Security Council
Sixty-second year

5632nd meeting
Tuesday, 20 February 2007, 3.05 p.m.
New York

President: Mr. Burian ..................................... (Slovakia)

Members:
Belgium ..................................................... Mr. Verbeke
China ...................................................... Mr. Li Kexin
Congo ....................................................... Mr. Ikoube
France ..................................................... Mr. De Rivièrè
Ghana ...................................................... Nana Effah-Apenteng
Indonesia .................................................. Mr. Jenie
Italy ......................................................... Mr. Mantovani
Panama ..................................................... Mr. Arias
Peru ........................................................ Mr. Pérez
Qatar ......................................................... Mr. Al-Nasser
Russian Federation ................................. Mr. Dolgov
South Africa ............................................. Mr. Kumalo
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .... Sir Emyr Jones Parry
United States of America ............................. Mr. McBride

Agenda

The maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform

Letter dated 8 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2007/72)
The meeting resumed at 3.05 p.m.

The President: I wish to remind all speakers, as was indicated at the morning session, to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously.

Mr. Dolgov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I wish to express our gratitude to the Slovakian delegation for having organized the discussion on this timely theme for the Security Council and for the United Nations as a whole. Peacekeeping missions conducted under the aegis of or in accordance with the guidelines of the United Nations have now become integrated and multifaceted operations. An effective combination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding instruments and close coordination of the military, political, civilian, reconstruction and humanitarian components are what guarantee the success of the missions. Experience has shown that only on the basis of a comprehensive approach can an effective settlement and lasting peace be achieved, and thus the reoccurrence of armed conflict be avoided. In that context, we note the importance of the question of security sector reform in countries emerging from crisis, including in the reconstitution or strengthening of the army, security services and other relevant institutions. It is clear that the role of the United Nations concerning the issue, like that of international assistance, should be designed on the basis of national needs and priorities as defined by the recipient countries themselves.

The Security Council, when preparing the mandates of multifaceted peacekeeping operations, should give due attention to the operational complementarity of tasks involved in supporting security sector reform with other aspects of integrated missions, in particular in the areas of restoring the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the reconstruction of the institutions of government. The Russian Federation therefore considers it useful that reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on specific operations should, where appropriate, give appropriate information on the problems of security sector reform in countries where those missions are deployed.

However, we should bear in mind that this is frequently a lengthy and complex process that goes far beyond time-bound peacekeeping operations. Several of those aspects fall within the competence of other components of the United Nations system. Supporting national efforts in security sector reform in countries emerging from crisis is an area of close constructive partnership and complementarity between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in order to achieve a common goal and thus enhance the effectiveness of international work in the area of peacebuilding. There is also a useful consultative and coordinating role to be played by the Peacebuilding Commission, in particular in the context of its work with Burundi and Sierra Leone.

Improving the coordination of the contributions of the United Nations system — donors, the international financial institutions and regional partners — and drawing lessons from integrated peacekeeping operations over the last 15 years can help to enhance the effectiveness of our collective efforts aimed at assisting countries emerging from conflict. That is of key importance for the successful implementation of the main task and responsibility of the Security Council, namely to maintain peace and security. The Russian delegation supports the draft statement of the President of the Security Council prepared by the delegation of Slovakia and agreed to by the members of the Council.

Mr. Ikouebe (Republic of the Congo) (spoke in French): My delegation welcomes the initiative taken by the presidency in convening this meeting which is shedding new light on peacekeeping and international security — a concern that is at the heart of activities of the United Nations, as stressed in the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, as well as that of the Security Council to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly.

Periodic reports of subsidiary bodies of the Council on counter-terrorism often reflect the need to strengthen the security sector in various Member States, in order to assist them in complying with their obligations in implementing resolutions on counter-terrorism. As has been said by others, recent years have seen a considerable increase in the number of peacekeeping operations in the world. That evolution clearly demonstrates the challenges posed by the need to reform the security sector in certain countries coming out of armed conflict, as has been recently discussed in the Council with regard to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Timor-Leste.
More concretely, at the most recent public debate of the Council on 31 January 2007 on the Peacebuilding Commission, my delegation pointed out on the basis of experiences with Burundi and Sierra Leone, two countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, that in order to build peace it is necessary to enhance the capacities of those countries, in various areas, in particular the security sector.

In fact, examining the situation of those two countries has shown, for example, that their security services do not have the means needed to guarantee public order, that social and political obstacles continue to pose real threats to the stability of those countries, that the unemployment among youth is far too high and that the dilapidated state of social services could lead to popular discontent, which could affect social peace and political stability. It is not out of place to recall that economic progress and improving the functioning of the State, as well as improving conditions of life for its people, are essential factors in creating stability. Strengthening the security sector should also be planned at various levels within an interactive system.

The Security Council must define policies for various organs of the United Nations system, in particular the Peacebuilding Commission, whose principal missions are, among other activities, to advise and propose integrated strategies for the re-establishment of peace and for peacebuilding after a conflict and to develop best practices on issues that need very intense cooperation between political, military, humanitarian and development actors.

In dealing with Member States, the Council should not only promote best practices in various fields, but should also help to ensure that those practices are assimilated, for which we urge the involvement of regional and subregional organizations, because they can provide essential and indispensable links.

Cooperation in many different fields of activity should be strengthened among Member States as a whole, especially those whose fragility does not allow them to ensure streamlined and effective management of administrative structures. Any action to that end should ensure greater streamlining of working methods and the improvement of public services so as to strengthen justice and equity.

The streamlining of the security sector must take into account good governance, fighting corruption, respect for human rights and the rule of law, free and democratic elections, promotion and defence of human rights and fighting impunity. The reform of the security sector cannot be ensured unless it generates a chain effect with the other sectors mentioned. In those areas, the coordinated technical support of the United Nations and other bilateral and multilateral partners is required.

The Slovak delegation is to be commended for providing the Council with a concept paper (S/2007/72, annex), which stresses the appropriateness of national ownership of security sector reform, seen as a comprehensive, contextual and long-term endeavour. Such an approach will make it possible to identify all the aspects of these problems, which must remain at the centre of the Council’s discussions on how to consolidate peace and security throughout the world. It is in that conviction that my delegation supports the draft presidential statement submitted by the Slovak delegation.

Nana Effah-Apenteng (Ghana): I, too, wish to commend your delegation, Mr. President, for organizing this debate. We are also pleased to see all the foreign ministers and dignitaries who are here today. Their presentations have substantially enriched our understanding of the complex challenges that must be addressed in order to implement credible security sector reforms, especially in those countries that are still struggling to recover from the harrowing experience of internal conflict.

The issue of security sector reform (SSR) is gaining increasing importance on the international plane, because it is seen as cutting across a wide range of policy areas, from peace and security to economic and social development. It is thus inextricably linked to other stabilization and reconstruction priorities, such as transitional justice; the rule of law; human rights; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes; equal and full participation by women in national affairs; and the problem of children in armed conflict.

The chronic instability that has characterized most of the post-independence era in Africa raises fundamental questions about the role of the security sector in the political economy of the continent, given its profound impact on the overall development of African countries. Our experience with regional...
integration — at least in West Africa — clearly shows that the legacies of colonialism and the cold war continue to cast their shadow on the outlook, traditions and ethical standards of key institutions in the security sector, including the military, the police, customs and the intelligence agencies. It is imperative, therefore, that we address the subject of security sector reform from a perspective that is in harmony with the determined efforts being made by the African Union to achieve lasting peace and stability on the continent, based on social inclusion, democratic governance and sustainable development.

At this point, perhaps it would help to shed a little more light on our position by referring to some important decisions adopted by African leaders in the recent past. Significantly, in July 1990, on the eve of the end of the cold war, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted its landmark Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. After taking stock of the continent’s fortunes over three decades, they concluded that its development would be held back as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability did not prevail in Africa. The Declaration further recognized that it was only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa could fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development.

Consistent with that position, African leaders subsequently adopted the Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, in which they unequivocally condemned and rejected any unconstitutional change of Government and reaffirmed the commitment of African peoples to respect for the rule of law based on the people’s will, expressed through the ballot and not by the bullet.

Those decisions have far-reaching implications for the security sector in African countries, since the overarching objective of security sector reform is to ensure that security institutions effectively perform their statutory functions — that is, providing security and delivering justice to the State and its people — in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles of good governance.

The implications range from the very conception and composition of the security sector to related issues, such as the size of the military and of its budget, civil-military relations, training and orientation and the nature of technical cooperation with donor countries, not to mention issues such as compliance with a code of ethics, including the observance of human rights, especially by police and intelligence agencies.

It is important to stress that, for the sort of radical shake-up required to realign the security sector with the ambitions reflected in those Declarations, the initiative must first come from African leaders themselves. After all, we know from experience that the performance of the security sector is closely related to, and invariably shaped by, the conduct of leaders in their exercise of the powers of State.

In that regard, we welcome the significant efforts that have been made recently by development partners to adapt their technical assistance programmes in the area of security to the changing reality in Africa. We expect the United Nations as well to fashion a reform strategy that will facilitate the attainment, where possible, of the objectives that Africans have set for themselves. A better appreciation of the history of the continent and a deeper understanding of the dynamics of its political economy are required in order to form a meaningful partnership in security sector reform.

Ghana believes that security sector reform not only is an integral part of the peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, but also confronts us with the need for clarity and consistency in defining the objectives of such reform. Unless that challenge is met, the search for a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated United Nations strategy will prove elusive. Moreover, many of the problems that threaten to derail ongoing security sector reform programmes in our region transcend the immediate needs of the post-conflict societies directly concerned.

For instance, how does the widely accepted notion of the right of the State to exercise a monopoly on the use of force — which underlies most DDR programmes — square up with the loose international regulatory framework that permits the illicit trade and proliferation in small arms and light weapons in volatile regions? There is also the growing menace of the private militias and military contractors that have often been deployed to guard mining operations against marginalized indigenous groups, not to mention those that have been recruited, armed and organized by central Governments either to terrorize their own
populations, to wage proxy wars against neighbouring States or to do both.

As far back as in 1972, African leaders adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which is complementary to the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. The two Conventions contain principles that are directly relevant to the problem of implementing credible security sector reform at the national level in order to enhance global peace and security. Unfortunately, since their adoption, the phenomenon of private militias has grown by leaps and bounds, alongside the illicit trade and proliferation in weapons. Indeed, the imperative of the global effort to combat terrorism underscores the need to fashion a strategy that tightens up both the national and international regulatory frameworks for the security sector.

Surely, if one of the central objectives of security sector reform is to concentrate force in the hands of the sole and legitimate authority of the State, then that imposes enormous responsibility on all Governments. When the State’s monopoly on force becomes perverted through the emergence of a dictatorial regime that tramples on the rights of its citizens and even perpetrates ethnic cleansing and genocide, how should the international community respond? Should such a regime continue to be armed to the teeth in the face of its crimes against humanity? Can it be trusted to honestly and impartially carry out the demobilization and disarmament of the very forces that it has unleashed in pursuit of its agenda? The persistence of those tendencies reflects a certain deficit in the political commitment within the international community to achieve comprehensive and credible security sector reform in developing countries.

The factors that have aggravated the growing militarization of some African societies are indeed complex. In view of the obvious interdependence of States, as manifested in cross-border trade and the movement of persons across borders, it is not only the countries that are emerging from conflict at which reform of the security sector must be targeted. That is why the Economic Community of West African States, for instance, has been increasingly active in the field of security sector reform. Besides, the weak character of most State institutions, such as public services, the legislature, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and the low capability of civil society groups in most African countries tend to pose special challenges.

Again, while national ownership is a sine qua non for successful security sector reform, it cannot be achieved without a reasonably literate population that understands its civil rights and responsibilities and can thus play a meaningful role in national affairs. Where the overwhelming majority of the population is not even aware of its rights or simply lacks the means to ensure respect for them, those rights tend to be at the mercy of the security forces.

A holistic approach to security sector reform must therefore not be limited to building the capacity of security and justice institutions, promoting management and oversight mechanisms and tackling SSR-related issues such as DDR and transitional justice; it should also strive to fully empower the population, particularly vulnerable groups such as women.

That brings to the fore the imperative of an integrated but flexible United Nations approach that enables national authorities, regional organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and civil society to work together purposefully in addressing the security needs of the countries in question. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that each case is sui generis and there can be no one-size-fits-all solution. Security sector reform in any country should also be recognized as a long-term process that must be adequately funded if it is to be successful and sustainable.

We are aware of the importance of security sector reform in the countries currently undergoing post-conflict reconstruction, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and others. We hope that we shall have the opportunity to review the progress made in those countries to enable us to assess the impact of the strategies that have been put in place to address their respective security challenges. We also welcome the creation by the Secretariat of an inter-agency working group on security sector reform to identify current United Nations engagement in that area. Once again, we cannot overstate the need — not only among the United Nations entities, but also among all relevant international actors involved in post-conflict security sector reform assistance — to coordinate their efforts and thereby function as a whole. That was evident
when we debated the direction of the Peacebuilding Commission, and it seems obvious that the same challenges have emerged in today’s discussions in terms of the actions that must be pursued in order to remove the obstacles to peace and stability and make real progress in poverty alleviation and sustainable development.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Slovakia.

The importance of security sector reform as an essential element of any stabilization process has been increasingly acknowledged by the international community in general, and by the Security Council and the whole United Nations system in particular. Yet, a common understanding of the concept of security sector reform is far from having been established. There is also a lot to be done in order to overcome the fragmented character of current efforts in the field of security sector reform so that we can fully benefit from orchestrated actions taken jointly by the international community.

Slovakia does not have a recipe for the solution to those problems, but we believe that our efforts and our debate today can serve several purposes.

First, they can highlight the central importance of security sector reform for peace and stability. There are numerous examples in which the lack of reform in the security sector and a lack of good governance, justice and democratic accountability represent the root causes of conflict. The need for security sector reform is often a precondition of stable and sustainable post-conflict development. It is therefore crucial to understand that it is a long-term — indeed, a never-ending — effort.

Secondly, they can underline the central role of national and local ownership. If a security sector reform programme is to be successful and sustainable, it must be country-specific and driven by local actors. One can hardly expect security sector reform to be implemented without a clear understanding on the part of recipient countries that security sector reform is beneficial for their development, stability, security and prosperity, and that resolute action and sustained effort are therefore needed on their side.

Thirdly, our efforts and this debate stress the ultimate objective of security sector reform, which should not be mere institution- and capacity-building. It should be improvement of people’s lives through that public service. Security sector reform should therefore be accompanied by the implementation of the principles of good governance, transitional justice, democratic accountability and respect for human rights.

Fourthly, they can accent the interlinkages between security, development and human rights. The primary tasks of security sector reform are related to peace, security and stability. However, if implemented correctly, security sector reform will sooner or later yield fruit in the form of improved living standards.

There are several ways to improve the performance of the international community in order to achieve the aforementioned goals. The following should receive particular attention.

First, donor efforts should be better coordinated not only among the donors, but notably with the recipient country. Besides the quantity of donor support, there is also the question of its quality and focus on the core areas that determine the success of the effort. International actors should better coordinate their support for States concerned in order to cover all key areas and to achieve cumulative effects.

Secondly, the role of regional and other international organizations should be further promoted. They often play a central role in developing and implementing security sector reform programmes and in awareness-raising. In particular, their added value is in their ability to embed national security sector reform processes in a regional context.

Thirdly, we are strongly convinced that the United Nations can do much more. Improvement of the United Nations performance does not necessarily have to lead to new institutionalization or increased resource needs in the United Nations. We believe that a lot can be achieved through more coherent and coordinated approaches.

We pin our hopes on a comprehensive report of the Secretary-General that could outline the basic strategy of the United Nations in the field of security sector reform. Such a report should define shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of United Nations support for security sector reform. It should summarize the lessons learned so far by different United Nations system entities and make clear the roles and responsibilities of individual players within the United
Nations system. Ultimately, the report could serve as a basic orientation and planning tool for various United Nations entities working on security sector reform and in related areas.

However, it is not just the Secretary-General’s responsibility. The Security Council has its own and unique responsibility for international peace and security. The Council therefore could and should make a difference through a better reflection of security sector reform priorities in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations and integrated political offices.

In conclusion, let me stress that today’s debate in the Security Council is not the end of our efforts related to security sector reform. We will continue promoting security sector reform priorities in the Council, other United Nations bodies and other relevant international forums. As I have mentioned, we hope to see the report of the Secretary-General on United Nations approaches in the foreseeable future so that we can build on his recommendations in our future activities, the first of which is a workshop we are planning to organize in cooperation with South Africa later this year. Through that initiative, we aspire to bring the issue of security sector reform where it is most urgently needed — to the continent that has suffered so much due to the lack of functioning security sectors.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Matussek (Germany): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area; as well as the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

I would like to thank Slovakia, as President of the Security Council, for organizing this useful debate on security sector reform.

The European Union holds the view that, without a functioning security sector, lasting peace and security for the population cannot be achieved. If successful, security sector reform can significantly contribute to establishing the right conditions for sustainable development. Therefore, it is of great importance to focus on that issue in countries in transition and in fragile or post-conflict countries.

The EU engages in more than 70 security sector reform-related activities worldwide through EU pre-accession assistance, development cooperation and conflict-prevention and crisis-management support. In June 2006, the EU adopted a policy framework for security sector reform support that brought together instruments across all EU policy areas and bridged the fields of security and development. That has enabled the EU to take a holistic and multi-sectoral approach in support of security sector reform. To illustrate our experiences, let me briefly mention some important European experiences in the field of security sector reform.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a potential candidate for EU membership, benefits from substantial security sector reform support in the areas of police, justice and border management. In addition, in January 2003, we started the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which followed on from the United Nations International Police Task Force. In accordance with best European and international practice, the Mission seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership. It does so through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. Following an invitation from the Bosnian authorities, in November 2005 the EU decided to establish a refocused police mission. It supports the police reform process and continues to develop and consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against major and organized crime.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo the European Union has been active in security sector reform since 2002, playing a leading role in defence, police and justice reform. We believe that the assistance of the international community in bringing peace and development to the whole of the country cannot bear fruit without reform of the security sector. The EU has therefore confirmed its readiness to assume a leading coordinating role in international efforts on security sector reform, together with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if requested by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In June 2005, the EU established an advisory and
assistance mission for security reform, which focuses on defence reform. The mission provides advice and assistance to Congolese authorities in charge of security, while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with international standards.

Also in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union launched — in close coordination with the United Nations — a police mission in Kinshasa. The mission monitors, mentors and advises the Integrated Police Unit and ensures that the Unit acts according to international best practice. The Unit’s impartiality is a key element. It has successfully intervened on various occasions during the election period, stabilizing the situation on the streets of the capital. The contribution by the European Union therefore had an immediate positive effect in the critical final phase of the transition period leading towards the establishment of a democratically elected Government.

Finally, last week the EU Council of Ministers decided to start planning a mission in Afghanistan in the field of policing. That mission will complement the already substantial EU support for the Afghan police force in the payment of salaries. It will be carried out in conjunction with an EU reform programme in the justice sector, which seeks to professionalize the judicial and public prosecution service. That is an important step that confirms the EU’s strong long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

Given the experiences the European Union has gained from the range of security sector reform programmes and missions in which it has been engaged so far, we believe that action on security sector reform needs to be approached in a holistic manner that is underpinned by comprehensive national security strategies. It starts with an assessment of the security needs of a country, and should include plans for the future architecture of the security system. The reform process should be designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and human rights. Democratic institutions that can provide civilian oversight and accountability and the overall management of reforms are especially relevant in that regard.

The European Union promotes coherent approaches within the United Nations system that are guided by lessons learned from past experiences and based on agreed principles within the international community. In that context, the EU is also making particular efforts to implement resolution 1325 (2000), on women, peace and security, as well as resolution 1612 (2005), on children affected by armed conflict.

There is a need for better cooperation among all partners involved in security sector reform, as well as better coordination of their efforts. We therefore welcome and support the draft presidential statement to be adopted today, which acknowledges the need for a report by the Secretary-General on approaches to security sector reform by the United Nations. Nevertheless, we think that the upcoming tasks should be fulfilled using existing resources and existing bodies, one of them being the Peacebuilding Commission.

Once more, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing today’s debate and thereby stimulating a broader discussion within the United Nations system and with external actors on an issue of such cross-cutting importance. The European Union is ready to continue to contribute constructively United Nations support for security sector reform.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Mr. Malmierca Díaz (Cuba) *(spoke in Spanish)*: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 118 countries members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Movement would like to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate, which provides us with an appropriate forum to make some comments on the issue of the security sector reform.

In recent months, the international community has begun to pay great attention to several controversial theories and ideas that are directly linked to the subject of our debate today. We have yet to reach consensus among Members of the United Nations as regards those concepts, which will require an exhaustive process of negotiations. The Non-Aligned Movement believes that security sector reform as a whole is a concept that was recently developed within several subregional and other intergovernmental organizations, although it has never been debated in a
transparent and inclusive manner at the multilateral level in the context of the General Assembly.

The underlying theme of security sector reform is that ineffectiveness and poor governance represent serious obstacles to peace, stability, poverty reduction, sustainable development, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Nevertheless, there is insufficient clarity as to how to assess that ineffectiveness. That lack of clarity has led to divergent interpretations and value judgments — a situation that could lead to arbitrary implementation. That will undoubtedly lead to undermining and infringing upon the concept of sovereignty, which is a matter of overriding concern in Charter of the United Nations.

The process of rehabilitating the security sector in States emerging from conflict is a matter that should be decided by national Governments as part of their national strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding bearing in mind their own needs and priorities, socio-cultural characteristics and the specificities of each case. It is not the prerogative of the international community to prescribe the road they should follow. National ownership is essential in that regard.

The Security Council, with its limited membership, does not seem to be the appropriate framework to plan, or even to direct, activities involving inter-agency coordination aimed at carrying out reforms in the security sector. In that regard, the Non-Aligned Movement would like to highlight the fact that if the concern is mainly about rehabilitating the security sector in post-conflict situations — where that sector has been affected along with other Government institutions following several years of conflict — then the issue is clearly not related to the reform of the security sector. Instead, it is a matter of capacity-building in the States emerging from conflict — an area in which the Peacebuilding Commission seems to be poised to play its role of coordinator of the work of all United Nations bodies.

The Non-Aligned Movement stresses that we cannot afford the luxury of repeating past mistakes: when the Security Council has attempted to impose reforms on the judicial and security sectors without prior consent of the concerned State.

The Movement believes that efforts should concentrate on resolving the root causes of conflicts. In this regard, the organs and agencies of the United Nations system need to coordinate their work to deal with issues of underdevelopment, epidemics and poverty, and the marginalization of the third world in the global economy.

In conclusion, the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirms the role of the Peacebuilding Commission and reiterates that, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the principal organs of the United Nations in relation to post-conflict peacebuilding activities, the General Assembly must play the key role in the formulation of such policies and in assessing the implementation of the relevant activities. The concerted actions of international agencies are essential in supporting the national programmes of States emerging from conflict, including reconstruction and rehabilitation and achieving economic development and social progress. The Non-Aligned Movement stresses the importance of national ownership and capacity-building in the planning and implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding activities, and these must be based on the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and on international law.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. Shinyo (Japan): We thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s open debate on this vitally important subject. My delegation highly commends the excellent preparatory work by the Government of Slovakia, in particular the holding of a series of round-table discussions and an Arria-formula meeting over the past six months, on which we have built today’s discussion, focusing on a number of specific issues that have proved to warrant close attention by the Security Council.

Security sector reform (SSR), particularly for countries emerging from conflict, provides one of the critical foundations of a State and is an essential element for the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as for rebuilding the lives of local populations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the eventual success of reconstruction and peacebuilding in a given country hinges on whether security sector reform can be implemented effectively; and, therefore, SSR should not be seen merely as one aspect of institution-building.

It is for this reason that Japan has been giving significant attention to security sector reform. My Government has been helping women and men in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor-Leste and other countries in their SSR activities.

Mr. President, we fully support your view that the objective of security sector reform is to ensure that security and justice are delivered to the State and its people, in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles of good governance and the rule of law, thereby promoting human security. This human security aspect is quite important in security sector reform. In addition to its political, technical and institutional aspects, we need to pay sufficient attention to its psychological aspect, as SSR is as much a question of winning the hearts and minds of the people. In other words, security sector reform can be achieved only if human security is ensured and if people are able to go through their daily lives with confidence and a sense of reassurance. Security institutions, therefore, must be developed with the perspectives of individuals and communities in mind, in addition to those of the State.

We fully endorse your view, Sir, that a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated approach is needed for security sector reform. Insofar as it is an important pillar of the rule of law and the democratic governance of a State, SSR should be undertaken in a comprehensive fashion. Furthermore, a wide range of outside actors have roles to play. The efforts of bilateral donors, United Nations organs, regional organizations, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations must also be adequately harmonized, while encouraging local ownership of the SSR process.

My delegation highly commends ongoing coordination efforts in the United Nations system within the framework of the inter-agency working group among the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development Programme and other players. We hope that such efforts will continue to further advance coordination on SSR, while fully utilizing existing mechanisms. When we talk about coordination, there is often the risk of narrowing our discussion to focus on building a new coordination mechanism, but we should remember that this is not what the individual men and women on the ground are hoping for. My Government recently utilized Afghanistan’s existing coordination body, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, to propose a joint effort between Japan and Germany towards reforming the Ministry of the Interior.

There is no doubt that the role of the Security Council is quite important with respect to security sector reform. For the eventual handover of security sector responsibilities from the international community to the local Government to be conducted smoothly, it is imperative, first and foremost, that the Security Council ensure that the international community’s intervention in a conflict, whenever the Council decides to authorize such intervention, is made with legitimacy. It is also important for the Security Council to see to it that sufficient consideration is given to SSR aspects at an early stage, especially during the negotiations for a peace agreement.

The mandates of peacekeeping missions in which security sector reform is an important element will be significantly enriched if the Security Council conducts dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders in the course of deliberations. It was from this perspective that my delegation stressed the importance of the Council’s communication with non-Council actors during our term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2005 and 2006.

In order to bridge the critical gap between a post-conflict situation and sustainable development, a smooth transfer of the principal local mandate from a peacekeeping operation to an integrated United Nations mission and then to a United Nations country team is essential. In this connection, it will be useful to closely coordinate the exit strategy of a peacekeeping operation or an integrated mission, both of which come within the Security Council’s purview, with the longer-term integrated peacebuilding strategy that the Peacebuilding Commission has just begun formulating. In this process, substantive progress in SSR provides a nexus between the peacekeeping phase and the peacebuilding phase. Effective collaboration between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission will therefore be important.

In conclusion, we need to build on today’s discussion and continue our efforts to make a difference on the ground. In our follow-up efforts, we must ensure a coherent approach within the United Nations system, so as to make the most of available financial resources. We must also continue to respect and promote the post-conflict countries’ sense of ownership. From these viewpoints, Japan fully supports the draft presidential statement, which refers to a report of the Secretary-General on this important subject.
The President: I give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Mr. Mayoral (Argentina) (spoke in Spanish): I should like first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on having convened, in such a timely manner, this open debate on a very important issue.

There is general agreement within the international community about the relevance of security sector reform — in its widest meaning — in countries emerging from conflict. That is a key factor in facilitating the transition from the establishment and maintenance of peace to the reconstruction and consolidation of institutions necessary for sustainable development.

Security sector reform is closely related to, and must be coordinated with, other priorities in the area of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, such as reforming the justice system, promoting the rule of law and ensuring respect for and the defence of human rights.

The United Nations system — through its various organs, departments, agencies, funds and programmes — is involved in and committed to many activities relating to security sector reform, in particular through peace operations and development programmes. In that context, we believe that it is important to have a broad, comprehensive strategy that covers all aspects of the security sector — one that can act as a useful tool for all United Nations institutions that work in related areas and that can be integrated into recovery programmes drawn up by the Peacebuilding Commission.

Participation in security sector reform by the country concerned is essential, since this is one of the most sensitive sectors of any State. Any reform programme or strategy must therefore be drawn up and carried out in coordination with local authorities. As my delegation stated here in the Council on 31 January during the open debate on peacebuilding (see S/PV.5627), the active participation of Governments and local representatives in the entire reform process allows for the better identification of priorities when a strategy is being drawn up. Furthermore, due commitment at the outset ensures long-term implementation.

Given that security sector reform is a long-term process, it is appropriate to recall the key responsibility of the Security Council at the beginning of the process — that is, when the mandate of a peace operation is established. That is when the immediate priorities need to be identified and provision made in the mandate for them to be addressed — initially by the peacekeeping operation itself. In that way, the foundations of the reform and restructuring of the security sector can be laid during the peace operation.

Later, in the period following the transition towards final institutional reconstruction, the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in continuing the reform will be fundamental, promoting international assistance and working together with local authorities. Thus there should be continuous coordination between the Commission and the Council throughout the entire security sector reform process, so that they can work together in an integrated manner.

My delegation agrees that there is a need to promote the creation, within the United Nations system, of a broad, comprehensive strategy that covers all aspects of the security sector, based on lessons learned and best practices, so as to ensure the necessary capacity to support security sector reform programmes undertaken in countries that are emerging from conflict.

Finally, we support the draft presidential statement to be adopted later.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. McNee (Canada): Thank you, Mr. President, for having organized today’s debate on security sector reform and for the strong leadership that Slovakia has shown on this important issue. Canada believes that that this cross-cutting issue, which today forms such a significant part of United Nations field operations, would benefit from a more comprehensive and coherent policy approach. We applaud the Council’s initiative in launching that effort through a formal open debate.

An effective, legitimate and accountable security sector is a prerequisite for surviving the fragile post-conflict period and building sustainable peace. A badly managed security sector, by contrast, inhibits development, discourages investment and increases the risk of a relapse into violent conflict.

Building a well-managed security sector requires not only military and police reforms, but also the construction of an impartial and accessible judicial and
corrections sector. To be sustainable, these reforms must be based on transparency, gender equality, civilian protection, democratic norms and respect for human rights. Security sector reform (SSR) is a long-term investment — one that must figure prominently in any peace operations mandate, as well as in longer-term peacebuilding strategies.

As with many thematic issues before the Security Council, SSR is not an abstract concept, but one with direct operational implications for Council-authorized missions. The Council’s responsibility for integrating the reform of basic security sector apparatus in its peace support missions is well established. However, while recent resolutions pertaining to integrated mission mandates have all, to some measure, included SSR-related provisions, there are still significant discrepancies. For the most part, the mandates approved by this body recognize the importance of military and police reform as the cornerstone of effective security sector reform. However, other equally critical and complementary elements of security sector reform, notably justice and corrections, are not consistently addressed. In addition, there are few mission mandates that make specific mention of governance-related SSR activities designed to strengthen the capacity for civilian control and accountability or the mainstreaming of gender equality within SSR.

Systematic undertreatment and underfunding of longer-term elements of SSR, such as judicial and governance reform, can have catastrophic results. It makes little sense to reform the military if governance structures are insufficiently robust to sustain control over the armed forces. Similarly, the professionalization of the police sector is a wasted effort if the judicial sector cannot process cases in a timely and legitimate manner.

The cost of such errors is measured not only in dollars, but also in the untold misery of ordinary people. Nowhere has this tragic myopia been in greater evidence than in Haiti, where insufficient attention to security sector reform has contributed to the repeated cycle of violence, corruption and insecurity that have necessitated the approval of no less than five new missions over the past 15 years.

That is not to suggest that SSR is the sole responsibility of the Security Council. Rather, the Council’s early engagement must address — and finance — all relevant parts of the security and justice sector in tandem if these reforms are to stand the test of time. Canada therefore urges the Council to systematically include all elements of security sector reform in integrated mission mandates, including justice reform and oversight bodies. Further, when authorizing integrated missions, the Council and the Secretary-General must ensure a coherent link between mandates and resources.

The upcoming renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Assistance in Afghanistan (UNAMA) affords an invaluable opportunity to translate this understanding into concrete action. Canada urges the Council to ensure that UNAMA is allocated the requisite resources to support comprehensive SSR across Afghanistan, including in the more volatile provinces and regions of the country.

While the Council bears particular responsibility for SSR in the immediate aftermath of conflict, long-term success demands efforts which bring to bear the capabilities of a much wider community of actors. Most important, it must include the commitment and engagement of local authorities.

We are gratified to note that the Peacebuilding Commission affirmed that nationally led SSR should form a key element of the peacebuilding strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone. Canada urges the Council to work closely with the Peacebuilding Commission to ensure that SSR efforts in the field successfully straddle the transition from peace operations to long-term peacebuilding missions.

Canada believes that the United Nations would benefit from a shared understanding of what is entailed in SSR and from a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities within the United Nations system.

(spoke in French)

Canada therefore welcomes today’s decision to request a report by the Secretary-General. We hope that the report will, inter alia, include recommendations on the following matters: how to improve coordination and implementation of SSR in the field; the advisability of establishing an internal coordinating mechanism and, if so, how to link its work to that of the Peacebuilding Support Office; and best practices for coordinating the transition from short-term to long-term SSR efforts.
Transparent, just and accessible security institutions are not a luxury; they are the fundamental guarantors of security for individuals and the best defence against renewed violence and instability. Only concrete steps and a willingness to make flexible and pragmatic use of all available levers will enable us to meet our responsibility to the vulnerable.

In this regard, let me conclude by drawing the Council’s attention to the deteriorating situation in Guinea, where poor governance and inadequate civilian control over security forces have contributed to a mounting crisis. We urge the Council to place the situation in Guinea on its agenda for immediate consideration, and for the Secretary-General to consider deploying an envoy on an expedited basis to explore options for a negotiated solution, before the situation on the ground worsens.

Once again, let me assure the Security Council that Canada will continue to devote resources to security sector reform. The Council can count on Canada’s support as it works to build a more coherent and comprehensive approach to security sector reform.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) *(spoke in Arabic)*: The delegation of Egypt, Sir, welcomes your presidency of the Security Council for this month and welcomes your initiative to organize this open debate. Such open debates are among the ways to strengthen and deepen the understanding and coordination between the Council and the general membership on issues that fall within the Council’s purview. However, it is incumbent upon us to start by assessing whether or not these open debates have achieved their purposes.

Once again, let me assure the Security Council that Canada will continue to devote resources to security sector reform. The Council can count on Canada’s support as it works to build a more coherent and comprehensive approach to security sector reform.

The Egyptian delegation expresses its support for the statement made earlier by the representative of Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

We must admit frankly that some of these open debates have indeed contributed to strengthening the overall understanding between the Council and the general membership regarding critical issues relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. But the great majority have gone beyond that domain and have aimed at reinforcing and entrenching the Security Council’s unusual and wilful encroachment on issues that, under the Charter, lie primarily among the prerogatives of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council — in clear disregard of repeated calls by Member States to put an end this grave phenomenon.

The Security Council’s involvement in issues of human rights, women, crime, HIV/AIDS and so forth, and its reported attempts to address economic and environmental issues cause serious concern among the general membership of the Organization. This shows clearly that the Security Council needs genuine reform of its working methods and an increase in its membership in order to become more democratic and more representative of the interests of all Member States.

Today’s debate falls into that grey area, which the Security Council is attempting to exploit in order to strengthen its control of an issue that — as document S/2007/72 indicates — falls primarily within the prerogatives of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Discussing the issue of security sector reform represents a continuation of the debates that took place in the Security Council and the General Assembly on the role of the Peacebuilding Commission. However, although the Security Council has the right to discuss the activities of the Peacebuilding Commission, it is not its prerogative to look into the application dimensions of security sector reform, even in cases of States emerging from conflict, except within the context of its specific responsibility on this issue, which is limited compared to the wider responsibilities of the other principal organs of the United Nations.

At a time when the issue of security sector reform may have seen limited application by some European regional organizations and among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the attempt to indicate that there is widespread agreement on a so-called new concept is far from the reality. That is especially true considering that security sector reform is linked to a number of controversial ideas on which there is also no consensus, such as the “responsibility to protect” and “human security”. These ideas seek to utilize humanitarian concepts to codify interference in the internal affairs of States without even reaching international agreement on the definition of those ideas, the scope of their application or their relationship to the sovereignty of each State over its territory.
Every effort in the field of security sector reform assumes that there are existing flaws, a matter that necessitates reaching general agreement — not in the Security Council but in the General Assembly — on justifications and on methods to assess the security situation in order to define such flaws. General agreement is also needed on the required institutional reforms and, more important, on the principle that such reforms must lie fully within national ownership when it comes to determining needs and priorities, fully supervising implementation and calling a halt to any reform at any time.

If the purpose behind proposing this new issue is to help States emerging from conflict to shoulder their responsibilities, then the issue is actually about rehabilitating security institutions, and not about reform. Such matters fall within the purview of national capacity-building. Undoubtedly, the Peacebuilding Commission is better able to marshal and direct the contributions of the international community to support the process of rehabilitating security institutions. It is also better able to coordinate the efforts exerted in this respect through the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the good offices of the Secretary-General and the donor countries and international financial institutions to deal with the concept of peacebuilding in a holistic manner, in all its political, security, economic, social and development dimensions.

In the light of the procedural and substantive difficulties that make the Security Council an unsuitable venue for discussing this new thinking from the standpoint of application, the delegation of Egypt believes that it is necessary first to hold a comprehensive debate in the General Assembly to reach consensus on the objectives of reforms and on the scope of their application. This should be deliberated in the General Assembly along with similar ideas that we failed to agree upon in the 2005 World Summit, such as “human security” and the “responsibility to protect”, within a framework that reaffirms commitment to all fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Most important among such principles are respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of States and non-interference in their internal affairs. The Secretary-General must submit all relevant reports on the issue to the General Assembly. The Security Council can then discuss its limited role in supporting the national will of States to reform their own security sectors, within the limits of the Council’s prerogatives, and only in areas affecting the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the adoption of a presidential statement by the Security Council before such a debate by the general membership of the United Nations would not send the needed positive signal.

In creating a role for the Security Council in security sector reform, as envisaged in the concept paper — to rebuild the capacity of States in ensuring security, justice and the rule of law, and to spread democracy on the national level — we must first uphold the values of democracy, equality and good governance at the international level within an integrated framework that strengthens the capacity of the principal organs of the United Nations to ensure security, justice and the rule of law — each within its own institutional competence.

As our peoples and Governments work to deepen the roots of democracy, respect for human rights and political reform, our actions must be based on the values of the societies themselves and must accord with internal measures that cannot be imposed from without. Such measures are founded on varied cultures, customs, traditions and religions, which represent the elements of human diversity, which in turn is the basis for the dialogue among civilizations and religions.

If the United Nations is to continue to play its designated role, we have a collective responsibility. That responsibility rests on a firm determination to make the Organization and its principal organs a crucible of joint international efforts to deal effectively and immediately with the regional and global issues and problems that face us, instead of attempting to deepen the encroachment of the Security Council on issues that institutionally fall within the competence of other principal organs.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. Hamburger (Netherlands): We commend Slovakia, Mr. Kubiš and you personally, Sir, for taking the initiative to put the important issue of security sector reform on the agenda of the Security Council. We appreciated our own close involvement in the preparatory seminars that Slovakia organized.
The representative of Germany has already spoken on behalf of the European Union, and we align ourselves with his statement. Let me just add a few brief points on the position of the Netherlands, while trying to stay within the set time limit by shortening my written text as distributed.

First, the phrase “no development without security and no security without development” applies to all countries, developing and developed alike.

Second, the security of people — and not only the security of States — is a precondition for development.

Third, in our view, security sector reform is not only essential in countries emerging from conflict; it should also play a crucial role in conflict prevention and should therefore be part of any peace negotiations.

Fourth, we recognize that security sector reform is a sensitive issue. It is not only about the effectiveness of security forces, but also about accountability for power and democratic control. It has to be part of a domestic framework of checks and balances.

Fifth, since security sector reform deals with so many actors — police, defence and intelligence services, security management and oversight bodies, justice institutions, customs and border control agencies and, not least, non-governmental bodies and local groups — a comprehensive approach is required. Stakeholders cannot be left out.

Sixth, security sector reform is clearly not only about training security services, or about bringing in equipment, or about building courts, but even more so about developing governance structures and democratic processes.

Seventh, security sector reform must be a nationally owned process, embedded in a tailor-made and integrated national development framework. International support will often be necessary, but the modalities of such support should not be imposed and should be carefully discussed with national stakeholders.

Eighth, we welcome the Security Council’s request to the Secretary-General to submit a report on United Nations-wide approaches to security sector reform. The concept of integrated United Nations missions, as we see for instance in Burundi and Sierra Leone, could provide good examples, including through the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in fostering such a joint approach. The Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office can, in our view, be instrumental in gathering relevant players around the table and in creating coherence between security and development strategies.

For my ninth point, finally, I would like to comment on international financial support for security sector reform. The possibility of such support will depend to a large extent on the availability of funds not part of official development assistance (ODA). However, non-ODA funds are usually scarce among donor countries. The Netherlands has developed specific mechanisms for pooled funding for the nexus of security and development. We believe that that is an issue for further discussion among those concerned, and we would be happy to share our experiences.

In conclusion, this debate shows that there is momentum for a more focused and coherent approach to security sector reform, in which the United Nations has a key role to play. The Netherlands supports that approach.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of Honduras.

Mr. Romero-Martínez (Honduras) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to thank you warmly, Sir, for the initiative to convene an open debate on such an important issue early this year, 2007. Your initiative, and the concept document prepared for the debate (S/2007/72, annex) reflect an intelligent effort. We believe they merit public recognition and are a useful basis for our debate. The concept paper is a significant theoretical and philosophical contribution to our discussion and promotes dialogue on security and on the role of the Council in that area. It is a holistic vision of the quest for security, which involves the internal security of our States in guaranteeing international peace and security.

From reading the document, and on the basis of our national experience, we can see that implementing the process will require a great deal of national determination. The United Nations system is an important factor in building such determination, and we are certain that, together, it will be possible to reach the objective we seek in the long-term. Honduras believes that national strategies should be coherent, precise and in full compliance with national and
international law; in particular, they should be human-centred.

Inter-institutional cooperation at the national level has a principal role to play. It is therefore important that there be a genuine and practical interaction between the justice system, the defence and national security machinery and, especially, the role played by the State through, in our case, its executive, legislative and judicial branches.

In our view, citizens in the broader sense of the word — including civil society and many other national institutions that are concerned with issues of national welfare — should participate actively in the process.

In that context, we have always pointed to the need to achieve, as soon as possible, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and above all, an international commitment to achieve the proper balance between peace and development, which will enable us to make sure progress towards overcoming obstacles and ensuring respect for human dignity.

We fully agree with the concept document that consensus must be reached as soon as possible on a concept of security sector reform. To that end, we respectfully suggest that a broader debate be held in the General Assembly to share ideas and exchange experiences and, in particular, as a way to achieve consensus, with the ultimate goal of establishing a comprehensive strategy in which everyone participates.

We believe that the Economic and Social Council should carry out its own exercise in that regard, in consultation with all organs of the system, such as the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. As a result of such sectoral debates, we could perhaps define a universal response.

I wish to congratulate the Secretary-General on the launching of the Counter-Terrorism Online Handbook (www.un.org/terrorism/cthandbook) on 16 February. That initiative, in our view, is in keeping with what we are discussing here today: providing Member States with mechanisms for coordination, training and consultation and for sharing their national experiences — mechanisms that can enable them to undertake better-coordinated action with the Organization.

Initiatives such as those that we are discussing today should be undertaken at the national and subregional levels on every continent. That would contribute greatly to a universal culture of peace. The delegation of my country, Honduras, reaffirms its commitment to contribute. We are prepared to lend our full cooperation in the development of this process.

Our peoples are waiting for concrete responses to many of their daily worries. Employment, education, anti-corruption efforts, housing, health, security, peace, poverty eradication and, above all, the defence of human rights are among the many issues to which we committed ourselves in the 2005 Outcome Document (General Assembly resolution 60/1) and the Millennium Declaration (General Assembly resolution 55/2). Those realities and aspirations, in addition to being reflected in these important official documents, are profoundly reflected in every hopeful look of a child, every sigh of an elderly person and the heart of every tormented human being. We cannot disappoint them.

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The President: I now call on the representative of Australia.

Mr. Hill (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President, for this initiative to hold a debate on security sector reform. I will speak on the basis of the written text that is being distributed on behalf of Australia.

In terms of peace and security, development and human rights, the security sector of any individual State plays an important role — for the better or for the worse. It is logical, therefore, that bilateral friends, regional partners and the United Nations all have an interest in the security sector of any State with which they might be engaged.

Not surprisingly, the United Nations has focused in particular on States in conflict or coming out of conflict and on the way in which an appropriately structured, led and motivated security sector can contribute to peace and security. It is heartening that the United Nations, through the Peacebuilding Commission and in other ways, is placing new emphasis on sustainable peace and is recognizing how important the security sector is in that regard.

I want to say today that, just as the line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is imprecise, so is the point at which a State is at risk of internal conflict or instability. It is therefore equally logical that attention should be given to States at risk, recognizing that an
inappropriate security sector is in itself a threat to internal stability.

This is not always an easy area for the United Nations. I believe that that was the point that the representative of Egypt was making a little while ago. Sometimes, it is easier for a bilateral friend to help, but the lessons learned and the best practices identified from United Nations experiences are equally useful. It is important that those experiences be documented and communicated.

Whether before conflict or not, it is equally important that the goal be to help the State concerned build an appropriate security sector, not to impose a solution. National ownership is important to long-term sustainability. But, whether through the Secretary-General’s good-offices role or through the support of regional partners, the identification of risks and constructive efforts to assist can reduce the chance that the State will slip into conflict.

The value of early identification and response is what I want to emphasize. I will cite two examples from Australia’s relatively recent experience. Some years ago, the Government of Papua New Guinea, after some worrying experiences, decided that its armed forces were too large to sustain, that there were logjams in promotions and recruitment, and that equipment and support were inadequate to maintain morale. They approached Australia for help. A programme aimed at restructuring the Papua New Guinea Defence Force was jointly agreed between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Australia has contributed significantly to that programme, both financially and in other ways. Implementation has been challenging but remains important, and we continue to be engaged.

Secondly, some years ago, the Government of Solomon Islands approached Australia, saying that its police force was unable, for a number of reasons, to provide law and order, and asking for help, which was provided by Australia, New Zealand and other States of the Pacific region. The Government of Solomon Islands adopted legislation to allow a regional police force to provide executive policing functions cooperatively with the Solomon Islands police. Again, that has not been an easy task, but here too we remain engaged.

The last lesson that I wanted to stress, in addition to identifying best practices, ensuring national ownership and recognizing the value of early identification and response, is that the offer of help must be ongoing. There must be a sense of partnership and long-term commitment. Obviously, the contributions that friends offer should evolve as the recipient State itself evolves. However, remaining supportive over time, through both the highs and the lows, is critically important.

The President: I now call on the representative of Guatemala.

Mr. Skinner-Klée (Guatemala) (spoke in Spanish): I wish at the outset to thank the delegation of the Slovak Republic for organizing this open debate, which enables those States that are non-members of the Council to express our views on this important issue. I also wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the lucid concept paper (S/2007/72, annex) circulated to delegations.

First, the delegation of Guatemala wishes to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Guatemala supports the idea of involving the United Nations system in formulating a concept of security sector reform. We are mindful that no agreement has yet been reached on a single or systematic approach to this issue. However, in discussing the concept, we should seek a consensus regarding the elements that constitute it, determine the contexts in which it should be implemented and identify the actors that should participate in its development.

We recall that the issue of security is only one part of the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in a conflict. In helping States to overcome the consequences and examine the underlying causes of conflict, we should be aware that there is an entire series of related issues, ranging from support for the administration of justice, the strengthening of institutions within the rule of law, and the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens to national reconciliation and rebuilding the social fabric and productive networks that make a nation’s economic life viable as it emerges from conflict.

We note that human security is inherent to that process. In accordance with paragraph 143 of the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document (resolution 60/1), the Member States have committed themselves “to discussing and defining the notion of human security”. We should not set that commitment aside; on the contrary, we must take it into account in this context. Indeed, we believe that both concepts are closely linked, and we are therefore pleased to note in the reference document (S/2007/72) that the principal objective of security sector reform is precisely to promote human security.

My delegation feels that the security sector cannot replace effective national leadership. It should be human-centred, broad, inclusive, long-term and implemented case by case. The issue is very sensitive from the perspective of national sovereignty and local traditions. If the necessary foundation for political agreement at the national and international levels does not exist, any United Nations participation will face severe obstacles to achieving success and ensuring security.

At the same time, we must ensure the greatest possible integration of capacities within the United Nations system. Responsibilities and clear competencies must be assigned with respect to various activities and effective coordination established to harmonize the efforts of the Organization with bilateral and other efforts, even with regard to the mobilization of resources.

Furthermore, as with many aspects of peacebuilding, international security sector efforts are often not coordinated or are isolated and dispersed. For one thing, bilateral donors at the United Nations and other participants follow their own objectives and do not agree on a common framework or approach. Given the competition for access to donor funds, those interested often do not announce their projects, leading to uneven distribution or an unnecessary duplication of assistance.

In that context, we note the important practical advice set out in the reference document with regard to the need to establish recommended best practices based on experience acquired in the various activities undertaken to date by different United Nations operations. We need to recognize that poverty, underdevelopment, the lack of opportunities and marginalization pose the greatest threat and challenge to security sector reform. Moreover, we believe that the component of prevention must be included to ensure a comprehensive and integrated approach to preventing violence and criminality, thereby making coercion less necessary.

We also need to stress that efforts in the security sector have generally been pushed by peace agreements, which address such issues in the context of the end of a conflict. The Guatemalan peace accords are a clear example of that, containing as they do many of the necessary tools for the complete reform of the sector, appropriately named “democratic security”.

With regard to the role played by the Security Council through its mandates to its missions in the establishment of parameters for security sector reform, we recall that this is not the only body competent to discuss the issue. We believe that any strategy developed by the United Nations must be multifaceted. However, when United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed, it is important that security aspects be appropriately integrated into a mission’s mandate and realities on the ground. One example of excellent work done by the United Nations is its security support through the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, in particular its provision of concrete support for reform of the Haitian national police.

We believe it necessary to stress that any security sector reform must include the gender perspective. Guatemala supports the full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security because of its three elements stressing the protection of human rights, the participation of women in peacekeeping operations, and the role of women in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.

With regard to the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in security sector reform, we believe that it can help national Governments to identify their needs and priorities in that field from a broad perspective, coordinating assistance from the international community.

My delegation has followed today’s debate closely, and we hope to continue to consider these ideas in the framework of the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission, in addition to the results of the work of the United Nations inter-agency working group on security sector reform.
The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. Grütter (Switzerland) (spoke in French): I would like to thank Slovakia for having organized this open debate on security sector reform, which follows up on the international workshop held in July 2006 and on two round tables organized late last year on the same subject. Having addressed the question in July 2005, the Security Council now reaffirms the importance of security sector reform both for establishing lasting peace and for consolidating peace in countries affected by crises and conflicts.

Switzerland is convinced that a shared approach of the whole United Nations system is essential when dealing with security sector reform issues during all phases of conflict. Such an approach should take into account the needs not only of peacekeeping operations, but also of long-term reconstruction and sustainable development.

My country stresses the need for broad-based and coherent coordination in this field. Particular attention must be paid to the link between the concept of security sector reform and related areas, such as the rule of law; transitional justice; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers; small arms control; and gender equality. Strengthening respect for human rights and, in general, social and economic development must also be taken into account.

Security sector reform requires an integrated and holistic approach. If security sector reform is to produce concrete results, it must encompass all aspects of security, addressing not only army and police reform, but also institutions responsible for prosecution, criminal justice and penitentiary administration.

Switzerland would also like to highlight the issue of governance, which is an integral part of security sector reform. Security sector reform is essentially shaped by political considerations. Its activities do not amount merely to providing technical assistance to governmental players in the field of security; it is also imperative that they be subject to principles of good governance and democracy.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, an international foundation established and co-financed by Switzerland, has solid experience in the field of SSR in general and of parliamentary oversight of the security sector in particular. Switzerland is convinced that the Centre could be a partner of choice for the United Nations.

The challenges are particularly great for countries in the post-conflict phase. Security sector reform programmes must contribute to overcoming the specific legacies of an armed conflict — such as the proliferation of small arms, anti-personnel landmines, the presence of former combatants and unpunished war crimes. In that regard, Switzerland would like to stress the crucial importance of the involvement of non-State actors — armed and civil society players — in SSR programmes.

The Security Council is contemplating requesting the Secretary-General to present a report on the United Nations approach to security sector reform. Switzerland supports the preparation of such a report, which we believe should include the following elements: the importance of ownership of the SSR process by national Governments and local players; the need for coordination among the various actors of the Organization involved in this sector; the importance of security sector reform for the consolidation of peace and development; and sustainable financing for SSR programmes.

Switzerland is convinced that security sector reform programmes that are well coordinated and carried out over the long term can contribute to world peace and stability and to poverty reduction. Switzerland looks forward to the Secretary-General’s future report and to the practical recommendations that it will contain on promoting action and progress in this field.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Choi Young-jin (Republic of Korea): Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for convening this debate on security sector reform (SSR). Today’s debate is very timely and appropriate, as the Security Council is increasingly including matters relating to SSR in the mandates it issues. My delegation is also grateful to the Mission of the Slovak Republic for the extensive and thorough preparations it has made for this meeting. We are certain that today’s debate will provide a sound basis for the Security Council to formulate its role in developing a comprehensive,
coherent and coordinated United Nations approach to security sector reform.

States emerging from conflict are invariably faced with the immense challenges of stabilization and reconstruction, often in highly volatile security environments. Those challenges can be met only in conjunction with SSR, which enables the security sector to provide the necessary security and justice, which are the preconditions for sustainable peace and development.

Recognizing that there are currently no common guidelines on the role of the United Nations in supporting SSR programmes, my delegation would like to highlight some basic principles that we believe merit serious consideration.

First, national ownership should be stressed. The principle of national sovereignty and the practical realities of SSR make national ownership of any such programme an imperative. No sector is more sensitive than national security, and no SSR effort can succeed without the participation of local security actors.

Secondly, SSR should be understood as a long-term process, particularly in States in post-conflict situations. It is thus important for the United Nations to incorporate long-term planning into SSR efforts, not least by ensuring that the necessary resources will be available over time. Short-term donor funding cycles undermine local ownership and lead to unsustainable outcomes.

Thirdly, SSR must be conceived in a comprehensive way. The various components of the security sector are interlinked, and reforms are apt to be ineffectual if they are confined to only one component. At the same time, where the recipient Government is weak, SSR must take realistic account of financial and human resource constraints. Careful planning, prioritization and sequencing are needed from the outset of any SSR effort.

Finally, SSR must be seen in the broader context of the reform and rebuilding of societies that are democratizing, emerging from conflict or otherwise in need of international assistance. The Security Council has an important role to play in establishing missions and mandates that incorporate that reality. The Council’s efforts will be strengthened through close cooperation with other relevant organizations, both within the United Nations system and in the broader international community. In particular, we hope that the Peacebuilding Commission can provide recommendations and coordination. My delegation therefore hopes that the Security Council will establish coordinating mechanisms with other bodies to ensure that assistance to societies in need is comprehensive, coherent and effective.

My delegation believes that the immediate priorities for the Security Council on SSR should include, first, determining an appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities among the various United Nations entities; secondly, determining the specific mandate and programmes of each entity in relation to SSR; and, thirdly, acquiring the necessary expertise. We hope that today’s debate will help the Council to forge a more systematic and comprehensive strategy on SSR as an integral component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Norway.

Mr. Løvald (Norway): Norway welcomes this opportunity to discuss security sector reform (SSR) in the Security Council. SSR deserves increased attention, and it is therefore important that SSR has been placed on the agenda of the Security Council. We welcome the concept paper prepared by the Slovak presidency (S/2007/72, annex). The concept paper serves as an excellent basis for today’s debate, and as an impetus for an enhanced United Nations role as regards SSR. We fully concur with the draft presidential statement to be adopted later today.

We support the formulation of a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated United Nations approach to SSR. Norway is ready to support United Nations efforts in that regard. We appreciate that the United Nations has already done a lot of work out in the field, albeit not always under the heading of SSR. The United Nations has important practical experiences to be drawn upon when formulating an overarching approach.

Norway would like to underline the importance of coordination with ongoing work on this subject taking place in other international and regional organizations. For several years, Norway has contributed to security sector reform in the Western Balkans, both bilaterally and in cooperation with various other actors, including NATO. I would also like to mention the work of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), especially regarding efforts to define the concept. Agreement on a definition is key to future cooperation and coordination of efforts in this vitally important field. The OECD defines the security system as encompassing the armed forces, civil police, the judicial and prison system, and the civil authorities responsible for controlling those groups, including ministries and parliaments. Reform of those sectors is vital to ensure sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, as well as in countries in transition from one-party rule to democracy.

The complex realities facing modern-day crisis management operations require multidimensional responses. Civilian aspects of international crisis management are increasingly regarded as integral parts of crisis management operations. SSR is an element of crucial importance if we are to achieve sustainable peace and viable democracies. If there is a fundamental lack of trust in the institutions that should uphold the principles of rule of law and respect for human rights, there will hardly be any progress in a post-conflict situation.

Norway has responded to the increasing demand for civilian crisis response capabilities by systematically pooling experts within priority areas. We have pools of police, legal and defence experts, as well as advisers on democracy-building and human rights. Our experts are deployed in international operations and to bilateral SSR projects.

Norway actively seeks to integrate gender awareness into security sector reform, as well as into all other activities of the United Nations. Mandates for peace operations should specify how the various measures affect both women and men. We have adopted a national plan of action for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security.

Security sector reform is also on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. In the case of Burundi, for example, SSR has indeed been identified as a critical area. Development and security are strongly related, both in the short and the long term. Without timely security sector reform, extensive peacebuilding and appropriate reintegration of fighters, countries may fall back into violent chaos. That would destroy any hope of rapid development.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of Afghanistan.

Mr. Tanin (Afghanistan): At the outset, Sir, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February and to wish you every success in guiding the work of the Council to a successful conclusion. We wish also to express our appreciation to your delegation for initiating today’s debate, which is aimed at developing a comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to security sector reform.

My delegation attaches great importance to the concept of security sector reform, as it constitutes one of the key elements in the restoration of peace, stability and normalcy in post-conflict settings. We therefore note with satisfaction the increased level of awareness among the general membership of the United Nations and the international community at large on security sector reform.

As a country emerging from more than two decades of armed conflict, Afghanistan is well aware of the importance of security sector reform in ensuring security, recovery and development, as well as in improving human rights and the rule of law in post-conflict countries.

Security sector reform has served as the linchpin of the entire State-building process in Afghanistan. That process has also been the flagship of the international engagement in rebuilding Afghanistan’s security forces and law enforcement agencies. The security sector reform process in Afghanistan has consisted of five pillars, each supported by a lead country in the following areas: military reform, police reform, counter-narcotics, judicial reform and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

The DDR process, launched in October 2003, marked the beginning of the security sector reform process in Afghanistan. In accordance with the programme’s mandate, more than 60,000 former combatants were disarmed and demobilized, with a view to creating an environment conducive to the implementation of security sector reform and the reconstruction process in the country. As the second phase of our reform process, we embarked upon the disbandment of illegal armed groups, which is aimed at disarming military units not registered with the Ministry of Defence. We remain committed to
concluding this process by the end of 2007, with the support of our international partners.

Security sector reform has not only facilitated improvements in the security environment; it has also served as a precondition for the formation of our national army and police. Over 35,000 soldiers of the national army and 62,000 officers of the national police have been trained. Our goal is to reach the target strength of a 70,000-strong standing army and a 82,000-strong police force by the end of 2008. Moreover, additional reforms in the Ministries of Defence and the Interior have constituted the main components of the security sector reform process in Afghanistan. In this regard, a number of steps have been taken to implement institutional and personnel reforms to achieve greater professionalism and to ensure adherence to democratic principles such as accountability, transparency and respect for human rights.

Despite our progress, we continue to face significant challenges in strengthening the capacity of our security institutions. The lack of resources and modern equipment and the low salaries of soldiers have had a drastic impact on the effectiveness of both the national army and the police to address the prevailing security challenges in the country. We are thus of the firm conviction that a sustained level of international engagement in building the capacity of security institutions in post-conflict countries should constitute an essential component of a successful security sector reform process.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the unwavering support of the international community and of donor countries in assisting the process of reforming our security institutions. In this regard, we welcome the recent announcement made by the United States of America that it will increase its assistance to enhancing the effectiveness and capacity of our national army and police. Moreover, we stress the importance of additional international assistance for the implementation of our national drug control strategy and the reform of our judiciary.

Security sector reform is a long-term process that requires a favourable atmosphere for its implementation. Our experience in security sector reform has been particularly challenging, given the prevailing security environment in the country. Continued terrorist attacks conducted by groups whose sanctuaries are located outside Afghanistan, and the nexus between insecurity and the narcotics trade, represent the main challenges to a successful security sector reform process in Afghanistan. In this connection, I would like to acknowledge the pivotal role of the international coalition and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in creating conditions conducive to the implementation of security sector reform, as well as to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

On the basis of our experience and lessons learned, we would like to refer briefly to some of the issues contained in the concept paper distributed by the presidency as an annex to document S/2007/72.

First, we must be aware of the fact that security sector reform is an endeavour that will be achieved over many years. There is no quick-fix solution. Reform of the security sector is not just about disarming former combatants or training and equipping a new army; rather, it is a long-term process that requires a particular focus on development. The objective should be to transform former combatants back into civilians. In this regard, it will be of paramount importance to facilitate the provision of long-term income-generating projects. Doing so will prevent former combatants from resorting to illegal activities.

Secondly, we are of the view that national ownership is an essential component of a successful and sustainable security sector reform process. In the case of Afghanistan, security sector reform is increasingly based on consensus among all segments of Afghan society. Indeed, without the lead role and cooperation of the country concerned, efforts to achieve a successful reform process will risk failure.

Thirdly, we stress the need for enhanced coordination between the relevant organs and agencies of the United Nations and other international actors with a view to achieving a comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to security sector reform. In this respect, my delegation would welcome the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General covering existing United Nations-related activities on security sector reform and including a concrete set of recommendations for future action. Equally important is the need to ensure greater coordination among donor
countries and the country concerned in coping with the challenge of building national capacity.

Finally, we believe that security sector reform should be addressed as part of an overall strategy to ensure lasting peace and stability in countries emerging from conflict. Equal attention must be accorded to building and strengthening State institutions and to enhancing the rule of law and good governance if we are to achieve a successful transition from conflict to peace in post-conflict countries.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of Uruguay.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (spoke in Spanish): Our delegation too would like to express its appreciation to you, Mr. President, and to the Slovak Republic, for the initiative to hold an open debate in the Security Council on security sector reform — an issue that the Council has already identified as key to any stabilization process in post-conflict situations, recognizing the need for the United Nations to outline more coherent strategies in this regard.

I would like to make some general comments regarding how the delegation of Uruguay approaches this issue. The traditional concept of security, understood as the protection of the State from external threats, is losing its relevance and giving way to a new concept of security that puts people, together with human rights and development, at the centre of its concerns. This new concept of security is closely connected to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Security sector reform is an essential element in the promotion of greater democratic civilian control over defence and security with a view to improving the efficacy of security institutions. We should not forget that the security sector has particular characteristics because of the important role that could be played by the potential use of force. Given that security sector reform affects institutions that protect State sovereignty, such reform will not be viable unless there is agreement, ownership, cooperation and the full participation of the State carrying it out.

Security sector reform is a process, not an end in itself. Experience shows that the tendency of some donors and institutions has been to follow the security model of Western democracies, without taking into account the specific characteristics of each country in need of security reform. Attempting to apply a single security model to societies that are undergoing transition and dealing with economic and political limitations — societies whose institutions are weak or non-existent or in which armed conflict may even be continuing — amounts to resorting to general formulas without acknowledging the complexities and particularities of each case.

The vast majority of international security sector reform initiatives focus on developing countries, especially those emerging from civil conflict. However, we should be aware that such reforms are just as relevant for developed countries. We need only consider the cases of police brutality in some of those countries, selective police searches on the basis of racial criteria and the general lack of measures to prevent or respond to violence against women, as well as the high levels of military expenditure.

The gender perspective must be taken into account in any security sector reform strategy. Resolution 1325 (2000) urges us to incorporate a gender perspective into all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. That could yield an effective response to gender-related threats, especially violence against women, and, in particular, could compensate for the underrepresentation of women in decision-making within the security sector.

I would like to make several concrete suggestions. My delegation believes that the United Nations should agree on a common approach to security sector reform. In this context, we believe that the request made in March 2006 by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary-General is relevant. In paragraph 123 of its report contained in document A/60/19, the Special Committee requested the Secretariat “to conduct a ... process of joint policymaking on security sector reform best practices bearing in mind the distinctive competencies of the United Nations, and those of other partners, and recognizing the linkages with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.”

Security sector reform policies should be an integral and sustained component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies. With regard to peacekeeping strategies, our delegation welcomes the Security Council’s increased inclination to include in peace mission mandates responsibilities relating to human rights, the police and judicial, legal and correctional
systems. However, it would be useful to know what concrete results have been attained so far in security sector reform in countries emerging from conflict.

It would be very helpful for the Council to have such information, especially when the time comes to renew peacekeeping mandates. It would also help the Council to focus on formulating policies aimed at correcting errors made in implementation and at strengthening those areas of security reform that a country’s specific situation requires.

With regard to peacebuilding activities, our delegation welcomes the fact that security sector reform has been included in the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Offices in Burundi and in Sierra Leone. It would be interesting to know the experiences and results in both countries in drawing up and implementing such policies so that the Peacebuilding Commission, in close cooperation with the Security Council and the Integrated Offices, can follow up on those policies.

Last but not least, international cooperation is indispensable for promoting and implementing activities linked to security sector reform. For example, Uruguay has developed a cooperation and assistance project for Haiti in the area of the consolidation of democracy. Through that project, my country hopes to be able to make a contribution in the area of elections, helping to strengthen Haiti’s institutions and to promote democratic training through programmes in civics education and citizen participation.

The President: I give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

Mr. Mohamad (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): Our delegation is pleased to see you, Sir, presiding over this important meeting of the Security Council. This is a clear reflection of your country’s firm commitment to the activities and programmes of the United Nations. I wish at the outset to say, Sir, that your country’s presidency has been marked by a spirit of purposeful initiative, as reflected in the concept paper (S/2007/72, annex) that you kindly distributed to Member States on security sector reform (SSR), which is a central element of the maintenance of international peace and security.

I should like also to pay tribute to you for reaching out to my country and working to restore peace there — even before you assumed the Council presidency. My tribute is particularly heartfelt because, through political will and persistence, my country put an end to one of the longest-standing conflicts in Africa by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005 with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) — in addition to signing the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. We are making every effort to convince all parties that have not yet signed the latter agreement to do so as soon as possible so that the peace process in the Sudan can be completed.

We are grateful for the assistance we receive from Mr. Jan Eliasson, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and from Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union. They have the full support of my Government. The Government of the Sudan is playing its part in efforts to speedily achieve success in the security sector. Here, let me share some information with members of the Council. The President of the Sudan today led a high-level delegation to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the context of peaceful dialogue with non-signatories to the Abuja Agreement, with a view to successfully completing the peace process in the Sudan.

Any discussion of security sector reform should, first and foremost, be undertaken within a clear frame of reference and should be based in particular on the purposes and principles of the Charter, including: respect for State sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity; respect for the national choices made by countries and for their economic and social systems; and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. In discussing reform in this sphere, we should not focus immediately on the military, security and judiciary sectors: security is an indivisible whole. Everybody agrees that security is a comprehensive system that can endure only with the support of all of its pillars: sustainable development; poverty alleviation; support for the economies of countries emerging from conflict; and bridging the digital divide through exchanges of information and know-how and through technology transfers between developed and developing countries. Only with all of those factors can we attain the political, economic and social stability that is needed to establish institutions of good governance, with executive and legislative branches, and to ensure the rule of law, respect for justice and human rights, and gender equality.
As you, Mr. President, say in your concept paper, “SSR is context-specific” (S/2007/72, annex, para. 8). I entirely agree. Indeed, the kind of support a country can provide to security sector reform depends on the situation in the country concerned and on the nature of its urgent needs. The highest priority of a country barely emerging from conflict is to achieve peace through speedy implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes so as to avoid relapsing into war. The priorities are different in a country that has passed through that stage and is experiencing democratic stability, whose institutions are nearly fully established and which is aspiring to the establishment of the full range of security and oversight bodies and judiciary institutions. Hence, SSR cannot be a one-size-fits-all enterprise: needs and priorities vary from case to case.

Security sector reform is never an immediate process that will bear fruit in the short term. Rather, it is a gradual, phased process. Hence, the only guarantee of its viability is the implementation of such reform by the national institutions of the country concerned, in accordance with the principle of respect for State sovereignty and legitimacy. That is especially true because such reform focuses on sensitive sovereign institutions; this requires unequivocal national ownership of the implementation of reforms.

Security sector reform should be the subject of an in-depth and transparent study, to be carried out by all Member States. Carrying out such a study should not prejudice the other principal organs of the United Nations with a stake in this matter: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other relevant bodies. Nor should it fuel the impression that the Security Council is increasingly interfering in legislative matters that fall within the mandates of other United Nations bodies. Reform of the Security Council itself exemplifies the kind of reform that all Member States seek for United Nations institutions in general.

I wish to conclude by reiterating our appreciation to you, Sir, for your meaningful initiative and for your valuable ideas, which provide a substantive framework for the Council’s consideration of this item.

The President: Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

“The Security Council recalls the statement by its President of 12 July 2005, in which it emphasizes that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilization and reconstruction process in post-conflict environments.

“The Security Council stresses that reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict. In that regard, a professional, effective and accountable security sector, and accessible and impartial law-enforcement and justice sectors are equally necessary to laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development.

“The Security Council underlines that it is the sovereign right and the primary responsibility of the country concerned to determine the national approach and priorities of security sector reform. It should be a nationally-owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question. The Security Council acknowledges that strong support and assistance of the international community are important to build national capacities thereby reinforcing national ownership, which is crucial for the sustainability of the whole process. The Security Council also underlines that the United Nations has a crucial role to play in promoting comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated international support to nationally-owned security sector reform programmes, implemented with the consent of the country concerned.

“The Security Council notes that the United Nations system has made significant contributions to the re-establishment of functioning security sectors in post-conflict environments, and that an increasing number of United Nations organs, funds, programmes and agencies are engaged in one aspect or another of security sector reform support activities.
“The Security Council acknowledges the contribution that non-United Nations actors, in particular regional, subregional and other intergovernmental organizations, including international financial institutions, and bilateral donors, as well as non-governmental organizations, can bring in supporting nationally-led security sector reform programmes.

“The Security Council recognizes the need when mandating a United Nations operation to consider, as appropriate, and taking into account the concerns of the Member State and other relevant actors, the national security sector reform priorities, while laying the foundation for peace consolidation, which could, inter alia, subsequently enable timely withdrawal of international peacekeepers. The Security Council notes the importance of close interaction among different United Nations system entities, and other relevant actors, in order to ensure that security sector reform considerations are adequately covered during implementation of Security Council mandates.

“The Security Council underlines that security sector reform can be a long-term process that continues well beyond the duration of a peacekeeping operation. In that regard, the Security Council emphasizes the important role that the Peacebuilding Commission can play in ensuring continuous international support to countries emerging from conflict. The Security Council takes note of the work already carried out by the Peacebuilding Commission concerning Burundi and Sierra Leone and requests it to continue advising the Council on the issue of security sector reform in the framework of its activities related to these countries. The Security Council requests the Peacebuilding Commission to include consideration of security sector reform programmes in designing integrated peacebuilding strategies for its continued engagement with those countries, with a view to developing best practices regarding comprehensive, coherent, and nationally-owned security sector reform programmes.

“The Security Council emphasizes that security sector reform must be context-driven and that the needs will vary from situation to situation. The Security Council encourages States to formulate their security sector reform programmes in a holistic way that encompasses strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, civilian oversight and good governance. The Security Council emphasizes the need for a balanced realization of all aspects of security sector reform, including institutional capacity, affordability, and sustainability of its programmes. The Security Council recognizes the interlinkages between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilization and reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues.

“In light of the above, the Security Council acknowledges the need for a comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on United Nations approaches to security sector reform, to foster its implementation in post-conflict environments, and expresses its readiness to consider such a report within the scope of its prerogatives under the United Nations Charter. The report should identify lessons learned, core security sector reform functions that the United Nations system can perform, roles and responsibilities of United Nations system entities, and how best to coordinate United Nations support for security sector reform with national and international activities in this field, as well as interaction with regional and subregional actors.

“The Security Council expects the Secretary-General’s report to make concrete recommendations on the identification, prioritization and sequencing of United Nations support to nationally-owned security sector reform, with particular emphasis on post-conflict environments. This should include recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness and coordination of all United Nations system entities that support security sector reform.

“The Security Council invites the Secretary-General to continue to include, in his periodic reports to the Security Council on specific United Nations operations mandated by the Security Council, a section on security sector reform, in order to foster continuous interaction among different United Nations system entities, and other relevant actors, in order to ensure that security sector reform considerations are adequately covered during implementation of the mandates.
Council, whenever appropriate, recommendations related to security sector reform programmes in the countries concerned.

“The Security Council welcomes the joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa to further discuss this issue with a focus on experiences and challenges of security sector reform in Africa at a workshop to be held in the course of 2007.”

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2007/3.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.