

Distr.: General 9 August 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 9 August 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 26 July 2013 from Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, forwarding a communiqué on the Central African Republic adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 385th meeting, held on 19 July 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon





Annex

Letter dated 26 July 2013 from the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you, on behalf of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, with respect to the situation in the Central African Republic, and following the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council, which, at its 385th meeting held in Addis Ababa, on 19 July 2013, decided to authorize the deployment, for an initial period of six months, of an African-led international support mission for the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR), which will have a total strength of 3,652, including 3,500 uniformed personnel (2,475 for the military component and 1,025 for the police component) and 152 civilians. I am herewith attaching the Peace and Security Council Communiqué on the Strategic Concept of Operations on this matter for your information and appropriate action, including their circulation as official documents of the Security Council (see enclosure 2).

Allow me to reiterate the African Union's appreciation for the continuous support extended to the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union in their efforts to effectively address the situation prevailing in the Central African Republic. We are grateful for the United Nations contribution at the technical meeting held in Addis Ababa from 2 to 5 July 2013, which resulted in an agreement on the draft Joint Strategic Concept of Operations for the AFISM-CAR, as well as on the successful holding of the second meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR) on 8 July 2013. As you are aware, the situation in the Central African Republic is of particular concern to countries of the region and the African Union. It poses a serious threat to the Central African Republic, the region and far beyond, particularly in view of the presence of foreign fighters among the armed groups operating in that country, the proliferation of small arms and weapons within the populations as an attempt to organize their self-defence against summary execution and other grave human rights violations.

We believe that the urgent establishment of AFISM-CAR will go a long way in contributing to our common overall objective to facilitate the creation of the necessary conditions for a sustainably stable and democratic Central African Republic exercising authority over its national territory and assuming its responsibilities for the protection of the population, properties and livelihood means and for addressing regional security and human rights challenges.

The magnitude of the challenges to be addressed in the Central African Republic requires a strong partnership with the United Nations, including helping to clarify the issues regarding political and logistical support to AFISM-CAR. It is only through joint efforts that we would be able to effectively support the Central African Republic people and transitional authorities, as they strive to overcome the very critical situation facing their country, and contribute to the promotion of lasting security, stability and development in the entire region.

> (Signed) Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra Commissioner Peace and Security

Enclosure 1

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 386th meeting held on 19 July 2013, adopted the following decision on the situation in the Central African Republic:

The Council,

1. Takes note of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the Central African Republic [PSC/PR/2(CCCLXXXV)], as well as of the statement made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security. The Council also takes note of the statements made by the Representatives of Rwanda, the Secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations, the European Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America;

2. Recalls its previous communiqués and press statements on the situation in the Central African Republic, especially communiqué PSC/PR/COMM/1.(CCCLXXX) adopted at its 380th meeting held on 17 June 2013, in which the Council supported, in principle, the establishment of an international support mission in Central Africa (AFISM-CAR) for the period of the transition as articulated in the road map;

3. Expresses deep concern at the prevailing social, economic and humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic;

4. Welcomes the initiatives taken by the Commission in follow-up to communiqué PSC/PR/COMM/1.(CCCLXXX), and commends, in this regard, the conclusions of the technical meeting held in Addis Ababa from 2 to 5 July 2013, which resulted in an agreement on the draft Concept of Operations for AFISM-CAR;

5. Welcomes further the successful holding of the second meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR), and appeals to all stakeholders to work towards the effective implementation of its conclusions;

6. Decides, on the basis of the concept of operations, annexed to the report of the Chairperson of the Commission, to authorize the deployment, for an initial period of six months, of AFISM-CAR, which will have a total strength of 3,652, including 3,500 uniformed personnel (2,475 for the military component and 1,025 for the police component) and 152 civilians, the nucleus of which will be constituted by the contingents currently serving in MICOPAX, in order to contribute to: (i) the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, through the implementation of appropriate measures; (ii) the stabilization of the country and the restoration of the authority of the central Government; (iii) the reform and restructuring of the defence and security sector; and (iv) the creation of conditions conducive for the provision of humanitarian assistance to population in need;

7. Requests the Commission to continue its consultations with the General Secretariat of ECCAS in order to finalize all aspects of the transition from MICOPAX to AFISM-CAR, which will take effect from 1 August 2013;

8. Urges the United Nations Security Council, the European Union through the Africa Peace Facility, and bilateral partners to lend their full support to the African Union and ECCAS to facilitate the transformation of MICOPAX into AFISM-CAR

and the effective functioning of AFISM-CAR through the provision of the necessary financial, logistical and technical support;

9. Requests the Chairperson of the Commission to forward this communiqué and the attached concept of operations to the United Nations Secretary-General for their circulation to the Security Council for appropriate action;

10. Reiterates its call for the mobilization of humanitarian and socioeconomic assistance that is commensurate with the problems facing the Central African Republic. In this regard, the Council stresses the urgency of the speedy operationalization of the Trust Fund agreed to during the inaugural meeting of ICG-CAR, held in Brazzaville on 3 May 2013;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Enclosure 2

Joint Strategic Concept of Operations for the African-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic

I. Review

1. On the basis of the attached references, an African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR) comprising an appropriate military force, police and civilian elements is to be established as a Mission, with an initial mandate of six months. Progress on the implementation of the mandate will be reviewed prior to its conclusion to assess any further actions required.

II. Summary of mission concept

2. The "Mission de Paix du Conseil de Paix et de Securite de l'Afrique Centrale en Republique Centrafricaine" (MICOPAX) will transition to AFISM-CAR after an appropriate decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council in coordination with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Comité de suivi.

3. AFISM-CAR will integrate the core MICOPAX elements, including its military, police and civilian components, and will be reinforced by contingents from other African countries so as to contribute to restore public order and security in the Central African Republic, in collaboration with national authorities, and to protect national and international institutions and facilities. The mission will attain full operational capability with a maximum strength of 3,500 uniformed personnel and a requisite civilian component so as to effectively discharge the mandate.

4. The international community should enhance its support to the Government of the Central African Republic towards restoration of security and public order, through their support for AFISM-CAR and the implementation of other appropriate measures.

III. Decisions and policy framework

5. The establishment of AFISM-CAR was informed by two decisions, namely:

(a) The Declaration of the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the Head of States and Government of ECCAS, held in N'Djamena on 18 April 2013, which urged the Central African Republic Government, ECCAS, the African Union, the European Union and the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) to hold consultations, as soon as possible, on the security arrangements that should support the transition period, including those likely to enhance the effectiveness of MICOPAX. In this regard, the Summit requested the African Union Commission to take necessary measures to assess the needs of MICOPAX in terms of its strength, equipment, financing and force generation, on the basis of a concept of operations and a concept of logistics support and, with the support of regional and international actors;

(b) In the Communiqué of the 380th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Central African Republic, held on 17 June 2013, the Peace and Security Council supported, in principle, the establishment of AFISM-CAR, whose core elements will be constituted by contingents serving under MICOPAX, augmented, as necessary (within a maximum strength of 3,500 uniformed personnel, and civilians) by contingents provided by other member States, as indicated in the report of the military assessment mission of MICOPAX, so as to contribute to the: (a) protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, through the implementation of appropriate measures; (b) the stabilization of the country and the restoration of State authority; (c) reform and restructuring of the defence and security sector; and (d) the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population.

6. The Peace and Security Council then requested the Commission to:

(a) Develop in consultation with ECCAS and other potential troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as with relevant international partners, notably the European Union, the United Nations and OIF, a concept of operations and a concept of logistical support, and to submit to it a detailed report, within 30 days from the date of the Communiqué, so as to enable it to take the required decision on the envisaged Mission;

(b) Actively consult with ECCAS, including the planning element of its regional standby force, to agree on urgent modalities for the strengthening and integration of MICOPAX within the envisaged new security arrangements;

(c) Intensify its efforts towards the mobilization of support from the United Nations, the European Union, OIF and other bilateral partners, towards the effective establishment and operationalization of AFISM-CAR.

IV. Background: threats and major developments in the Central African Republic

7. **Human rights situation**. The seizure of power by Seleka rebel elements in Bangui, on 24 March 2013, resulted in large-scale pillaging, summary executions, rape and other gross violations of human rights as reported by various civil society and international organizations. Several rebel groups, including Seleka, have been implicated in this pattern of gross violations of human rights. Although the level of incidents has reduced, the security situation remains precarious, characterized by weariness among the population and a growing humanitarian crisis.

8. **Deterioration of the humanitarian situation**. While the Central African Republic has been weakened by long-standing humanitarian challenges, the current rebel crisis has exacerbated humanitarian needs; 1.6 million people currently require humanitarian assistance and close to half a million suffer from food insecurity as a result of the ongoing insecurity. This is compounded by widespread looting, limited access to farms, large-scale internal displacement and restricted access to humanitarian assistance. Insecurity has also generated large displacement; with over 206,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and approximately 55,000 seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian access is severely curtailed due to the volatile and unpredictable security situation. The United Nations is facilitating access negotiations with Seleka authorities in regions outside of Bangui. In addition

to access constraints, humanitarian response capacity has been compromised by insecurity, looting of supplies and hijacking of vehicles.

9. Disintegration of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and other security agencies. With an estimated strength of approximately 6,000, FACA was largely concentrated in Bangui, with temporary projections of force into the rest of the country. Following the entry of Seleka into the capital, FACA was overwhelmed and subsequently fled to neighbouring countries or blended into the civilian population. Only approximately 10 per cent of FACA personnel have returned back to Bangui, despite calls by the new regime to this effect. This reluctance to return is largely due to fear of reprisals by Seleka forces. A similar situation exists with the police and gendarmerie forces. If FACA is to be restructured and given purpose and a new sense of pride. Reconstituting the army remains a critical aspect in addressing the Central African Republic's security situation. Most interlocutors are of the view that the reconstitution of FACA should precede the integration of Seleka into the reconstituted force and through a comprehensive selection process.

10. **Current security situation**. The security situation in Bangui has improved in the last two months since the March 2013 seizure of power by the Seleka armed group. Yet, the situation remains precarious and characterized by limited political will from various stakeholders, which could undermine current progress on the security situation. In the long run, the achievements attained thus far will be unsustainable in the face of continued exclusion of the defence and security forces. Recent events have revealed the reluctance of military personnel to come together, citing fears of personal safety and reprisals, and this could jeopardize the progress achieved thus far. Also, there is a need to ensure that the defence and security forces are brought together under a unified command structure with the requisite political backing.

11. While efforts to restore security in the capital and hinterlands are ongoing, the following challenges still persist:

- Incidents of car-hijacking (perpetrated by uncontrolled elements)
- Protests emanating from extrajudicial killings
- Illegal occupation of private properties
- Increasing numbers of Seleka recruits in Bangui
- Birth of a new rebellion in the eastern part of the country under the name "SIRIRI", meaning peace in Sango the national language
- Mobilization of the Lord's Resistance Army in the areas of Bria, Ouadda and Sam Ouandja, an act that could be described as a build-up or a reassertion of their presence in the region
- Widespread activities of Abdoulaye Miskine, a rebel leader and former member of the Seleka Coalition in the western part of the country along the border with Cameroon
- Potential threats posed by the deposed President, former military generals and senior officers who are currently exiled.

12. Foreign fighters and the lack of cohesion and unity of command within the Seleka force. There exists a strong legacy of foreign intervention, including the participation of foreign fighters in the unconstitutional seizure of power in the Central African Republic. The Seleka force is also composed primarily of foreign fighters, up to 80 per cent, by some estimates. However, unlike in 2003, when the foreign fighters were mostly under one command, the foreign fighters within Seleka come from a range of disparate groups. Currently, Seleka is estimated at a strength of approximately 20,000 men, with some 4,000 in Bangui. There is a lack of a unified command in Seleka due to its loose coalition of several disparate groups, each owing loyalty and allegiance to different political and military authorities. Although Seleka controls the capital, it cannot be considered a cohesive force. This lack of cohesion not only creates an immediate security problem, but it also creates the additional risk of fighting among the Seleka factions.

13. **Emergence of self-defence groups**. The emergence of anti-Seleka groups is likely to further complicate the security situation and the process of stabilization that the region, the African Union and the rest of the international community are calling for.

14. **Proliferation of small arms and light weapons**. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to pose significant threat to the security of the country. Some FACA elements fled with their weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, President Bozize had distributed weapons to his supporters to counter the Seleka forces. Seleka had also distributed weapons on its entry into Bangui, particularly in the "Combatants" and "PK 5" neighbourhood. This arsenal, combined with the weapons in the hands of the uncontrolled elements of Seleka, significantly increased the number of small arms and light weapons outside official control, thereby creating an environment conducive to the perpetuation of violence.

15. **Disorganization of the economy**. Several companies have shut down operations, and economic activities have stalled. The Central African part of the transport corridor linking the Central African Republic to Cameroon, through which most of the import and export products transit, is not secure. Traders who ventured in this trading corridor have been looted and, in some cases, killed. As a result, the cost of living has risen. Insecurity has also disrupted the farming season, causing food shortages.

V. Strategic framework

16. **Strategic end state**. The security conditions are established for a stable democratic Central African Republic State exercising authority over its national territory and assuming its responsibilities for the protection of the population, properties and livelihood means and for addressing regional security and human rights challenges.

17. **Strategic objectives**. AFISM-CAR will support the national authorities in meeting its obligations on regional security issues. It will contribute to the following:

(a) Support to the national authorities of the Central African Republic in its primary responsibilities to put an end to impunity, ensure the protection of civilians,

and restore security and public order through the implementation of appropriate measures;

(b) Sustained stabilization of the country and the restoration of State authority, as well as support to the development of a post-conflict reconstruction strategy for the Central African Republic;

(c) Assisting the national authorities with the development of a new disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for all armed groups, the development of a national weapons management, control and destruction programme, and a special programme for the repatriation of foreign fighters;

(d) Assist the national authorities to re-establish the security sector reform programme and to set up national structures for its implementation;

(e) Create conditions conducive to the establishment of legitimate democratic institutions through free and fair elections;

(f) Observe, monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Central African Republic.

18. **Strategic intent**. Establish and deploy AFISM-CAR by integrating MICOPAX and addressing capability gaps with international assistance and the deployment of additional personnel to the Mission area. Preliminary operations are to be conducted to shape the operational environment and develop more in-depth situational awareness. Appropriate logistical arrangements are to be concurrently established for additional forces that will be deployed, to ensure force protection and support operations. Once AFISM-CAR has reached full operational capability, operations are to be conducted to stabilize strongholds around sectors throughout the entire Central African Republic territory and to support the primary responsibility of the national authority for the protection of the population.

19. **Strategic assumptions**. The following assumptions have been made in planning:

(a) The African Union Peace and Security Council decides on the deployment of AFISM-CAR;

(b) The United Nations Security Council endorses the Peace and Security Council decision, authorizes and provides a support package for the Mission;

(c) Central African Republic and neighbouring countries support the African Union in the establishment of AFISM-CAR;

(d) There is a political consensus at national, regional and international levels on the deployment of the Mission;

(e) The African Union Commission and contributing countries generate and fulfil pledged capacities and capabilities for the Mission;

(f) The African Union member States, ECCAS, regional and international partners mobilize and provide the requisite resources in support of the Mission.

20. Constraints and limitations. The main constraints and limitations are:

(a) Limited timeline for preparation in view of the dire security, human rights and humanitarian situation on the ground;

(b) Limited level of host nation support and local infrastructure in the Central African Republic;

(c) Lack of common good will and homogeneity among political parties and existence of political armed groups in the Central African Republic;

(d) Existence of armed groups in the region;

(e) Challenges relating to the command and control and cohesion with the defence and security forces;

(f) Identification and accessibility of financial and logistical support.

VI. Proposed mandate

21. The AFISM-CAR shall operate in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the African Union in order to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in the Central African Republic territory through the use of all necessary means and will thereby provide support to the national authorities in the maintenance of security and public order throughout the Central African Republic. AFISM-CAR will also support the reconstruction of the national defence and security forces in close coordination with the international community. In so doing, AFISM-CAR, for an initial period of six months, shall:

(a) Create security conditions conducive to the implementation of the national processes and to the implementation of the political road map;

(b) Support the national authorities of the Central African Republic in their primary responsibility for ending impunity, providing protection to civilians and restoring security and public order;

(c) Support security sector reform including a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process;

(d) Create conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population;

(e) Create conditions conducive to post-conflict reconstruction and development;

(f) Observe and report human rights violations and support the establishment of mechanisms to deal with such violations;

(g) Liaise and coordinate with other regional operations, including the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA);

(h) Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right to self-defence.

VII. Operational environment

22. **Mission area**. The mission area comprises the area of operations and the area of interest. The area of operations is defined by the territory of the Central African Republic, but may also include parts of the bordering areas and neighbouring countries, including staging areas subject to their agreement and within appropriate

legal frameworks. The area of interest includes the territories of neighbouring countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan.

VIII. AFISM-CAR strength

23. The total strength of AFISM-CAR is 3,652, comprising 3,500 uniformed personnel and 152 civilians. The breakdown is as follows:

(a) Civilian component: 152 comprising substantive and support staff at the mission headquarters;

(b) Military component: 2,475 comprising infantry battalions, engineers, fire support, air assets and logistic units;

(c) Police component: 1,025 comprising formed police units and individual police officers.

IX. Execution

24. Concept of operations. The operation will be conducted as follows:

Phase 0: Strategic planning (M-30 to M)

This phase will consist of strategic planning and preparatory activities.

Phase 1: Integration of MICOPAX (M to M+90),¹ stabilization of Bangui and main supply route

(a) Detailed multidimensional operational level planning will be conducted with all parties concerned;

(b) The African Union, in consultation with ECCAS, regional and international partners, shall generate the necessary capabilities in addition to forces from ECCAS, as well as other African countries as soon as possible, in order to fully stabilize the capital town of Bangui and secure the main supply route;

(c) Mission leadership will engage national authorities of the Central African Republic in defining areas of cantonment of Seleka forces outside Bangui;

(d) AFISM-CAR will support the Central African Republic authorities in their primary responsibility for the protection of the population, particularly for security and policing in Bangui and its surrounding areas;

(e) Establish preconditions for conducting basic training for a reconstituted FACA;

(f) Logistics support arrangements, initial basing, communication and operational stocks will be sourced for the deployment of future mission sectors outside Bangui.

¹ The mission will commence at "M", which is the date of authorization of the mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council.

Phase 2: Expansion outside Bangui (M+90 to M+160)

(a) AFISM-CAR will conduct expansion operations to secure key areas;

(b) AFISM-CAR, in cooperation with the national institutions of the Central African Republic, will support the cantonment of armed groups, including Seleka;

(c) AFISM-CAR will assist the Central African Republic authorities in their primary responsibility for the protection of the population, particularly for security and policing throughout the national territory.

Phase 3: Stabilization (M+160 to M+360)

(a) FACA will start transition to stabilization activities to maintain security, expand and consolidate State authority and ensure law and order;

(b) FACA will start deploying to sector areas throughout the country;

(c) AFISM-CAR, in cooperation with FACA, will secure the electoral process;

(d) AFISM-CAR will start redeployment to home locations after the holding of free and fair elections.

25. Civilian concept of operations:

(a) The AFISM-CAR civilian component is comprised of a substantive and a support section (in addition to civilian personnel of the Senior Mission Leadership Team). The relatively small size of the AFISM-CAR civilian component necessitates that the mission's substantive civilian section be multifunctional and cross-cutting in its approach. The substantive section is primarily responsible for the implementation of activities in support of the mission mandate and will, on the basis of priorities as articulated by the national authorities, (i) provide support to the implementation of the political transition and dialogue processes; (ii) provide support to the authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the civilian population, giving particular regard to women and child protection; (iii) monitor the human rights situation and strengthen national human rights capacity; (iv) provide support to stabilization, the restoration of State authority and post-conflict reconstruction and development activities; (v) provide support to disarmament processes and measures designed to strengthen the security sector and the rule of law; and (vi) create conditions conducive for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to liaise with the humanitarian community;

(b) AFISM-CAR employs an integrated support approach wherein military and police second personnel to the civilian-led mission support team. The mission support component is responsible for providing administrative and logistical support on a mission-wide basis, and in this way supports the mission in executing its mandated tasks in a manner that is effective, timely and coordinated. The mission support component of AFISM-CAR is divided into three sections, namely, Integrated Support Services, which provides and oversees integrated mission logistical support requirements, including engineering, transportation and communication and information technology, among others; the Administrative Services Section which plans, organizes, implements, manages and oversees the activities of all administrative support services of the mission; and the Finance, Accounting and Budget Section, which will ensure the efficient management of the financial resources of AFISM-CAR.

26. **Military concept of operations**: The military component of AFISM-CAR will be built up on contingents and core elements serving currently deployed in the Central African Republic. The component shall initially secure and stabilize the capital town of Bangui and main supply routes, including through the use of force. It shall impose public order and security and protect national institutions and international organizations. Once AFISM-CAR attains full operational capability, the military component will expand its operations throughout the entire territory of the Central African Republic.

27. Police concept of operations:

(a) The authorized strength of the AFISM-CAR police component is 1,025 police personnel, comprising formed police units of 140 personnel each and individual police officers. The individual police officers will comprise senior leadership personnel, police trainers, police advisers, police mentors and police support services personnel, and will be deployed initially in Bangui under the supervision of the Police Commissioner;

(b) In accordance with the mission mandate, the police shall have a partial executive status, but should be allowed to carry and use firearms, as directed in the Directives on the Use of Force;

(c) As part of the mission's overall objective to restore security and State authority over the entire national territory of the Central African Republic, and support to the establishment of legitimate institutions, the AFISM-CAR police will work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safety, democracy and human rights by delivering professional policing in accordance with the mandate. Priority will be placed on support to the national Government in the restoration of public order and safety and the protection of civilians against violence, abuse and rape. AFISM-CAR will further contribute to the restructuring and training of the Central African Republic security forces to enable them to protect and serve all citizens in line with international standards. In so doing, AFISM-CAR will carry out the following actions:

(i) Support the national Government to ensure the safety and security of Central African Republic citizens and protect civilians against imminent threat of physical violence;

(ii) Support, when requested, Central African Republic security forces and other security agencies to resume their responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of law and order;

(iii) Assist and support capacity-building for the Central African Republic security forces (national police and gendarmerie) through training, monitoring, mentoring and advising, and to extend this scope to all areas of criminality;

(iv) Assist the Central African Republic in the reform and restructuring of its security forces, in collaboration with other partners;

- (v) Support security sector reform;
- (vi) Provide support for humanitarian actors as may be required;

(d) The AFISM-CAR police will augment the current police of MICOPAX in stabilizing Bangui, while waiting for the completion of the force generation process of the new mission.

28. Concept of mission support:

(a) Support will be delivered to the military, police and civilian components across all phases of AFISM-CAR operations, through an integrated support organization utilizing a combination of mission-owned, contingent-owned and contracted assets and services subsequent to a 30-day self-sufficiency period. Based on the operational and situational environment in the Central African Republic, the main effort for the delivery of support will be through the generated military logistics enabling units augmented by contractual support where feasible. Prior to the deployment of the forces and as part of phase 1, stocks will be pre-positioned and contracts set in place for critical levels 2 and 3 support covering medical, transport, communications and information technology systems engineering and supply-related activities. Immediate support will be provided to the civilian component and staff officers while full support to military and police contingents will be provided from M+30;

(b) The AFISM-CAR integrated support organization will cover supply, transport, medical, engineering, logistics services, communications and information technology systems and operational support contracts capabilities. A support network will be deployed in order to support both the geographical spread of troops and the extended lines of communication including the main supply routes, such as the Central African Republic-Cameroon corridor. The support network will be centrally controlled and coordinated by the mission support organization (or Force Logistics Group) due to the limited level of infrastructure in the Central African Republic with a main logistics base in Bangui and logistics hubs co-located with the Sectors;

(c) Since the Central African Republic is landlocked, the primary means of delivery of goods to the logistics base and hubs will be through road convoys supplemented by air assets, as considered feasible. Consequent to the conduct of a detailed situational and threat analysis of the operational environment, particularly outside Bangui, appropriate risk mitigation measures would be put in place. These would include the dumping of materiel and establishment of robust reserves in designated locations in the forward areas. The delivery and distribution system and level of reserves held along the network could therefore vary from one commodity (fuel, rations and water) to the other depending on the prevailing situation;

(d) Logistics support will be provided down to unit level in all the phases. A main logistics base, to hold strategic reserves as considered necessary, will be established in Bangui and additional logistics bases — Forward Logistics Bases — will be established in the forward areas, as considered necessary. Alternate logistics bases/nodes may also be established in neighbouring countries based on considerations as regards the lines of communication and other operational exigencies;

(e) Medical support will be provided to ensure a high standard of health care that is accessible and acceptable to all members of AFISM-CAR through planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and professional supervision. Medical support will comprise all activities aimed at maintaining a healthy manpower and cover preventive health care for all personnel in the mission, as well as curative medical care for individuals;

Robust medical capabilities in terms of staffing, equipment, drugs, (f)consumables and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)/medical evaluation (MEDEVAC) assets will be put in place to provide adequate support, particularly in an environment with limited local medical facilities and long lines of communications to all Mission personnel. All members of the mission headquarters shall be deployed after completion of first-aid training and the provision of first-aid personal kits. Troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries shall deploy with basic medical level capabilities able to provide first-aid to a casualty at point of injury and preventive medicine to contingent members, as well as organic Level 1 medical facility able to split into two forward medical teams (1 medical doctor and 3 nurses/paramedics), and be prepared to support sub-units deployed in different and remote locations. Additionally, troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries deploying one company shall have at least a medical cell comprising one nurse at company level and one field nurse assistant with medical kits for each section;

(g) Level 2 medical hospitals will be established within the area of operations in Bangui and other areas subject to further assessment of the operational needs and environment. Level 3/4 medical capabilities will be provided through medical facilities contracted in the region. Casualty evacuation by road would be considered as and when feasible without compromising the "Golden Hour Rule", and achieved with regular ambulance vehicles or armoured ambulances (armoured personnel carrier ambulances). Aero medical evacuations (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC) will be made available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by dedicated air assets (helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft) within the area of operation. Dedicated MEDEVAC assets will be provided 24 hours a day, 7 days a week through air assets (fixed-wing aircraft) to the contracted Level 3/4 facilities in the region. For the aero medical evacuation teams, each Level 2 hospital shall deploy with at least one aero medical evacuation team and each organic Level 1 medical unit with the troopcontributing countries and police-contributing countries should also be able to provide one aero medical evacuation team as additional back-up in the event of mass casualty situations;

(h) The medical section at the level of the Mission headquarters, with a Chief Medical Officer/Force Medical Officer, will provide travel advice, health education, counselling services, advice for mission administration on health-related issues including medical evacuations, and liaison with the mandating authority and its strategic headquarters.

The African Union Commission will provide Information, (i) Communication, Command and Control System capability in support of the mission. The capability will be provided at three levels; strategic (African Union Commission to Mission headquarters in Bangui); operational (Mission headquarters down to Sector headquarters); and tactical (Sector headquarters to contingents (limited)). In addition, a liaison link will also be established in coordination with ECCAS between the ECCAS secretariat in Libreville and Mission headquarters in Bangui. At Mission and Sector headquarters, the African Union Commission will provide the requisite communication and information system equipment, including personnel. The Information, Communication, Command and Control System,

infrastructure will include a secure LAN/WAN and a Radio Net (high frequency (HF) for long-haul communications and very high frequency (VHF) for short range). A signal unit to be provided by troop-contributing countries will support the Mission and Sector headquarters.

X. Coordinating instructions

29. **Timings**: The Mission will commence at "M", which is the date the African Union Peace and Security Council mandates AFISM-CAR.

XI. Command and control

30. **Political level**: The African Union Peace and Security Council is responsible for the political control of AFISM-CAR. The Head of Mission is nominated by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

31. Strategic level:

(a) **Follow-up Committee at ministerial level**: chaired by the President's Representative of the ECCAS Follow-up Committee on the Central African Republic; it is responsible for the coordination of the international efforts in consultation with the ECCAS President;

(b) Joint Coordination Mechanism: this mechanism has two levels:

(i) Joint Coordination Mechanism at the ministerial level: co-chaired by both the Peace and Security Commissioner of the African Union Commission and the Executive Secretary of ECCAS, this mechanism ensures the preparation and the follow-up of political decisions related to AFISM-CAR, on behalf of the ECCAS President and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Representatives of the troop- and police-contributing countries and of the immediate neighbouring countries are permanent members of this mechanism. This committee can ask, on a case-by-case basis, for the participation of representatives of States, bodies or organizations whose presence would be beneficial (see appendix A).

(ii) Joint Coordination Mechanism at the technical level: the composition of the technical cluster is similar to that of the ministerial level committee. Before the sessions, it examines the issues on the agenda at the ministerial level and provides recommendations. This committee can ask, on a case-bycase basis, for the participation of external experts. The Head of Mission is charged with the command and control of the mission and acts as Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to whom she or he reports and from whom she or he gets guidance. The Head of Mission is nominated by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, in consultation with the President of ECCAS.

32. **Operational level**: The Head of Mission is assisted by a Deputy Head of Mission who is also head of the civilian substantive component and Chief of Staff. The mission has a multidimensional command structure consisting of a military component under the command of a Force Commander, a police component under the command of a Police Commissioner and a Mission Support component

responsible for the support of the entire mission under the direction of the Head of Mission Support. These Heads of Components have, respectively, a deputy (see appendix B).

33. The immediate subordinates of the Head of Mission (Deputy Head of Mission, Chief of Staff, Heads of Components and their deputies) are appointed by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

References

Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000

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Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002

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Political Road Map for Central African Republic

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African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, 2013


African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, January 2007

Decision No. 06/CEEAC/CCEG/13 of the Peace and Security Council dated 18 April 2013 mandating the Second Peace Mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX 2)

Communication of the CDS of FACA during the technical planning session for the development of the strategic concept of operations for AFISM-CAR dated 2 July 2013

Appendix A

AFISM-CAR coordination organigram




Abbreviations: AU, African Union; CAR, Central African Republic; CoS, Chief of Staff; DSRCC, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission; FACA, Central African Armed Forces; HMS, Head of Mission Support; JCM, Joint Planning Coordination Mechanism; LRA, Lord's Resistance Army; RCI, Regional Cooperation Initiative; SRCC, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission.

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Se Appendix B

AFISM-CAR organizational structure



Abbreviations: CAS, Chief Administrative Services; CFAB, Chief of Finance, Accounting and Budget; CISS, Chief Integrated Support Services; FMO, Force Medical Officer; MAC, Military Analysis Centre; MOC, Military Operations Centre; MPEC, Military and Planning Evaluation Centre.