Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 33
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

In its 2009 report (A/63/19), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the recommendations contained therein. The present report outlines progress made in implementing those recommendations and in restructuring and strengthening United Nations peacekeeping, and proposes a shared agenda for effective United Nations peacekeeping and the immediate steps required for its implementation.
I. Introduction

1. During 2009, operational demands on United Nations peacekeeping continued to grow. The number of personnel serving in the 17 missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations increased to over 118,000, including 83,414 military personnel, 12,700 police and 22,421 civilian staff. The numbers of personnel in the field are matched by increasingly complex mandates and deployment in often harsh terrain. However, these high demands are not always matched with the capabilities and resources required to meet them.

2. Safety and security of personnel in the field is an ever present and growing concern. Challenging security environments in places like Afghanistan and Darfur hamper the ability of the United Nations to deliver on its mandates. Globally, the nature of the security threats has changed and attacks on the United Nations have increased. International organized crime and local banditry, including kidnappings of national and international staff, are also part of this new threat picture. Recent attacks in Kabul and Darfur are examples, among many, of how United Nations personnel in the field have increasingly become the direct target of lethal attacks.

3. Two of our missions, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), are completing their deployments under difficult circumstances. Together with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), they also continue to lack key capabilities, in particular aviation assets, to enable full implementation of their mandates. Such shortages are especially critical since their mandates require them to act rapidly and robustly across vast areas of operations to implement critical mandated tasks such as the protection of civilians, including from sexual violence.

4. Meanwhile, several missions have seen progress with regard to establishing security and supporting political processes, allowing in some cases for adjustments to the United Nations field presence. Over the past year, good progress has been registered in the peace process in Burundi, and the management of BINUB will be handed over from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs on 1 January 2010. In Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has reconfigured its presence significantly and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo has assumed a number of tasks in the rule of law area. In Liberia, as progress has been achieved in advancing reform of the security sector, the rule of law and the creation of economic opportunities, the United Nations Mission in Liberia was able to begin the third stage of its drawdown, which will be completed in May 2010. One mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, was closed after the Security Council did not reach agreement on its future. The liquidation of the Mission was completed successfully by October 2009.

5. In Côte d'Ivoire, the peace process has made significant headway in recent months. Free and fair elections, hopefully in the first quarter of 2010, would mark a defining moment. In Haiti, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti continued to provide the necessary security environment to support progress on rule of law and economic development. It is now crucial to maintain this momentum to ensure that the people of Haiti see tangible economic and social dividends.
6. Several missions continued to face a broad range of security and political challenges, many of which are expected to remain acute in 2010. The situation in the Sudan, for example, will remain a key priority, with national elections scheduled for April 2010, referendums in 2011 and the continued search for peace in Darfur. Enormous challenges also lie ahead for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; one of the most critical tasks now is to support Afghan institutions in building their capacity for all aspects of governance, with the international community in a supporting role. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although the ending of the rebellion of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple was a positive development in 2009, the situation in the east remains highly volatile.

7. The year 2010 marks the tenth anniversary of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), the so-called Brahimi report. The Secretariat has worked to implement the Brahimi report reforms agreed by Member States, including through the “Peace operations 2010” reform strategy of 2005 (see A/60/696, paras. 6-21) and the restructuring and strengthening of Headquarters since 2007. We will continue to implement these reforms while adapting to the new challenges we face. It is against this background that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support initiated the “New Horizon” process (see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon) to engage Member States in developing a future agenda for United Nations peacekeeping.

8. The aim is to identify a shared set of priorities, through dialogue among the peacekeeping partners, to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping, and to translate those priorities into practical actions and concrete results in the field. So far this dialogue between the troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat has resulted in the development of a number of priorities for the short to medium term. However, we hope that the ongoing dialogue will continue to shape the common priorities for many years to come.

9. Based on these already identified priorities, the present report and its addendum seek to set out a shared agenda for effective United Nations peacekeeping and the immediate steps required for its implementation. It provides an update on the progress made to date in restructuring and strengthening United Nations peacekeeping. The report outlines four priority building blocks for future effectiveness: guidance on critical tasks; mobilizing and building the capabilities necessary for high performance in the field; adapting the United Nations support system to enable performance and the effective use of resources; and stronger planning, management and oversight of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

II. Developing practical guidance on critical roles for modern United Nations peacekeeping

10. Clear guidelines are essential for peacekeeping operations to successfully carry out all their mandated tasks. The Secretariat has therefore made considerable efforts in recent years to elaborate coherent guidance for field operations. However, for three critical, cross-cutting areas of activity, greater clarity is required on what modern peacekeeping missions can reasonably be expected to perform. These areas of activity are protection of civilians, robust peacekeeping and early peacebuilding.
A. Protection of civilians

11. The international community's commitment to protect civilians in armed conflict reflects the core of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The primary responsibility for protection of civilians lies with host Governments. However, in many conflict and post-conflict contexts, United Nations peacekeeping missions are tasked with protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Eight missions are currently mandated to do so. Nevertheless, sufficient guidance is lacking to assist them in this challenging undertaking.

12. In line with the request made by the Special Committee at its 2009 session, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support undertook a lessons-learned exercise drawing on the experiences of mission personnel and troop- and police-contributing countries. This stocktaking, including an independent study commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, provided valuable insights into the operational concepts, training, resources and logistical support required.

13. One clear finding was that a mission-wide protection of civilians strategy, based on sound threat analysis and early warning systems, is essential to prevent or anticipate instances in which the safety of civilians is threatened. Assessing potential threats to the civilian population, types and patterns of violence, and motives and methods of perpetrators is central. Conflict prevention is also a key element of such a strategy. A number of missions have implemented innovative practices in this regard. For example, UNAMID conducts patrols to protect women collecting firewood. UNMIS is mapping seasonal migration routes and initiating mitigation strategies months in advance of nomadic movements, as part of a preventive strategy involving early negotiations with nomads and farmers who could potentially come into conflict.

14. Rapid response capacity to contain and manage situations before they escalate to unmanageable proportions is another important element. Peacekeepers establishing open around-the-clock lines of communication with the communities in their areas of deployment have been successful in preventing impending attacks. Protection efforts are also enhanced when all components of the mission — military, police and civilian — are involved in a coordinated effort. The joint protection teams now widely used in MONUC are such an example.

15. However, a fundamental lesson emerging from this process is the need for a basic operational concept for the implementation of protection of civilians mandates to guide mission planning, resource allocation and predeployment and in-mission training.

16. The lessons-learned exercise has provided the practical input to develop an operational concept that can ensure that all parties involved — troop- and police-contributing countries, field missions, the Security Council and the Secretariat — share a common understanding of the implications of its implementation.

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17. This draft operational concept organizes the protection activities undertaken by missions into four categories. The first relates to the mission’s overarching mandate to support the implementation of a peace agreement. A peaceful environment and capable and responsive national authorities are the best forms of protection. The second category concerns the mission’s mandate to provide physical protection for civilians, and involves efforts to prevent or intervene in a situation in which civilians are under imminent threat of physical violence.

18. The third category encompasses activities aimed at ensuring that the rights of individuals are respected, including human rights monitoring, child protection and activities related to sexual and gender-based violence, as well as the coordination of humanitarian assistance. Activities in the fourth category are those directed at supporting national efforts to establish an environment that enhances the physical safety and sustainable protection of the rights of civilians, including efforts by national authorities to establish the rule of law, exercise authority throughout their territory and address impunity. Protection activities from the various categories are mutually reinforcing and are often pursued simultaneously.

19. Peacekeepers have a unique role to play in supporting national authorities in exercising their responsibility to protect civilians. This requires, at the outset, clarity among the peacekeeping partners on the interpretation of Security Council mandates to protect civilians under “imminent threat” of physical violence. Prevention can be one of the most effective tools for implementing protection of civilians mandates, and experience suggests that the definition of an imminent threat should not be limited to the moment at which civilians are directly faced with physical violence. Similarly, mandate caveats on the protection of civilians “within capabilities and within areas of deployment” should also be addressed. The Secretariat looks forward to taking this work forward during the forthcoming session of the Special Committee.

B. Robust peacekeeping

20. United Nations peacekeeping operations are frequently deployed into volatile environments with lingering sporadic violence and where the potential for relapse into resumed conflict is high. Multiple parties to a conflict, including non-State actors and armed militias, increase the possibility of challenges to a peace process and the credibility of the mission may be put to the test by potential spoilers.

21. The complexity of today’s peacekeeping mandates also demands more of missions. Tasks such as disarming and demobilizing former combatants, supporting the restoration and maintenance of public security, helping Governments to exercise their authority throughout their territory, supporting the establishment of good governance, training and monitoring host-country police services, monitoring borders and taking deterrent action to decrease levels of violence and crime all demand a level of activity and capability, or robustness, that traditional static peacekeeping forces do not provide.

22. Although troop- and police-contributing countries frequently call for better guidance and capabilities to perform these tasks, no shared understanding exists as to what robust peacekeeping means in scope and in practice. As a result, efforts to equip missions with the guidance, capabilities and support they require to carry out such tasks remain insufficient.
23. Over the course of the past year, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have sought the views of missions, troop- and police-contributing countries and members of the Security Council on how the concept of robustness and its practical application in United Nations peacekeeping might be more clearly articulated. Three key guiding points have emerged. First, robust peacekeeping is not a military issue alone. It is a political and operational strategy to signal the determination of a peacekeeping operation to implement its mandate and, where necessary, to deter threats to an existing peace process, in the face of resistance from spoilers. It therefore involves all components of the mission, directed and coordinated by the senior mission leadership.

24. The second point, a corollary of the first, is that robust peacekeeping is a posture and involves many different types of activity beyond military tasks. Robustness in mandate implementation can be demonstrated in many ways, including the use of political dialogue and negotiation to bolster a flagging peace process, targeted sanctions against identified spoilers, support and incentives to national reconciliation efforts, and the initiation of early peacebuilding activities to help deliver a tangible peace dividend to local populations.

25. Third, robust peacekeeping is not peace enforcement. It operates within the principles of United Nations peacekeeping: consent by the host Government, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. Where a robust approach necessitates the use of force by peacekeeping operations, it takes place at the operational, tactical level, on a case-by-case basis, and in full adherence to these principles.

26. The importance of a robust approach was underscored in the Brahimi report which noted that United Nations peacekeepers must be “prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them” (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 1). In this context, robust peacekeeping can be understood as a posture adopted by a mission that demonstrates willingness, capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of its mandate.

27. What is required now is a sustained effort to support the missions in the practical application of a robust posture. Lessons and perspectives from the field have highlighted five essential requirements for effective implementation: (a) increased consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries prior to and during deployment to ensure that all involved clearly understand and are willing to fully implement mandated tasks; (b) a coherent and accountable chain of command and sufficient flexibility in operational conduct to enable effective planning and response in the field; (c) strengthened information and analysis capacities in the mission as well as at Headquarters to assist missions in detecting, deterring and confronting threats to the peace; (d) improved delivery of logistics in the field, including sufficient mobility and communication assets, to implement practically a robust posture; and (e) enhanced safety and security arrangements to ensure the protection of peacekeeping personnel at all times.

28. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support are developing a concept note to define the scope and practical implications of robust peacekeeping for consultation with the peacekeeping partnership before and during the forthcoming session of the Special Committee. This is the critical first step in providing a basis for guidance to peacekeepers on robust peacekeeping.
and addressing the training, logistics and other support dimensions of its implementation in the field. I look forward to discussions with the Special Committee to help clarify this concept.

C. Peacebuilding tasks undertaken by peacekeeping operations

29. The Special Committee has noted the importance of planning and conducting the peacebuilding activities of a peacekeeping mission in consultation with the host Government and in a manner that facilitates post-conflict peacebuilding and progress towards sustainable peace and development. The report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) provides an overarching account of the United Nations system’s approach to the topic. It identifies some of the priority areas where the early and coordinated support of the United Nations is frequently requested. Peacekeepers are a critical part of this broad effort. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations are frequently tasked, along with partners, to support national authorities in providing basic security and safety, including through mandated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mine action, police, corrections, justice and security sector reform activities as well as in restoring core government functions and in delivering basic services. In some contexts, peacekeeping missions contribute to broader efforts to support social and economic development, a critical element in the early consolidation of peace.

30. A key component of effective delivery of such support, as the Special Committee has noted, is coherence and synergy among all mandated actors. Some progress has been made in this regard. Where there is a peacekeeping operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has the lead role in putting in place integrated planning processes to support a coordinated United Nations approach in post-conflict environments including through the elaboration of an integrated strategic framework that sets out the priority areas of coordinated United Nations support to peacebuilding for the mission and the United Nations country team.

31. An integrated effort can only be successful if every actor is clear on its contribution, is capable of delivering on it and works in cooperation with partners. For this reason, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a strategy for critical early peacebuilding tasks undertaken by peacekeepers. The strategy will focus on police, rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform activities, and will seek to help missions establish priorities for implementing complex mandates and sequencing their activities in these critical areas. In support of the implementation of this broader strategy, the Department is also developing specific guidance, including a strategic framework for international police peacekeeping tasks; guidance for missions on mapping the capacities and needs of national justice sectors; and new modules of the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards to address linkages with other post-conflict processes such as security sector reform.

32. If United Nations peacekeepers are to successfully carry out early peacebuilding tasks mandated to them, four additional dimensions must be addressed. The first is the capabilities required. Critical early peacebuilding tasks, as indicated in the Secretary-General’s report (A/63/881-S/2009/304), require properly trained and prepared civilian experts who can deploy quickly and work as part of an
integrated effort to implement the Security Council mandates. An expanded standing police capacity, complemented with a small number of justice and corrections experts, would help to address this pressing contingency need.

33. The second dimension is the need to work effectively with partners. This includes regional organizations, international financial institutions and bilateral and multilateral development organizations. The Peacebuilding Commission can play a valuable role in facilitating international coordination in post-conflict contexts.

34. Third is the importance of adequate resources for early peacebuilding tasks. A significant number of the early peacebuilding tasks allocated to peacekeepers, such as rehabilitation of prisons or police training, currently require mobilization of additional financial resources. The Peacebuilding Fund can provide valuable catalytic funding for such tasks undertaken by missions. It is critical that this and other funds support the delivery of early peacebuilding in post-conflict environments.

35. Fourth, peacekeepers are not long-term peacebuilders. The establishment of agreed benchmarks between the national authorities, the mission and the United Nations country team is an important tool for monitoring progress, preparing for the handover of tasks and responsibilities from peacekeepers to national and development partners and identifying critical gaps in a broader peacebuilding effort. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has begun to gather lessons from missions on the challenges of peace consolidation as a first step in helping missions to plan and implement sustainable and effective transitions to long-term peacebuilding.

III. Developing the required capabilities

36. Increased clarity on guidelines alone will not suffice to effectively carry out critical mandated tasks. Well-trained and prepared, flexible and rapidly deployable personnel with the adequate capabilities and support systems are also required.

37. A comprehensive approach, linking training and assessment to performance challenges, is required to develop capabilities for modern United Nations peacekeeping, and to guide the strengthening of support and incentive arrangements.

38. In the immediate term, I seek your endorsement to advance the Secretariat’s development of such a comprehensive capability development approach. The implementation of such an approach will take time and will require sustained engagement. It can only take place with the support and active input of troop- and police-contributing countries.

A. Filling critical capability gaps

39. The first priority must be to fill critical gaps in our current missions. The absence of crucial assets hampers missions’ ability to successfully carry out mandates. For example, the mobility of personnel is undermined by the lack of surface and aerial mobility assets, including military utility helicopters, transport aircrafts and unmanned aerial vehicles. Limitations in critical equipment, self-
sustainment capacities and information-gathering assets also impede situational awareness of military personnel on the ground.

40. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have elaborated current critical capability gap lists, outlining priority requirements in United Nations peacekeeping operations for critical equipment and military, police and civilian personnel. They will be updated and shared with Member States on a regular basis. The Departments will continue to explore mechanisms to inform Member States of critical requirements in an effort to aid countries considering contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations and to facilitate donor planning for training and equipment support. A broad and sustainable base of contributors is critical to closing existing gaps and ensuring sufficient capacities for the future.

B. Setting capability and performance standards

41. Effective mandate implementation relies not only on numbers, but also on clarity of expectations. Peacekeepers and their respective training institutions must also be able to refer to baseline capability standards for each core component of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in order to enable them to adequately prepare for and execute tasks on the ground. Training and equipment support can be more effectively targeted when guided by baseline standards. Clear performance expectations and standards are also critical for commanders, who must be able to assess what capabilities and what performance they can expect from United Nations personnel, staff officers and contingents.

42. Work is already under way with the support of Member States to review and adapt the functions, capacities and readiness requirements of formed police units. The Office of Military Affairs has begun identifying essential tasks for military components of peacekeeping operations. Any baseline operational standards should be informed by real scenarios facing contributing countries implementing mandates on the ground.

43. Elaborating sound capability and performance standards will require a sustained commitment. An initial set of pilot projects exploring baseline standards for a limited set of peacekeeping components could provide a starting point for advancing this effort in the coming year. From our military commanders in field missions, we have heard initial views on where the needs for clear standards and training are most urgent. We will continue to seek the views of experienced troop- and police-contributing countries in the months ahead on where performance challenges are greatest.

C. Filling critical personnel gaps

44. Our capacity to effectively carry out mandated tasks will be facilitated by clearer guidance and operational standards, also allowing for the identification of civilian capacities with the required skills and abilities. The introduction of a new talent management system in the first quarter of 2010 will bring about an improved, more efficient and integrated system for the identification, recruitment and selection and succession management of civilian staff. Rooted in a strengthened strategic planning process, this new and improved framework includes rosters of civilian
personnel who are adept and readily available for selection and deployment, having been pre-cleared by a central review body. These are qualitative improvements serving to accelerate the process of deploying capable and agile civilian staff to field missions. The human resource reforms approved by the General Assembly in resolution 63/250, on streamlining contractual arrangements, has enabled the integration of field and Headquarters staff into one global Secretariat. Yet, the ability to attract and retain civilian staff, particularly senior managers and specialists, rests largely on the ability to offer a competitive compensation package. Over 90 per cent of mission staff serves in non-family missions. This calls for a more flexible approach to determining the designation of missions as family or non-family. It also requires that staff serving in non-family missions be compensated for the costs of maintaining a separate residence for family members outside the duty station. It is necessary to offer incentives for rapid deployment and continuing, long-term mobility to non-family locations, which are often hazardous. An integrated and comprehensive package would not only strengthen the Organization’s capacity to attract and retain adept and rapidly deployable capacities but also facilitate mobility between Headquarters and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on the one hand, and field missions on the other, and the establishment of rapid deployment mechanisms including standby arrangements and standby capacity rosters, including for senior-level positions and specialized functions.

45. Building on the success of the standing police capacity, it is critical to ensure, from the outset, a coordinated and integrated approach to strengthening the rule of law that results in the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities. The broader human resource reforms being implemented by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will improve the capacity to deploy staff to meet emerging requirements in the field. Yet, certain critical and specialist civilian skill sets in the areas of justice and corrections capacities will remain in very short supply and may not be readily available when required on short notice. This argues in favour of complementing the standing police capacity, whose own modest expansion is being requested, with an additional small component of field-focused justice and corrections experts operating alongside the standing police capacity and based in Brindisi. In keeping with General Assembly resolutions 61/279 and 63/250, appointment of these staff will be subject to review by a central review body. The terms and conditions of their employment will enable their mobility across missions, as needed, and will also require that they deploy to meet urgent operational requirements. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will provide the Special Committee with further details on this proposal during its 2010 substantive session.

46. As demands for rapid deployment at the start-up of a mission often require specialized expertise that may not be readily available internally, or an immediacy of response which cannot be provided through existing capacities, the global field support strategy will focus on exploring the use of external sources of human capacities to supplement internal capacities, provide expertise not readily available from within and to meet rapid deployment requirements. External sources of capacity could include military enabling units, consultants and individual contractors, commercial contractors, United Nations Volunteers or partnerships with United Nations or other organizations. Government personnel will also be explored as a source of rapid deployment capacity. However, the use of gratis personnel continues to be subject to the conditions established by the General Assembly.
D. Training

47. The structural improvements being made in peacekeeping training through the United Nations peacekeeping training strategy will allow performance standards to be more effectively linked to predeployment and in-mission training. In order to establish clear mechanisms for the standardization of peacekeeping training across Member States, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations adopted a policy on support to military and police predeployment training for United Nations peacekeeping operations and accompanying standard operating procedures for training recognition, mobile training support teams and training of trainers in October 2009. The policy and standard operating procedures, developed in collaboration with Member States, clarify the training support services provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the areas in which the Department will seek to facilitate cooperation among Member States to enhance training capabilities and address existing gaps in training or materiel.

48. In 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations also issued the first set of United Nations peacekeeping predeployment training standards for individual police officers and a temporary curriculum for formed police units. The accompanying core predeployment training materials for all personnel (police, military and civilian) and the specialized training materials for police have been disseminated to Member States and are accessible to all training partners on the new peacekeeping resource hub (http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org). The Department is also in the final stage of developing a gender training strategy focusing on the operational as well as the policy level. It will provide a consistent approach to gender training materials and lead to effective implementation of Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security.

49. The Department will continue to build on its efforts to facilitate effective partnerships for peacekeeping training among Member States and to match capacity-building resources and programmes with priority needs.

E. Support and incentive mechanisms as enablers of performance

50. Effective performance is possible only where troop- and police-contributing countries enjoy sound logistical and managerial support. While all missions require effective support, high-risk, complex environments bring particular demands. In these environments flexible transport, communications and logistics structures that can support contributors in the execution of increasingly challenging tasks are essential. United Nations peacekeeping support structures differ from the logistics arrangements of national military forces, and adapting an intergovernmental civilian framework to the needs of modern peacekeeping is a challenge that can only be met through a collective effort of all peacekeeping partners. I will elaborate further on the critical need to prioritize the development of new strategies for mission support in section IV below.

51. The ongoing preparations for the 2011 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment will provide an opportunity for a dialogue on viable options for performance-based incentives. Such options should be considered in the light of their possible financial implications.
F. Partnerships with regional organizations

52. Regional organizations such as the African Union and the European Union have planned, deployed and conducted military and civilian peackeeping operations under a United Nations mandate and alongside United Nations peackeeping operations in various contexts and forms, including the “hybrid” operation in Darfur and bridging operations, over the past decade. These experiences have made evident that the respective organizations’ varying administrative procedures and structures can create obstacles to effective operational cooperation. While increased mutual knowledge and lessons learned can facilitate cooperation, we must also look at ways of improving our interoperability, for example, for cost-recovery and infrastructure arrangements.

53. The report of the Secretary-General on support to African Union peackeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (A/64/359-S/2009/470) underscored the importance of the strategic relationship between the United Nations and the African Union and outlined a number of concrete actions to strengthen this partnership and address the requirements of the African Union as it develops its peackeeping capacity. While some of the actions proposed in that report will be part of a long-term process, others can be initiated much more quickly and some are ongoing.

54. In the immediate future we will identify those areas in which United Nations experience, particularly in the area of logistics and availability of essential planning materials and information, can be shared with the African Union. This is relevant for our cooperation with other regional organizations. We will continue to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat to address issues of common concern and we are in the process of streamlining the United Nations presence in Addis Ababa to increase our ability to provide advice across the full range of functions needed for the African Union to develop its peackeeping capacity and prioritize its requirements.

55. When the Security Council requests a bridging operation and the establishment of a follow-on mission, the mandate and financing should be provided well in advance to facilitate transitions. I encourage Member States to ensure that their positions in United Nations bodies are fully aligned with the positions they take in regional organizations on relevant aspects of bridging operations and to improve interoperability for future bridging operations.

IV. Developing stronger United Nations field support arrangements

A. The global field support strategy

56. Two years after the creation of the Department of Field Support, a new global field support strategy has been developed to transform service delivery to field missions over the next five years. This will be achieved through improvements in financial management and personnel management; the introduction of service packages; and the optimal placement of service delivery.

57. Alongside the present report, I will be submitting to the General Assembly a report that details this strategy, its underlying business case and proposed implementation arrangements. That report seeks General Assembly endorsement of
the broad direction of the global field support strategy and approval of several specific measures, including (a) creation of global and regional service centres; (b) establishment of deployment modules to facilitate rapid deployment, particularly in start-up or surge operations; (c) increased pre-mandate commitment authority and agreement for pre-approved budget models and improved resourcing for special political missions; and (d) securing external civilian capacities and building internal civilian capacities to improve rapid deployment.

58. The proposed global field support strategy is designed to achieve four core objectives: (a) to expedite and improve support for peacekeeping; (b) to expedite and improve support for peacebuilding and peacemaking, electoral assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention missions; (c) to improve the safety and living conditions of personnel; and (d) to strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale. The strategy pursues two important additional objectives of contributing to local and regional investment and capacity, and reducing the in-country environmental impact of United Nations field missions. A robust internal governance mechanism has been designed to ensure successful implementation of the strategy according to measurable performance indicators.

59. This strategy development process has included sustained dialogue with client departments, missions and Member States in order to identify the key changes required to address today’s field support challenges and strengthen United Nations field support systems for tomorrow. As has been noted, increasingly, the field environments for United Nations missions are remote, austere and, at times, dangerous. Troops, police and civilian staff are asked to do more and more operationally, and this has significant implications for support systems. Lines of communications for support and sustainment can be extremely long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, office and housing stock is frequently in short supply, reliable communications infrastructure is lacking, and the bulk of United Nations troops or staff often do not speak the language of the local population.

60. In addition to these environmental factors that affect field deployments, there are also structural limitations to the rapid deployment of United Nations missions. These have been seen each time the United Nations has deployed new and expanded field missions in the past 10 years. Each operation is built anew and each is run on individual budget, support and administrative lines. In each case, an on-the-ground assessment must be conducted, a budget must be prepared in accordance with the Security Council mandate, a fully justified staffing table must be devised and the necessary equipment must be identified, prepared, inspected and transported to the mission areas. Appropriate status-of-forces agreements, memorandums of understanding and letters of assist must be negotiated. Forces must be identified, prepared and deployed. Land for mission operations and accommodation must be secured and improved. Contracts for every product and every service from gravel to aircraft operations must be negotiated. Hundreds of international and local staff must be recruited in an open and transparent manner, navigating complex rules and regulations. For all of these reasons, planning, mounting and deploying a new operation takes on average six to 12 months and sometimes longer for the larger, more complex missions.
61. Peacekeeping in its current form requires more predictable, professional and adaptable capacities. It needs a global system to match the global enterprise it has become. This global system calls for a new business model for support that aims to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale as well as rapid deployment of personnel and equipment and a secure operating environment while promoting innovation, flexibility and accountability in a comprehensive and integrated fashion. A piecemeal approach is not an option. It is necessary to evolve from managing support to individual missions as independent entities to managing a global support operation. Such an approach is intended to maximize economies of scale and allow an overarching evaluation of priorities, based on an understanding of the broad resource implications and possible trade-offs. The global field support strategy is an initiative aimed at transforming service delivery to United Nations field missions to address the challenges and objectives outlined above. Acknowledging the complexity and challenges inherent in implementing procedural and cultural shifts, a five-year period is envisaged.

B. Safety and security

62. The safety and security of personnel are of utmost importance to the Organization. In response to an increased global security threat, United Nations peacekeeping field security arrangements will be significantly strengthened through a series of measures during 2010.

63. To increase the coherence of risk management approaches among United Nations civilian security, military and police components at Headquarters and in the field, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Safety and Security will launch an initiative to adopt common threat assessment and risk mitigation methodologies supported by standardized risk mitigation and force protection standards. The outputs of this initiative will inform and support decision-making by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and senior mission management with regards to threat and risk assessment and risk mitigation measures. Further, a coherent methodology will allow the Departments to better inform Member States, in particular troop and police contributors, of security threats and risks and force protection measures relevant to their deployed units.

64. Another concrete measure will be to develop capacities to address the increasing threat that improvised explosive devices pose to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

65. At its 2009 substantive session, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested the development of a United Nations policy on monitoring and surveillance technology. The Committee requested that legal, operational, technical and financial considerations, and especially the consent of the countries concerned, be given due attention. The Secretariat is developing a draft policy that will be shared with Member States before the upcoming session. The draft policy addresses five priority areas: immediate protection, surveillance of immediate surroundings, improved surveillance of the local tactical environment, improved regional surveillance and information management.

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2 Ibid., para. 42.
66. The draft policy addresses financial implications related to assets provided by
troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as technologies provided by
Member States. It considers United Nations-owned equipment and equipment
obtained contractually. The draft also proposes equipment for possible inclusion in
the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi,
Italy, and measures to reduce the time required to deploy these assets to the field.
The Secretariat seeks the Special Committee’s support in further developing these
priority areas. In particular, it seeks the Committee’s support to strengthen the
strategic deployment stocks and to ensure that mission monitoring and surveillance
activities are adequately resourced to ensure the safety and security of personnel.

V. Ensuring more effective arrangements for planning,
management and oversight

A. Ongoing strengthening of structures at Headquarters

67. In my previous report on the implementation of the recommendations of the
Special Committee (A/63/615 and Add.1), I described progress made in 2008 in the
restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the creation of the
Department of Field Support. During that first phase of the process, emphasis was
given to the establishment of new structures and specialized capacities, while
strengthening capacity at the leadership, senior management and working levels, as
approved by the General Assembly. Those structures and capacities are fully in
place. Mid-course adjustments have also been made to address challenges faced,
particularly with the establishment and functioning of integrated operational teams
in the Office of Operations. The Departments are therefore now focused on realizing
the full benefits of restructuring.

1. Integrated operational teams

68. A second evaluation of the performance of integrated operational teams was
undertaken in 2009. This review notes that while significant progress has been made
in the functioning of the teams, many of the challenges identified by the first
evaluation late in 2008 still remain. These include the need to enhance the
understanding of the objectives, roles and composition of the teams and to employ
greater flexibility in the assignment of specialist officers to the teams to ensure
optimal utilization of these capacities to meet operational needs.

69. The 2009 evaluation underscores that the teams have especially improved the
level of support provided to missions in a high operational tempo, undergoing
deployment, change of mandate or downsizing. Integrated operational teams are a
crucial instrument for the multidimensional aspects of mission support: helping to
ensure that appropriate political guidance is provided; to channelling and
synthesizing mission requirements; solving problems directly or following up with
specialized functional areas when they are better placed to take action; monitoring
developments; and integrating the views of the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Department of Field Support and other partners to ensure that the
multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping are considered in a coherent way. At
Headquarters, the teams have allowed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and the Department of Field Support to better integrate activities across organizational units in support of mission mandate delivery.

70. Work undertaken by the Office of Operations and the Office of the Chief of Staff has helped the teams to operate more effectively. This work includes an extensive review of team staff and stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, led by the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. Efforts have resulted in improved teamwork within the teams, integrated support to field missions in terms of operational guidance and, where appropriate, integrated planning and deployment plans as well as crisis management. A table delineating the respective responsibilities of the teams and the functional areas was developed to ensure unity and complementarity of effort, as required, as well as clear lines of communication between Headquarters and the field.

71. To address the need for the regular updating and delivery of information, the description of the role, objectives and composition of the integrated operational teams on the internal website of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is regularly updated.

72. Both the 2008 and 2009 evaluations of the integrated operational teams pointed out that the flexible utilization of team resources would better serve the needs of field missions. The Office of Operations has coordinated the assignment of integrated operational team specialist officers with their functional units to optimize the use of these resources across the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support.

73. Finally, the reviews recognized that due to the overstretching of personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, dedicated functional specialists from the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division have not been sufficiently included in the work of the teams. Efforts are under way to address this finding, including through their active participation in integrated mission task forces to bring the United Nations family together to plan for and implement mission mandates.

2. Office of Military Affairs

74. The overall conclusions of the report of the Secretary-General on the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/572) are that the strengthened Office of Military Affairs is now capable of providing increased strategic direction, oversight and situational awareness; identifying and helping to fill essential gaps in United Nations military policy and doctrine; and facilitating cessation of Strategic Military Cell operations by the target date of 30 June 2010. The Office also has developed a limited mission start-up, surge and crisis response capability. More specifically the creation of the Assessment Team in the Office of Military Affairs will increase the level of information-sharing between that Office and other components of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, such as the Situation Centre as well as the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Field Support, to ensure the widest spectrum of threat analysis, all of which contribute to greater information-sharing between the Member States, the Security Council and the Secretariat.
3. **Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions**

75. The establishment of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in July 2007 has fostered an integrated approach to mandated tasks in the areas of policing, justice and corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and mine action and supported the development of guidance, training and tools that will improve the delivery of rule of law and security institution mandates in the field. The General Assembly endorsed the strengthening of the Police Division in 2009. The 17 Professional and 2 General Staff posts approved, of a recommended 26 posts, should be filled by 2010. The Division is prioritizing the strengthening of its recruitment, selection and planning capabilities. Additional strengthening will be required to meet critical operational demands and support the increased number of police officers on the ground.

76. The components of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions collaborate in joint assessment missions; joint communications and operational guidance to the field; joint briefings of Member States; and integrated training and guidance materials development. Components assist each other and share resources to support missions more efficiently and draw on each other’s experiences as documented in lessons learned studies. The participation of various components in inter-agency forums convened by other components has helped to build a shared identity for the Office and has strengthened the work of these forums. The Office is also conducting joint assessment missions and programmes with its United Nations partners (the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

B. **Consultation and reporting to troop- and police-contributing countries**

77. A critical element of effective Secretariat management is timely and comprehensive communication with Member States. In 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support took a number of important steps to improve Secretariat consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries and to ensure that the Secretariat contributes to the full implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 1353 (2001). Secretariat and field mission personnel have been instructed to ensure that briefings of troop- and police-contributing countries are organized in a timely fashion, particularly ahead of mission mandate renewals and Secretariat technical assessment missions. Such consultations should be well planned and coordinated, with agendas circulated in advance to facilitate discussion. Reports of the Secretary-General on missions should reflect the scope of relevant consultations with contributing countries at field and Headquarters levels.

78. While this is still a work in progress, the Secretariat is committed to enhancing relations with troop- and police-contributing countries. The knowledge, expertise and information that contributing countries bring are essential for the successful planning, management and oversight of peacekeeping missions.

79. The quality and efficiency of Secretariat reporting to Member States is another aspect of effective communication. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have initiated a study on reporting on United
Nations peacekeeping operations with a view to enhancing the quality of reports provided to Member States and, at the same time, developing an efficient and manageable reporting framework for missions. The study is taking stock of the reporting stream from mission to Headquarters, as well as written reports and formal briefings by the Secretariat to Member States. As part of this exercise, the views of Member States will be sought. Resulting recommendations for the revised reporting framework will aim at improving the quality and effectiveness of all reporting products and reducing duplicative reporting streams, many of which demand significant mission resources.

C. **Strengthened management, oversight and accountability**

80. The effort to strengthen the management, oversight and accountability of United Nations peacekeeping and broader field support activities has included an additional 11 business process improvement projects, to be completed in January 2010, in areas such as finance, logistics, human resources management and information and communications technology.

81. Efforts to strengthen accountability frameworks will be furthered in 2010 with the extension of the performance compact to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, heads of mission and their deputies.

D. **Conduct and discipline**

82. Over the past years, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries have made significant progress in combating sexual exploitation and abuse and other types of misconduct by all categories of peacekeeping personnel. In 2007 and 2008, there was a marked reduction of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations. However, we remain extremely vigilant. Force and contingent commanders in particular have continued to implement strong preventive measures to ensure strict adherence to our zero-tolerance policy. Statistical information on the status of conduct and discipline has been made available on the Conduct and Discipline Unit website (http://cdu.unlb.org/).

83. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have devoted considerable energy to conduct and discipline training for field missions personnel. Most uniformed personnel receive such training either before or immediately after deployment. Oversight of such activities has been strengthened to ensure that all personnel receive the appropriate conduct and discipline training. New comprehensive pre-deployment and induction training material was developed and piloted in 2009.

84. The revised model memorandum of understanding, endorsed by the General Assembly in 2007, provides that the responsibility for investigating allegations of misconduct involving members of military contingents, and for taking subsequent disciplinary actions, rests with the troop-contributing countries. In the past years, troop-contributing countries have deputized a number of national investigation officers to investigate allegations of serious misconduct. The feedback from troop- and police-contributing countries on action taken as a result of substantiated allegations remains limited, however, and this in turn affects the ability of the United Nations to show effective enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy. I call
upon all Member States, therefore, to provide such information to the United Nations.

VI. Observations

85. The past year has seen the start of a strong and constructive dialogue among the peacekeeping partners — the troop- and police-contributing countries represented in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council and the Secretariat. This has been an important and necessary first step in identifying a shared set of priorities for the strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping and translating them into practical actions that yield concrete results in the field. The New Horizon process is the Secretariat's contribution to this dialogue. Our goal is to reinvigorate the peacekeeping partnership and thereby to chart a course for United Nations peacekeeping in the future.

86. Each partner has a role to play in realizing this ambitious vision. Ten years ago, the Special Committee played a unique role in taking forward an agenda for strengthening United Nations peacekeeping on the basis of proposals set out in the Brahimi report. The fruits of these reform efforts have been seen in the growth and expansion of United Nations peacekeeping and in successful mandate implementation. Ten years later, I can think of no better way to mark this anniversary than the endorsement by the Special Committee of a renewed partnership agenda to take United Nations peacekeeping forward to meet the challenges of the next 10 years.

87. The priorities that I have set out in this report reflect our dialogue to date. They are the start, not the end, of our reform effort. I call upon the Special Committee to help us make this first step, including by helping us to implement the measures outlined below.

88. We need to achieve greater clarity on the scope of the protection of civilians mandates. A basic operational concept is critical for the effective performance of this crucial task.

89. A related priority is to develop a concept note defining the scope and practical implications of robust peacekeeping so as to provide a basis for guidance and better address the training, logistics and other aspects of support for robust peacekeeping.

90. Another area of great importance is to clarify the role of peacekeeping operations in contributing to wider peacebuilding efforts. This can be achieved by identifying critical early peacebuilding tasks for peacekeepers and developing a strategy for their prioritization, sequencing and rapid and effective implementation. Such a strategy, as well as an expanded standing police capacity, complemented with justice and corrections experts, would be important steps to enable a synergized early peacebuilding effort.

91. A comprehensive approach should be developed to generating immediate and sustainable future capabilities on the basis of clear roles and performance standards linked to adequate training, incentives and support. To increase the efficient usage of available capabilities, interoperability with regional organizations should be improved.
92. To support the improved delivery of the mandated tasks, a global field support strategy has been developed that will transform service delivery to the field over the next five years. The aim is to expedite and improve support for field missions, including through improved safety and living conditions of personnel, and to strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale.

93. To implement increasingly robust mandates in hostile environments, it is crucial to take all measures to ensure that missions are adequately resourced to provide for the safety and security of personnel, including through improved information gathering and situational awareness using modern monitoring and surveillance techniques.

94. Only together can we achieve these improvements and continue our efforts to successfully bring peace and security to the thousands of children, women and men around the globe who look to United Nations peacekeeping as their only hope. Therefore, I count upon your continued support for a strong peacekeeping partnership.