
I. Introduction

1. In his letter dated 21 May 2003 (S/2003/558), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had decided to send a mission to Central Africa from 7 to 16 June 2003, which would be led by Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière. Following consultations among the members of the Council, it was agreed that the composition of the mission should be as follows:

   France (Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière, Head of Mission)
   Angola (Ambassador Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins)
   Bulgaria (Ambassador Stefan Tafrov)
   Cameroon (Ambassador Martin Chungong Ayafor)
   Chile (Ambassador Cristian Maquieira)
   China (Ambassador Zhang Yishan)
   Germany (Minister Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg)
   Guinea (Minister Counsellor Boubacar Diallo)
   Mexico (Minister María Angélica Arce de Jeannet)
   Pakistan (Ambassador Masood Khalid)
   Russian Federation (Ambassador Alexander Konuzin)
   Spain (Ambassador Ana María Menéndez)
   Syrian Arab Republic (Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad)
   United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ambassador Adam Thomson)

   United States of America (Ambassador John D. Negroponte)

2. The terms of reference of the mission are annexed to document S/2003/558.

3. The Security Council mission left New York on 7 June and returned on 16 June. During that period, the mission visited Pretoria, Luanda, Kinshasa, Bunia,
Bujumbura, Kigali, Dar-es-Salaam and Entebbe. The mission met with the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki; the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos; the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila; the President of Burundi, Domitien Ndayizeye; the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame; the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa; and the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. The mission also met in Pretoria with Deputy President Jacob Zuma of South Africa; in Kinshasa with the Commission nationale de suivi, the International Committee to Support the Transition, and two of the four Vice-Presidents designate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Members of the mission also met with representatives of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) (Goma) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo. The mission met in Bunia with the Commander of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) and the Ituri interim administration; in Bujumbura with senior members of the Government of Burundi; the Implementation Monitoring Committee; the Chief of the African Union mission and the Commander of the African Union Force. Some members of the mission met with local representatives of international NGOs and representatives of Burundian women’s organizations. In Pretoria, the mission met with the Chairman and two members of the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Kinshasa, Bujumbura and Kigali, the mission was briefed by the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Office in Burundi and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. In Kinshasa, the mission participated in a ceremony at MONUC headquarters to commemorate MONUC peacekeepers who had lost their lives. The mission also met, while in Kinshasa, with the Special Representative of the European Union for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello. The mission was accompanied from Luanda onwards by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Amos Namanga Ngongi, and from Bujumbura by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Berhanu Dinka.

II. Democratic Republic of the Congo

Political transition

4. One of the primary objectives of this, the fourth mission of the Security Council to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries, was to encourage the Congolese parties to put into practice, with the least possible further delay, the global and all inclusive accord on the establishment of a transitional government for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission recalled that the Security Council was committed to the creation of a strong, healthy, viable Congolese State. While the Security Council mission noted the progress made so far, members also manifested their disappointment at the slow pace of implementation. In the view of the Security Council mission, the time for war had passed and the time had come to carry out the political agreements the parties had already signed. The leadership of President Kabila himself should be fully engaged in order to prevail upon all parties to put the national ahead of the factional interest. The mission pointed out that the international community, which looked forward to contributing to the reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, would be better able to increase its support when a transitional Government was in place.
The mission noted that the date announced in its presence by the Commission nationale de suivi for the establishment of the transitional Government was 16 June, the date of its return to New York, and that the transitional Government was to be fully in place by 30 June, the anniversary of the independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Accordingly, the mission registered its expectation with all the parties concerned that a functioning transitional Congolese Government would be set up by 30 June, with a unified national army capable of the defence of its national borders and population, and a developing economy in control of the country’s natural resources.

5. The mission believes that, on the basis of agreements already reached, most of the work required to establish a transitional Government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a unified national army, has already been completed. However, the remaining steps to be taken may well prove among the most difficult.

6. The mission expects the Congolese parties to establish a functioning transitional Government by 30 June 2003, in accordance with undertakings provided to the mission during its visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Persistent fighting and outbreaks of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo**

7. The mission also made clear its deep concern at the persistent fighting that continued to afflict Bunia and North and South Kivu, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. This fighting was not only inconsistent with the quest for a political solution, it also posed the risk that political agreements might be undermined and their credibility called into question. All parties should therefore cease all hostile military activity. The mission, in its meetings and contacts, called for all parties in North Kivu to withdraw their forces to the positions previously agreed. Furthermore, the gross and widespread violations of human rights that have accompanied the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including murder, rape and the destruction of property, the large-scale displacement of civilians from their homes, the use of child soldiers, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and even the reported incidence of cannibalism, were cause for extreme dismay and should be stopped forthwith. It was also noted that these problems were exacerbated by influence from neighbouring countries.

8. Among the proposals mentioned in this context included a possible agreement on a declaration of good neighbourliness, which might subsequently be formalized as a treaty. The organization of the eventual international conference on the Great Lakes Region should be seen in this context. The mission expected that the Security Council would be kept informed of developments in respect of this important conference.

9. The mission took note of the preparatory steps taken in connection with the international conference on the Great Lakes Region. The mission felt that, if properly conceived, the international conference could help to address and resolve the long-term peace and security issues, following the necessary progress of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. The region’s ownership of the process would be important to ensure its success.
Situation at Bunia

10. The mission spent 12 June visiting Bunia and consulting there with representatives of the Ituri Pacification Commission and its organs, as well as the humanitarian community. The mission was struck by the depopulation of some parts of the city, as well as the highly visible presence of child soldiers it observed in the streets as it passed. The mission is aware that it is the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) that holds and surrounds the town of Bunia and currently controls the access routes.

11. The Council Mission received briefings from the commander of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force. The mission of IEMF was to ensure the security of the sites where it was deployed, to control access to the town, to prevent movements of armed personnel in and towards the town, to project its presence, particularly through foot patrols, and to establish a rapid reaction reserve for any eventuality. The mission took note of the high level of cooperation between IEMF and the MONUC force. All the mission’s various interlocutors throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region as a whole expressed support for IEMF. The head of mission paid a tribute to the courage and dedication of the Uruguayan contingent of MONUC.

12. The mission also heard Pétronille Vaweka, President of the Special Interim Assembly, and Emmanuel Leku Apuobo, principal coordinator of the Interim Executive Organ of Ituri. The mission was impressed by the dignity and sense of commitment conveyed by these two representatives of the interim administration, which currently represents the sole source of legitimate authority in the Ituri region. They requested international contributions to reconstruction projects to help consolidate the restoration of peace. The mission, noting the actions already taken that had culminated in the deployment of MONUC and of IEMF, expressed the view that the problems of Ituri could best be resolved in the context of the broader political agreement to be reached in Kinshasa among the Congolese parties, so that Iturian issues, institutions and actors could be integrated into the national transitional political process. The mission welcomed MONUC’s intention to facilitate this. In this context, the mission heard proposals from some of its interlocutors for the creation of a criminal tribunal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

13. The mission reflected deeply on steps that might be taken to improve security for the people of Ituri in the short and medium terms. They devoted particular attention to the questions of what was likely to happen when the current mandate of IEMF expired on 1 September 2003, and what mandate and means would have to be provided to any successor force in order to safeguard the gains that had been made and prevent a relapse into violence, both in the city of Bunia and in Ituri as a whole. In this respect, some of the mission’s interlocutors pointed out that if MONUC was to take over from IEMF as from 2 September, it should be given, at least for a limited period of time, the same mandate and means as IEMF. Otherwise, MONUC would not enjoy the necessary credibility in the eyes of the local militias. What was required was a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with sufficient strength to carry it out. Some interlocutors proposed a mission of as many as 3,000 troops for the whole Ituri region. These interlocutors noted that, if this were not done, the various militias around Bunia would seize the opportunity of the departure of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force to resume their
depredations in the presence of a force they judged less capable. Furthermore, the mission’s interlocutors pointed out that while IEMF would, during the period of its deployment, provide Bunia with stability, the rest of Ituri would remain vulnerable to the activities of the various militias. The mission therefore called on those of its interlocutors in the region with influence on the armed groups and militias to exert pressure in favour of a cessation of hostilities and the restoration of calm. Mission members were careful not to make any commitments regarding the size or nature of MONUC’s future mandate, pointing out that this would be the subject of Council discussion upon return to New York.

14. The mission noted further that the return of stability in Bunia could not depend purely on a military approach. While it had been necessary to deploy IEMF as a matter of urgency to achieve the objectives set forth in resolution 1484 (2003), the deployment of military forces alone would not suffice to permit a return to stability in the medium term. A political settlement was urgently required. The parties to the conflict in Ituri must understand that it was in their interest to find a solution to their disputes within the context of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC), the only legitimate framework that included all the actors in Ituri. The return of calm to Bunia, which the deployment of IEMF made possible, should thus allow MONUC to resume and develop its indispensable political role in reinvigorating the IPC process and integrating it with the national political transition process; the mission cautioned against any attempt to disrupt that political process. The Congolese parties had to work within it, but the States of the region, which support or supported the armed groups or the militias operating in Ituri, also had responsibilities in the matter. The States of the region should take all necessary measures to end the supply of arms to militias and armed groups, and countries should use their positive influence to prevail upon the militias and armed groups to abandon the military option and participate in the political process. Some members mentioned the possibility that the Security Council might have to consider whether MONUC should have two separate mandates — on the one hand a variable mandate for Ituri and Bunia, and on the other a mandate for the rest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Security Council may wish to discuss this further.

15. While in Bunia, the mission also met representatives of humanitarian and women’s organizations and was briefed in detail on the plight of the civilian population, particularly those displaced from their homes, the blockage of humanitarian access owing to insecurity, and the gross and widespread violations of human rights against the civilian population, particularly women, children and minorities.

16. The mission found Bunia, for the moment, calm but tense. How long that relative calm can last, with the International Emergency Multinational Force still now in the process of deploying, is not known. What is clear is that the suffering population of Bunia deserves as much assistance as the international community can provide, whether to meet the immediate security need or through eventual reconstruction and development programmes, which would assist in the sustainment of stability in the long term.

17. For its part, the mission sees a clear need for the demilitarization of Bunia; for the securing of the city by an IEMF/MONUC capable of maintaining order in support of the Ituri interim administration; for control of the access roads to prevent the return of armed groups to the city, thus permitting the administration to continue
its work; for the provision of support and protection to the interim institutions established with the help of MONUC, which represent the beginnings of a democratic administration; and for the expansion, albeit gradual, into Ituri as a whole of the authority of the interim administration in secure conditions. Wider secure humanitarian access, the safe return home of those who have been displaced, the energetic follow-up of allegations of serious crimes and human rights violations, and the widening of humanitarian access to populations at risk are also required.

18. The mission was also made aware of persistent allegations of the continued supply of arms to the belligerents by outside parties, including foreign parties, and was presented with proposals on possible measures to verify and cut off that supply. In particular, the mission discussed with its interlocutors the possibility of imposing an arms embargo on Ituri, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 27 May 2003. Many of the mission’s interlocutors expressed support for this approach, and some stressed that in order to be effective an embargo should be enforced and monitored.

Military situation in North Kivu

19. The mission was informed while in Kinshasa that RCD (Goma) forces had taken the town of Kanyabayonga, in North Kivu, just as the mission was seeking to convince the Congolese parties in Kinshasa to devote themselves to the political transition process. The offensive launched by RCD (Goma) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo thus represents not only a violation of the agreements but also a threat to the pursuit of the political process, and the mission vigorously condemns it. Members of the mission who met with RCD (Goma) representatives in Kinshasa demanded that it cease hostilities forthwith and withdraw its forces to the positions earlier agreed. The mission also expressed its full support for the efforts of Special Representative Ngongi to meet with representatives of RCD (Goma), the Government and RCD (K/ML) to conclude an agreement on mutual disengagement and local confidence-building measures.

20. The military offensives conducted by RCD (Goma) in North and South Kivu are particularly damaging to MONUC’s voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation operations, many of which have been disrupted by military activity. Members of the mission drew the particular attention of RCD (Goma) representatives, and subsequently of the Rwandan Government, to their views on these disruptions, which seemed to go far beyond coincidence. While the deployment of the MONUC task force based at Kindu will help improve the situation considerably, the creation of a climate of security and confidence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, without which voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation cannot succeed, is primarily the responsibility of the parties concerned, especially the de facto local authorities that control the areas in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation is to be carried out. It is they who will be held accountable for any failure to proceed rapidly with disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation. MONUC discussed with the mission measures it might take to give voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation the best chance of success.
The end of impunity

21. The mission stressed to all its interlocutors that impunity would no longer be tolerated, and that those responsible for crimes should expect to be held accountable for them. This responsibility was considered to extend to the leaders of armed factions guilty of serious crimes.

22. The mission deplores the impunity that characterizes much of the fighting and the accompanying human rights abuses and humanitarian crises in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The murder and mass rape of unarmed civilians, the destruction and looting of property, the expulsion of families from their homes and the use of child soldiers are very grave crimes and those responsible should be held accountable. The mission is aware of well documented cases, and has appealed for more specific information and eyewitness testimony, that it intends to follow up. Impunity can no longer be tolerated. The mission made its position clear to the leaders of all Congolese parties and neighbouring countries during its visit. The mission considers leaders responsible for the acts of their followers, particularly when the parties concerned are the de facto local authorities and where the mission is aware of no evidence of any action taken by those authorities to prevent or punish the crimes in question.

Recommendations

23. The recommendations made by the mission to the Security Council are informed not only by its visit to the countries of the region but also by the second special report of the Secretary-General of 27 May 2003 (S/2003/566). As noted above, however, the mission chose to concentrate its attention on the following important questions requiring urgent attention: the installation of the transitional Government and the creation of a unified national army; the situation in Bunia; the situation in North Kivu; the need for the countries of the region to exert a positive influence on the situation; and the end of impunity. The mission will therefore confine its specific recommendations to those matters.

24. The mission recommends that the Security Council be prepared to pledge its full support to the transitional Government to be established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by 30 June 2003; that the Council be prepared to call on bilateral and multilateral donors to render all possible assistance in the reconstruction of the country, including in the development of a capable unified armed forces and police service, and to promote its further development by all possible means and on an urgent basis.

25. The mission further judges that the installation of the Congolese transitional Government and the successful conclusion of a ceasefire in Burundi could clear the way for the possible convening of an international conference on the Great Lakes Region, whose objective should be carefully defined and well prepared.

26. The mission is deeply concerned, not only by the present situation in Bunia but also by the possibility of further fighting, humanitarian catastrophe and human rights violations after the current emergency measures expire on 1 September. The present calm is fragile. The severe logistical constraints on any international force, combined with the widespread tendency to lawlessness and violence, against a background of reports of the supply of arms from outside sources, must be taken carefully into account when the Security Council decides on measures aimed at
consolidating and restoring the peace of Bunia and taking forward the Ituri political process, particularly taking into account the eventual withdrawal of the International Emergency Multinational Force.

27. The mission recommends to the Security Council that it increase pressure on the parties, both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and throughout the region, to ensure that the necessary guarantees are provided to MONUC to permit its verification activities. A number of troubling allegations have been made which have seriously damaged confidence, without which the peace process will remain uncertain. Supporting MONUC’s efforts in investigating these various allegations should be the priority of all the parties to the conflict.

28. The international community has made some progress in establishing and strengthening mechanisms to enforce international criminal justice. Both in Ituri and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a whole, impunity is rampant and should no longer be tolerated. The mission recommends that consideration be given to what practical steps can be taken to end impunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi.

29. The mission was presented with indications that the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the spoils of which served both to enrich some of the individuals concerned and to fuel the continuation of the conflict, was still being perpetrated. The mission recommends that the Security Council be prepared to consider carefully and act on the recommendations to be made by the Expert Panel in its forthcoming report.

30. The mission will continue to reflect on the impressions it formed during its visit to Bunia, in the light of the success of IEMF and of subsequent developments, in order to define what could be the most effective role for MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process, including the possibility of a more robust mandate, taking into account the departure of IEMF.

31. The Security Council will continue to follow closely the roles and activities of the States of the region in the light of the responsibilities borne by those States to assist the Congolese parties and the international community by using their positive influence to find peaceful solutions to the conflict both in Ituri and in the wider Democratic Republic of the Congo.

III. Burundi

32. The Security Council mission visited Bujumbura from 12 to 14 June. The objective of the mission was to demonstrate the support of the Council for the second phase of the political transition, at a time when the peace process was facing particular challenges. The mission decided to concentrate on a limited number of issues which require urgent attention: the cessation of hostilities, through a political process and in the framework of the Arusha Agreement of 28 August 2000; support for the African mission; the mobilization of economic and financial assistance to the country; and the fight against impunity.

33. The mission held consultations in Burundi with President Ndayizeye, Vice-President Kadege, and the President of the Senate, Mr. Bararunyeretse, Special Representative Dinka, the Implementation Monitoring Committee, the African Union and the African Mission in Burundi. Contacts were also established with the
Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) (Pierre Nkurunziza) and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL) (Agathon Rwasa). The mission also consulted with the Facilitator of the Burundi Peace process, Vice-President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, as well as with Presidents Mkapa and Museveni.

Transitional institutions

34. The mission expressed its support for the Burundian parties in their implementation of the second phase of the transition, which began when the Presidency of the Republic was handed over to Mr. Ndayizeye on 30 April. The mission recalled that the Security Council had welcomed the peaceful transfer of power. All the mission’s interlocutors in Burundi expressed their satisfaction at the transfer of power. The mission stressed that the transitional institutions should continue to undertake the reforms as provided for in the Arusha Agreement, particularly in the security sector, the judiciary and the organization of the elections.

Security situation and ceasefire negotiations

35. All the interlocutors of the mission, both national and international, stressed that the continuation of fighting was the most serious obstacle to the full implementation of the Arusha peace process. They urged the mission to exert strong pressure on both parties to cease hostilities: on FNL to enter into serious ceasefire negotiations and on FDD to implement the ceasefire agreement it had signed. Some insisted that countries that had an influence on FNL and FDD should put pressure on the movements, noting that a summit of the regional initiative was going to be organized soon. Others stressed that the full implementation of the ceasefire agreements would positively influence the movements to join the process.

36. The mission expressed concern at the very slow pace of ceasefire negotiations between the Government and FDD and FNL. The mission called on the rebel groups to cease hostilities immediately and join the Arusha process. The mission emphasized that the solution of the conflict was to be found in the political process provided by the Arusha Agreement. The mission reminded the rebel groups that there were no alternative processes and that joining the Arusha process was in their own interest. In parallel, the Army would have to exercise restraint. The mission encouraged the Government to continue to display flexibility in order to make room for the rebel groups in the institutions created by the Arusha Agreement. The Government and the rebels would have to work out a reasonable accommodation. Both parties reiterated their commitments to the peace and ensured the mission that they would do their utmost to resolve outstanding issues.

37. The mission encouraged the transitional Government to put in place measures to enable some FDD combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to be repatriated voluntarily to Burundi. The mission believes that such a repatriation exercise would constitute a positive confidence-building measure towards Burundian combatants still outside the country. On a more general note, the mission suggested to the transitional Government that it initiate preparation for the repatriation of Burundian refugees and the return to their homes of internally displaced persons.
African mission

38. The Political Head and the Force Commander of the African Mission gave a detailed briefing on the status of deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). They indicated that the preparation of the cantonment sites was seriously hampered by the failure of the parties to provide the location and troop strength to the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC). They also urged the mission to appeal to FDD to send its representatives to JCC. Support for AMIB and JCC was also strongly requested by the transitional authorities. The mission reiterated the Council’s continued support for AMIB on three levels: political support from the Council, financial support from the donor community and technical support from the United Nations Secretariat. However, these efforts must be pursued and expanded.

Combating impunity

39. The mission discussed with the transitional Government and the armed movements the issue of combating impunity, and accountability for past and continuing human rights violations. The mission stressed that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law would be prosecuted for any crimes they committed. The transitional Government indicated that several steps had recently been taken in that regard. It asked the mission to respond positively to the request of the transitional Government for the establishment of an international judiciary commission of inquiry, as provided for in the Arusha Agreement, to help Burundi put an end to impunity. The transitional Government stressed the importance of such a commission as an indispensable tool to address the question of impunity and thus to facilitate genuine national reconciliation.

Humanitarian and economic situation

40. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate alarmingly. Some members of the mission met with representatives of Burundian women’s organizations and, separately, with humanitarian and human rights international organizations, and were briefed in detail on the prevailing situation as well as on the increasing difficulties they faced in carrying out their activities. The Burundian authorities appealed to the mission to urge the donor community to accelerate the disbursement of the pledges made in Paris and Geneva conferences and to provide budgetary and balance of payments support. The mission acknowledges that there should be some dividends to peace and indicates that it will follow closely the results of the donor conference to be organized in September by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) aimed at clearing Burundi’s arrears.

Conclusion and recommendations

41. The Burundi peace process is at a critical juncture. Every effort should be made to ensure its success. The mission considers that the outcome of the peace process is primarily the responsibility of the Burundian parties. Nevertheless, the mission believes that the international community should make every effort to assist the Burundians in this regard.

42. The mission recommends that the Security Council call on the international financial community to assist AMIB with adequate financial and logistical assistance and on the Secretary-General to provide appropriate expertise.
43. The mission sees a clear need for providing adequate budgetary and economic support to the transitional Government. There is a risk that all the gains achieved so far could collapse if such assistance is not provided immediately. The mission recommends that the Council urge donor countries to fulfil the commitments they made at the Paris and Geneva conferences. The mission, which welcomes the convening in September 2003 of a donor round table organized by UNDP to help clear Burundi’s arrears, will recommend to the Council to continue to follow up closely this point with the international financial community.

44. The Security Council mission notes that urgent attention should be paid to putting an end to impunity in Burundi. The mission recommends that the Security Council assist Burundi in this regard and that it consider carefully the Government’s request for the establishment of the international judicial commission of inquiry as provided for in the Arusha Agreement.

45. The mission feels that strong support should be provided to the efforts made by heads of State in the subregion to promote a settlement between FDD and the transitional Government, consistent with the Arusha Agreement peace process.

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46. The mission wishes to express its appreciation to the heads of States who met with the mission to share their views. This mission is also very grateful to Special Representatives Ngongi and Dinka for the sound advice and impeccable arrangements made for the mission’s visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. The mission also wishes to thank the United Nations Development Programme and other United Nations agencies for the faultless logistical support made on its behalf in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Luanda, Bujumbura, Kigali, Dar-es-Salaam and Entebbe, as well as the Secretariat staff who accompanied it for their unfailing support.