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Overview

Pakistan will preside over the Security Council in January.

Open debates are planned on a [comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism](#) and a [multidimensional approach to peacekeeping](#). Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar is expected to preside over the counter-terrorism debate and both debates are likely to include a briefing by the Secretary-General. There is also going to be the quarterly [open debate on the Middle East](#), with a briefing expected from the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry.

A briefing is expected on developments in [Yemen](#), by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar.

Briefings, followed by consultations are likely on:

- developments in the [Central African Republic](#) and the latest Secretary-General's report on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of BINUCA;
- developments in [Côte d'Ivoire](#) and the latest Secretary-General's report on the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) by Albert Gerard Koenders, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOCI;
- developments in [Libya](#) by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL);
- developments in [Burundi](#) and the latest Secretary-General's report on the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of BNUB;
- the work of the [UN Office for West Africa](#) (UNOWA) and the Secretary-General's report by Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of UNOWA;
- the Secretary-General's quarterly report on the [AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#) (UNAMID) by the head of the UN Peacekeeping Department, Hervé Ladsous;
- the Secretary-General's further options for a

voluntary and UN-funded logistics support packages for the [African-led International Support Mission in Mali](#) (AFISMA); and

- the [rule of law](#), most likely by the Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson. Briefings in consultations are likely on:
 - the work of and the latest Secretary-General's report on the [UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus](#) (UNFICYP) by Lisa Buttenheim, the Special Representative and head of mission;
 - developments in [Sudan](#) and [South Sudan](#) by Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios (twice, in line with resolution 2046); and
 - the work of the [UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia](#) (UNRCCA), by its head Miroslav Jenča.
- The Council will also be following closely developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria and may hold meetings on these situations.

A formal meeting will be needed to adopt the renewal of the mandate of [BINUCA](#) and [UNFICYP](#).

21 December 2012

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IN HINDSIGHT: Security Council Working Methods

On 26 November 2012, the Council held an open debate on its working methods (S/PV.6870 and resumption 1). It was the fifth open debate on the subject since the first in 1994 and followed an equivalent debate organised by Portugal on 30 November 2011 (S/PV.6672 and resumption 1). (See our January 2012 *Monthly Forecast* for background information.)

The 26 November all-day meeting enabled member states to take stock of what had been an eventful year on working methods. States commended Portugal for its proactive leadership of the Informal Working Group that addresses working methods. (Russia observed that the group had taken on a “new dynamism”.)

Several states welcomed the discussions that took place in 2012 aimed at increasing the interactivity and efficiency of the Council, which culminated in a presidential note on 5 June (S/2012/402). This note included references to the increased use of video-conferencing and of the more streamlined scheduling of Council work, among other housekeeping issues.

While acknowledging these positives, some states observed that improvements had been important but also “modest” and that within the Working Group, as stated by Liechtenstein, progress remained “limited and slow.” The chair of the Working Group, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal), alluded to some of the challenges the group faced when he briefed the Council on 7 December: “It is never easy to get away from routine, which is always more comfortable than change; so it is a difficult task to generate interest in new measures, to discuss their usefulness and practicability and to adopt them” (S/PV.6881).

Several initiatives that had been discussed during the year were raised during the open debate, notably the role of “pen-holders”, which Germany said should increasingly include elected members. The desire for inclusive consultations on the appointment of chairs of the subsidiary bodies also featured prominently.

Following the open debate and several attempts to reach consensus during the preceding months, Council members agreed upon a presidential note (S/2012/937) of 17 December on the “chairpersons of subsidiary organs” issue. The note stated that Council

members supported a process, with the participation of all members, to appoint the chairs in a “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way.”

Nevertheless, at press time, decisions regarding the 2013 chairmanships had just been finalised, and no agreement had been reached on the “pen-holders” issue. (The disconnect between the pen-holders and the chairs of the subsidiary bodies is particularly glaring, as the former “trumps” the latter when drafting Council decisions.)

The open debate saw many recurring points raised. The permanent members largely espoused familiar positions, emphasising that the key test for the Council was its effectiveness in preventing and resolving international conflict, with the UK pointing to practical changes made to improve its efficiency.

Within the context of the Council’s enhanced interaction with non-members, many spoke in favour of the increasing number of open debates, as well as encouraging the use of flexible and innovative formats such as “Arria formula” meetings and informal interactive dialogues. Russia said that while it advocated a “reasonable increase” in the number of Council open debates, the “great importance” of closed consultations should be recognised.

Permanent members also reasserted that any potential modifications to the working methods were the “responsibility of the Council itself” (Russia). China and the US noted that the UN Charter provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure (Article 30). (Less attention was paid to Article 10, which states that the General Assembly may make recommendations to the Council on its powers and functions.)

Several speakers referred to the work in 2012 of the Small Five group (S5), particularly its list of twenty recommendations for the Council to consider regarding its working methods (A/66/L.42/Rev.2). (See our November 2012 *Monthly Forecast* for a background.) Several member states mentioned the worthiness of these recommendations. Some members suggested that discussions needed to go beyond presidential note 507 (S/2010/507), hitherto seen as the reference point for working methods improvements and that the S5 recommendations should serve as the “yardstick”. Japan, which played a key role in negotiating note 507, recalled

that Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland) on 16 May had said the permanent members had expressed their willingness to consider the S5’s recommendations seriously. Japan asked, rhetorically, whether any tangible progress had been made since.

Singapore was emphatic in its criticism of the P5, suggesting that there was disconnect between the permanent members’ public statements and their actions behind closed doors where they appeared to block improvements. On the use of the veto, France reiterated that it supported the P5 “voluntarily and jointly forgoing the use of the veto in situations under the Council’s consideration in which mass atrocities are being committed and, more generally, which pertain to the responsibility to protect.” The other P5 members have kept silent on this, notwithstanding that some have called the vetoes on Syria “despicable” (US) and “inexcusable and indefensible” (UK).

Some new ideas emerged. Liechtenstein, supported by Switzerland, proposed that a subsidiary body address accountability issues of relevance to the Council, including notifications from the International Criminal Court on non-cooperation. New Zealand proposed that a Council open debate be held in 2013 focused on improving working methodologies under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlements of Disputes). South Africa suggested that the president of the Council interact regularly with the chairperson of the AU Peace and Security Council.

Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Iran welcomed Council meetings with troop-contributing countries as part of wider efforts to improve peacekeeping operations. It also noted that the NAM was in favour of informal wrap-up sessions at the end of each presidency. (As Council President in January, Pakistan seems set to schedule such a session.) This suggestion was included in another presidential note agreed on 12 December (S/2012/922). The note also contained language aimed at enhancing interaction with member states, such as suggesting that Council members alternate their interventions with non-Council members during open debates. Furthermore, the note encouraged the inclusion of more substantive information in the annual report the Council must submit to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 24(3) of the UN Charter. •

Status Update since our December Forecast

DRC

On 30 November, the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee added two M23 rebel group leaders—Baudoin Ngaruye and Innocent Kaina—to the sanctions list (SC/10842). On 7 December, Council members were briefed in consultations by peacekeeping head Hervé Ladsous on recent developments in North Kivu after the M23 pulled out of Goma on 1 December and on the efforts of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. On 18 December, Council members were briefed again by Ladsous and by the Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet, Susana Malcorra, on her recent visit to Kinshasa.

Iraq/Kuwait

On 1 December, the Security Council issued a press statement welcoming the joint request of Iraq and Kuwait to reactivate the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project, and calling on Iraq to complete field maintenance work on the project in a timely manner (SC/10843). On 18 December, Council members were briefed in consultations by the current High-Level Coordinator, Gennady Tarasov, on the Secretary General's most recent report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property (S/2012/931). At press time, no decision had been reached regarding the renewal of the funding for the High-Level Coordinator, which was set to expire on 31 December.

Tribunals

On 4 December, the informal working group on international tribunals met with the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR who also briefed the Council on 5 December (S/PV.6880). On 12 December, the Council adopted resolution 2080 extending the terms of five permanent judges of the ICTR until 31 December 2014. On 17 December, the Council adopted resolution 2081 extending the terms of 13 permanent judges of the ICTY until 31 December 2013 and the terms of eight ad litem judges for different periods of time. The Council also requested the ICTY to produce a consolidated comprehensive plan on the completion strategy to the Council by 15 April 2013, to be considered by the Council before 30 June 2013.

Liberia

Pakistan, as chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, briefed Council members

in consultations on 6 December on the final report of its Panel of Experts (S/2012/901). On 12 December, the Council adopted resolution 2079 renewing for a year both the sanctions regime on Liberia and the mandate of the Panel. The resolution mandated the Panel to conduct two follow-up assessment missions to Liberia and neighbouring states “to investigate and compile” a midterm and final report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures on arms, including the various sources of financing, such as from natural resources, for the illicit trade of arms.

Subsidiary Bodies

On 7 December, the Council was briefed by the chairs of the subsidiary bodies whose countries will be finishing their term on the Council on 31 December, including Colombia on Iran and Sudan sanctions, Germany on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions and the working group on children and armed conflict, India on Somalia and Eritrea sanctions, Portugal on Libya and DPRK sanctions, and South Africa on the ad hoc working group on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (S/PV.6881).

The Sahel

At the initiative of Morocco, the Council held a high-level meeting on the Sahel presided by Foreign Minister Saad-Eddine Al Othmani on 10 December. The Secretary-General and the Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, as well as representatives from several regional organisations made statements (S/PV.6882). On 10 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing serious concern over the insecurity and the significant ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region, “which is further complicated by the presence of armed groups, including separatist movements, terrorist and criminal networks, and their increased activities, as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threaten peace, security, and stability” (S/PRST/2012/26).

Guinea-Bissau

On 11 December, Council members received a briefing in consultations from Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS, Joseph Mutaboba, on the most recent report on the restoration of constitutional order in the

country (S/2012/887). Morocco, chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee, also briefed. On 13 December, Council members issued a press statement expressing “serious concern” over the lack of progress in the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. The statement noted that stabilisation can only be achieved through genuine dialogue and effective civilian oversight of the military and condemned the armed attacks of 21 October expressing deep concern over the reports of killings and serious human rights violations in the aftermath of those attacks (SC/10857).

DPRK (North Korea)

On 12 December, following the missile launch by the DPRK, Morocco, as President of the Council, read out remarks to the press which had been agreed on by all Council members. (These so-called “elements” to the press are more informal than a press statement.) The remarks condemned the launch as a “clear violation” of resolutions 1718 and 1874 and recalled that in its 16 April presidential statement, the Council had demanded that the DPRK not proceed with further launches and expressed its “determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch” (S/PRST/2012/13). Finally, the statement noted that Council members would “continue consultations on an appropriate response.” At press time, no formal Council action had been taken.

Peacekeeping

On 12 December, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and Field Support, Hervé Ladsous and Ameerah Haq, briefed the Council on inter-mission cooperation between UN peacekeeping operations (S/PV.6886). Ladsous focused on cooperation involving the temporary transfer or sharing of personnel or equipment among two or more missions. He proposed to explore the possibility of discussing the setting up of a light, flexible framework that would allow the Secretariat, the Council and troop-contributing countries to plan for inter-mission cooperation on a contingency basis. Haq emphasised the need to establish an institutional framework that would allow such inter-mission cooperation to succeed.

Status Update since our December *Forecast* (con't)

Iran

On 13 December, the Council held a regularly scheduled public briefing (S/PV.6888) by the outgoing chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia). The chair noted that the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts, which assists the Committee, had briefed the Committee on its midterm report of 9 November. He also noted that during two recent Committee meetings some delegations had expressed concerns about possible non-compliance with Council resolutions, which may have led to transfers of prohibited material from Iran to regional states. On 20 December, the Committee added two further companies—Yas Air and SAD Import Export Company—to the sanctions regime, for their role in transporting and supplying prohibited arms from Iran to Syria, in violation of Council resolutions. The designation of both entities was recommended by the Panel of Experts in its 2012 final report (S/2012/395).

Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions

The Council unanimously adopted two resolutions related to the Taliban (1988) and Al-Qaida Sanctions (1267/1989) regimes during a meeting on 17 December. In resolution 2082, the Council modified the Taliban sanctions regime, allowing for a number of exemptions to make it easier for listed individuals to travel in order to participate in meetings in support of peace and reconciliation. In resolution 2083, the Council renewed the mandate of the Ombudsperson for 30 months. Both resolutions also renewed the mandate of the Monitoring Team, which

assists both the Al-Qaida and the Taliban Sanctions Committees, for 30 months.

Syria

On 17 December, Council members received a briefing in consultations from OCHA head Valerie Amos on the humanitarian situation in Syria following her 15 December visit to Damascus reporting that Syria was on the edge of irreversible damage. On 19 December, during the regular monthly briefing on the Middle East, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman noted that the violence in Syria had escalated dangerously and stressed that if nothing is done “the destruction of Syria will be the likely outcome” (S/PV.6894).

LRA/UNOCA

On 18 December, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6891) from the Special Representative and head of UNOCA, Abou Moussa, on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNOCA and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) affected areas (S/2012/923). On 19 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement requesting Moussa to keep the Council informed via a single report on UNOCA and the LRA to be submitted before 15 May 2013 (S/PRST/2012/28).

Timor-Leste

On 19 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement on Timor-Leste noting the “remarkable achievements” made since independence in 2002 and the successful presidential and parliamentary elections

in 2012 (S/PRST/2012/27). The statement came as UNMIT prepared to conclude its mandate in the country on 31 December 2012. As is customary, Timor-Leste will formally remain on the Council’s agenda, although there will be no further debates in the Council or regular reporting.

Golan Heights

On 19 December, the Council adopted resolution 2084 renewing UNDOF for six months, requested reporting every 90 days (previously it had been every six months) and strengthened language regarding the security of UN personnel. Prior to the adoption, peacekeeping head Hervé Ladsous briefed Council members on 17 December in consultations on the most recent UNDOF report (S/2012/897).

Afghanistan

On 19 December, the Council held a debate on Afghanistan (S/PV.6896) following a briefing by Special Representative and UNAMA head Ján Kubiš on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2012/907).

Peacebuilding

On 20 December, the Council held an open debate on peacebuilding (S/PV.6897). The Secretary-General presented his report on the issue (S/2012/746) and Bangladesh, as chair of the PBC, also briefed. A presidential statement was adopted emphasising the importance of inclusivity in national peacebuilding processes (S/PRST/2012/29). •

Mali

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive a briefing and hold consultations on the Secretary-General’s options for voluntary and UN-funded logistics support packages for an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments

On 20 December, the Council adopted resolution 2085 under Chapter VII authorising the deployment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year. The resolution mandates the mission to take “all necessary measures as appropriate” to carry out the following tasks: help rebuild the national defence and security forces; support the national authorities in recapturing areas in the north of the country now under the control of terrorists

and separatist forces; support the authorities in their primary responsibility to protect their citizens and create a secure environment for civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance; and help stabilise the country after the military operations. The resolution was the culmination of weeks of intense activity and negotiations among Council members on the issue.

On 5 December, Jeffrey Feltman, the head of the Department of Political Affairs, briefed

Mali (con't)

(S/PV.6879) the Council on the Secretary-General's 29 November report on the situation in Mali (S/2012/894). Feltman warned that the security situation in northern Mali continued to deteriorate, with foreign jihadists and terrorist elements arriving to join the armed groups. Feltman stressed that the priority had to be supporting the national authorities in their efforts to restore constitutional order and reach a political settlement to the ongoing crises. Foreign Minister Traoré Rokiatou Guikine also addressed the Council, pleading for its authorisation of AFISMA to "ease the suffering" of the north for the past nine months and to help save the subregion from "an even more serious disaster whose repercussions cannot be predicted." Guikine noted that since Mali gained its independence from France in 1960, it had grappled with an inchoate separatist rebellion from its Tuareg minority but that this had always been dealt with by the authorities "in accordance with their resources and together with the neighbouring countries, in particular through dialogue." He said the current incarnation of the rebellion, involving "terrorists, extremists and other organised criminals, who are most often foreigners" is a threat to international peace and security and requires an international response. He added that Mali was not asking for the international force to fight its rebellious ethnic minorities. Later that same day, France circulated a draft resolution to authorise AFISMA.

On 10 December, as Council experts were deliberating the draft, soldiers loyal to the 22 March coup leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo, arrested interim Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, forcing him to resign. The incident was a sharp reminder of how volatile the political situation in the country continues to be despite a negotiated arrangement by which the military junta that led the 22 March coup handed over power to a transitional civilian government and retreated to the barracks. The events of 10 December also showed that despite the semblance of a transition to civilian rule, Sanogo continued to be effectively in control. On 11 December the Council condemned the arrest

of Diarra and urged the interim President to swiftly reappoint a national unity government (SC/10851).

Partly as a reaction to the political events in Bamako, the US—which by law cannot provide military assistance to a military-led or -controlled government—proposed significant changes to the draft resolution. It suggested a two-step authorisation of AFISMA, with an initial resolution authorising deployment only to train the army and security forces.

On 13 December, in a letter to the President of the Council (S/2012/926), the Secretary-General set out three options for UN logistical and funding support for AFISMA.

- Drawing from the experience in Somalia, the first option would be a phased approach, by which logistics support for the combat operations would come from voluntary contributions from member states or bilateral sources. Once the military objectives had been achieved, the UN would provide logistics support for the stabilisation phase from assessed contributions.
- The second option would provide logistics support to AFISMA to be deployed in southern Mali for the purpose of supporting the defense and security forces to help build their capacity to conduct the military operations themselves. Under this option, the UN would provide a comprehensive logistics support package but would not extend the support to troops in areas of active combat.
- The third option would combine the two previous options: supporting the international forces in southern Mali and, once northern Mali had been reconquered, support the international forces in the stabilisation phase of the operations.

The Secretary-General in effect made clear that the UN itself was not in a position, for various technical and practical reasons, to provide a funding package that would bankroll the logistics and other needs for AFISMA in carrying out offensive combat operations in northern Mali. Such support, the Secretary-General suggested, should come

voluntarily from bilateral sources.

On 19 December, a compromise was struck, and the draft resolution was placed in blue. While authorising AFISMA with the tasks outlined in the original draft, the resolution set in motion a 60-day cycle for the AU to report to the Council on the deployment and the activities of the mission, including before the commencement of military operations in the north. It set out several benchmarks against which this progress will be measured: a roadmap for the restoration of constitutional order; the effective training of military and police units of AFISMA and Mali; and the operational readiness of AFISMA's forces. It also asked the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every 90 days. Significantly, the resolution also requested the Secretary-General to "confirm in advance the Council's satisfaction with the planned offensive operation".

Furthermore, a preambular paragraph was included in the draft condemning the "continued interference" of the military in the work of the transitional government and stressing the "need to work expeditiously" toward the restoration of democratic governance and constitutional order in Mali.

The Council also expressed in the resolution its intention to consider providing a UN-funded logistics support package for AFISMA, including equipment and services for an initial period of one year. It took note of the Secretary-General's funding options for AFISMA, and requested him, in coordination with the AU, ECOWAS and Mali, to "further develop and refine options within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution" for a voluntary and UN-funded logistics support packages, including detailed recommendations for "a swift, transparent and effective implementation" of the options. The draft resolution also established a trust fund to allow member states to provide financial support to AFISMA or to the training of the military and security forces of Mali.

The resolution furthermore requested UN member states and regional and international organisations to provide coordinated

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI [Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2085](#) (20 December 2012) authorised the deployment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year. [S/RES/2071](#) (12 October 2012) requested the Secretary-General to provide military planners to assist ECOWAS and the AU on the plan for an international force in Mali and to submit a written report within 45 days. [S/RES/2056](#) (5 July 2012) expressed the Council's full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the transitional authorities in Mali in trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity. [Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/9](#) (4 April 2012) strongly condemned assaults by rebels in northern Mali and the seizure of power in the capital by elements of the armed forces. [Security Council Press Statement SC/10851](#) (11 December 2012) condemned the arrest of the interim Prime Minister and the dismissal of the government of Mali and urged the interim President to swiftly reappoint a national unity government. [Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6879](#) (5 December 2012) was a briefing by Feltman on the Secretary-General's report on Mali. [Security Council Letter S/2012/926](#) (13 December 2012) was from the Secretary-General setting out funding options for AFISMA. [Secretary-General's Report S/2012/894](#) (29 November 2012) was the Secretary-General's recommendations for an international force in Mali.

Mali (con't)

support to AFISMA, including military training, equipment, intelligence, logistical support and any necessary assistance in efforts to combat terrorist and affiliated extremist groups.

The resolution called on AFISMA to support national and international efforts, including those of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to bring to justice perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in Mali. It further took note of the intention to strengthen, at the request of Mali, the UN presence in Bamako to enable the UN to provide broad and continued support to the ongoing political and security processes in Mali, including to the deployment and operations of AFISMA.

At the time of the adoption of the resolution on 20 December, Mali became a stand-alone Council agenda item, previously considered under the general rubric of “Peace and Security in Africa”.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In his 5 December briefing to the Council, Feltman stressed that gross human rights abuses continued to be perpetrated against the population in northern Mali, including cases of summary and extrajudicial execution, sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment and use

of child soldiers and torture.

Mali will be reviewed on 22 January under the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council following the authorisation of AFISMA is ensuring proper oversight of the process set in motion.

An immediate related issue is to help establish a funding mechanism that would see the mission through.

Its role in ending the constitutional limbo into which the 22 March coup threw the country and preserving the territorial integrity of Mali by helping it end the occupation of the north by terrorist and extremist groups are further key issues for the Council.

Addressing the massive humanitarian crisis in the north is a related issue.

Underlying Problems

The 10 December forced dismissal of the interim Prime Minister by Sanogo loyalists suggests that the 22 March coup leaders continue to wield strong political power. Sanogo has been known to oppose foreign intervention and has claimed that all that was needed to recapture the north was better weaponry and a bigger defence budget.

Council Dynamics

Considerable disagreement emerged after France circulated the initial draft resolution authorising AFISMA. Eventually, as negotiations progressed, the draft got the full support of all European and African Council members, as well as China (which tends to support the AU position on African issues). However, the US continued to insist on a two-phase approach, raising doubts about the timing and capacity of AFISMA to carry out combat operations in the vast desert terrain of northern Mali and concerns regarding the continued influence of the rebellious military over the transitional government. While the other 14 members of the Council were open to a single resolution setting up AFISMA, several were nevertheless of the view that before agreeing to any military action there should be a serious attempt made at creating a political process which will allow for negotiations with groups that are willing to cut off ties with terrorist organisations. A number of members were also concerned about the signal that would be sent to the AU and ECOWAS if the Council was unable to support their request for a military stabilisation force in Mali. •

UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action

In January the Council expects a briefing from Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), on the Secretary-General's semi-annual report, including an update on the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem.

No Council action is envisaged.

UNOWA's mandate expires on 31 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments

The Council has been dealing in recent months with various West African issues that

technically fall within the remit of UNOWA but are now being addressed separately. The most important of these has been Mali.

Mali and the wider Sahel region to which it belongs was one of the situations about which Djinnit warned the Council on 11 July, saying it could potentially reverse the significant gains made in consolidating peace and promoting democracy in West Africa. Introducing the Secretary-General's report on UNOWA (S/2012/510) to Council members, Djinnit said that the security situation in West Africa remains “precarious and reversible as the root causes of instability are yet to be fully addressed.” He noted that the coups in Mali

(22 March) and Guinea-Bissau (12 April), armed insurrection and continuing instability in parts of Côte d'Ivoire, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, terrorist threats and attacks in the region and the increase in illicit drug trafficking meant that the security situation presents a new wave of challenges to governance, peace consolidation and conflict prevention.

The report covered the period from 1 January to 30 June, providing considerable detail on events in Mali and the wider Sahel since the 22 March coup. It emphasised the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and the complexity of the situation in the region. Even so, the report noted strong economic growth in

UN DOCUMENTS ON WEST AFRICA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2039 (29 February 2012) requested the Secretary-General to support regional strategy to combat Gulf of Guinea piracy. S/RES/2018 (31 October 2011) was a resolution on the threats of piracy and armed robbery on the seas in the Gulf of Guinea. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/24 (19 November 2012) was on piracy as a threat to international peace and security. S/PRST/2012/2 (21 February 2012) was on transnational crime in West Africa, including piracy. Secretary General's Report S/2012/510 (29 June 2012) was the Secretary-General's report on UNOWA covering the period from 1 January to 30 June 2012. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6879 (5 December 2012) was on Mali. S/PV.6865 (19 November 2012) was on piracy as a threat to international peace and security. S/PV.6804 (11 July 2012) was on UNOWA. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOWA Said Djinnit (Algeria). UNOWA: Size and Composition of Mission Strength (as of 30 April 2010): 13 international civilians, ten local civilians and four military advisers. UNOWA: Duration Mandate expires on 31 December 2013.

UNOWA (West Africa)(con't)

the region, despite the weak global economic environment. It cited the International Monetary Fund as saying that the subregion “will register an average economic growth rate of more than 7.5 percent in 2012.” The growth, it says, will be due in part to the discovery and increased extraction of natural resources in such countries as Sierra Leone, Niger and Liberia, where growth rates were estimated at 35.9, 14 and 8.8 percent, respectively, in 2012. In Côte d’Ivoire, the report said, growth was expected to rebound to about 8 percent. These economic trends, however, will continue to be dependent on political stability, the impact of the food security crisis in the region and the global economic situation, the report said.

Since then, Sierra Leone has conducted peaceful general elections on 17 November. On 7-8 December, Ghana also conducted presidential elections which incumbent President John Dramani Mahama won. (Mahama, formerly vice-president, took over as president in July following the death of President John Atta Mills.) However, the transition to civil rule in Guinea-Bissau, brokered by ECOWAS, remains uncertain although elections are slated for April 2013.

Djinnit is also likely to update the Council on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. On 19 November, at the initiative of India, the Council for the first time held an open debate on piracy as a threat to international peace and security. After the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/24) expressing its grave concern about the threat posed by piracy, condemning hostage-taking and violence against hostages and calling for a continuation of efforts to combat piracy at the national, regional and international levels. It

asked the Secretary-General to include in relevant reports to the Council information on ways to advance the international response to piracy. The statement welcomed the initiatives already taken by states and regional organisations to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea—which is home to major oil producers Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Ghana—was added to the Council’s agenda on 23 August 2011. On 29 February 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2039 calling on the Secretary-General to “support efforts towards mobilising resources following the creation of the regional strategy to assist in building national and regional capacities in close consultation with states and regional and extra-regional organizations.”

Despite these concerns, piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea increased during the year, with 34 incidents recorded between January and September 2012 up from thirty in 2011. Togo, in fact, reported more attacks in 2012 than in the previous five years combined, with three vessels hijacked, two boarded and six attempted attacks, according to reports. Nigeria reported over twenty attacks in 2012.

During the open debate on piracy on 19 November, Ambassador Kodjo Menan (Togo) noted that progress in tackling the problem has been slim “despite the stated willingness and determination of the states and organizations concerned.” Meanwhile, Menan said, the income from such illicit activities as the diversion of oil cargoes are used to finance subversive or criminal networks that seek to challenge or diminish states’ authority. Menan referred to such networks as “true mafia organisations”, noting

that they help to undermine the efforts of the weaker states of the subregion to ensure good governance and respect for human rights.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is determining the precise role of UNOWA in the fast-developing situation in Mali.

A related issue is to fashion a policy to coordinate the various special envoys for the Sahel appointed by the UN, AU and EU and, in this context, the role of the head of UNOWA to ensure effective responses to the multifaceted problems of the region.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- receiving the briefing and awaiting the Secretary-General’s integrated strategy on the Sahel; or
- adopting a presidential statement highlighting key concerns raised in the briefing, most likely regarding the growing threats of piracy, organised crime and terrorism in West Africa; and possibly also
- providing a degree of clarification for the role of UNOWA in the context of the various Sahel diplomatic initiatives.

Council Dynamics

While there is strong interest in the work of UNOWA among Council members, there has been increasing awareness of its limited capacity to cover various crises in the region. Some Council members appear anxious to see UNOWA be more assertive in coordinating the various initiatives on the Sahel, including those of the various special envoys for the Sahel.

Togo leads on this issue in the Council. •

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council expects a briefing on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and on the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report by Albert Gerard Koenders, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), followed by consultations.

The outcome may be a presidential or press statement. The current mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 July 2013.

Key Recent Developments

A number of recent security incidents and political developments indicate that Côte d’Ivoire remains unstable and is still

recovering from the events following the 2010 elections.

The security situation has significantly deteriorated since Koenders last briefed the Council on 26 July, with a spate of attacks on army and police bases and on border posts during August and September, deepening insecurity and further heightening political

Côte d'Ivoire (con't)

tensions. These attacks included cross-border violence from both Ghana and Liberia.

Since these attacks, there have been an increasing number of reports accusing the military of illegal detention and mistreatment.

Allies of both current President Alassane Ouattara and former President Laurent Gbagbo committed atrocities in the aftermath of the elections, yet more than 100 people linked to Gbagbo are reported to have been charged, in contrast to several low-level soldiers who supported Ouattara.

Inaugurated in September 2011, the 11-member Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been facing difficulties in establishing its presence in rural areas and receiving the necessary political and financial support it needs for effective operation. No amnesties will be available for those who confess to crimes.

Recent events reflect an increasing rift between the political parties, particularly between the Rally of the Republicans—which won an outright majority in the legislative elections in December 2011—and its main partner in the coalition government, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire. On 14 November 2012, Ouattara dissolved the 36-member cabinet and formed a new government on 22 November with 28 ministers. Meanwhile, the pro-Gbagbo Ivorian Popular Front, which boycotted the December 2011 elections, remains marginalised from the political process.

Challenges remain in moving forward on security sector reform (SSR). It is hoped the stalled reform process will be reinvigorated by the wake-up call provided by the recent string of violent attacks and will subsequently promote progress in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants who participated in the conflict.

An inter-ministerial working group completed a national SSR strategy in early August—including DDR elements—which was endorsed by the National Security Council. This working group is expected to

conduct consultations with stakeholders for its validation, which in turn will feed into the broader national reconciliation process.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed that proceedings against Gbagbo will start on 19 February 2013. In ICC custody since 30 November 2011, Gbagbo has been charged, as an indirect co-perpetrator, with four counts of crimes against humanity for incidents that occurred in the post-electoral violence between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011. On 22 November 2012, the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant against his wife, Simone Ehiwet Gbagbo, for four counts of crimes against humanity.

During an open debate on the subject of peacekeeping operations, several Council members cited the increasing cooperation between UNOCI and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as a positive example of inter-mission cooperation to fill critical gaps. UNOCI has also demonstrated its ability to promote regional cooperation, supporting the governments of Côte d'Ivoire and others in the region—including Ghana and Liberia—in addressing subregional security issues along common borders. The 15 October report (S/2012/766) of the Group of Experts assisting the 1572 Sanctions Committee also highlighted increasing concerns of links between the military junta in Mali and pro-Gbagbo groups attempting to seize power in Côte d'Ivoire.

Human Rights-Related Developments

From 24 September to 12 October 2012, Doudou Diène, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire appointed by the Human Rights Council (HRC), undertook his third visit to the country. In addition to meetings with the government, he visited pro-Gbagbo detainees to assess their treatment. On 12 October, he deplored that no one had yet been arrested for the 20 July deadly attack on the Nahibly camp for internally displaced people in Duékoué. Diène is next due to report to the HRC in March 2013.

The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ivan Šimonović, visited the country for six days, warning on 1 December that failure to quickly bring perpetrators of serious human rights

crimes to justice could lead to recurrent violence in Côte d'Ivoire. He also stressed the urgency of completing investigations into the Nahibly incident.

Key Issues

An overarching issue is the security situation, in particular the recent series of attacks targeting national security forces.

A related issue is the impact of such attacks on already existing divisions throughout the country, impeding progress in both political dialogue and national reconciliation.

Security sector reform—comprising the DDR process—remains a key issue.

A broader issue is regional cooperation with the governments of neighbouring countries, in addition to inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL.

Options

One option for the Council is to issue a presidential or press statement that would contain some or all of the following elements:

- urging the authorities to pursue SSR and move ahead on the reconciliation process;
- encouraging UNOCI to play a more active role in supporting the political process, promoting progress in SSR and reconciliation; and
- highlighting the importance of considering the fragile security situation when planning for the scaling down of UNOCI.

Another option would be to take no action and instead wait until the expiry of UNOCI's mandate on 31 July.

Council Dynamics

There are no serious divisions among Council members on the issue of Côte d'Ivoire.

While Ouattara has enjoyed international credibility and support, some members are frustrated with the lack of progress and the slow pace of the SSR and reconciliation processes under his leadership.

France is the lead country on Côte d'Ivoire. •

UN DOCUMENTS ON CÔTE D'IVOIRE **Security Council Resolutions** S/RES/2062 (26 July 2012) renewed the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013. S/RES/2045 (26 April 2012) renewed the Côte d'Ivoire sanctions regime for 12 months, renewed the mandate of the Group of Experts and rolled over most of the measures in resolution 1980. S/RES/2008 (16 September 2011) extended the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2012 and called on UNOCI and UNMIL to coordinate strategies and operations in the Liberia-Côte d'Ivoire border regions. **Secretary-General's Reports** S/2012/506 (29 June 2012) was the thirtieth progress report on UNOCI. S/2012/186 (29 March 2012) was a special report on the reduction of UNOCI's military component. **Letters** S/2012/772 (16 October 2012) was from the Secretary-General to the Council recommending a deferment in the reduction of UNOCI's military strength. **Security Council Meeting Records** S/PV.6808 (18 July 2012) was Koenders' last briefing to the Council. **Security Council Press Statements** SC/10668 (8 June 2012) condemned the attack by unknown militia fighters which killed seven peacekeepers from Niger and eleven others near the Liberian border. **Sanctions Committee Documents** S/2012/766 (15 October 2012) was the midterm report of the Group of Experts. S/2012/196 (11 April 2012) was a report of the Group of Experts. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOCI** Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands) **UNOCI Size and Composition** *Strength as of 31 October 2012*: 415 international civilians, 767 local civilians, 9,398 troops, 189 military observers, 1,428 police and 189 UN volunteers **UNOCI Duration** 4 April 2004 to present

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council will likely meet twice to discuss Sudan/South Sudan issues in accordance with resolution 2046. At press time, it was unclear whether there would be an outcome from these deliberations.

Key Recent Developments

On 6 December, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed the Council in consultations on the situation in the disputed Abyei area and on other Sudan/South Sudan issues. Noting that the situation in Abyei was generally calm, he said that the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was creating buffer zones so that the nomadic Misseriya would not enter areas inhabited by the Ngok Dinka and engaging in discussions with leaders from both communities to mitigate the potential for violence. (The Misseriya are generally aligned with Sudan, while the Ngok Dinka are generally more supportive of South Sudan.) Mulet also noted that while the parties had not implemented the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) and the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ), UNISFA was training the monitors that Sudan and South Sudan had provided for the JBVMM in Assosa, Ethiopia. (UNISFA is mandated to provide operational support for the JBVMM.)

Regarding other Sudan/South Sudan issues, Mulet said that while it was encouraging that the parties were negotiating, he was unable to report any developments on the implementation of the 27 September agreements on security, oil wealth-sharing, cross-border trade and other issues. With respect to the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) is fighting the government in Khartoum—Mulet said that the situation had not improved. He underscored the need for direct negotiations between the government and the SPLM-N.

On 7 December, four Darfuri students at Al-Gazira University south of Khartoum were found dead in a canal. They had participated in a protest demanding tuition exemptions that security forces had broken up. Several days of protests ensued in Khartoum in response to the deaths, including one

on 10 December that reportedly included the participation of approximately 600 students at Al-Neelain University. The government alleges that the four students drowned.

Sudan and South Sudan, including respective Defence Ministers Abdel-Rahim Hussein and John Kong Nyuon, met in Khartoum in early December. The parties discussed plans to resume the production of oil in South Sudan, which reaches the outside world through pipelines in Sudan. However, after weeklong discussions, the parties decided that before the export of oil through Sudan could recommence, they needed to agree first on a plan to withdraw their military forces from their mutual border. Unable to resolve this security measure, the talks ended on 10 December.

The two parties reconvened in Addis Ababa on 16 December with Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), mediating. On 18 December, Mbeki reported that the parties had taken measures to establish border security mechanisms. At press time, it seemed that the parties had established a technical committee to implement the JBVMM and the SDBZ; however, it appeared that activation would occur only after President Omar-Al Bashir of Sudan and President Salva Kiir of South Sudan engaged in direct talks at a meeting, anticipated to take place during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2013.

Sudan and South Sudan have been engaged in bilateral meetings with officials from other governments to discuss their perspectives on the future of Abyei. On 12 December, in a meeting in Khartoum with Ambassador to Sudan Luo Xiaoguang (China), Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti reportedly said that Sudan opposes the AUHIP proposal of 21 September calling for a referendum to resolve the status of Abyei. It also seems that Karti indicated in the meeting that Sudan would not accept a decision imposed on it by an international body. (In its communiqué of 24 October, the AU Peace and Security Council [PSC] requested that the parties resolve the status of Abyei within six weeks, using the proposal for a referendum in Abyei as a basis for discussion. If the parties did not reach an agreement in

six weeks, the PSC indicated that it would “endorse the...proposal as final and binding, and...seek the endorsement by the UN Security Council of the same.” The six-week deadline for discussions on the proposal expired on 5 December without negotiations taking place between the parties on the issue.)

Officials from South Sudan met with Russian officials in Moscow in early December. “We would like the Russian government to play a positive role in current discussions”, said Luka Biong Deng, a member of the delegation, as quoted in the *Sudan Tribune* on 7 December. Russian Africa Envoy Mikhail Margelov has reportedly visited Khartoum several times recently to discuss the situation in Abyei.

The PSC adopted a communiqué on 14 December in which it, inter alia:

- noted its concern that Sudan and South Sudan have not implemented the 27 September agreements;
- reiterated acceptance of the 21 September AUHIP proposal to resolve the status of Abyei;
- noted that the 5 December deadline for the parties to negotiate the status of Abyei, using the PSC proposal as the basis for negotiations, had expired without negotiations taking place;
- referred the matter to its January 2013 summit meeting in Addis Ababa;
- encouraged the holding of a summit between the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan in “the shortest possible time” to resolve pending issues;
- reiterated that Sudan and the SPLM-N should engage in direct dialogue on political matters with the facilitation of AUHIP; and
- requested a final report from AUHIP on the unresolved issues between the parties that had been outlined in the 24 April communiqué and road map of the PSC.

On 18 December, the Council was briefed on Sudan/South Sudan issues by Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Haile Menkerios (via VTC) and Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet. Menkerios noted that there was a good chance that Presidents Bashir and Kiir would meet in the near future to discuss outstanding matters. He further noted that it appeared that the parties were

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Security Council Press Statement SC/10779 (28 September 2012) welcomed the 27 September agreements. Secretary-General's Report S/2012/877 (26 November 2012) was a report on Sudan/South Sudan relations. **USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES** PSC/PR/COMM (CCCXLIX) (14 December 2012) is the communiqué of the PSC that notes concern with the lack of implementation of the 27 September agreements. PSC/MIN/COMM/1 (CCCXXXIX) (24 October 2012) is the communiqué of the PSC responding to the AUHIP report. PSC/PR/2 (CCCXXXIX) (24 October 2012) is the report of the AUHIP. PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCXXIX) (3 August 2012) was a communiqué of the PSC on negotiations between the parties.

Sudan and South Sudan (con't)

making progress in their negotiations on the implementation of the JBVMM and SDBZ. It seems that Mulet spoke about the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Human Rights-Related Developments

During a press briefing in Geneva on 11 December, Rupert Colville, a spokesman for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), expressed concern about a number of attacks on human rights defenders in recent months in South Sudan and the killing of a journalist, Diing Chan Awol, on 5 December. Colville welcomed South Sudan's request for a thorough investigation of the murder and urged the government to send a strong signal of its readiness to protect the safety of journalists and human rights defenders. The High Commissioner's office was also deeply concerned about the killing of ten people in Wau, in Western Bahr al Ghazal State, when the South Sudan army allegedly fired at protestors on 8-9 December. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) released a press statement on 13 December saying that the mission is investigating the use of force and other reports of violence in order to establish the facts behind the Wau incident. UNMISS also called on the authorities to seek accountability if disproportionate force was used during demonstrations.

Key Issues

One key issue is how the Council can facilitate the implementation of the 27 September agreements between Sudan and South Sudan.

A related issue for the Council is what approach the Council can take in supporting the implementation of the JBVMM and the SDBZ.

Another key issue is how the Council decides to approach the impasse over the status of Abyei. (South Sudan has expressed its willingness to accept the 21 September AUHIP proposal calling for a referendum in

Abyei, but Sudan rejects this proposal.)

An ongoing important issue for the Council is how to address the fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLM-N and the related humanitarian crisis in these two states.

A related issue for the Council is the refugee crisis that has been precipitated by the violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. (More than 200,000 people from these regions have crossed the border into South Sudan and Ethiopia.)

Options

Options for the Council include:

- holding an informal interactive dialogue with AUHIP chair Thabo Mbeki to get his perspective of the status of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan;
- requesting a briefing from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the challenges facing refugees who have fled to South Sudan and Ethiopia from South Kordofan and Blue Nile states;
- adopting a statement that reiterates the need for the parties to continue to engage in constructive negotiations and encourages the convening of a meeting between Bashir and Kiir; or
- awaiting the PSC's response to the AUHIP's final report to the PSC, expected in January 2013, before making any significant decisions.

Council Dynamics

Council members remain concerned at the lack of progress made by the parties in implementing the 27 September agreements, although at press time it appeared that negotiations on the implementation of the JBVMM

and the SDBZ had made some progress.

One key area of disagreement appears to be how to approach the final status of Abyei. It seems some members would be willing to endorse a PSC decision about a referendum in Abyei, if the PSC were to follow through on its stated intention in its 24 October communiqué to ask the Council to do so. However, other members appear to believe that such an endorsement would be tantamount to imposing a decision on the parties. At least one Council member also seems to hold the perspective that it is legally untenable for the Council to endorse a decision made by a regional organisation regarding international borders.

There is a widespread sense in the Council about the urgency for hostilities between Sudan and the SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states to cease and for the parties to engage in direct political negotiations. Although all members are concerned with the humanitarian crisis in these two areas, differences of opinion on the conflict nonetheless persist. Some members are highly critical of Khartoum for its heavy-handed military campaign and for not allowing humanitarian access to civilians in these two areas. (Media outlets and non-governmental organisations have referred to indiscriminate aerial bombardment, looting, rape and other human rights violations on the part of Sudan.) Other Council members appear to be less critical of Khartoum for its actions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, noting that Sudan is a sovereign country that must defend itself from a rebel group that has vowed to overthrow the regime.

The US is the lead country on Sudan/South Sudan issues. •

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council will consider the Secretary-General's quarterly report on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). At press time, no outcome was expected.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July 2013.

Key Recent Developments

On 13 December, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda briefed the Council on her work in Darfur. She argued that Sudan's "actions on the ground...show an ongoing commitment to crimes against civilians as a solution to the government's problems in Darfur." She said that while the ICC had carried out its mandate in Darfur, the Council had

exhibited "fragmentation and indecision", stating that the victims of crimes in Darfur were still waiting for "decisive, concrete and tangible actions" by the Council. Bensouda also indicated that given continuing allegations of crimes committed in the region—including attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers and civilians and efforts to prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance—she would

Sudan/Darfur (con't)

consider opening new investigations and producing additional arrest warrant applications.

Ambassador Daffa-All Elhag Ali Osman (Sudan) also addressed the Council and claimed that Bensouda made unsubstantiated allegations, falsely accusing Sudan of extensive gender-based violence and mistaking intertribal conflict for attacks by militias. He said that since the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), the situation in Darfur has improved and is stable and secure in most areas. (The DDPD is a peace agreement signed by Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement [LJM] in Doha in July 2011 focusing on seven areas: human rights; power-sharing; wealth-sharing; justice and reconciliation; compensation of refugees and internally displaced persons; ceasefire and security arrangements; and internal dialogue and consultation.)

On 5 December, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) attacked militants that it suspected were preparing to launch rockets at El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. Sudan said that two combatants from the Sudan Revolutionary Front, an umbrella group of rebel movements vowing to overthrow the government, were killed in the attack. However, Eltigani Seisi, head of the LJM, said that the SAF attack had been perpetrated against LJM forces, which were not attacking El Fasher.

Seisi expressed concern about comments made by Al-Sawarmi Khaled, a spokesman for the SAF, who alleged that if LJM forces were in the area, they must have been targeting El Fasher. Seisi said that the allegation “undermines trust and weakens the spirit to implement the Doha Document.” He added that the LJM had asked the government to cease its false portrayal of the incident and that it had notified UNAMID about it.

In Addis Ababa, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a communiqué on Darfur at its 348th meeting on 13 December. The communiqué:

- expressed grave concern at the worsening security environment in some areas of Darfur and urgently called on the government and armed groups to end their military operations;
- strongly condemned attacks on UNAMID

peacekeepers;

- expressed serious concern regarding restrictions placed on UNAMID’s movements;
- commended the government and the LJM for efforts to implement the DDPD while urging them to overcome their differences;
- welcomed the 21 October agreement between Sudan and an offshoot of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the so-called JEM-Military Council, to cease hostilities against one another;
- expressed serious concern with delays in issuing visas to UNAMID personnel on the part of the government; and
- requested quarterly reports from the AU Commission on the situation in Darfur.

On 14 December, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon wrote a letter to the Council indicating that he and Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, president of the AU Commission, intended to appoint Mohamed Ibn Chambas of Ghana as the new AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim. (Chambas previously served as the Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States). The appointment was officially announced on 20 December.

According to the World Health Organisation and the Ministry of Health of Sudan, 788 people contracted yellow fever and 166 people died from the disease in Darfur from 2 September to 9 December. According to OCHA, 2.2 million vaccinations were performed in Darfur between 21 November and 7 December.

Human Rights-Related Developments

During a press briefing in Geneva on 11 December, Rupert Colville, a spokesman for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concern about recent violent clashes between students and police in Khartoum. Four Darfuri students had been found dead on 7 December after they had taken part in a protest about plans to repeal a tuition fee exemption for Darfuri students. Colville stressed the need for swift investigations into the circumstances surrounding the murders of the students and the importance of bringing the perpetrators to justice.

Key Issues

An ongoing key issue is the fact that the LJM is the only major rebel group in Darfur to

sign the DDPD and accede to the related peace process.

A related key issue is whether tensions between the government and the LJM sparked by the 5 December incident outside El Fasher can be allayed.

Another key and related issue is whether the willingness of a branch of the JEM to negotiate with Sudan can generate momentum for the peace process and encourage the participation of other rebel groups.

An important issue is the ongoing attacks on UNAMID personnel and how security can be improved. A related issue is how restrictions on UNAMID’s movements inhibit the mission’s effectiveness.

Another key issue is the upsurge in violence in North Darfur in recent months, particularly related to criminal activities and fighting between the SAF and rebel groups. (According to OCHA, the resulting insecurity has limited the activities of humanitarian organisations in this region.)

Another key issue is how a lack of funding, including the fact that Sudan has not contributed the \$200 million it committed to the Darfur Regional Authority, has affected implementation of the DDPD.

Options

The Council may choose to consider the report without taking action at the present time.

Another option would be to invite the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to brief on the situation in Darfur.

The Council may also consider adopting a resolution that:

- expresses concern with the recent escalation in violence in North Darfur;
- welcomes the decision of the JEM-Military Council to participate in peace talks with the government;
- imposes sanctions on rebel groups that refuse to participate in the peace process;
- demands that the government strengthen efforts to investigate alleged atrocities and to combat impunity in Darfur; and
- demands that the government expedite the issuance of pending visas for UNAMID personnel.

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Secretary-General’s Report S/2012/771 (16 October 2012) was the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6887 (13 December 2012) was the latest briefing on the ICC’s work in Sudan. Security Council Letters S/2012/943 (14 December 2012) and S/2012/944 (18 December 2012) was an exchange of letters regarding the appointment of Mohamed Ibn Chambas as the new AU-UN Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim. **USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES** PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCXLVIII) (13 December 2012) was a communiqué of the PSC on Darfur.

Sudan/Darfur (con't)

Council Dynamics

There are ongoing concerns among several Council members about reports of violence against civilians in Darfur, including indiscriminate aerial bombardment, gender-based violence, murder and other serious human rights violations. (Allegations of violence against civilians have been made against both government and non-government forces.)

Some Council members, notably the UK and the US, have expressed disappointment with the lack of progress in implementing the DDPD, pointing to the difficult security situation, weak rule of law and the lack of funding provided for implementation. (A donor conference on Darfur is planned for early

2013 in Doha, although a precise date has not been determined.)

Several Council members also remain alarmed by the lack of access for humanitarian workers and UNAMID peacekeepers, as well as the dangerous environment in which they operate. As was noted in the 13 December Council briefing, 43 UNAMID peacekeepers have been killed since the mission became operational in December 2007.

While some members are encouraged that the Interim Military Council of the JEM has decided to pursue peace talks with the government, several members remain alarmed that there are still many rebel movements that persist in fighting the regime. A recent report in *The Sudan Tribune* has indicated that the

US is playing an active role in engaging with rebel leaders to try to persuade them to join the peace process.

Some Council members are supportive of imposing sanctions on the rebel groups that continue to fight the government. For example, in the 13 December briefing, Pakistan argued that sanctions should be imposed on armed groups in Darfur that hinder the peace process and that violate international humanitarian and human rights law, while India likewise said that the Council “should consider targeted measures” against the rebel groups.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on Darfur. •

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is likely to be briefed by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), on the latest Secretary-General's report on BINUCA and most recent developments following the uprising by the Seleka rebel coalition. The briefing may be followed by consultations.

The current mandate of BINUCA expires on 31 January 2013. The Council is likely to adopt a resolution extending the mandate for a year.

Key Recent Developments

A number of security incidents have occurred over recent weeks in northern Central African Republic (CAR), reflecting increasing discontent among rebel groups over the lack of implementation of the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2007 peace agreement signed with the government. On 10 December and over subsequent days,

the Seleka rebel alliance—formed by factions of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention—stepped up attacks and several towns—including the northern city of Ndele—are believed to be under the control of the rebels. Media reports indicated that, at the request of President François Bozizé, 2,000 troops from Chad went into the CAR on 18 December to help the army fight the rebels.

On 20 December, the Seleka rebel alliance announced that the advance of its troops had been unilaterally halted after Chadian authorities pledged not to attack rebel positions. In the same statement, the alliance said it was open to peace talks but would remain in the territory it has secured. This follows Council members' call for cessation of hostilities in a press statement issued following a briefing in consultations by the Department of Political Affairs on 19 December (SC/10867).

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continues to threaten the process of consolidating

peace, security and stability in the CAR. It is believed that most senior LRA commanders continue to operate out of eastern CAR, as well as the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave on the border of Sudan and South Sudan.

The Council adopted a presidential statement on 29 June (S/PRST/2012/18), welcoming a UN regional strategy (S/2012/481) to address the threat and impact of the LRA on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Uganda and the CAR. During a Council briefing on 18 December, the head of the UN Office Regional Office for Central Africa announced plans to organise a resource mobilisation forum early next year with the aim of raising funds for the most critical areas of the strategy.

LRA-affected countries have been contributing troops to a Regional Task Force, the military component of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA, since its launch on 24 March to fulfil its authorised strength of 5,000 troops. On 12 September, 360 soldiers from the *Forces*

UN DOCUMENTS ON CAR [Security Council Resolution S/RES/2031](#) (21 December 2011) extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2013. [Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/28](#) (19 December 2012) was on the LRA and requested an implementation plan for the UN Regional Strategy by 28 February 2013. [S/PRST/2012/18](#) (29 June 2012) condemned LRA attacks and welcomed the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA. [Secretary-General's Reports S/2012/923](#) (13 December 2012) was on the activities of UNOCA and on LRA-affected areas. [S/2012/374](#) (29 May 2012) was a report on the situation in the CAR and on the activities of BINUCA. [S/2012/365](#) (25 May 2012) was a report on the situation of children and armed conflict in areas affected by the LRA. [Letter S/2012/481](#) (25 June 2012) contained the UN regional strategy to address LRA activities. [Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6895](#) (19 December 2012) was a briefing on UNOCA and the LRA. [S/PV.6780](#) (6 June 2012) was a briefing on the CAR and on BINUCA. [Security Council Press Statements SC/10867](#) (19 December 2012) was on the attacks conducted by armed groups over the last few days in the country's northeast. [SC/10665](#) (6 June 2012) followed Vogt's briefing to the Council. [SC/10335](#) (21 July 2011) was on efforts to address the LRA issue. **USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES** [PSC/PR/2.\(CCCXLV\)](#) (6 December 2012) was an AU report on the CAR. [PSC/PR/COMM\(CCCXLV\)](#) (6 December 2012) was a communique from a meeting of the AU on the CAR. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** [Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUCA Margaret Vogt \(Nigeria\)](#). [BINUCA Size and Composition Strength as of 30 September 2012](#): 64 international civilians, 85 local civilians, two military advisers, two police and five UN volunteers. [BINUCA Duration](#) 1 January 2010 to present.

Central African Republic (con't)

Armées Centrafricaines were deployed to operate in the southeast of the country, as part of a total of 500 soldiers to be deployed from the CAR. South Sudan and Uganda have also contributed soldiers to the Task Force, as will the DRC.

Humanitarian issues remain a concern in the CAR, with displacement a top priority.

Recent progress in the political situation in the CAR includes the consensus that was reached between the government, the opposition and civil society in September on reforming the electoral code and setting up an independent national electoral authority, with the bill establishing the latter expected to be submitted for adoption at the next session of the National Assembly. However, tensions remain between the government and members of the opposition with the incumbent National Convergence Kwa Na Kwa party considering a constitutional reform to lift presidential term limits in preparation for the 2016 elections.

There was some progress in reaching agreement in 2012 on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of armed rebel groups in the CAR. Despite this progress, however, concerns remain regarding the slow pace of implementing DDR. On 17 May, the rebel People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy was dissolved with almost 6,500 combatants progressively demobilised and disarmed while the Chadian People's Front for Recovery started repatriating to Chad after their chief, Baba Laddé, surrendered on 3 September.

Since January, the Economic Community of Central African States' Peace Consolidation Mission in the CAR (MICOPAX) has

been preparing for its gradual withdrawal scheduled to be completed by 31 December 2013. Concerns remain about the handover process and whether the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* will have the necessary operational capacity and resources to continue MICO-PAX's work upon the conclusion of the disengagement process.

The Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configuration for the CAR last met informally on 21 March, shortly before Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium) resigned as chair of the configuration on 1 June. Since then, consultations have been underway to identify a new chair.

The Secretary-General appointed Kaarina Immonen (Finland) as his Deputy Special Representative for the CAR on 11 December.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 10 December, Vogt welcomed the 6 December meeting that the AU Peace and Security Council held on the CAR, taking note of its communiqué hinting at sanctions against groups that are hindering efforts to restore security and are involved in violations of international humanitarian law.

Two human rights-related documents were issued during a 5-12 December visit to CAR by Zainab Hawa Bangura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The first, an agreement signed by Bangura and the government, included commitments to fight impunity for crimes of sexual violence, to protect vulnerable persons from sexual violence and to provide greater support to survivors. The second was a joint communiqué of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Steering Committee (made up of representatives of the government, armed groups, the UN, and other members of the international community) and includes the requirement that political-military

groups immediately release vulnerable individuals such as women and children.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is its potential role in addressing the latest challenge to state authority arising from the Seleka rebellion in the north.

Another key issue is encouraging the implementation of the UN regional strategy and AU initiative to address the threat posed by the LRA to the region.

An ongoing issue for the Council is the volatile security situation in CAR, and in this context, supporting the DDR process currently underway.

Another security-related issue is MICO-PAX's disengagement process and capacity-building of the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines*.

Options

One option for the Council is to simply receive the briefing and adopt a resolution renewing BINUCA's mandate for another year.

A further option is for the Council to use the opportunity of the mandate renewal to also highlight its concerns about the security situation in the CAR and call on all parties to abide by the 2007 and 2008 peace agreements.

Council Dynamics

Council members are in general agreement on the issue of the CAR and united in their concern for the precarious security situation and continuing armed attacks throughout the country. The recent spike in rebel activity may prompt Council members to follow the situation in the CAR more closely.

France is the lead country on the CAR. •

Burundi

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council expects a briefing on Burundi by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon). A Secretary-General's report with data, assessments and observations to guide the mission's eventual evolution into a country team is expected mid-month. The

chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), is also expected to brief. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

No Council action is expected in January but the briefing will likely help members start preparing for BNUB's mandate renewal before it expires on 15 February 2013.

Key Recent Developments

The Council last discussed Burundi on 5 July, following a briefing by Karin Landgren (Sweden), the outgoing Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of BNUB and by Seger. On 7 June, the Secretary-General appointed Onanga-Anyanga.

UN DOCUMENTS ON BURUNDI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2027 (20 December 2011) renewed BNUB's mandate until 15 February 2013. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6799 (5 July 2012) was the briefing by Landgren. Secretary-General's Letter S/2012/310 (10 May 2012) contained the benchmarks for the future evolution of BNUB.

Burundi (con't)

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

On 21 November, the PBC's Working Group on Lessons Learned discussed the relationship between the PBC and the Security Council with particular focus on the transition of UN missions in PBC-agenda countries. Some states stressed that the PBC could advise the Council on key peacebuilding goals and the level of commitment to meet these goals during a mission's downsizing while also contributing to transition planning and benchmarking.

Seger is scheduled to visit Burundi in January to assess what role the PBC should play in 2013, in particular if BNUB is downscaled.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Burundi's human rights record will be scrutinised on 24 January under the Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council. Burundi submitted its national report on 21 November 2012.

Key Issues

A key immediate issue is assessing whether Burundi has achieved further progress and how it should be reflected in BNUB's mandate.

A longer-term issue will be whether the country is approaching a stage when the mission should transition into a UN country team.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in relation to Burundi and possible modifications to BNUB.

Council Dynamics

Council members see the current BNUB arrangements as a transition phase. During the last mandate renewal in December 2011, some members emphasised the importance of taking into account the position of the government and the need for benchmarks for BNUB's eventual withdrawal. Some will also want to develop further BNUB's cooperation with the PBC (which seems to have improved in the last few months) on the grounds that the PBC should be involved in the evaluation process.

The lead country on Burundi is France. •

Libya

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council will likely be briefed on the situation in Libya via videoconference by Tarek Mitri (Lebanon), Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), followed by consultations.

The briefing is expected to serve as an opportunity to discuss Libya and UNSMIL in the lead-up to the likely renewal of the mission before its mandate expires on 12 March 2013.

No Council action is expected in January.

Key Recent Developments

As highlighted by Mitri during his last Council briefing on 8 November, there have been a number of welcome developments on the political front in Libya over the past six months, including the successful elections on 7 July and the handover of the National Transitional Council (NTC) to the democratically elected General National Congress (GNC). Since then, Ali Zeidan was elected prime minister, and the formation of the new government was completed on 31 October.

The next key milestone for Libya will be the drafting of its constitution, which most agree must be an inclusive process that should move ahead swiftly. Current discussions on

the composition of the Constitutional Commission are focused on how to select its sixty members. The current proposal draws twenty members each from three provinces, although no agreement has yet been reached on whether to elect or appoint members on a regional basis.

Security remains a key issue in Libya. A number of armed rebel groups continue to operate throughout the country, as demonstrated by attacks during the past months around Tripoli and Benghazi and in Bani Walid, the south and the east. A related issue is the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups, which continues to pose challenges.

While there has been progress in terms of long-term defence-sector reform, challenges remain in addressing pressing security issues. There is a need for the adoption of interim security measures while the new national defence and police forces are being built. This includes the development of an arms control programme to address concerns about border security and arms being trafficked from Libya to fuel other crises in the region such as those in the Sahel and Syria.

Three months after the 11 September attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, US officials investigating the attack have suggested

that Libya is reluctant to move against Islamist extremist suspects who belong to militia groups. A decision has not yet been made on whether to try suspects connected with the attack in Libyan or American courts.

The more than 7,000 conflict-related detainees who are currently being held in Libya remains a difficult issue. When Mitri last briefed the Council, he urged the government to accelerate the screening of detainees as well as to investigate cases of detention mistreatment and torture. To date, little progress has been made in this critical area of judicial reform.

On 7 December, ICC judges requested information from Libya regarding the status of investigations in the case of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi—an ICC indictee, currently being held in Zintan. The ICC has given Libya until 23 January 2013 to “provide concrete, tangible and pertinent evidence...to demonstrate to this Chamber that proper investigations are currently ongoing and proper and concrete preparations for the trial are ongoing.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

A two-day conference on truth-seeking and reconciliation in Libya organised by the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Committee of the GNC in partnership with UNSMIL and UNDP was held in Tripoli on 12 and

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2040 (12 March 2012) extended the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts assisting the Sanctions Committee by 12 months. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and established a Sanctions Committee for the arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze imposed by the resolution. Secretary-General's Report S/2012/675 (30 August 2012) was a report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL. Letters S/2012/700 (11 September 2012) and S/2012/699 (10 September 2012) was an exchange of letters on the appointment of Mitri as the new Special Representative and head of UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6857 (8 November 2012) was a briefing by Special Representative Tarek Mitri. S/PV.6855 (7 November 2012) was the latest briefing by the ICC on its work in Libya. Security Council Press Statements SC/10761 (12 September 2012) condemned the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL Tarek Mitri (Lebanon). UNSMIL Size and Composition Strength as of 30 September 2012: 136 international civilians; 23 local civilians; one police. UNSMIL Duration 16 September 2011 to present.

Libya (con't)

13 December. Addressing the conference, Mitrì said that seeking truth and reconciliation can restrain revenge and collective punishment tendencies but that this should not be perceived as a call for amnesty for past crimes. He stressed that truth and reconciliation alone are not enough and that for them to be mutually reinforcing and effective, justice must be achieved.

Key Issues

An overarching issue for the Council continues to be the precarious security situation in Libya, particularly the continued attacks by armed rebel groups throughout the country, as well as security-sector reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.

A related issue connected to border security is the countering of arms movements in and out of Libya. This flow of arms has been linked to crises in the Sahel and Syria.

Strengthening the justice system to ensure the transfer of detainees to state custody and compliance with international standards is another pressing issue.

A further issue for Council members is

what UNSMIL's supporting technical role will be in relation to the GNC, the Constitutional Commission and the truth and reconciliation process.

Another significant issue is how to respond if the ICC makes a ruling on jurisdiction that does not please Libya.

Options

One option for the Council is to issue a press or presidential statement that would contain some or all of the following elements:

- welcoming political progress made;
- urging Libya to ensure inclusivity, to reach agreement on the composition of the Constitutional Commission and to move swiftly on the drafting process;
- urging the government to accelerate the screening of detainees; and
- calling on the government to provide the ICC with sufficient information on the status of investigations in the case against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi.

Taking no action at this moment

and instead waiting until the renewal of UNSMIL's mandate on 12 March, is another option.

Council Dynamics

Council members are generally in agreement that the principal elements of UNSMIL's work as outlined in resolution 2040 remain relevant.

Regarding the ICC, while Council members would prefer that Qaddafi as well as a second ICC indictee, Abdullah al-Senussi, be tried at the ICC, some members have expressed satisfaction about the manner in which Libya has respected the requirements of the ICC in their insistence in trying them domestically.

Some Council members have generally applauded the UN's efforts during 2011 and 2012, pointing to the useful role UNSMIL has played in serving as a coordination point for channelling donors' goodwill and assistance. Some members express their hope that UNSMIL will continue its work in this regard.

The UK is the lead country on Libya. •

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East following a briefing from Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry. The discussion will likely focus on the stalled peace process, the consequences of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and the General Assembly resolution upgrading the status of Palestine at the UN from permanent observer to non-member observer state.

Key Recent Developments

In the most serious escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas since December 2008, Israel launched *Operation Pillar of Defence* in the Gaza Strip on 14 November in response to intensified rocket attacks from Hamas that

began on 9 November. That evening, the Council held emergency consultations and a private meeting on Gaza during which Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council, followed by statements from all Council members, Israel and Palestine. In accordance with rule 55 of its rules of procedure, a communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General following the meeting (S/PV.6863). (In current Council practice, this format is almost exclusively used for meetings with troop contributors.)

Council members met in consultations on Gaza on 19-20 November. On 21 November, following an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire agreement, Council members issued a press statement (SC/10829) welcoming the ceasefire, calling on the international community

to contribute to improving the living conditions in the Gaza Strip, deploring the loss of civilian life and reiterating the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace.

On 27 November, the Council received its regular monthly briefing on the Middle East from Serry (S/PV.6871). Noting both the hostilities in Gaza and the upcoming vote in the General Assembly, Serry asserted that "the status quo is unsustainable and...it is all the more vital to identify a way ahead to urgently put the peace process back on track."

On 29 November the General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/67/19) conferring on Palestine non-member observer state status in the UN. Nine Council members voted in favour of the resolution (Azerbaijan, China, France, India, Morocco, Pakistan,

UN DOCUMENTS ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE **Security Council Resolutions** S/RES/1860 (8 January 2009) called for an immediate ceasefire leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the sustained reopening of the crossing points. S/RES/1850 (16 December 2008) supported the Annapolis peace process and its commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations. S/RES/1515 (19 November 2003) stated the necessity for a two-state solution. **Security Council Letters** S/2012/899 (3 December 2012) was from Palestine reiterating that settlement activity would be a breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute. S/2012/840 (14 November 2012) was from Egypt requesting a meeting of the Security Council on the violence in Gaza. S/2012/839 (14 November 2012) was from Palestine informing the Council of Israeli military action in Gaza. **Security Council Meeting Records** S/PV.6894 (19 December 2012) was the regular monthly briefing on the Middle East by Under-Secretary-General Feltman. S/PV.6871 (27 November 2012) was the regular monthly briefing on the Middle East by Special Coordinator Serry. S/PV.6863 (14 November 2012) was the communiqué following the private meeting of the Security Council on hostilities in Gaza. S/PV.6847 (15 October 2012) was the last quarterly debate on the Middle East. **Security Council Press Statement** SC/10829 (21 November 2012) welcomed the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire and called on the international community to contribute to improving the living conditions of those in the Gaza Strip. **General Assembly Documents** A/RES/67/19 (29 November 2012) conferred non-member observer state status in the UN on Palestine. **Other** S/2011/24 (18 February 2011) was the draft resolution on settlements vetoed by the US.

Israel/Palestine (con't)

Portugal, Russia and South Africa), five abstained (Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, Togo and the UK) and one voted in opposition (the US).

In response, Israel announced on 30 November that it had accelerated planning for the construction of more than 3,000 new housing units in an area east of Jerusalem known as E-1, potentially bisecting the West Bank and rendering a contiguous Palestinian state impossible. On 3 December, several European nations expressed their displeasure over the announcement, while the US urged Israel to reconsider these unilateral decisions, exercise restraint, and viewed the actions as counterproductive to resuming direct negotiations to achieve a two-state solution.

On 2 December, Israel announced that it would withhold up to 350 million shekels (more than \$100 million) in tax revenue from the Palestinian Authority, ostensibly to repay part of the debt owed to a utility company for power supplied to the West Bank. On 9 December, Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Doha pledged to make up the \$100 million shortfall.

On 3 December, in a letter to the President of the Council (S/2012/899), Palestine reiterated that the announced settlement activity would be a breach of both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the ICC, asserting that Israel “must be held accountable for all of the war crimes it is committing against the Palestinian people.”

On 19 December, the Council received its regular monthly briefing on the Middle East from Feltman, who noted that recent events “should remind us...how much the momentum for the two state solution has slipped.” Several states made remarks to the press following subsequent consultations. The UK read a statement on behalf of the EU members on the Council (France, Germany, Portugal and the UK) expressing strong opposition to the planned expansion of the settlements, in particular in the E-1 area, and reiterating that “responsibility lies...with the Security Council...to provide urgently for a credible framework for the resumption of direct talks.” The Non-Aligned Movement, in a statement read by India, also called “for the Council to uphold its Charter responsibility...with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Russia likewise expressed concern over the settlement activity, and argued that it was necessary “to convene

without further delay a ministerial meeting of the Quartet to discuss seriously the situation.” (The Quartet comprises the UN, the EU, Russia and the US.) South Africa, speaking on behalf of the IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South Africa), remarked that “the Security Council has an essential irreplaceable role to play” in the Middle East peace process, including calling for a complete halt to settlement activities, calling for the implementation of its own resolutions, and receiving regular reports from the Quartet on its progress.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In November, the International Fact-Finding Mission on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory – established by the 22 March resolution of the Human Rights Council (HRC) visited Amman – to collect information from a wide range of stakeholders. The mission, which has not been granted access to the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel, will be reporting to the HRC in March.

In response to the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in which more than 100 civilians died, the Coordination Committee of UN human rights special procedures condemned on 23 November all attacks against civilians and called for prompt, impartial and thorough investigations into allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Israel will be examined on 29 January under the Universal Periodic Review process of the HRC.

Key Issues

The key issue remains the lack of progress in the Israel/Palestine peace process and whether or not the Security Council can positively impact that process.

The humanitarian and security situations in Gaza also remain a concern in light of the renewed hostilities.

Underlying Problems

Recent events have largely hardened the positions on both sides of the conflict; Israel considers the upgraded status attained by Palestine at the UN through the General Assembly to be a unilateral action that is counter-productive to the return to direct negotiations, while the Palestinian Authority would like to see an end to settlement activity as a precondition for direct negotiations.

The lack of any progress on reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas further impedes the possibility of reaching a solution even if negotiations were to resume. Israel considers Hamas a terrorist organisation and so will not negotiate with any

Palestinian government that includes it.

The renewed hostilities refocused attention on the lack of substantial progress in easing the Israeli blockade of Gaza. At the end of November, Hamas and Israel began indirect talks in Cairo on the subject of the blockade, under the terms of the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire of 21 November; however, those talks have no timetable.

Options

Council options in January appear extremely limited given the lack of progress on the political track. It is most likely that the open debate will again feature member states reiterating their known positions on the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Should the Council want to take a more active role in the Middle East peace process in 2013, one option may be to adopt a resolution that would do one or more of the following:

- reaffirm past Council decisions that Israeli settlements in the occupied territory are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to peace;
- call on both parties to create the conditions necessary to promote the peace process;
- outline parameters for renewed negotiations between the parties; or
- call on the Quartet to report back to the Council (an unlikely option).

The Council’s last substantive outcome specifically addressing the Middle East peace process was resolution 1850 adopted on 16 December 2008.

Council Dynamics

The most recent effort to adopt a resolution on Israel/Palestine took place on 18 February 2011, when a draft resolution (S/2011/24) condemning Israeli settlement activity was vetoed by the US. Major divisions in the Council regarding the Middle East peace process remain and were evident in the voting record on the General Assembly resolution upgrading the status of Palestine at the UN. With the composition of the Council changing on 1 January, the dynamic is expected to shift slightly in favour of the US position. (Of the five exiting members two abstained on the resolution and three voted in favour, while three of the five incoming countries abstained and two voted in favour.)

Most Council members are of the view that any progress towards negotiations is unlikely prior to the 22 January parliamentary elections in Israel. •

Yemen

Expected Council Action

In January, Council members will likely be briefed by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser Jamal Benomar (Morocco) on the situation in Yemen.

A presidential or press statement is a possible outcome.

Key Recent Developments

On 4 December, Benomar briefed the Council highlighting the breakthrough agreement on the allocation of seats for the forthcoming National Dialogue Conference. The conference, which will feed into the drafting of a new constitution, is expected to start in early 2013 and conclude in the lead up to general elections scheduled for February 2014.

Challenges to the political process remain. There is continued mistrust between the two principal political blocs that make up the Government of National Unity. Furthermore, resentment among southerners over unmet demands related to unresolved issues since unification has deepened divisions and prompted further demands of local autonomy.

On 19 December, President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi issued key decrees related to

the structure and centralisation of the armed forces. The decrees included the disbanding of the Republican Guard led by Brig. Gen. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh—son of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh—as well as the appointment of a new Chief of Staff of the Central Security Forces replacing Brig. Gen. Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, a nephew of the former president.

The Secretary-General visited Sana'a on 19 November to mark the first anniversary of the Yemen Peace and Transition Agreement. Ban highlighted the need for a Yemen-led dialogue, as part of the path towards an inclusive transition to democracy.

Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui also visited Yemen in late November, leading to a commitment by the government to end recruitment and use of children by the armed forces.

A Council visiting mission to Yemen originally scheduled for October 2012 was postponed to early 2013.

Key Issues

A key issue is the National Dialogue Conference, including the constitution-drafting process, as well as the work of the electoral

commission, in preparation for the 2014 elections.

Options

One option is for the Council to issue a presidential statement, welcoming progress and urging the start of the National Dialogue Conference.

Another option to signal support for the transition would be to schedule the previously postponed Council visiting mission around the same period as the start of the National Dialogue. This may also be timely in light of the next Friends of Yemen meeting anticipated for March. (Saudi Arabia, the UK and Yemen jointly chair the Friends of Yemen, which also includes key Persian Gulf countries, the G8 and intergovernmental organisations.)

Council Dynamics

Council members are united in their support for President Hadi and the transition process and are firm in their emphasis of the importance of a timely start to the National Dialogue.

The UK is the lead country on Yemen. •

Cyprus

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months before its mandate expires on 31 January.

The Special Representative and head of UNFICYP, Lisa M. Buitenheim (US), is expected to brief Council members in consultations. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, Alexander Downer (Australia), who assists the parties in their negotiations, may possibly brief as well.

Resolution 2058 of 19 July 2012 requested the Secretary-General to report by 10 January on developments in Cyprus.

Key Recent Developments

Since Buitenheim and Downer briefed Council members in consultations on 10 July, few significant developments related to the

resolution of the Cyprus problem have taken place. During the consultations, summarised in the monthly assessment by the President of the Council (S/2012/629), Downer confirmed via videoconference that no agreement had been reached between the two parties on the way forward in the negotiating process. (In April 2012, Downer provided a private report to the Secretary-General recommending that a multilateral conference on Cyprus should not be called due to insufficient progress in the negotiations. Downer was later quoted as saying that “the risk of failure and of total collapse was way too high, and it would have been reckless of us to have called a multilateral conference.”)

Two key factors are cited as having contributed to the lack of high-level progress towards a political settlement.

The first relates to the Republic of Cyprus

assuming the rotating EU presidency on 1 July 2012 for six months. The UN had hoped to convene a multilateral conference before the presidency began, ideally finalising the international elements of a settlement. But previous high-level talks were not productive in resolving the key domestic issues, such as the election of the executive and property. In his statement at the general debate of the General Assembly on 25 September, President Demetris Christofias (Cyprus) said that in response to the assumption of the EU presidency, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had “abandoned the negotiations”. (In his comments on 10 July, Downer said that the Turkish Cypriots had expressed the view that there would be no guarantee that dialogue would continue while Cyprus presided over the EU.) Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his statement during the general debate on 28 September,

Cyprus (con't)

said that the round of talks that began in 2008 on the Cyprus problem was “stuck with no end in sight, due to Greek Cypriots’ intransigence and lack of political will.” (Turkey is the only country that recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and is seen as having close links with the Turkish Cypriot leadership.)

The second important factor is that Cyprus is scheduled to hold presidential elections on 17 February and President Christofias is not standing for re-election. The impending change in the Greek Cypriots’ leadership—combined with Cyprus’s EU presidency—has essentially resulted in the abandonment of prospects for high-level negotiations before February. In a visit to Cyprus in November 2012, Downer emphasised that while his good-offices team looks forward to working with the next Greek Cypriot leader, whoever that is, the presidential election is solely a matter for the Cypriots and not the international community.

During his November visit, where he met with both leaders, Downer clarified that his team had kept “notes and records” throughout the electoral process and as the presidential elections drew nearer that work would be consolidated. These comments were in reference to suggestions that Downer would prepare a paper or report that would be presented to both leaders after the election cataloguing the convergences made in negotiations in recent years.

With President Christofias not running for re-election, there will be added interest in the positions of the three main candidates on the “Cyprus problem.” Stavros Malas is from the incumbent Progressive Party of Working People, while the candidate leading in the polls is Nicos Anastasiades, leader of Democratic Rally, and Giorgos Lillikas is an independent. Of note, Anastasiades was a supporter of the “Annan Plan” in 2004, which proposed—ultimately unsuccessfully—the establishment of a federated United Cyprus Republic comprising two component states.

Another issue that Downer has focused on recently is revitalising the technical committees that were established in 2008 to help find solutions to everyday problems that people on the island face because of its divisions. (One such example was reaching agreement to allow ambulances to cross the dividing

line in emergency cases.) While there is some optimism about the work that these technical committees can do, it seems that there has been little meaningful progress since high-level talks stalled in April 2012.

Underlying Problems

One underlying problem is that the leaders from the two sides hold the other responsible for the lack of progress in the high-level negotiations. Blame is attributed to both sides for not being prepared to make the bold concessions necessary to break the present impasse.

Another apparent problem, related to the differing historical perspectives, is a propensity for looking to the past, including the failed Annan Plan in 2004, as well as the perceived relative flexibility of the other’s earlier leaders, rather than focusing on pragmatic solutions in the present.

Finally, any settlement reached between the two sides is likely to be voted on by the two communities in referenda, as in 2004. This makes the success of any proposed settlement unpredictable.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether it should be actively encouraging a political settlement of the Cyprus problem in its resolutions or whether the talks are ultimately best served by simply renewing UNFICYP’s mandate.

A related issue, which arose prominently in July 2012 when the Council last considered UNFICYP, was whether—and how—to refer to a potential review of the long-standing peacekeeping mission.

A further important issue that relates to the political messages inferred from Council resolutions is whether there should be any reference to the lack of tangible progress since the last resolution.

Options

One likely option for the Council in January, particularly with the election of the new Greek Cypriot president soon thereafter, is simply to adopt a resolution rolling over UNFICYP’s mandate for a further six months.

Another, less likely, option would be for the Council to encourage both sides to make greater headway towards a durable settlement in 2013. Such a resolution could

emphasise the important economic benefits for all Cypriots that a comprehensive settlement would allow for or specify other mutually beneficial incentives.

Council Dynamics

During the negotiations leading up to the adoption of resolution 2058, interesting dynamics emerged that resulted in the renewal receiving much attention from Council members. This heightened interest in the text extended to several elected members and was particularly notable given that UNFICYP’s renewals had previously been agreed on by the P5 with minimal input from other—especially non-EU—members. Much of the debate centred on the inclusion of language referencing a review of UNFICYP. While the final text welcomed the continuing review of all peacekeeping missions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, “including a review of UNFICYP when appropriate,” it did not specify that a specific review should take place. The rationale for the suggestion was to ensure that the mission composition was appropriate, possibly with an eye towards potential savings.

However, several members—permanent and elected—took issue with the insertion of such language in the text and argued that a technical review at that juncture was not justified. Some states argued that at a sensitive time in the negotiating process, sending such a message would be interpreted as the Council saying that the situation on the ground had altered or been accepted—something which the Republic of Cyprus was seemingly loath to see happen.

Azerbaijan, which has been sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot position, asserted that the final text did not give sufficient weight to a “results-orientated process” and did not appropriately reflect a sense of encouraging the review. It abstained. Pakistan also abstained, saying that the Council could have done better “from the point of view of both procedure and substance.” It lamented that insufficient time was given for all Council members to negotiate the text.

Although there are unlikely to be significant changes in the Council dynamic, eyes will also turn in January to the positions of the five incoming members.

The UK is the lead on the issue. •

UN DOCUMENTS ON CYPRUS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2058 (19 July 2012) extended UNFICYP’s mandate until 31 January 2013. **Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6809** (19 July 2012) was a meeting on Cyprus in which resolution 2058 was adopted. **OTHER RELEVANT FACTS UNFICYP:** Budget Appropriation (1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013): \$56.97 million (one-third of which is funded by the government of Cyprus, with \$6.5 million from Greece).

UNRCCA (Central Asia)

Expected Council Action

In January, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), is scheduled to brief Council members in consultations. A press statement is likely.

Key Recent Developments

Jenča last briefed Council members on the work of UNRCCA on 7 August. In a press statement issued on 8 August (SC/10739), Council members welcomed UNRCCA's role as a preventive diplomacy mechanism and expressed their appreciation for its efforts in responding to regional challenges, such as water- and energy-resources management and implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and in monitoring developments in the region. They also welcomed UNRCCA's role in facilitating Central Asian states' assistance in addressing the situation in Afghanistan and encouraged further cooperation between the Centre, states in the region and relevant regional organisations.

In cooperation with the government of Kyrgyzstan, UNRCCA on 18 October organised the fourth annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers of foreign affairs to discuss how it could assist the participating countries to more effectively address existing and emerging threats to stability and security in the region. The meeting also considered the potential impact on the region of the expected withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and possible measures to meet this challenge.

On 20 November, UNRCCA, in cooperation with the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, organised a seminar in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, entitled "Mutually Acceptable Mechanism on Integrated Use of Water Resources in Central Asia through Applying a Scenario Approach", as part of a project aimed at studying the

interdependence of water, energy and agriculture in the Aral Sea basin.

UNRCCA also co-organised a conference with the government of Turkmenistan on 11 December on "Neutrality and Preventive Diplomacy: Bases for Peace and Stability". The conference, which marked UNRCCA's fifth anniversary, was attended by high-level officials from the region as well as representatives from the UN system, including the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and the heads of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Discussions focused on lessons learnt, best practices, prospects and challenges in the field of preventive diplomacy.

Background on UNRCCA

Based in Ashgabat, UNRCCA was inaugurated on 10 December 2007 as a special political mission by the Department of Political Affairs with the aim of assisting the countries of the region in building their conflict-prevention capacities. UNRCCA's latest programme of action for 2012 to 2014 focuses on three areas:

- impact of trans-boundary threats facing the region (terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking);
- implications of national developments on regional stability; and
- management of common natural resources and environmental degradation.

UNRCCA's mandate includes liaising with the governments of the region and, with their concurrence, other parties about issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring the situation on the ground and providing the Secretary-General with relevant information; maintaining relationships with regional organisations and encouraging their peacemaking efforts and initiatives; providing a political framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the UN country teams and resident coordinators across the

region; and maintaining close contact with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Key Issues

A key issue for Council members is whether opportunities may exist to enhance UNRCCA's role as a preventive diplomacy tool.

Another issue is the general security situation in the region, including threats posed by ethnic conflict, resource management concerns, terrorism and general instability. In particular, disputes over water resources linked to the building of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan seem to be a key concern as Uzbekistan, a downstream neighbour, opposes the dam project.

An emerging issue is the potential impact for the region of the withdrawal of most of the international troops from Afghanistan, expected in 2014, and UNRCCA's role in this context.

Options

One option for Council members is to simply receive the briefing.

Another option for Council members is to issue a press statement, as it has done on several occasions in the past, reaffirming its support for UNRCCA's activities in the region. This would also provide an opportunity to acknowledge its five-year anniversary.

Council Dynamics

Council members are generally supportive of the work of UNRCCA, particularly in light of the Council's expressed intention to strengthen its work on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. They seem to find the semi-annual briefings to be a useful tool for facilitating discussion about the situation in Central Asia as a whole. At this stage they seem particularly interested in how UNRCCA can contribute in supporting the region's engagement in issues concerning Afghanistan.

Russia is the penholder on UNRCCA press statements. •

Notable Dates for January

REPORT DUE	REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN JANUARY	REQUESTING DOCUMENT
21 December.....	SG report on BINUCA (Central African Republic)	S/RES/2031
31 December.....	SG report on UNOWA (West Africa).....	S/2010/661
31 December.....	SG report on UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire).....	S/RES/2062
10 January.....	SG report on UNFICYP (Cyprus).....	S/RES/2058
16 January.....	SG report on UNAMID (Darfur).....	S/RES/2063
18 January.....	SG report on BNUB (Burundi).....	S/RES/2027

MANDATES EXPIRE		RELEVANT DOCUMENT
31 January.....	UNFICYP (Cyprus).....	S/RES/2058
31 January.....	BINUCA (Central African Republic).....	S/RES/2031

OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

Mid-January	At the initiative of Pakistan, Security Council president in January, the Council is expected to hold open debates on a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism on the 15th and on a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping on the 21st.
Late-January.....	Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir expect to meet in Addis Ababa during the AU Summit.
23 January.....	The quarterly Security Council open debate on the Middle East is expected.
30 January	The Security Council is expected to hold a briefing and consultations on the rule of law.

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