Letter dated 8 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1708 (2006), I have the honour to transmit herewith the update report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (see annex).

In this connection, I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. Vassilakis
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire
Annex

Letter dated 27 November 2006 from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the update report requested in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1708 (2006).

(Signed) Agim de Bruycker
(Signed) Christian Dietrich
(Signed) Oumar Dieye Sidi
(Signed) Alex Vines
Summary

The Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire documents embargo violations. In October 2006 the National Police prepared to import ammunition and tear gas from the Islamic Republic of Iran via a broker of Belgian nationality registered in the British Virgin Islands and based in South Africa. Fortunately, the transfer of the equipment had not occurred when the Group intervened, and the transaction will now be placed before the Security Council Committee for exemption.

The Group also investigated the importation of small-arms ammunition into Côte d’Ivoire by a criminal network using international courier firms. The arrest on 26 September 2006 in San Diego (United States of America) of Ivorian national Yssouf Diabaté by agents of the United States Department of Homeland Security highlights the exploitation of United Nations sanctions by opportunistic individuals: small arms and ammunition destined for Abidjan were seized by United States agents in San Diego just prior to export. Ammunition already sent by Mr. Diabaté was also seized by Customs agents in Abidjan in September 2006. Mr. Diabaté clearly violated the United Nations embargo.

The Ivorian Government admitted to the Group that it has three foreign technicians for its Mi-24 helicopter and also hired foreign technicians for land-based equipment in 2005. The Group recognizes that test flights of the Mi-24 need to be conducted in order for it to remain airworthy. The Group recommends minimum requirements under an exemption system approved by the Security Council Committee to permit test flights and technical assistance. The requirements must include full disclosure of the identities of foreign or dual-nationality Mi-24 technicians.

The Group documents the role of R.M. Holdings and its directors, French national Robert Montoya and Belarusian national Mikhail Kapylou, who supported and funded foreign technicians, including Dzmitry Lapko, a Belarusian citizen who worked for the Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) ground-to-air artillery battalion in Abidjan beginning in March 2005. Mr. Kapylou also holds an Ivorian diplomatic passport issued in March 2005 that describes him as “Conseiller technique au Ministère de la défense”.

The creation of an embargo cell by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in August 2006 is mainstreaming embargo monitoring, with the support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff. The embargo cell would benefit from a short-term maritime Customs consultant to assist in its monitoring of shipping. Currently, the ports are wide open to abuse, and UNOCI has not conducted a port inspection since August. The Group continued to experience access problems with the Gendarmerie and FANCI during inspections. No inspections of the Presidential Guard have been carried out, and its bases urgently need inspection.
The Group found continued evidence of diamond production in Côte d’Ivoire and illicit exporting of diamonds, especially to Mali. The Group observed Malian agents in Séguéla and established that one key dealer, identified as Sekou Sidibe on his Ivorian passport, also has Malian nationality, under the name Niangadou Sekou and with a different birthdate. The Group welcomed the efforts of Kimberley Process participants to assist Ghana in reforming its internal diamond controls to ensure that it does not receive conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. The Group also highlights that Dubai released a package of suspect “Ghanaian” diamonds to its importer without conducting a proper investigation.
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abbreviations</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1–4 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. <strong>Arms</strong></td>
<td>5–20 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ammunition and tear gas for the police</td>
<td>6–11 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Deliveries of arms and ammunition by Federal Express and United Parcel Service</td>
<td>12–17 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. False Burkina Faso end-user certificate 732</td>
<td>18–20 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Provision of military assistance, advice and training</strong></td>
<td>21–31 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Status of the Mil Mi-24</td>
<td>23–24 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Identity of Mil Mi-24 foreign technicians</td>
<td>25 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Payment for foreign technicians and associated personnel of the Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>26–28 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. R.M. Holdings, Montoya and Kapylou</td>
<td>29–31 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Embargo inspections</strong></td>
<td>32–36 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. Diamonds</strong></td>
<td>37–47 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ghana and Mali</td>
<td>37–40 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Dubai and the “Ghanaian” diamond package</td>
<td>41 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Séguéla inspection</td>
<td>42–46 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Ministry of Mines</td>
<td>47 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. Targeted measures on three Ivorians</strong></td>
<td>48 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annexes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annexes</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Meetings and consultations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Invoice sent by Tusk Trading Pty Ltd</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. End-user certificate issued by the Ministry of Security</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Ammunition sent to Abidjan by Yssouf Diabaté</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Example of cheque from R.M. Holdings to Ivan Bohach</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Passport and laissez-passer of Dzmitry Lapko</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. French passport of Robert Montoya</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Delegation of authority by Robert Montoya to Mikhail Kapylou for R.M. Holdings</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Ivorian diplomatic passport of Mikhail Kapylou describing him as “Conseiller technique au Ministère de la défense”</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. Malian identity card of Niangadou Sekou, also known as Sekou Sidibe</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSVT</td>
<td>Belspetsvneshtechnika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACI</td>
<td>Force aérienne de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANCI</td>
<td>Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATL</td>
<td>Groupement aérienne de transport et de liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPCS</td>
<td>Kimberley Process Certification Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

1. The present report is an update of the previous report of the Group of Experts issued on 5 October 2006 (see S/2006/735). The Group began its renewed mandate under Security Council resolution 1708 (2006) of 14 September 2006 in early October and consulted with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) in New York on 4 October. This report is the result of six weeks of field investigation.

2. During its mandate, the Group visited Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, France, Ghana, South Africa, Togo, Hungary, Ukraine and the United States of America. The Group cancelled its visit to Guinea, scheduled for 20 and 21 November, because the Government of Guinea failed to confirm any appointment.

3. In Côte d’Ivoire the Group visited Abidjan, San Pedro and Séguéla. It liaised closely with the political, police and military branches of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and also met with the French forces that support it (Licorne), as required by resolution 1643 (2005), and was fully briefed on its efforts to monitor the embargo. The Group cooperated with other relevant groups of experts, such as its Liberia counterpart (established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1689 (2006)), whose information from an October mission to Guiglo and Toulépleu in Côte d’Ivoire the Group drew upon.

4. The Group of Experts sought to obtain fully authenticated documentary evidence. Where this was not possible, the Group required at least two credible and verifiably independent sources of information to substantiate a finding.

II. Arms

5. Continued investigations by the Group exposed two arms embargo violations. The Group also continued to investigate the issuance of false end-user certificate 732 (see S/2006/735).

A. Ammunition and tear gas for the police

6. The Group obtained an invoice dated 12 October 2006 for 269,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, faxed with a cover sheet dated 13 October 2006 as “facture 001/2006” to Commissioner Killy of the National Police. The invoice for $916,076 was sent by Michel Vandenbosch of Tusk Trading Pty Ltd, a company registered in Cape Town, South Africa (see annex II). The Group visited Cape Town on 10 November and met Mr. Vandenbosch, who admitted that the invoice was genuine but said the Ivorian police had told him that such supplies were not embargoed material. He was waiting to receive an end-user certificate from the Ivorians before the goods were transferred.

7. According to Mr. Vandenbosch, he is the Chairman of Tusk Trading Pty Ltd and brokers military equipment, second-hand clothes and other goods. There are Tusk Trading companies in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia as well; he also has a second Cape Town company called Tresso Trading. Tusk Trading Pty Ltd and Tresso Trading are not registered in South Africa to broker military goods and services,
although there are a number of companies that have the same name. Further investigation into Tusk Trading Pty Ltd established that it was incorporated as company 639935 at the Register of Corporate Affairs of the British Virgin Islands on 31 January 2005. According to its register of directors, its occupation is “Merchant. Hardware, clothing, footwear, military paraphernalia and accessories importer and exporter”. Its Managing Director is Michel Ferdinand Vandenbosch, who is Belgian, born on 18 June 1946 and currently resident in Cape Town.

8. The Group also met Commissioner Killy of the National Police in Abidjan on 14 November. The Commissioner admitted that the invoice was genuine but said that the goods had not been received, although he was unsure whether his Ministry of Security had already paid a deposit or issued an end-user certificate. He said that the police were short of munitions and that he had also ordered tear gas. The Group explained that such transfers would constitute a violation of the embargo unless exempted by the Security Council Committee under paragraph 8 (e) of Council resolution 1572 (2004).

9. On 20 November the Group met in Abidjan with the Minister for Security, Joseph Dja Ble, to further discuss this case and was provided a copy of an official letter with supporting documentation dated 16 November and sent to the Permanent Mission of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations to seek Security Council Committee exemption for military goods. Attached to that letter were end-user certificates for munitions and tear gas, dated 6 November 2006 (see annex III). The Group has learned that by 23 November a request had not been received by the Committee.

10. The Group was informed by the Minister that a deposit had been paid to Tusk Trading Pty Ltd for the equipment in question. With the assistance of the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations the Group also obtained details of the financial transaction. According to documentation obtained by the Group, Tusk Trading Pty Ltd opened account No. 591-07-370672-01 at Hellenic Bank in Cyprus on 12 October 2006 for expected incoming financial transfers from “Ivory Coast, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Nigeria”, with expected outgoing transfers to “Cyprus — Iran — France — and RSA”. On 30 October 2006 that account was credited with $903,953.00 from an Ivorian Government central account on behalf of the National Police for “Achat de matériels de sécurité”. On 15 November Ministry of Security documents, including the end-user certificates, were faxed to the Hellenic Bank Representative Office in Sandton, Johannesburg (South Africa), and its Chief Representative Officer was briefed that the United Nations was now engaged in discussions for approval.

11. A violation of the embargo was narrowly avoided because of the intervention of the Group. End-user certificates had been issued and a deposit made in a newly opened bank account for this transaction. The Group hopes now that the National Police will follow correct procedures by seeking an exemption from the Security Council Committee. Clearly, there are equipment needs, and UNOCI can assist by giving its assessment. The Group believes that if the needs are genuine, with marking and storing in a UNOC-monitored and easily audited location such imports should be considered for exemption by the Security Council Committee. The Economic Community of West African States, which has a newly launched convention on small arms and light weapons, should also be consulted.
B. Deliveries of arms and ammunition by Federal Express and United Parcel Service


13. Yssouf Diabaté was arrested following an undercover operation and was charged with knowingly and wilfully attempting to export 38 pistols, 10 firearm magazines, 10 gun-mount illuminators and 5 laser Max sights from the United States to Côte d’Ivoire. Mr. Diabaté paid approximately $19,950 for those items and travelled to a storage facility in San Diego to conceal them by breaking them down into parts and stuffing them into video monitors for shipment by UPS to Côte d’Ivoire. At a UPS office in San Diego, Mr. Diabaté addressed the shipment to “Mr. Stephene Douhot” at an address in Abidjan. He signed the shipping invoice, falsely describing the shipment as “monitor-camera and accessories to friend”, valued at $400.

14. Mr. Diabaté is on trial for attempting to export military goods without a licence, in violation of the United States Arms Export Control Act. During the investigation Mr. Diabaté was informed of the United Nations arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire but told an undercover agent that there was increased demand for firearms because of this. He stated that he had a friend who could import the weapons by bribing a local official. Mr. Diabaté also indicated that he preferred to export from San Diego because the courier companies were more vigilant in New York. He also admitted that he wanted to use UPS because in September 2006 he had used FedEx to ship ammunition in two boxes from New York to Côte d’Ivoire and a box had been intercepted in Abidjan. When United States police searched Mr. Diabaté’s apartment in Brooklyn, New York City, they found 9mm handgun ammunition and a small arm.

15. A joint team from the Group and the UNOCI embargo cell visited UPS and FedEx in Abidjan on 16 November. At UPS the joint team established that no other shipments had been received from Mr. Diabaté and that the intended recipient, Stéphene Douhot, is head of the Government’s Customs enforcement unit embedded in UPS. He denied knowing Mr. Diabaté.

16. The joint team also visited FedEx, which confirmed that a package had been intercepted following screening. It was declared as “telephones and accessories” valued at $1,400 and was sent on 22 September 2006 by a Yssouf Diabaté, from the address of the same Brooklyn apartment referred to above, to Soumahoro Boubacar at an address in Abidjan. The package was opened, found to contain ammunition, taken away by Customs officials and handed over to an investigative unit of the Gendarmerie. According to Customs officials, Mr. Boubacar was known to have run a shop selling firearms in Abidjan prior to the embargo.

17. On 21 November, at the Gendarmerie in Abidjan, the Group inspected a seized package addressed to Diabate Youssof at a different address in Abidjan and photographed and recorded the 2,210 rounds of seven different types of handgun ammunition that it contained (see annex IV). The Gendarmerie investigation of
Mr. Boubacar appears to have made little progress. As these are sanctioned goods, the Group recommends that UNOCI inspect the package every two months and seek an update on how the Gendarmerie investigation progresses. Once this process is over, if sanctions remain in force, the ammunition should be surrendered to UNOCI for destruction. Mr. Diabaté pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 28 September; the date of his trial in San Diego is expected to be set on 27 November.

C. False Burkina Faso end-user certificate 732

18. In S/2006/735, paragraphs 30 to 34, the Group highlighted the case of false Burkina Faso end-user certificate 732 for ammunition. On 19 October 2006, the Group received official confirmation from the Government of Burkina Faso that the certificate was false and that it was based upon an authentic document — MS/724, dated 13 June 2005.

19. Additional investigation by the Group into the company mentioned in the false end-user certificate was inconclusive. On 18 October, the Group visited the Budapest address cited on end-user certificate 732 but found no sign of IVH Trading Ltd. The company registered in Hungary is called Ivory Hill Trading Ltd, not IVH Trading Ltd, as on end-user certificate 732, and the Hungarian authorities cannot investigate further unless criminal activity can be proved.

20. The Government of Seychelles reported to the Group on 8 November that it could not find a link between TING Ltd (incorporated in Victoria) and Ivory Hill Trading Ltd. In Ukraine, on 23 October, the Group met with the relevant authorities and discussed end-user certificate 732. Previous correspondence with the Group from the authorities of the Ukraine was clarified and additional information provided. The Group concludes that Segiy Kirichuk and a Ukrainian woman named on the Ivory Hill Trading Ltd registration document were victims of identity theft by an unknown entity and had no proven relationship with that company.

III. Provision of military assistance, advice and training

21. The Group continued to investigate the use of foreign nationals by the Government and the rebels. The Panel of Experts on Liberia, following its investigations in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, supported the findings of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reported in S/2006/735, paragraphs 54 to 60. In addition, the Liberia Panel reported a worrisome movement of unemployed ex-Movement for Democracy in Liberia fighters from Monrovia to Zwedru in possible anticipation of potential work across the border in western Côte d’Ivoire.

22. The Group also continued to investigate the ongoing activities of foreign technicians, from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. As described below, nationals of Belarus and Ukraine have engaged in activities in 2005 and 2006 that are in breach of the United Nations embargo.

A. Status of the Mil Mi-24

23. The Group noted previously that test flights of the FANCI Mil Mi-24 combat helicopter are a potential threat to peace and security. The Group further noted a
case in which FANCI attempted to deploy the Mi-24 armed, and exposed the continued presence of foreign technicians who maintained the helicopter’s airworthiness, a violation of the embargo. On 20 November, the Group met with FANCI Chief of Staff General Mangou, who, after being provided by the Group with compelling evidence, admitted that foreign technicians assist with the Mi-24. General Mangou apologized for the trouble that the Group had encountered at the Groupement aérien de transport et de liaison (GATL) military air base during an inspection and, by telephone, with the Group present, ordered that the base be fully open for inspection in the future.

24. The Group understands that without test flights the Mi-24 will rapidly lose value. A solution is to arrange for such tests in an open, transparent and accountable manner, approved by the Security Council Committee, so that no threat to peace and security is posed. The Group recommends that testing be restricted to a flight range over the airport, and that all technical work occur only under UNOCI observation. To ensure safety and airworthiness, foreign technicians could be exempted individually when appropriate and accommodated in one place, such as the Hotel Ivoire, where they can be easily located. Such a procedure has also been agreed upon for the munitions for the Mi-24, which should all be stored in one easily verifiable location. The Group informed General Mangou that he must provide comprehensive lists of technicians working at GATL and seek exemption through the Security Council Committee for foreign or dual-nationality technicians involved with the Mi-24 helicopter and for test flights. FANCI failed to provide the Group with such a list; a test flight should not be permitted until such time as it has been furnished and transparency modalities have been agreed upon.

B. Identity of Mil Mi-24 foreign technicians

25. The Group previously noted the identities of four technicians and one interpreter associated with the Mi-24 since 2005. The Governments of Belarus and Ukraine confirmed the identity of those individuals, as well as additional names that had been under investigation by the Group. Aleg Boyko and Ivan Bohach (interpreter), mentioned in an April 2005 UNOCI inspection report, are Belarus citizens who had worked for Belspetsvneshechtechnika (BSVT) in Côte d’Ivoire until October 2004. Feodosiy Karlovskiy, Sergiy Romanchuk, Igor Burla, Vyacheslav Labuzov, Oleksandr Manzhulyev, Volodymyr Rodyn, Vasyl Kononenko and Yaroslav Narytnyk are Ukrainian citizens who arrived in Côte d’Ivoire in their private capacity between June and August 2003 and remained until May 2005. The Ukrainian Government could not exclude the possibility that Karlovskiy, Burla and Romanchuk, Mi-24 technicians from a disbanded military unit, did not remain in Côte d’Ivoire past May 2005. The Group previously identified Karlovskiy as the head Mi-24 technician in mid-2006 and interviewed him, under the name Vadim Feodosiy Karlovskiy, on 18 November at the Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan. The Group also noted the presence of another Mi-24 technician, who appeared in photograph 1 of S/2006/735 and was observed working on the Mi-24 by the Group on 30 May and 2 August 2006. The Group was informed by FANCI that three foreign technicians were retained to provide technical assistance for the Mi-24 but was not provided with names or contract details.
C. Payment for foreign technicians and associated personnel of the Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire

26. Evidence obtained during the Group’s current mandate shows that a Belarus interpreter, Ivan Bohach, has been paid by R.M. Holdings. He was identified by UNOCI in April 2005 during an inspection of the Mi-24. R.M. Holdings provided 16 cheques worth approximately $770,000 (417 million CFA francs) to Bohach in August and September 2005 and from February to June 2006 (see annex V). This large amount does not appear to correspond to the salary or expenses of only one person. FANCI informed the Group that Bohach served as an interpreter for Slavic technicians, including those working on the Mi-24.

27. R.M. Holdings also provided a payment of approximately $18,000 (9.8 million CFA francs) to Dzmitry Lapko in August 2005 and paid for air tickets for Lapko and another individual, Aliaksandr Skavartsov, in September 2005. Lapko, a Belarusian citizen, worked for the FANCI ground-to-air artillery battalion in Abidjan starting in March 2005 (see annex VI). FANCI Chief of Staff General Mangou admitted to the Group that Mr. Lapko had worked on BMP-1s in 2005 but that the work ended because the funds ran out. The Group views the activities of this individual and payments to sustain his work as an embargo violation. The status of Mr. Skavartsov remains under investigation. The Group noted in S/2006/735 that non-aviation technicians working for FANCI lived in a residential house in Abidjan in 2005, according to an informant and diplomatic sources. Mikhail Kapylou paid the rent for that house and transferred just over $18,700 (10.1 million CFA francs) to the owner in August 2005.

28. R.M. Holdings further provided air tickets to the An-12 crews and payment of approximately $71,000 (38 million CFA francs) to the pilot-in-command of the aircraft in September 2005. R.M. Holdings also purchased air tickets for Mikhail Kapylou, Robert Montoya, Bahiro Denis Adou (a FACI Colonel), Bredou Angoua (also a FACI Colonel) and Zié André Gnatou (Directeur de cabinet civil et militaire, Defence Ministry) between Abidjan and points in eastern Europe including Belarus and the Russian Federation, in August 2005. The Banque nationale d’investissement closed the R.M. Holdings account held at the bank in October 2006.

D. R.M. Holdings, Montoya and Kapylou

29. The Group attempted to contact Mikhail Kapylou by telephone on numerous occasions and at his residence in Abidjan without success. The Group interviewed Robert Montoya in Lomé on 16 October 2006 (see annex VII). The Group requested that Mr. Montoya furnish information regarding transfers to and from the R.M. Holdings bank account noted in S/2006/735, for which Mr. Montoya and Mr. Kapylou were both signatories (see annex VIII). Mr. Montoya stated that Government of Côte d’Ivoire’s payments to R.M. Holdings in 2005 and 2006 recorded for Belarusian personnel or citing contract numbers were repayment for expenses or to fulfil contractual obligations incurred or concluded prior to the embargo. Mr. Montoya was unable to furnish evidence of expenses or contracts to support this claim. Mr. Montoya further informed the Group that R.M. Holdings made no payments to or for the benefit of foreign technicians working for FANCI after the embargo, including crews and technicians for the Mi-24 and An-12. On 16 November, however, Mr. Montoya’s lawyers noted that R.M. Holdings had paid
the plane tickets for an An-12 crew in September 2005, which was at variance with Mr. Montoya’s previous statements to the Group. The Group has obtained further evidence of payments by R.M. Holdings for other plane tickets and expenses of An-12 crews, made to Ivan Bohach and Dzmitry Lapko.

30. The Government of Belarus and BSVT informed the Group that four payments from R.M. Holdings to BSVT in 2005 were in repayment for contracts concluded prior to the embargo. BSVT also noted a further two payments from Darkwood for similar reasons. Those contracts were No. 112/084/03-486 of 10 December 2003, with a Customs stamp of 15 October 2004 for Su-25 aircraft, and No. 112/084/03-457C of 22 September 2003, with a Customs stamp of 11 October 2004 for ground equipment, Su-25 equipment and Mi-24 helicopter equipment.

31. The Government of Belarus informed the Group that Mikhail Kapylou is not an official representative of the Ministry of Defence or BSVT in Côte d’Ivoire, nor is Robert Montoya a BSVT representative for Côte d’Ivoire. The Group published the Belarus passport of Mr. Kapylou in S/2006/735, annex IV. The Group obtained a copy of an Ivorian diplomatic passport issued to Mr. Kapylou on 30 March 2005 describing him as “Conseiller technique au ministère de la defense” (see annex IX). This again shows the closeness of the relationship between R.M. Holdings and the Ivorian defence and security establishment and that Mr. Kapylou’s activities in Côte d’Ivoire constitute a violation of United Nations sanctions.

IV. Embargo inspections

32. In S/2006/735, the Group highlighted that UNOCI should create a dedicated embargo cell. Such a cell was created in August 2006 and falls under UNOCI headquarters operations. The creation of the cell has resulted in a tangible improvement in the methodology, quality and number of inspections carried out and the creation of databases. There is also better liaison within UNOCI and with Licorne, although the cell still suffers from resource limitations and the impact of six-month staff rotations.

33. The Group is impressed by how in a few months the concept of effective embargo monitoring has been mainstreamed within UNOCI. The Group is hopeful that, with the support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Force Commander and the Chief of Staff of UNOCI, there will be continued progress.

34. The creation of an embargo unit is a useful start, but the ports of San Pedro and Abidjan remain open for abuse, and there have been no inspections since August 2006. The Group once more believes that UNOCI could benefit from the advice of a skilled maritime Customs consultant, as previously recommended in S/2005/699 and S/2006/204, not a consultant for the arms embargo, as was eventually appointed by UNOCI for the period from August to October 2006.

35. Such a consultant could help the UNOCI embargo cell use effectively the new container scanner installed by BIVAC International at Abidjan port and could teach UNOCI personnel how to make effective risk appraisals of shipping and cargo manifests for targeting. This BIVAC scanner is not yet operational because of administrative issues.
36. The greatest challenge remains unimpeded access for inspections. The Forces nouvelles continue to impede inspections, and although on 8 September 2006 the FANCI Chief of Staff, General Mangou, issued order No. 11.323/EMA/CCIAT/CON DU 08/09/06, instructing that all units of the Gendarmerie and FANCI should provide unimpeded access for inspections, there are regular obstructions, including those experienced by the Group of Experts in November at GATL and the Gendarmerie. The Presidential Guard and the town of Gagnoa have not been inspected to date.

V. Diamonds

A. Ghana and Mali

37. The Group visited Ghana on 17 October 2006, to discuss its findings that diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire have penetrated the Ghanaian supply chain (see S/2005/735). Ghana’s officials responsible for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) strenuously denied that their supply chain had been contaminated.

38. The Chair of the Kimberley Process for 2006, Botswana, also sent a special envoy to Ghana in early November to emphasize the seriousness of the Group’s findings and to make its own appraisal. It concluded that the Group’s findings were credible and recommended that Ghana be put under KPCS review.

39. The Group presented its findings to the Kimberley Process plenary meeting in Botswana in November 2006 and held a number of bilateral meetings, including with Ghana, non-governmental organizations and other participants. The Group was accompanied by the head of the embargo cell and the senior legal adviser of UNOCI. The plenary meeting agreed upon a detailed action plan with Ghana to strengthen the country’s internal controls within three months. The implementation of the plan will be evaluated by a Kimberley Process review team in February 2007. If the evaluation team is not satisfied, Ghana could face suspension from the Kimberley Process.

40. No action could be taken against Mali, as it is not a KPCS participant. During a bilateral meeting with the Malian observer for KPCS, the Group drew attention to the paragraphs in the previous report of the Group highlighting violations by Malian individuals of the diamond embargo and asked the official to propose measures to stop such smuggling.

B. Dubai and the “Ghanaian” diamond package

41. A suspicious shipment of rough diamonds with a Ghanaian certificate of origin was blocked in Dubai in July 2006 (see S/2006/735, para. 163). The Group sought additional information from the United Arab Emirates but, despite sending an additional letter in October 2006, has not received a reply. Informally, the Group learned that the shipment had been released to the importer in Dubai. According to scientific examination (as communicated to the Group of Experts by the Dubai Diamond Exchange through the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations on 17 August 2006), the diamonds were not of
Ghanaian origin, and the Group was surprised that the United Arab Emirates had released the package to the importer. Dubai is an important international diamond-trading centre, and its system is vulnerable to contamination, especially as it does not engage in any proper or proactive investigation of conflict diamonds. The Group believes that there were reasonable grounds for submitting the package of alleged Ghanaian diamonds for judicial investigation rather than releasing it to the importer.

C. Séguéla inspection

42. With the creation of the UNOCI embargo cell, the Group has noted a dramatic improvement in efforts to monitor the diamond embargo. Since September 2006, monthly aerial pictures using fixed reference points have been taken of the two main diamond areas in the northern part of Côte d’Ivoire. This assists in the monitoring of diamond production.

43. The Group joined the embargo cell in an aerial survey over Séguéla in November 2006. During the overflight, continued activity was observed, and a new diamond pit under intensive mining was discovered.

44. To identify additional persons involved in the illicit export of Ivorian rough diamonds, the Group again interviewed the main dealers in Séguéla (see S/2006/735) on 17 November and identified two additional associates of Bamako-based Siaka Coulibaly, Oumar Diakite and Mohamed Diallo. Malian nationals and long-time residents of Séguéla, admitted working for him in the past; a third individual, Abdoulaye Camara (identified as Abdul Kamara in S/2006/735, para. 148), is also of Malian nationality (born 1958) and reportedly works for Siaka Coulibaly. The Group visited him in his office, which had diamond-buying evaluation equipment ready for business.

45. During an interview with Sekou Sidibe (see S/2006/735, paras. 145-146) the Group was able to copy his recent identity document. He had an Ivorian passport until 1997 but also possesses a Malian identity card that indicates Malian nationality. His identity card lists him as Niangadou Sekou, born 17 September 1968 (see annex X), while his Ivorian passport shows his date of birth as 25 December 1959 and a different family name.

46. The identification of these Malian buyers further underlines the significant smuggling of Ivorian diamonds to Mali in violation of United Nations sanctions, as previously noted by the Group.

D. Ministry of Mines

47. The Group met with the Ministry of Mines in Abidjan on 20 November. Ministry officials informed the Group that all mining in Séguéla and Tortiya was currently illicit. If Government control was restored to the diamond areas, individuals and companies licensed by the Ministry would be allowed to trade in diamonds, and the Government would then seek a lifting of the diamond embargo. They reported that in addition to Ghana and Mali, they believed there was regular smuggling of Ivorian diamonds to Guinea.
VI. Targeted measures on three Ivorians

48. In February 2006, the Security Council Committee designated three Ivorian nationals as subject to the travel ban and assets freeze imposed by paragraphs 9 and 11 of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004) for one year and renewed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1643 (2005). The Group continued to investigate and established that Charles Blé Goudé is identified as Goude C. Blé on an Ivorian passport (PDAE088DH12). The Group was unable to obtain passport details for Eugène Djué or Martin Fofie. The Bank of Ghana also reported to the Group on 23 October that it had found a bank account of one Martin Fofie, and was verifying whether or not he was the targeted individual.
Annex I

Meetings and consultations

Belarus

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Military and Industrial Committee
State Secretariat of the Security Council
Ministry of Defence
Committee of State Security
Belspetsvneshtechnika

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
United Nations Development Programme

Belgium

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
Kimberley Process

Private sector
High Diamond Council

Botswana

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
Kimberley Process plenary meeting, participants and observers

Côte d’Ivoire

Government
Agence pour le sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar
Gendarmerie
Ministère des mines et l’énergie
Ministère de la sécurité
Police national
Force aérienne de Côte d’Ivoire
Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire
Armed non-State actors
Forces nouvelles

Diplomatic entities
Embassy of South Africa
Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Private sector
Banque nationale d’investissement
BIVAC International
FedEx
UPS

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
Licorne
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

France

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
Institut français des relations internationales

Ghana

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines
Precious Minerals Marketing Co. Ltd

Hungary

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office
South Africa

Government
Department of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
Institute for Global Dialogue
Institute for Security Studies
South African Institute of International Affairs

Private sector
Tusk Trading Pty Ltd

Togo

Private sector
Darkwood logistique
Gypaële
Groupe R.M. Holdings

Ukraine

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States of America

Government
Department of State
Department of Treasury
Department of Homeland Security (San Diego)
Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of California

Multilateral and bilateral agencies
International Monetary Fund
Annex II

Invoice sent by Tusk Trading Pty Ltd

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TOTAL COST: US $ 98,676.43

RETAIN COPY UN DROIT DE SEPTIEME SIX US DOLLAR.

MODALITE DE PAIEMENT: A l'acquisition de cette facture.

À NOTER: C.C. AFRICANUS TRADING LTD: P.O. BOX 70973-03 USA.

ADDRESS: 12 MILLION NARROW PUBLIC COMPANY LTD,
NICOHSOU MYLONA BRANCH 591-4, NICOHSOU MYLONA STREET, PAPHOS - CYPRUS.
Annex III

End-user certificate issued by the Ministry of Security

Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
Union - Discipline - Progress

Ministry of Security

End User

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE IMPORTED FOR THE USE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE.

ITEMS TO BE IMPORTED:
- 50,000 12G AMMUNITION
- 20,000 12G AMMUNITION
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WE CONFIRM THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED ITEMS ARE FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND WILL NOT BE RE-EXPLODED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SUPPLIERS.
Annex IV

Ammunition sent to Abidjan by Yssouf Diabaté
Annex V

Example of cheque from R.M. Holdings to Ivan Bohach
Annex VI

Passport and laissez-passer of Dzmitry Lapko
Annex VII

French passport of Robert Montoya
Annex VIII

Delegation of authority by Robert Montoya to Mikhail Kapylou for R.M. Holdings

Procuration

Monsieur Robert Montoya, Président de la Société R.M Holdings, avec le numéro de passeport 02RE37510 et l’adresse (ci-dessous) le Président Directeur Général,

Par ce document nomme et accorde une Procuration Générale à:

M. Mikhail Kapylou Directeur du Développement de la Société R.M Holdings, demeurant rue des jardins à Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire),

Comme mandataire afin d’agir au nom du Président Directeur Général avec plein pouvoir et autorité de faire et entreprendre pour le bien la Société R.M Holdings les cas suivants:

1- Ouverture des Comptes en banque au nom de la Société R.M Holdings sur le territoire de la République de Côte d’Ivoire.
2- Mise en place des Gestions des comptes et des signatures autorisées.

Cette Procuration sera valide jusqu’au 31/12/2006.

Le Président Directeur Général a fourni cette procuration afin d’être exécutée ce jour 26 janvier, 2005.

R.M. HOLDINGS a.s
au capital de 2 000 000 €, registra numars 40003638186 RC n° 000 363319, LATVIA
Elizabetes avenue 31-a, Rīga, LV 1001, Latvie, Phone/Fax: +371 76 17 384
Aéroport de LOMES TOKOIN, Togo BP 14474, Phone: +225 233 82 42 – Fax: +225 233 82 44
E-mail: info@rmholdings.net
Annex IX

Ivorian diplomatic passport of Mikhail Kapylou describing him as “Conseiller technique au Ministère de la défense”
Annex X

Malian identity card of Niangadou Sekou, also known as Sekou Sidibe