both sides, as the defections continued and the fighting spread.

8. On 19 December, Mr. Machar announced to the press that he had appealed to SPLM and SPLA to remove the President from office. Two days later, on 21 December, he told the press that he was in rebellion against the Government. On 3 February, he announced to the press that he had formed a “resistance” group to fight the Government. The armed opposition forces subsequently became known as the SPLM/A in Opposition, after Mr. Machar’s representatives negotiated and signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in Addis Ababa under that name.

9. From 19 to 21 December, a delegation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers, supported by the United Nations and the African Union, travelled to Juba in an effort to contain the crisis and persuade the parties to settle their differences peacefully. They met the President of South Sudan and political actors to obtain a first-hand understanding of the crisis and explore possible interventions. On 26 December, a second IGAD delegation, led by the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, visited Juba for talks with the President of South Sudan, members of the Cabinet and the detained SPLM leaders to probe further into the root causes of the conflict and discuss how best to address it. These efforts culminated in the convening, on 27 December in Nairobi, of an extraordinary summit of IGAD member States. Participants in the summit appointed three special envoys (Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo of
Kenya and General Mohamed Ahmed Mustapha al-Dabi of the Sudan) to support the Government of South Sudan and the members of the self-proclaimed SPLM/A in Opposition to reach, in an inclusive manner, a resolution to the crisis and initiate a dialogue by 31 December.

10. IGAD, following individual consultations, proxy talks and direct talks, commenced the formal negotiation process between the parties in Addis Ababa on 4 January. After approximately 20 days of talks, on 23 January the Government and the SPLM/A in Opposition signed agreements on the cessation of hostilities and on the status of detainees, thus paving the way towards an inclusive dialogue and a process of national reconciliation. Opposition political parties and civil society organizations have underscored their strong interest in participating in the national dialogue on the way forward. The second phase of the political dialogue and national reconciliation process resumed in Addis Ababa on 10 February. In the meantime, fighting at various locations continues and both sides remain in breach of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

11. The second phase of the political dialogue and national reconciliation process, which resumed in Addis Ababa on 11 February, adjourned on 3 March. During that round, the parties reached agreement on the modalities of the monitoring and verification mechanism and discussed the way forward on the national dialogue and issues related to SPLM. The parties are expected to reconvene for talks later in March. In the meantime, fighting at various locations continued and both sides remained in breach of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

III. Security situation

A. Onset and progression of the current crisis

12. The political crisis and the break-up of the security forces have affected the 10 states of South Sudan in different ways. The consequences on the civilian population too have varied from state to state. Four of the 10 states of South Sudan, namely Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria, have seen the worst of the fighting since the onset of the current crisis on 15 December. Lakes and Warrap States have received thousands of displaced persons from Jonglei and Unity States, respectively, as a consequence of the fighting. The effect on the remaining four states (Eastern and Western Equatoria and Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal), where there has been no fighting, has so far been limited to small-scale displacement from the other states, some defections and a recruitment drive by the Government to replenish the SPLA ranks depleted by the defections.

13. As the fighting escalated in the greater Upper Nile region, the President declared states of emergency in Jonglei and Unity States on 1 January and in Upper Nile State on 17 January. On 20 January, in an emergency session, the National Legislative Assembly unanimously approved the President’s decisions for a period of six months.

Central Equatoria State

14. In Central Equatoria State, Juba county has been the most affected. Large numbers of civilians have reportedly been targeted and killed in Juba, especially
during the first three days of fighting, and there have been reports of a continuation of sporadic human rights violations. Fighting has also occurred in Yei, Mangalla and Terakeka counties, as well as in Rokon, on the border with Western Equatoria State, and in Raja, to the south, where clashes broke out in barracks as troops deserted. In the environs of Juba, fighting took place as SPLA pushed anti-government forces to the outskirts of the city. For more than two weeks, from 18 December to 4 January, there was intensive fighting on the Juba-Bor axis, particularly around Gemmazia, as anti-government forces attempted to advance towards Juba from Bor. Pockets of anti-government forces continue to be scattered in the vicinity of Juba, where former militia leader Gabriel Tanginye is reported to be mobilizing forces against the Government. It is also reported that former Minister of the Environment Alfred Ladu Gore, who left Juba after the crisis erupted, maintains a rebel presence in the vicinity of Juba with a group of anti-government forces.

15. On 10 January, the Governors of Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria States convened an “emergency Equatoria conference”, during which they declared their support to the Government and agreed to mobilize 5,000 recruits each to defend the Equatorian territory and people. In Central Equatoria State, the Governor was able to mobilize several thousand youth in support of the Government.

16. While the situation in Juba has stabilized somewhat, the capital remains vulnerable to possible destabilization by nearby pockets of anti-government forces. Moreover, the large number of deserters from the security forces who are sheltered in sites meant for the protection of civilians in UNMISS compounds are also a significant source of security risks for UNMISS and the internally displaced persons in the compounds. The deserters are also perceived by the Government as a fifth column.

Jonglei State

17. The capital of Jonglei State, Bor, fell under the control of anti-government forces on 18 December after Major-General Peter Gadet, the Commander of SPLA Division 8 headquarters in Panpandiar, defected along with most of his soldiers. Large numbers of civilians were reportedly targeted and killed during and following the defection.

18. A seemingly ethnically motivated deadly attack on 19 December by an armed group at the UNMISS base in Akobo, Jonglei State, where civilians were seeking refuge, resulted in the deaths of two UNMISS peacekeepers, one international consultant and at least 19 civilians, and precipitated the evacuation by the Mission of all personnel from Akobo. The following day, in Yuai, two UNMISS helicopters came under direct small-arms fire by anti-government forces while evacuating military personnel and internally displaced persons. In Bor, on 24 December, several shells hit the UNMISS compound, resulting in injuries to three peacekeepers. The risks faced during this period of deteriorating security prompted the Mission to relocate its personnel from Yuai and Gumuruk.

19. While SPLA forces recaptured Bor on 25 December, the town fell under the control of anti-government forces, for the second time, on 31 December. SPLM/A in Opposition forces and a column of several thousand armed Nuer youth moved towards Bor from the greater Akobo area and started to advance southward along the main road from Bor to Juba. Heavy fighting between SPLA and anti-government forces ensued in the days that followed. With SPLA reinforcements from the greater
Bahr el Ghazal region and Uganda People’s Defence Forces on the front line, SPLA was able to push the anti-government forces north and eventually recapture Bor on 18 January. Anti-government forces continue to hold on to Akobo, Nyirol and Uror counties in the State.

**Unity State**

20. On 21 December, the commander of SPLA Division 4 in Bentiu defected, along with the bulk of his forces, overthrew the Governor of Unity State and appointed himself as the new caretaker Governor. Following his lead, the vast majority of SPLA Division 4 defected. The same day, Bentiu fell under the control of anti-government forces. SPLA retook Bentiu on 10 January, following heavy fighting in northern areas of Unity State. SPLA has continued its offensive in Unity State to reclaim other counties and towns under the control of anti-government forces. Anti-government forces appear to maintain a presence in Panyijar and Mayendit counties. Other areas, including the oilfields, remain contested, and the flow of oil from Unity State oilfields has stopped. Early in February, despite signing the cessation of hostilities agreement, SPLA forces attacked and captured Leer, the home town of Mr. Machar, in violation of the agreement.

**Upper Nile State**

21. Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State, fell under the control of anti-government forces on 25 December. It was recaptured by SPLA on 27 December, fell back under anti-government control on 14 January and was recaptured again by SPLA on 20 January. While SPLA consolidated its position in Malakal, anti-government forces maintained a hold on a number of other areas outside Malakal, including in Nassir and Ulang counties; yet other areas remained contested. On 18 February, SPLM/A in Opposition forces once again attacked and took over Malakal, another serious violation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

**B. Other armed group activities**

22. In the months preceding the crisis, progress had been made in ending rebellions. On 25 November, the President issued a decree confirming the reintegration and commissioning of Lieutenant General Bapiny Monytuil of the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) and Major General Johnson Olony of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA) into SPLA. The leadership council of the former South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) issued a statement on 27 November expressing support for the President’s announcement. Thereafter, SSLA troops in Unity State awaiting integration joined the fighting on the SPLA side after being attacked by anti-government forces in Mayom county.

23. On 30 January, in Addis Ababa, the Government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement with the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) Cobra Faction, the armed group led by David Yau Yau. Notably, in the agreement, the SSDM/A Cobra Faction agreed to remain neutral in the conflict between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition forces. Despite speculation to the contrary, from the onset of the crisis, David Yau Yau’s armed forces have desisted from engaging in the conflict.
IV. Humanitarian situation

24. On 14 November, aid agencies launched a consolidated appeal for 2014-2016 with a three-pronged strategy to address residual humanitarian needs, boost community resilience and build the capacity of key institutions in South Sudan. The humanitarian situation deteriorated sharply, however, following the outbreak of violence in mid-December. Within the first four weeks of the crisis, almost 500,000 persons were displaced within South Sudan and around 74,300 people had crossed into neighbouring countries. These numbers have continued to grow, with total displacement now reaching 900,000 persons, some 167,000 of whom have crossed into neighbouring countries. More stark, however, is that the number of civilians who have tipped into the “acute” or “emergency” categories of food insecurity has increased from 1.1 million to 3.2 million. In addition, some 500,000 displaced persons are in urgent need of food aid, which means that the survival of 3.7 million South Sudanese is currently in question.

25. Aid agencies have put on hold the consolidated appeal they had launched in November and issued a crisis response plan that seeks to achieve three aims: to save lives and alleviate suffering, to support the resumption of livelihoods and to preposition stocks before June, which is when heavy rains will render roads impassable. The plan focuses on emergency relief, exception made for a few projects that aim to boost capacity to plant, fish and keep livestock alive. Given that 3.7 million people are already experiencing acute food insecurity, should people be unable to move with their livestock or plant at the outset of the rainy season, there is a significant danger that the current situation of food insecurity could deteriorate into famine. Given the magnitude of the crisis, a level 3 system-wide humanitarian emergency was activated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator on 11 February 2014, to ensure the rapid mobilization of an effective response.

26. Within its bases, UNMISS has assumed the lead in the management of safety and security of civilians in the protection sites within its bases, while humanitarian aid partners are providing clean water, emergency latrines, food, health care and shelter to civilians. Mitigating the risk of outbreaks of diseases such as cholera by improving sanitation and access to clean water has been a key priority. Nevertheless, the likelihood of serious health crises is high given the blistering heat, severe overcrowding and the lack of space for an adequate number of latrines. It is incumbent on the authorities to provide UNMISS with more space to create an additional area for the protection of civilians in Juba and Bor or, more importantly, to create the security conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of civilians. In that regard, the efforts of the Government of China to build an alternate protection site in Juba are highly appreciated. At the same time, efforts have been made to address intercommunal tensions within protection areas. Meanwhile, contingency planning has been initiated, including the prepositioning of humanitarian supplies inside UNMISS bases and the exploration of other locations to be used as potential sites for the protection of civilians in case of a further deterioration in the situation.

27. The Government and SPLM/A in Opposition have both committed themselves to facilitating humanitarian access to all civilians in need, which has allowed humanitarian actors to continue to work in areas where Government forces are present and in areas where SPLM/A in Opposition forces are present. However, in several of the areas with the greatest needs, daily activities and humanitarian access
have been constrained by active hostilities, interference in humanitarian operations and attacks on aid workers and assets, among other obstacles. Many of the compounds of aid agencies, including nearly all humanitarian premises and warehouses in Bor, Bentiu and Malakal, have been looted by armed actors from both sides, as well as criminal elements. Three aid workers have been killed and in January 106 aid workers were prevented from relocating from Yirol in Lakes State to Juba for safety. More than 75 humanitarian vehicles have been commandeered or stolen, primarily in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States. Although partners have since scaled-up activities and are providing assistance wherever security and logistical conditions permit, access and capacity constraints on the ground continue to pose a challenge.

V. Human rights

28. On 21 February, UNMISS issued a public interim report on the serious human rights violations that had occurred from 15 December 2013 to 31 January 2014. Another, more comprehensive, report will be published by the Mission at the end of April 2014. As noted in the interim report, the crisis has had widespread negative consequences for the human rights situation in many parts of the country, namely in areas of greatest military confrontation (in the national capital and in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States). UNMISS estimates that thousands of people have been killed during the hostilities. Both parties to the conflict have been responsible for ethnically targeted attacks on civilians and have failed to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence (including rape), torture, looting, the destruction of property, the recruitment of children and other violations of major concern. In view of the serious reports of grave human rights violations associated with the crisis, UNMISS has given utmost priority to monitoring, investigating, verifying and reporting on the most serious of allegations. These incidents are now under investigation but are still subject to further corroboration and verification. Finally, UNMISS has also undertaken substantial protection interventions in numerous cases involving human rights defenders and individual victims, including those subject to sexual and gender-based violence.

29. By mid-February, UNMISS had conducted roughly 600 interviews with eye witnesses, victims and government and security officials in sites for the protection of civilians and other locations who reported on the deliberate targeting of civilians, both South Sudanese nationals and foreigners, in extrajudicial and other unlawful killings, including mass killings. Enforced disappearances, gender-based violence, such as rapes and gang rapes, and instances of ill-treatment and torture were also reported. In Juba, SPLA soldiers were reported to have engaged in numerous targeted killings of civilians of Nuer origin following house-to-house searches. A mass killing was also reportedly perpetrated by security elements at Gudele police station in Juba. In Malakal, Dinka civilians were allegedly targeted and killed by Nuer armed youths, as well as by deserters from SPLA and the South Sudan national police service, who were presumably aligned with opposition forces. In a number of instances, SPLA soldiers of Dinka origin in Malakal were reportedly shot after being forcefully disarmed at military barracks. Between 16 and 20 December, SPLA soldiers were also engaged in inter-ethnic fighting at military barracks; the clashes
resulted in deaths on both sides, notably during an attempt to disarm the predominantly Dinka tank unit.

30. Between 16 December and 9 January, security forces of Nuer origin (including presumably defected elements of SPLA, the national police service, the wildlife service and the fire brigade) allegedly targeted security forces and civilians of Dinka origin in extrajudicial killings, the looting of businesses owned by foreign nationals and conflict-related sexual violence, notably against foreign women. After gaining control of Bentiu on 10 January, combined pro-government SPLA/SSLA forces allegedly joined by elements of the Justice and Equality Movement reportedly engaged in looting and the burning of property of Nuer civilians in Rubkona and Bentiu. Those forces also allegedly engaged in the extrajudicial killing of Nuers, looting and the wanton destruction of property as anti-government forces fled to southern counties.

31. Meanwhile, in Bor, after fighting broke out along ethnic lines among SPLA and national police elements, deserting SPLA soldiers and Nuer youth allegedly killed Dinka civilians in their homes or while they were trying to flee to safety. UNMISS is investigating allegations of a mass rape and the killing of women at the Episcopal Cathedral compound in Bor, as well as allegations of killings at Bor State hospital. UNMISS is also investigating several allegations according to which SPLA and civilians of Dinka origin have engaged in the targeted killing of Nuer civilians in the vicinity of the site for the protection of civilians in the UNMISS Bor compound, after the SPLA recapture of Bor on 24 December. Finally, UNMISS has investigated reports of mass graves in Juba, Bentiu and Rubkona, in addition to the attack of 19 December on the support base in Akobo county.

32. UNMISS has received numerous reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. In the first three days of the crisis, approximately 400 national police officers from the Nuer ethnic group were reportedly disarmed and arrested in Juba. UNMISS visited several police stations and other places of detention around Juba but so far has not been able to confirm these detentions. It has also been reported that civilians have been detained arbitrarily at various locations.

33. UNMISS has received reports of widespread looting, occupation and destruction of residential and commercial property. In Juba, SPLA elements reportedly stormed, looted, demolished and burned houses. In Malakal, Bentiu and Rubkona, shops and houses were similarly occupied, looted, vandalized and burned by elements of the security forces, including those who had deserted and joined the anti-government forces, as well as armed youths and the so-called “white army”. In Bentiu, foreign business owners were reportedly targeted in looting incidents.

34. Concurrently, on 30 December 2013, the African Union Peace and Security Council decided to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan and to make recommendations on the best ways and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities. As a follow up to that decision, the African Union Commission has taken steps to develop terms of reference for the commission of inquiry, select its members and mobilize the support required for the effective discharge of its mandate.
VI. Violations of the status-of-forces agreement and security of United Nations staff

35. A few days into the crisis, the relationship between the Government and UNMISS started to grow increasingly tense, amid mounting anti-United Nations sentiment emanating from misperceptions about the Mission’s role during the crisis. There were unfounded allegations that UNMISS was not impartial and that the Mission was aiding and abetting the anti-government forces. Hostile public statements were made by senior officials of the Government. The ability of UNMISS to move freely was increasingly obstructed. Demonstrations against the United Nations were organized in several state capitals, including Rumbek (Lakes State) and Aweil (Northern Bahr el Ghazal State).

36. The situation reached a critical point on 19 January, when the Minister of Information, together with 65 armed SPLA soldiers, sought to forcibly enter the site for the protection of civilians in the UNMISS compound in Bor, Jonglei State. After the State Coordinator refused to grant entry to the armed soldiers, some of them threatened the State Coordinator and revoked all safety assurances previously given to United Nations personnel and assets in the area. Subsequently, following hostile statements against the United Nations from the Government, a number of incidents of harassment, threats and serious status-of-forces agreement violations occurred, including by SPLA soldiers in Bor, who attempted to forcibly enter the UNMISS compound on four occasions. On 20 January, President Kiir gave a press conference during which he criticized UNMISS and accused the United Nations of attempting to act as a parallel government. This resulted in more demonstrations against the Mission in Juba (Central Equatoria State) and Kwajok (Warrap State). Subsequently, on 23 January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement explaining that the President’s remarks had been misinterpreted. Following his meeting with my Special Representative, Hilde Johnson, on 24 January, the President held another press conference, in which he largely retracted his comments about UNMISS and instructed Government security ministers to protect United Nations and international personnel. While the situation has since abated to some degree, some Government officials have continued to make critical public remarks about the Mission. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, visited Juba on 3 February and protested these issues in his meeting with the President of South Sudan.

37. During the reporting period, UNMISS experienced many serious incidents that constitute violations of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government of South Sudan. Incidents affecting the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate were also carried out by anti-government forces. From 6 November to 21 February, 60 cases involving threats against and the harassment, physical assault, arrest and detention of United Nations staff and the seizure of United Nations vehicles were recorded.

38. The most egregious incidents occurred in Jonglei State. As mentioned above, on 19 December, in Akobo, an armed group attacked the UNMISS base, where civilians were seeking refuge; the attack resulted in the deaths of two UNMISS peacekeepers and one International Labour Organization consultant, the wounding of another UNMISS peacekeeper, the death of 19 civilians and the wounding of at least 13 other civilians. In Yuai, on 20 December, two UNMISS helicopters being used to evacuate military personnel and internally displaced persons came under
direct small-arms fire by anti-government forces and, on 29 December, an UNMISS helicopter on an aerial reconnaissance mission was fired upon by anti-government forces in the Gadiang area, Jonglei State. The aircraft sustained damage but no injuries were reported. My Special Representative lodged a strong protest on both incidents with Mr. Machar. In Bor, on 24 December, several shells hit the UNMISS compound, which resulted in injuries to three peacekeepers. Other incidents included the commandeering of vehicles belonging to the United Nations country team and threats to the UNMISS supply line.

39. In Malakal, Upper Nile State, the UNMISS compound was caught in the crossfire between SPLA and anti-government forces on at least two occasions. On 26 December, fighting between the two sides in the vicinity of the UNMISS compound resulted in the death of one civilian and the injury of seven others inside the site for the protection of civilians in the same compound. Similarly, on 20 January, further fighting between SPLA and anti-government sides resulted in two rounds of artillery fire hitting the UNMISS compound in Malakal. The incident resulted in the wounding of 32 civilians in the UNMISS protection site and damages to the hospital in the United Nations compound.

40. On 5 January, another incident of concern occurred at the UNMISS compound in Juba, Central Equatoria State: gunfire erupted between two groups of armed men in combat fatigues. During the firing, seven persons, including one woman and one child, were injured and an UNMISS sentry tower was hit.

41. While UNMISS continues to investigate incidents as they occur, the Mission has, on each occasion, brought the incidents to the attention of the relevant Government authorities, reminding them of their obligations under the status-of-forces agreement, and has requested an investigation and accountability, as a deterrent. With regard to the more egregious cases, the Mission has sent a formal protest note and presented a démarche to the Government at the highest levels. To protest the various incidents, UNMISS also met representatives of both SPLA and anti-government forces. During these meetings, UNMISS emphasized its impartiality and highlighted the responsibilities of the parties under applicable South Sudanese and international law and sought assurances that neither force would endanger United Nations personnel and assets.

42. In the light of the deteriorating security situation, on 20 December 2013 the United Nations endorsed the relocation of non-critical personnel from affected duty stations. On 21 December, 40 non-critical personnel were relocated from Bentiu to Juba and then to Entebbe, Uganda. On 22 December, some United Nations civilian personnel were relocated from Bor to Juba. Also on 22 December, 450 United Nations personnel were relocated from Juba to Entebbe and 164 personnel were relocated to Nairobi. On 27 December, UNMISS determined that the return of extremely critical personnel to Bor was essential to meet programme-critical needs for the protection of civilians. On 24 January, UNMISS relocated two staff members outside South Sudan, following an assessment by the Department of Safety and Security that concluded that their personal security in the host country could no longer be guaranteed owing to public threats by senior Government officials.
VII. Implementation of the Mission mandate during the crisis period

43. The current staffing strength of the Mission as at 4 February was 869 international staff, 1,321 national staff and 409 United Nations Volunteers, with vacancy rates of 16, 25 and 27 per cent, respectively. As noted above, the deterioration in the security situation that followed the outbreak of fighting on 15 December compelled UNMISS to relocate outside the country and to place on administrative leave non-critical staff from the conflict-affected areas, leaving only those needed to perform the critical tasks that had to continue during the crisis.

Protection of civilians

44. When the fighting erupted in Juba and spread throughout the greater Upper Nile region, tens of thousands of civilians fled from areas where large numbers of killings were taking place, including to escape targeted attacks against particular communities, and arrived at UNMISS compounds in Juba, Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, Malakal and Melut to seek refuge. The Mission opened its gates and its military engineers, working with humanitarian partners, quickly prepared sites in the compounds for the protection of civilians, despite having minimum facilities to accommodate them. Since then, as many as 85,000 civilians have sought protection in eight UNMISS compounds across the country.

45. The influx of so many civilians into United Nations premises and their settlement there is an unprecedented development, one that has presented unique challenges and placed a huge strain on Mission resources. UNMISS has strived to ensure adequate security for the protection sites in its bases and has worked with humanitarian partners to provide sufficient assistance to displaced persons. With the arrival of additional uniformed capabilities pursuant to resolution 2132 (2013), the operational focus has gradually shifted beyond UNMISS bases.

46. The UNMISS three-tiered strategy for the protection of civilians has remained valid but will be revised given the significant changes in the operational context. In the interim, the Mission has developed a medium-term, three-tiered response plan to guide its protection activities during the current crisis.

47. Under the first tier of the plan (protection through political process), the Mission has intensified political engagement with the parties to the conflict to help prevent an escalation of violence and ensure the protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law. UNMISS has urged restraint and promoted a peaceful political resolution to the crisis through the IGAD-led process. The Mission has also engaged with civil society, youth and church leaders, as a preliminary step for the eventual development of an inclusive reconciliation process.

48. Under the second tier of the plan (protection from physical violence), in November 2013 the Mission began reinforcing its military presence at locations in Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap and Unity States where civilians were deemed to be at greatest risk, in preparation for the dry season. However, with the onset of the crisis on 15 December, UNMISS had to redeploy and refocus its military presence across the country at the strategic hubs of Juba, Bor, Malakal and Bentiu, where the fighting has been most intense. Following the tragic attack on the UNMISS base in Akobo on 19 December, UNMISS has strengthened the defence of its bases.
49. Significant military assets have been required to protect civilians in UNMISS bases from external and internal threats. The presence of former combatants, the availability of weapons and overcongestion in the sites has generated significant security and crime-related concerns. The Mission has had to respond to incidents on a daily basis, including with the use of force. UNMISS has undertaken periodic weapons searches in the sites to maintain their civilian character. It has introduced ground rules for displaced persons and is working with local leaders and authorities to address criminal cases. The situation has taken UNMISS into uncharted territory, as it develops, together with the Secretariat, a strategy to address criminality in the protection sites and ascertain the resources necessary to implement the strategy.

50. The demands placed on the Mission within and near its bases and delays in the arrival of additional troops have constrained the military’s ability to proactively patrol locations affected by the conflict. Daytime and night-time patrols started to take place in Juba in January and have gradually been extended to Bor, Malakal and Bentiu to deter violence and help create an improved security environment with a view to enabling the eventual return of displaced persons. With the arrival of the additional troops authorized under resolution 2132 (2013), this more robust posture of the Mission will be extended. As at 22 February UNMISS had treated 14,745 people in 13 medical clinics, including 1,849 for gunshot wounds, and evacuated hundreds of casualties from areas of heavy fighting. Wounded combatants from both sides have received medical treatment in UNMISS bases. During the period from the onset of the crisis to 10 February, 110 babies were born in sites for the protection of civilians at the UNMISS bases in Juba, 50 were born in Malakal, 13 in Bentiu and 10 in Bor.

51. Under the third tier of the plan (establishment of a protective environment), UNMISS has focused on creating security conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance in protection sites for displaced persons by using Mission assets to provide site management and to support humanitarian agencies in the delivery of assistance. In this context, the Mission has coordinated closely with the protection cluster and other humanitarian actors under the leadership of the Resident Humanitarian Coordinator. This has involved working with community leaders on security and protection concerns and responding to the needs of individuals belonging to the most vulnerable groups. The Mission has also strengthened its human rights monitoring and investigation capacity.

52. Approximately 40 per cent (295,880 people) of the total displaced population are children. In the Bentiu, Bor and Malakal protection sites, 592 unaccompanied or separated children are receiving family tracing and reunification support. Of that number, 68 have been reunited with their families. In addition, 84 families looking for missing children have registered the names of their missing children. In the United Nations House protection site, five children were reported as abducted and tortured by the SPLA, two of whom were kept for two days in a prison container. Child protection agencies have set up referral centres in the protection sites for children who are survivors of gender-based violence.

53. Meanwhile, reports have been received alleging that the mobilization and recruitment of youths by both SPLA and anti-government forces have taken place. The so-called “white army”, which Mr. Machar says is under his command, reportedly comprises large numbers of armed children.
54. Serious crimes of conflict-related sexual violence have also been reported in
the four states directly affected by the conflict, with credible allegations that such
violence has been perpetrated by SPLA, national police and anti-government forces.
These grave incidents are now under investigation, as reflected in the section on
human rights, and will be reported to the Security Council pursuant to Council
resolution 1960 (2010).

Reinforcement of the Mission

55. In order to give UNMISS adequate capacity to cope with the crisis, the
Security Council, by its resolution 2132 (2013), approved my recommendation to
temporarily increase the overall troop and police strength of the Mission. The
interim troop level of UNMISS has been raised to 12,500 personnel and the police
component to 1,323 personnel, including appropriate formed police units, through
temporary transfers from existing peacekeeping operations through inter-mission
cooperation, as well as, if needed and subject to further Council consideration,
complementary force and asset generation.

56. Under Security Council resolution 2132 (2013), the Mission has received more
aviation assets. On 6 January, three Mi-17 utility helicopters (Bangladesh) were
deployed to UNMISS from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), together with one commercial
Mi-26 helicopter. Currently, one C-130 fixed-wing aircraft (Bangladesh) remains on
standby in MONUSCO for use by UNMISS. The rotation of the Bangladeshi
engineering company has been delayed until September to allow the Mission to
continue to utilize its services during the ongoing crisis.

57. Timely approval by the Security Council of the surge capacity for UNMISS
military and police components under the inter-mission cooperation arrangements
played a critical role in enhancing the Mission’s capacity to save lives and protect
civilians from further harm. Completion of the deployment of the surge capacity
remains a priority. It is important that this capacity remain deployed for at least
12 months, with approval from the Security Council to temporarily raise the troop
ceilings for the military and police components of the Mission. This one-year period
would fit with the likely timeline of internally displaced persons returning only after
a peace process has been agreed upon and leave the dry months in the latter half of
2014 for stabilization in return areas. The increase in the troop ceiling could be
reviewed at the end of the 12-month period and be closely linked to the outcome of
the political negotiations between the parties.

58. The deployment of the military surge capacity will take place in three phases
(see annex), keeping in mind the situation on the ground, the ability of troop-
contributing countries to deploy and the absorption capacity of UNMISS. In the first
phase, which is expected to be completed by the end of March 2014, the first half of
the Nepalese battalion, with 350 troops from the United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the first half of the Ghanaian battalion, with
300 troops from the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and the
Rwandan battalion, with 850 personnel from the African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), are expected to be deployed to the mission
area. As at 21 February, 328 Nepalese troops from MINUSTAH, a Rwandese
advance party (20 personnel) from UNAMID and a Ghanaian advance party
(30 personnel) from UNOCI had deployed to the mission area. In the second phase,
which is expected to be completed by the end of June 2014, the main bodies of the Nepalese battalion (500 troops) and of the Ghanaian battalion (550 troops) will be deployed. The third phase includes the deployment of the remaining two battalions and will be executed after the Mission has reviewed the situation and completed preparations to absorb them. Those two battalions will be required to perform additional tasks related to the protection of civilians and stabilization and to recreate the force reserve that has been fully committed. The rainy season is fast approaching and, once it begins, the Mission will have to depend largely on air assets to undertake most of the operational tasks. It is therefore a priority that the first two phases be completed before the rainy season peaks.

59. Five priority tasks have been identified for the military component: (a) protecting civilians; (b) contributing to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as requested and within capability; (c) supporting human rights investigations and reporting; (d) providing support to the IGAD monitoring and verification mechanism, if and when requested and authorized by the Security Council; and (e) protecting United Nations personnel and installations.

60. In order to organize the Mission’s military component for the effective fulfilment of the above-mentioned tasks, the establishment of three sector headquarters is essential, given the increased scope of control accompanying the arrival of the new units and the associated command and control issues. The sector headquarters would be established where the force reinforcements will be in place, namely in Malakal, Bor and Bentiu.

61. The Nepalese troops from MINUSTAH and Nepal will deploy to Juba and be responsible for the security of the site for the protection of civilians and facilities at the United Nations House. As the battalion’s main body and its contingent-owned equipment arrive, troops will increase their patrolling efforts in Juba and areas outside Juba where it is known that internally displaced persons might return to. It is expected that the Rwandan battalion from UNAMID will deploy directly from the Sudan to Malakal and be responsible for the security of sites for the protection of civilians and United Nations compounds in Malakal and other vulnerable areas in the northern part of Jonglei State to include those areas vacated at the beginning of the crisis (e.g. Yuai and Akobo). The Ghanaians from UNOCI and Ghana will deploy to Bentiu, where they will initially be responsible for the security of sites for the protection of civilians and UNMISS facilities. As the battalion’s main body and its contingent-owned equipment begin to arrive, troops will assume additional security responsibilities in western Warrap State and southern Unity State. Two Kenyan companies will deploy to Warrap State and be responsible for areas near Kwajok and Turalei. That deployment would also support efforts in the event that violence or fighting spills over from Unity State into Warrap State.

62. Three medium-lift helicopters from Rwanda and three medium-lift helicopters from MONUSCO (inter-mission cooperation) will be based in Juba and Bor, depending on the security threat and be utilized for logistical and operational requirements in areas considered to be under heightened threat. Tasks will include reconnaissance missions, troop movements, resupply missions and the conduct of dynamic patrols. The arrival of additional battalions will allow the force to reconstitute its reserve battalion in Rumbek. The reconstituted battalion will be ready to respond immediately in areas where troops are not present or are present in
insufficient numbers to handle any additional crisis that may occur. The level II hospital contributed by Sri Lanka will be deployed to Bor in order to reinforce the current level I facilities there. Construction of the hardstand facilities has begun and will be ready when the unit arrives in March or April. With the arrival of the surge troops, the UNMISS force will have increased capability to deter possible threats against the civilian population, engage in the protection of civilians under threat where possible and help create an improved security environment to eventually allow internally displaced persons to return home safely and voluntarily. During the rainy season, the waterways of South Sudan become the main route for the transportation of both people and goods. The concentration of internally displaced persons along these waterways, the need to protect supplies being transported on them, the advent of the rainy season and fighting in various parts of the country are factors that make a strong case for UNMISS to have a riverine battalion as part of its military component. The riverine capacity will also be a much cheaper substitute for aerial supply operation.

63. With regard to the police component, three formed police units consisting of 351 personnel have been deployed under Security Council resolution 2132 (2013) to sites for the protection of civilians in UNMISS compounds in the four areas most affected by the crisis. In that regard, two formed police units (Bangladesh) have been deployed from MONUSCO and one (Nepal) from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). These formed police units, along with other United Nations police personnel, are performing critical functions for the protection of civilians under imminent threat in Juba (at the United Nations House and in Tomping), Bor, Bentiu and Malakal, where the vast majority of the over 74,000 internally displaced persons currently seeking protection in United Nations camps are present. Tasks entrusted to these formed police units include the protection of internally displaced persons, public order management within United Nations compounds, the screening of dangerous substances, riot control during the distribution of humanitarian assistance, the protection of United Nations staff and assets and the protection of vulnerable groups, such as women, children and persons with disabilities.

64. While reinforcement through the deployment of formed police units has contributed greatly to security, law and order and the protection of internally displaced persons on United Nations premises, the deployment of three units in four locations poses serious challenges to their operational capacity owing to a lack of contingent-owned equipment and in terms of self-sustainability and command and control. The three formed police units are deployed at four locations to meet the need for the presence of such units in Juba, Bentiu, Malakal and Bor, respectively, adversely affecting the integrity of the chain of command and logistics. Furthermore, since these units responded to the crisis by deploying immediately, the entire equipment of the camp, particularly heavy and fixed assets, were not transferred to UNMISS, requiring a rear party to remain behind in the original camp.

65. There are over 700,000 internally displaced persons in conflict-affected areas, over 74,000 of whom are in UNMISS bases. They are not expected to return home voluntarily and safely until they are convinced that there is a secure environment to do so. These formed police units are therefore likely to remain engaged in activities related to the protection of civilians for some time to come. The number of formed police units, therefore, would need to be increased to four considering the Mission’s need to cover four locations (Malakal, Juba, Bor and Bentiu). Such a deployment
would also be needed beyond the scope of the inter-mission cooperation framework, through fresh deployments, with flexible adjustments in the number of formed police units personnel, to overcome the serious challenges faced by UNMISS.

**Logistical support and financial implications**

66. Considering the reinforcement of the Mission and the deployment of surge capacity, the Secretariat will have to re-evaluate the support capacity of the Mission, as the existing capacity may not be sufficient to sustain the reinforcement.

**Refocusing Mission priorities**

67. Planning for the coming 12 months was based on two scenarios: the most likely scenario and the worst case scenario. The scenarios are planning tools to enable the United Nations to prepare itself in order to save lives and protect civilians and United Nations personnel in a timely fashion. In the most likely scenario, the cessation of hostilities agreement is likely to be partially implemented and the political negotiations are unlikely to deliver a comprehensive peace agreement covering the governance, security and reconciliation aspects of the conflict in the coming months. A large number of internally displaced persons will remain at United Nations protection sites, especially during the rainy season, and human rights violations are bound to continue in the absence of a peace agreement and reconciliation. United Nations personnel and facilities will remain subject to obstructions from both sides, including movement restrictions and demands for facilities and supplies. In addition, the humanitarian situation could continue to deteriorate as agricultural activities are paralyzed and there are few signs of an economic recovery. The worst case scenario envisages the possibility of an increase in fighting and violence, violations of the integrity of United Nations premises and, therefore, forced entry by security forces into sites for the protection of civilians, continued atrocities and grave violations of human rights and, last but not least, an increased risk of involvement by external actors.

68. In the light of those scenarios, the Mission must reprioritize its activities towards five main activities: (a) protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence; (b) contributing to the creation of security conditions conducive for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as requested and within capability; (c) increasing human rights monitoring and reporting; (d) fostering intercommunal and national dialogue; and (e) supporting the IGAD monitoring and verification mechanism and political dialogue in support of the Addis Ababa negotiations, if and when requested. As a result of this necessary reprioritization and to reinforce its ability to engage with both parties on the urgent need to respect international humanitarian and human rights law, UNMISS has adjusted its posture and is proceeding with a strategic shift, from a stand dedicated to peacebuilding, State-building and the extension of State authority, to one of strict impartiality in its relations with both parties. This shift is necessary to enable liaison and coordination activities with both parties for the effective implementation of the Mission’s redefined priority tasks in conflict-affected areas.

69. Until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached by the parties, UNMISS would focus its engagement on activities aimed at enhancing human rights monitoring and reporting and the protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence. In particular, UNMISS would need to put on hold any operational and
capacity-building support to either party that may enhance their capacity to engage in conflict, commit human rights violations and abuses and undermine the Addis Ababa negotiations process. However, to prevent further destabilization, the Mission will continue its mandated activities in those states that have so far been spared by the conflict, provided they do not directly contribute to enhancing the fighting capacities of the parties or undermine the Addis Ababa negotiations. Support to SPLA would be limited to the military justice sector and focus on monitoring and reporting on the trials of those accused of perpetrating atrocities.

70. UNMISS will continue to engage with the South Sudan national police service and the national justice and corrections institutions to enhance human rights protection, monitoring and reporting, and support training to increase the protection of civilians under threat of violence, enhance security around protection of civilians sites and potential areas of return for internally displaced persons and prevent arbitrary detentions or the excessive use of force in law and order management. Engagement with the national police will also be contingent upon the completion of a review of these activities under the human rights due diligence policy. Concurrently, it is essential that a strong UNMISS early warning and civil affairs capacity be maintained in the states where violence has not erupted, to carry out local-level engagement with communities, in order to help reduce the risk of intercommunal animosities spreading further throughout the country.

71. The crisis in Jonglei State in general and in Pibor county in particular has been the focus of the Mission’s strategy and activities on the protection of civilians since 2011/12. The effort to bring all the communities of Jonglei State to the negotiating table was intended to address inter-tribal conflict, which had reached a climax involving attacks and revenge attacks between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities. UNMISS has participated in and backed the initiatives of the bishops to undertake negotiations between David Yau Yau and the Government. Following the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement between David Yau Yau and the Government, Pibor county has experienced relative peace and stability. The UNMISS support base in Pibor county is now operational and the civil affairs component has resumed its mandated activities. Coordination and cooperation is taking place between forces loyal to David Yau Yau and national authorities, and civilians are returning to Pibor town and beginning to move freely. In keeping with the UNMISS responsibility to provide support for peace consolidation, UNMISS will assist the bishops, who have been central to the negotiations, by supporting their peace awareness-raising efforts in Pibor, Boma and other villages. Linked to this will be UNMISS support to peacebuilding initiatives among Murle. In recognition of the particular need for humanitarian actors to return to the county, UNMISS will support the work of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to deliver programmes in support of the peace process.

72. This temporary reprioritization of the Mission’s mandated tasks is proposed for formal endorsement by the Security Council, pending a more thorough integrated review of the mandate once the parties to the conflict have reached a comprehensive political agreement. To support this reprioritization and face the challenges of the new political and security environment, military and police reinforcements would also be needed for a period of one year.
VIII. Observations and recommendations

73. The people of South Sudan had already endured far too much suffering before they became citizens of an independent country of their own. Unfortunately, that suffering has reached even greater levels since the violence that erupted on 15 December. The extent of death, destruction, gross violations of human rights and displacement in such a short period has few precedents. The leadership responsible for this conflict must heed the calls of the population and put an immediate end to the violence and suffering.

74. In my previous report to the Security Council, I stated that South Sudan was at a crossroads and that the most critical determinant would be the internal dynamics within SPLM and how they would be managed. However, appeals for reconciliation between the leaders of SPLM, from both internal and regional stakeholders, have gone unheeded and tensions have mounted.

75. It is a tragedy that South Sudan has been plunged into a crisis as severe as the currently unfolding conflict. The damage done in such a short time is staggering. Not only has the conflict caused massive loss of innocent life, but major towns such as Bor, Malakal and Bentiu have been completely destroyed and close to 1 million people have been displaced or have sought refuge abroad. Livelihoods have been lost, markets destroyed and, most critically, lack of freedom is preventing people in rural areas in the most affected states from hunting, fishing and planting crops, which means that the already increasing food insecurity could spiral into famine. Security institutions, especially SPLA, have partially disintegrated and their legitimacy has been massively eroded by the atrocities committed. Deep animosities and old wounds between communities have been reopened and exacerbated. The investment made in capacity-building across many sectors has been lost and the goodwill that the country had earned from the international community has been eroded.

76. By allowing differences and the power struggle within the ruling SPLM to spiral out of control and cause a devastating conflict and a national crisis, the political leaders of South Sudan collectively have failed their people and severely set back a country that was already struggling to emerge from a state of fragility. While the declared intention by Mr. Machar to remove an elected government by force is unacceptable, both sides now bear full responsibility for bringing the senseless fighting, as well as the continuing loss of lives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, to an immediate end. By fully complying with the cessation of hostilities agreement they signed on 23 January under the auspices of IGAD and by fully cooperating in an inclusive political process, the parties can set the country on a path to peace, profound national reconciliation and fundamental systemic reform.

77. Justifiably, the people of South Sudan had high expectations at independence on 9 July 2011. The only way to satisfy these legitimate expectations is through good governance, inclusive democratic institutions and the delivery of the basic services they have been deprived of for so long. In every crisis there is opportunity, to make fundamental changes on the basis of lessons learned and mistakes corrected. For such an opportunity to be seized, the violence must stop and the Government must assume responsibility for the protection of all its citizens. The peace process under way in Addis Ababa must seek to address the root causes of the persistent fragility and instability of South Sudan and include the democratic
transformation of the country as an element necessary for good governance. I call on SPLM to address its internal political crisis immediately. And I call on the Government and on all South Sudanese stakeholders to take the opportunity presented to them by IGAD and other regional partners to engage in dialogue, in good faith, towards national reconciliation and an open democratic system of governance that can respond to the basic needs of the population and protect their human rights.

78. The ethnic dimension of the killings and abuses is most alarming. The affected populations and their community leaders and key stakeholders must make every effort to start the healing and reconciliation processes in order to save South Sudan from sinking into a deeper abyss. In order for reconciliation to take root and succeed, accountability too is essential. Justice will be required to right the wrongs suffered by so many. The United Nations will stand by the people of South Sudan and I pledge to make every effort to ensure that expectations are met and that the perpetrators of crimes committed against civilians are brought to justice. In that regard, the United Nations stands ready to provide support to the commission of inquiry of the African Union, if requested by the African Union Peace and Security Council, as appropriate and feasible and in coordination with other possible partners, and encourages its establishment and operationalization as soon as possible.

79. UNMISS was deployed to assist the people of South Sudan in building a new nation and it remains committed to that goal. During the unfolding conflict, the Mission will be an impartial and independent international presence that will continue to assist all victims of the conflict and protect civilians under threat of violence. The main priority, as long as the conflict continues, must be to meet the needs of the people, the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, the victims of abuse and the thousands who will suffer with the disruption of livelihoods.

80. The main focus of the Mission will be on the protection of civilians, human rights and contributing to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as requested and within capability, in the areas most affected by the conflict. The Mission will protect those in need, within its means. The Mission’s impartiality going forward is the sine qua non of all its actions throughout the country as long as the conflict persists.

81. While some areas have been affected less than others, this is a national crisis. Within its means, UNMISS will continue to facilitate local-level reconciliation initiatives and continue its capacity-building work as it relates to the protection of civilians and ensuring respect for human rights.

82. In the less-affected states, where there is no fighting, it is essential that a strong UNMISS early warning capacity be maintained. Capacity to engage local communities in order to help reduce the risk that intercommunal animosities spread further is also essential, as mentioned earlier in this report. Subject to a review under the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, the Mission will continue its mandated activities to prevent further destabilization as long as those activities do not enhance the capabilities of the parties to engage in conflict and do not undermine the Addis Ababa negotiations. These principles will guide UNMISS action throughout the country for an interim period until the IGAD peace process has facilitated a broad-based and sustainable resolution to the crisis. Once the IGAD peace process has been concluded, the Secretariat will consult the Government,
South Sudanese actors and partners of the United Nations family on recommendations for a new mandate to support stabilization in South Sudan.

83. As noted in the present report, I expect that insecurity will continue for some time in the States most affected by the conflict and that those displaced will continue to fear returning to their homes until a security environment conducive to such return has been established. I therefore request that the Security Council consider authorizing a temporary increase in UNMISS military strength to 12,500 troops (see paras. 53-60 above) and of its police strength by four formed police units (see paras. 61-63 above). I intend to deploy the requested additional five battalions in three phases. The additional resources requested will further assist UNMISS in protecting civilians.

84. Resolving the conflict and addressing the fear of civilians, which prevent them from returning to their homes, can only be resolved by the political leadership of South Sudan. I call on all parties to commit themselves fully to finding a lasting solution to the root causes of the conflict. I call on the military leadership of both parties to end the conflict and ensure the protection of civilians. I remind them of their obligations under international humanitarian law. Finally, I remind them that all those responsible for atrocities and abuses must be held accountable.

85. I have taken note with deep concern of the violations of the status-of-forces agreement and of incidents of harassment of United Nations personnel in South Sudan. Such violations and cases of harassment must stop immediately. I call upon the international community to impress upon all stakeholders the crucial need for the United Nations to work and move freely in South Sudan.

86. I commend the timely efforts of IGAD to resolve the conflict and express my full support for the mediation process under way. I call upon IGAD to make the mediation process as inclusive as possible and to keep good governance and human rights at the centre of all its efforts.

87. I would like to thank the Security Council for its timely adoption of resolution 2132 (2013) and, within that context, to also thank the leadership of MONUSCO, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNAMID and MINUSTAH, as well as the troop- and police-contributing countries concerned for the provision of additional troops, police and air assets under the inter-mission cooperation arrangements.

88. In closing, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative, Hilde Johnson, and the staff of UNMISS for their hard work under extremely difficult circumstances. I also extend my deep thanks to the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the non-governmental organizations who are also working in arduous conditions to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to those in need.
Annex

Implementation matrix for the reinforcement of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Units to be deployed during phase 1 (March 2014)</th>
<th>Units to be deployed during phase 2 (June 2014)</th>
<th>Units to be deployed during phase 3 (Late 2014)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Nepal: 350</td>
<td>Nepal: 500</td>
<td>Battalion 1: 850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana: 300</td>
<td>Ghana: 550</td>
<td>Battalion 2: 850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda: 800</td>
<td>Kenya: 310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>Bangladesh: three military utility helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nine additional military utility helicopters: 165</td>
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<td>support</td>
<td>(inter-mission cooperation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverine</td>
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<td>1 riverine unit: 200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>Level II: 63</td>
<td>Bangladesh engineering company: 275</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three sector headquarters: 120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1,423</td>
<td>2,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*† Minus three military utility helicopters (Bangladesh) under the inter-mission cooperation framework.