I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/5) of 25 February 2002, in which the Council requested the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to submit to the Council a first assessment of the number of members of the Rwandan armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Please find attached information I have received from MONUC in response to the Council’s request. This assessment takes the form of an introductory narrative, supported by a map and detailed fact sheets. There is also a section on information sources and methodology.

This assessment provided by MONUC concerns not only the number of members of the Rwandan armed groups, but also, to assist the Security Council in understanding the background to the armed-group problem, the number, location, leadership, structure and armaments of all armed groups listed in the annex to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In view of the importance of the Mayi-Mayi presence to the military situation in the east, data on the Mayi-Mayi is included in a separate appendix.

A refined version of this preliminary assessment will be provided once MONUC has made more progress in the implementation of the third phase of its deployment.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Annex

First assessment of the armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Introduction

1. This note is submitted pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/5) of 25 February 2002, in which the Council requested MONUC to make a first assessment of the number of members of the Rwandan armed groups (ex-Forces armées rwandaises and Interahamwe) in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to report to the Council by the end of March.

2. In accordance with that request, and pursuant to its mandate to initiate preparations for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration into society of former combatants, MONUC has been gathering and analysing data from various sources, including in and around Kindu, on the armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Sources of information

3. In compiling the information to be submitted to the Security Council, MONUC has relied on a wide range of sources. The first of these was the information submitted by the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement themselves in accordance with the request made of them by the Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001. In that resolution, the Council requested all parties that had not already done so to provide “inter alia, the numbers, location and armaments of the armed groups, and the proposed sites of their demobilization areas, in order to facilitate United Nations planning to assist the parties in the implementation of these plans”.

4. MONUC has conveyed to the parties its view that the Council’s request should be considered as an invitation for the establishment of mechanisms for the sharing and joint analysis of the information sought, rather than for a one-time submission by the parties of an information package which might become incomplete or outdated as the situation on the ground continued to develop.

5. At the same time, MONUC has been proceeding, on the basis of the approach outlined in the tenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2002/169), to inform itself in as much detail as possible on the number, location, armaments, leadership, structure, movements and intentions of the armed groups, and the number of their dependants. To that end, since late January, the Mission’s disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) Division has been dispatching teams to the capitals of the signatories and throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo to gather information, and to cross-check and analyse it. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Amos Namanga Ngongi, brought these activities to the attention of the Political Committee at its meeting in Luanda in February 2002, and requested that signatory parties extend their full cooperation to these efforts.

6. Phase III of the deployment of MONUC in Kindu and elsewhere in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo will greatly assist in the further collection and
analysis of the information required. To that end, shortly after military deployment began in Kindu in February 2002, a DDRRR team was sent to the town to make contact with the local civilian and military authorities and, to the extent possible, with civil society and other sources that might be in a position to throw further light on the situation of armed groups in the eastern part of the country. Other sources include members of the armed groups themselves, government representatives from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, non-governmental organizations, civil society and personnel of United Nations agencies on the ground, as well as MONUC military observer teams, which are stationed at 55 locations throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

7. The armed groups are dynamic entities. Alliances within and between the groups are constantly shifting, and often linked to short-term goals or individual operations. The groups themselves are subject to leadership struggles linked to political, economic or other objectives. They also undergo change in the course of victory or defeat in military actions. They are in constant motion and their locations, although generally known, cannot be precisely pinpointed.

8. In order to give the Security Council the fullest possible picture of the situation as it appears at this stage, including the full military and security context of the information gathered so far, MONUC would like to present information not on the numbers of the Rwandan armed groups only, but on all the armed groups listed in the Lusaka Agreement whose disarmament, demobilization and repatriation is being sought.

9. MONUC would also like to present information on the Mayi-Mayi that it has gathered in the course of enquiries on the armed groups. Since the Mayi-Mayi are not listed among the armed groups that appear in the annex to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but are an important element in the military situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, this information is contained in the appendix to the present report.

UNITA

10. MONUC has no recent reliable reports of UNITA activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, though the group may use that country’s territory as a transit route for logistic supplies. There may also be some UNITA presence associated with the refugee camps close to the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Zambia.

11. Having consulted with the Government of Angola, MONUC has concluded that such UNITA presence as there is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo takes the form of groups or individuals who are not under coherent command, and who may have been assimilated into other armed groups, or simply become dormant. The Mission’s Radio Okapi has begun broadcasts in Portuguese aimed at former UNITA fighters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, giving them the latest information concerning the situation in Angola, including the implications of the death of Jonas Savimbi and details of the Angolan Government’s reinsertion programmes. There are plans to invite Angolan government officials to participate in these broadcasts.
Ugandan armed groups

12. Information gathered by MONUC indicates that only one of the six Ugandan armed groups mentioned in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is still active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, namely, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Three of the other five groups listed are reported to have been disbanded. The National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) is recognized to have been absorbed by ADF, and the Ugandan National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) and the Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA) were dissolved following negotiations with Kampala. The last two groups, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) are still operational but not in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

13. The Allied Democratic Forces are reckoned to have 200 to 300 fighters, mainly in the Ruwenzori Mountains close to the border with Uganda. Unlike some of the other foreign armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ADF are not known to have external allies. Like most other armed groups, ADF are believed to be only lightly armed.

14. In view of the apparent isolation and vulnerability of the remaining ADF presence in the field, and their severely reduced effectiveness as a fighting force, MONUC has been working with the World Bank post-conflict fund and the Government of Uganda on plans to disseminate information about the Government’s amnesty and reinsertion programme in order to encourage ADF elements to give themselves up.

Burundian armed groups

15. The Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) and the Forces nationales pour la libération (FNL) maintain a presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and are also very active in their country of origin.

16. The Forces pour la défense de la démocratie are the armed wing of the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD). FDD consist of two wings, led by Pierre Nkurunziza and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, respectively. There are, however, unconfirmed reports that Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye has recently been toppled by Pierre Nkurunziza, uniting the armed wing under one leader.

17. MONUC estimates that there are 3,000 to 4,000 FDD troops operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These are mainly located in the South Kivu and Katanga Provinces, along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. In Katanga Province, FDD are said to fight alongside the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) and in South Kivu they are known to have undertaken joint operations with Rwandan armed groups and with the Mayi-Mayi. They are also said to receive outside support from a variety of sources including the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies. MONUC has not been able to verify these reports. Approximately 1,000 FDD fighters were believed to be in Moliro, but were scattered when the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) seized the village in mid-March.

18. The Forces nationales de libération (FNL) are the armed wing of the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU). Although it is generally recognized that FNL are present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in small numbers, MONUC has no precise information as to their strength and location.
Rwandan armed groups

19. Although the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement refers to the ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe, evidence gathered since the signing of the Agreement indicates that these groups are now collectively known as the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR), which is divided into two parts, designated as ALIR I and ALIR II. Despite, or perhaps because of, the multiplicity of sources with information on the Rwandan armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, establishing precise and reliable figures has proved particularly difficult. ALIR I and ALIR II represent the bulk of the foreign fighters to be disarmed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

20. The present submission contains information provided by the Government of Rwanda to MONUC and to the Political Committee up to December 2001, as well as information gathered by MONUC from other sources. The numbers provided by the Government of Rwanda have usually been higher than those gathered elsewhere. Nevertheless, during recent meetings, Rwandan authorities have agreed with the MONUC estimates of the strength of ALIR I and ALIR II. The estimates do not include the Rwandan elements from these armed groups that may have been incorporated into FAC.

21. It is customary to describe the Rwandan armed groups as structured organizations with traditional military appellations, such as division, brigade, battalion and company. While these appellations have been used in the present submission, MONUC is not convinced that the Rwandan armed groups conform to a traditional military structure, or that they necessarily operate under coherent command and control.

22. ALIR I is believed to include in its ranks the majority of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe who fled Rwanda in 1994. Estimates of the number of ALIR I troops vary considerably according to which source is consulted. MONUC estimates that there are between 4,000 and 6,000 troops.

23. ALIR I is based in North and South Kivu and Maniema Provinces. It is believed to have two divisions, Division Arbre/Yaounde, which operates on the Shabunda-Fizi-Kabambare axis, and Division Beor/Douala, which operates on the Masisi-Walikale axis.

24. ALIR I fighters are currently thought to suffer from low morale following their failed attempt to invade Rwanda in May 2001. They are believed to be isolated and living in harsh conditions. MONUC is aware of indications that outside support that may once have been provided to the group is now no longer available, and has been trying, with the cooperation of the RCD and Rwandan authorities and the help of Mayi-Mayi representatives, to establish direct contact in order to discuss disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration with some ALIR I elements near Masisi, north of Goma.

25. ALIR II is said to be larger and better equipped than ALIR I. Its members are thought to be younger, and not to have participated in the 1994 genocide. Estimates of the group’s size vary considerably, with some knowledgeable sources placing the number between 4,000 and 6,000.

26. ALIR II is believed to have at least one division with three brigades in the South Kivu and Katanga Provinces and headquarters in Lubumbashi. The existence
of a second division remains unconfirmed. However, reports that there may be two or three more brigades in Katanga would, according to traditional military structures, tend to indicate the existence of a second division whose headquarters remain unknown. ALIR II is said to be equipped with more sophisticated weaponry than other groups, including light anti-aircraft guns.

**Conclusion**

27. The preliminary information contained herein has been collected and analysed in the framework of the implementation of the third phase of the mandate of MONUC, a principal objective of which is the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of armed groups. As MONUC embarks on step I of Phase III and reinforces its presence in the East, in particular with the establishment of the Task Force in Kindu, the Mission is expected to have increased access to concrete data concerning the presence and activities of the armed groups and will, accordingly, refine the information contained herein and update its operational plans for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration.

**Fact sheets on the armed groups**

**Uganda**

**ADF (Allied Democratic Forces/Front)**

*Structure*

ADF had been organized in four companies. Following successful operations by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, they now operate in small groups of 10 to 15 men with little coordination between them.

*Strength*

Between 200 and 300 fighters

*Location*

- West and north of Lake Edward
- Butembo
- Mount Varunga
- Beni
- Kanyabayonga
- Area south of the Semliki River
- Ruwenzori Mountains, Buhira, Isale, area above Rugetzi

*Weapons*

Primarily small arms (AK-47 rifles). In the past they were reported to have 60-mm and 82-mm mortars as well as heavy machine guns (12.7 mm) and SPG-9
recoilless rifles. With their present limited numbers, however, it is unlikely that they would be able to move with any heavy weapons.

*Other equipment*

The group has been reported to have access to satellite telephones, man-pack radios and Motorola walkie-talkies.

*Links with other groups*

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)

*Support*

- Given that the leaders of the ADF rebellion are thought to come from central and eastern Uganda, support from that area may continue
- There are reports that the Sudan and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have previously supported this group. MONUC is unable to confirm this.

**Burundi**

**FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie)**

*Political leaders*

 Pierre Nkurunziza
 Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye

*Strength*

FDD forces operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are estimated at around 3,000-4,000 troops

*Location*

- 1,000 men are or were located in Moliro, Mwenge and Moba; the location of those dislodged from Moliro is not known
- 2,000 are scattered around Fizi and along Lake Tanganika, near Ubwari
- 1,000 towards Lumbumbashi (Kampini, north of Pweto, Kinsense River, Kamamba, Kilewa, Kilinga)

*Weapons*

Rifles and grenades; heavy machine guns (12.7 mm and 14.5 mm); RPG rocket launchers; 60-, 82- and 107-mm mortars

*Other equipment*

Speed boats on Lake Tanganyika (for transport of personnel and supplies). FDD use Motorola transmitting/receiving sets within fighting units. For long-
distance communication, they have some satellite telephones and GSM telephones

Links with other groups

FAC, Zimbabwe Defence Forces, ALIR II and Mayi-Mayi

Support

FDD have been fighting together with FAC, ex-FAR, Interahamwe and Mayi-Mayi troops in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwanda

ALIR I (Armée pour la libération du Rwanda I)

Structure

Two divisions in Kivu: headquarters Kahuzi-Biega; North Kivu Beor/Douala, South Kivu Arbre/Yaounde
• Brigade Limpopo/Tribune (Masisi)
• Brigade Lilongwe (Walikale)
• Brigade Misissipi/Tensiometre (Shabunda)
• Brigade Kolwezi (Fizi)
• Brigade Matadi (Kabambare)

Strength

4,000-6,000; RPA estimations are around 13,000-15,000

Location

• Masisi
• Walikale
• Shabunda
• Fizi
• Kabambare

Weapons

RPA information: AK-47 and M-16 rifles; medium machine guns and grenades; 60-82-mm mortars; rocket launchers like RPG and 107-mm Katyusha single barrel; anti-tank and anti-personnel mines; light anti-aircraft guns (11.5 mm, 12.7 mm)

Other sources: 80-mm mortars; RPG-7; machine guns (12.7 mm); AK-47 rifles; and anti-personnel mines
Other equipment

Motorola radios and satellite telephones

Support

Sources indicate that the group has received support from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but that this support may have stopped. Furthermore, it was reported that the logistic support was received by airdrops in Masisi, Lulimba and Kilembwe. The last supply (not confirmed) was received on 1 and 3 May 2001, by Antonov 12. MONUC has not been able to verify this.

Rwanda

ALIR II (Armée pour la libération du Rwanda II)

Structure

One division in Katanga with one active brigade (Horizon); brigades 11 and 12 are no longer active; Brigade Horizon is active in Nyunzu

- Brigades Kasai and Jaguar are no longer active. Some units of Jaguar are scattered around Kabalo and Nyunzu. Brigade Kasai has moved to the north to join forces with ALIR I. Its location is not known at the moment
- Brigade Albatros (unconfirmed) and two battalions (Samurai and Claire)

Strength

Total strength is 4,000-6,000. According to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and RCD, ALIR II organizes joint operations and mutual reinforcement with FAC

Location

- Lubumbashi
- Nyunzu
- Kabalo
- Area along the southern end of Lake Tanganyika

Weapons

They are better equipped than ALIR I, but have less experience. ALIR II seems to have lost heavy weapons (80-, 105- and 120-mm mortars) that were captured by RPA at Makotano, the former ALIR II logistic base. According to RPA, ALIR II is equipped with AK-47 and M-16 rifles; machine guns and grenades; 60-82-mm mortars; rocket launchers like RPG and 107-mm Katyusha single barrel; anti-tank and anti-personnel mines; and light anti-aircraft guns (12.7 mm, 14.5 mm). This is generally confirmed by other sources.
Other equipment

Satellite telephones and Motorola radios

Links with other groups

According to RPA, they operate in close cooperation with FDD/FAC

Support

ALIR II reportedly recruited in the United Republic of Tanzania. These recruits cross into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the zones of Kazimia (Fizi), Simbi, Mungwe, and Swima. It is reported that they receive supplies from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Lulimba, Kilembwe and Masisi are drop zones. The supplies are sent mainly to ALIR and Mayi-Mayi cooperating with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is reported that the lack of supplies is at the root of a large number of banditry attacks, especially in the Bukavu and Uvira areas. MONUC cannot confirm these reports.
Appendix

The Mayi-Mayi

1. All the armed groups explicitly listed in the Lusaka Agreement are foreign, whether from Angola (UNITA), Burundi (FDD), Rwanda (ex-FAR/Interahamwe) or Uganda (ADF and others). The Mayi-Mayi, by contrast, are a distinctly Congolese phenomenon. Although, accordingly, they do not fall within the strict category of “armed groups” within the meaning of the Lusaka Agreement and the various Security Council resolutions governing disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, it is impossible to consider the full picture of armed groups in the east without considering the Mayi-Mayi.

2. Gathering information on the Mayi-Mayi has proved to be a rather difficult endeavour. Many groups and individuals claiming to represent the Mayi-Mayi have contacted MONUC in the field. Some have provided documentation on their own groups and on other groups. MONUC has established contacts with representatives of some of the main Mayi-Mayi groups in Kinshasa. Finally, information obtained from RCD officials, MONUC military observer teams in the east and other sources have helped fill out the picture.

3. The umbrella term Mayi-Mayi refers generally to community-based fighters who come together to defend their local territory, including, as in this case, from foreign invaders and their allies. The term includes seigneurs de guerre, traditional chiefs, heads of villages, and resistance groups. The military capacity and political orientation of these groups varies considerably, and can change rapidly. A high proportion of Mayi-Mayi militia are reported to be child soldiers.

4. The Mayi-Mayi are known to shift alliances to achieve their interests. This has at times led to internal differences and strife and helps to explain why there is no apparent pattern in Mayi-Mayi alliances with outside groups. Some Mayi-Mayi groups have sided with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, others with the Government of Rwanda. Factions have collaborated with different rebel groups, as well as with the foreign armed groups.

5. Consequently, in the course of discussions with several Mayi-Mayi groups, it has become clear that at least some Mayi-Mayi are prepared to assist the international community in its effort to bring peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and help in the disarmament process by creating a mixed force to facilitate the location and identification of foreign armed groups. One major Mayi-Mayi group has declared a unilateral ceasefire.

6. In South and North Kivu, the territory under the control of RCD-Goma, there are two main groups, led by General Padiri and General Dunia. These two groups are well structured and generally recognized by other Mayi-Mayi groups as the overall leaders of the groups in the region. Both are reported to have received support from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are also some smaller groups with no perceivable links or affiliations with other groups. Some, such as Mudundu 40 and MLAZ, are reported to collaborate with the Government of Rwanda and RCD-Goma.

7. The highest concentrations of Mayi-Mayi groups in North Kivu are in the areas of Walikale and Masisi north of Goma; in South Kivu, in the territory of Walungu and Bunyakiri south of Lake Kivu; at the northern end of Lake Tanganyika around
Uvira and Mwenga; and further south towards Fizi. Around Shabunda, halfway between the Rwandan border and Kindu, there is another high concentration of Mayi-Mayi groups. The total number of Mayi-Mayi active in the Kivus is estimated at 20,000 to 30,000.

8. There is also a large Mayi-Mayi presence in Maniema, including the areas around Kindu, and, in the south, around Kalemie. For security reasons, precise information about groups, leaders and numbers have proved very difficult to gather, although MONUC deployment at Kindu will permit better information-gathering and analysis.

9. There are also Mayi-Mayi groups in Province Orientale, but these are apparently active in connection with ethnic conflicts there, and are not expected to participate in the MONUC disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration operations for the foreseeable future.
Mayi-Mayi

*Strength*

20,000-30,000 in the Kivus

*Military objectives*

- Withdrawal of foreign troops
- Disarmament of “negative forces”: some propose a mixed force, in order to facilitate location and identification of these forces

*Support*

Some groups reportedly receive military and logistic support from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

**Group of Padiri**

*Location*

- Shabunda: more than 2,000 men in the area (60 per cent armed, around 840 under the age of 18)
- Bunyakiri
- Walungu
- Mwenga
- Uvira
- Other locations: Lulingu, Kalehe, Hombo, Nzovu, Kaye Bunyakiri Forest, Kalonge, Urega
- North Kivu: Masisi, Walikale

*Strength*

6,000

**Group of Dunia**

*Location*

- Fizi
- Uvira
- Maniema

*Strength*

4,000-5,000
Mudundu 40/FRDKI (Front de résistance et de défense du Kivu)

Location
- Walungu: Odilon Kurhengamuzimu
- Mwenga
- Shabunda
- Kabare
- Uvira

Strength
4,000

Col Rubaruba Zabuloni

Location
- Kagomba (near Uvira)

MLAZ/FURNAC: Mouvement de lutte contre l’agression au Zaïre/Forces unies de résistance nationale contre l’agression de la République démocratique du congo

Location
- Kivu: Moleta, Uvira, Fizi
- Maniema