General Assembly
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Sixty-fifth year

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and
follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations
conferences and summits in the economic, social and
related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Identical letters dated 19 July 2010 from the Permanent
Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly
and the President of the Security Council

As set out in the letter of 11 December 2009 from the President of the General
Assembly to the United Nations membership and in the letter of 17 December 2009
from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly,
we have undertaken our review of the arrangements set out in General Assembly
resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), which established
the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with paragraph 27 of those
resolutions.

We attach our report, which seeks to reflect the views expressed to us by
Member States, based on an extensive, open, transparent and inclusive process.
Over the course of the past six months, we have held three open-ended informal
consultations with the United Nations membership, wide-ranging discussions with
key actors in the United Nations system and visits and meetings aimed at consulting
a wide range of stakeholders and partners. A full list of our consultations and other
meetings is attached to the present report (see annex).

We wish to thank you for the confidence and support from you and your
predecessors throughout the process. We are grateful to Member States and
interlocutors within the United Nations system for their cooperation and support. We
also thank the Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Ms. Judy
Cheng-Hopkins, and her team at the Peacebuilding Support Office for their
assistance and cooperation.

The co-facilitators wish to emphasize the need for consideration and
implementation of the range of recommendations made in our report. No doubt you,
together with future Presidents of the Security Council and the incoming President of the General Assembly, will wish to discuss this important issue; we stand ready to offer our views as to how the implementation of our recommendations can be ensured.

(Signed) Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations

(Signed) Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations
Annex to the identical letters dated 19 July 2010 from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture

Executive summary

The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 was seen as a groundbreaking step, holding new promise for the populations of countries emerging from conflict. Five years later, despite committed and dedicated efforts, the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized. We are now at a crossroads: either there is a conscious recommitment to peacebuilding at the very heart of the work of the United Nations, or the Peacebuilding Commission settles into the limited role that has developed so far. Our consultations suggest that the membership strongly favours the former path.

Before entering the detail of the report, the co-facilitators set out half a dozen issues that frame the exercise: (a) the complexity of peacebuilding; (b) the imperative of national ownership; (c) the illusion of sequencing; (d) the urgency of resource mobilization; (e) the importance of the contribution of women; and (f) the need for connection with the field.

In the field

The report looks at the mixed experience to date with the four countries on the agenda of the Commission and notes the views of potential “agenda countries”. This field perspective brings a number of issues into relief: national ownership (in particular in the planning process) and capacity-building; developmental aspects of peacebuilding; the need for coherence and coordination; and the importance of the regional dimension. Given the widespread lack of knowledge of and misunderstanding about the Commission’s role and potential, we underline the need for an effective communications strategy.

Peacebuilding Commission role and performance

The report looks at a number of issues relating to the Organizational Committee, including its composition and representativity, and the potential for distinctive contributions by each of its membership streams. We envisage a more solid relationship between the Organizational Committee and the country-specific configurations, while allowing for the necessary flexibility. The main focus of the Organizational Committee should remain on strategic thematic issues; on building partnerships within and outside the United Nations; and on developing mutual accountability frameworks.

Regarding the country-specific configurations, we consider the challenge of how to combine innovation and vibrancy with weight and solidity. We recommend adding a country dimension to the chairing role, so as to buttress the support available to the Chair. We also recommend the establishment of country-specific configuration liaison committees in the field. We note the widespread support for possibilities of multi-tiered engagement and suggest some options in that regard.
Key relationships

To date, interaction with the Security Council has been limited and falls short of the expectations of 2005. We believe, however, that the potential now exists to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better performing Peacebuilding Commission. We consider how this might be given substance, and focus in particular on the potential for the involvement of the Commission in its relationship to the Council’s consideration of peacekeeping mandates.

The Commission’s relationships with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council also remain insufficiently developed and we recommend steps that might be taken. Regarding partnerships in general, we note a growing sense of the importance of strengthening the relationship between the United Nations and the World Bank and suggest a more structured input by the Commission at World Bank headquarters.

We consider why a more diverse range of countries has not been referred to the Commission. With respect to the preventive dimension, we note the scope offered by the existing mandate and suggest it be utilized to the full.

Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund

The report looks at issues within the Peacebuilding Support Office, where we recommend a strengthening of resources and a better use of existing resources. The weight of the Support Office within the Secretariat also needs to be enhanced; it is important that the Secretary-General put in place organizational arrangements that properly reflect the priority of peacebuilding.

Despite improvements, a stronger synergy and better communication between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund is still required.

Summing up

Our detailed report builds on high-quality inputs by the membership, the Secretariat, the wider United Nations and other stakeholders and partners, as well as the valuable insights of those who have worked to develop the Peacebuilding Commission since its inception. We believe that implementation of the report’s recommendations in an integrated manner will help to pave the way for a revitalized Peacebuilding Commission: more relevant, more flexible, better performing, more empowered, better supported, more ambitious and better understood.

Our hope is that the present review will serve as a wake-up call, helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.
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I. Framing the review

A. Introduction

Process

1. The mandate of the review has its origin in the provision of the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission whereby the new arrangements would be reviewed after a period of five years. The founding resolutions were adopted in December 2005; the co-facilitators of the review were appointed in December 2009.

2. Throughout the six months of the review process, we were heartened by the level of interest and engagement in this exercise. The groundswell of support for peacebuilding is strong and cross-regional, and encompasses government and wider political and civil society actors. The appendix to the present report summarizes the consultations held in the course of the review process, and the report attempts to capture a very wide range of inputs. Although a succinct report cannot do justice to the detail of each submission, we hope that all who gave of their time will find some reflection of their ideas.

Context

3. The co-facilitators are conscious of the weight of expectation regarding the review. While the hopes that accompanied the 2005 resolutions have yet to be realized, the needs that gave rise to those resolutions remain as great as ever. Indeed, the peacebuilding challenge continues to grow: the World Development Report 2011 will confirm that conflict remains the single most important impediment to development.

4. The review was conducted in a context of rapidly changing international realities, with inescapable consequences for the United Nations. Our consultations have brought some fundamental questions into focus: are we facing a paradigm shift in the United Nations peacekeeping model? Does a more relevant United Nations require a radical re-think of the relationship between Headquarters and the field? Are we still collectively failing to address the root causes of conflict and disproportionately focusing on the symptoms?

5. The review also coincides with key dates on the United Nations calendar. This year’s rededication to the Millennium Development Goals is provoking new and challenging debate about delivery on the targets set in 2000. The discussion on United Nations reform is intensifying, including questions about the equitable participation of the developing world in decision-making processes. Developments regarding system-wide coherence have a particular relevance for a process as multifaceted as peacebuilding.

6. A key task for the co-facilitators has been to set the appropriate boundaries for the review. A very wide interpretation of our mandate would draw us into sweeping commentary on United Nations reform issues; a very narrow one would not do justice to the scale of the challenge. In trying to find middle ground, we have seen our task as reinvigorating the vision of 2005 and making it more realizable.
The hopes of 2005

7. The principal reference point is General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), adopted simultaneously in 2005. Setting these resolutions in the context of the accompanying debate conveys a vivid sense of the hopes that attended their adoption. The new peacebuilding architecture was seen as a determined and ambitious effort to fill a critical void. The President of the General Assembly, speaking of “a genuinely historic moment”, summed up the general sentiment.

8. Although resolutions 60/180 and 1645 (2005) brought the new bodies into operation, the actual founding decision was taken at the World Summit in September 2005. The Summit deliberations in turn were grounded in a decade of earlier work. As far back as 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “An Agenda for Peace” defined and discussed peacebuilding. The debate was taken forward in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of December 2004 (see annex to A/59/565); this, in turn, informed Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s seminal 2005 report, entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” (A/59/2005). In summary: the decision to establish the new architecture was taken at the highest level, with ample advance consideration, and was attended by the highest expectations. This is the backdrop against which performance must be assessed.

How would “success” have looked in 2010?

9. Without being unduly speculative, it is reasonable to extrapolate from the 2005 resolutions and discussion how the peacebuilding architecture might have looked in 2010 if the expectations of 2005 had been fully met. One would have assumed a wider demand from countries to come on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda; that there would be a clearer sense of how the engagement of the Commission had made a difference on the ground; that peacebuilding would have a higher place among United Nations priorities; that stronger relationships would have been forged between the Commission and the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council; that the Peacebuilding Support Office would carry more weight within the Secretariat; and that the Commission would be perceived as a key actor by those outside as well as inside the United Nations system, including by the international financial institutions.

A qualified record

10. It must be squarely acknowledged that this threshold of success has not been achieved. This is not to understate what has been accomplished, and certainly not to devalue the unfailing commitment shown by many dedicated Member State representatives, especially those with chairing responsibilities, and by Secretariat staff. The new institutions are up and running; they have kept a focus on countries emerging from conflict that receive insufficient international attention and, in some cases, have promoted better planning, more inclusive political dialogue and more effective resource mobilization than would otherwise have been the case.

11. However, the momentum that carried the process forward up to and including December 2005 was not sustained. The protracted discussion on procedural issues created a hiatus. Member States that were considerably exercised about securing a seat on the Organizational Committee have not always invested commensurate
energy in discharging the responsibilities of membership. The Peacebuilding Support Office has struggled to find an identity that would enable it to fulfil an effective coordinating role on peacebuilding issues across the United Nations Secretariat.

**At the crossroads**

12. Incremental improvements have undoubtedly occurred during the lifetime of the new institutions. Successive Peacebuilding Commission Chairs and Chairs of country-specific configurations have worked with devotion and with some success to enhance the relevance of the Commission’s work. The Peacebuilding Fund has been reviewed twice. The Peacebuilding Support Office, also benefiting from dedicated leadership, has begun to settle in, and some important outputs have been or are currently being prepared.

13. However, something more is required if the vision and ambition of 2005 are to be restored. The Organization is still not rising to the peacebuilding challenge. A new level of attention and resolve on the part of Member States and the top echelons of the Secretariat is required. If there is not a conscious re-commitment to peacebuilding at the very heart of the Organization’s work, the Commission will settle into the limited role that has developed to date. From our consultations, we sense a strong desire by the membership to follow the former path.

**B. Key issues**

14. At the outset, the co-facilitators wish to set out a number of key issues and concerns that underpin the detail of the present report.

1. **Complexity of peacebuilding**

15. Peacebuilding, of its nature, is a complicated process: rebuilding fragile or shattered relationships inevitably takes time. It does not lend itself to compartmentalization or “boots on the ground” measurement. Organizations such as the United Nations and the international financial institutions can find it inherently difficult to deal with this complexity and interrelatedness. There is inevitably a gravitational pull, for organizations and donors, towards the concrete and more readily measurable.

16. These complexities, even if recognized at the establishment of the new architecture, are perhaps still not fully internalized. There is impatience for the Commission to construct its narrative, to find its success stories, to define precisely its added value. These are legitimate concerns and the review seeks to address them. However, the Organization must adjust to the realities: the United Nations must continually reappraise its own structures and prioritize its approach to ensure they match needs on the ground.

2. **Imperative of national ownership**

17. Put simply, people must own their own peace: it has to begin, grow and become embedded in people’s minds. It follows that peacebuilding can only happen within communities and within a country. “National ownership” is not something
that is merely desirable or politically correct; it is an imperative, an absolute essential, if peacebuilding is to take root.

18. The principle of national ownership is widely invoked and accepted; the challenge is to work through the full range of implications. The international community must understand the limits of its role as midwife to a national birthing process. In the countries concerned, ownership cannot be approached as a right wrested from the international community: what people need and require of their Governments is that they exercise the responsibilities conferred by ownership.

19. The Peacebuilding Commission needs to ensure that national ownership genuinely and comprehensively underpins its work. In multiple ways — helping to build administrative capacity, promoting dialogue, encouraging a definition of “national ownership” that fully embraces all stakeholders — it must go beyond mantra to substance.

3. The illusion of sequencing

20. There is acceptance in all quarters that sequencing does not work, that effective peacebuilding must not follow peacekeeping operations but accompany them from their inception. This is not a new insight: it was clearly articulated in both the Brahimi report and the New Horizon approach.

21. Despite this acknowledgement, there is a widespread sense that the sequential approach remains the dominant one at the United Nations. Even if modest elements of peacebuilding are incorporated in mandates, the focus and mindset of operations is a peacekeeping one. Peacebuilding tends to be viewed as an add-on during the lifetime of the peacekeeping operation, expected to come into its own in the aftermath.

22. Such a sequential approach neither gives adequate weight to peacebuilding nor responds to needs and realities on the ground. In the current context of debate about the future of a number of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the question has assumed a further relevance.

23. The challenge is to ensure that doctrinal or philosophical shifts are fully reflected in new organizational approaches. The obstacles, not least the differing financial arrangements underpinning peacekeeping and peacebuilding, are formidable. However, meaningful steps can be taken, both in the design of mandates by the Security Council and in the allocation of resources.

24. The issue of sequencing relates also to the discussion about a preventive role for the Commission. Realities on the ground are not compartmentalized: there can be slides towards conflict or relapses into conflict where lines are crossed almost imperceptibly. The Commission needs to be fully alert to these realities and mindful of the preventive dimension in its existing mandate.

4. Urgency of resource mobilization

25. The Commission’s role in helping to ensure predictable financing for post-conflict recovery is recognized in the founding resolutions and was seen from the outset as a key dimension of its work.

26. It is well understood that peacebuilding requires a parallel focus on political, security and developmental needs. As conflict ends, people desperately need to live
free from fear and free from hunger. To the extent that they can, they experience a peace dividend, and their resolve to move forward is strengthened. With so many strands interwoven, failure in any one area can reverse progress in others.

27. While recognizing this interrelatedness, interlocutors repeatedly pointed out that it is the failure to deal with basic developmental needs that poses the biggest risk of dragging a country back into conflict. Study after study has shown that underdevelopment and conflict are intimately related. The Commission clearly should not seek to duplicate the work of development agencies. However, it must be a strong and persistent voice in calling for the integration of political and developmental perspectives and in reminding the international community that food, shelter and jobs are also essential tools of peacebuilding.

28. Resource mobilization for peacebuilding needs to be both ambitious and focused. The Commission’s role is essentially one of advocacy, a relentless advocacy for the allocation of adequate resources to certain critical and urgent issues which, if left unaddressed or unfunded, have the potential to threaten peace. It must seek to leverage resources on the scale necessary to make a real difference across the widest possible range of actors within the United Nations, the international financial institutions and the private sector. Its relevance and success will, to a great extent, be demonstrated by its capacity to do so.

5. Importance of women’s contribution

29. The Peacebuilding Commission has the distinction of being the first United Nations body to have the gender dimension explicitly built into its founding resolutions. The potential contribution that women can make to peace processes hardly needs reiteration. This will be underlined again in the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding, which is expected to contain clear and action-oriented recommendations.

30. Thus far, the Commission has not lived up to its strong and specific mandate in this regard. There have been some successes in involving women’s organizations, but their voices are insufficiently heard, especially in the field. The exhortation to integrate gender concerns across peacebuilding work has also met with limited success. The gender perspective needs to filter down more fully through the country-specific configurations and inform every aspect of peacebuilding work on the ground. Women’s role in peacebuilding needs to move from a niche concern to the mainstream, and the Peacebuilding Commission should be at the forefront of that movement.

6. Need for connection with the field

31. The appropriate slide rule for measuring the success or failure of the peacebuilding architecture is how much it matters in the field. Throughout the review, the co-facilitators were repeatedly reminded that preoccupations and perspectives on the ground can differ quite radically from those in the corridors of New York. In the area of strategic planning, for example, the kind of exercise that looks reasonable and appropriate in New York may be perceived in the field as excessively burdensome, adding another layer of tasks to an already overstretched and fragile administration. A similar difference of perspective is evident in other areas.
32. In their field contacts, the co-facilitators were struck by the lack of basic understanding of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, how it operates and what it offers. The gap that has opened up between Headquarters and the field must be a matter of concern; we strongly hope that one of the outcomes of the review will be to narrow that gap.

II. In the field

33. The first part of this section summarizes some of the experiences of the four agenda countries and looks at the perspectives of potential candidates. The second part seeks to identify some of the emerging key points.

A. Countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda

34. Each of the four agenda countries is different and has experienced the Peacebuilding Commission differently. Sierra Leone and Burundi were placed on the agenda in June 2006, Guinea-Bissau in December 2007, and the Central African Republic in June 2008. Given the much longer period of engagement, there has been scope for evolution over time in the relationship with Sierra Leone and Burundi. Despite initial difficulties, both are now seen as generally positive experiences, resulting in some concrete benefits. Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic were further back on the road to peace when they came on the agenda and have more serious capacity and resource issues. Guinea-Bissau continues to suffer gravely from political instability and has had limited benefit from the Commission’s engagement.

Attention and political accompaniment

35. In cataloguing the benefits, it can be said that all four countries have experienced, to varying degrees, an increment of international attention as a result of engagement with the Commission. This is especially important for countries that perceive themselves to be suffering an “attention deficit” on the part of the international community.

36. The Commission has also played a role in promoting inclusive political dialogue in all four countries. It helped to facilitate a peaceful election process in Sierra Leone in 2007 and, in the aftermath of the political violence of March 2009, provided a political umbrella for the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to lead negotiations between the political parties. In Burundi, the Commission’s efforts led to the establishment of a permanent forum for dialogue and helped to create an environment conducive to the holding of elections.

37. In the Central African Republic, the Commission supported an all-inclusive national political dialogue in December 2008 and gave parties the necessary encouragement to establish an electoral commission. In the difficult circumstances of Guinea-Bissau, the Commission called for calm and dialogue during periods of turmoil.
Planning

38. The experience with respect to planning has been mixed. In Sierra Leone, the “agenda for change” has replaced the proliferation of political, security and development plans previously in place. Having a single planning document has improved coherence and national ownership and has reduced the administrative burden on the country. However, the “agenda for change” was agreed only after an extensive period of institutional dispute both within the United Nations system and between the system and its partners, and after the Commission had sought to develop a separate strategic framework for peacebuilding.

39. There was a parallel experience in Burundi. The effort to draw up and implement a strategic framework was felt to be extremely onerous. As in Sierra Leone, a compromise was eventually reached, resulting in a single strategy document that better reflects national priorities and is more focused and realizable.

40. Notwithstanding the experiences in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the country-specific configurations for the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau went down the road of separate peacebuilding strategies. The fact that, in both cases, the drafting processes were prolonged and, to some degree, duplicated the existing poverty reduction strategies and other texts was a source of frustration for actors on the ground. Given the limited national capacity in these countries, the administrative burden of drawing up, implementing and monitoring the strategic framework has been particularly marked.

41. The uneven involvement of national stakeholders in the process of drawing up peacebuilding priorities has also been commented on. In some cases, civil society organizations have felt marginalized and, despite the Commission’s explicit mandate to integrate a gender perspective, women’s groups, in particular, have complained of inadequate engagement.

Resource mobilization

42. The record as regards resource mobilization is also mixed. There have been Peacebuilding Fund allocations in all four cases: $37 million to Sierra Leone; $40 million to Burundi; $31 million to the Central African Republic; and $6 million to Guinea-Bissau. In the case of all four countries, efforts have been made to mobilize resources more widely. In Sierra Leone, for example, following strong advocacy by the Commission, key partners joined forces to produce a joint response to youth employment. In Burundi, the country-specific configuration played a role in breaking the impasse over the sixth International Monetary Fund (IMF) replenishment for the country. Co-sponsorship of the donors’ round table held in Bujumbura in May 2007 produced pledges of increased financial support.

43. There has been some success in resource mobilization for the Central African Republic. The Commission established a dialogue with the World Bank concerning the country’s progress towards reaching the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in June 2009, and this dialogue continues. A list of peacebuilding projects in need of funding is also being prepared and has elicited the interest of some new partners. In Guinea-Bissau, contributions from Commission members to support the elections in November 2008 were partly a response to country-specific configuration advocacy. Continued increases in
assistance from the African Development Bank, IMF and the World Bank to Guinea-Bissau are also, in part, attributable to the Commission’s role.

44. Despite the efforts being made, resource mobilization is falling well short of needs. The constraints are clear (in Guinea-Bissau, for example, political instability greatly complicates the task), and it is essential that the Commission’s approach remain realistic and focused on needs that are distinctively or strongly associated with peacebuilding. Efforts need to intensify, and this issue re-emerges throughout our report.

B. Perspectives of potential agenda countries

45. In 2005, the expectations of potential benefits were such that there was a concern that the number of countries wishing to be considered would overwhelm the Commission’s capacity. That has not proved to be the case. It is clear that, for a number of potential candidates, the perceived “risk-to-reward ratio” has not favoured engagement. The co-facilitators held a number of meetings to try to better understand the perspectives of countries that prefer not to come on the Commission’s agenda.

46. There is undoubtedly some sense of the potential advantages attached to engagement by the Commission: the international attention and political accompaniment that the Commission promises can be attractive. Offset against these potential benefits, however, is the perception of potential downsides. Placement on the agenda may be seen as an indication of dysfunctionality. The heavy administrative burden of Peacebuilding Commission engagement can be off-putting. We saw some evidence of the mistaken perception that a place on the Commission’s agenda would imply a loss of Security Council attention and the automatic drawdown of a peacekeeping operation.

47. It was clear to us that some potential candidates consider that a lighter form of Peacebuilding Commission engagement would be more appropriate to their circumstances than the creation of a fully fledged country-specific configuration. Such engagement might focus specifically on the peacebuilding process in the country or on a sector requiring attention. The co-facilitators see benefit in having such a “light option” available and, in the following section, we consider how it might be given practical effect.

C. Issues arising from country experiences

48. The experience on the ground brings a number of issues into perspective, some of which are dealt with later in the report. In this section, the co-facilitators wish to comment on issues of national ownership and capacity-building; developmental and, in particular, employment-generation challenges; coordination and coherence; and, briefly, to consider the regional dimension of peacebuilding. Responding to the confusion and misunderstandings we perceive in the field, we also underline the importance of developing an effective communications strategy.
1. National ownership and capacity issues

49. In the introductory section, the co-facilitators underlined their conviction that national ownership must underpin the entire peacebuilding effort. Our exposure to the situation in the field clearly demonstrated that the Commission has not yet been able to generate a full sense of national ownership in critical areas.

50. Perhaps the most crucial stage of establishing ownership is the planning process. Even if they are rudimentary or slow to emerge, national inputs should, from the outset, form the basis of the engagement of the international community. A stake for national actors must be built in by establishing mechanisms to transfer the management and implementation of plans and projects to the Government and its national partners.

51. Given the likelihood of an inverse relationship between the length and complexity of the planning document and the degree of genuine national ownership, the co-facilitators suggest a planning approach that is light but inclusive. Bearing in mind that “no one size fits all”, we are not proposing a single template. On balance, however, it seems that the stand-alone integrated peacebuilding strategies have generated more difficulties than benefits. There are clear advantages to a single overarching planning document (with whatever title the national authorities wish to confer) around which national authorities and the international community can coalesce. This single text should contain well-defined peacebuilding elements worked out with the full involvement of all stakeholders.

52. The experiences in the four agenda countries illustrate the vital connection between ownership and capacity: unless local actors have the capacity to fully engage throughout all phases of planning and implementation, national ownership will remain theory rather than reality. In making this point, the co-facilitators emphasize that it is essential to prevent lack of capacity from becoming an alibi for avoiding potential difficulties associated with involving national actors; rather it should galvanize the international community behind the key task of capacity-building.

53. Building capacity in national administrations is critical but not of itself sufficient; there is also a need to build capacity across the board. Although the Commission has had some success in bringing together political parties, civil society, the private sector and others, more must be done to ensure that these groups are in a position to engage meaningfully in the peacebuilding process. The record regarding women’s organizations is particularly thin.

2. Developmental aspects of peacebuilding

54. It is widely acknowledged that there can be no peace without development and no development without peace. In the introductory section, we underlined the urgency of prioritizing development and ensuring its full integration into peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from conflict. All four countries on the Commission’s agenda face a range of development challenges, and responding to these challenges is one of the most crucial aspects of building peace.

55. Youth unemployment in particular is identified as a potential Achilles’ heel in any peacebuilding process. Youth who have been caught up in conflict are vulnerable to being drawn into destructive patterns of behaviour if left idle and without the means to support themselves. The need to develop strategies to draw young people back into purposeful civilian life must be a key priority.
56. The co-facilitators are conscious that employment generation is a challenge in all economies and an acute one in many developing countries. But the connection between job creation and peacebuilding needs clear and specific focus. It is imperative that all avenues to enhance local employment are exploited. Local procurement, for example, can create significant opportunities, and the international community needs to demonstrate a stronger awareness of this in its local engagement. Many conflict-affected countries are also resource-rich; there needs to be a strong emphasis on local employment in mineral extraction, and transfer of skills should be made a condition for investment.

3. **Coordination and coherence**

57. The whole Peacebuilding Commission concept is built around complementarity and partnership. The Commission should help to provide political support to United Nations peacebuilding missions which, in turn, should reflect United Nations peacebuilding principles and priorities in their operation. It is especially important that there be a mutually reinforcing relationship with the Special Representatives and United Nations country teams. The Special Representatives and Executive Representatives have a mandate and continuous local presence, which confers a particular role and authority. The members of the Commission represent peer Governments, with the empathy and capacity for dialogue inherent in a peer relationship. Each should be conscious of empowering the other.

58. In practice, the international community still struggles to achieve the necessary degree of coherence in the field. The first challenge is to fully integrate the work of United Nations actors on the ground, based on joint planning and clear inventories of actions to avoid duplication. The relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary-General needs to be properly worked through, with full accommodation for the lead role of the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary-General on the ground. The second challenge is to improve coordination among the different international partners. The existence of a single strategic document does not guarantee that all actors will act in accordance with its priorities. The Commission must use its political weight to seek to align the various actors behind the same overarching objectives.

59. If the integration of United Nations missions works as intended, the prospects of peacebuilding will be greatly enhanced. Fragmentation, territoriality and competition among United Nations actors as well as among international organizations and donors generally are corrosive of the entire aid effort, and will critically undermine the peacebuilding effort.

4. **Regional dimension**

60. Experience in all four agenda countries underlines the regional dimension of conflict. There is ample evidence of the potential for cross-border spillover, which can create or exacerbate conflict and frustrate peacebuilding efforts. On the positive side, there is the potential for regional organizations to play a crucial role in helping to consolidate peace as countries emerge from conflict.

61. Problems such as drug trafficking or the management of displaced persons are inherently of a cross-border nature and require regional cooperation if they are to be
effectively tackled. Other challenges such as youth unemployment or issues surrounding the extraction of natural resources are primarily domestic but are common to several countries in a region, and benefit from joint discussion.

62. National ownership should also be considered in the context of regional and continental ownership. Many countries may prefer to receive assistance and advice from peer countries in their own region, and regional organizations may be better placed to intervene in a timely manner and to assist in grappling with certain sensitive issues, in particular where the Government itself is part of the problem.

63. For all these reasons, it is clear that the Commission must give even further weight to the regional dimension than it has thus far. There may be some cases where region-specific configurations would be more logical and hold greater promise of progress than country-specific configurations, and this should be an available option. Additionally, the co-facilitators urge that every opportunity be taken to enhance engagement with regional organizations; we revert to this issue later in the report.

5. Communications strategy

64. From our contacts at Headquarters and, in particular, on the ground, it is clear that there is a very incomplete understanding of the breadth of the Peacebuilding Commission mandate. In part, this may arise from the inherent complexity of the peacebuilding task and the consequent difficulty of neat mission statements or promises of short-term outcomes. However, the issue goes beyond this: there appears to be a major communication gap in which misperceptions and misunderstandings about the Commission’s role have taken root.

65. The confusion relates in particular to the relationship between the Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund. The Fund was conceived as a complement to the Commission’s work but, in some respects, seems to have obscured it. Because it was established at the same time as the Commission and operates in parallel, there is a tendency to view the Commission as primarily a route to obtaining financing from the Peacebuilding Fund. This not only misinterprets the relationship between the Commission and the Fund, but makes it more difficult to create the space in which the Commission was intended to operate.

66. Together with the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Commission urgently needs to develop a communications strategy that has a strong field focus but is also targeted at Member States in New York and the Secretariat. The purpose of such a strategy should be to identify, in accessible terms, how the peacebuilding architecture is constituted and how the elements interact. It should spell out succinctly the benefits that the Commission offers: key among these are “attention, accompaniment, advocacy”. The “brand” needs to be repositioned to become much more positive: the Commission represents an innovative and modern approach in which the international community accompanies conflict-affected countries as they chart their own future. The key message is not one of dysfunctionality, but of determination and resolve.
D. Summary of recommendations

Capacity, planning, levels of engagement, regional dimension

• Increase the focus on capacity-building across the board, in national administrations, political parties and civil society, including women’s organizations, to build expertise and ensure sustainability

• Lighten the administrative burden; a single overall planning document should include peacebuilding elements developed through a participatory and inclusive process

• Introduce more flexibility, with possibilities of multi-tiered engagement

• Strengthen the regional dimension across all aspects of the Commission’s work

Resource mobilization

• Intensify overall resource mobilization efforts; ensure they are strongly attuned to development challenges with political implications

Developmental aspects of peacebuilding

• Sharpen the emphasis on employment generation, in particular for youth (local procurement, skills transfer)

Coherence and coordination

• Encourage United Nations actors in all Peacebuilding Commission agenda countries to further integrate their activities on the ground, under the leadership of the Special or Executive Representative

• Utilize the Commission’s political weight to align international actors on the ground behind agreed overarching objectives

• Ensure clear inventories of peacebuilding activities in agenda countries, to avoid duplication

Communications strategy

• Develop an effective communications strategy, which “rebrands” the Peacebuilding Commission and clearly spells out what it can offer

III. Role and performance of the Peacebuilding Commission at Headquarters

67. The Peacebuilding Commission is dealing not just with the inherent complexity of peacebuilding, but with the challenges associated with being a relatively late entrant in a crowded field. Both across the United Nations and in other international bodies, there has been a significant growth of interest in peacebuilding over recent years. Rather than suggesting any redundancy on the part of the Commission, this proliferation of actors reinforces the need for a focal point. This was precisely what world leaders had in mind in 2005: that the Peacebuilding Commission should bring coherence and impetus to the range of efforts.
68. Becoming an effective focal point in a crowded field was never going to be easy. Both the Organizational Committee and the country-specific configurations continue to face difficulties. The role of the configurations is more concrete and more readily understood, while the Organizational Committee has a greater struggle to establish its mission and its specific added value.

A. Organizational Committee

69. An initial comment about attendance levels is applicable to both the Organizational Committee and the country-specific configurations, but in particular to the Organizational Committee. If, in 2005, the Commission was deemed to be a key institution filling a critical gap, it was reasonable to expect that it would receive commensurate attention from Member States. This is not always the case. The co-facilitators have heard significant comment on the level of attendance. There is perplexity that some countries that apparently attached enormous value to becoming Commission members should routinely be represented at a junior level at Organizational Committee meetings.

1. Membership issues

70. Issues surrounding the membership of the Organizational Committee surfaced periodically throughout the review. These issues fall into two categories: the contribution of the different membership streams; and the representativity of the Committee.

Contribution of membership streams

71. A distinctive feature of the Organizational Committee is the make-up of its membership, with members nominated by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as leading donors and troop-contributors. The membership formula emerged following lengthy negotiations, and it may be inferred that some expectation of a specific contribution by each of the various streams and a degree of bridge-building back to the respective nominating bodies was implicit in the formula.

72. The Commission as a whole acts collectively and reaches decisions by consensus. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the General Assembly members would bring a General Assembly perspective, as would the Security Council and Economic and Social Council members in respect of their nominating bodies.

73. To date, there is little evidence that the various membership streams have been conscious of particular responsibilities by reference to their nominating bodies. A renewed sense on the part of all Organizational Committee members of the distinctive contributions expected of them, including the scope for particular engagement by the permanent members, would do much to reinvigorate the Committee.

Composition of the Organizational Committee

74. The question of composition consumed considerable time in 2005, and the formula eventually identified is set out in the founding resolutions. Opinions may
differ as to whether the overall Organizational Committee membership figure of 31 is too large to be efficient or too small to be appropriately representative. However, we do not see any desire to reopen a debate which was conducted in 2005 and which would be unlikely to lead to any different conclusion if rerun today.

75. Two issues are nevertheless worthy of comment. First, there is a legitimate concern about adequate rotation to ensure balanced regional representation. A number of delegations emphasized the provision in the founding resolutions that, to help correct any regional imbalances that may have emerged, the General Assembly elections should take place in the aftermath of other nominating processes. The co-facilitators endorse the importance of this provision.

76. Additionally, it was pointed out that the group of ten top financial donors to the United Nations operates a rotation in choosing its five Peacebuilding Commission members; a similar rotation does not apply within the group of ten top troop-contributing countries. Although this is a matter for the troop-contributing countries themselves to decide, the co-facilitators agree that there should be at least some element of rotation within both groups.

77. A second issue relates to the importance of allowing the countries that are on the agenda to attend Organizational Committee meetings. This is obviously desirable, and we believe it should be given effect, without prejudice to the existing membership formula.

2. Agenda and working methods

78. Significant efforts have been made by successive Chairs of the Organizational Committee to enhance the substance and relevance of its work. Those efforts have met with some success. However, there is a widespread sense that the Committee still needs more focus and output; many of our interlocutors felt that it has yet to demonstrate that it is making a clear and measurable difference. The identity of the Committee still needs to settle down; although the founding resolutions do not define responsibilities in detail, the designation of the Organizational Committee as the “standing” committee of the Peacebuilding Commission and the care taken in its composition suggest that a role of substance was intended.

79. It might be useful to consider the rhythm and duration of meetings. If the Organizational Committee is to provide real added value, it is important that attendance be at an appropriate level and include expertise from capitals and the field. This might suggest less frequent meetings of a longer duration. To support the work of the Committee, a representative bureau with a more developed vice-chairing structure might also be considered, while allowing for the flexibility that is a hallmark of peacebuilding work.

Relationship with country-specific configurations

80. The Organizational Committee should remain fully abreast of what is happening in the country-specific configurations and be ready to give policy guidance and advice as appropriate. Periodic collective consideration would be helpful, with the country-specific configuration Chairs attending open interactive discussions with the Organizational Committee. This would enable a cross-fertilization of ideas and methodology and ensure general consistency of approach. A more solid relationship with the country-specific configurations would also help
to ensure that the Organizational Committee’s thematic work remains grounded in field realities.

81. The co-facilitators are confident that the membership as a whole is sufficiently conscious that “no one size fits all” to ensure there is the necessary flexibility and space for the country-specific configurations. Nor is there any question of the Chair of the Commission seeking to substitute for the Chairs of the configurations in their necessary direct interactions with entities inside and outside the United Nations. But there should be a “whole of Peacebuilding Commission” view on a range of issues, and this is best formulated in the Organizational Committee and articulated by the Chair of the Commission. A more committed Organizational Committee membership, exercising the greater level of engagement sketched out above, should be able to draw fully on country-specific configuration experience in forming this “whole of Peacebuilding Commission” view.

**Thematic issues**

82. In addition to overseeing the Commission’s overall work programme, the Organizational Committee should identify each year a number of strategic thematic issues on which it would focus that year. These would comprise issues of high current and operational relevance. The output on each theme would be a subject-specific report which would be presented by the Chair of the Commission to the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Organizational Committee is also the appropriate partner for dialogue on thematic issues with relevant United Nations entities and other peacebuilding actors.

83. In addition, the Organizational Committee should take oversight responsibility for ensuring mutual accountability. Although each of the country-specific configurations should assess mutual accountability in relation to its agenda country, the Organizational Committee has an important role in developing the tools that can be used to monitor and track progress. Backed by the Peacebuilding Support Office, it should take a lead role in developing mutual accountability frameworks specifically adapted to the peacebuilding area. In undertaking this work, the Organizational Committee will be able to draw on lessons learned and on aid accountability research under way in the relevant international bodies.

**Lessons learned**

84. The co-facilitators considered whether it might make sense for the “Lessons learned” function to be returned to the Organizational Committee. While there was a level of support and some agnosticism among the membership, the balance of opinion seemed to favour retention of the working group on lessons learned. The co-facilitators therefore suggest a focus on improved functioning, with a clear rationale for discussions and clear outcomes. If the Organizational Committee develops a stronger and more interactive relationship with the country-specific configurations, it may, over time, come to feel that the lessons learned function is better carried out directly, rather than at one remove, in the working group. If so, a decision to that effect could be taken at the appropriate time. The capacity to evolve and innovate is intended to be among the Peacebuilding Commission hallmarks, and the Organizational Committee should not hesitate to exercise that capacity.
B. Country-specific configurations

85. The country-specific configurations have been instrumental in the achievements of the Peacebuilding Commission to date. As with the Organizational Committee, there have been notably dedicated Chairs who have invested considerable time and effort. The co-facilitators would not wish in any way to devalue the steps taken, and we recognize that there are significant differences across the four configurations. However, there is a general sense that more could be done, with respect to both working methods and substantive output.

1. Working methods

86. As regards working methods, the challenge is how to combine innovation and vibrancy with weight and solidity. It is important to recall the sense of the founding resolutions that the Peacebuilding Commission would be different from other United Nations bodies, namely, more flexible and innovative in its working methods. The intention was that the Commission would find new ways to bring together key actors from across the public and private sectors and civil society, whose collective wisdom and energy would be at the service of the countries on the Commission’s agenda.

87. At the same time, there is a clear requirement for weight and solidity. The configuration Chairs need to be of a certain profile: respected, knowledgeable, able to operate effectively both in New York and in the field. They must have the full confidence of the agenda countries and inspire the confidence of key actors. They need solid support from the Peacebuilding Support Office and from within their national administrations.

88. In order to give further depth and solidity to the chairing role, the co-facilitators suggest that a country dimension should be added. Such an approach would have a number of practical implications. The chairing function would continue to be filled by Permanent Representatives in New York, as the persons best placed to discharge the responsibilities of the chairing role. However, the country whose Permanent Representative in New York was appointed as country-specific configuration Chair would be expected to demonstrate clear commitment and support at all levels of Government, both in the capital and in the field. If the chairing country has a diplomatic presence in the agenda country, as would normally be the case, the Ambassador in situ would be expected to play a useful linking role under the leadership of the Special or Executive Representative and the host Government. The country dimension would also ensure greater continuity: a country would be expected to commit for a reasonable period of time, and its responsibilities would be unaffected by any turnover in the Permanent Representative position in New York.

89. There has been considerable discussion of the potential benefits of a Peacebuilding Commission configuration in the field, which could help to feed and validate the work of the country-specific configuration in New York. The co-facilitators agree that an appropriately structured country-level liaison committee should be established in each agenda country and should report regularly to the country-specific configuration in New York. The committee should be co-chaired by a representative of the host Government and the Special or Executive Representative; there should be a broad range of members and a level of attendance
commensurate with the Commission’s high-level political role. A special role could be envisaged for the Ambassador of the country-specific configuration Chair country.

2. **Country-specific configuration output**

90. The benefits that a country-specific configuration brings to an agenda country include attention, accompaniment and advocacy. Depending on the individual circumstances of the country concerned, each of the three may be needed to different degrees. The challenge at all times is to assess what is of most practical value, namely, what is likely to make a real difference on the ground.

91. The importance of sustaining international attention is obvious. The second potential benefit, “high-level political accompaniment”, needs to be offered in a context-specific and appropriate way. The objective is to facilitate and advance the kind of broad-based dialogue that will enable a society to heal and rebuild. All stakeholders, notably civil society, including women’s groups, are central to that dialogue and therefore must be central to the country-specific configuration approach.

92. The advocacy role can take various forms but will certainly include funding advocacy. As we underline throughout the report, resource mobilization is critical to demonstrating the Commission’s relevance and added value. Each configuration must exercise its advocacy role in an energetic and innovative way, reaching across the United Nations, the international financial institutions and other international and regional organizations, but also embracing regional banks, the private sector and other funding sources. Suggestions we have heard include more donor round tables under Peacebuilding Commission auspices, more active outreach to non-traditional donors, steps to bolster absorption capacity, and tapping into remittance flows.

93. Ensuring mutual accountability is critical to the entire peacebuilding effort and is a natural corollary of resource mobilization. Applying tools developed by the Organizational Committee, each configuration should map and track delivery of peacebuilding commitments with respect to its agenda country. Combining its evaluations of delivery both by national stakeholders and by the international community, the configuration will be in a position to authoritatively assess how each is meeting its responsibilities.

94. Beyond the above general recommendations, the co-facilitators do not wish to be overly prescriptive in setting out views as to the functioning and output of the country-specific configurations. We are conscious that the elements of specificity, experimentation and agility are central to the whole design of country-specific configurations. We also note the expectation that a fifth country-specific configuration is likely to be established shortly. This will provide a fresh opportunity to demonstrate how the approach might be further adapted and new avenues explored.

C. **Multi-tiered engagement**

95. Given a widespread sense that there should be possibilities of multi-tiered engagement (sectoral, regional and “light footprint”), the co-facilitators have sought
to address the issue of what form that engagement should take. The approach of establishing a country-specific configuration as soon as a country comes on the Commission’s agenda has worked well to date. A dedicated country-specific configuration brings a degree of attention and engagement that otherwise is not possible, and will continue to be the normal vehicle for interaction with a country on the Commission’s agenda. Equally, it can be anticipated that, if there is to be a regional referral, the complexity will require a dedicated regional configuration.

96. There may, however, be situations requiring something lighter than a full country-specific configuration along the lines of the current models. The co-facilitators sense a general readiness to consider some degree of experimentation, providing there is a guarantee that the situation will receive the requisite degree of dedicated attention. Options could include the appointment of a country-specific focal point by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, a role for a Vice-Chair in the Organizational Committee Bureau or the establishment of an informal working group. The engagement instrument would be decided on a case-by-case basis, by reference to the particular context and in close consultation with the national stakeholders.

D. Criteria for entry and exit

97. The potential for the Peacebuilding Commission to add value is largely dependent on which countries or situations form part of its agenda. No matter how dedicated its work, a country-specific configuration will struggle if the situation on the ground is unripe for peacebuilding efforts. Equally, if a country has progressed to a situation where its challenges are essentially developmental rather than distinctively of a peacebuilding nature, it makes little sense to have a continuing Peacebuilding Commission focus.

98. Given the fluidity and specificity of individual circumstances, the co-facilitators do not deem it appropriate to draw up detailed or technocratic criteria for entry and exit. Referral must rely on informed political judgement. The referring body, to date the Security Council but perhaps others in future, needs to be reasonably confident that the primary effort currently required is peacebuilding, that there is potential for clear added value in the Commission’s engagement, and that the Government concerned is fully conscious of the responsibilities and potential benefits of coming on the agenda.

99. As regards exit strategies, benchmarks must be flexible and essentially political. The Commission needs to be a responsive body, available to take on new situations as circumstances require. However, there are obviously capacity constraints, and new countries cannot indefinitely be added without the graduation of any of the existing agenda countries.

100. An agenda country will have its own sense of when it is ready to graduate, and this must be the key to decision-making. However, there must be regular mapping and measuring of progress, with periodic assessments of the extent to which priorities defined when a country came on the agenda have been achieved, and of gaps remaining. The biannual reviews of the strategic framework in each agenda country provide key opportunities for such assessments. The multi-tiered levels of the Commission’s engagement outlined above may also prove relevant in this
regard. A country that feels itself ready to move on from a country-specific configuration could transitonally opt for a lighter relationship.

E. **Summary of recommendations**

**Organizational Committee**

- Encourage members of the Organizational Committee to reflect their constituencies and ensure regular two-way communication
- Confirm that General Assembly elections should follow other nominating processes and consider some degree of rotation among troop-contributing countries as well as donors
- Adopt a decision granting countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda the right to attend Organizational Committee meetings
- Consider having fewer Organizational Committee meetings, but of longer duration
- Consider the establishment of a bureau with a more developed vice-chairing structure
- Develop a more solid relationship between the Organizational Committee and the country-specific configurations
- Identify a number of strategic thematic issues for annual consideration by the Organizational Committee and develop tools for mutual accountability

**Working group on lessons learned**

- Clarify the rationale for the working group’s discussions, ensure clear outcomes and identify defined follow-up

**Country-specific configurations**

- Add a country dimension to the chairing role in country-specific configurations
- Establish a Peacebuilding Commission liaison committee on the ground in each agenda country
- Strengthen the resource mobilization functions of the country-specific configurations
- Present authoritative assessments on mutual accountability by the country-specific configurations, applying tools developed by the Organizational Committee

**Multi-tiered engagement**

- Consider options for a lighter form of engagement and make available the option of regional or sectoral tiers of engagement
Entry and exit criteria

- Retain flexibility in benchmarks, taking account of the fluidity and specificity of individual circumstances
- Give due weight to the view of the agenda country as to when it is ready to graduate
- Refocus the biannual reviews to assess countries’ progress towards nationally recognized peacebuilding goals

IV. Key relationships

A. Relationship with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council

Making space and earning space

101. In the course of the review, we encountered two propositions that can be set side by side: that the Peacebuilding Commission needs to be accorded more space within United Nations structures; and that, unless and until the Commission can more convincingly demonstrate its added value, the Security Council and other United Nations bodies will not see good reason to accord that space.

102. We do not believe that these two propositions should be viewed as either competitive or sequential. The Commission certainly faces its own challenges. However, it is in the interest of the United Nations and its entire membership that the new body should succeed more fully. No part of the Organization can sit back and wait for the Commission to prove itself. The General Assembly and the Security Council are co-parents of the Commission and have the nurturing responsibilities inherent in that role. The founding resolutions also recognize a key role for the Economic and Social Council, which needs to be more fully developed.

1. Security Council

103. The 2005 resolutions make clear that a key, although not exclusive, route by which countries will arrive on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda is through requests for advice by the Security Council. The relationship with the Security Council is therefore critical in shaping the agenda; it is also key to determining the relevance of the Commission within the United Nations architecture. If the Security Council is seen to attach real value to the Commission’s role, respect for the body is enhanced. Conversely, if the role accorded by the Security Council to the Commission is perceived to be slight, the Commission is devalued.

104. The Security Council has recently shown increasing recognition of the importance of peacebuilding through a series of thematic debates on the matter and through presidential statements setting out the views of the Council on peacebuilding issues. The Chair of the Commission has been invited to address the Council at each of the relevant open thematic debates and the country-specific configuration Chairs have addressed the Council at all formal meetings dealing with countries on the Commission’s agenda.
105. However, a Security Council more convinced of the added value of the Commission would have gone beyond the steps taken to date. It would actively and creatively be looking for opportunities to involve the Commission. There would be more frequent requests for advice, and the Council would engage with the Commission earlier, beginning at the stage of drafting mandates.

106. Instead, the interaction between the Security Council and the Commission has been limited. The problem appears to be twofold: the Security Council perceives that the advice of the Commission does not provide much added value, and the Commission does not provide more focused advice, in part because the Security Council does not make more specific requests.

107. This situation is one of missed opportunities, and falls short of the hopes and expectations of 2005. More positively, the co-facilitators believe that the benefits of an enhanced and more organic relationship between the Security Council and the Commission are increasingly being recognized, and the potential now exists to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better performing Peacebuilding Commission.

108. Questions arise as to how such an improved interaction could be given procedural form. The co-facilitators have no doubt that, if the political will exists, appropriate processes will be identified. The Security Council has demonstrated a capacity for procedural innovation in the past (for example, in establishing mechanisms for meeting privately with troop-contributing countries and in setting up the working group on peacekeeping operations with scope for external participation) and could do so again.

109. Even within existing procedures, more could be done. There could be more meaningful exchanges with the Commission in informal settings, where advice can be better shared. More regular exchanges between the Organizational Committee and country-specific configuration Chairs and the President of the Security Council would provide opportunities to offer advice privately. Formats such as informal interactive dialogue sessions could enable the country-specific configuration Chairs to share their insights. When the Security Council identifies a lead country in relation to the framing or renewal of a peacekeeping mandate, consultation could take place between the appropriate Peacebuilding Commission representative and the designated lead country. The head of the Peacebuilding Support Office could be invited to brief the Security Council in closed consultations in the same manner as the heads of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs or the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding

110. There is a widely held view that Security Council deliberations would benefit from the Commission’s advice at an early stage in the framing of peacekeeping mandates, on relevant aspects during the lifetime of missions, and as drawdown approaches.

111. In order for this to happen, the Commission must be an informed and focused interlocutor in the dialogue, providing an analysis and perspective that is genuinely valuable to the Security Council. An effectively performing Commission will be well positioned to convey specific elements of information and concern that the Security Council might not obtain elsewhere. It can bring to bear its extensive
knowledge and experience of agenda countries and can draw on its interactions with the international financial institutions and other actors. It can make an important contribution in addressing the linkage between security and development where the Security Council does not always have an integrated perspective.

112. The co-facilitators are clearly fully conscious of the rights and responsibilities that the Charter of the United Nations confers on the Security Council in relation to peacekeeping mandates. Consistent with these prerogatives, however, and in the context of a better-performing Commission providing genuine added value, the co-facilitators believe that the Council should draw on the Commission’s expertise and advice to the maximum extent at the successive phases of mandate framing and renewal, and in approaching the drawdown of operations.

113. Beyond the processes of interaction between the Security Council and the Commission, a more fundamental question is the relative prioritization of peacekeeping and peacebuilding within the Organization as a whole. The co-facilitators note a strong sense among the membership that a new balance will need to be struck if the United Nations peace operations of the twenty-first century are to achieve their goals. For the purpose of the present review, we focus on the more limited question of how to inject greater substance and relevance into the interaction between the Security Council and the Commission. However, the larger question is likely to be posed with increasing urgency.

114. Financing implications will be an integral part of that larger question. Peacebuilding budgets are a fraction of peacekeeping budgets, and the United Nations system can draw salutary lessons from the comparative figures. The one unacceptable lesson would be any inference that peacebuilding is United Nations engagement “on the cheap”. Peacekeeping operations must draw down at the right time for good reasons; peacebuilding operations must be adequately financed to have a realistic chance of success. A new approach to peace operations, including the financial implications, is a challenge confronting the Organization as a whole.

2. General Assembly

115. The Peacebuilding Commission’s founding resolutions clearly outlined the General Assembly’s relationship with the new body. However, despite the relatively heavy formal relationship established, there is a widely shared view that the General Assembly has had insufficient weight in the activities of the Commission and that more structured and interactive relations are needed.

116. The point is rightly made that the Commission draws legitimacy and strength from the General Assembly and that this must be reinforced. We suggested earlier that General Assembly and Economic and Social Council nominees to the Organizational Committee should play a conscious bridging role. Additionally, some members are of the view that the General Assembly should discuss peacebuilding policy more often, that the current annual overview debate is insufficient. We also noted the suggestion that the General Assembly hold a high-level debate on peacebuilding during ministerial week.

117. The co-facilitators endorse the view that the co-parenting role of the General Assembly should be more visible and meaningful. However, as in the case of the Security Council, any box-ticking exercises are to be avoided. Any additional debates need to be purposeful and value-added.
118. A range of choices is available in seeking to advance this objective. Reflecting the co-parenting role, the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council might periodically lead joint discussions. The seven members elected by the General Assembly to the Organizational Committee might address the Assembly in panel and interactive format regarding how they interpret and are discharging their role. The Special and Executive Representatives of countries on the agenda might also engage in joint interactive discussions to illuminate common issues and approaches.

119. In addition to the wide-ranging annual overview debate, it would seem useful to periodically bring to bear a General Assembly perspective on a key thematic issue under consideration in the Commission, or to frame Assembly discussions with a view to achieving specific outcomes.

3. Economic and Social Council

120. The founding resolutions also set out a strong role for the Economic and Social Council, both in relation to the election of Peacebuilding Commission members and the prerogative to request the Commission’s advice on the same basis as the General Assembly. The resolutions note the particular relevance of the Commission providing advice to the Council as countries move from transitional recovery towards development. At the time of adoption, the President of the General Assembly underlined the importance of a reformed Economic and Social Council playing its rightful role in peacebuilding.

121. This rightful role has yet to be properly and fully identified. The nexus between peacebuilding and development is a key focus of the present report, and creates the basis for substantive interaction between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Council. The efforts made to date to give meaning to this interaction (including periodic briefings by the Chair of the Commission to the Council, meetings between the Chair and the President of the Council, the recent joint bureaux meeting and occasional joint thematic sessions between the two bodies) are important steps in the right direction.

122. However, more needs to be done to fulfil the intentions that informed the resolutions. As with the Security Council and the General Assembly, if there is sufficient commitment and focus, the appropriate mechanisms for interaction will be found. The Economic and Social Council could consider adding peacebuilding themes to its annual session; it could facilitate interaction between the Commission and United Nations funds and programmes as well as with the specialized agencies; and more regular joint events could be scheduled. For its part, the Commission could take the initiative of regularly updating the Council on aspects of its work.

123. Specific opportunities also arise: for example, in the ministerial declaration of the high-level segment of the Council’s 2010 substantive session, the ministers and heads of delegations urged the Council and the Commission to jointly explore ways of strengthening the contribution of women in the prevention and resolution of conflict and in peacebuilding processes generally. A serious exercise in this regard would be an important step towards a more meaningful relationship between the two bodies.
B. Referral of countries to the Peacebuilding Commission agenda

124. Paragraph 12 of the founding resolutions identifies four avenues by which countries may come on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda: referral by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General. To date, all four referrals have been by the Security Council and, despite the reference to regional balance in the resolutions, all four are African countries. The question arises as to why a more diverse range of countries, in terms of size, regional background, or the stage of the peacebuilding process reached, has not been referred.

125. The referral prerogatives of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly are carefully circumscribed, and their use is likely to be limited in practice. Nevertheless, these prerogatives are important and should not be allowed to lapse through inertia or default; nor should the referral right of the Secretary-General remain an academic one. In practice, however, referral by the Security Council is likely to remain the main channel by which countries arrive on the agenda. The process by which these referrals are made therefore deserves particular comment.

126. There are two elements to the equation: the attitude of potential agenda countries and the approach of the Security Council. The position of the potential agenda country is, of course, critical, since referral is always dependent on the wish and consent of the country concerned. Section I of the report touches on the ambivalence that may be felt by a potential agenda country about a perceived “downgrading” from Security Council to Peacebuilding Commission consideration. Better communication, reassurance and an upscaling of the Commission’s performance may help to address concerns in this regard.

127. As for the Security Council approach, the co-facilitators have already indicated a concern about possible circularity — a Security Council that sees the Commission as insufficiently relevant and a Commission that feels it does not have sufficient opportunity to demonstrate its relevance. We hope that the review will help to break any such circle and open the way towards a more forthcoming and interactive relationship.

128. We do not, of course, advocate experimentation for the sake of experimentation: referral of new countries must be needs-based and take account of the Commission’s performance and capacities. What is important is to move beyond a limited and limiting view of the Commission; it is an instrument that was created and designed to make a real difference and should be challenged to do so.

129. In practice, this would mean a readiness on the part of the Security Council to consider a wider range of situations for referral: these could include larger countries, or sectoral or regional situations. The multi-tiered approach set out earlier would offer a new menu of possibilities for engagement.

C. A preventive role

130. In the course of our consultations, many interlocutors expressed the view that the time is ripe for, and situations on the ground require, a more forthright acceptance of the preventive dimension of the Commission’s role.
131. The founding resolutions provide scope for a preventive dimension. Paragraph 12 confers an unqualified prerogative on both the Security Council and the Secretary-General to request advice from the Commission. In the case of other referral routes (the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and Member States themselves), requests for advice can arise in situations in which the Member State concerned is in “exceptional circumstances, on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict” and of which the Security Council is not seized.

132. The co-facilitators are mindful of the controversy on this point prior to the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 and are also conscious of the preventive work being carried out across the United Nations system. Dealing with situations of risk of relapse into conflict is likely to remain the focus of the Commission’s work; however, the mandate provides wider scope.

133. In approaching its preventive role, the Commission will need to be guided both by demand from affected countries and by realism in assessing its likely added value. When the country concerned has the determination and willingness to seek assistance and the Commission considers that it can respond meaningfully, the Commission should utilize to the full the potential offered by its existing mandate.

D. Other partnerships: international financial institutions, the United Nations family, regional bodies

International financial institutions

134. The partnership with the international financial institutions is critical to the functioning of the Commission; their role is specifically recognized in the founding resolutions and their participation in all meetings is provided for. In accordance with our concern about the developmental and resource mobilization priority for the Peacebuilding Commission, the co-facilitators have devoted particular attention to the relationship with the World Bank.

135. We recognize that there are already regular and useful exchanges in the field, at meetings in New York, and when the Commission or country-specific configuration Chairs travel periodically to Washington, D.C. The current Chair of the Commission has attached priority to improving the partnership. However, much further work is required if the aspirations of genuine United Nations-World Bank partnership are to be met, and we note a growing impatience in this regard.

136. There is a major challenge for Member States to engage in “joined-up” thinking within their own administrations. The difference in approach that can open up between different arms of government, as articulated at World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. and United Nations Headquarters in New York, is well documented. In this year of the sixteenth International Development Association (IDA) replenishment, it is especially important that Member States ensure coherence between their United Nations priorities and the positions taken by their Executive Board representatives and IDA negotiators.

137. Improving coordination in the field is vital: it is the first and essential step in achieving coherence of approach. However, it is not, of itself, sufficient. Proposals framed in the field are decided at Headquarters: we have consequently probed as to what scope there is for Peacebuilding Commission input in the relevant decision-making processes in Washington, D.C.
138. We believe there is potential for more systematic Peacebuilding Commission entry points into Headquarters decision-making, and that this is achievable in full respect for internal World Bank processes. For countries on the Commission’s agenda, we suggest that, in the interim between receipt of recommendations from the field and the transmission of files to the Executive Board for decision, there should be a structured and well-prepared session in Washington, D.C. to allow the country-specific configuration Chair and his or her team to have meaningful input.

139. In addition to this specific recommendation, we strongly endorse all ongoing initiatives to improve policy and operational coherence between the two bodies. We trust that our earlier recommendation for less frequent and thus better-attended Commission meetings will also result in consistent senior-level attendance by the international financial institutions.

Within the United Nations family; regional and other bodies

140. The Commission should be a constant and active networker within the United Nations family. For example, there is a need for interaction with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the promotion of human rights during conflict and in its aftermath, and on advocacy for legislation that protects all forms of human rights. There is a similar space for dialogue with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which plays a significant role in preparing refugees for normal civilian life. The International Labour Organization should be an important partner in underpinning lasting peace with sustainable livelihoods. There is a need to interface with bodies such as the International Organization for Migration, to involve diaspora more fully in peacebuilding initiatives.

141. The importance of the regional dimension is emphasized in the section entitled “In the field” (section II). For example, there is a network of regional and subregional organizations on the African continent that are active in the peacebuilding field. The African Union’s post-conflict reconstruction and development framework and the African peer review mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, as well as subregional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States constitute a well of local knowledge, experience and lessons learned. It is vital that the Commission tap into this wealth of experience, in Africa and on other continents.

142. The Commission’s working arrangements, both at Headquarters and in the field, must fully reflect the importance of regional engagement. Participation by regional bodies in the field through, for example, videoconferencing, should be standard in Commission discussions. Wherever possible, field visits by country-specific configurations should include representation by the relevant regional organizations as part of the delegation.

143. The co-facilitators’ visit to the European Union in Brussels underlined the interests shared with that body. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other bodies also have a track record of engagement in peacebuilding. Backed by Peacebuilding Support Office research and analysis, the Commission should ensure that the experience, resources and sense of common purpose in the international community is fully brought to bear.
E. Summary of recommendations

Key relationships with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council

• Strengthen the relationship with the Security Council. In a context of a better-performing Peacebuilding Commission bringing genuine added value, its advice would be sought when peacekeeping mandates are being established, reviewed, or approaching drawdown

• Pending procedural innovation, encourage an expansive use of existing
A. Peacebuilding Support Office

146. The founding resolutions make clear that the Peacebuilding Support Office is expected to be a “small” secretariat drawn from existing resources within the system. Its functions are identified as supporting the Commission, managing the Peacebuilding Fund and providing analysis of cross-cutting issues and best practices. The intended role, therefore, is not an operational one but rather one of coordination and support. The Support Office has had some success in these various functions: it provides some useful support to the Organizational Committee and country-specific configuration Chairs; its management of the Fund is now recognized as largely sound; and it is drawing on resources outside the Office to produce important outputs.

147. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable distance to travel. The Support Office continues to struggle with the same issue that confronts the Commission in general: how to carve out a distinctive and leadership role in an Organization where peacebuilding functions are distributed across many departments and offices. In the view of the co-facilitators, the problem lies partly with the Support Office and its place within the Secretariat as a whole.

1. Within the Peacebuilding Support Office

148. It is our view that the Support Office needs to be strengthened if it is to perform its mandated role adequately and meet the additional challenges defined in the present report. The issue of resources needs to be addressed. Currently, the Office has 41 posts, 13 of which are classified as core posts; the remainder are temporary, seconded, extrabudgetary or funded by the Peacebuilding Fund. Lack of technical expertise limits the Support Office’s analytical capacity and ability to network and communicate effectively with experts outside.

149. One avenue towards achieving the necessary strengthening would be a significant upward adjustment of the ratio of core to non-core staff. The co-facilitators strongly recommend that a ratio in the order of two-thirds core and one-third non-core be put in place and sustained. In our view, core functions should be carried out by core staff. Whether conducting in-house work or tapping the expertise that exists elsewhere in the system, the Support Office needs a complement of capable and experienced officers who stay a sufficient time in the Office to ensure institutional memory, set and achieve midterm objectives, and bring a sense of identity and teamwork. Developing appropriate staff recruitment and retention policies must be a clear priority.

150. There is also a need for the Office itself to make better use of its existing resources. While its management of the Fund has visibly improved, similar advances are required in the other two branches of its work, namely in supporting the Commission and the country-specific configurations in particular, and in carrying out its analytical functions.

151. There needs to be a clearer understanding across the system as to what analysis is best done where. The Support Office should not seek to duplicate expertise that exists within various agencies and Secretariat entities; rather, it should leverage and collate this expertise to ensure its coherence, accessibility and usefulness.
152. The goal should be a Peacebuilding Support Office that earns respect as a “centre of competence” at the cutting edge of United Nations thinking on peacebuilding. Drawing on work across and outside the United Nations system, including that of non-governmental organizations, academics and local actors, the Support Office can ensure that United Nations peacebuilding efforts are informed by the best available research and the most relevant field experience. Analytical work of this quality would be an important resource for the Commission, and would also be influential in challenging other parts of the system to engage in innovation and experimentation.

2. **Weight within the Secretariat**

153. The Support Office was envisaged as a small office, but also one with a certain weight, owing to its ability to harness resources from across the Secretariat and to the fact that it was actively and visibly supported by the most senior level of the Organization. The two aspects are interlinked since, as in any organization, a new arrival is more likely to command the respect of larger and longer-established offices if it is seen to be championed from the top.

154. It is worth recalling that, in the original concept of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the Support Office was envisaged as operating in association with a powerful new Deputy Secretary-General for Peace and Security (see A/59/565). The envisaged Deputy Secretary-General, by virtue of rank, would be in a position to ensure that offices such as the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would put their considerable weight behind the peacebuilding efforts led by the Support Office. In the event, the Deputy Secretary-General proposal was not pursued for a variety of reasons and the co-facilitators do not suggest reviving it.

155. Nevertheless, the current situation cannot be regarded as satisfactory. It is not consistent with the 2005 intention that the Support Office be relegated to a kind of add-on role within the Organization. In the course of our consultations, the co-facilitators did not form the impression that the Office is seen as a significant player across the Secretariat.

156. Part of the answer lies in the proposed adjustment in staffing ratios, which will assist the Support Office in demonstrating that it brings a distinctive and valued contribution to cross-Secretariat deliberations. However, it is also important to have a clear, continuing and unequivocal message from the Secretary-General that peacebuilding is central to United Nations priorities, and to have his support for organizational arrangements that reflect this.

157. The co-facilitators encourage the Secretary-General to consider the various avenues through which this support can be expressed. These could include strengthening the mandate and role of the Senior Peacebuilding Group and the peacebuilding dimension of the policy committee. The objective must be to ensure the mainstreaming of peacebuilding across the Organization, clarify the roles of each of the component parts, and strengthen the role of the Peacebuilding Support Office as a focal point in the overall effort.
B. Peacebuilding Fund

158. As set out in the founding resolutions, the Peacebuilding Fund’s objective is to ensure the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery. The Fund is not a development fund or a continuous funding mechanism. Rather, it was intended to be a first resort and to have a catalytic function that would trigger additional and longer-term funding. In summary, it was to be a vehicle for consolidating early wins through quick-impact projects. Donors have so far contributed $343 million, well ahead of the initial target of $250 million; $205 million of that amount has been allocated to date.

159. The co-facilitators are aware that the Fund has been reviewed twice over the past five years and we do not wish to duplicate work already done. There are, however, two aspects we wish to address:

1. Synergy with the Peacebuilding Commission

160. The report of the Secretary-General on the arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund (A/63/818) noted the need for greater synergy between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund, and this is reflected in the revised terms of reference agreed in 2009. However, in our consultations, many suggested that stronger synergy and alignment between the Commission and the Fund is still required.

161. We recognize that this is a sensitive issue. The Fund has an independent decision-making structure, with decisions being made by the Secretary-General following recommendations by the Advisory Group. This independence of decision-making is in line with donor wishes and with wider United Nations procedures.

162. In practice, there is a strong correlation between being on the Commission’s agenda and receiving funds: 56 per cent of the Peacebuilding Fund funds have been allocated to the four agenda countries (20 per cent to Burundi, 18 per cent to Sierra Leone, 15 per cent to the Central African Republic and only 3 per cent to Guinea-Bissau).

163. The co-facilitators welcome this correlation and assume it will be maintained. The fact that countries choose to come on the agenda involves a clear reaching out on their part for the advice and assistance of the international community. This outreach should be recognized with a readiness to ensure that the Peacebuilding Fund remains strongly focused on their needs.

164. It is widely recognized that communication between the Fund and the Commission needs to be improved. The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support briefs the Organizational Committee on a regular basis. However, more should be done through Peacebuilding Support Office briefings to the country-specific configurations and through briefings by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group to the Organizational Committee. It is clearly important that Commission Chairs receive timely information on allocation decisions, which has not always been the case in the past. Peacebuilding Fund projects and expertise will become steadily more relevant to the Commission’s thematic work, and detailed briefings by the Support Office on Peacebuilding Fund
recipient countries that are not on the Commission’s agenda should also be envisaged.

2. Usage of funds

165. A comment on the level of risk tolerance on the part of the Peacebuilding Fund seems appropriate. Various studies, including the Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/64/866-S/2010/386), point to the need for a considerable degree of risk tolerance in post-conflict funding. An appropriate balance between the necessary prudence in the use of donor monies and the boldness required in post-conflict situations is not an easy one to strike. However, with its emphasis on early impact and quick wins, the Peacebuilding Fund was intended to be qualitatively different from other development-focused funds; its risk tolerance threshold can therefore be expected to be higher. While relying on due diligence by the Secretariat, a kind of venture capital approach needs to be brought to bear in deciding Peacebuilding Fund allocations.

166. A second point relates to the need for speedy and streamlined decision-making procedures. Peacebuilding Fund-funded projects are intended to be locally owned, and sufficient time must be allowed to ensure full national buy-in. However, once this national ownership is assured, decision-making should move efficiently, in keeping with the quick-impact concept of the Fund.

C. Summary of recommendations

Peacebuilding Support Office

- Strengthen the staffing arrangements of the Peacebuilding Support Office, notably through a significant upward adjustment of the ratio of core to non-core staff, in the order of two-thirds core to one-third non-core
- Better use the existing resources of the Support Office, in particular in improving support to the country-specific configurations and in carrying out its analytical functions
- Draw on research within and outside the United Nations system to ensure United Nations peacebuilding is backed by the best available analysis and most relevant field experience
- Demonstrate the importance of peacebuilding for the Organization as a whole through leadership from the top and encourage the Secretary-General to consider organizational arrangements reflecting this importance, for example, through strengthening the mandate and role of the Senior Peacebuilding Group and the peacebuilding dimension of the policy committee

Peacebuilding Fund

- Retain the decision-making autonomy of the Peacebuilding Fund, but strengthen its synergy with the Peacebuilding Commission
- Demonstrate more risk tolerance on the part of the Fund
VI. Summing up

167. As we stated at the outset, the co-facilitators hope that the review will help to reclaim and reinvigorate the vision of 2005. We are suggesting some recalibration of the operation of the peacebuilding architecture in the light of the experience of the initial years. However, we emphasize that the exercise will not succeed unless it is infused with a renewed commitment and a strengthened sense of engagement. Change must be psychological as well as institutional.

168. The Peacebuilding Commission needs to recognize and play to its distinctive strengths. It currently lacks a sufficiently clear identity, and confusion as to its role has contributed to disappointment about its delivery. Neither a technical nor an implementing body, it should view itself as a political actor and make full use of this privileged position.

169. As a political actor, the Commission is uniquely positioned to serve as a high-level liaison between needs on the ground and the United Nations system in New York. Its initial task is to assist agenda countries in determining their own peacebuilding priorities. Using its knowledge and experience, it must bring its political weight to bear in efforts to engage the United Nations system and the wider international community in fulfilling these priorities in the best possible way. Moreover, it must not hesitate to use its political weight to urgently address issues of mutual accountability. It is by recognizing and leveraging to the full this essentially political role that the Peacebuilding Commission can best carve out its space.

A. Overview of recommendations

170. The recommendations lend themselves to a certain categorization and are presented at the conclusion of individual sections of the report. However, the co-facilitators see them working as an integrated whole, with one element reinforcing another. It is obvious, for example, that if the Commission becomes more relevant in the field, it will enhance its role at Headquarters. Conversely, interlocutors in the field will value the Peacebuilding Commission connection more if it is perceived as being at the heart of Member State priorities.

171. Our focus throughout this exercise has been on seeking to achieve real, implementable change that will lead to a qualitative enhancement of the Commission’s contribution. Within each section, we have included the rationale for our recommendations and the suggested means of implementation.

172. Taking our recommendations together, we would hope to see emerging:

- **A more relevant Peacebuilding Commission**, with genuine national ownership ensured through capacity-building and greater civil society involvement, simplification of procedures, more effective resource mobilization, deeper coordination with the international financial institutions and a stronger regional dimension

- **A more flexible Peacebuilding Commission**, with a possibility of multi-tiered engagement
• **A better performing Peacebuilding Commission**, with an Organizational Committee that has improved status and focus, and country-specific configurations that are better resourced, more innovative and have a stronger field identity

• **A more empowered Peacebuilding Commission**, with a considerably strengthened relationship with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council

• **A better supported Peacebuilding Commission**, with a strongly performing Peacebuilding Support Office that carries greater weight within the Secretariat and a Peacebuilding Fund that is fully attuned to the purposes for which it was created

• **A more ambitious Peacebuilding Commission**, with a more diverse range of countries on its agenda

• **A better understood Peacebuilding Commission**, with an effective communications strategy that spells out what it has to offer and creates a more positive branding

**B. Conclusion**

173. Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, setting out the purposes of the United Nations, enshrines the responsibility “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”. That the United Nations focus should have so disproportionately moved to peacekeeping in the intervening years is a matter that the membership as a whole needs to address. In creating the new architecture in 2005, world leaders clearly wished to reclaim the Organization’s peacebuilding vocation.

174. The co-facilitators hope that the present review will serve as a wake-up call. We have not captured every point made by our interlocutors: some went in competing directions, while others were pertinent but too detailed to be included in the report. The basic message is unmistakable: peacebuilding is a litmus test of our Organization and much more needs to be done collectively, if that test is to be passed.

175. As we noted in the introduction, the *World Development Report 2011* will provide a reality check. Its message is stark: more than half of the world’s poorest billion live in conflict-affected and recovering countries, and the development challenge faced by those countries is deep both in absolute and in relative terms. In combination with the present review, we hope that the *World Development Report 2011* findings will help to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.

176. As to next steps, it is for the membership to decide how to take forward the outcome of the review. We hope that our recommendations will be widely accepted and implemented in a sufficiently comprehensive way to make a real difference. Above all, we hope the Organization as a whole will prove responsive to our call for the peacebuilding challenge to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency.

177. Finally, we thank the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council for the confidence placed in us, and the membership, the Secretariat and the wider United Nations for their commitment to this exercise and the high quality of their engagement.
Appendix

List of consultations undertaken by the co-facilitators

Informal open-ended consultations of Member States

• 17 February 2010
• 10 May 2010
• 7 July 2010

United Nations stakeholders

• Secretary-General
• President of the General Assembly
• President of the Security Council
• President of the Economic and Social Council
• Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
• Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
• Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support
• Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning
• Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
• Former Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
• Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
• Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea-Bissau
• Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone
• Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia
• Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste
• Past and current Chairs of the Organizational Committee and country-specific configurations

Member States and regional organizations

• Representatives of individual Member States
• Representatives of regional groups
• Political and Security Committee of the European Union
• Peace and Security Council of the African Union
Partners

- Representatives of the World Bank
- Representatives of international civil society organizations
- Representatives of civil society organizations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, South Africa and the Sudan
- African Union Partners Group

Specific events organized to enable the co-facilitators to gather views from stakeholders

- “Reviewing the Peacebuilding Commission: Perspectives from Civil Society” — a round-table discussion hosted by the International Peace Institute, with the participation of internationally and locally based civil society organizations, including the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 30 March 2010
- Five-year review of the Peacebuilding Commission — a consultative workshop hosted by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, with the participation of Geneva-based organizations active in peacebuilding, 12 April 2010
- “Securing sustainable peace in Africa: coordination, coherence and partnerships. Assessing the Progress of the Peacebuilding Commission” — conference co-hosted by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes and the South African Department for International Relations and Cooperation, with the participation of government, including heads of State and Government, civil society and academia from the countries on the Commission’s agenda and other conflict-affected States in Africa, 29 and 30 April 2010
- “Review and Vitalization of Peacebuilding” — a conference hosted by the Stanley Foundation, with the participation of Member State representatives, civil society representatives and academics, 21 to 23 May 2010