



SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

MONTHLY FORECAST

AUG 2011



29 July 2011

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OVERVIEW FOR AUGUST

India will be holding the presidency of the Security Council during August. There is an **open debate on peacekeeping** planned for late in the month, with a wide range of issues likely to be covered, including the relationship between troop and police-contributors and UN bodies, as well as the issue of resources for missions. The Secretary-General is expected to address the Council at the outset of the debate.

A debate will also be held on **Kosovo**.

Several briefings are likely on:

- developments in **Kosovo**, most likely by DPKO;
- the transitional process developments in **Somalia** and the impact of famine on parts of the country, by Special Representative Augustine Mahiga (either in person or by videoconferencing), followed by consultations;

- the **Middle East**, most likely by the head of DPA, B. Lynn Pascoe, also to be followed by consultations; and
- **Libya**, most likely by Pascoe, followed by consultations.

The Council expects to be briefed in consultations:

- by the DPA’s head B. Lynn Pascoe on issues of current concern (as part of the recently established monthly practice referred to as the “**horizon scanning**”);
- on the work of the **UN Office in Central Africa**, UNOCA, (established in March) by its head Special Representative Abou Moussa; and
- on the work of the **DPRK Sanctions Committee** (the 1718 Committee) by its chair, Portuguese Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral.

The Council will meet in a private meeting with troop-contributors to **UNIFIL** and will

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hold consultations to discuss the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate and will have a formal session to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:

- The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of **Lebanon**, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte d’Ivoire**, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the **mandate of MONUSCO**, the operation

in the **DRC**, the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.

- UNAMI reports on **human rights in Iraq**, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency. The last report, released in July 2010, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.
- The request in resolution 1460 on **Children and Armed Conflict** that all the Secretary-General’s reports to the

Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2010 protection of children elements had been incorporated into just over half of the relevant country-specific reports.

- The committee established by **resolution 1540** (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism) has not yet completed a report this year on the implementation of that resolution. (Resolution 1810 of 2008 directed it to submit the report to the Council by 24 April 2011. On 24 April the committee informed the Council that it was continuing its consideration of the report and would submit it

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Aide-Memoire (continued)

by 24 May.)

- In its presidential statement of 22 October 2010 (S/PRST/2010/21) the Council said it looked forward to receiving within six months a report from the Secretary-General which would define the UN Secretariat's **strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation** in peace and security taking into account the lessons learnt from the various experiences of joint cooperation between the two bodies. The report was expected to be made available in June, but now it appears it has been delayed until late in the year.
- The position of **Special Envoy for Myanmar** has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009.

Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.

- The **Secretary-General's Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide** has been dormant since 2008 when it held its last meeting.
- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the expert groups assisting the **three counterterrorism committees** (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee or CTC, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the

Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements "as soon as possible." This request, reiterated in September 2010 (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.

- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894 on **protection of civilians**, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council's monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on **working methods**. This has not been published.

Status Update since our July Forecast

- **Afghanistan:** On 6 July, the Council held an open debate on the situation in Afghanistan, where the Council received a briefing from the head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura (S/PV.6574). There was no outcome from the debate.
- **Central African Republic:** On 7 July, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6575) from Margaret Vogt, Special Representative and Head of BINUCA as she presented the Secretary-General's most recent report (S/2011/311) on CAR. Vogt emphasised that the country still faced serious challenges, including extreme poverty, weak national institutions, corruption, a high rate of violent crime perpetrated by armed movements and brigands, human rights violations and impunity. She stressed that the two most immediate challenges were the implementation of peace agreements with rebel groups, and the sustainable disarmament and reintegration of former combatants as part of overall security-sector reform. Jan Grauls Chair of the PBC's CAR Configuration also briefed the Council saying that the PBC had convened the Partners' Round Table in Brussels to increase awareness of the second phase of CAR's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
- **West Africa (UNOWA):** On 8 July, the Council was briefed (S/PV.6577) by Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWA on the situation in West Africa and the

Secretary-General's most recent report (S/2011/388). Djinnit urged the Council to remain vigilant as several elections scheduled between now and 2013 in the subregion had the potential to ignite violence and instability. He also noted drug trafficking and organised crime as threats to stability. Djinnit highlighted positive developments in the subregion, including the end of the protracted post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and Niger's successful elections and political transition. Also on Niger, he stressed the need to address security and development challenges, including ending chronic food insecurity. Djinnit also highlighted the positive impact of increased women's participation on resolving conflicts in the subregion.

- **Children and Armed Conflict:** On 12 July, the Security Council held an open debate (S/PV.6581 and resumption 1) on children and armed conflict and adopted resolution 1998 on children and armed conflict, expanding the criteria for listing parties to conflict in the Secretary-General's report on children and armed conflict to include parties that attack or threaten schools and hospitals. The Council also expressed its intention when establishing, modifying or renewing the mandate of relevant sanctions regimes to consider including provisions on parties to armed conflict that violate international law relating to the protection of children in armed conflict. The German foreign minister presided over the debate, which was

attended by the Colombian and Bosnia and Herzegovina foreign ministers, the South African Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, and Portugal's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council heard from the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy and Anthony Lake, Executive Director of UNICEF. Forty-one other member states also spoke at the debate.

- **Syria:** On 12 July, the Council issued a press statement condemning the 11 July attacks on the French and US embassies in Damascus (SC/10321). On 14 July the Council was briefed by an official from the IAEA on the Syrian nuclear issue in informal consultations. (The IAEA referred the issue to the Council on 9 June due to Syria's lack of cooperation with the Agency.) There was no Council outcome. Council members have been keen to keep their consideration of the nuclear issue and the embassy attacks separate from the ongoing political and humanitarian crisis in Syria. For months Council members have been discussing a draft resolution on Syria focused the political and humanitarian issues without being able to reach agreement, the last discussion was at experts level on 6 July. The Syrian situation was also mentioned by some Council members at the 26 July open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6590 and resumption 1) and was discussed during the monthly DPA

Status Update since our July Forecast (continued)

horizon scanning exercise on 28 July.

- **Terrorism:** On 13 July, Council members condemned the terrorist attacks that killed over twenty people that day in Mumbai, India (SC/10325). On 23 July the members of the Council condemned the terrorist attacks in Norway that killed scores of people the day before (SC/10337).
- **UNRCCA:** On 15 July members of the Council were briefed by Special Representative Miroslav Jenča on the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia over the past six months. In a press statement which followed the briefing (SC/10327) Council members expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Centre as a mechanism of preventative diplomacy responding to challenges to peace and development in the region, including solutions to water and energy management, the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the situations in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan.
- **Côte d'Ivoire:** On 18 July, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Choi Young-jin, briefed the Council on the latest developments in Côte d'Ivoire (S/PV.6584) as well as the key observations from the latest Secretary-General's report (S/2011/387). The Council followed the briefing with closed consultations. On 27 July the Council adopted resolution 2000 which renewed the mandate of UNOCI at its current force levels (including the earlier ad hoc increases) until 31 July 2012.
- **Climate Change:** On July 20, the Council held an open debate on the impact of climate change on the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.6587 and resumption 1). The debate was attended by the Secretary-General; the executive director of the UN Environment Programme, Achim Steiner; the President of Nauru, Marcus Stephen, on behalf of the Pacific small islands developing states; the acting head of the delegation of the EU to the UN; and representatives from 47 additional countries. (During the open debate, several states including Egypt, on behalf of the non-aligned movement, and Argentina, on behalf of the group of 77 and China, expressed concerns that any Council decision should not encroach on the authority of other bodies addressing the issue of climate change. By contrast, other states argued that climate change has security implications that fall under the purview of the Security Council's mandate.) Towards the end of the open debate Council members reached agreement on the text of a presidential statement which was adopted as (S/PRST/2011/15). The statement expresses the concern of the Council that sea-level rises may carry security implications on low-lying island states and requested the Secretary-General to provide contextual information on the possible security implications of climate in his reporting on situations on the Council's agenda.
- **LRA:** On 21 July, the Council held a private meeting on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, while representatives of the CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda and the AU were in attendance. Following the meeting, the Council released a press statement (SC/10335) strongly condemning the ongoing attacks of the LRA and urging all LRA elements to surrender and disarm. The statement commended the efforts taken by the militaries of the CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda to address the LRA threat and welcomed the recent AU initiative proposing a range of activities to address the LRA problem. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report back to in October about on developments in relation to the LRA, including an assessment of the threat posed by the group and regional and UN efforts to address this threat.
- **Eritrea:** On 21 July, the Council held an Interactive Dialogue with Eritrea. Eritrea had been requested a meeting of the Security Council to press its case for lifting of sanctions. However, in light of the latest Somalia Monitoring Group report which includes information of Eritrea's support for anti-government elements in Somalia. Council members decided to have the meeting as an Internal Dialogue so that IGAD members Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda could also participate in the meeting.
- **Sudan/Darfur:** On 22 July, the Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur and head of the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Ibrahim Gambari, briefed the Council on recent developments in Darfur (S/PV.6589), largely drawing upon the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/422). The Council followed the briefing with closed consultations. At press time the Council was expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of UNAMID for a further 12 months. The current mandate expired on 31 July.
- **Somalia:** On 25 July, Council members heard a briefing from Catherine Bragg, Assistant Secretary General in the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on the humanitarian situation in Somalia, following the UN's declaration of famine in two areas. The Council issued a press statement following this briefing (SC/10339) urging humanitarian access to the affected areas and urging all UN member states to contribute funds to the UN's consolidated appeal for Somalia. At press time the Council was expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the Somalia Monitoring Group which expired on 31 July.
- **Middle East:** On 26 July, Robert Serry, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, briefed the Council. This was followed by the Council's quarterly open debate (S/PV.6590 and resumption 1). Serry said that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in profound and persistent deadlock. The Quartet again failed to reach an agreement at its 11 July meeting in Washington, DC. Council members expressed concern about the stalemated peace process against the backdrop of heightened expectations of developments in the General Assembly in September regarding Palestine's status at the UN. The report of the Panel of Inquiry into the 31 May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, originally expected in February, is now completed but formal transmission to the Secretary-General has been delayed to permit a short period of bilateral negotiations.
- **Iraq:** On 28 July the Council extended the mandate of UNAMI for a year (S/RES/2001). On 30 June, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10307) that welcomed Iraq's establishment of a successor arrangement for the Development Fund for Iraq and noted that oversight of the fund had been transferred to Iraq.

Libya

Expected Council Action

Council members are expecting the regular monthly briefing on Libya from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe in late August.

No Council decisions are currently expected in August. However, if progress is made on negotiating a political solution and a ceasefire between Benghazi and Tripoli it will likely require some Council action, including a possible decision to deploy military observers to monitor any ceasefire arrangement.

The next meeting of the Libya Contact Group is anticipated for September in New York.

Key Recent Developments

At press time, NATO air strikes against Libyan military capabilities under resolution 1973 were headed into their fifth month.

On 28 July Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council on recent developments in Libya, including mediation efforts. South Africa spoke after Pascoe's briefing.

On 26 July, British Foreign Minister William Hague said that the UK preferred that Qaddafi leave the country but "what happens to Qaddafi is ultimately a question for the Libyans."

On 20 July, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé suggested Qaddafi could stay in Libya if he relinquished power. (On 12 July, Juppe had suggested that Qaddafi's envoys were seeking to negotiate Qaddafi stepping down.)

On 19 July the US confirmed that it had held talks with representatives of Qaddafi to deliver the message that he must leave power. (Media reports indicate the meeting took place on 16 July in Tunisia.)

On 15 July the Libya Contact Group met in Istanbul and:

- reaffirmed that Qaddafi must leave power;
- agreed all [Contact Group] participants would deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate governing authority until an interim government is formed which could include some members of the Tripoli regime;
- reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya;
- stressed the need for a genuine ceasefire, an immediate political transition and

humanitarian access;

- reaffirmed the leading role of the UN and Special Envoy Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib's role in that regard and included language encouraging the AU's mediation role;
- adopted explicit language on the functioning of the Temporary Financial Mechanism to fund the NTC and welcomed the NTC's commitment to honour Qaddafi-era contracts; and
- indicated the post-conflict stage should be Libyan-led with the UN leading the support efforts of the international community.

On 11 July, Khatib briefed Council members in informal consultations after his 9 July visit to Tripoli. He suggested a key element of any political solution linked to a ceasefire could be an interim "institutional mechanism" comprised of representatives of both Benghazi and Tripoli. However, he said disagreements remained between Benghazi, which wanted talks only after Qaddafi left power, and Tripoli, which wanted talks only after a ceasefire. Khatib said he hoped indirect talks would evolve into direct talks. He also expressed concern about the humanitarian situation across Libya and about the intensity of the NATO campaign during Ramadan which starts on 1 August.

On 5 July, media reports indicated that Russian mediators had said Qaddafi was willing to step down in exchange for security guarantees. Benghazi rejected internal exile for Qaddafi.

On 1 July the AU High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya presented Tripoli and Benghazi representatives with a proposal endorsed at the 17th AU Summit in Malabo in Equatorial Guinea on 30 June. The critical difference in this proposal from the previous AU plan is that it called for negotiations which would exclude Qaddafi.

At the Malabo summit the AU decided its member states should not cooperate with the execution of the arrest warrants issued by the ICC on 27 June for Qaddafi, his son and his intelligence chief saying that the warrants complicate reaching a negotiated political solution to the Libyan crisis. The summit also requested the Security Council to defer the ICC process under article 16 of the Rome Statute.

On 30 June, France informed the Secretary-General that it had "taken an additional measure in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 (2011): airdrops of

self-defence weapons for the civilian populations that have been victims of attacks by Libyan armed forces, in the absence of any other operational means of protecting these populations under threat." Media reports indicate the weapons were dropped in the Nafusa Mountain area, southwest of Tripoli, and included ammunition, rifles, machine guns, anti-tank missiles, and RPGs.

Aspects of the UN post-conflict contingency planning undertaken by special adviser Ian Martin seem to have been shared with the Contact Group and Security Council members. Preliminary assessments in the following areas were set to conclude in late July: political process, security apparatus, rule of law and human rights, economic recovery, public administration and physical infrastructure.

Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

At press time, the Sanctions Committee said it had not received any notification of a ship docked in Algeria allegedly carrying arms bound for Tripoli. (The Committee would need to be notified by a member state before it could consider any implications vis-à-vis the arms embargo.)

The Sanctions Committee met on 7 July to discuss the issue of the French arms drop and on 18 July to hear a briefing from OCHA on the humanitarian situation in Libya and discuss other pending issues, in particular frozen assets.

The Panel of Experts is expected to submit its interim report on 10 August. It is not anticipated that the chair of the Sanctions Committee will brief the Council in August but may do so in September.

In June "holds" on applying sanctions to two individuals and one entity were lifted. However, most of the additional designations for the sanctions regime received by the Committee in April remain subject to various "holds".

Key Issues

Ongoing key issues for the Council include:

- whether the Council can play a more active role in establishing parameters for political initiatives to secure an end-game in Libya;
- the divergence among members regarding the interpretation of resolution 1973, especially relating to the arms embargo and the unfreezing of assets;

- the humanitarian impact on the population under Qaddafi's control and related access issues; and
- the necessary framework for a ceasefire.

Potential issues for the Council in the future include:

- a UN role in any ceasefire-monitoring mechanism; and
- a UN role in post-conflict Libya.

Options

An option for the Council is to engage with the Secretary-General to better empower Khatib in his mediation efforts by giving him clearer parameters to negotiate with Tripoli and Benghazi, including on post-conflict scenarios—especially now that UN post-conflict contingency planning is well developed—to give both sides a higher level of comfort about a future Libya and their roles in it.

A second option may be to involve Council members in more detail on post-conflict planning (perhaps via the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping) and the potential deployment of military observers, assessment of Libya's needs, any potential interim stabilisation force and whether any future UN Mission might require political, peacekeeping or an integrated approach.

Immediate options for the Council could include:

- a briefing from Khatib (who was in Benghazi on 25 July and in Tripoli on 26 July);
- more regular Secretariat briefings; and
- designating more individuals and entities under the sanctions regime by lifting holds on some of the outstanding recommendations.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Since the Contact Group meeting on 15 July, there now seems to be nearly uniform agreement among Council members that political transition in Libya is an essential part of the end game and a political process leading to this is the way forward. In general, the fact that Council members appear to be more agreed on the need for a political transition in Libya suggests that the outlook for productive and congenial Council activity around authorising any necessary ceasefire monitors and follow-on UN presence may be more positive.

The more unified approach from the wider international community which has also emerged over the past weeks has contributed to this convergence in the Council. While leadership of mediation efforts in this

regard has been previously contentious between the AU and UN, it now seems there is broad consensus around the central role of UN Special Envoy Khatib. (However, it is unclear if this progress on the diplomatic front will provide Khatib the requisite tools to negotiate more effectively.)

Council members that have recognised the TNC include France, Germany, Lebanon, the UK and the US. China, Russia and South Africa are also openly engaging with Benghazi and attend Contact Group meetings as observers along with elected Council members Brazil, India and Portugal.

Some Council members are signalling that the TNC may need to be more flexible vis-à-vis conditions for potential talks with Tripoli.

A number of Council members remain wary so long as the NATO air campaign authorised by resolution 1973 maintains its current intensity and the TNC maintains its progress towards Tripoli.

There remains an awareness that the current situation in the Council is fragile. There continues to be a degree of tension in the Council about the seeming exclusion most elected members feel from oversight and input to the political process via the Council. Secondly, the public confirmation of the French arms drop also contributed to the ongoing tension. Most Council members are aware that there is an argument that the drop may be legal under resolution 1973 (and indeed the language was likely crafted envisioning such a possibility) but the publicity exacerbated the ongoing anxiety by some in the Council about the resolution being taken beyond its protection mandate.

There is also a growing concern that if the TNC were to take Tripoli (or other towns strongly supportive of Qaddafi, e.g. Sirte)—given recent reports of reprisals (albeit limited)—reprisal violence by Benghazi forces is possible.

The request of the AU for the Security Council to defer the ICC proceedings on Libya could raise the level of tension. (However, unlike the Kenyan case where the AU had tasked African members of the Security Council to bring the issue to the Council's attention—no such specific obligation was imposed in the Libya case.)

There also seems to be ongoing tension in the Council over how best to achieve humanitarian access in Qaddafi-controlled areas.



UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions and established a sanctions committee.

Security Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6596 (28 July 2011) was the most recent monthly briefing on Libya by Pascoe.

Security Council Letters

- S/2011/402 (30 June 2011) was from France regarding its airdrop of self-defence weapons under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973.
- S/2011/377 (21 June 2011) appointed the eighth member to the Panel of Experts.

Other Relevant Facts

Chair of the Sanctions Committee

Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts

- Yousef Fahed Ahmed Alserhan, Jordan (maritime)
- Oumar Dièye Sidi, Niger (customs)
- Simon Dilloway, UK (finance)
- Theodore M. Murphy, US (humanitarian and regional)
- Giovanna Perri, Italy (finance)
- Salim Raad, Lebanon (heavy weapons)
- Savannah de Tessières, France (small arms and light weapons)
- Ahmed Zerhouni, Algeria (aviation)

UN Special Envoy

Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib (Jordan)

Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry

Cherif Bassiouni, Chair (Egypt); Asma Khader (Jordanian/Palestinian); Philippe Kirsch (Canada)

AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee

Heads of state of Congo, Mali, Mauritania (Chair), South Africa, Uganda and the chair of the AU Commission

International Contact Group

Australia; Bahrain; a rotating seat shared by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; Bulgaria; Canada; France; Germany; Greece; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Malta; Morocco; a Nordic seat shared by Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Poland; Qatar; Spain; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; UK; USA and representatives from the Arab League, EU, GCC, NATO, OIC and the UN. The AU, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Tunisia and Ukraine attend as observers

Commander for NATO Operations under Resolution 1973

Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard (Canada)

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action

The Council has no previously scheduled meetings on Sudan or South Sudan in August. However, because of developments there members will be following the situation closely and meetings at short notice are possible.

If there is progress in ongoing negotiations between the parties, the Council might mandate in August a UN role in the border-monitoring arrangements agreed to in late June by Sudan and South Sudan.

The ongoing conflict in Southern Kordofan, the potential for violence to spread into Blue Nile state, or any hindrance to the deployment of peacekeepers in Abyei, could lead the Council to take up these issues in August.

Key Recent Developments

On 9 July the Republic of South Sudan became an independent state. Sudan was the first country to recognise the new nation. South Sudan became the 193rd member of the UN, following adoption of a resolution by the Security Council recommending its membership on 13 July and a subsequent decision by the General Assembly on 14 July.

On 29 June the governments of Sudan and then-Southern Sudan signed an agreement on border security and a joint political and security mechanism, which reaffirmed

earlier agreements in May and in December 2010. Under the agreement, the parties are to establish a “safe demilitarised border zone” (SDBZ), with the forces of both parties redeployed 10 kilometres from the north/south borderline of 1 January 1956, pending resolution of disputed border areas and final demarcation of the border. The SDBZ would be monitored by unarmed observers from the parties supported by UN observers, with force protection provided by the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA).

On 7 July the president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, renounced an agreement signed on 28 June between the government of Sudan and the Southern People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) on political and security arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states. The agreement had been signed by NCP power-broker and presidential adviser Nafie Ali Nafie and the governor of Blue Nile state, Malik Agar, with the head of the AU high level implementation panel, Thabo Mbeki, as witness. It seems Bashir determined he was opposed to the SPLM-North continuing as a legal political party in Sudan.

Upon the establishment of the state of South Sudan, the newly mandated UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) became active. The Council adopted the mandate for this mission on 8 July. UNMISS is a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation with a focus on peace consolidation and a strong protection of civilians dimension that emphasises early warning and community-level conflict prevention. In the resolution, the Council requested the parties to propose modalities to implement the border agreement by 20 July (which did not occur). The resolution stated that if a proposal was not received by that date UNMISS would be required to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms and related materiel across the border.

The mandate for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) expired on 9 July, despite last-minute diplomatic efforts from the Secretary-General and Council members to convince Khartoum to accept a continued UN presence at least in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Council subsequently adopted a resolution on 11 July to liquidate UNMIS and provide extended legal cover for the ongoing presence of UN peacekeepers as they withdrew. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to consult with the parties, the AU and other partners and present options to the Council for UN

support for security arrangements in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile that were agreed to in late June by the parties. The Council expressed its readiness to continue current UN operations in these areas, with the consent of the parties.

The Council held a high-level debate on South Sudan on 13 July; German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle presided. The Secretary-General addressed the Council, as did the vice president of South Sudan, Riek Machar. The head of the UN department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO), Alain Le Roy, briefed the Council on the set-up of UNMISS, as well as progress in the deployment of UNISFA, emphasising that the armed forces of each party are to withdraw from the Abyei area at the beginning of UNISFA’s deployment. With respect to the border agreement, Le Roy indicated that DPKO might be able to prepare recommendations to the Council on a UN role in border-monitoring by the end of July.

Fighting continued in Southern Kordofan with further allegations of acts amounting to ethnic cleansing targeting the Nuba minority. The Sudanese government accused Southern People’s Liberation Army elements in the Nuba Mountains, who have refused to disarm, of instigating the current violence. An unpublished report by the human rights section of UNMIS on the human rights situation during the violence in Southern Kordofan, which was leaked to the media on 14 July, contained first and second hand accounts of atrocities committed by the Sudanese Armed Forces, including violations of international humanitarian law, such as not distinguishing between military and civilian targets and the specific targeting of Nuban civilians. Reported human rights violations included abductions, house-to-house searches, targeted killings, summary executions, systematic destruction of dwellings and attacks on churches. The report also outlined violations against the UN mission and staff, including summary execution of a UN national staff member, the arbitrary arrest and detention of UN staff, including ill-treatment amounting to torture, and verified incidents of shelling close to UN property. There have been unconfirmed reports of mass graves, including from the NGO, Satellite Sentinel Project.

On 15 July the Council received a briefing in consultations on the humanitarian situation in Southern Kordofan from Valerie Amos, the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The president of the Council,

Permanent Representative of Germany Peter Wittig, in his remarks to the press following the consultations said that during the consultations members of the Council:

- expressed their grave concern over the ongoing violence in Southern Kordofan;
- called on the government of Sudan and the SPLM-North in accordance with the 28 June framework agreement on Southern Kordofan to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities, viable security arrangements and modalities for their implementation;
- condemned in the strongest terms any violent or unlawful acts against civilians and UN personnel;
- demanded an immediate end to threats of harassment and attacks on civilians and UN personnel;
- stressed that those responsible for the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law should be held accountable;
- urged all parties to respect humanitarian principles and to allow humanitarian personnel timely and unfettered access to the affected civilian population; and
- called on all parties to refrain from unilateral actions and encouraged the parties to resolve the crisis in Southern Kordofan peacefully.

Wittig explained that the remarks to the press did not constitute a formal press statement, as the Council had wanted to respond to the briefing in a timely way and negotiations on a more formal statement would have resulted in a delay.

The Secretary-General requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to send a fact-finding mission to Southern Kordofan. It is expected to deploy at the end of July or early August.

On 27 July Le Roy briefed the Council on the deployment of UNISFA. His briefing covered several issues regarding getting the deployment of the force to full strength, including the need to build new team sites, impediments to transport owing to the rainy season and the lack of a signed status-of-forces agreement. Le Roy also informed the Council of the political impasse between the parties on forming the Abyei Area administration to which they each need to nominate two mutually acceptable representatives. Le Roy's briefing also touched upon the humanitarian situation in Abyei, noting 113,000 persons remained displaced; and noted that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is planning to conduct an assessment mission in Abyei to take stock of recent events.

Le Roy also said that the security situation in Southern Kordofan remained alarming.

On 28 July Council members met in consultations to hear a briefing from the Assistant Secretary-General of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in New York, Ivan Simonovic, on the human rights situation in Southern Kordofan.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a press statement on 27 June issued at the end of her mission to Sudan, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang observed that "impunity, marginalisation and discrimination have gripped Sudan for far too long and have driven multiple conflicts and decades of violence." She called on the government of Sudan to create a human rights environment in Darfur and across Sudan that was conducive to discussing, creating and sustaining peace. She said she believed that central to such an environment would be the lifting of the state of emergency and guaranteeing freedom of expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest and freedom of association. "The broad powers granted to the National Intelligence and Safety Service to arrest and detain for long periods must be brought in line with the international conventions that Sudan has ratified," said Kang.

Key Issues

A key issue is the increasing number of unofficial reports of atrocities in Southern Kordofan. A related issue is keeping abreast of developments in Blue Nile state, given the risk of violence spreading.

A second possible issue for the Council in August might be the possible scope, size and duration of UN assistance to a border-monitoring mechanism.

A related issue for Council members is information about progress in negotiations between the parties on the outstanding aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), including on Abyei, on economic arrangements and wealth-sharing and citizenship criteria—all of which could have a significant impact on the stability of the security relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and the humanitarian situation in the region.

A further issue for the Council is whether the parties are fulfilling their agreement on Abyei by withdrawing their armed forces upon the deployment of UNISFA.



Underlying Issues

Approximately one million people could be rendered stateless in Sudan if its parliament passes a law disallowing dual north-south citizenship. As it is, tens of thousands of South Sudanese remain at a number of way-stations in Sudan awaiting promised transportation south.

Options

The Council could:

- adopt a resolution expanding the role of UNISFA to incorporate a force-protection role to support unarmed border monitors, mandating UN support for a border-monitoring mechanism and retaining a limited border-observation role for UNMISS in disputed areas;
- seek a briefing from Mbeki and the special envoy of the Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios, on the status of negotiations between the parties to reach a ceasefire in Southern Kordofan and implementation of the remaining aspects of the CPA;
- seek follow-up briefings from OCHA on the humanitarian situation in Southern Kordofan; and
- issue a formal response to the situation in Southern Kordofan either by picking up the draft presidential statement that was being considered following the outbreak of violence in early June or issuing a press statement.

Council Dynamics

Given the current budget environment for many Council members, it can be expected that several Council members would raise questions over the number of troops required for a border-monitoring protection force. Likewise, many Council members would want at least an understanding of what benchmarks might be needed for the completion of such a mission.

It seems that many Council members did not consider it helpful to include in the UNMISS resolution a strict and early deadline for the parties to propose modalities on the implementation of the border-monitoring arrangements which did not reflect the pace of the negotiations between the parties.

The Council seems divided still over the ongoing violence in Southern Kordofan. A number of Council members seem to want

the Council to speak formally on this issue, either through a press statement or a presidential statement. It is clear that the expiry of the UNMIS mandate will hamper getting information on the security and human rights situation from the peacekeepers. Some argue that the Council should not take concrete actions in the absence of such reports.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1999 (13 July 2011) recommended to the General Assembly that South Sudan be admitted as a member of the UN.
- S/RES/1997 (11 July 2011) liquidated UNMIS.
- S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011) established UNMISS.
- S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established UNISFA.

Council Meetings

- S/PV.6593 (27 July 2011) was a briefing on UNISFA.
- S/PV.6583 (13 July 2011) was a high-level debate on South Sudan.
- S/PV.6579 (11 July 2011) was the meeting at which the Council liquidated UNMIS.

Other Relevant Facts

UNMISS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Hilde Frafjord Johnson (Norway)

UNMISS: Size and Duration

Maximum authorised strength: up to 7,000 military and 900 police

Duration: 9 July to present; mandate expires 9 July 2012.

UNISFA: Force Commander and Head of Mission

Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede Tesfay (Ethiopia)

UNISFA: Size, Composition and Duration

Maximum authorised strength:

up to 4,200 military and 50 police

Estimated troops deployed by 31 July:

1,200 military personnel

Troop contributor: Ethiopia

Duration: 27 June to present; mandate expires 27 December

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan

Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

Kosovo

Expected Council Action

In August the Council is expecting a debate on the situation in Kosovo.

Key Recent Developments

The Council held an urgent meeting on tensions in northern Kosovo on 28 July, following a Russian-backed Serbian request after an outbreak of violence along the Kosovo-Serbia border. At the time of writing it appeared that the Council would be briefed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation. It was unclear whether or not an open meeting would be held. Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić was expected to meet with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon following the consultations.

One Kosovo officer was killed on 26 July after Kosovo police seized two border posts, Brnjak and Jarinje, along the frontier with Serbia in order to try to enforce a newly instituted trade embargo against all Serbian products. The embargo was imposed on 20 July in retaliation for Serbia's refusal to recognise Kosovo's documents and customs stamps. (Kosovo also introduced a 10 percent tax for imports from Bosnia which also blocks exports from Kosovo.) On 21 July Serbia said it would ask the European Commission and UN to mediate the dispute. Serbian President Boris Tadić, commenting on the events on 26 July, said that Belgrade will not use force to resolve the conflict. Commander of NATO's Kosovo force, KFOR, Erhard Bühler, met with leaders in northern Kosovo on 27 and 28 July in an attempt to ease tensions. On 27 July NATO took control of the two border posts.

The EU and US on 26 July criticised the Kosovo operation, saying that the government should have consulted with its Western allies who have troops on the ground and called on Pristina and Belgrade to restore calm. The US Department of State issued a statement urging both sides to refrain from the use of violence and urging both parties to "return to the negotiating table immediately".

At the most recent round of EU talks between Kosovo and Serbia, held on 2 July in Brussels, agreements were reached for the first time in several areas: on civil registry and freedom of movement (the parties agreed to allow freedom of movement of respective citizens who carry identity cards or driving licenses issued by the other side, but excluded passports)

and the acceptance of university and school diplomas. This outcome built on discussions in previous meetings, held in March, April and May. The next round of technical talks is expected in September.

Following the July talks, some Kosovo Serbs opposed the agreements, claiming that they reinforced Kosovo's claims to statehood. Some 600 Kosovo Serb representatives met in Mitrovica on 4 July to call on Serbia to stop its talks with Kosovo and to end its cooperation with EULEX. The representatives approved a document that described the negotiated agreement as an act of "national treason and against state interests."

Belgrade rejected calls to end the dialogue with Pristina. Serbian Minister for Kosovo Goran Bogdanović said in a 12 July statement that Belgrade would not withdraw from the dialogue and that talks were the only means to solving problems faced by Serbs, along with the issue of Kosovo's status. Bogdanović said that the agreements reached in Brussels did not prejudice the status of Kosovo in any way, stressing that Serbia would never recognise an independent Kosovo. Currently 77 UN member states have recognised Kosovo.

Serbia continues to call for an international inquiry into the allegations implicating Kosovo rebels in the trafficking of human organs in the late 1990s. The allegations, initially presented in a December 2010 report by Dick Marty, rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), allege that Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi had been involved in organised crime, including drug trafficking and the illegal trafficking of human organs, during his time as a Kosovo Liberation Army leader. PACE, on 25 January called for an investigation of allegations of inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in organs based on the Marty report.

On 23 June Russia circulated a draft Security Council resolution on behalf of Serbia that requested the creation of an ad-hoc mechanism, under the authority of the Security Council, to investigate allegations of trafficking of human organs in Kosovo. Council members have since met for several rounds of consultations on the draft, which has been subsequently amended. Consultations on the text are expected to continue. Previously, on 19 April, Serbia had circulated a letter and concept note sent to the Secretary-General requesting the creation of the investigative mechanism.

On 6 July, Serbia submitted a draft resolution to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly (PA) entitled “Combat against illegal human organ trafficking,” which requested a “comprehensive and independent international investigation under UN auspices and mandate into kidnappings and crimes that were aimed at removing and selling human organs” in Kosovo in 1999. The draft resolution called on EU and UN missions and relevant international institutions to cooperate in investigating allegations and submitting information.

On 9 July, the OSCE PA subsequently adopted a resolution recommending the establishment of closer co-operation, including exchange of information, and more efficient actions by the institutions of the OSCE-participating states in combating illicit trade in human organs. It also called for a comprehensive investigation of abductions and crimes connected with the removal and sale of human organs allegedly committed in Kosovo during the armed conflicts in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and immediately afterwards and invited full co-operation with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), as well as the relevant national institutions.

The last briefing to the Council on the situation in Kosovo was on 12 May. Special representative to the Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier stated that he supported the call by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly for a thorough, impartial and independent investigation into allegations of inhumane treatment of people and illicit trafficking of human organs in Kosovo and said UNMIK “remains fully available to cooperate with such an investigation.” Zannier also stressed that the EU-mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia are of crucial importance.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 25 May, the Political and Security Committee of the EU formally approved the establishment of a task force to investigate alleged crimes in Kosovo and Albania after the Kosovo war. The special investigation is charged with examining allegations of abductions, disappearances, executions, organ trafficking and other serious crimes and will examine the alleged involvement of former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army and current Kosovo leaders, including Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether Council members will use the opportunity in August to reinforce the need for further progress in the technical talks.

An underlying issue continues to be a division in the Council over the end point of the process and the long-term status of Kosovo.

The allegations presented in the Marty report remain an issue and Serbia’s request for the establishment of a UN investigative mechanism continues to be controversial.

Options

One option is simply to receive the briefing and hold a debate, allowing each country to state its positions, as in recent practice.

A second more proactive option is to adopt a statement following up in more detail discussions in the consultations on 28 July and addressing the need for such issues to be resolved by negotiations rather than unilateral action by either side. It could also welcome the agreements made in recent technical talks and encouraging continuing dialogue on the issues between the parties.

Another option would be to include in any statement language addressing the organ trafficking allegations and expressing support for prompt and thorough investigation and deciding to keep it under review.

A fourth option would be to request the Secretary-General to initiate an investigation using UN resources.

Council Dynamics

Council members were divided on whether the 28 July meeting on the situation in northern Kosovo was warranted. Russia strongly supported Serbia’s call for the meeting, while the US and UK felt the issue could wait until the Council’s regular debate on Kosovo in August.

All Council members seem to agree that the allegations concerning organ trafficking brought forth in the Marty report are serious and necessitate further investigation and prosecution of perpetrators.

Some Council members, including the US, UK, France and Germany, feel that EULEX, and not the Council, should oversee investigations into the allegations.

Russia supports the Serbian request for the establishment of an ad-hoc UN investigative mechanism and feels that EULEX currently does not have the capacity necessary to undertake an investigation and ensure adequate witness protection.



Russia also supports the involvement of UNMIK. China also favours the option of a UN-mandated investigative mechanism.

On the issue of the status of Kosovo, the Council remains divided.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/281 (3 May 2011)

Other

- OSCE PA Resolution AS (11) Res 18 E (9 July) recommended the establishment of closer co-operation and more efficient actions by the institutions of the OSCE-participating states in combating illicit trade in human organs.
- S/2011/363 (14 June 2011) was the letter transmitting the most recent report on the NATO force in Kosovo, KFOR, covering the period 1 January to 31 March.
- S/PV.6534 (12 May 2011) was the most recent debate on Kosovo.
- S/2011/256 (19 April 2011) was the letter from Serbia to the Secretary-General requesting the creation of an ad-hoc mechanism to conduct a criminal investigation into allegations of trafficking of human organs in Kosovo.
- PACE Resolution 1782 (25 January 2011) was on investigating allegations of inhumane treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo.
- A/64/L.65/Rev.1 (8 September 2010) was the General Assembly resolution welcoming EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo.
- A/64/876 (27 July 2010) was the letter from Serbia to the Secretary-General outlining Serbia’s position concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion.
- A/64/881 (26 July 2010) was the ICJ advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Vacant at press time

UNMIK

Size of mission: 421

Cost: \$44.915 million (1 July 2011- 30 June 2012 budget)

KFOR (NATO force)

Force commander: Maj. Gen. Erhard Bühler (Germany)

Size of mission: 8454 Troops (as of 7 November 2010)

Peacekeeping

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to have an open debate in late August on peacekeeping. This will be the first thematic peacekeeping debate in 2011. Among the wide range of issues likely to be covered are the relationship between troop and police-contributing (TCCs/PCCs) and UN bodies and the issue of resources for missions.

India, August Council president and one of the leading troop-contributors, is expected to circulate a concept note in early August. A presidential statement is also a possible outcome.

Key Recent Developments

On 27 July the force commanders of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) briefed the Council. The UN Military Adviser, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, also participated. The force commander from MONUSCO briefed on the impact of “conditionality policy” on operations, the force commander from UNAMID talked about protection of civilians in a non-permissive environment, the force commander from UNIFIL talked about safety concerns in southern Lebanon and its impact on operations, and the force commander from UNMIL briefed on inter-mission cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI.

The last Council high-level debate on peacekeeping was on 23 September 2010 and it focused on better integrating the Council’s core tools in addressing peace and security—preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding. This was the culmination of a process involving a series of discussions that began in early 2009 and led to a growing recognition of the inter-linkage and overlap between preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (Resolution 1996 establishing UNMISS for South Sudan shows some concrete evidence that some of the lessons learnt from that process are being implemented.)

On 12 February 2010, the Council held a debate on transition and exit strategies for UN peacekeeping operations. It adopted a presidential statement committing itself to ensuring successful transitions by developing clear, credible mandates matched by appropriate resources.

Another significant debate on peacekeeping took place on 5 August 2009 under the UK presidency. During that debate the Council adopted a presidential statement identifying the need for better integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding and more meaningful engagement with TCCs/PCCs, as well as increased interaction with the Secretariat. (While the latter theme was well followed up in 2010 the TCC/PCC theme was not. And some TCCs are critical of the Council’s failure to implement the good intentions in practice. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2011 is cited by some as an example of where the Council could and should have done more to engage with TCCs.) The 2009 presidential statement also led to the establishment of a practice of holding regular thematic peacekeeping briefings in 2010. The first was on 17 February, when Under-Secretary-Generals for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, and Field Support, Susana Malcorra, briefed Council members following the 12 February peacekeeping debate. The next briefing was on 27 May and covered areas ranging from the extension of peacekeeping missions to capabilities and gaps in peacekeeping.

In August, Council members held a debate and were briefed by Le Roy and the force commanders of UNMIL, MONUSCO, UNMIS and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as well as the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).

The final 2010 peacekeeping consultations on 24 November included a briefing by Le Roy and Malcorra and a discussion of the overlap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, writing better mandates, balancing mandates with resources and ways to include peacebuilding tasks in mandates.

The one peacekeeping briefing in 2011 to date was by Le Roy and Malcorra in February. It focused on the issue of national consent by the host country.

Key Issues

An issue for the Council is whether to have a more generic presidential statement on peacekeeping or whether to try to focus on taking forward a small number of specific issues which are of concern to some members, such as the TCC/PCC question.

Another issue is whether the significant differences which emerged earlier this year in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) and the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee over troop cost reimbursement levels will have an impact on this debate. In the current financial climate the costs of peacekeeping are never far from the surface.

Options

One option is a more general presidential statement covering a range of peacekeeping issues and perhaps bringing together the generic peacekeeping concepts that have been discussed over the last few years.

Another option is a presidential statement focused on more specific issues such as the TCC concerns. One possibility is for the Council to try and negotiate more satisfactory arrangements. However, the summer absences in August might make this difficult. The Council could therefore request the Secretary-General to consult indirectly with all of the key TCCs and each of the Council members, and bearing in mind the experience from Côte d’Ivoire, produce recommendations by the end of the year on how the Council, the TCCs and the Secretariat could interact more effectively and efficiently to ensure that TCC engagement is enhanced. Other options include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to submit to the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping a lessons-learned exercise based on the experience of setting up the UN mission in South Sudan; or
- requesting the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide regular briefings to the Working Group on Peacekeeping.

Council Dynamics

With Council members occupied with so many crisis situations in the first six months of the year, capacity for driving Council peacekeeping reforms—even from such members as France and the UK, initiators of the review of the Council’s role in peacekeeping in 2009—has waned significantly.

Looking ahead, a number of members including Lebanon (the Council president in September) appear to be keen to pay greater attention to prevention.

However, some situations on the Council's agenda such as South Sudan have allowed members who have been keen on improving the framework for peacekeeping to put into practice some of the concepts that have been discussed in recent years, including the need to initiate peacebuilding activities in the early stages of planning a peacekeeping mission.

Most permanent members are still driven to a large extent by a desire to keep down the cost of peacekeeping. But the dynamics are also affected by the fact that a number of elected members, including India and Nigeria, are significant contributors of peacekeepers, and remain concerned about improving the framework for peacekeeping rather than trimming it.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1353 (13 June 2001) contained a statement of cooperation and categories of consultation with TCCs.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) adopted the decisions and recommendations of the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/18 (23 September 2010) reaffirmed the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the need for a more comprehensive and concerted approach.
- S/PRST/2010/2 (12 February 2010) focused on peacekeeping exit and transition strategies.
- S/PRST/2009/24 (5 August 2009) set out future areas for improvement in peacekeeping.

Meeting Records

- S/PV.6389 (23 September 2010) was the summit meeting on peace and security.
- S/PV/6370 (6 August 2010) was the meeting with force commanders.
- S/PV.6270 and resumption 1 (12 February 2010) was on transition and exit strategies.

Other

- A/65/680 and A/65/689/Add.1 was the Secretary-General's report on implementation of the recommendations of the C34.

Somalia

Expected Council Action

The Council expects in August a briefing on Somalia, to be followed by consultations, from the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga. Among the issues Mahiga is likely to focus on are the roadmap for the implementation of the June Kampala accord and the preparations for the consultative meeting of the stakeholders in Somalia to discuss the roadmap. The impact of the famine declared in parts of the country is also likely to be discussed.

At press time it was unclear if Mahiga will brief in person or by videoconferencing and whether there would be an outcome.

Background

The Consultative Meeting on Ending the Transition is being planned by a preparatory committee, comprising representatives from the Transitional Federal Government, Transitional Federal Parliament and the regions of Puntland and Galmudug. It will be a follow-up to the 9 June Kampala accord on transitional issues that broke a long stalemate between key actors within the transitional institutions. It is hoped that the meeting will take place by 20 August, the originally envisaged date for ending the transitional period, in a location within Somalia.

A key issue for the Council will be the role it could play in encouraging maintaining the momentum that appears to have emerged towards ending the transitional period and consolidating the political process.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1972 (17 March 2011) extended the humanitarian asset freeze exemption for another 16 months.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2011/13 (24 June 2011) welcomed the signing of the Kampala Accord.
- S/PRST/2011/6 (10 March 2011) stressed the need for a comprehensive strategy for Somalia.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania)



Lebanon

Expected Council Action

In August the Security Council is expected to extend the UNIFIL mandate for a further year. This is the fifth renewal since the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. Given the increased tension and an uncertain political climate in the region and the recent attacks on UNIFIL it is possible that the resolution will contain elements reflecting these developments.

A meeting with troop-contributing countries, including a possible briefing by UNIFIL's force commander, is likely prior to the adoption. The mandate expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments

On 27 July the force commander of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) briefed the Council during an interactive meeting on UN peacekeeping operations. He talked about safety concerns in southern Lebanon and its impact on operations.

On 26 July the Council issued a press statement condemning an attack on a UNIFIL convoy. Earlier that day, a bomb exploded on a road regularly travelled by UNIFIL, injuring six French peacekeepers. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati condemned the attack. (It follows a similar attack on 27 May.)

On 21 July Michael Williams, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, briefed the Council in informal consultations on the Secretary-General's latest 1701 report. He said the cessation of hostilities was holding despite the 15 May Al-Nakba protests when the Israeli army used direct fire against demonstrators approaching the technical fence before employing other crowd-control measures. He also signalled concern that the Syrian situation might spark inter-religious clashes in Lebanon.

On 16 July Mikati visited UNIFIL headquarters (he is the first premier to ever do so) expressing support for UNIFIL and stressing the Lebanese government's commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701.

In early July Israel deposited its proposed coordinates with the UN for the maritime boundary with Lebanon. Lebanon deposited its proposed coordinates on 9 July and 11 October 2010. The disputed maritime boundary has become a point of tension recently with Lebanon's new government indicating that any unilateral measures by Israel in the disputed area (approximately 850 square kilometres) might be considered aggression. Lebanon is a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; Israel is not.

On 7 July the new Lebanese government agreed on a ministerial statement that:

- stated Lebanon's commitment to resolution 1701;
- but contrary to resolution 1701 the statement effectively allows Hezbollah to continue as an armed force, citing its resistance role; and
- regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon—the statement says “the government respects international resolutions...and... will follow [the Tribunal's] progress... which was established to achieve...justice, without politicization...and without impact on Lebanon's stability”.

On 30 June the Tribunal transmitted a sealed indictment and arrest warrants to the Lebanese government. However, the identities of the indicted were leaked in the Lebanese press which reported four names—seemingly all Hezbollah members. Lebanon has thirty days to arrest the suspects at which point the Tribunal may publically call on them to surrender. (The Tribunal issued international arrest warrants to Interpol on 8 July.)

On 2 July the head of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, said no power would be able to arrest the four who were indicted.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in the current situation is persuading Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo of the last five years—cessation of hostilities—toward a formal ceasefire and permanent solution. But progress seems more remote than ever.

Peacekeeper's freedom of movement so that UNIFIL may fulfil its mandate is currently a major issue, especially given the bomb attacks on 26 July and 27 May.

A further issue is the lack of an established maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon. (Israel unilaterally installed a buoy line which Lebanon does not recognise.) This issue is gaining importance given the

recent discovery of underwater natural gas reserves and heightened rhetoric between Israel and Lebanon over their respective national rights to such natural resources.

The crisis in Syria is also likely to delay any resolution to the issues of Ghajar and Sheb'a Farms, both unimplemented dimensions of resolution 1701.

The security arrangements for an Israeli military withdrawal from northern Ghajar to redeploy south of the Blue Line have been completed. However, progress seems to have been suspended by Israel after the collapse of the Lebanese government in January. Ghajar is a village straddling the Blue Line, parts of which extend into Lebanese territory. Its residents are Syrian (mostly Alawite) who after Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 were granted Israeli citizenship. Lebanon administered the area from 2000 to 2006.

Regarding Sheb'a Farms, Syria has linked it to the wider issue of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Another complicating factor is that the Farms are part of the UN Disengagement Force's area of operations.

Other issues include the regular Israeli over flights and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

Options

Options available to the Council include:

- given the attacks on UNIFIL to reenergise its working processes vis-à-vis troop-contributing countries (TCCs), perhaps by inviting TCCs to meet with the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping prior to the formal meeting;
- simply renewing the UNIFIL mandate as it currently stands for another year;
- renewing the mandate with new elements on the security of UN peacekeepers and the need to respect their freedom of movement; and
- reenergised Council language addressing the key issues with the goal of calming the situation.

In regard to the Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary, Lebanon has suggested assigning UNIFIL the task of installing a buoy line based on international law. However, UNIFIL is not mandated or technically equipped to deal with such legal issues. An option for the Council is to request the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on the issue and to indicate some provisional measures to assist the existing tripartite mechanism between

UNIFIL, Lebanese and Israeli forces to manage any possible security dimensions that may arise due to current tensions.

Regarding the Tribunal, there are no immediate issues for the Council. However, given the ambiguous language in the Lebanese ministerial statement on the Tribunal the issue may come to fore in the coming months.

Council Dynamics

Council members agree that UNIFIL continues to be an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—especially in light of the current developments in the region. Most seem to accept that continued quiet in southern Lebanon may be the only achievable goal in the medium term.

Many Council members (Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Nigeria and Portugal) are troop-contributing countries to UNIFIL. All are likely to have interests in the security and freedom of movement of peacekeepers. India during its presidency in August intends to focus on peacekeeping and relations with TCCs.

On the issue of the Lebanese government's ministerial statement, most Council members welcome Lebanon's commitment to its international obligations. Commitment to resolution 1701 was reiterated by Lebanon—an elected member of the Council—in a 22 June letter to the Council and made explicit in the ministerial statement. However, the comfort level among Council members on implementation of the resolution by the new government, both on the Tribunal and in terms of allowing Hezbollah to continue as an armed force, is not high.

Many Council members have repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Tribunal's independence. If Lebanon does not cooperate with the Tribunal then some may consider it necessary to address that development in some way.

Lebanon is likely to be uneasy about any deviation from past practices when it comes to the UNIFIL renewal or addressing Tribunal issues in the Council.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress is only likely in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, which at this juncture seems unlikely any time soon.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

flag of Belize. Belize gave permission for the ship to be boarded, but the crew refused and after several days the ship turned back without being searched. Samore said that the ASEAN nations (including Myanmar) had cooperated to encourage the DPRK to recall the ship.

The DPRK assumed the presidency of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 28 June. (The presidency of the conference rotates on an alphabetical basis.) The DPRK, whose presidency will run until 19 August, said it was prepared to participate in nuclear disarmament discussions in the context of the conference. However, substantive talks appeared unlikely. Canada announced on 11 July that it would temporarily withdraw from the conference to protest the DPRK's leadership position.

The EU announced on 4 July that it had negotiated an agreement with the DPRK to establish a monitoring mechanism to ensure that aid was delivered directly to those individuals who are most vulnerable, such as children under age five, pregnant and breast-feeding women, the sick and the old. The agreement came after an EU mission found that food rations distributed by the DPRK, which two thirds of its population rely on, had been cut from 400g of cereals per person per day in early April to 150g in June, or only a fifth of the daily average nutritional requirement. EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response Kristalina Georgieva said that if it were discovered that aid was being diverted from the intended recipients the commission would not hesitate to end the aid. (While humanitarian groups have warned that up to 6 million DPRK citizens face severe food shortages in eastern and northern provinces, donors remain concerned about the risks of diversion of supplies by the regime.)

US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen arrived in China on 10 July for talks with his counterpart, Chinese People's Liberation Army General Staff head Chen Bingde. Mullen told reporters that recent DPRK provocations are potentially more dangerous than in the past. He said it would continue to be very important for China to

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1937 (30 August 2010) renewed UNIFIL until 31 August 2011.
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government's control over all Lebanese territory.

Security Council Press Statement

- SC/10341 (26 July 2011) and SC/10264 (27 May 2011) condemned the attacks on UNIFIL convoys.

Security Council Letters

- S/2011/400 (22 June 2011) was a position paper by Lebanon on implementation of resolution 1701.

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2011/406 (1 July 2011) was on resolution 1701.
- S/2011/258 (19 April 2011) was on resolution 1559.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Michael Williams (UK)

Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559

Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 May 2011

Authorised: 15,000 troops
Current: 11,832 military personnel
Troop Contributors: Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Turkey

Duration

March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2011

Cost

1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011: \$518.71 million (A/C.5/65/15)

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action

In August the Council is expected to receive a briefing from the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee. No Council decision was expected at time of writing.

Key Recent Developments

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho and Republic of Korea (ROK) Nuclear Envoy Wi Sung-lac held talks on the sideline of an ASEAN conference in Bali on 22 July. After the meeting, Ri said the purpose was to work toward a resumption of six-party talks. Wi said the parties had agreed to make joint efforts toward denuclearisation and to set conditions to resume six-party talks. On 24 July US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced the US had invited DPRK Vice Minister Kim Kae-gwan to New York in late July. Kim will apparently meet with a number of US officials for discussions on a return to six party talks.

On 10 June the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts that supports the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2012. Resolution 1985 requested that the Panel submit to the Council a midterm report on its work by 12 December and a final report upon termination of its mandate. The Panel was asked to provide each of these reports to the Committee a month before they are submitted to the Council in order to allow for a discussion. In addition, the Panel is requested to provide the Committee with a programme of work within 30 days of its appointment. (The Secretary-General informed the Council on 27 June that he had reappointed the individuals on the Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts after consulting with the Committee and the Panel submitted its programme of work in mid-July.)

Gary Samore, the US White House special assistant on arms control, said on 13 June that a US navy ship had intercepted a ship traveling from the DPRK to Myanmar on 26 May. The ship, the *M/V Light*, was flying the

exercise its influence with the DPRK leadership. During a visit to the ROK that followed, Mullen praised the ROK leadership on 14 July for showing restraint in the face of provocations last year. He also cautioned that the DPRK should not mistake restraint for lack of resolve and warned of a strong response to any future attack.

On 12 July DPRK leader Kim Jong Il and his son and assumed successor, Kim Jong Un, met with visiting Chinese delegates, including Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang.

Key Issues

An ongoing issue is weighing the benefit of holding off on discussion in the Council of the underlying issues regarding the DPRK. This remains problematic for Council members both at the Council and sanctions committee levels. The Sanctions Committee still has on its agenda whether, and when, to implement some or all of the recommendations made in the last panel of experts report.

A related issue is whether the cautious approach in the Council enhances the possibility of the DPRK and others reengaging in the six-party talks process or not. It is unclear whether the sanctions regime is helpful in prompting a change in behaviour on the part of the DPRK.

Underlying Problems

Key underlying problems are the refusal of the DPRK to abide by Council resolutions relating to its nuclear programme and the perception by many in the international community that the DPRK tries to maximise leverage by reengaging in, and disengaging from, negotiations at will.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- refraining from public action at present while allowing the Committee to continue discussing the possible implementation of recommendations contained in the last Panel of Experts report;
- encouraging the Committee to act on some of the recommendations made by the Panel; or
- issuing a statement in response to the DPRK's uranium enrichment activity and continued non-compliance with Council resolutions.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members were in agreement on the June renewal of the Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts. Support was apparent both for the Panel and for the overall work of the Committee. However,

some tensions exist. The Committee remains at odds over the Panel's most recent report, including whether to publish it and whether to implement its recommendations (such as naming additional entities to the sanctions list).

The permanent members who have been involved in the six-party talks process seem to prefer the cautious approach with the Council. Many Council members continue to be concerned by reports of DPRK efforts to circumvent sanctions measures (the August briefing appears likely to cover at least two new reported sanctions violations).

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1985 (10 June 2011) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts that supports the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2012 and asked the Panel to provide its midterm and final reports to the committee a month before they are submitted to the Council, in order to allow for a discussion.
- S/RES/1928 (7 June 2010) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts that assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2011.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK's 25 May 2009 underground nuclear test, expanded the existing arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK, as well as vessels on the high seas, and provided for the creation of a panel of experts to assist the Committee.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK's nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.

Security Council Letter

- S/2011/391 (27 June 2011) notified the Council that the Secretary-General had reappointed the panel of experts that supports the committee's work.

Latest Sanctions Committee Annual Report

- S/2011/84 (18 February 2011)

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

Useful Additional Sources

Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South, Asia Report No. 208, International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011.

Andrew Marble, "Political Change in the DPRK: An Interview with Stephan Haggard and Daniel Pinkston," Policy Q&A No. 12, Asia Policy, July 2011.

UN Office in Central Africa (UNOCA)

Expected Council Action

In August, Council members will hold consultations with the special representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), Abou Moussa. The Council is due to receive the first Secretary-General's report on UNOCA in August.

Background on UNOCA

On 11 December 2009, the Secretary-General advised the Council of his intention to establish UNOCA. After eight months delay, the president of the Council responded on 30 August 2010 that the Council considered that the mission should be established with a two-year mandate, to be reviewed after 18 months.

Key Recent Developments

On 2 March, the UN inaugurated UNOCA, located in Libreville, Gabon, to support central African nations in consolidating peace, preventing conflict and tackling cross-border arms-trafficking and organised crime. UNOCA is also charged with coordinating UN efforts in the region against armed groups, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint Moussa as head of UNOCA on 11 March. On 3 June, Moussa briefed the Council prior to his deployment, giving the Council the opportunity to exchange views with him on the missions' priorities and expectations.

On 21 July, the Council held a private meeting on the LRA. In the following press statement the Council requested UNOCA to facilitate cooperation between the UN and the AU on issues related to countering the threat posed by the LRA.

Key Issues

A key issue for Council members, following the 21 July meeting, will be discussing with

Moussa the role that UNOCA can play in addressing the LRA problem and other regional threats on the Council's agenda.

A second issue is the progress UNOCA is making with its wider mandate.

Options

Options include:

- issuing a press statement following the briefing, reaffirming support for UNOCA's activities in the region; or
- taking no action.

Council Dynamics

Some Council members were initially hesitant about establishing UNOCA. However, there is now wider support for UNOCA and members are interested in discussing UNOCA's priorities, its work during the first months of operation and its capacity to implement its mandate. Some members are particularly interested in UNOCA's capacity to coordinate UN efforts to address the LRA issue.

UN Documents

Security Council Letters

- S/2010/457 (30 August 2010) and S/2009/697 (11 December 2009) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council about the establishment of UNOCA.

Security Council Press Statement

- SC/10335 (21 July 2011) was a press statement on efforts to address the LRA issue.

International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action

In August the Council is expected to receive the annual reports of the two international criminal tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). These reports are usually discussed in the General Assembly in September. The Council is not expected to debate these reports which are likely to cover the timetables for trials, the latest information on remaining fugitives and the progress on the preparations for the commencement of the residual mechanism and the tribunals' completion strategy.

The working group on international tribunals may meet in August to review the draft rules of procedure for the residual

mechanism, prepared by the UN Office of Legal Affairs and circulated to Council members in July.

Key Recent Developments

On 20 July, Serbia announced the arrest of the last remaining fugitive sought by the ICTY. Goran Hadžić, a key figure in the former Krajina Serb entity in Croatia, faces charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Council released a press statement the same day calling for the swift transfer of Hadžić to the ICTY. Hadžić was transferred to the ICTY on 22 July.

The presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR last briefed the Council on 6 June 2011. ICTY President Patrick Robinson reiterated his concerns about staff attrition and asked Council members to use their influence with the General Assembly's fifth committee to support specific exceptions to UN staffing policies. Robinson warned that without addressing this issue, the tribunal would continue to experience difficulties in completing its work. He also raised the concern that if states do not sign additional agreements on the enforcement of sentences of the tribunal, the tribunal will not be able to enforce future sentences. ICTR President Khalida Rachid Khan also raised staffing issues and in addition highlighted the difficulties that acquitted and released convicted individuals who had served their sentences face in leaving from Arusha, where the ICTR is located.

On 29 June, the Council adopted resolution 1993, extending the terms of certain permanent and ad-litem judges of the ICTY until 31 December 2012 or until the conclusion of their cases. The resolution also reiterates the importance of adequately staffing the tribunal and calls upon states to conclude agreements on enforcement of sentences.

On 6 July, the Council adopted resolution 1995, responding to the letter by former ICTR President Dennis Byron requesting that the ICTR statute, which is annexed to Security Council resolution 955 (1994), be amended in order for it to be possible for the president of the tribunal to be redeployed to the appeals chamber sitting in The Hague. Alternatively, Judge Byron suggested the Council authorise that an ad-litem judge be elected vice president and become president later on, after the departure of the president. The Council decided not to amend the statute but to allow for an exception so that an ad-litem judge could be elected president or



vice-president of the tribunal. The resolution also allowed Byron to work as part-time judge from 1 September, while emphasising that the authorisation is exceptional and shall not be considered a precedent.

Key Issues

The main issue in the coming months will be further work by the working group on practical arrangements for the residual mechanism encompassing both tribunals.

The continued staffing shortage in the tribunals and the resulting impediments to completing trials, and the issues of the relocation of acquitted individuals and released convicts from the ICTR are likely to be considered again at a later stage.

Regarding the issue of enforcement of sentences, it seems that President Robinson also raised informally the possibility of the Council revisiting its decision in 1993 when it approved the recommendation of the Secretary-General that sentences not be carried out in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY may yet deliver up to 40 more sentences and lack of enforcement locations could become a reality.

Options

Members are likely to receive but not discuss the annual reports, as is the Council's practice.

Council Dynamics

The Council members resisted President Byron's proposal to amend the ICTR statute in part to avoid the possible need for certain states to amend their own internal legislation on cooperation with the ICTR and its statute. The Council members also preferred not to allow the president to sit in the appeals chamber in The Hague so as to maintain the presence of the seat of the president of the ICTR in Arusha. This means that current President Khan will not be able to maintain her position if she moves to the appeals chamber. Resolution 1995's language also reflects the determination of several members that this exception will not entail further expenses as it clearly states that an ad-litem judge elected as president will not enjoy any additional privileges.

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UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1995 (6 July 2011) said that an ad-litem judge may be elected president of the ICTR and authorised Judge Byron to serve as part-time judge from 1 September.
- S/RES/1993 (29 June 2011) extended the terms of permanent and ad-litem judges of the ICTY.
- S/RES/1966 (22 December 2010) established the residual mechanism.
- S/RES/827 (25 May 1993) established the ICTY and adopted its Statute.

Secretary-General Report

- S/25704 (3 May 1993) contained the suggested Statute for the ICTY and suggestions on the establishment of the Tribunal.

Security Council Letters

- S/2011/392 (8 June 2011) was from the president of the ICTY to extend the terms of permanent and ad-litem judges.
- S/2011/329 (5 May 2011) was from the president of the ICTR on a needed amendment to the statute to fill the position of the president.

Other Relevant Documents

- S/2011/317 (12 May 2011) and S/2011/316 (12 May 2011) were the latest reports from the ICTR and ICTY, respectively, on implementation of their completion strategies.
- S/PV.6545 (6 June 2011) was the latest Council briefing by the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR.

Other Relevant Facts

ICTY

- Three accused awaiting re-trial, two awaiting trial, 14 on trial and 16 at the appeals stage.

ICTR

- Nine accused at large, of which three are considered high-ranking.
- One accused awaiting trial, ten on trial and 19 at the appeals stage.

Notable Dates for July

Report Due	Reports for Consideration in August	Requesting Document
31 July	<i>SG report on Kosovo (UNMIK)</i>	S/RES/1244
10 August	<i>Panel of Experts report on the Libyan sanctions regime</i>	S/RES/1973
12 August	<i>SG report on Central Africa (UNOCA)</i>	S/2010/457
30 August	<i>SG report on Somalia (AMISOM)</i>	S/RES/1964

Mandate Expiry in August 2011

	Relevant Document	
31 August	<i>Lebanon (UNIFIL)</i>	S/RES/1937

August 2011 Other Important Dates

23 August *The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled.*

Also expected in August:

- The Council is expected to receive the annual reports of the two international criminal tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
- The Council is likely to meet with UNIFIL troop-contributing countries.
- The Council is likely to continue following Sudan and South Sudan closely, with meetings possible.

Briefings are expected by:

- Special Representative Augustine Mahiga, on Somalia
- Special Representative Abou Moussa, on Central Africa
- Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe, on the Middle East and Libya
- Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy, on UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Sanctions Committee Chairman Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral, on DPRK

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The next meeting of the Libya Contact Group is expected in September.
- There will be an open meeting organised by the Counterterrorism Committee to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373 and the establishment of the Committee in September.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.
- Palestinian local elections are expected in the West Bank in October.
- Legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire are possible in November.
- Legislative and presidential elections are tentatively scheduled in the DRC for 28 November.

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