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**Report of the Peacebuilding Commission**

**Report of the Secretary-General on the  
Peacebuilding Fund**

**Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit**

**Strengthening of the United Nations system**

## **Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict**

### **I. Introduction**

1. In 2009 I submitted my report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) to the Security Council and the General Assembly. I outlined how the United Nations and the international community could support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. In its subsequent presidential statement of 22 July 2009 (S/PRST/2009/23), the Council invited me to report within 12 months on progress achieved in fulfilling the agenda for action set out in that report, taking into consideration the views of the Peacebuilding Commission. Accordingly, following consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission on 23 June 2010, I am submitting the present report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The challenges that the international community faces in peacebuilding have not diminished since my last report. Indeed, the current agenda of the Security Council reflects their range and depth, from Timor-Leste to Sierra Leone or Nepal, where the emphasis is on consolidating progress towards lasting peace and preventing any relapse into conflict, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Chad, where the peacekeeping operations that directly enable continued peacebuilding efforts face unique challenges. Even in country situations as diverse as post-earthquake Haiti, or the Sudan after the expected referendum, where meeting urgent humanitarian needs or securing stability are the most immediate demands, our underlying long-term challenge remains how to build sustainable peace.



3. I welcome therefore the increasing emphasis that Member States are placing on the need to ensure the sustainability of the international community's peacebuilding efforts. I share the determination of Member States, clearly expressed in the recent debates of the Security Council on peacebuilding and on transitions from peacekeeping, to support more effectively the efforts of post-conflict countries to make a decisive shift to an enduring peace. The preparations for the Group of Eight summit in 2010 and the World Bank *World Development Report 2011* likewise show the importance the international community attaches to the prevention of violence and sustainable peacebuilding.

4. Peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility. But the international community, including the United Nations, has a critical role to play in supporting the national agenda. Our response must be a collective effort, with all the pillars of the United Nations — peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian — fully engaged in support of a common vision. International standards, including human rights standards, must underpin all the efforts of the international community. My last report set out an ambitious agenda for action that called for stronger leadership, more effective strategies and planning, strengthening our coordination within the United Nations system and our capacity to deliver, predictable deployment of civilian capacities, more productive United Nations-World Bank engagement, furthering national ownership, strengthening national capacity development and improving peacebuilding financing. Across this broad agenda we have taken steps towards strengthening the United Nations response while advocating for an earlier, more coherent response from the wider international community.

5. Progress has been made in several areas, including leadership, civilian capacity, financing and increasing system-wide coherence. But we still have a long way to go. The strategic and management changes needed at Headquarters to enable the United Nations to deliver more effectively will take longer than one year to translate into real impact on the ground. In some areas, such as predictability of response and national capacity development, much greater efforts are required with and from our international partners, including other key multilaterals such as the international financial institutions and Member States, regional organizations and civil society, to reach agreement on how we will work together to address the continuing challenges. Our impact in country will be greater when complemented by a more coherent response from the international community.

6. Events of the last year have presented many opportunities for implementing this agenda, in country situations that range from the immediate aftermath of conflict, longer-term peace consolidation, and the transitional periods in between. This progress report includes examples of our experience from these diverse contexts because they all yield useful lessons for that crucial immediate post-conflict period.

7. The support of Member States for my report last year created valuable momentum towards implementing my agenda for action, which I gratefully acknowledge. Member States are key stakeholders in peacebuilding and share the responsibility for its success. I rely on them, therefore, to play their part in our collective effort — not just through the commitment of resources, but through coherent, consistent and sustained participation in all the various peacebuilding forums.

## II. Effective leadership, coordination and accountability

8. One of the core elements of the agenda for action in my last report was the need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground. Identifying and deploying individuals with the requisite knowledge and experience in post-conflict or post-crisis settings remain a critical challenge. I consider it a priority to ensure that suitably qualified leaders are deployed as early as necessary and that senior leadership teams are functioning effectively and are held accountable.

9. Over the past year, efforts have been made to better assist in bridging leadership gaps in field missions. Seasoned managers from across the United Nations system have been deployed more systematically at short notice, for short periods of time, to bridge these gaps. Effective examples can be seen in the dispatch of temporary leadership to the missions in Haiti, Somalia, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Afghanistan. In Haiti, where a fragile, conflict-prone country suffered a devastating earthquake that took the lives of my Special Representative, the Deputy Special Representative, the Police Commissioner and many other key staff, I immediately dispatched two of my most senior officials to fill the gap, supported by teams of strong staff. We will continue to build on and learn from these cases by increasing the pool of individuals with the necessary range of skills and experience who can be called upon to undertake these temporary assignments.

10. Our experience in Haiti also illustrates the importance of reinforcing leaders with properly equipped and trained teams of experts. Multidisciplinary teams with expertise in peacekeeping planning and mission support, including former staff of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with valuable local knowledge and experience, were deployed jointly by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. United Nations agencies, too, rapidly deployed staff with relevant experience, including senior experts to support the post-disaster needs assessment. I reiterate my request to Member States to support my initiative to create and train unified teams of experts, from across the United Nations system, to support senior leaders deployed in the immediate aftermath of conflict or other fragile situations. This is vital to crafting coherent peacebuilding strategies from the very start.

11. To reinforce these efforts to deploy the right leadership, a senior level mechanism has been introduced at Headquarters to help ensure that leadership teams in the field, in integrated settings, function effectively and to troubleshoot in instances where they do not. This collective approach will enable Headquarters to better address the range of issues faced by senior United Nations representatives and promote more integrated and effective leadership teams on the ground.

12. In order to strengthen my senior leaders' accountability, I have extended the application of the senior manager's compact to leaders of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The field compact has been aligned with the senior manager's compact at Headquarters for consistency in the assessment of leadership performance across the Organization. At the same time, the field compact has been tailored to ensure its relevance to the field, and to improve coherence between mission and Headquarters leadership in support of mandate implementation. All senior managers of peacekeeping operations and special political missions will have completed their compacts by June 2010.

13. In my last report I noted that stronger, more effective leadership in the field requires improved guidance and support from Headquarters. In this regard, the Integration Steering Group, which includes the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors across the United Nations system, has provided new guidance and minimum standards for Headquarters-based task forces charged with providing coherent policy guidance for peace consolidation in 18 countries where there is both a Mission and a United Nations country team. These task forces now include field colleagues and can act as important drivers of a coherent United Nations approach during challenging periods or transitions. They meet regularly at the Director and even the Principal level in response to crises or to plan future strategies.

14. We have also taken action to improve Headquarters support to resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, focusing particularly on countries facing complex political challenges that do not have a resident United Nations peacekeeping or political mission. United Nations Headquarters representatives and resident coordinators convened in October 2009 to discuss how United Nations country teams can help national counterparts to manage or resolve emerging challenges, and what support they need from Headquarters to do so. As a result, efforts are under way to strengthen cooperation between United Nations Headquarters and country teams, including more systematic communication, operational assistance and technical expertise, and enhanced training for Headquarters and field staff.

15. This new approach was applied in Guinea, for example, where the United Nations has worked closely with regional and international partners to support an inclusive, peaceful return to constitutional order following the military's seizure of power in December 2008. The office of the Resident Coordinator was strengthened with expertise in mediation, strategic planning, external communications, advocacy, electoral assistance, and project implementation. Allocations from the Peacebuilding Fund were reprogrammed in support of the transitional framework agreed in January 2010, including funding for the Joint Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-African Union-United Nations security sector assessment, with additional funding to assist the ECOWAS-led mediation efforts by President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is opening a country office in Guinea to help the Government address the underlying causes of violence and instability. The United Nations system on the ground in Conakry is now better positioned to support Guinea in addressing its transition priorities.

16. Similarly, following the coup in Honduras in June 2009, the Resident Coordinator received additional support from Headquarters. A joint UNDP-Department of Political Affairs mission was dispatched to assist the country team in reviewing and adapting its governance programmes. A senior official from the Department of Political Affairs participated in a high-level visit of the Organization of American States (OAS) to Honduras in October 2009 to facilitate dialogue between the parties, and a consultant has now been deployed to support the process of reconciliation and national dialogue.

17. Progress has also been made in enhancing the analysis and planning capacities of Resident Coordinators' offices. A mechanism has been created to fund a core group of experts who can be deployed to Resident Coordinators' offices on a longer-

term basis, following on from temporary deployments, thus ensuring continuity of support. Experts have deployed to seven countries so far, including Nepal, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.

### **III. Assessment, planning and strategy**

18. In my last report I stressed the need for the United Nations to improve its ability to agree on and deliver a critical set of priorities for early post-conflict environments. These priority areas span development, peace and security and human rights, reflecting the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature of these areas, as repeatedly emphasized by Member States, including in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. In the past year, we have made significant progress towards developing integrated strategies for peace consolidation. However, earlier attention and stronger planning capacities are needed to achieve the goal set out in my last report: to agree rapidly on a common approach in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The challenge of preserving humanitarian space in these situations adds to the complexity of coordinating a response.

19. Efforts in this area are supported by the new United Nations system-wide guidelines for the Integrated Missions Planning Process, which are mandatory in 18 locations with a United Nations Mission and United Nations country team.<sup>1</sup> These new guidelines, endorsed by the full range of peace and security, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors within the United Nations system, set standards for Headquarters and field-based integrated strategy and planning. They include two significant changes that complement my agenda for action: first, the requirement for senior leadership teams to directly oversee and drive integration processes with the aim of improving the collective peacebuilding effort of the United Nations; and, second, the development of integrated strategic frameworks for peace consolidation that promote mutual accountability by attributing roles and responsibilities to individual agencies and the Mission. In Liberia, for example, detailed operational workplans drawn up under the combined United Nations Development Assistance Framework/integrated strategic framework are used by my Special Representative to identify resource gaps and track delivery rates. The most recent integrated strategic framework exercise, in the occupied Palestinian territory, where roles and responsibilities were already fairly clear, facilitated agreement about how the different strategic activities would be implemented. These initial integrated strategic framework exercises are also revealing the inherent challenge in preparing common frameworks that bring together Missions and United Nations agencies, with their varied budget sources and planning cycles, and thereafter ensuring adequate and timely financial resources for the key priorities.

20. Early lessons learned on United Nations transitions and reconfigurations in the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic integrated peacebuilding missions, as well as the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Nepal, point to the inadequate nature of the financing arrangements for these types of special political missions in the field. The lack of pre-mandate commitment

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<sup>1</sup> Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Haiti.

authority and access to predictable and adequate resources meant that ad hoc arrangements were needed to conduct these complex exercises, creating significant obstacles to the smooth and timely establishment of the new missions, integration with others, and implementation of their mandates. There is a compelling need to address this, particularly since the Security Council increasingly relies on such missions to support critical political and peace consolidation processes, including protecting peacekeeping investments. I intend to submit proposals to the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly to address this fundamental gap in our collective ability to successfully field these missions.

21. In my last report I encouraged my senior representatives in country to convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and to develop early strategy and action plans to address immediate national priorities. Over the past year we have tried to apply this approach in countries undergoing various forms of crisis. In Guinea the United Nations was able to use Peacebuilding Fund resources to kick-start a common peacebuilding approach: to develop a short-term strategic plan that focused on supporting the political process, humanitarian needs, security sector reform and human rights; and, by adjusting the Peacebuilding Fund priority plan, to respond to emerging needs, including help for victims of sexual violence and strengthening capacity to prevent sexual violence in future.

22. In early 2009 the United Nations response to the Djibouti Peace Agreement and the inauguration of a new Somali President showed its ability quickly to produce a prioritized, costed action plan, in conjunction with the World Bank, given effective coordination between the Resident Coordinator and senior mission leadership, and with Member States. However, the subsequent difficulty of attracting new funds to implement the identified priorities shows the importance of Member States' readiness to be flexible and tolerant of risk in cases of similar urgency.

23. In the wake of a crisis, an immediate United Nations response will be needed, including on the future of United Nations programming, and even before an early strategy can be developed, as for example after the coups in Honduras and Madagascar. I have instituted a policy to establish an interdepartmental working group within 24 hours of any unconstitutional change in government, in order to determine a strategic response. Notwithstanding the urgency, these must still be collective decisions involving Headquarters and the field, reflecting an understanding of country needs and United Nations capacities and space for action.

24. This strategic planning at Headquarters must be backed up by corresponding coordination structures in the field. After the Haiti earthquake, despite initial difficulties in coordinating a system-wide response, MINUSTAH and the country team worked together to undertake an integrated strategic planning process that informed a rapid review of the Mission mandate. This forms an early basis for an integrated strategic framework, which should be aligned to the emerging national planning process. While our aim should be to support nationally owned planning processes, we saw in Haiti how difficult it is to realize true national ownership when national capacity has been devastated. In such cases we must avoid the trap of diverting too much national capacity to the planning process too early, thus depriving Governments of the capacity they need to carry out their essential functions.

25. Thorough conflict analyses are vital in identifying the most urgent peacebuilding priorities. The post-conflict needs assessment, a critical tool for bringing the international community together around common priorities, has been adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), the World Bank and the European Commission as a common and joint methodology. Efforts have been made to expand this partnership to other regional institutions such as the African Development Bank. A joint expert roster and training is being developed in order to provide more coordinated, timely and predictable support to post-conflict needs assessment exercises.

#### **IV. National capacity development**

26. In my last report, I emphasized national capacity development as the cornerstone of all peacebuilding efforts. National leadership is crucial because it enables national actors to set priorities and engage international partners in support of a common vision. Developing capacity at subnational and local levels is also essential. Women's capacities to engage in decision-making or contribute to economic recovery, which are often overlooked, require particular attention.

27. To achieve these ambitious goals, more must be done to mainstream national capacity development as a system-wide priority and to integrate short-term interventions into longer-term strategies for peacebuilding. For example, with financing from the Peacebuilding Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Nepal has supported community-based programmes that help children associated with armed groups reintegrate into their communities. In addition to helping over 10,000 individual children since 2009, of whom 39 per cent are girls, support is also provided to community structures, including 195 schools, thus developing local capacity to prevent conflicts from recurring.

28. But such approaches have to be mainstreamed from the very start. In the immediate post-conflict period in Liberia, the United Nations and the World Bank initially tried to address the widespread lack of national capacity by injecting technical experts, many from the Liberian diaspora, into critical government offices. While these secondments are considered to have been necessary and largely successful, they were not always designed to build local capacity. The resulting gap is being addressed only now by a newly developed capacity development strategy that will be monitored by a permanent Government Office for Capacity Development.

29. The international review of civilian capacity now under way is founded on the premise that deployment of international experts should always be based on an assessment of existing capacities, local and regional, and geared to support national capacity development efforts. For example, in Afghanistan, UNDP and the World Bank have supported the Capacity for Afghan Public Service, which has enabled coaches from Afghanistan and the region, including senior civil servants from India, to work alongside 22 Afghan ministries to implement institutional reform.

30. Various initiatives are under way to improve the tools and approaches of the United Nations to strengthen national capacities after conflict. The inter-agency security sector reform task force is developing practical, field-oriented guidance on priority areas, including supporting national ownership and international coordination of security sector reform processes. A roster of security sector reform

specialists is now available for short-term deployments. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing guidance for Civil Affairs Officers on capacity strengthening for local authorities and supporting national ownership. The post-conflict needs assessment toolkit is being expanded to help conduct capacity assessments and identify capacity development priorities that integrate political, security, economic and social aspects of recovery. UNDP is testing and adapting its capacity assessment, programming and measurement approaches, in order to make the UNDG capacity development methodology more applicable in post-conflict situations.

31. There continues to be a serious gap in national capacities to ensure a stable transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development: the inability of national and community level actors to manage or resolve new or recurrent tensions that might spark renewed conflict. The United Nations has accelerated work to address this gap, developing guidance and training programmes to reinforce national capacity in conflict management, from natural resources to implementation of peace agreements. The Civil Affairs components of United Nations peace operations devote increasing attention to strengthening national capacity to manage inter-community conflict, drawing on existing local capacity. In Liberia, the joint programme on country support team combines the local presence of Civil Affairs components with the programmatic expertise of five United Nations agencies to support county and district administration across Liberia. In Darfur, the United Nations has supported the unique role of the native administration in resolving community disputes and has enhanced access to justice and dispute resolution through 15 legal aid centres across the Sudan. And in Nepal, the United Nations has worked to pre-empt tensions during elections by assessing high-risk areas in advance and deploying civil affairs teams there. In advance of the referendum in southern Sudan, national United Nations volunteers are being deployed to help communities reach lasting agreements over land and water and to resolve local tensions before they turn violent. In Burundi, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) implemented a Peacebuilding Fund project to strengthen the capacity of the National Commission for Land and other Properties. The project resolved over 2,000 land conflict cases, prompting a substantial increase in the number of refugees returning from the United Republic of Tanzania for whom land disputes had been a major concern.

## **V. Women and peacebuilding**

32. My report last year emphasized that more concerted efforts were needed to address women's post-conflict needs and to increase opportunities for women to engage in decision-making and economic recovery. At the request of the Security Council, I am preparing a report that will lay out an agenda for action, which should be implemented and monitored as an integral part of this broader peacebuilding agenda. Recommendations in that report will address boosting the role of women in mediation processes; ensuring United Nations operations have adequate personnel to address women's post-conflict priorities effectively; enhancing women's participation in politics and elected office; and increasing the level of post-conflict financing devoted to promoting women's empowerment.

33. In the meantime, good progress has been made towards tracking gender-related allocations in United Nations-managed pooled funds. A gender marker was

introduced in the revised guidelines of the Peacebuilding Fund. The Fund, which to date has allocated 13 per cent of its expenditure to projects that target women beneficiaries and aim to advance gender equality, intends to increase allocations in this area significantly. UNDP now scores all project outputs based on their expected contribution to gender equality. Preliminary analysis suggests that, of 5,820 projects, 22.3 per cent (representing 31 per cent of the budget) were expected to significantly contribute to gender equality. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has piloted a gender marker in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen and Ethiopia, to be rolled out in 2010. UNICEF will also test a gender marker in various locations in 2010. These pilots show that the marker not only helps track gender expenditures, but also improves gender mainstreaming in projects and helps advocate for increased funding.

## **VI. Predictable international support: an effective United Nations response**

34. In my last report I stressed that national and international efforts in the early post-conflict period should ensure predictable support in the core priority areas of peacebuilding: basic safety and security; support to political processes; the provision of basic services; restoring core government functions; and economic revitalization. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, where the Government launched in June 2009 a stabilization and reconstruction plan in conflict-affected areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, national and international partners chose to adapt the existing United Nations strategy as the primary mechanism for international assistance. The strategy was revised to focus on security, political processes, the restoration of State authority and sustainable return and reintegration, with a cross-cutting focus on combating sexual violence. Support to reform of the security sector and the justice and corrections sector, as well as efforts to create livelihoods and promote agricultural productivity, have helped build security and stability. Coordinated efforts by the World Food Programme and UNICEF have helped the reintegration of child soldiers through schooling, feeding and protection programmes.

35. Some progress has been made towards ensuring predictable support in these core areas, but much remains to be done. Arrangements already exist within the United Nations to deliver a more predictable response on rule-of-law assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; mine action; mediation; and electoral assistance. These arrangements are being reviewed at a senior level, with the reviews of mine action and mediation already completed.

36. In some areas, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mediation, mine action and electoral support, the internal policy, guidelines and division of labour among United Nations entities are relatively well developed. Building on the good practice of the United Nations focal point for electoral support, focal points for each thematic area should act as a service provider to the United Nations system, with the provision of commensurate resources, and as a source of comparative knowledge and specialist expertise, including standing capacity and expert rosters, on which the whole United Nations system, national authorities, regional organizations, civil society actors and others may call. For example, the review of arrangements on mediation is focused on reinforcing the role

of the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs as a global service provider, having provided operational support to 23 peace processes and capacity-building for national actors, United Nations and regional organizations.

37. But even in the areas where there is a reasonable degree of internal clarity, we face other obstacles to predictability and effectiveness on the ground, such as a lack of predictable, flexible and sufficient funding; human resource procedures that hamper flexibility and rapid deployment; a shortage of deployable specialized capacities; or the challenge of coordinating a multiplicity of actors beyond the United Nations. Moreover, in mine action, the internal policy has not always provided sufficient coordination authority to ensure rapid, predictable and effective delivery in complex post-conflict environments, and it will be under review by inter-agency mine action partners. And in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the clear division of labour among actors in peacekeeping operations is not yet equally well established in integrated peacebuilding missions.

38. In the case of electoral assistance, the newly established inter-agency coordination mechanism for United Nations electoral assistance and the revised note of guidance outlining the respective roles and responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP have helped further to clarify roles and responsibilities, but more needs to be done. Given the complexity, cost and high profile associated with Security Council-mandated electoral activities, the lead role of the United Nations focal point needs to be established more firmly. Moreover, the variety of actors outside the United Nations presents a broader challenge of coordination, particularly in translating clearer arrangements at Headquarters to activities in the field. I recommend that the Security Council, when mandating the United Nations to provide electoral assistance, also mandate the United Nations to assist the relevant host country authority in coordinating efforts.

39. In areas where the reviews of existing arrangements are still ongoing, such as security sector reform and rule of law, the reviews are focusing on global roles and responsibilities, as well as addressing the challenges of capacity and delivery at the country level. Notwithstanding the successful examples of United Nations assistance to rule of law on the ground, for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and the Sudan, efforts to ensure predictable delivery in core peacebuilding areas are still hampered by the lack of quickly deployable expert capacity, inadequate donor funding and coordination, and a multiplicity of funding sources that fail to ensure sustained and coordinated support to all critical actors. In this regard, I call upon Member States to support the overall coordination role of the United Nations in core peacebuilding areas, where mandated, at the country level. The coordination of disparate efforts in support of a nationally owned strategy is a prerequisite for ensuring lasting progress in each of these areas.

40. In sum, our analysis so far reveals that clear roles and responsibilities at the global level promote predictability of delivery, and that having a focal point for each thematic area as a resource for planners and United Nations leaders in the field helps ensure coverage of gaps. On the one hand, the United Nations needs practical flexibility based on country-level capacities and presence, and, on the other hand, it would be important to establish clarity in those areas where it is lacking, particularly rule-of-law assistance and security sector reform, including through completing the reviews of current arrangements.

41. In my last report I noted some additional areas where further clarity and predictability are needed. In the area of public administration, a review of country experiences in post-conflict public administration will be conducted with the World Bank and other partners, followed by initiatives to strengthen United Nations capacity, including the improvement of existing rosters. Contributions to this process include the 2010 report of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs entitled *Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned*. On the ground, the Civil Affairs components of various peacekeeping missions are supporting the restoration of State authority and local administration. In southern Sudan, for example, the United Nations has supported consultative processes with civil society, the transport of officials to their counties, use of local and national media to inform about the roles of government institutions and civic duties, and civic education workshops.

42. To support early employment generation, peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams have worked together in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia and elsewhere to provide jobs for thousands and thus build confidence in the peace process. In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has helped develop livelihoods for children formerly associated with armed groups, and their families, through vocational training and other critical skills. To enable a more systematic approach, an inter-agency task force led by the International Labour Organization and UNDP has produced a policy paper and an operational guidance note on post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration. It aims to help translate emergency employment programmes into sustainable national employment strategies, with particular attention to women and youth. Implementing this policy across the system will require resources to establish a dedicated team to support employment programming in post-conflict countries; stronger partnerships with other United Nations entities and the World Bank; and close collaboration with the Peacebuilding Fund to kick-start programmes for employment creation.

43. Regarding the reintegration of returnees (internally displaced persons and refugees) in the immediate aftermath of conflict, an inter-agency team led by UNDP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNHCR is cataloguing current efforts and gaps in support of reintegration, with the aim of agreeing on an inter-agency framework for reintegration; strengthening coordinated planning and delivery in the field; and addressing the need for timely and efficient funding in the transition phase. For example, continued funding is essential to support the health and education services being provided by the humanitarian agencies in southern Sudan, vitally important to building stability and encouraging the return of those displaced by conflict. I urge Member States to continue to support United Nations efforts aimed at sustaining voluntary return and reintegration.

44. I wish to highlight two areas of increasing concern where greater efforts will be needed to deliver a more effective United Nations response. First, natural resources: a recent study by the United Nations Environment Programme concluded that 40 per cent of internal conflicts over a 60-year period were associated with land and natural resources, and that this link doubles the risk of conflict relapse in the first five years. Efforts have been made to draw early attention to these risks and to improve inter-agency coordination to address them, including by strengthening national capacity to prevent disputes over land and natural resources, as described in paragraph 31 above. Examples include programmes in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Sudan, where coordination among several United Nations entities

addressing land and natural resource management has demonstrated the importance of an inclusive approach. In order to further deliver on the ground I call on Member States and the United Nations system to make questions of natural resource allocation, ownership and access an integral part of peacebuilding strategies.

45. Second, organized crime and trafficking networks pose increasing risks to the stability of State institutions and to the entire justice and security architecture in countries recovering from conflict or other crises. In West Africa, for example, a vicious cycle has developed where weak rule of law allows the proliferation of illicit activities controlled by organized criminal groups, which in turn undermine peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. Failure to address these challenges threatens a relapse into conflict and instability for the States and the region. Strengthened regional approaches, much greater international cooperation and stronger inter-agency cooperation are needed now. I welcome efforts to support the implementation of the ECOWAS action plan to combat transnational organized crime through the inter-agency West African Coast Initiative.

46. The World Bank has significant expertise in certain core peacebuilding areas, including public administration and public finance, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic revitalization. Both the United Nations and the World Bank recognize that we should aim to maximize the effectiveness of our collective response to crisis or post-crisis situations. In this regard, we both acknowledge that effective response entails accountability and further clarity about our roles and responsibilities. In the field, allocation of roles and responsibilities will continue to be guided by relative resources, presence on the ground and the views of the host Government. This will help maximize efficiency, effectiveness and coherence with other actors. As emphasized in my last report, however, I continue to believe that gaps in global capacity must also be assessed globally, so that appropriate capacities are built and United Nations leaders in the field or national actors know where to go when they need specific resources or expertise.

## **VII. Predictable international support: strengthening civilian capacities**

47. In my last report, I emphasized that rapid and effective support to countries emerging from conflict requires augmenting existing capacity on the ground and deploying additional international civilian capacity. Such capacities exist within the United Nations, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and non-governmental organizations. The challenge is to ensure that the efforts of these entities to deploy civilians are coordinated and coherent; that capacity corresponds to demand; and that the international community more effectively leverages capacities in the global South and among women. I therefore recommended that the United Nations undertake a review of international civilian capacity, to analyse how to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts available to meet these needs.

48. The review has begun, under my auspices, through the Peacebuilding Support Office. I have established a senior advisory group, led by former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno, that includes two of my Special Representatives of the Secretary-General from peace operations, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, and senior representatives from Member States and civil society. The review is consulting broadly across host

nations and Member States, civil society, field and Headquarters staff of the entire United Nations family, including the international financial institutions, donor agencies and technical cooperation entities.

49. The overall goal of the review is to strengthen the availability, the deployability and the appropriateness of civilian capacities for peacebuilding across the entire United Nations system. It will develop recommendations in various areas, including changes within the United Nations, to ensure that civilian capacities can be deployed effectively and efficiently across the United Nations family, with special attention to gender equity; frameworks to improve linkages between the United Nations, regional entities and Member States; ideas for how to strengthen and leverage civilian capacities from the global South and from among women; and strategies for ensuring that the deployment of civilian experts serves to develop sustainable national capacity. The review will also aim to leverage initiatives already under way among Member States and regional organizations, through regional consultations in which the senior advisory group will be actively involved.

50. The review is deeply into its first phase, drawing lessons directly from countries emerging from conflict and relevant United Nations field operations. Even at this early stage it is becoming increasingly clear that the international community struggles to consistently assess both local needs and existing local capacities, including the capacity to absorb assistance, before deploying international capacities. Augmenting national capacity with international expertise is often required in some critical areas, but it should be paired with capacity development and should have a clear timeline and exit strategy.

51. Initial findings focus on changes to be made within the United Nations in relation to capacity gaps, capacity development, and the challenges presented by the United Nations human resources management system in meeting the unique requirements of the immediate aftermath of conflict. In this context, significant changes are in progress to reform the recruitment and the selection system for Secretariat staff serving in field missions. This includes new contractual arrangements under one series of staff rules, which have enabled the integration of the field and Headquarters into one global secretariat. This new system will allow the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support to laterally move staff between field missions and between Headquarters and field missions, thereby facilitating faster deployments within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to meet some of the needs presented in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

52. However, post-conflict situations are often non-family duty stations, and the lack of harmonized conditions of service within the United Nations system, especially for staff serving in non-family duty stations, has been a major obstacle to the ability of the United Nations to respond quickly to requests for specialized personnel in the immediate aftermath of conflict and to mobility within the wider United Nations system. This has been further exacerbated by difficult security environments, which have a negative impact on the ability of the United Nations to maintain operations in the countries where we are most needed. A review is therefore being conducted by the International Civil Service Commission on the conditions of service in non-family duty stations for the entire United Nations system. Ensuring the recruitment and the retention of staff in these situations is of utmost priority. In this context, it is also critical to ensure that conditions of service

being applied for staff members in non-family duty stations do not deteriorate. On this basis, I request the General Assembly to take action at its sixty-fifth session to address conditions of service in non-family duty stations in the United Nations common system.

53. A further challenge in the immediate aftermath of conflict is to secure highly specialized expertise on a short-term basis. To do so, the Organization needs to have the option of partnering with others, the capacity for enhanced and targeted outreach, and flexible funding and contracting modalities. The civilian capacities review is therefore also examining how to leverage initiatives under way among Member States and regional organizations. In this regard, the review will also examine the recruitment and the deployment models within the wider United Nations family, particularly those used by the humanitarian agencies to boost initial response capacity in the wake of natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies.

54. In my previous report I noted the value of standing capacities, an immediate resource of experienced United Nations staff to be deployed to meet urgent operational needs. I am pleased to note that Member States endorsed my recommendation that we build on the successful experience with the standing police capacity by ensuring the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities, in order to ensure a holistic approach to strengthening the rule of law in immediate post-conflict settings. Reinforcing standing capacities in key areas such as these will be a critical part of my overall review.

55. Finally, the review will also consider the role of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, which is making an important contribution to civilian capacities for peacebuilding. Over the past year 60 per cent of its 8,000 volunteers worked in post-conflict countries. Approximately 20 per cent of Civil Affairs staff in peacekeeping missions are UNVs. The UNV programme has made peacebuilding and early recovery priorities for the 2010-2012 period, and intends to expand its roster of volunteers for core peacebuilding areas.

## **VIII. Engagement with the World Bank**

56. In my last report I reaffirmed the World Bank as a critical strategic partner of the United Nations in the initial post-conflict period. I committed to deepening the relationship and ensuring that it can be operationalized to leverage our respective strengths. Building on our 2008 Partnership Framework Agreement, I called for a mechanism for regular headquarters-level consultations on crisis and post-crisis countries of common concern, with the goal of improving our strategic coordination and collective impact.

57. We have since made progress towards closer institutional collaboration at Headquarters level. The United Nations and the World Bank are seeking to initiate a country-specific dialogue between senior officials at Headquarters and in the field on how we respond to emerging issues or concerns such as forthcoming elections or the prospect of rising tensions or economic shocks. The dialogue will be piloted in one country context with a view to its subsequent application in others. World Bank officials are invited with increasing frequency to United Nations high-level strategic policy discussions, including meetings of my Policy Committee. Senior United Nations officials receive regular briefings on key World Bank initiatives, including

the preparation of *Conflict, Security and Development: World Development Report 2011*. Joint activities include a capacity development workshop this June, part of a UNDP-World Bank State building initiative.

58. From an operational perspective, we are finalizing a programme to enhance the understanding of both institutions of the importance and modalities of joint work and to strengthen our collaboration at the country level and make it more systematic. This will comprise common analysis and assessment exercises, joint strategies and training and exchange of staff at Headquarters level. We will focus these efforts in several countries, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. In addition, 11 United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have signed the Fiduciary Principles Accord, which facilitates transfers of resources between United Nations entities and the Bank, and makes it easier to manage our multi-donor trust funds. We intend to provide joint training and support to field presences in the application of the Accord. The Bank and the United Nations are working together to include regional development banks, other regional organizations and bilateral development agencies in our operational partnership.

59. The key challenge in our partnership is to ensure that the cooperation between our institutions becomes embedded in our modus operandi, is systematic and leads to improved delivery at the country level. The World Bank and the United Nations will continue to work together towards this end, and I urge Member States to assist us by ensuring that their guidance to the two institutions is consistent and reinforces this strategic objective.

## **IX. Financing for peacebuilding**

60. Timely funding, aligned with national peacebuilding priorities, is essential for successful peacebuilding. Yet it is often lacking; hence the prescriptions in my last report for faster, more flexible, risk-tolerant funding mechanisms. I again urge donors to be bold and innovative in developing such mechanisms, and to continue to support early recovery and humanitarian assistance in the conflict and post-conflict period, thus building confidence in the peace process through visible, tangible dividends of peace.

61. The main donor forum for discussion of transition financing, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility Financing Task Team is expected to produce recommendations at the end of 2010 to increase the effectiveness of financing in transition situations. These may include improving efforts to measure transition financing across instruments and modalities, establishing a clearer link between financing instruments and national ownership, and improving the operation of pooled funding. A UNDG/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Task Team on Financing for Transition is providing a strong and coherent United Nations contribution to the International Network on Conflict and Fragility process.

62. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund is one of several multilateral funds established to pre-position resources for rapid and early disbursement. As suggested in my last report, the Fund has revised its terms of reference and guidelines. It now comprises two funding facilities, the Immediate Response Facility and the

Peacebuilding Recovery Facility, which are focused on four areas: responding to threats to a peace process or supporting political dialogue; building national capacities to resolve conflict; economic revitalization; or re-establishing essential services. This new, simpler structure enables the Fund to provide both a flexible and an early release of funds for critical peacebuilding needs and a second catalytic release as other funds are mobilized, and in doing so to empower United Nations leaders on the ground and support a coherent, strategic response. In particular, the funding ceiling for immediate and urgent peacebuilding support has increased from \$1 million per project to \$10 million for a portfolio of projects under the new Immediate Response Facility. The Immediate Response Facility has since provided rapid funding to fill a critical gap in resources for elections in the Central African Republic and Burundi, and over \$8 million for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in southern Sudan, ahead of the 2011 referendum. Donors are increasingly participating in the country level joint steering committees, which have delegated responsibility to identify and approve projects for Peacebuilding Fund support. Such collaboration is critical if early Peacebuilding Fund intervention is to succeed in catalysing additional donor support.

63. As a result of these changes, the volume of Peacebuilding Fund allocations has increased substantially since 2009 and the targets for faster approval of project proposals and priority plans have largely been met, including approving Immediate Response Facility proposals within three weeks. The Peacebuilding Fund is now starting to address an issue raised by its Advisory Board: the need to measure outcomes and thus to demonstrate more clearly the impact of the Fund's interventions.

64. A joint donor review of the Peacebuilding Fund identified the need to clarify the comparative advantages of the existing global multi-donor trust funds and to improve their complementarity. A group of donors is now undertaking a study, in cooperation with the Peacebuilding Support Office, to examine these questions. The World Bank is conducting a study of the Bank's experience as a multi-donor trust fund manager that will also examine the partnership between the United Nations and the Bank. As for country-level pooled funding mechanisms, a review is under way, commissioned by the UNDG/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Task Team, to identify how these can contribute to greater aid effectiveness, including strengthened ownership, coordination, speed, flexibility and risk-sharing, and how to ensure coherence between several different pooled funds in one country, including humanitarian and development funds.

65. Developing national capacities to manage aid information and financial flows is important to sustainable peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Support Office and UNDP are reviewing lessons learned from the implementation of aid management systems in post-conflict situations, in order to produce guidance on how the United Nations can better support post-crisis countries in managing their aid inflows effectively. They are now designing a proposal for a web-based repository of peacebuilding-related aid information management systems data as a resource for the Peacebuilding Commission and the wider peacebuilding community.

## **X. Role of the Peacebuilding Commission**

66. In my report last year, I noted that the Peacebuilding Commission has a critical role to play in championing and promoting my agenda for action. I am heartened by their active and constructive engagement since then. For example, a recent discussion by the Commission on the international review of civilian capacity provided valuable perspectives on how the review can help devise a more coherent approach to national capacity development. Furthermore, the Commission has increasingly focused on strengthening its partnerships with the international financial institutions and regional organizations, including practical steps to institutionalize its relationship with the African Union.

67. The ongoing review of arrangements set out in the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly and the Security Council has generated political momentum and offered Member States an opportunity to engage more deeply in questions about the future of the United Nations peacebuilding agenda. I am confident that Member States will focus the review on making the Commission's impact even more tangible, especially at the country level. I believe that one means to that end is for Member States to take greater ownership of the Commission's agenda and its advice.

## **XI. Conclusions**

68. It is evident from the assessment above that considerable work remains to be done in order to implement my agenda for action and thus to support national efforts to build sustainable peace more effectively. We have seen improvements in certain areas, such as stronger and more accountable leadership. We have embarked on the essential project of strengthening civilian capacities, including the launch of the international review. We have also established United Nations system-wide standards for strategy and planning in mission settings that will, with continued effort, produce more coherent approaches to peacebuilding at the field level. But in other areas we still fall short of an effective and predictable response, including in areas fundamental to sustainable peacebuilding like close collaboration with the World Bank, predictable and norms-based delivery in core areas such as rule of law and security sector reform, and supporting national capacity development through significantly improved operational approaches. We must continue our efforts across the United Nations system to make the necessary changes and to ensure that changes at Headquarters lead to strengthened delivery in the field.

69. The United Nations cannot achieve these goals in isolation. A broader, collective effort is needed, based on strong partnerships with Member States, regional organizations, civil society, the private sector, the international financial institutions and other multilateral partners. Strengthening our relationship with the World Bank, and putting into practice on the ground the vision of collaboration and coordination expressed in our Framework Agreement, is especially important. Strong partnerships with national actors are also needed to further authentic national ownership of peacebuilding, without which we are unlikely to achieve sustainability.

70. The global economic downturn has inevitably put pressure on the availability of donor resources. It has also increased the economic challenges facing post-conflict countries. The need for timely, coherent and sustainable funding for

peacebuilding is therefore all the more important: funding that can be accessed quickly and for as long as it takes to consolidate peace, even when this is a long and difficult process. I urge Member States to make the necessary commitments to achieve this, including through the replenishment of the Peacebuilding Fund starting in 2011.

71. The various elements of this agenda for action are interdependent. If we fail to implement change in one area, progress in others will suffer. Equally, success in one area will bolster the chance of reaching our goals across the board. Fundamental to them all is consistency of support from Member States. I urge Member States to adopt consistent positions on peacebuilding issues across the various peacebuilding forums. For example, anything less than full support for my proposals for human resources reform will undercut the ability of the United Nations to deploy our staff to post-conflict and crisis situations with the necessary speed and flexibility. Likewise, if Member States do not send a clear, consistent message about clarity of roles and responsibilities — whether in the World Bank Governing Board, United Nations subsidiary bodies or elsewhere — then our goals become unclear and our direction weaker. The United Nations is strongest when its membership is united.

72. The agenda for action set out in my report last year was a huge challenge. We have made good progress towards our goals in some areas, but not enough in others. We must continue our efforts to implement the agenda in order to fulfil our commitment to deliver more effective support to peacebuilding. I am personally committed to leading this effort within the United Nations. I look to Member States, our other partners and all peacebuilding stakeholders to work with us towards that end.

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