Note by the President of the Security Council


[Original: English and Spanish]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, I have the honour to submit a personal report on the activities of this Group during 2004. The report is thus submitted under my sole responsibility.

It would be appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Cristián Maquieira
Chairman
Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations
Annex


I. Introduction

1. The Security Council during 2004 considered the issue of peacekeeping operations and the strengthening of cooperation between the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

2. The Security Council stressed during that period the importance of full compliance with the provisions of its resolution 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000, as well as with the contents of previous statements of the President (S/PRST/1996/13 and S/PRST/1994/22).

3. In the light of the opinions expressed by the members of the Security Council during the debate that took place at its 4257th meeting, on 16 January 2001, on the issue of the strengthening of cooperation with troop-contributing countries, it was recognized that relations with troop-contributing countries could be improved and that to do so it was necessary to work together with a common purpose to achieve the shared objectives and to promote a new spirit of partnership, cooperation and confidence between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries.

4. The Security Council thus decided to establish a Working Group of the whole on United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Working Group would not replace private meetings with troop-contributing countries and would address both generic peacekeeping issues relevant to the responsibilities of the Council and technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations.

5. Accordingly, the Working Group was charged with seeking the opinions of troop-contributing countries, including through meetings between the Working Group and troop-contributing countries, with a view to making their opinions known to the Security Council.

6. In fulfilment of this mandate, the Working Group met on four occasions in 2004. The principal statements and discussions at these meetings are detailed below in the present report.

II. Meetings

A. First meeting, on 2 April 2004

7. The first meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations had as its main objective to discuss the peacekeeping operation in Burundi and was attended by the 15 members of the Security Council. Troop contributors, such as India, South Africa and others, as well as financial contributors, such as Japan and some of the neighbouring countries of Burundi, were also invited to the meeting.

8. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was represented by the Assistant Secretary-General, Hédi Annabi, who was accompanied by Colonel Nicholas
Seymour and by the Civilian Police Adviser, Kiran Bedi, both of the Military Division of the Department.

9. The meeting began with a presentation by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations delivered by Mr. Annabi, who said that significant political progress had been made towards a cessation of hostilities in Burundi and that the parties seemed genuinely prepared to build a future of peace.

10. He added and emphasized that the African Union, with the support of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, had played an important role in the peace process in Burundi. However, the African Union had requested the United Nations to take charge of the peace process in Burundi and to expand the size of the peacekeeping force in that country. That had led the Secretary-General to request that the Security Council consider the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation comprised of a military component based on the reassignment of the military component of the African Union Mission and consisting of a total of 5,650 troops, including 200 military observers, and a civilian component drawn from the current capacity of the United Nations Office in Burundi.

11. The Assistant Secretary-General also reported that some progress had been made thus far towards the planning of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and repatriation operations. With the assistance of the World Bank, the United Nations Office in Burundi and the African Union Mission, the appropriate structures had been created and the armed groups were assembling their forces at the designated sites to prepare for disarmament.

12. He continued by stating that the support for elections and the transition process must be accompanied by development options that could definitively transform the lives of the population. The ideal was to be able to deploy a strong force in Burundi in support of the transition process.

13. In order to determine how best to contribute to the fulfilment of the provisions of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, an evaluation mission was sent which concluded that it was possible to expand the role of the United Nations and thus provide support for the peace process.

14. The most immediate priority proposed for the military component was for it to assume and to strengthen the role played thus far by the African Union Mission, undertaking as its principal task to supervise the pre-disarmament assembly sites, guaranteeing their security, collecting weapons and destroying unstable arms and munitions. In turn, as additional tasks, protection had to be provided for United Nations personnel and equipment; the freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the personnel of humanitarian organizations had to be facilitated; the civilian population had to be protected and, to the extent possible, support had to be provided to the local authorities for creating the conditions of internal security and providing support during the electoral process.

15. The peacekeeping operation would need a civilian police component to support the elaboration of a comprehensive plan for the establishment and strengthening of the National Police of Burundi, as well as to provide support for the planning and implementation of a training programme for the National Police, to develop the training curricula, and to assist in the selection of candidates and training instructors.
16. He concluded by stating that the force in Burundi could not remain in place for an indefinite period and that a review would be conducted six months after the elections to determine when it should leave the country. He then expressed appreciation for the excellent work done thus far by the African Union Mission and, in accordance with the request that had been made, the Mission would be strengthened with the creation of the United Nations Peace Mission, in which the regional organization would provide more than half of the United Nations force.

Comments of the delegations of the Security Council and invited persons

17. The comments focused on the following issues:

• The biggest challenge for the peacekeeping mission is to achieve a total ceasefire, which has not been achieved thus far.

• The problem in Burundi is political but with ethnic characteristics that complicate its solution.

• An exit strategy must be developed for the mission once the objectives and established time frames have been met.

• It would be appropriate to review the mandate and presence of the mission after six months from the date of the elections.

• Care must be taken to prevent a precipitate withdrawal in order to avoid a repetition of regrettable situations with peacekeeping operations that had to be restarted because of the failure to achieve the complete stability and progress needed to guarantee their sustainability over time.

• The conditions for deployment of a peacekeeping operation are the best that they have ever been because of the work already done by the African Union Mission.

• The peacekeeping operation must work towards improving the situation in order to enable the elections to be held.

• It is a very positive development that the peacekeeping operation planned for Burundi is multifunctional and interdisciplinary.

• Delegations that are not members of the Security Council expressed satisfaction at the format of the meeting and their desire that it should be maintained and that meetings should be held with greater frequency.

B. Second meeting, on 11 June 2004

18. The second meeting was held with the participation of only the members of the Security Council.

19. The topics dealt with were the following:

• Role of the Security Council in the light of the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations.

• Format and contents of a periodic review of peacekeeping operations.

• Format of meetings of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and potential invitees to the meetings.
Role that the Security Council can play in the light of the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations in terms of adequate time to put together the personnel, funding and logistical arrangements

20. The principal ideas expressed on this topic were the following:

• Rapid reaction of the United Nations to crises is critical and, to that end, it is important to overcome the difficulties in recruitment of personnel, logistics, funding and meeting civilian police needs, among other things.

• The need to prevent crises from developing.

• Planning for the rapid deployment of the United Nations.

• Availability of a list of possible candidates who can cover the civilian police needs of peacekeeping operations.

• Identify and have waiting lists of French-speaking police officers who can be included in peacekeeping missions.

• Have exit strategies for peacekeeping forces and provide for them to be relieved by the forces of regional organizations.

• Evaluate implementation of the mandate of peacekeeping operations.

• Assist the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in keeping the Security Council informed of key problems facing peacekeeping missions.

• Determine what the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations can achieve without duplicating the efforts of other United Nations organs.

• Identify peacekeeping missions that must be renewed with a view to meeting beforehand to consider how to improve the peacekeeping mission without duplicating the work of the Group of 34.

• Have a United Nations rapid deployment force.

• Troop-contributing countries should have a reserve force which should be available for rapid deployment.

• Examine the possibility of a pre-mandate in order to have forces available.

• There is a major change in the peacekeeping situation as a result of which old methods can no longer be used to deal with logistic and personnel problems.

• The Working Group must meet more frequently, interact with countries and monitor the work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

• Study the recruitment practices of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with a view to improving these operations.

• Also address the new element of the security of peacekeeping forces, attacks against them and the lack of respect which this implies for United Nations mandates.

• Measures that the Security Council should adopt to prevent the loss of lives and materials of peacekeeping missions. What are the rules for preventing such losses?
• Consider in the Working Group the issue of the excessive use of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in peacekeeping mandates.

• Examine the need to consider military aspects in peacebuilding operations.

• Undertake reforms that would permit the United Nations to develop a strategy to identify and study potential threats.

• Examine with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations how to reform mandates when the political conditions in which a current operation is taking place change.

• Examine how the Working Group relates to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with a view to reporting thereon to the Security Council.

• Obtain more information from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations about difficulties on the ground.

• Strengthen the work of the Military Staff Committee, which would improve the work of the Security Council.

Format and content of the periodic review referred to in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 17 May 2004 (S/PRST/2004/16)

21. The main ideas on this subject were the following:

• Once again mention was made of not duplicating the work of other organs.

• Examine how discussions can be had with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the planning capacity to deal with this increase in the number of peacekeeping operations, and review what authority exists for a mission prior to its deployment.

• Consider how to undertake periodic reviews, which should be done in a manner similar to the reviews used by the military, and in a very simple way should describe the status of each mission, the areas where problems are being encountered and ways to improve the situation or resolve the problems.

• Have an independent snapshot of each peacekeeping mission, in the preparation of which, in addition to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, other United Nations organizations and agencies involved in peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Development Programme, should also participate.

• The evaluations must be practical in nature to provide value-added.

Follow-up

Invitation to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Frequency of meetings

Invitation to the biggest financial and troop contributors to peacekeeping operations

22. The main ideas on this topic were the following:

• Invite the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to attend a meeting of the Working Group, for which a paper will be prepared with the
issues to be discussed with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and request that he put forward in detail his views on those issues.

- Proposal that the five largest troop and financial contributors should participate in the meetings of the Working Group.
- Need for flexibility to invite other countries, depending on the subject being dealt with or the peacekeeping mission being considered.
- Differentiate between the five largest financial contributors, which is an issue that is clear, but differentiate between the five largest contributors in accordance with the importance of each country to specific missions.
- Let those countries that intend to contribute with resources participate, instead of those which, despite having a legitimate interest in peacekeeping operations, only wish to talk.
- A determination must be made of which States are useful in this wave of peacekeeping operations to be able to contribute and they should be invited to participate in meetings.

C. Third meeting, on 2 July 2004

23. The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations met for the third time on 2 July, with the participation of the Assistant Secretary-General, Jane Lute, of the Office of Mission Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to consider an agenda that included the following two items:

   (a) Issues related to the increase in peacekeeping missions and the challenge that that poses for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;

   (b) Future activities of the Working Group in these areas, including the question of convening the largest contributors to peacekeeping operations.

Issues related to the increase in peacekeeping missions and the challenge that that poses for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

24. The Assistant Secretary-General, Jane Lute, in her presentation to the members of the Working Group, said that there was currently an unprecedented increase in peacekeeping operations, which posed great difficulties because of the environment in which the demands were being made and because of the simultaneous nature of the demand for such a large number of peacekeeping missions, which made it difficult to determine the timeliness of such missions.

25. In strategic terms, she said that it was an interesting period, since Member States could approach problems of the world through regional and local organizations or through the United Nations. That meant that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was practically in a market together with the Security Council.

26. On the other hand, it was established that not all problems being experienced by States had easy solutions and that the United Nations was the only organization that really had a budget to confront such problems.
27. In addition, those peacekeeping operations were currently being carried out under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and more frequently than at any earlier stage when Chapter VII was used to send a signal to the parties, while currently it was so that they could begin to use weapons in the discharge of their mission and under strict rules of engagement.

28. In her opinion, the work of the Security Council had contributed a great deal to the solution of specific internal problems of States, and it could be said that those were intrusive operations under Chapter VII. It also meant that peacekeeping operations no longer needed only the use of force to establish peace, but that different tasks were also being carried out related to the processes of economic and political development of States.

29. That meant that there was a change in the expectations for peacekeeping operations, so that no State assumed the burden of what it was believed had to be assumed by the United Nations, which then posed a problem for the organization of missions and represented a collective commitment when the Security Council acted through its resolutions.

30. The questions that we must pose based on the above are the following: When can one say that an established peacekeeping mission has succeeded? In what cases are Blue Helmets the solution to the problems of States? Under what conditions should the United Nations intervene?

31. There are no common replies to each situation, but what must be understood is that integrated peacekeeping operations will not resolve by themselves the internal problems of States but rather will create the conditions for nationals of that State to take responsibility for their own destiny.

32. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was currently reviewing when peacekeeping operations should be adapted, when to expand them and also when to close them. Here there emerged an issue of considerable relevance, which was the availability of resources to launch a peacekeeping operation.

33. As the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) states, these operations must be organized and become operational within a maximum period of 90 days. However, it has been seen that no State is capable of launching a peacekeeping operation within this period when there is no prior planning and no resources are available.

34. The future of peacekeeping operations is at a strategic turning point where the emphasis must be placed on their regional dimension and on the capacity of regional organizations to assume responsibility for mounting or contributing the most resources to peacekeeping operations to act in their region.

35. For the success of a peacekeeping mission, a vital component is the commitment of local people to take ownership of the process and assume responsibility for the conduct of their affairs, taking advantage of the conditions which peacekeeping forces have been able to establish.

36. The delegations stated their views as follows:

- With regard to the greater use of Chapter VII of the Charter, some delegations of non-permanent members expressed the view that that should not become routine and that not all peacekeeping operations should be undertaken under that Chapter, but only those that were necessary. Others expressed the view
that the use of Chapter VII created greater expectations, but also gave more flexibility for the use of the tools of combat.

- There was emphatic agreement that all necessary resources should be provided to organize peacekeeping operations and that the idea could be considered of having pre-established forces available which could be deployed rapidly to deal with emergency situations.

- The United Nations continues to be the main organization with the capacity to organize peacekeeping operations. However, regional groups can make a bigger contribution, thereby making resources from outside the region unnecessary.

- The prevention of situations is an issue that needs to be more effectively addressed, thereby strengthening the principle of the provision of resources to do so. That brings up the question of how to improve the intelligence available to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to anticipate events and to prepare the resources that will be needed for future operations.

- With regard to the organization of peacekeeping operations, some delegations pointed to the need for the biggest contributors to be involved in the operation during its planning stages in order to ensure greater participation and to receive their support in the early stages of the process.

- Another important aspect that was discussed was that the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation had nothing to do with its size and volume but rather depended on the mandate that it received and its efficient and timely organization to enable it to fulfil its mandate.

**Future activities of the Working Group in these areas, including on the question of inviting the largest contributors to peacekeeping operations**

37. The following views were expressed:

- On this question, there was no consensus since some delegations wanted all financial and troop contributors to participate in the meetings on a permanent basis. Other delegations were of the view that the Working Group should proceed in the matter on a case-by-case and meeting-by-meeting basis.

- There was also a discussion on the participation of neighbouring countries when the situation of a State in conflict or a given peacekeeping operation was being reviewed. As with the contributors to peacekeeping operations, most delegations preferred the matter to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**D. Fourth meeting, on 27 August 2004**

38. On 27 August, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations held its fourth meeting, which was attended by the Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Marie Guehenno, Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to consider an agenda that included the following items:

- Challenges facing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the design, planning and deployment of new peacekeeping missions, while it continued to support ongoing missions.
• Support for missions under pre-mandate commitments.
• Recruitment of troops and civil police for the command posts and field units.
• The situation of Brindisi and the problems of accumulating stockpiles to meet deployment needs on a timely basis.
• Integrated planning of peacekeeping operations.
• Establishment of a method and format of evaluation to achieve this objective, which should be short, practical and easy to use.

Presentation of the Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

39. In his presentation, he stated that the meetings of the Working Group were a positive initiative that permitted the establishment of closer links between the Secretariat and members of the Security Council on those issues. He gave an overview of the current situation in peacekeeping operations and added that over the next few months 27,000 more troops would be needed, in addition to 2,500 civilian police, 1,300 observers, 4,000 local staff and 2,000 international personnel. All of that represented a cost of approximately $2 billion.

40. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations had had an extremely heavy workload in recent times, since it had to launch a series of new missions and to expand ongoing missions, such as, for example, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). That presented no great difficulties in budgetary terms, since funding was available for them. However, it represented a heavy burden in terms of the workload for personnel in the Department.

41. With regard to what was stated in the Brahimi report, namely, that it should be possible to deploy a peacekeeping operation within a period of 90 days, he said that it was a goal that they were striving to achieve under the difficult conditions of the moment, since several missions had to be serviced at the same time while a number of others had to be deployed simultaneously and resources committed to ensure the maintenance of ongoing missions. He added that military personnel with the greatest experience in such deployments were aware of the difficulty of that activity.

42. He continued by saying that new peacekeeping operations were rather complex, mainly because the parties to the conflict did not respect the peace agreements made. In order to enforce compliance, there must be peacekeeping troops which, while acting in a cordial and friendly manner with the population, at the same time had the capacity to use weapons when necessary.

43. The main difficulties faced by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were to persuade countries to provide more technical and specific resources such as helicopter units and communications and engineering units. He also said that there was a need for adequate hospital units in the field, since that gave more peace of mind to the forces for the fulfilment of their missions and they were force-multiplying elements.

44. Among the difficulties faced in securing and deploying troops was the fact that when a mission was to be deployed in regions where adequate facilities and accommodations such as airports did not exist, countries would definitely not go,
and that was why the Department could not comply with the deadline of 90 days for the deployment of an operation.

45. On the other hand, there must be fully simultaneous efforts to effect deployments and when a piece of the puzzle of launching a peacekeeping operation was missing, it had consequences for the rest of the puzzle and disrupted planning. The logistical aspect was vital in that sense and if it failed or was delayed, then the Department obviously could not deploy troops in the field until a solution was found.

46. With regard to the deployment of civilian police, it was necessary to reconcile quantity and quality, which was the best way to be effective. What was needed was not only a group of trainers but also policemen to deploy in the field and to see how police departments functioned and give them advice. There must be cultural sensitivity in that regard.

47. If obtaining troops was difficult, securing policemen was even more so, since normally they were occupied in the activities of their respective countries. Moreover, obtaining good policemen was even more difficult. Obtaining policemen who spoke local languages was also a challenge. Establishing a police force in the country that had the trust of the population was a vital aspect for the success of a peacekeeping operation.

48. On the question of strategic deployment, he said that they were pleased that stockpiling would be authorized based on the situation in Brindisi. He also added that a mechanism was needed to facilitate the purchase of equipment.

49. With regard to ways of improving the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, he said that when a mission was evaluated, an integrated team was sent. That team later became a coordinating oversight group. He added that when a mission changed, an evaluation team was also sent out. The next step was to have a plan and to that end they were working on a manual so that the different components involved in the deployment of a peacekeeping operation would understand each other and be coordinated in order to serve the main component. The objective being pursued was to operationalize integrated planning for which the manual would be used.

50. It was more work for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to have three operations of 5,000 troops than one of 15,000. To deal with several simultaneously meant that there was a shortage of personnel to service them.

51. He concluded by stating that at the end of July 2004 there were 60,000 persons in 17 peacekeeping operations and that it was a challenge “to have to repair a boat while it was sailing”. For the success of peacekeeping operations, there must be commitment by all the parties involved in the conflict and, in particular, by the international community beginning with the Security Council. The key elements of each operation depended in turn on political, economic and military factors.

**Statements by delegations**

52. The statements focused on the following issues:

- Better coordination was needed between countries and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, not with a view to supervising what the Department
was doing but to more effectively address the challenges that were common and which must be faced together.

- The sudden increase in peacekeeping missions had required the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to take measures that were effective but we must ask ourselves how that surge in demand could be more effectively met.

- Peacekeeping operations must create the spaces and conditions for the development of political processes that would restore normalcy to the country.

- The resources that were needed for each peacekeeping operation should be determined so that better use could be made of existing capacities.

- It was necessary to establish a method to evaluate the most urgent needs.

- The real need for continuing with peacekeeping operations on the same scale as when they began should be determined and ways of reducing them should be sought when they had achieved objectives, thus permitting priorities to be established.

- Greater emphasis should be placed on continuing dialogue with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and more countries should be included in the meetings of the Working Group. On that question, there were differences of opinion and the criterion that should be used was to view each meeting on a case-by-case basis.

- Interest was expressed in focusing the meetings of the Working Group on more practical issues.

- It should be determined how countries that provided more troops could receive requests on a more timely basis.

### III. Final observations

53. At the meetings held by the Working Group over the course of 2004, it was pointed out that the great value of the Group was to create a spirit of partnership, cooperation and confidence between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, which are the main reasons for which it was established and in some cases it has gone beyond that. Indeed, as the present report shows, the Working Group dealt with various issues concerning the relationship between troop contributors and peacekeeping operations but also focused attention on the relationship between the Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, both in their mutual relations and in terms of how to deal jointly with the demands of peacekeeping, both from the perspective of new and increasingly complex operations and from the point of view of the management of ongoing operations.

54. In this process, the Working Group has clearly demonstrated its value as the appropriate instrument for discharging the functions of the Security Council in the area of peacekeeping.

55. It is my opinion that, after a tentative beginning, the Working Group has gone beyond the functions initially foreseen for it. The Group can perfectly well assume operational functions — and not simply functions of diagnosis and analysis as has been the case thus far — in the relationship between Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council.
56. To this end, it is vital for the Working Group to cease being “informal” and to become a full-fledged subsidiary organ of the Security Council. As provided for in the initial agreement that gave rise to the establishment of the Working Group (S/PRST/2001/3), the meetings of the Working Group are required to take into account the working calendar of the Council, a limitation that is not imposed on any other subsidiary organ and which means, in practice, that the Working Group is not free to convene its meetings as other subsidiary organs are. Because of this, it has been necessary to suspend many meetings, such as those that were held this year, because of the lack of services or because the services had to be provided to another subsidiary organ. From the substantive point of view, the Working Group is also in a position to be a forum of the Council and to have a more effective role in terms of peacekeeping mandates. Nothing prevents the Working Group, for example, from being the forum for discussion of the terms of the future mandate of a peacekeeping operation or of the renewal of an existing mandate with a view to reaching broad agreement which experts, acting as a drafting committee, could later convert into a specific draft.

57. With these modifications, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations could better discharge its functions and be of greater use to the Security Council.